Information Notice 1986-50, Inadequate Testing to Detect Failures of Safety-Related Pneumatic Components or Systems: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 06/18/1986
| issue date = 06/18/1986
| title = Inadequate Testing to Detect Failures of Safety-Related Pneumatic Components or Systems
| title = Inadequate Testing to Detect Failures of Safety-Related Pneumatic Components or Systems
| author name = Jordan E L
| author name = Jordan E
| author affiliation = NRC/IE
| author affiliation = NRC/IE
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 4
| page count = 4
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:ORIGINAL SSINS No.: 6835IN 86-50UNITED STATES.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON,,D.C. 20555June 18, 1986IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-50: INADEQUATE TESTING TO-DETECT FAILURES OFSAFETY-RELATED PNEUMATIC COMPONENTS ORSYSTEMS
{{#Wiki_filter:ORIGINAL                             SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-50
                                  UNITED STATES.
 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
 
WASHINGTON,,D.C. 20555 June 18, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-50:   INADEQUATE TESTING TO-DETECT FAILURES OF
 
SAFETY-RELATED PNEUMATIC COMPONENTS OR
 
SYSTEMS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or aconstruction permit (CP).
:
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a
 
construction permit (CP).


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
:This notice is being provided to alert recipients to a potentially significantproblem pertaining to inadequate testing practice relating to air operatedvalves. The NRC expects that recipients will review this notice for applica-bility to their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice donot constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or writtenresponse is required.Past Related Correspondence:IE Information Notice No. 82-25, "Failures of Hiller Actuators UponGradual Loss of Air Pressure," July 20, 1982IE Information Notice No. 85-35,- '.Failure of Air Check Valves to Seat,"April 30, 1985IE Information Notice No. 85-84, "Inadequate Inservice Testing of MainSteam Isolation Valves," October 30, 1985IE Information Notice No. 85-94, 'Potential for Loss of Minimum FlowPaths Leading to ECCS Pump Damage During a LOCA," December 13, 1985
:
This notice is being provided to alert recipients to a potentially significant
 
problem pertaining to inadequate testing practice relating to air operated
 
valves. The NRC expects that recipients will review this notice for applica- bility to their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do
 
not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written
 
response is required.
 
Past Related Correspondence:
IE Information Notice No. 82-25, "Failures of Hiller Actuators Upon
 
Gradual Loss of Air Pressure," July 20, 1982 IE Information Notice No. 85-35,- '.Failure of Air Check Valves to Seat,"
  April 30, 1985 IE Information Notice No. 85-84, "Inadequate Inservice Testing of Main
 
Steam Isolation Valves," October 30, 1985 IE Information Notice No. 85-94, 'Potential for Loss of Minimum Flow
 
Paths Leading to ECCS Pump Damage During a LOCA," December 13, 1985


==Description of Circumstances==
==Description of Circumstances==
:The NRC has reported previously on instances where safety-related equipmentfailed to operate as intended when non-safety-related pneumatic systems wereunavailable (IE INs 82-25 and 85-35). In these situations, main steam isola-tion valves and containment isolation valves failed to operate properly whencontrol air pressure decreased slowly rather than rapidly as would be expectedfor an air line break. In the case of IN 85-35, the fault was exposed by aloss of offsite power test, and in the case of IN 82-25, the fault was exposedby a preoperational test designed .to simulate a slow air leak. In both cases,8606160044 IN 86-50June 18, 1986 the components in question--an accumulator isolation check valve (IN 85-35) andpneumatic selector valves (IN 82-25)--were not tested adequately. Severalrecent events have indicated continuing problems of similar nature. Theseevents are discussed below.On February 13, 1986, the licensee at Turkey Point Unit 3 first reported to thtNRC a concern that the component cooling water (CCW) system might fail to meetits functional requirements for a design-basis accident. One part of theconcern involved the CCW heat exchanger outlet control valve. This valveregulates flow of intake cooling water (ICW) to this heat exchanger. Loss ofcontrol air, coincident with a loss of offsite power, a valid engineeredsafeguards features (ESF) actuation signal, and a loss of an emergency dieselgenerator (EDG) would cause this valve to fail closed. If this happened, theCCW heat exchanger would not receive sufficient flow of ICW. This situationwas discovered during a design review of the ICW system. Earlier disclosuremight have been possible if ICW operation had been considered or tested withnon-safety-related control air secured, coincident with loss of electricalpower.On January 7, 1986, the licensee at Robinson Unit 2 reported a concern with theair-operated valves in the safety injection (SI) pump minimum-flow recircula-tion line from the pump discharge to the refueling water storage tank (RWST).This concern evolved from review of IN 85-94. Two such valves had been insert-ed in series in this line and had been designed to fail closed on loss ofnon-safety-related air or loss of electrical power to the valves. The purposeof the valves is to protect the RWST (outside containment) from highly radioac-tive reactor coolant during the long-term circulation phase of accident recov-ery. In the event of SI initiation under small-break loss-of-coolant-accidentconditions concurrent with closure of either of these valves, the SI pumpswould be operating with no flow until reactor pressure decreased below theirshutoff head. This would damage the SI pumps after only a short time. Thelicensee's remedy was to put mechanical blocks on the air operators so thevalves would fail as-is (open). Again, if SI operation had been considered ortested with non-safety-related control air secured, the fault might have beendisclosed earlier.On December 9, 1985, the licensee at Catawba Unit 2 reported finding that oneof the two valve closure springs was missing on one of the pressurizerpower-operated relief valves (PORVs). Thus, with loss of air the valve wouldnot have closed against system pressure. The other two PORVs had their normalcomplement of springs. The valve with the missing spring had been foundsatisfactory in preoperational tests. During the preoperational loss of airtest, the valve closed because system pressure was not present; during the hotfunctional test, the valve closed because actuator air pressure was present.This is clearly a case in which a fail safe valve was tested without allactuator power secured (IN 85-84).
:
The NRC has reported previously on instances where safety-related equipment
 
