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| | issue date = 08/18/1986 | | | issue date = 08/18/1986 |
| | title = Potential Failure of All Emergency Diesel Generators | | | title = Potential Failure of All Emergency Diesel Generators |
| | author name = Jordan E L | | | author name = Jordan E |
| | author affiliation = NRC/IE | | | author affiliation = NRC/IE |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| | page count = 6 | | | page count = 6 |
| }} | | }} |
| {{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-70 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY | | {{#Wiki_filter:SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-70 |
| | UNITED STATES |
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| |
|
| COMMISSION | | NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION |
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| OFFICE OF INSPECTION | | OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT |
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| ===AND ENFORCEMENT===
| | WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 18, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-70: POTENTIAL FAILURE OF ALL EMERGENCY |
| WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 18, 1986 IE INFORMATION | |
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| |
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| NOTICE NO. 86-70: POTENTIAL
| | DIESEL GENERATORS |
| | |
| ===FAILURE OF ALL EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS===
| |
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| |
|
| ==Addressees== | | ==Addressees== |
| : | | : |
| All nuclear power reactor facilities | | All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a |
| | |
| holding an operating | |
| | |
| license or a construction | |
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| |
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| permit. | | construction permit. |
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| |
|
| ==Purpose== | | ==Purpose== |
| : This notice informs recipients | | : |
| | This notice informs recipients of multiple design deficiencies in a vital ac |
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| |
|
| of multiple design deficiencies | | power system that could potentially result in the loss of all emergency diesel |
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| |
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| in a vital ac power system that could potentially
| | generators (EDGs). It is expected that recipients will review the information |
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| |
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| result in the loss of all emergency
| | for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to |
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| |
|
| diesel generators (EDGs). It is expected that recipients
| | preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions |
|
| |
|
| will review the information
| | contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; there- fore, no specific action or written response is required. |
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| |
|
| for applicability
| | ==Description of Circumstances== |
| | | : |
| to their facilities
| | On June 10, 1986, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Florida Power & Light |
| | |
| and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem occurring
| |
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| |
|
| at their facilities.
| | (FP&L) reported the results of a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). |
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| |
|
| ===However, suggestions===
| | This analysis identified multiple design deficiencies in the Turkey Point |
| contained
| |
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| |
|
| in this information | | Units 3 and 4 vital ac power system that could potentially result in the loss |
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| |
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| notice do not constitute
| | of both EDGs due to overloading. In addition, one deficiency was identified |
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| |
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| NRC requirements;
| | that could result in the loss of all ac power to Unit 4. Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 share two EDGs. Simplified diagrams of part of the Turkey Point 3 & 4 electrical distribution system are provided as Figures 1 and 2. |
| there-fore, no specific action or written response is required.Description
| |
|
| |
|
| of Circumstances:
| | One design deficiency involved a "swing bus." As shown on Figure 1, 480 volt |
| On June 10, 1986, in accordance
| |
|
| |
|
| with 10 CFR Part 21, Florida Power & Light (FP&L) reported the results of a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA).This analysis identified
| | MCC "D" is normally supplied from EDG "B" but will shift its power supply to |
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| |
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| multiple design deficiencies
| | EDG "A" if needed. MCC "D" also feeds a non-safety stub bus through a single |
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| |
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| in the Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 vital ac power system that could potentially
| | circuit breaker. This breaker is normally opened by the 48 load sequencer to |
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| |
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| result in the loss of both EDGs due to overloading.
