Information Notice 1986-35, Fire in Compressible Material at Dresden Unit 3: Difference between revisions

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{{#Wiki_filter:Ls LSSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-35 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
{{#Wiki_filter:Ls       LSSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-35 UNITED STATES


COMMISSION
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


OFFICE OF INSPECTION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT


===AND ENFORCEMENT===
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 15, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-35:  FIRE IN COMPRESSIBLE MATERIAL AT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 15, 1986 IE INFORMATION


NOTICE NO. 86-35: FIRE IN COMPRESSIBLE
DRESDEN UNIT 3
 
MATERIAL AT DRESDEN UNIT 3  


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:
:
All nuclear power reactor facilities
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a


holding an operating
construction permit (CP).
 
license (OL) or a construction
 
permit (CP).


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
: This notice is being issued to advise recipients
:
This notice is being issued to advise recipients of the circumstances surrounding


of the circumstances
a fire which occurred at Dresden Unit 3 on January 20, 1986. It is expected that


surrounding
recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and


a fire which occurred at Dresden Unit 3 on January 20, 1986. It is expected that recipients
consider actions, if appropriate, to determine whether a similar fire hazard


will review the information
exists at their facilities. No specific action or response is required by this


for applicability
notice.


to their facilities
==Description of Circumstances==
 
:
and consider actions, if appropriate, to determine
Dresden Unit 3 is a 773 MWe BWR with a typical "light bulb" Mark I drywell, which includes a free-standing steel containment vessel. A reinforced concrete


whether a similar fire hazard exists at their facilities.
shield wall surrounds the containment vessel. To allow for thermal and pressure


No specific action or response is required by this notice.Description
expansion and contraction under design-basis conditions, an annular space of


of Circumstances:
about 2 inches is provided between the vessel and the shield wall. After the
Dresden Unit 3 is a 773 MWe BWR with a typical "light bulb" Mark I drywell, which includes a free-standing


steel containment
vessel was erected and pressure tested, a composite urethane foam and fiberglass
 
vessel. A reinforced
 
concrete shield wall surrounds
 
the containment
 
vessel. To allow for thermal and pressure expansion
 
and contraction
 
under design-basis
 
conditions, an annular space of about 2 inches is provided between the vessel and the shield wall. After the vessel was erected and pressure tested, a composite
 
urethane foam and fiberglass


sheet was glued to the external surfaces of the vessel. This method of application
sheet was glued to the external surfaces of the vessel. This method of application


provides a compressible
provides a compressible fill in the space between the vessel and the concrete
 
fill in the space between the vessel and the concrete to ensure that adequate freedom for motion is maintained.
 
Dresden Unit 3 is replacing
 
certain pipe that is part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.
 
In connection
 
with this work, a pipe which penetrates


the shield wall was being removed using a arc-air cutting technique.
to ensure that adequate freedom for motion is maintained.


The sleeve in the shield wall through which the pipe passes slopes downward from the outside;hot slag from the pipe cutting inadvertently
Dresden Unit 3 is replacing certain pipe that is part of the reactor coolant


ran through the sleeve and contacted the urethane foam. The small fire which started was thought to have been promptly extinguished.
pressure boundary. In connection with this work, a pipe which penetrates the


Some time later, personnel
shield wall was being removed using a arc-air cutting technique. The sleeve in


working inside the drywell noted that the inner surface of the vessel was heated by a continuing
the shield wall through which the pipe passes slopes downward from the outside;
hot slag from the pipe cutting inadvertently ran through the sleeve and contacted


fire such that the paint was discolored
the urethane foam. The small fire which started was thought to have been


in sizeable local areas. The station fire brigade reviewed plant records and identified
promptly extinguished.


the presence of the combustible
Some time later, personnel working inside the drywell noted that the inner


foam in the annular space. Water was applied through the penetration
surface of the vessel was heated by a continuing fire such that the paint was


where the fire apparently
discolored in sizeable local areas. The station fire brigade reviewed plant


8605130022
records and identified the presence of the combustible foam in the annular
'
, -' ,IN 86-35 May 15, 1986 started as well as through adjacent penetrations.


*The temperature
space. Water was applied through the penetration where the fire apparently


of the inside surface of the steel drywell was monitored
8605130022'


and was determined
,                      -'  ,IN            86-35 May 15, 1986 started as well as through adjacent penetrations. *The temperature of the inside


to have returned to normal about 12h hours after the fire was first detected.Discussion:
surface of the steel drywell was monitored and was determined to have returned
The licensee is committed


to provide to the NRC an extensive
to normal about 12h hours after the fire was first detected.


