IR 05000254/2012301: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 06/15/2012
| issue date = 06/15/2012
| title = IR 05000254-12-301 (DRS) & 05000265-12-301 (Drs), 06/06/2012, Errata to Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
| title = IR 05000254-12-301 (DRS) & 05000265-12-301 (Drs), 06/06/2012, Errata to Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
| author name = Bloomer T E
| author name = Bloomer T
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OB
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OB
| addressee name = Pacilio M J
| addressee name = Pacilio M
| addressee affiliation = Exelon Generation Co, LLC, Exelon Nuclear
| addressee affiliation = Exelon Generation Co, LLC, Exelon Nuclear
| docket = 05000254, 05000265
| docket = 05000254, 05000265
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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 2443 WARRENVILLE ROAD, SUITE 210 LISLE, IL 60532
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES une 15, 2012
-4352 June 15, 2012 Mr. Michael Senior Vice President, Exelon Generation Company, LLC President and Chief Nuclear Officer (CNO), Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555


SUBJECT: ERRATA TO QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2; NRC INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT 05000254/2012301(DRS); 05000265/2012301(DRS)
==SUBJECT:==
ERRATA TO QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2; NRC INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT 05000254/2012301(DRS);
05000265/2012301(DRS)


==Dear Mr. Pacilio:==
==Dear Mr. Pacilio:==
On June 6, 201 2, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Initial Examination Report 050002 54/20 12301; 05000 265/201 2301 (ML12159A083
On June 6, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Initial Examination Report 05000254/2012301; 05000265/2012301 (ML12159A083). In the examination report, the Summary of Findings incorrectly assigned Non-Cited Violation numbers (NCVs)
). In the examination report , the Summary of Findings incorrectly assign ed Non-Cited Violation numbers (NCV s) 05000254/2012301
05000254/2012301-01; 05000265/2012301-01. As indicated in the body of the report, the finding that resulted in these NCVs was licensee-identified and, therefore, should not have been assigned numbers. Please replace page 5 of Enclosure 1 and page 1 of the Attachment to Inspection Report 05000254/2301; 05000265/2012301 with the enclosed corrected pages.
-01; 05000265/2012301
-01. As indicated in the body of the report, the finding that resulted in these NCVs was licensee
-identified and
, therefore , should not have been assign ed numbers. Please replace page 5 of Enclosure 1 and page 1 of the Attachment to Inspection Report 050002 54/2301; 05000 265/201 2301 with the enclosed corrected pages.


We apologize for any inconvenience to you and your staff.
We apologize for any inconvenience to you and your staff.


Sincerely,/RA/ Tamara E. Bloomer, Acting Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50
Sincerely,
-254; 50-265 License Nos. DPR
/RA/
-29; DPR-30  
Tamara E. Bloomer, Acting Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30 Enclosure: Errata to Inspection Report 05000254/2012301; 05000265/2012301 cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ'


===Enclosure:===
on March 30, 2012, at the Clinton Power Station, the licensee identified that the control room simulators plant process computer model was saving sequence of events files on a routine basis. A licensee investigation determined that the same condition existed at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The licensee determined that some of the files contained examination materials related to examinations required by 10 CFR Part 55. The integrity of a test or examination is considered compromised if any activity, regardless of intent, affected, or, but for detection, would have affected the equitable and consistent administration of the test or examination.
Errata to Inspection Report 050002 54/201 2301; 05000 265/201 2301 cc w/encl:
Distribution via ListServ
Ž 5 Enclosure 1 on March 30, 2012, at the Clinton Power Station, the licensee identified that the control room simulator's plant process computer model was saving sequence of events files on a routine basis. A licensee investigation determined that the same condition existed at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The licensee determined that some of the files contained examination materials related to examinations required by 10 CFR Part 55. The integrity of a test or examination is considered compromised if any activity, regardless of intent, affected, or, but for detection, would have affected the equitable and consistent administration of the test or examination.


Although the examination materials were compromised, the licensee was able to demonstrate that the files were not readily viewable and required interpretation. Therefore, no individuals had an unfair advantage in taking any NRC
Although the examination materials were compromised, the licensee was able to demonstrate that the files were not readily viewable and required interpretation.
-related examinations. This issue was documented in the facility's corrective action program as IR1348733. Corrective actions for this issue included revising the simulator's software to delete data from the sequence of events files being generated by the simulator until a longer term fix is decided. The licensee's corporate procedure TQ-QC-201-0113, "Simulator Examination Security Actions Checklist," will add steps to delete data after simulator resets.