failed to operate as intended when non-safety-related pneumatic systems were
 
unavailable (IE INs 82-25 and 85-35). In these situations, main steam isola- tion valves and containment isolation valves failed to operate properly when
 
control air pressure decreased slowly rather than rapidly as would be expected
 
for an air line break. In the case of IN 85-35, the fault was exposed by a
 
loss of offsite power test, and in the case of IN 82-25, the fault was exposed
 
by a preoperational test designed .to simulate a slow air leak. In both cases,
                                                    8606160044
 
IN 86-50
                                                                  June 18, 1986 the components in question--an accumulator isolation check valve (IN 85-35) and
 
pneumatic selector valves (IN 82-25)--were not tested adequately. Several
 
recent events have indicated continuing problems of similar nature. These
 
events are discussed below.
 
On February 13, 1986, the licensee at Turkey Point Unit 3 first reported to tht
 
NRC a concern that the component cooling water (CCW) system might fail to meet
 
its functional requirements for a design-basis accident. One part of the
 
concern involved the CCW heat exchanger outlet control valve. This valve
 
regulates flow of intake cooling water (ICW) to this heat exchanger. Loss of
 
control air, coincident with a loss of offsite power, a valid engineered
 
safeguards features (ESF) actuation signal, and a loss of an emergency diesel
 
generator (EDG) would cause this valve to fail closed. If this happened, the
 
CCW heat exchanger would not receive sufficient flow of ICW. This situation
 
was discovered during a design review of the ICW system. Earlier disclosure
 
might have been possible if ICW operation had been considered or tested with
 
non-safety-related control air secured, coincident with loss of electrical
 
power.
 
On January 7, 1986, the licensee at Robinson Unit 2 reported a concern with the
 
air-operated valves in the safety injection (SI) pump minimum-flow recircula- tion line from the pump discharge to the refueling water storage tank (RWST).
 
This concern evolved from review of IN 85-94. Two such valves had been insert- ed in series in this line and had been designed to fail closed on loss of
 
non-safety-related air or loss of electrical power to the valves. The purpose
 
of the valves is to protect the RWST (outside containment) from highly radioac- tive reactor coolant during the long-term circulation phase of accident recov- ery. In the event of SI initiation under small-break loss-of-coolant-accident
 
conditions concurrent with closure of either of these valves, the SI pumps
 
would be operating with no flow until reactor pressure decreased below their
 
shutoff head. This would damage the SI pumps after only a short time. The
 
licensee's remedy was to put mechanical blocks on the air operators so the
 
valves would fail as-is (open). Again, if SI operation had been considered or
 
tested with non-safety-related control air secured, the fault might have been
 
disclosed earlier.
 
On December 9, 1985, the licensee at Catawba Unit 2 reported finding that one
 
of the two valve closure springs was missing on one of the pressurizer
 
power-operated relief valves (PORVs). Thus, with loss of air the valve would
 
not have closed against system pressure. The other two PORVs had their normal
 
complement of springs. The valve with the missing spring had been found
 
satisfactory in preoperational tests. During the preoperational loss of air
 
test, the valve closed because system pressure was not present; during the hot
 
functional test, the valve closed because actuator air pressure was present.
 
This is clearly a case in which a fail safe valve was tested without all
 
actuator power secured (IN 85-84).
 
IN 86-50
                                                                June 18, 1986 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
 
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional
 
Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.
 