| | isolate the non-safety loads from MCC "D" when the 48 4160V bus is loaded on |
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| |
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| In addition, one deficiency
| | EDG "B". A single failure in that circuit breaker would leave the non-safety |
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| |
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| was identified
| | loads connected to MCC "D". During safety injection for one unit, the addi- tional non-safety loads could overload EDG "B", possibly resulting in a trip |
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| |
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| that could result in the loss of all ac power to Unit 4. Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 share two EDGs. Simplified
| | of this EDG. MCC "D" would then transfer its power supply and could overload |
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| |
|
| diagrams of part of the Turkey Point 3 & 4 electrical
| | EDG "A" as well. |
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| |
|
| distribution
| | 8608130578 |
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| |
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| system are provided as Figures 1 and 2.One design deficiency
| | IN 86-70 |
| | August 18, 1986 In addition to the above design deficiency, five deficiencies in the EDG load |
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| |
|
| involved a "swing bus." As shown on Figure 1, 480 volt MCC "D" is normally supplied from EDG "B" but will shift its power supply to EDG "A" if needed. MCC "D" also feeds a non-safety
| | evaluation were found, each of which could contribute to an overloading of both |
|
| |
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| stub bus through a single circuit breaker. This breaker is normally opened by the 48 load sequencer
| | EDGs. Both EDGs could be overloaded in the event of a safety injection on one |
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| |
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| to isolate the non-safety | | unit and a loss of offsite power to both units. In some cases this could occur |
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| |
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| loads from MCC "D" when the 48 4160V bus is loaded on EDG "B". A single failure in that circuit breaker would leave the non-safety
| | without a single failure. These deficiencies are as follows: |
| | 0 The post-TMI Emergency Operating Procedures require an additional charging |
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| |
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| loads connected
| | pump and high head safety injection pump in the 1-30 minute and 30-60 |
| | minute EDG load interval, respectively. |
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| |
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| to MCC "D". During safety injection
| | o In the event of a single failure of one EDG, actual testing of component |
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| |
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| for one unit, the addi-tional non-safety
| | cooling water and intake cooling water showed that pump loads (KW) were |
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| |
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| loads could overload EDG "B", possibly resulting
| | higher than expected. Under this condition, the cooling water pumps provide |
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| |
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| in a trip of this EDG. MCC "D" would then transfer its power supply and could overload EDG "A" as well.8608130578 IN 86-70 August 18, 1986 In addition to the above design deficiency, five deficiencies
| | flow to parallel hydraulic trains. Since the flow resistance is lower, the pump flow rate is greater and the pump motor horsepower would increase. |
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| |
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| in the EDG load evaluation | | This in turn may increase the load on the EDG to an unacceptable value. |
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| |
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| were found, each of which could contribute
| | o Recent environmental qualification evaluations per 10 CFR 50.49 assumed |
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| |
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| to an overloading
| | that the emergency containment coolers operate longer than previously |
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| |
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| of both EDGs. Both EDGs could be overloaded
| | assumed. |
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| |
|
| in the event of a safety injection | | 0 Load center transformer losses had not been accounted for in prior EDG |
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| |
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| on one unit and a loss of offsite power to both units. In some cases this could occur without a single failure. These deficiencies
| | load evaluations. |
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| |
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| are as follows: 0 The post-TMI Emergency | | o Some nonsafety loads that are auto-start enabled when the safety injection |
|
| |
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| Operating
| | signal is reset could result in EDG overloading. These loads would not |
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| |
|
| Procedures
| | always immediately start, but would auto-start when their start setpoints |
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| |
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| require an additional
| | were reached after the reset. |
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| |
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| charging pump and high head safety injection
| | In addition to the overloading deficiencies above, a design deficiency.was found |
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| |
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| pump in the 1-30 minute and 30-60 minute EDG load interval, respectively.
| | that could result in the loss of one EDG, and at the same time could result in |
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| |
|
| o In the event of a single failure of one EDG, actual testing of component cooling water and intake cooling water showed that pump loads (KW) were higher than expected.
| | the loss of all ac power to Unit 4 as mentioned earlier. In the event of a |
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| |
|
| Under this condition, the cooling water pumps provide flow to parallel hydraulic
| | single failure of the 4A battery or the 4A load sequencer subsequent to a loss |
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| |
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| trains. Since the flow resistance
| | of off-site power, the 4A 4160V bus shown in Figure 2 would be prevented from |
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| |
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| is lower, the pump flow rate is greater and the pump motor horsepower
| | automatically loading onto the "A" EDG. It would also prevent the transfer of |
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| |
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| would increase.This in turn may increase the load on the EDG to an unacceptable
| | the 4A MCC swing bus from 4A load center to 4B load center. The "B" EDG has a |
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| |
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| value.o Recent environmental
| | self-contained supply of fuel oil that lasts about one hour. After that time, fuel must be gravity supplied by the day tank via a solenoid operated valve. |
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| |
|
| qualification
| | However, this valve is powered from MCC 4A. Therefore, the above mentioned |
|
| |
|
| evaluations
| | single failure would also cause the loss of the "B" EDG and the loss of all ac |
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| |
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| per 10 CFR 50.49 assumed that the emergency
| | power to Unit 4. The Unit 3 3B 4160V bus would also be deenergized, along with |
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| |
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| containment
| | three of the four high head safety injection pumps and the control room |
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| coolers operate longer than previously
| | air-conditioning. |
| | |
| assumed.0 Load center transformer
| |
| | |
| losses had not been accounted
| |
| | |
| for in prior EDG load evaluations.
| |
| | |
| o Some nonsafety
| |
| | |
| loads that are auto-start
| |
| | |
| enabled when the safety injection signal is reset could result in EDG overloading.
| |
| | |
| These loads would not always immediately
| |
| | |
| start, but would auto-start
| |
| | |
| when their start setpoints were reached after the reset.In addition to the overloading
| |
| | |
| deficiencies
| |
| | |
| above, a design deficiency.
