Information Notice 2009-09, Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 06/19/2009
| issue date = 06/19/2009
| title = Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify
| title = Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify
| author name = McGinty T J
| author name = Mcginty T
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DPR
| author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DPR
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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| page count = 4
| page count = 4
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter: ML091050027 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 June 19, 2009   NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2009-09: IMPROPER FLOW CONTROLLER SETTINGS RENDERS INJECTION SYSTEMS INOPERABLE AND SURVEILLANCE DID NOT IDENTIFY
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES
 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
 
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 June 19, 2009 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2009-09:               IMPROPER FLOW CONTROLLER SETTINGS
 
RENDERS INJECTION SYSTEMS INOPERABLE
 
AND SURVEILLANCE DID NOT IDENTIFY


==ADDRESSEES==
==ADDRESSEES==
All holders of operating licenses for boiling-water nuclear power reactors, except those who have permanently ceased operations and who have certified that fuel has been permanently removed from the reactor vessel.
All holders of operating licenses for boiling-water nuclear power reactors, except those who
 
have permanently ceased operations and who have certified that fuel has been permanently
 
removed from the reactor vessel.


==PURPOSE==
==PURPOSE==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert addressees that improper flow controller settings in the high-pressure core spray (HPCS) system, high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system, and/or reactor core isolation cooling
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert
 
addressees that improper flow controller settings in the high-pressure core spray (HPCS)
system, high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system, and/or reactor core isolation cooling
 
(RCIC) system injection systems at several boiling-water reactors resulted in system flow
 
oscillations that rendered the systems inoperable. Testing failed to identify the inoperable


(RCIC) system injection systems at several boiling-water reactors resulted in system flow oscillations that rendered the systems inoperable.  Testing failed to identify the inoperable systems because the system alignment during the surveillance differed from the system alignment when the systems are called upon to perform their safety functions.  The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and will
systems because the system alignment during the surveillance differed from the system


consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
alignment when the systems are called upon to perform their safety functions. The NRC
 
expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and will
 
consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN
 
are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.


==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
==DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES==
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1  As discussed in NRC IN 2008-13, "Main Feedwater System Issues and Related 2007 Reactor Trip Data," on November 28, 2007, an unplanned automatic reactor trip occurred at Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, that stemmed from a failure of the digital feedwater control system.


As the reactor vessel water level decreased, the RCIC pump automatically started but tripped after 11 seconds on low RCIC pump suction pressure because the RCIC flow controller was tuned incorrectly in 2006. At the time of the RCIC pump trip, RCIC was aligned to take suction from the suppression pool instead of the normal path from the condensate storage tank (CST) because of an inoperable CST level indicator. While using HPCS to maintain the water level in the reactor vessel, the operating crew attempted to recover RCIC by first realigning the RCIC pump suction from the suppression pool to the CST. With the RCIC flow controller in automatic, operators started and ran the RCIC pump and then attempted to feed water into the reactor. At that point, the operator noted large injection flow oscillations and RCIC again tripped on low suction pressure. Operators successfully recovered RCIC by starting the RCIC pump with the flow controller in manual, and supplied water to the reactor vessel without large flow oscillations or RCIC tripping. It was later determined that the RCIC flow controller gain, reset and rate settings had been altered from the settings used to successfully inject to the reactor vessel during plant startup testing. These changes resulted in an overly responsive flow control loop.
===Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1===
As discussed in NRC IN 2008-13, Main Feedwater System Issues and Related 2007 Reactor
 
Trip Data, on November 28, 2007, an unplanned automatic reactor trip occurred at Perry
 
Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, that stemmed from a failure of the digital feedwater control system.
 
As the reactor vessel water level decreased, the RCIC pump automatically started but tripped
 
after 11 seconds on low RCIC pump suction pressure because the RCIC flow controller was
 
tuned incorrectly in 2006. At the time of the RCIC pump trip, RCIC was aligned to take suction
 
from the suppression pool instead of the normal path from the condensate storage tank (CST)
because of an inoperable CST level indicator. While using HPCS to maintain the water level in
 
the reactor vessel, the operating crew attempted to recover RCIC by first realigning the RCIC
 
pump suction from the suppression pool to the CST. With the RCIC flow controller in automatic, operators started and ran the RCIC pump and then attempted to feed water into the reactor. At
 
that point, the operator noted large injection flow oscillations and RCIC again tripped on low
 
suction pressure. Operators successfully recovered RCIC by starting the RCIC pump with the
 
flow controller in manual, and supplied water to the reactor vessel without large flow oscillations
 
or RCIC tripping. It was later determined that the RCIC flow controller gain, reset and rate
 
settings had been altered from the settings used to successfully inject to the reactor vessel
 
during plant startup testing. These changes resulted in an overly responsive flow control loop.
 
===Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2===
On April 24, 2007, the Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2, was at 100-percent power when the


Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2  On April 24, 2007, the Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2, was at 100-percent power when the redundant reactivity control system inadvertently initiated a reduction in total feedwater flow to
redundant reactivity control system inadvertently initiated a reduction in total feedwater flow to


the reactor vessel. Subsequently, the rapid decrease of the water level in the reactor vessel caused an automatic scram.  As the water level of the reactor vessel continued to decrease during the event, the HPCI and RCIC systems automatically started at -38 inches, as designed.  Following initiation, the HPCI and RCIC systems experienced abnormal system flow oscillations from no-flow to full-flow (5,600 gallons per minute for the HPCI system and 600 gallons per minute for the RCIC system) for 3.4 seconds and 1.2 seconds, respectively.  Additionally, the common suction source for both systems unexpectedly swapped from the CST to the
the reactor vessel. Subsequently, the rapid decrease of the water level in the reactor vessel


suppression pool due to pressure oscillations in the common suction piping. Approximately 2 minutes following the scram, the operators placed both HPCI and RCIC flow controllers into manual control and continued to restore reactor water level.  Both systems responded to manual control as expected, and the flow oscillations ceased.  The licensee subsequently determined it had incorrectly adjusted the flow controller gain and reset settings to the values
caused an automatic scram. As the water level of the reactor vessel continued to decrease


outside the expected range by a factor of 10.  Additional information is available in Limerick Licensee Event Report 50-353/2007-003, dated June 22, 2007 (which can be found on the NRC's public Web site in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under Accession No. ML071730270).
during the event, the HPCI and RCIC systems automatically started at -38 inches, as designed.


Root Cause  In each of the above examples, one of the causes of the flow oscillations was improper flow controller tuning of the HPCS, HPCI, and RCIC systems.  Licensee test programs and surveillance procedures did not identify this deficiency.  Surveillance testing of HPCS, HPCI,
Following initiation, the HPCI and RCIC systems experienced abnormal system flow oscillations
and RCIC pumps is performed while at power with the systems drawing water from the CST and discharging through a full-flow test return line back to the CST, also known as a CST-to-CST alignment.  However, when these systems are called upon to perform their safety function, these systems draw water from the CST and inject into the reactor vessel.  Industry operating experience has demonstrated that HPCS, HPCI and RCIC system response is slower when


operating in a CST-to-CST alignment compared to actual injection operation. Therefore, these systems need to be tuned and maintained appropriately to account for the difference in response during actual vessel injection. General Electric/Hitachi Report 0000-0079-1103, Revision 1, delineates that RCIC operability of the flow control loop can be assured by maintaining RCIC flow controller tuning settings used during successful reactor pressure vessel injections.
from no-flow to full-flow (5,600 gallons per minute for the HPCI system and 600 gallons per
 
minute for the RCIC system) for 3.4 seconds and 1.2 seconds, respectively. Additionally, the
 
common suction source for both systems unexpectedly swapped from the CST to the
 
suppression pool due to pressure oscillations in the common suction piping. Approximately
 
2 minutes following the scram, the operators placed both HPCI and RCIC flow controllers into
 
manual control and continued to restore reactor water level. Both systems responded to
 
manual control as expected, and the flow oscillations ceased. The licensee subsequently
 
determined it had incorrectly adjusted the flow controller gain and reset settings to the values
 
outside the expected range by a factor of 10. Additional information is available in Limerick
 
Licensee Event Report 50-353/2007-003, dated June 22, 2007 (which can be found on the
 
NRCs public Web site in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
 
(ADAMS) under Accession No. ML071730270).
 
Root Cause
 
In each of the above examples, one of the causes of the flow oscillations was improper flow
 
controller tuning of the HPCS, HPCI, and RCIC systems. Licensee test programs and
 
surveillance procedures did not identify this deficiency. Surveillance testing of HPCS, HPCI,
and RCIC pumps is performed while at power with the systems drawing water from the CST and
 
discharging through a full-flow test return line back to the CST, also known as a CST-to-CST
 
alignment. However, when these systems are called upon to perform their safety function, these systems draw water from the CST and inject into the reactor vessel. Industry operating
 
experience has demonstrated that HPCS, HPCI and RCIC system response is slower when
 
operating in a CST-to-CST alignment compared to actual injection operation. Therefore, these
 
systems need to be tuned and maintained appropriately to account for the difference in
 
response during actual vessel injection. General Electric/Hitachi Report 0000-0079-1103, Revision 1, delineates that RCIC operability of the flow control loop can be assured by
 
maintaining RCIC flow controller tuning settings used during successful reactor pressure vessel
 
injections.