;d~waA tJordan, Director
 
Divisi  of Emergency Preparedness
 
and E gineering Response


IN 86-50June 18, 1986 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the RegionalAdministrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.;d~waA tJordan, DirectorDivisi of Emergency Preparednessand E gineering Response-~ Office of Inspection and Enforcement
-   ~   Office of Inspection and Enforcement


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Vern Hodge, IE(301) 492-7275Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices


Attachment 1IN 86-50June 18, 1986LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDIE INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issue Issued to86-4986-4886-47Age/Environment InducedElectrical Cable FailuesInadequate Testing Of BoronSolution Concentration In TheStandby Liquid Control SystemFeedwater Transient WithPartial Failure Of TheReactor Scram SystemImproper Cleaning And Decon-tamination Of RespiratoryProtection EquipmentPotential Falsification OfTest Reports On FlangesManufactured By Golden GateForge And Flange, Inc.6/16/866/13/866/9/866/12/866/10/8686-4686-4586-44All power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll BWR facilitiesholding an OL or CPAll BWRs and PWRsfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP andfuel fabricationfacilitiesAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP andresearch and testfacilitiesAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP andresearch and testreactorsAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power rectorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll byproductmaterial licenseesFailure To Follow Procedures 6/10/86When Working In High RadiationAreas86-43Problems With Silver ZeoliteSampling Of Airborne Radio-iodine86-42Improper MaintenanceRadiation MonitoringOfSystems6/10/866/9/866/9/8686-41Evaluation Of QuestionableExposure Readings Of LicenseePersonnel DosimetersOL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
===Vern Hodge, IE===
                    (301) 492-7275 Attachment:  List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
 
Attachment 1 IN 86-50
                                                              June 18, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
 
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
 
Information                                    Date of
 
Notice No.     Subject                         Issue   Issued to
 
86-49          Age/Environment Induced        6/16/86  All power reactor
 
Electrical Cable Failues                facilities holding
 
an OL or CP
 
86-48          Inadequate Testing Of Boron    6/13/86  All BWR facilities
 
Solution Concentration In The            holding an OL or CP
 
Standby Liquid Control System
 
86-47          Feedwater Transient With        6/9/86  All BWRs and PWRs
 
Partial Failure Of The                  facilities holding
 
Reactor Scram System                    an OL or CP
 
86-46            Improper Cleaning And Decon-   6/12/86  All power reactor
 
tamination Of Respiratory                facilities holding
 
Protection Equipment                    an OL or CP and
 
fuel fabrication
 
facilities
 
86-45            Potential Falsification Of      6/10/86 All power reactor
 
Test Reports On Flanges                  facilities holding
 
Manufactured By Golden Gate              an OL or CP and
 
Forge And Flange, Inc.                  research and test
 
facilities
 
86-44          Failure To Follow Procedures 6/10/86    All power reactor
 
When Working In High Radiation          facilities holding
 
Areas                                    an OL or CP and
 
research and test
 
reactors
 
86-43          Problems With Silver Zeolite    6/10/86  All power reactor


}}
Sampling Of Airborne Radio-              facilities holding
 
iodine                                  an OL or CP
 
86-42            Improper Maintenance Of        6/9/86  All power rector
 
Radiation Monitoring Systems            facilities holding
 
an OL or CP
 
86-41            Evaluation Of Questionable    6/9/86  All byproduct
 
Exposure Readings Of Licensee          material licensees
 
Personnel Dosimeters
 
OL = Operating License
 
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 03:04, 24 November 2019

Inadequate Testing to Detect Failures of Safety-Related Pneumatic Components or Systems
ML031220684
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date: 06/18/1986
From: Jordan E
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-86-050, NUDOCS 8606160044
Download: ML031220684 (4)
v • d • e


ORIGINAL SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-50

UNITED STATES.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON,,D.C. 20555 June 18, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-50: INADEQUATE TESTING TO-DETECT FAILURES OF

SAFETY-RELATED PNEUMATIC COMPONENTS OR

SYSTEMS

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a

construction permit (CP).

Purpose

This notice is being provided to alert recipients to a potentially significant

problem pertaining to inadequate testing practice relating to air operated

valves. The NRC expects that recipients will review this notice for applica- bility to their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice do

not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written

response is required.