| |
| | |
| was found that could result in the loss of one EDG, and at the same time could result in the loss of all ac power to Unit 4 as mentioned
| |
| | |
| earlier. In the event of a single failure of the 4A battery or the 4A load sequencer
| |
| | |
| subsequent
| |
| | |
| to a loss of off-site power, the 4A 4160V bus shown in Figure 2 would be prevented
| |
| | |
| from automatically
| |
| | |
| loading onto the "A" EDG. It would also prevent the transfer of the 4A MCC swing bus from 4A load center to 4B load center. The "B" EDG has a self-contained
| |
| | |
| supply of fuel oil that lasts about one hour. After that time, fuel must be gravity supplied by the day tank via a solenoid operated valve.However, this valve is powered from MCC 4A. Therefore, the above mentioned single failure would also cause the loss of the "B" EDG and the loss of all ac power to Unit 4. The Unit 3 3B 4160V bus would also be deenergized, along with three of the four high head safety injection
| |
| | |
| pumps and the control room air-conditioning.
| |
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| |
|
| Discussion: | | Discussion: |
| The single failure vulnerability | | The single failure vulnerability of the non-safety stub bus discussed above may |
| | |
| of the non-safety | |
| | |
| stub bus discussed | |
| | |
| above may have been evaluated | |
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| |
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| during the licensing | | have been evaluated during the licensing review and the loads on the EDGs found |
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| |
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| review and the loads on the EDGs found to be low enough so that failure of the stub bus breaker would not overload the diesel. Subsequent
| | to be low enough so that failure of the stub bus breaker would not overload the |
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| |
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| to initial operation, however, additional | | diesel. Subsequent to initial operation, however, additional loads have been |
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| |
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| loads have been
| | IN 86-70 |
| | August 18, 1986 added on the diesels. Prior to November, 1985, there was the potential for |
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| |
|
| IN 86-70 August 18, 1986 added on the diesels. Prior to November, 1985, there was the potential
| | loading the EDGs to 3544 kw in the 1-30 minute period and 3451 in the 30-60 |
| | minute period following a LOCA in one unit with a loss of offsite power in both |
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| |
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| for loading the EDGs to 3544 kw in the 1-30 minute period and 3451 in the 30-60 minute period following
| | units. These load levels exceed the highest FSAR value (1/2 hour exceptional |
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| |
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| a LOCA in one unit with a loss of offsite power in both units. These load levels exceed the highest FSAR value (1/2 hour exceptional | | rating) of 3050 Kw by a substantial margin. With the EDGs overloaded, the |
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| |
|
| rating) of 3050 Kw by a substantial
| | potential exists that safety-related loads would not start or would not operate |
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| |
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| margin. With the EDGs overloaded, the potential
| | at design ratings. Under these conditions, the EDG engines could stall and |
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| |
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| exists that safety-related
| | damage to the generator and/or engine could occur. There are no test data |
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| |
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| loads would not start or would not operate at design ratings. Under these conditions, the EDG engines could stall and damage to the generator
| | available to demonstrate that the EDGs could accept the above load levels. |
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| |
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| and/or engine could occur. There are no test data available
| | As an interim solution to the above design deficiencies, FP&L disabled the |
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| |
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| to demonstrate | | automatic transfer between EDGs and established a dedicated operator to take |
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| |
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| that the EDGs could accept the above load levels.As an interim solution to the above design deficiencies, FP&L disabled the automatic
| | corrective action (i.e., manipulate appropriate breakers) as necessary. The |
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| |
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| transfer between EDGs and established
| | licensee has now modified EDG loads, loading sequences and plant procedures. |
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| |
|
| a dedicated
| | This example illustrates the importance of reviewing EDG load limits under all |
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| |
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| operator to take corrective
| | possible operating configurations for a range of design basis accident condi- tions. FP&L, through an FMEA, system testing, and evaluation of EDG load limits, found design deficiencies that may have prevented one or both EDG's from |
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| |
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| action (i.e., manipulate
| | performing their required function. |
|
| |
|
| appropriate
| | No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. |
|
| |
|
| breakers)
| | If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional |
| as necessary.
| |
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| |
|
| The licensee has now modified EDG loads, loading sequences
| | Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office. |
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| |
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| and plant procedures.