==DISCUSSION==
==DISCUSSION==
The HPCS, HPCI, and RCIC systems are required to be operable as specified in plant technical specifications. As illustrated above, failure to establish adequate procedures to properly tune system flow controllers as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)  
The HPCS, HPCI, and RCIC systems are required to be operable as specified in plant technical
Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings" can result in these systems being rendered inoperable. In addition, surveillance testing did not reveal that systems were inoperable and could not perform their safety function to inject water to the reactor vessel, which is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control." 
 
specifications. As illustrated above, failure to establish adequate procedures to properly tune
 
system flow controllers as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)
Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings can result in these systems being rendered inoperable. In addition, surveillance testing did not reveal that systems
 
were inoperable and could not perform their safety function to inject water to the reactor vessel, which is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this


Regulation (NRR) project manager.          /RA by TQuay for/  Timothy J. McGinty, Director
matter to the technical contact listed below or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor


Division of Policy and Rulemaking Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
 
/RA by TQuay for/
                                              Timothy J. McGinty, Director
 
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Pong Chung, NRR 301-415-2473 E-mail: Pong.Chung@nrc.gov Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections. systems being rendered inoperable. In addition, surveillance testing did not reveal that systems were inoperable and could not perform their safety function to inject to the reactor vessel, which is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control." 
 
===Pong Chung, NRR===
                      301-415-2473 E-mail: Pong.Chung@nrc.gov
 
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections. systems being rendered inoperable. In addition, surveillance testing did not reveal that systems
 
were inoperable and could not perform their safety function to inject to the reactor vessel, which
 
is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control.


==CONTACT==
==CONTACT==
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this
 
matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor


/RA by TQuay for/ Timothy J. McGinty, Director Division of Policy and Rulemaking Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Regulation (NRR) project manager.
 
/RA by TQuay for/
                                                Timothy J. McGinty, Director
 
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


===Technical Contact:===
===Technical Contact:===
Pong Chung, NRR 301-415-2473 E-mail:  Pong.Chung@nrc.gov


Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections. ADAMS Accession Number: ML091050027   TAC No.: ME0622 OFFICE EICB:DE TECH EDITOR BC:EICB:DED:DE PGCB:DPRPGCB:DPR NAME PChung KAzariah-Kribbs WKemper PHilandDBeaulieu CHawes DATE 5/12/09 4/15/09 email 5/26/09 5/28/09 6/3/09 6/3/09 OFFICE BC:PGCB:DPR D:DPR    NAME MMurphy TMcGinty     DATE 6/16/09 6/19/09    OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
===Pong Chung, NRR===
                      301-415-2473 E-mail: Pong.Chung@nrc.gov
 
Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.
 
ADAMS Accession Number: ML091050027                             TAC No.: ME0622 OFFICE   EICB:DE       TECH EDITOR       BC:EICB:DE D:DE       PGCB:DPR  PGCB:DPR
 
NAME     PChung         KAzariah-Kribbs   WKemper       PHiland DBeaulieu  CHawes
 
DATE     5/12/09       4/15/09 email     5/26/09       5/28/09 6/3/09   6/3/09 OFFICE   BC:PGCB:DPR   D:DPR
 
NAME     MMurphy       TMcGinty


}}
DATE    6/16/09        6/19/09 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Latest revision as of 08:07, 14 November 2019

Improper Flow Controller Settings Renders Injection Systems Inoperable and Surveillance Did Not Identify
ML091050027
Person / Time
Site: Perry  FirstEnergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/19/2009
From: Mcginty T
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To:
Pong Chung, NRR/DE/EICB 415-2473
References
IN-09-009
Download: ML091050027 (4)
v • d • e


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 June 19, 2009 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2009-09: IMPROPER FLOW CONTROLLER SETTINGS

RENDERS INJECTION SYSTEMS INOPERABLE

AND SURVEILLANCE DID NOT IDENTIFY

ADDRESSEES

All holders of operating licenses for boiling-water nuclear power reactors, except those who

have permanently ceased operations and who have certified that fuel has been permanently

removed from the reactor vessel.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert

addressees that improper flow controller settings in the high-pressure core spray (HPCS)

system, high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system, and/or reactor core isolation cooling

(RCIC) system injection systems at several boiling-water reactors resulted in system flow

oscillations that rendered the systems inoperable. Testing failed to identify the inoperable

systems because the system alignment during the surveillance differed from the system

alignment when the systems are called upon to perform their safety functions. The NRC

expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and will

consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Suggestions contained in this IN

are not NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

As discussed in NRC IN 2008-13, Main Feedwater System Issues and Related 2007 Reactor

Trip Data, on November 28, 2007, an unplanned automatic reactor trip occurred at Perry

Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, that stemmed from a failure of the digital feedwater control system.