Past Related Correspondence:

IE Information Notice No. 82-25, "Failures of Hiller Actuators Upon

Gradual Loss of Air Pressure," July 20, 1982 IE Information Notice No. 85-35,- '.Failure of Air Check Valves to Seat,"

April 30, 1985 IE Information Notice No. 85-84, "Inadequate Inservice Testing of Main

Steam Isolation Valves," October 30, 1985 IE Information Notice No. 85-94, 'Potential for Loss of Minimum Flow

Paths Leading to ECCS Pump Damage During a LOCA," December 13, 1985

Description of Circumstances

The NRC has reported previously on instances where safety-related equipment

failed to operate as intended when non-safety-related pneumatic systems were

unavailable (IE INs 82-25 and 85-35). In these situations, main steam isola- tion valves and containment isolation valves failed to operate properly when

control air pressure decreased slowly rather than rapidly as would be expected

for an air line break. In the case of IN 85-35, the fault was exposed by a

loss of offsite power test, and in the case of IN 82-25, the fault was exposed

by a preoperational test designed .to simulate a slow air leak. In both cases,

8606160044

IN 86-50

June 18, 1986 the components in question--an accumulator isolation check valve (IN 85-35) and

pneumatic selector valves (IN 82-25)--were not tested adequately. Several

recent events have indicated continuing problems of similar nature. These

events are discussed below.

On February 13, 1986, the licensee at Turkey Point Unit 3 first reported to tht

NRC a concern that the component cooling water (CCW) system might fail to meet

its functional requirements for a design-basis accident. One part of the

concern involved the CCW heat exchanger outlet control valve. This valve

regulates flow of intake cooling water (ICW) to this heat exchanger. Loss of

control air, coincident with a loss of offsite power, a valid engineered

safeguards features (ESF) actuation signal, and a loss of an emergency diesel

generator (EDG) would cause this valve to fail closed. If this happened, the

CCW heat exchanger would not receive sufficient flow of ICW. This situation

was discovered during a design review of the ICW system. Earlier disclosure

might have been possible if ICW operation had been considered or tested with

non-safety-related control air secured, coincident with loss of electrical

power.

On January 7, 1986, the licensee at Robinson Unit 2 reported a concern with the

air-operated valves in the safety injection (SI) pump minimum-flow recircula- tion line from the pump discharge to the refueling water storage tank (RWST).

This concern evolved from review of IN 85-94. Two such valves had been insert- ed in series in this line and had been designed to fail closed on loss of

non-safety-related air or loss of electrical power to the valves. The purpose

of the valves is to protect the RWST (outside containment) from highly radioac- tive reactor coolant during the long-term circulation phase of accident recov- ery. In the event of SI initiation under small-break loss-of-coolant-accident

conditions concurrent with closure of either of these valves, the SI pumps

would be operating with no flow until reactor pressure decreased below their

shutoff head. This would damage the SI pumps after only a short time. The

licensee's remedy was to put mechanical blocks on the air operators so the

valves would fail as-is (open). Again, if SI operation had been considered or

tested with non-safety-related control air secured, the fault might have been

disclosed earlier.

On December 9, 1985, the licensee at Catawba Unit 2 reported finding that one

of the two valve closure springs was missing on one of the pressurizer

power-operated relief valves (PORVs). Thus, with loss of air the valve would

not have closed against system pressure. The other two PORVs had their normal

complement of springs. The valve with the missing spring had been found

satisfactory in preoperational tests. During the preoperational loss of air

test, the valve closed because system pressure was not present; during the hot

functional test, the valve closed because actuator air pressure was present.

This is clearly a case in which a fail safe valve was tested without all

actuator power secured (IN 85-84).

IN 86-50

June 18, 1986 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

d~waA tJordan, Director

Divisi of Emergency Preparedness

and E gineering Response

- ~ Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contact:

Vern Hodge, IE

(301) 492-7275 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

Attachment 1 IN 86-50

June 18, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

86-49 Age/Environment Induced 6/16/86 All power reactor

Electrical Cable Failues facilities holding

an OL or CP

86-48 Inadequate Testing Of Boron 6/13/86 All BWR facilities

Solution Concentration In The holding an OL or CP

Standby Liquid Control System

86-47 Feedwater Transient With 6/9/86 All BWRs and PWRs

Partial Failure Of The facilities holding

Reactor Scram System an OL or CP

86-46 Improper Cleaning And Decon- 6/12/86 All power reactor

tamination Of Respiratory facilities holding

Protection Equipment an OL or CP and

fuel fabrication

facilities

86-45 Potential Falsification Of 6/10/86 All power reactor

Test Reports On Flanges facilities holding

Manufactured By Golden Gate an OL or CP and

Forge And Flange, Inc. research and test

facilities

86-44 Failure To Follow Procedures 6/10/86 All power reactor

When Working In High Radiation facilities holding

Areas an OL or CP and

research and test

reactors

86-43 Problems With Silver Zeolite 6/10/86 All power reactor

Sampling Of Airborne Radio- facilities holding

iodine an OL or CP

86-42 Improper Maintenance Of 6/9/86 All power rector

Radiation Monitoring Systems facilities holding

an OL or CP

86-41 Evaluation Of Questionable 6/9/86 All byproduct

Exposure Readings Of Licensee material licensees

Personnel Dosimeters

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit


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