| | Jordan, Director |
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| |
|
| This example illustrates
| | Divisi of Emergency Preparedness |
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| |
|
| the importance
| | and Engineering Response |
|
| |
|
| of reviewing | | Office of Inspection and Enforcement |
|
| |
|
| EDG load limits under all possible operating
| | Technical Contacts: Henry Bailey, IE |
|
| |
|
| configurations
| | (301) 492-9006 Joseph Giitter, IE |
|
| |
|
| for a range of design basis accident condi-tions. FP&L, through an FMEA, system testing, and evaluation
| | (301) 492-9001 Attachments: |
| | 1. Figures 1 and 2, Turkey Point - Units 3 & 4* |
| | 2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices |
|
| |
|
| of EDG load limits, found design deficiencies
| | Attachment 1 IN 86-70 |
| | August 18, 1986 FIGURE 1 TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 E 4 EDG "B" |
| | I) |
| | LOAD CENTERS |
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| |
|
| that may have prevented
| | h |
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| |
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| one or both EDG's from performing
| | * |
| | 480V 4C 3D 480V |
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| |
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| their required function.No specific action or written response is required by this information
| | N.C. |
|
| |
|
| notice.If you have any questions
| | N.C. |
|
| |
|
| about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator
| | 480V MCC D NON-SAFETY |
|
| |
|
| of the appropriate
| | SAFETY |
|
| |
|
| regional office or this office.Jordan, Director Divisi of Emergency
| | UNIT 3 UNIT 4 |
| | 'Simplified Diagram of Portion of Electrical Distribution System. |
|
| |
|
| ===Preparedness===
| | Attachment 1 IN 86-70 |
| and Engineering
| | FIGURE 2 August 18, 1986 TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 & 4* |
| | If |
|
| |
|
| Response Office of Inspection
| | EDG "'A" /-\ 4160V 3A 3B 4160V EDG 'B" |
| | 4160V 4A 4B 4160V |
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| |
|
| and Enforcement
| | 4A 3S |
|
| |
|
| Technical
| | I) |
| | I Cl38 4B |
|
| |
|
| Contacts:
| | Si Si Si Si |
| Henry Bailey, IE (301) 492-9006 Joseph Giitter, IE (301) 492-9001 Attachments:
| |
| 1. Figures 1 and 2, Turkey Point -Units 3 & 4*2. List of Recently Issued IE Information
| |
|
| |
|
| Notices
| | LOAD CENTERS |
|
| |
|
| Attachment
| | 480V 4A 4D 480V |
|
| |
|
| 1 IN 86-70 August 18, 1986 FIGURE 1 TURKEY POINT -UNITS 3 E 4 EDG "B" I)LOAD CENTERS 480V 4C 3D 480V* h N.C.N.C.480V MCC D NON-SAFETY
| | N.O. |
|
| |
|
| SAFETY UNIT 3 UNIT 4'Simplified
| | N.O. |
|
| |
|
| Diagram of Portion of Electrical
| | 480V NON-SAFETY |
|
| |
|
| Distribution
| | SAFETY |
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| |
|
| System.
| | "B1 EDG |
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| |
|
| Attachment
| | AUXILIARIES |
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| |
|
| 1 IN 86-70 August 18, 1986 FIGURE 2 TURKEY POINT -UNITS If 3 & 4*EDG "'A"/-\ 4160V 3A 3B 4160V EDG 'B" 4160V 4A 4B 4160V I)I 3S Si Cl 38 Si 4A Si 4B Si LOAD CENTERS 480V 4A 4D 480V N.O.N.O.480V NON-SAFETY
| | 'Simplified Diagram of Portion of Electrical Distribution System. |
|
| |
|
| SAFETY"B1 EDG AUXILIARIES
| | Attachment 2 IN 86-70 |
| | August 18, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED |
|
| |
|
| 'Simplified
| | IE INFORMATION NOTICES |
|
| |
|
| Diagram of Portion of Electrical
| | Information Date of |
|
| |
|
| Distribution
| | Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to |
|
| |
|
| System.
| | 86-69 Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve 8/18/86 All BWR facilities |
|
| |
|
| Attachment
| | (SSPV) Rebuild Kit Problems holding an OL or CP |
|
| |
|
| 2 IN 86-70 August 18, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION
| | 86-68 Stuck Control Rod 8/15/86 All BWR facilities |
|
| |
|
| NOTICES Information
| | holding an OL or CP |
|
| |
|
| Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-69 86-68 86-67 86-66 86-65 Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve 8/18/86 (SSPV) Rebuild Kit Problems Stuck Control Rod 8/15/86 Portable Moisture/Density
| | 86-67 Portable Moisture/Density 8/15/86 All NRC licensees |
|
| |
|
| 8/15/86 Gauges: Recent Incidents -And Common Violations
| | Gauges: Recent Incidents -And authorized to possess, Common Violations Of Require- use, transport, and |
|
| |
|
| Of Require-ments For Use, Transportation, And Storage Potential
| | ments For Use, Transportation, store sealed sources |