As the reactor vessel water level decreased, the RCIC pump automatically started but tripped

after 11 seconds on low RCIC pump suction pressure because the RCIC flow controller was

tuned incorrectly in 2006. At the time of the RCIC pump trip, RCIC was aligned to take suction

from the suppression pool instead of the normal path from the condensate storage tank (CST)

because of an inoperable CST level indicator. While using HPCS to maintain the water level in

the reactor vessel, the operating crew attempted to recover RCIC by first realigning the RCIC

pump suction from the suppression pool to the CST. With the RCIC flow controller in automatic, operators started and ran the RCIC pump and then attempted to feed water into the reactor. At

that point, the operator noted large injection flow oscillations and RCIC again tripped on low

suction pressure. Operators successfully recovered RCIC by starting the RCIC pump with the

flow controller in manual, and supplied water to the reactor vessel without large flow oscillations

or RCIC tripping. It was later determined that the RCIC flow controller gain, reset and rate

settings had been altered from the settings used to successfully inject to the reactor vessel

during plant startup testing. These changes resulted in an overly responsive flow control loop.

Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2

On April 24, 2007, the Limerick Generating Station, Unit 2, was at 100-percent power when the

redundant reactivity control system inadvertently initiated a reduction in total feedwater flow to

the reactor vessel. Subsequently, the rapid decrease of the water level in the reactor vessel

caused an automatic scram. As the water level of the reactor vessel continued to decrease

during the event, the HPCI and RCIC systems automatically started at -38 inches, as designed.

Following initiation, the HPCI and RCIC systems experienced abnormal system flow oscillations

from no-flow to full-flow (5,600 gallons per minute for the HPCI system and 600 gallons per

minute for the RCIC system) for 3.4 seconds and 1.2 seconds, respectively. Additionally, the

common suction source for both systems unexpectedly swapped from the CST to the

suppression pool due to pressure oscillations in the common suction piping. Approximately

2 minutes following the scram, the operators placed both HPCI and RCIC flow controllers into

manual control and continued to restore reactor water level. Both systems responded to

manual control as expected, and the flow oscillations ceased. The licensee subsequently

determined it had incorrectly adjusted the flow controller gain and reset settings to the values

outside the expected range by a factor of 10. Additional information is available in Limerick

Licensee Event Report 50-353/2007-003, dated June 22, 2007 (which can be found on the

NRCs public Web site in the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

(ADAMS) under Accession No. ML071730270).

Root Cause

In each of the above examples, one of the causes of the flow oscillations was improper flow

controller tuning of the HPCS, HPCI, and RCIC systems. Licensee test programs and

surveillance procedures did not identify this deficiency. Surveillance testing of HPCS, HPCI,

and RCIC pumps is performed while at power with the systems drawing water from the CST and

discharging through a full-flow test return line back to the CST, also known as a CST-to-CST

alignment. However, when these systems are called upon to perform their safety function, these systems draw water from the CST and inject into the reactor vessel. Industry operating

experience has demonstrated that HPCS, HPCI and RCIC system response is slower when

operating in a CST-to-CST alignment compared to actual injection operation. Therefore, these

systems need to be tuned and maintained appropriately to account for the difference in

response during actual vessel injection. General Electric/Hitachi Report 0000-0079-1103, Revision 1, delineates that RCIC operability of the flow control loop can be assured by

maintaining RCIC flow controller tuning settings used during successful reactor pressure vessel

injections.

DISCUSSION

The HPCS, HPCI, and RCIC systems are required to be operable as specified in plant technical

specifications. As illustrated above, failure to establish adequate procedures to properly tune

system flow controllers as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR)

Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings can result in these systems being rendered inoperable. In addition, surveillance testing did not reveal that systems

were inoperable and could not perform their safety function to inject water to the reactor vessel, which is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control.

CONTACT

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contact listed below or to the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

/RA by TQuay for/

Timothy J. McGinty, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Pong Chung, NRR

301-415-2473 E-mail: Pong.Chung@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections. systems being rendered inoperable. In addition, surveillance testing did not reveal that systems

were inoperable and could not perform their safety function to inject to the reactor vessel, which

is contrary to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control.

CONTACT

This IN requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any questions about this

matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation (NRR) project manager.

/RA by TQuay for/

Timothy J. McGinty, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical Contact:

Pong Chung, NRR

301-415-2473 E-mail: Pong.Chung@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

ADAMS Accession Number: ML091050027 TAC No.: ME0622 OFFICE EICB:DE TECH EDITOR BC:EICB:DE D:DE PGCB:DPR PGCB:DPR

NAME PChung KAzariah-Kribbs WKemper PHiland DBeaulieu CHawes

DATE 5/12/09 4/15/09 email 5/26/09 5/28/09 6/3/09 6/3/09 OFFICE BC:PGCB:DPR D:DPR

NAME MMurphy TMcGinty

DATE 6/16/09 6/19/09 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY


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