evaluation
Discussion:
The licensee is committed to provide to the NRC an extensive evaluation of


of damage that may have been done by the fire and the repairs (if any) that may be required, the methods of accomplishment, the consequences
damage that may have been done by the fire and the repairs (if any) that may be


of a recurrence
required, the methods of accomplishment, the consequences of a recurrence of


of a fire in this or any similar space where a significant
a fire in this or any similar space where a significant fraction of the local


fraction of the local volume may be occupied by combustible
volume may be occupied by combustible foam, and methods of detection and


foam, and methods of detection
suppression of any potential future fire. The NRC also has requested that the


and suppression
licensee consider and discuss the matter of conformance to Appendix R of 10 CFR


of any potential
50. When the requested information is received the NRC will consider whether


future fire. The NRC also has requested
further action is required.


that the licensee consider and discuss the matter of conformance
The reactor was shut down and defueled at the time of the fire, and resolution


to Appendix R of 10 CFR 50. When the requested
of NRC concerns will be required before restart. The event is discussed in


information
greater detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 56-249/86006 (DRSS).*
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.


is received the NRC will consider whether further action is required.The reactor was shut down and defueled at the time of the fire, and resolution
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional


of NRC concerns will be required before restart. The event is discussed
Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.


in greater detail in NRC Inspection
a    irector


Report No. 56-249/86006 (DRSS).*No specific action or written response is required by this information
Divisi n f Emergency Preparedness


notice.If you have any questions
and Edineering Response


about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator
Office of Inspection and Enforcement


of the appropriate
===Technical Contact:===


regional office or this office.a irector Divisi n f Emergency
===James Henderson, IE===
                    (301) 492-9654 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices


===Preparedness===
*NRC Inspection Report 50-249/86006 (DRSS), available for review at the NRC
and Edineering


Response Office of Inspection
Public Document Room, 1717 H St. NW, Washington, DC; the NRC Local Document


and Enforcement
Room, Morris Public Library, 604 Liberty St., Morris, IL 60450; and the NRC


Technical
Region III Document Room, 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn, IL 60137.


Contact: James Henderson, IE (301) 492-9654 Attachment:
Attachment 1 IN 86-35 May 15, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
List of Recently Issued IE Information


Notices*NRC Inspection
; IE INFORMATION NOTICES


Report 50-249/86006 (DRSS), available
Information                                  Date of


for review at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H St. NW, Washington, DC; the NRC Local Document Room, Morris Public Library, 604 Liberty St., Morris, IL 60450; and the NRC Region III Document Room, 799 Roosevelt
Notice No.     Subject                      Issue  Issued to


Road, Glen Ellyn, IL 60137.
86-34          Improper Assembly, Material  5/13/86 All power reactor


Attachment
Selection, And Test Of Valves        facilities holding


1 IN 86-35 May 15, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED; IE INFORMATION
And Their Actuators                  an OL or CP


NOTICES Information
86-33          Information For Licensee      5/6/86  Fuel cycle licensees


Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-34 86-33 86-32 86-31 86-30 86-29 86-28 86-27 Improper Assembly, Material Selection, And Test Of Valves And Their Actuators Information
Regarding The Chernobyl              and Priority 1 material


For Licensee Regarding
Nuclear Plant Accident                licensees


The Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident Request For Collection
86-32          Request For Collection Of    5/2/86  All power reactor


===Of Licensee Radioactivity===
Licensee Radioactivity               facilities holding
Measurements


Attributed
Measurements Attributed To            an OL or CP


To The Chernobyl
The Chernobyl Nuclear Plant


Nuclear Plant Accident Unauthorized
Accident


Transfer and Loss of Control of Industrial
86-31          Unauthorized Transfer and     5/6/86  All power reactor


Nuclear Gauges Design Limitations
Loss of Control of                    facilities holding


of Gaseous Effluent Monitoring
Industrial Nuclear Gauges            an OL or a CP


Systems Effects of Changing Valve Motor-Operator
86-30          Design Limitations of         4/29/86 All power reactor


Switch Settings 5/13/86 5/6/86 5/2/86 5/6/86 4/29/86 4/25/86 All power reactor facilities
Gaseous Effluent Monitoring          facilities holding


holding an OL or CP Fuel cycle licensees and Priority 1 material licensees All power reactor facilities
Systems                              an OL or a CP


holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
86-29          Effects of Changing Valve    4/25/86 All power reactor


holding an OL or a CP All power reactor facilities
Motor-Operator Switch                facilities holding


holding an OL or a CP All power reactor facilities
Settings                              an OL or a CP


holding an OL or a CP 4/28/86 Access Control at Nuclear Facilities
86-28                                        4/28/86
  86-27          Access Control at Nuclear     4/21/86 All power reactor


4/21/86 All power reactor facilities
Facilities                            facilities holding


holding an OL or CP, research and nonpower reactor facilities, and fuel fabrication
an OL or CP, research


& pro-cessing facilities
and nonpower reactor


86-26 Potential
facilities, and fuel


Problems In Generators
fabrication & pro- cessing facilities


Manufactured
86-26          Potential Problems In        4/17/86 All power reactor


By Electrical
Generators Manufactured By           facilities holding


===Products Incorporated===
Electrical Products                   an OL or CP
4/17/86 All power reactor facilities


holding an OL or CP.OL = Operating
Incorporated


License CP = Construction
. OL = Operating License


Permit}}
CP = Construction Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 03:03, 24 November 2019

Fire in Compressible Material at Dresden Unit 3
ML031250020
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date: 05/15/1986
From: Jordan E
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-86-035, NUDOCS 8605130022
Download: ML031250020 (3)


Ls LSSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-35 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 15, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-35: FIRE IN COMPRESSIBLE MATERIAL AT

DRESDEN UNIT 3

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or a

construction permit (CP).