|
| |
|
| For Failure Of 8/15/86 Replacement
| | And Storage |
|
| |
|
| AC Coils Supplied By The Westinghouse
| | 86-66 Potential For Failure Of 8/15/86 All power reactor |
|
| |
|
| Electric Corporation
| | Replacement AC Coils Supplied facilities holding |
|
| |
|
| ===For Use In Class lE Motor Starters And Contractors===
| | By The Westinghouse Electric an OL or CP |
| Malfunctions
| |
|
| |
|
| Of ITT Barton 8/14/86 Model 580 Series Switches During Requalification
| | Corporation For Use In Class |
|
| |
|
| Testing Deficiencies
| | lE Motor Starters And |
|
| |
|
| In Upgrade 8/14/86 Programs For Plant Emergency Operating
| | Contractors |
|
| |
|
| Procedures
| | 86-65 Malfunctions Of ITT Barton 8/14/86 All power reactor |
|
| |
|
| Loss Of Safety Injection
| | Model 580 Series Switches facilities holding |
|
| |
|
| 8/6/86 Capability
| | During Requalification Testing an OL or CP |
|
| |
|
| Potential
| | 86-64 Deficiencies In Upgrade 8/14/86 All power reactor |
|
| |
|
| Problems In West- 7/31/86 inghouse Molded Case Circuit Breakers Equipped With A Shunt Trip Failure Of Auxiliary
| | Programs For Plant Emergency facilities holding |
|
| |
|
| Feed- 7/28/86 water Manual Isolated Valve All BWR facilities
| | Operating Procedures an OL or CP |
|
| |
|
| holding an OL or CP All BWR holding All NRC licensees authorized
| | 86-63 Loss Of Safety Injection 8/6/86 All PWR facilities |
|
| |
|
| to possess, use, transport, and store sealed sources All power reactor facilities
| | Capability holding an OL or CP |
|
| |
|
| holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
| | 86-62 Potential Problems In West- 7/31/86 All power reactor |
|
| |
|
| holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities | | inghouse Molded Case Circuit facilities holding |
|
| |
|
| holding an OL or CP All PWR facilities
| | Breakers Equipped With A an OL or CP |
|
| |
|
| holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
| | Shunt Trip |
|
| |
|
| holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
| | 86-61 Failure Of Auxiliary Feed- 7/28/86 All power reactor |
|
| |
|
| holding a CP facilities | | water Manual Isolated Valve facilities holding |
|
| |
|
| an OL or CP 86-64 86-63 86-62 86-61 OL = OperatinG
| | a CP |
|
| |
|
| License CP = Construction | | OL = OperatinG License |
|
| |
|
| Permit}} | | CP = Construction Permit}} |
|
| |
|
| {{Information notice-Nav}} | | {{Information notice-Nav}} |
Potential Failure of All Emergency Diesel GeneratorsML031250102 |
Person / Time |
---|
Site: |
Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill |
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Issue date: |
08/18/1986 |
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From: |
Jordan E NRC/IE |
---|
To: |
|
---|
References |
---|
IN-86-070, NUDOCS 8608130578 |
Download: ML031250102 (6) |
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Category:NRC Information Notice
MONTHYEARInformation Notice 2020-02, Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges2020-09-15015 September 2020 Flex Diesel Generator Operational Challenges ML20225A0322020-09-0303 September 2020 NRC Choice Letter to NAC International with Attached Safety Inspection Report, IR 0721015/2020201, February 24-27, 2020 and July 22, 2020, Inspection of NAC International in Norcross, Georgia Information Notice 2012-09, PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs.2019-11-30030 November 2019 PWROG-16043-NP-A, Revision 2, PWROG Program to Address NRC Information Notice 2012-09: Irradiation Effects on Fuel Assembly Spacer Grid Crush Strength for Westinghouse and CE PWR Fuel Designs. 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Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Contain2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Con2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend and/or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notice 2010-12: Containment Liner Cor Information Notice 2010-12, Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). Appendix VI: NRC FOIA Responses (B-51 Through B-53); Turkey Point Event Report; NRC Information Notic2012-08-17017 August 2012 Intervenors' Fifth Motion to Amend And/Or Supplement Proposed Contention No. 5 (Shield Building Cracking). 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Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination2006-07-13013 July 2006 E-mail from M. Mclaughlin on NRC, Regarding NRC Information Notice 2006-13: Groundwater Contamination 2020-09-03 The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:Skagit]] OR [[:Marble Hill]] </code>.
[Table view]The following query condition could not be considered due to this wiki's restrictions on query size or depth: <code> [[:Beaver Valley]] OR [[:Millstone]] OR [[:Hatch]] OR [[:Monticello]] OR [[:Calvert Cliffs]] OR [[:Dresden]] OR [[:Davis Besse]] OR [[:Peach Bottom]] OR [[:Browns Ferry]] OR [[:Salem]] OR [[:Oconee]] OR [[:Nine Mile Point]] OR [[:Palisades]] OR [[:Palo Verde]] OR [[:Perry]] OR [[:Indian Point]] OR [[:Fermi]] OR [[:Kewaunee]] OR [[:Catawba]] OR [[:Harris]] OR [[:Wolf Creek]] OR [[:Saint Lucie]] OR [[:Point Beach]] OR [[:Oyster Creek]] OR [[:Watts Bar]] OR [[:Hope Creek]] OR [[:Grand Gulf]] OR [[:Cooper]] OR [[:Sequoyah]] OR [[:Byron]] OR [[:Pilgrim]] OR [[:Arkansas Nuclear]] OR [[:Three Mile Island]] OR [[:Braidwood]] OR [[:Susquehanna]] OR [[:Summer]] OR [[:Prairie Island]] OR [[:Columbia]] OR [[:Seabrook]] OR [[:Brunswick]] OR [[:Surry]] OR [[:Limerick]] OR [[:North Anna]] OR [[:Turkey Point]] OR [[:River Bend]] OR [[:Vermont Yankee]] OR [[:Crystal River]] OR [[:Haddam Neck]] OR [[:Ginna]] OR [[:Diablo Canyon]] OR [[:Callaway]] OR [[:Vogtle]] OR [[:Waterford]] OR [[:Duane Arnold]] OR [[:Farley]] OR [[:Robinson]] OR [[:Clinton]] OR [[:South Texas]] OR [[:San Onofre]] OR [[:Cook]] OR [[:Comanche Peak]] OR [[:Yankee Rowe]] OR [[:Maine Yankee]] OR [[:Quad Cities]] OR [[:Humboldt Bay]] OR [[:La Crosse]] OR [[:Big Rock Point]] OR [[:Rancho Seco]] OR [[:Zion]] OR [[:Midland]] OR [[:Bellefonte]] OR [[:Fort Calhoun]] OR [[:FitzPatrick]] OR [[:McGuire]] OR [[:LaSalle]] OR [[:05000000]] OR [[:Zimmer]] OR [[:Fort Saint Vrain]] OR [[:Shoreham]] OR [[:Satsop]] OR [[:Trojan]] OR [[:Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant]] OR [[:Skagit]] OR [[:Marble Hill]] </code>. |
SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-70
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 August 18, 1986 IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-70: POTENTIAL FAILURE OF ALL EMERGENCY
DIESEL GENERATORS
Addressees
All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license or a
construction permit.
Purpose
This notice informs recipients of multiple design deficiencies in a vital ac
power system that could potentially result in the loss of all emergency diesel
generators (EDGs). It is expected that recipients will review the information
for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to
preclude a similar problem occurring at their facilities. However, suggestions
contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; there- fore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
On June 10, 1986, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Florida Power & Light
(FP&L) reported the results of a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA).
This analysis identified multiple design deficiencies in the Turkey Point
Units 3 and 4 vital ac power system that could potentially result in the loss
of both EDGs due to overloading. In addition, one deficiency was identified
that could result in the loss of all ac power to Unit 4. Turkey Point Units 3 and 4 share two EDGs. Simplified diagrams of part of the Turkey Point 3 & 4 electrical distribution system are provided as Figures 1 and 2.
One design deficiency involved a "swing bus." As shown on Figure 1, 480 volt
MCC "D" is normally supplied from EDG "B" but will shift its power supply to
EDG "A" if needed. MCC "D" also feeds a non-safety stub bus through a single
circuit breaker. This breaker is normally opened by the 48 load sequencer to
isolate the non-safety loads from MCC "D" when the 48 4160V bus is loaded on
EDG "B". A single failure in that circuit breaker would leave the non-safety
loads connected to MCC "D". During safety injection for one unit, the addi- tional non-safety loads could overload EDG "B", possibly resulting in a trip
of this EDG. MCC "D" would then transfer its power supply and could overload
EDG "A" as well.
8608130578
IN 86-70
August 18, 1986 In addition to the above design deficiency, five deficiencies in the EDG load
evaluation were found, each of which could contribute to an overloading of both
EDGs. Both EDGs could be overloaded in the event of a safety injection on one
unit and a loss of offsite power to both units. In some cases this could occur
without a single failure. These deficiencies are as follows:
0 The post-TMI Emergency Operating Procedures require an additional charging
pump and high head safety injection pump in the 1-30 minute and 30-60
minute EDG load interval, respectively.
o In the event of a single failure of one EDG, actual testing of component
cooling water and intake cooling water showed that pump loads (KW) were
higher than expected. Under this condition, the cooling water pumps provide
flow to parallel hydraulic trains. Since the flow resistance is lower, the pump flow rate is greater and the pump motor horsepower would increase.
This in turn may increase the load on the EDG to an unacceptable value.
o Recent environmental qualification evaluations per 10 CFR 50.49 assumed
that the emergency containment coolers operate longer than previously
assumed.
0 Load center transformer losses had not been accounted for in prior EDG
load evaluations.
o Some nonsafety loads that are auto-start enabled when the safety injection
signal is reset could result in EDG overloading. These loads would not
always immediately start, but would auto-start when their start setpoints
were reached after the reset.
In addition to the overloading deficiencies above, a design deficiency.was found
that could result in the loss of one EDG, and at the same time could result in
the loss of all ac power to Unit 4 as mentioned earlier. In the event of a
single failure of the 4A battery or the 4A load sequencer subsequent to a loss
of off-site power, the 4A 4160V bus shown in Figure 2 would be prevented from
automatically loading onto the "A" EDG. It would also prevent the transfer of
the 4A MCC swing bus from 4A load center to 4B load center. The "B" EDG has a
self-contained supply of fuel oil that lasts about one hour. After that time, fuel must be gravity supplied by the day tank via a solenoid operated valve.
However, this valve is powered from MCC 4A. Therefore, the above mentioned
single failure would also cause the loss of the "B" EDG and the loss of all ac
power to Unit 4. The Unit 3 3B 4160V bus would also be deenergized, along with
three of the four high head safety injection pumps and the control room
air-conditioning.
Discussion:
The single failure vulnerability of the non-safety stub bus discussed above may
have been evaluated during the licensing review and the loads on the EDGs found
to be low enough so that failure of the stub bus breaker would not overload the
diesel. Subsequent to initial operation, however, additional loads have been
IN 86-70
August 18, 1986 added on the diesels. Prior to November, 1985, there was the potential for
loading the EDGs to 3544 kw in the 1-30 minute period and 3451 in the 30-60
minute period following a LOCA in one unit with a loss of offsite power in both
units. These load levels exceed the highest FSAR value (1/2 hour exceptional
rating) of 3050 Kw by a substantial margin. With the EDGs overloaded, the
potential exists that safety-related loads would not start or would not operate
at design ratings. Under these conditions, the EDG engines could stall and
damage to the generator and/or engine could occur. There are no test data
available to demonstrate that the EDGs could accept the above load levels.
As an interim solution to the above design deficiencies, FP&L disabled the
automatic transfer between EDGs and established a dedicated operator to take
corrective action (i.e., manipulate appropriate breakers) as necessary. The
licensee has now modified EDG loads, loading sequences and plant procedures.
This example illustrates the importance of reviewing EDG load limits under all
possible operating configurations for a range of design basis accident condi- tions. FP&L, through an FMEA, system testing, and evaluation of EDG load limits, found design deficiencies that may have prevented one or both EDG's from
performing their required function.
No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.
If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional
Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.
Jordan, Director
Divisi of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Technical Contacts: Henry Bailey, IE
(301) 492-9006 Joseph Giitter, IE
(301) 492-9001 Attachments:
1. Figures 1 and 2, Turkey Point - Units 3 & 4*
2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices
Attachment 1 IN 86-70
August 18, 1986 FIGURE 1 TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 E 4 EDG "B"
I)
LOAD CENTERS
h
480V 4C 3D 480V
N.C.
N.C.
480V MCC D NON-SAFETY
SAFETY
UNIT 3 UNIT 4
'Simplified Diagram of Portion of Electrical Distribution System.
Attachment 1 IN 86-70
FIGURE 2 August 18, 1986 TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 & 4*
If
EDG "'A" /-\ 4160V 3A 3B 4160V EDG 'B"
4160V 4A 4B 4160V
4A 3S
I)
I Cl38 4B
Si Si Si Si
LOAD CENTERS
480V 4A 4D 480V
N.O.
N.O.
480V NON-SAFETY
SAFETY
"B1 EDG
AUXILIARIES
'Simplified Diagram of Portion of Electrical Distribution System.
Attachment 2 IN 86-70
August 18, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
IE INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to
86-69 Scram Solenoid Pilot Valve 8/18/86 All BWR facilities
(SSPV) Rebuild Kit Problems holding an OL or CP
86-68 Stuck Control Rod 8/15/86 All BWR facilities
holding an OL or CP
86-67 Portable Moisture/Density 8/15/86 All NRC licensees
Gauges: Recent Incidents -And authorized to possess, Common Violations Of Require- use, transport, and
ments For Use, Transportation, store sealed sources
And Storage
86-66 Potential For Failure Of 8/15/86 All power reactor
Replacement AC Coils Supplied facilities holding
By The Westinghouse Electric an OL or CP
Corporation For Use In Class
lE Motor Starters And
Contractors
86-65 Malfunctions Of ITT Barton 8/14/86 All power reactor
Model 580 Series Switches facilities holding
During Requalification Testing an OL or CP
86-64 Deficiencies In Upgrade 8/14/86 All power reactor
Programs For Plant Emergency facilities holding
Operating Procedures an OL or CP
86-63 Loss Of Safety Injection 8/6/86 All PWR facilities
Capability holding an OL or CP
86-62 Potential Problems In West- 7/31/86 All power reactor
inghouse Molded Case Circuit facilities holding
Breakers Equipped With A an OL or CP
Shunt Trip
86-61 Failure Of Auxiliary Feed- 7/28/86 All power reactor
water Manual Isolated Valve facilities holding
a CP
OL = OperatinG License
CP = Construction Permit
|
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list | - Information Notice 1986-01, Failure of Main Feedwater Check Valves Causes Loss of Feedwater System Integrity and Water-Hammer Damage (6 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-02, Failure of Valve Operator Motor During Environmental Qualification Testing (6 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-03, Potential Deficiencies in Enviromental Qualification of Limitorque Motor Valve Operator Wiring (14 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-04, Transient Due to Loss of Power to Intergrated Control System at a Pressurized Water Reactor Designed by Babcock & Wilcox (31 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-05, Main Steam Safety Valve Test Failures and Ring Setting Adjustments (31 January 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-06, Failure of Lifting Rig Attachment, While Lifting Upper Guide Structure at St. Lucie Unit 1 (3 February 1986, Topic: Control of Heavy Loads)
- Information Notice 1986-06, Failure of Lifting Rig Attachment, while Lifting Upper Guide Structure at St. Lucie Unit 1 (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-07, Lack of Detailed Instruction & Inadequate Observance of Precautions During Maintenance & Testing of Diesel Generator Woodward Governors (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-08, Licensee Event Report (LER) Format Modification (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-09, Failure of Check & Stop Check Valves Subjected to Low Flow Conditions (3 February 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-10, Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Resulting From Boric Acid Corrosion. (5 January 1995, Topic: Boric Acid, Stress corrosion cracking)
- Information Notice 1986-10, Feedwater Line Break (10 November 1988, Topic: Coatings, Anchor Darling)
- Information Notice 1986-10, Degradation of Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Resulting from Boric Acid Corrosion. (5 January 1995, Topic: Boric Acid, Stress corrosion cracking)
- Information Notice 1986-11, Anomalous Behavior of Recirculation Loop Flow in Jet Pump BWR Plants (31 December 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-13, Standby Liquid Control System Squib Valves Failure to Fire (21 February 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-13, Standby Liquid Control Squib Valves Failure to Fire (5 August 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-14, Overspeed Trips of AFW, HPCI & RCIC Turbines (26 August 1991, Topic: Fire Barrier)
- Information Notice 1986-14, Overspeed Trips of Afw, HPCI & RCIC Turbines (26 August 1991)
- Information Notice 1986-15, Loss of Offsite Power Caused by Problems in Fiber Optics Systems (10 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-16, Failures to Identify Containment Leakage Due to Inadequate Local Testing of BWR Vacuum Relief System Valves (11 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-17, Update of Failure of Automatic Sprinkler System Valves to Operate (24 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-18, NRC On-Scene Response During a Major Emergency (26 March 1986, Topic: Squib, Backfit)
- Information Notice 1986-19, Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Failure at Crystal River (21 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-20, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Scaling Factors, 10 CFR Part 61 (28 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-21, Recognition of American Society of Mechanical Engineers Accreditation Program for N Stamp Holders (31 March 1986, Topic: Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-22, Underresponse of Radiation Survey Instrument to High Radiation Fields (31 March 1986, Topic: High Radiation Area, Squib)
- Information Notice 1986-23, Excessive Skin Exposures Due to Contamination with Hot Particles (9 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-23, Excessive Skin Exposures due to Contamination with Hot Particles (9 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-24, Respirator Users Notice: Increased Inspection Frequency for Certain Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Air Cylinders (11 April 1986, Topic: Hydrostatic)
- Information Notice 1986-25, Traceability and Material Control of Material and Equipment, Particularly Fasteners (11 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-26, Potential Problems in Generators Manufactured by Electrical Products Incorporated (17 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-27, Access Control at Nuclear Facilities (21 April 1986, Topic: Contraband)
- Information Notice 1986-28, Telephone Numbers to the NRC Operations Center and Regional Offices (24 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-29, Effects of Changing Valve Moter-Operator Switch Settings (25 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-30, Design Limitations of Gaseous Effluent Monitoring Systems (29 April 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-31, Unauthorized Transfer and Loss of Control of Industrial Nuclear Gauges (14 July 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-32, Request for Collection of Licensee Radioactivity Measurements Attributed to Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident (2 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-33, Information for Licensee Regarding the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident (6 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-34, Improper Assembly, Material Selection, & Test of Valves & Their Actuators (13 May 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-34, Improper Assembly, Material Selection, & Test of Valves & their Actuators (13 May 1986)
- Information Notice 1986-35, Fire in Compressible Material at Dresden Unit 3 (15 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-36, Change in NRC Practice Regarding Issuance of Confirming Letters to Principal Contractors (16 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-37, Degradation of Station Batteries (16 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-38, Deficient Operator Actions Following Dual Function Valve Failures (20 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-39, Failures of RHR Pump Motors and Pump Internals (20 May 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-40, Degraded Ability to Isolate the Reactor Coolant System from Low-Pressure Coolant Systems in Bwrs (5 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-40, Degraded Ability to Isolate the Reactor Coolant System from Low-Pressure Coolant Systems in BWRs (5 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-41, Evaluation of Questionable Exposure Readings of Licensee Personnel Dosimeters (9 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-42, Improper Maintenance of Radiation Monitoring Systems (9 June 1986, Topic: Temporary Modification, Chernobyl)
- Information Notice 1986-43, Problems with Silver Zeolite Sampling of Airborne Radioiodine (10 June 1986, Topic: Chernobyl)
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