The inspectors determined that the failure to control sequence of event files generated by the facility's simulator was a performance deficiency that required a Significance Determination Process evaluation. The inspectors determined that this finding impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and consulted IMC 0609, Appendix I, to assess the impact of this issue on examination security. The inspectors concluded that a potential examination compromise had occurred and the facility had taken immediate compensatory actions to prevent recurrence of this condition. Based on circumstances described above and the licensee's corrective actions, the inspectors concluded that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green).
Therefore, no individuals had an unfair advantage in taking any NRC-related examinations. This issue was documented in the facilitys corrective action program as IR1348733. Corrective actions for this issue included revising the simulators software to delete data from the sequence of events files being generated by the simulator until a longer term fix is decided. The licensees corporate procedure TQ-QC-201-0113, Simulator Examination Security Actions Checklist, will add steps to delete data after simulator resets.


ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
The inspectors determined that the failure to control sequence of event files generated by the facilitys simulator was a performance deficiency that required a Significance Determination Process evaluation. The inspectors determined that this finding impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and consulted IMC 0609, Appendix I, to assess the impact of this issue on examination security. The inspectors concluded that a potential examination compromise had occurred and the facility had taken immediate compensatory actions to prevent recurrence of this condition. Based on circumstances described above and the licensees corrective actions, the inspectors concluded that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green).


1 Attachment 1 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTAC T K. Moser, Training Director Licensee E. Pannell, Operations Training Manager C. Burkhart, Examination Lead B. Palagi, Chief Examiner Nuclear Regulatory Commission M. Bielby , Senior Examiner R. Walton , Senior Examiner ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED NoneOpened, Closed, and Discussed
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 5  Enclosure 1
 
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee K. Moser, Training Director E. Pannell, Operations Training Manager C. Burkhart, Examination Lead Nuclear Regulatory Commission B. Palagi, Chief Examiner M. Bielby, Senior Examiner R. Walton, Senior Examiner ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened, Closed, and Discussed None 1  Attachment 1


Mr. Michael
Mr. Michael
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 03:02, 12 November 2019

IR 05000254-12-301 (DRS) & 05000265-12-301 (Drs), 06/06/2012, Errata to Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2
ML12170A936
Person / Time
Site: Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/15/2012
From: Tamara Bloomer
Operations Branch III
To: Pacilio M
Exelon Generation Co, Exelon Nuclear
Bruce Palagi
References
IR-12-301
Download: ML12170A936 (5)


Text

UNITED STATES une 15, 2012

SUBJECT:

ERRATA TO QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2; NRC INITIAL LICENSE EXAMINATION REPORT 05000254/2012301(DRS);

05000265/2012301(DRS)

Dear Mr. Pacilio:

On June 6, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Initial Examination Report 05000254/2012301; 05000265/2012301 (ML12159A083). In the examination report, the Summary of Findings incorrectly assigned Non-Cited Violation numbers (NCVs)05000254/2012301-01; 05000265/2012301-01. As indicated in the body of the report, the finding that resulted in these NCVs was licensee-identified and, therefore, should not have been assigned numbers. Please replace page 5 of Enclosure 1 and page 1 of the Attachment to Inspection Report 05000254/2301; 05000265/2012301 with the enclosed corrected pages.

We apologize for any inconvenience to you and your staff.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Tamara E. Bloomer, Acting Chief Operations Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-254; 50-265 License Nos. DPR-29; DPR-30 Enclosure: Errata to Inspection Report 05000254/2012301; 05000265/2012301 cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ'

on March 30, 2012, at the Clinton Power Station, the licensee identified that the control room simulators plant process computer model was saving sequence of events files on a routine basis. A licensee investigation determined that the same condition existed at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station. The licensee determined that some of the files contained examination materials related to examinations required by 10 CFR Part 55. The integrity of a test or examination is considered compromised if any activity, regardless of intent, affected, or, but for detection, would have affected the equitable and consistent administration of the test or examination.

Although the examination materials were compromised, the licensee was able to demonstrate that the files were not readily viewable and required interpretation.

Therefore, no individuals had an unfair advantage in taking any NRC-related examinations. This issue was documented in the facilitys corrective action program as IR1348733. Corrective actions for this issue included revising the simulators software to delete data from the sequence of events files being generated by the simulator until a longer term fix is decided. The licensees corporate procedure TQ-QC-201-0113, Simulator Examination Security Actions Checklist, will add steps to delete data after simulator resets.

The inspectors determined that the failure to control sequence of event files generated by the facilitys simulator was a performance deficiency that required a Significance Determination Process evaluation. The inspectors determined that this finding impacted the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and consulted IMC 0609, Appendix I, to assess the impact of this issue on examination security. The inspectors concluded that a potential examination compromise had occurred and the facility had taken immediate compensatory actions to prevent recurrence of this condition. Based on circumstances described above and the licensees corrective actions, the inspectors concluded that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green).

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION 5 Enclosure 1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee K. Moser, Training Director E. Pannell, Operations Training Manager C. Burkhart, Examination Lead Nuclear Regulatory Commission B. Palagi, Chief Examiner M. Bielby, Senior Examiner R. Walton, Senior Examiner ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened, Closed, and Discussed None 1 Attachment 1

Mr. Michael