Purpose

This notice is being issued to advise recipients of the circumstances surrounding

a fire which occurred at Dresden Unit 3 on January 20, 1986. It is expected that

recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and

consider actions, if appropriate, to determine whether a similar fire hazard

exists at their facilities. No specific action or response is required by this

notice.

Description of Circumstances

Dresden Unit 3 is a 773 MWe BWR with a typical "light bulb" Mark I drywell, which includes a free-standing steel containment vessel. A reinforced concrete

shield wall surrounds the containment vessel. To allow for thermal and pressure

expansion and contraction under design-basis conditions, an annular space of

about 2 inches is provided between the vessel and the shield wall. After the

vessel was erected and pressure tested, a composite urethane foam and fiberglass

sheet was glued to the external surfaces of the vessel. This method of application

provides a compressible fill in the space between the vessel and the concrete

to ensure that adequate freedom for motion is maintained.

Dresden Unit 3 is replacing certain pipe that is part of the reactor coolant

pressure boundary. In connection with this work, a pipe which penetrates the

shield wall was being removed using a arc-air cutting technique. The sleeve in

the shield wall through which the pipe passes slopes downward from the outside;

hot slag from the pipe cutting inadvertently ran through the sleeve and contacted

the urethane foam. The small fire which started was thought to have been

promptly extinguished.

Some time later, personnel working inside the drywell noted that the inner

surface of the vessel was heated by a continuing fire such that the paint was

discolored in sizeable local areas. The station fire brigade reviewed plant

records and identified the presence of the combustible foam in the annular

space. Water was applied through the penetration where the fire apparently

8605130022'

, -' ,IN 86-35 May 15, 1986 started as well as through adjacent penetrations. *The temperature of the inside

surface of the steel drywell was monitored and was determined to have returned

to normal about 12h hours after the fire was first detected.

Discussion:

The licensee is committed to provide to the NRC an extensive evaluation of

damage that may have been done by the fire and the repairs (if any) that may be

required, the methods of accomplishment, the consequences of a recurrence of

a fire in this or any similar space where a significant fraction of the local

volume may be occupied by combustible foam, and methods of detection and

suppression of any potential future fire. The NRC also has requested that the

licensee consider and discuss the matter of conformance to Appendix R of 10 CFR

50. When the requested information is received the NRC will consider whether

further action is required.

The reactor was shut down and defueled at the time of the fire, and resolution

of NRC concerns will be required before restart. The event is discussed in

greater detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 56-249/86006 (DRSS).*

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional

Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

a irector

Divisi n f Emergency Preparedness

and Edineering Response

Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Technical Contact:

James Henderson, IE

(301) 492-9654 Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices

  • NRC Inspection Report 50-249/86006 (DRSS), available for review at the NRC

Public Document Room, 1717 H St. NW, Washington, DC; the NRC Local Document

Room, Morris Public Library, 604 Liberty St., Morris, IL 60450; and the NRC

Region III Document Room, 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn, IL 60137.

Attachment 1 IN 86-35 May 15, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to

86-34 Improper Assembly, Material 5/13/86 All power reactor

Selection, And Test Of Valves facilities holding

And Their Actuators an OL or CP

86-33 Information For Licensee 5/6/86 Fuel cycle licensees

Regarding The Chernobyl and Priority 1 material

Nuclear Plant Accident licensees

86-32 Request For Collection Of 5/2/86 All power reactor

Licensee Radioactivity facilities holding

Measurements Attributed To an OL or CP

The Chernobyl Nuclear Plant

Accident

86-31 Unauthorized Transfer and 5/6/86 All power reactor

Loss of Control of facilities holding

Industrial Nuclear Gauges an OL or a CP

86-30 Design Limitations of 4/29/86 All power reactor

Gaseous Effluent Monitoring facilities holding

Systems an OL or a CP

86-29 Effects of Changing Valve 4/25/86 All power reactor

Motor-Operator Switch facilities holding

Settings an OL or a CP

86-28 4/28/86

86-27 Access Control at Nuclear 4/21/86 All power reactor

Facilities facilities holding

an OL or CP, research

and nonpower reactor

facilities, and fuel

fabrication & pro- cessing facilities

86-26 Potential Problems In 4/17/86 All power reactor

Generators Manufactured By facilities holding

Electrical Products an OL or CP

Incorporated

. OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit