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| | number = ML13269A287 | | | number = ML13269A287 |
| | issue date = 11/25/2013 | | | issue date = 11/25/2013 |
| | title = Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3: LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2; and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information Related to Potential Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling (TAC No. ME6 | | | title = County Station, Units 1 and 2; and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information Related to Potential Loss of Spent Fuel Pool Cooling |
| | author name = Hiland P L | | | author name = Hiland P |
| | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DE | | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR/DE |
| | addressee name = Pacilio M J | | | addressee name = Pacilio M |
| | addressee affiliation = Exelon Nuclear | | | addressee affiliation = Exelon Nuclear |
| | docket = 05000237, 05000249, 05000254, 05000265, 05000373, 05000374 | | | docket = 05000237, 05000249, 05000254, 05000265, 05000373, 05000374 |
| | license number = | | | license number = |
| | contact person = Lamb J G | | | contact person = Lamb J |
| | case reference number = TAC ME6761 | | | case reference number = TAC ME6761 |
| | document type = Letter, Request for Additional Information (RAI) | | | document type = Letter, Request for Additional Information (RAI) |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 Michael J. Pacilio President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 November 25, 2013 SUBJECT: DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3; AND QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2-REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO POTENTIAL LOSS OF SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING (TAC NO. ME6761) Dear Mr. Pacilio: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received a petition submitted in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR) 2.206, "Requests for Action under This Subpart," related to the potential loss of forced cooling to spent fuel pools (SFPs) at boiling-water reactors (BWRs). Mr. David Lochbaum, on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists (the Petitioner), requested that the NRC issue a demand for information (DFI) to all licensees of BWRs with Mark I or Mark II containment designs.1 The Petitioner requested that the DFI compel the licensees to describe how their individual facilities comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 44, "Cooling Water," and/or with 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants." The request was based on the need to transfer the heat from the SFP to an ultimate heat sink or account for the effects of potential boiling of the SFP following a design-basis event on the temperature, humidity, and submergence conditions within the reactor building. The NRC staff initially considered this petition to be within the scope of issues that may be addressed as a result of the NRC's post-Fukushima actions because the request involved SFP boiling, which was an area of concern at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant following the March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and resultant tsunami. However, the focus of post-Fukushima actions has been on the protection of the fuel within the pool following beyond-design-basis events, rather than the potential for boiling in the SFPs to affect other systems and components essential for accident mitigation or safe shutdown following basis events. The NRC staff has completed an initial evaluation of the petition request using information contained in each subject facility's safety analysis report, and has concluded that additional information is necessary from certain facilities in order to evaluate the response of the facilities following design-basis events. Specifically, the NRC staff has selected facilities that share a common secondary containment surrounding two SFPs for its initial information request 1 See Letter from David Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union of Concerned Scientists, to R. William Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations, NRC (July 29, 2011) (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML 11213A030). | | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 November 25, 2013 Michael J. Pacilio President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555 |
| M. Pacilio -2-because these facilities are more likely to have a high decay heat load due to refueling in one of the SFPs at a time when other equipment within the secondary containment may be essential for accident mitigation or safe shut down of an adjacent, operating unit. Some facilities in this group had sufficiently detailed information in the associated safety analysis report to indicate that forced SFP cooling could be reestablished to even an isolated SFP using high quality equipment designed to function following the facility design-basis earthquake. However, other facility safety analysis reports had descriptions indicating that reestablishment of forced SFP cooling was not assured because, for example, connections from the residual heat removal (RHR) system to the SFP were not seismically qualified or the system was not configured to both draw water from and return cooled water to the SFP. The NRC staff believes, based on information in the safety analysis reports at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (Dresden), and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (Quad Cities), that a reliable means of SFP forced cooling may not exist at these facilities. Since the RHR system may not be configured to provide reliable forced cooling to the SFP and the normal SFP cooling system was not safety-related at the Dresden, and Quad Cities facilities, the NRC staff believes that a sustained loss of forced cooling to the SFPs at these facilities could be a potential consequence of a design-basis earthquake with an associated loss of offsite power. The configuration of the secondary containment at these facilities may allow accumulation of evolved steam or condensed water in reactor building areas housing related equipment that could result in inoperability of this safety-related equipment. In order to better understand the reliability of the SFP cooling systems, the expected response of the affected facilities to their loss, and the safety significance of the SFP cooling function at the Dresden and Quad Cities facilities, please respond to the request for additional information provided in the enclosure to this letter. Please provide the response within 90 days of the date of this letter. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact the petition project manager, Mr. John Lamb, at 301-415-3100. Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 50-254 and 50-265 Enclosure: Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ Sincerely, Patrick L. Hiland, Director Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELIABILITY OF FORCED SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING 2.206 PETITION FROM UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 EXELON GENERATION COMPANY DOCKET NOS. 50-237, 50-249, 50-254 AND 50-265 Please respond to the following requests for information for each requested facility. The performance of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) should consider standard accident analysis methods and assumptions used in the safety analysis report, including loss of function under conditions beyond those considered in the design of the SSC and consideration of additional single failures. Operator actions may be included when the action is specified in existing operating, alarm response, or emergency procedure and the personnel expected to execute the action have been properly trained. 1. Describe the ability to maintain forced cooling of the spent fuel pool (SFP) using installed equipment following a design-basis earthquake with consequential loss of offsite power. Please consider SFP configurations encountered during routine refueling and normal operating conditions. The normal SFP cooling system and the SFP cooling assist mode of the residual heat removal system should be considered at a minimum, and, if a sustained loss of forced SFP cooling is expected, identify the expected range of times for the pool to reach saturation conditions. 2. If the response to the above request determines that the SFP would experience a sustained loss of SFP forced cooling, describe the expected changes in environmental conditions within each affected secondary containment ventilation zone. Address the expected response of operators to manage environmental conditions, consistent with existing procedures, and describe the survivability of ventilation systems, such as the standby gas treatment system. Identify any secondary containment areas that could experience a harsh environment (i.e., an environment significantly more severe than the environment that would occur during normal plant operation with respect to radiation, temperature, humidity, or submergence of equipment as a result of accumulated condensate) as a result of the sustained loss of SFP forced cooling. 3. If the response to the above request identifies harsh environmental conditions in any area of the facility secondary containment, describe the effect of these environmental conditions on important-to-safety electrical equipment within those areas necessary to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposure. Enclosure | | |
| -2-4. If the response to the above request identifies that electrical equipment necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain safe shutdown conditions could be adversely affected by a sustained loss of SFP forced cooling potentially resulting from a basis event, describe any corrective actions that will be implemented at the affected facility and the basis for concluding that those actions would acceptably resolve the described condition.
| | ==SUBJECT:== |
| M. Pacilio -2-because, for example, connections from the residual heat removal (RHR) system to the SFP were not seismically qualified or the system was not configured to both draw water from and return cooled water to the SFP. The NRC staff believes, based on information in the safety analysis reports at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (Dresden), and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (Quad Cities}, that a reliable means of SFP forced cooling may not exist at these facilities. Since the RHR system may not be configured to provide reliable forced cooling to the SFP and the normal SFP cooling system was not safety-related at the Dresden, and Quad Cities facilities, the NRC staff believes that a sustained loss of forced cooling to the SFPs at these facilities could be a potential consequence of a design-basis earthquake with an associated loss of offsite power. The configuration of the secondary containment at these facilities may allow accumulation of evolved steam or condensed water in reactor building areas housing related equipment that could result in inoperability of this safety-related equipment. In order to better understand the reliability of the SFP cooling systems, the expected response of the affected facilities to their loss, and the safety significance of the SFP cooling function at the Dresden and Quad Cities facilities, please respond to the request for additional information provided in the enclosure to this letter. Please provide the response within 90 days of the date of this letter. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact the petition project manager, Mr. John Lamb, at 301-415-3100. Sincerely, Ira/ Patrick L. Hiland, Director Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 50-254 and 50-265 Enclosure: Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ Distribution: PUBLIC RidsNrrPMDresden RidsNrrDorl RidsNrrDe ADAMS Accession No ML13269A287 OFFICE DORULPLI-2/PM NAME Jlamb DATE 10/23/2013 OFFICE OGC-NLO NAME JWachutka DATE 11/07/2013 RidsNrrDeEeeb RidsNrrDss RidsNrrDoriLpll-2 RidsNrrPMQuadCities DORULPLII-2/LA DORULPLII-2/BC A Baxter VRodriguez 10/22/2013 10/23/2013 DORUD DSS/D MEvans TMcGinty 11/21/2013 11/21/2013 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY RidsNrrDssSbpb JLamb, NRRIDORL SJones, NRR DSS/SBPB/BC GCasto 10/30/2013 DE/D PHiland 11/25/2013 DE/EEEB/BC JZimmerman 11/05/2013
| | DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3; AND QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2- REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO POTENTIAL LOSS OF SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING (TAC NO. ME6761) |
| }} | | |
| | ==Dear Mr. Pacilio:== |
| | |
| | The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received a petition submitted in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR) 2.206, "Requests for Action under This Subpart," related to the potential loss of forced cooling to spent fuel pools (SFPs) at boiling-water reactors (BWRs). Mr. David Lochbaum, on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists (the Petitioner), requested that the NRC issue a demand for information (DFI) to all licensees of BWRs with Mark I or Mark II containment designs. 1 The Petitioner requested that the DFI compel the licensees to describe how their individual facilities comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 44, "Cooling Water," and/or with 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants." The request was based on the need to transfer the heat from the SFP to an ultimate heat sink or account for the effects of potential boiling of the SFP following a design-basis event on the temperature, humidity, and submergence conditions within the reactor building. |
| | The NRC staff initially considered this petition to be within the scope of issues that may be addressed as a result of the NRC's post-Fukushima actions because the request involved SFP boiling, which was an area of concern at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant following the March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and resultant tsunami. However, the focus of post-Fukushima actions has been on the protection of the fuel within the pool following beyond-design-basis events, rather than the potential for boiling in the SFPs to affect other systems and components essential for accident mitigation or safe shutdown following design-basis events. |
| | The NRC staff has completed an initial evaluation of the petition request using information contained in each subject facility's safety analysis report, and has concluded that additional information is necessary from certain facilities in order to evaluate the response of the facilities following design-basis events. Specifically, the NRC staff has selected facilities that share a common secondary containment surrounding two SFPs for its initial information request 1 |
| | See Letter from David Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union of Concerned Scientists, to R. |
| | William Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations, NRC (July 29, 2011) (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11213A030). |
| | |
| | M. Pacilio because these facilities are more likely to have a high decay heat load due to refueling in one of the SFPs at a time when other equipment within the secondary containment may be essential for accident mitigation or safe shut down of an adjacent, operating unit. Some facilities in this group had sufficiently detailed information in the associated safety analysis report to indicate that forced SFP cooling could be reestablished to even an isolated SFP using high quality equipment designed to function following the facility design-basis earthquake. However, other facility safety analysis reports had descriptions indicating that reestablishment of forced SFP cooling was not assured because, for example, connections from the residual heat removal (RHR) system to the SFP were not seismically qualified or the system was not configured to both draw water from and return cooled water to the SFP. |
| | The NRC staff believes, based on information in the safety analysis reports at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (Dresden), and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (Quad Cities), that a reliable means of SFP forced cooling may not exist at these facilities. |
| | Since the RHR system may not be configured to provide reliable forced cooling to the SFP and the normal SFP cooling system was not safety-related at the Dresden, and Quad Cities facilities, the NRC staff believes that a sustained loss of forced cooling to the SFPs at these facilities could be a potential consequence of a design-basis earthquake with an associated loss of offsite power. The configuration of the secondary containment at these facilities may allow accumulation of evolved steam or condensed water in reactor building areas housing safety-related equipment that could result in inoperability of this safety-related equipment. |
| | In order to better understand the reliability of the SFP cooling systems, the expected response of the affected facilities to their loss, and the safety significance of the SFP cooling function at the Dresden and Quad Cities facilities, please respond to the request for additional information provided in the enclosure to this letter. Please provide the response within 90 days of the date of this letter. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact the petition project manager, Mr. John Lamb, at 301-415-3100. |
| | Sincerely, Patrick L. Hiland, Director Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 50-254 and 50-265 |
| | |
| | ==Enclosure:== |
| | Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ |
| | |
| | REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELIABILITY OF FORCED SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING 2.206 PETITION FROM UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 EXELON GENERATION COMPANY DOCKET NOS. 50-237, 50-249, 50-254 AND 50-265 Please respond to the following requests for information for each requested facility. The performance of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) should consider standard accident analysis methods and assumptions used in the safety analysis report, including loss of function under conditions beyond those considered in the design of the SSC and consideration of additional single failures. Operator actions may be included when the action is specified in existing operating, alarm response, or emergency procedure and the personnel expected to execute the action have been properly trained. |
| | : 1. Describe the ability to maintain forced cooling of the spent fuel pool (SFP) using installed equipment following a design-basis earthquake with consequential loss of offsite power. |
| | Please consider SFP configurations encountered during routine refueling and normal operating conditions. The normal SFP cooling system and the SFP cooling assist mode of the residual heat removal system should be considered at a minimum, and, if a sustained loss of forced SFP cooling is expected, identify the expected range of times for the pool to reach saturation conditions. |
| | : 2. If the response to the above request determines that the SFP would experience a sustained loss of SFP forced cooling, describe the expected changes in environmental conditions within each affected secondary containment ventilation zone. Address the expected response of operators to manage environmental conditions, consistent with existing procedures, and describe the survivability of ventilation systems, such as the standby gas treatment system. Identify any secondary containment areas that could experience a harsh environment (i.e., an environment significantly more severe than the environment that would occur during normal plant operation with respect to radiation, temperature, humidity, or submergence of equipment as a result of accumulated condensate) as a result of the sustained loss of SFP forced cooling. |
| | : 3. If the response to the above request identifies harsh environmental conditions in any area of the facility secondary containment, describe the effect of these environmental conditions on important-to-safety electrical equipment within those areas necessary to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposure. |
| | Enclosure |
| | : 4. If the response to the above request identifies that electrical equipment necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain safe shutdown conditions could be adversely affected by a sustained loss of SFP forced cooling potentially resulting from a design-basis event, describe any corrective actions that will be implemented at the affected facility and the basis for concluding that those actions would acceptably resolve the described condition. |
| | |
| | ML13269A287 OFFICE DORULPLI-2/PM DORULPLII-2/LA DORULPLII-2/BC DSS/SBPB/BC DE/EEEB/BC NAME Jlamb A Baxter VRodriguez GCasto JZimmerman DATE 10/23/2013 10/22/2013 10/23/2013 10/30/2013 11/05/2013 OFFICE OGC- NLO DORUD DSS/D DE/D NAME JWachutka MEvans TMcGinty PHiland DATE 11/07/2013 11/21/2013 11/21/2013 11/25/2013}} |
|
|---|
Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000254/20230042024-02-0505 February 2024
Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2023004 and 05000265/2023004
IR 05000237/20230042024-02-0202 February 2024
Integrated Inspection Report 05000237/2023004 and 05000249/2023004
IR 05000373/20230042024-01-24024 January 2024
County Station - Integrated Inspection Report 05000373/2023004 and 05000374/2023004
ML24024A1332024-01-24024 January 2024
Confirmation of Initial License Examination
IR 05000373/20230122024-01-18018 January 2024
County Station - Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000373/2023012 and 05000374/2023012
IR 05000010/20230012024-01-17017 January 2024
NRC Inspection Report 05000010/2023001 (Drss)
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Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0042 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting))
ML23354A2902024-01-0505 January 2024
Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0028 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting))
ML23354A2812024-01-0404 January 2024
Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0031 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting))
RS-24-001, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Relief Request I5R-26, Inservice Inspection Program Relief Request Regarding Examination Coverage for the Fifth Inservice Inspection Interval2024-01-0303 January 2024
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ML23360A6082023-12-27027 December 2023
County Station Request for Information for NRC Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection: Inspection Report 05000373/2024010 and 05000374/2024010
IR 05000254/20234032023-12-22022 December 2023
Public- Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000254/2023403 and 05000265/2023403
IR 05000254/20230102023-12-20020 December 2023
Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000254/2023010 and 05000265/2023010
ML23349A1622023-12-17017 December 2023
Issuance of Amendment Nos. 298 and 294 Increase Completion Time in Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4 (Emergency Circumstances)
RS-23-128, Response to Request for Additional Information for the Emergency License Amendment Request Increase Technical Specifications Completion Time in TS 3.8.1.B.4 from 7 Days to 30 Days2023-12-15015 December 2023
Response to Request for Additional Information for the Emergency License Amendment Request Increase Technical Specifications Completion Time in TS 3.8.1.B.4 from 7 Days to 30 Days
ML23278A1292023-12-14014 December 2023
Units 1 & 2; Limerick, Units 1 & 2; Nine Mile Point, Units 1 & 2; and Peach Bottom, Units 2 & 3 -Revision to Approved Alternatives to Use Boiling Water Reactor Vessel and Internals Project Guidelines
ML23305A1402023-12-13013 December 2023
Units 1 & 2; Nine Mile Point, Unit 2; Peach Bottom, Units 2 & 3; and Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments to Adopt Traveler TSTF-580
RS-23-123, Emergency License Amendment Request - Increase Technical Specifications Completion Time in TS 3.8.1.B.4 from 7 Days to 30 Days2023-12-13013 December 2023
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ML23339A1762023-12-0505 December 2023
Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information (05000265/2024001)
RS-23-121, Sixth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program2023-11-30030 November 2023
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SVPLTR 23-0037, Core Operating Limits Report for Cycle 292023-11-29029 November 2023
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ML23319A3342023-11-20020 November 2023
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RS-23-104, Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-11-17017 November 2023
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RS-23-120, Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information2023-11-10010 November 2023
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RS-23-119, Supplemental Information Letter for Part 73 Exemption Request - Responses to Request for Confirmatory Information2023-11-10010 November 2023
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ML23317A1192023-11-10010 November 2023
Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - 2023 Annual Report - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums
IR 05000254/20230032023-11-0909 November 2023
Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2023003 and 05000265/2023003
IR 05000373/20230032023-11-0909 November 2023
County Station Integrated Inspection Report 05000373/2023003, 05000374/2023003, and 07200070/2023001
ML23286A2602023-11-0808 November 2023
Issuance of Amendment Nos. 260 and 245 to Renewed Facility Operating Licenses Relocation of Pressure and Temperature Limit Curves to the Pressure Temperature Report
RS-23-107, Relief Request I5R-22, Inservice Inspection Program Relief Request Regarding Examination Coverage for the Fifth Inservice Inspection Interval2023-11-0808 November 2023
Relief Request I5R-22, Inservice Inspection Program Relief Request Regarding Examination Coverage for the Fifth Inservice Inspection Interval
IR 05000373/20234012023-11-0707 November 2023
County Station Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000373/2023401 and 05000374/2023401
RS-23-113, Submittal of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Ufsar), Revision 17 and Fire Protection Report (Fpr), Revision 262023-10-20020 October 2023
Submittal of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Ufsar), Revision 17 and Fire Protection Report (Fpr), Revision 26
RS-23-102, Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-10-16016 October 2023
Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation
ML23285A2342023-10-13013 October 2023
Confirmation of Initial License Examination
RS-23-103, Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-10-13013 October 2023
Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation
RS-23-097, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans2023-10-12012 October 2023
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IR 05000374/20230102023-10-11011 October 2023
NRC Inspection Report 05000374/2023010
ML23279A0712023-10-0606 October 2023
Response to NRC Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 - Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000237/2023011 and 05000249/2023011
ML23269A0662023-09-28028 September 2023
Proposed Alternative Request RV-23H Associated with the Sixth 10-Year Inservice Testing Interval
ML23265A1322023-09-27027 September 2023
Proposed Alternative Request RV-03 Associated with the Sixth 10-Year Inservice Testing Interval
ML23206A0382023-09-21021 September 2023
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IR 05000254/20230112023-09-20020 September 2023
Safety-Conscious Work Environment Issue of Concern Team Inspection Report 05000254/2023011 and 05000265/2023011
ML23205A1362023-09-20020 September 2023
Proposed Alternative Request RV-02D Associated with the Sixth IST Interval
IR 05000373/20233012023-09-15015 September 2023
Errata to NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000373/2023301; 05000374/2023301
IR 05000237/20230112023-09-0606 September 2023
Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000237/2023011 and 05000249/2023011
2024-02-05
[Table view]
Category:Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARML23360A6082023-12-27027 December 2023
County Station Request for Information for NRC Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection: Inspection Report 05000373/2024010 and 05000374/2024010
ML23349A0362023-12-14014 December 2023
NRR E-mail Capture - Draft Request for Additional Information Re Quad Cities Emergency Amendment Related to Unit 1 Diesel Generator Inoperability
ML23338A1192023-11-21021 November 2023
NRR E-mail Capture - Draft Request for Additional Information Quad Cities Relief Request I5R-26
ML23264A7992023-09-21021 September 2023
NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI - Constellation Energy Generation, LLC Fleet Request License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-580, Revision 1
ML23208A3182023-07-27027 July 2023
Notification of an NRC Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program Inspection and RFI
ML23187A0462023-07-0606 July 2023
Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information; Inspection Report 05000237/2023004
ML23153A1562023-06-0202 June 2023
NRR E-mail Capture - RAI LaSalle pressure-temperature Limits Report (PTLR) Amendment Request
ML23150A2482023-05-25025 May 2023
NRR E-mail Capture - RAI Re LaSalle Downcomer Analysis Amendment Request
ML23118A1652023-04-28028 April 2023
NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Quad Cities, Unit 2, Alternative Request I6R-11
ML23110A3202023-04-21021 April 2023
Information Request to Support the NRC Annual Baseline Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection
ML23065A2832023-03-0707 March 2023
Request for Information for the NRC Quadrennial Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection: Inspection Report 05000254/2023010 and 05000265/2023010
ML23052A0652023-02-21021 February 2023
NRR E-mail Capture - Dresden Units 2 and 3 - Request for Additional Information for Alternative Request RV-23H
ML23037A9192023-02-0707 February 2023
Request for Information for the NRC Quadrennial Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection: Inspection Report 05000237/2023011 and 05000249/2023011
ML23013A1502023-01-17017 January 2023
Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information; Inspection Report 05000254/2023002
ML23019A0132023-01-12012 January 2023
NRR E-mail Capture - Final RAI Dresden 2 and 3 - License Amendment Pertaining to GNF3 Fuel Transition
ML22361A0792022-12-27027 December 2022
Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information (05000374/2023001)
ML23004A0262022-12-16016 December 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - Draft Request for Additional Information - Quad Cities Alternative RV-04, Inservice Testing of High Pressure Coolant Injection Drain Pot Solenoid Valves (EPD L-2022-LLR-0070)
ML22348A0452022-12-14014 December 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - Draft Request for Additional Information Regarding Quad Cities Alternative I6R-09
ML22290A0842022-10-13013 October 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - Dresden 2 and 3 - RAI License Amendment Request Regarding New Fuel Storage Vault and Spent Fuel Storage Pool Criticality Methodologies
ML22270A1032022-09-27027 September 2022
Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information (05000249/2022004)
ML22227A1152022-09-27027 September 2022
Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure
ML22256A0112022-09-12012 September 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 License Amendments Related to Fuel Storage
ML22249A2332022-09-0606 September 2022
Notification of NRC Fire Protection Team Inspection Request for Information Inspection Report 05000254/2022011 05000265/2022011
ML22203A0442022-07-21021 July 2022
Request for Additional Information (RAI)
ML22199A2422022-07-13013 July 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - Draft RAI Dresden 2 and 3 Proposed Alternative Related to Sblc Nozzle Inspection for the Sixth Inservice Inspection Interval
ML22206A0352022-07-13013 July 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - Draft RAI Quad Cities Alternative Related to Sblc Nozzle Inspection
ML22193A0412022-07-11011 July 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - RAI Quad Cities License Amendment to Expand the Use of Prime Methods
ML22182A1992022-07-0101 July 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - RAI Alternative RV-11, Code Case OMN-28
ML22178A1362022-06-28028 June 2022
Information Request to Support Upcoming Problem Identification and Resolution (Pi&R) Inspection at Quad Cities Station
ML22164A8582022-06-13013 June 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - RAI Alternative RV-09, MSSVs
ML22164A8562022-06-13013 June 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - RAI Quad Cities Alternative RV-08, Safety Relief Valves
ML22164A7852022-06-13013 June 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - RAI Quad Cities Amendment for Spent Fuel Pool Storage Analysis
ML22138A4112022-05-18018 May 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - Lasalle 1 and 2 - (RAI) License Amendment Request Regarding New Fuel Storage Vault and Spent Fuel Storage Pool Criticality Methodologies, with Changes to TS Sections 4.3.1 and 5.6.5 (EPID-L-2021-LLA-0124)
ML22126A0392022-05-0606 May 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - Lasalle 1 and 2 Draft (RAI) License Amendment Request Regarding New Fuel Storage Vault and Spent Fuel Storage Pool Criticality Methodologies, with Proposed Changes to TS Sections 4.3.1 and 5.6.5
ML22097A0832022-04-0707 April 2022
County Station Information Request for the Cyber-Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000373/2022403 and 05000374/2022403
ML22076A1122022-03-15015 March 2022
Request for Additional Information Related to the Amendment Request to Transition to GNF3 Fuels (EPID L-2021-LLA-0159) (Redacted)
ML22062B0232022-03-0303 March 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - EPID-L-2022-LLR-0028, LaSalle Unit 1, Request for Additional Information (Rai), LaSalle Unit 1, Relief Request I4R-13 Relief from Code Examinations for 1B33-F060A and 1B33-F060B Repairs
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Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Amendment to Implement Prime Methodologies for Evaluating Thermal Overpower and Mechanical Overpower Limits for Non-Global Nuclear Fuels Fuel
ML22041B5362022-02-10010 February 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - Request for Additional Information Regarding Fleet License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-541
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Information Request for an NRC Triennial 10 CFR 50.59 (Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments) Baseline Inspection
ML22020A0642022-01-13013 January 2022
NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Generation Company, LLC - Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Fleet Alternative for Repair of Water Level Instrumentation Partial Penetration Nozzles
ML21342A3842021-12-0808 December 2021
NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information: Quad Cities 1 & 2 License Amendment Request Transition to GNF3 Fuel
ML21294A0032021-10-26026 October 2021
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ML21292A1782021-10-19019 October 2021
Information Request for a NRC Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal 05000373/2022010
ML21256A1902021-09-10010 September 2021
NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Generation Company, LLC - Request for Additional Information Regarding License Transfer Application
ML21238A3142021-08-26026 August 2021
Notification of an NRC Triennial Heat Sink Performance Inspection and Request for Information; Inspection Report 05000254/2021004; 05000265/2021004
ML21244A4012021-08-10010 August 2021
(Final) Request for Information (RAI) Dresden, Units 1, 2, 3, and ISFSI Request for Exemptions from Portions of 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR 50 Appendix E
ML21207A0072021-07-26026 July 2021
NRR E-mail Capture - La Salle Units 1 and 2 - Request for Additional Information (RAI) License Amendment Request to Incorporate Licensing Topical Report NEDE-33885P-A, Revision 1, GNF CRDA Application Methodology(EPID-L-2021-LLA-0016)
ML21190A0192021-07-0808 July 2021
NRR E-mail Capture - Exelon Fleet - Request for Additional Information Regarding Adoption of TSTF-582 and TSTF-583-T
ML21187A2972021-07-0707 July 2021
Information Request for an NRC Triennial 10 CFR 50.59 (Evaluation of Changes, Tests, and Experiments) Baseline Inspection
2023-09-21
[Table view] |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 November 25, 2013 Michael J. Pacilio President and Chief Nuclear Officer Exelon Nuclear 4300 Winfield Road Warrenville, IL 60555
SUBJECT:
DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3; AND QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2- REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELATED TO POTENTIAL LOSS OF SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING (TAC NO. ME6761)
Dear Mr. Pacilio:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has received a petition submitted in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (1 0 CFR) 2.206, "Requests for Action under This Subpart," related to the potential loss of forced cooling to spent fuel pools (SFPs) at boiling-water reactors (BWRs). Mr. David Lochbaum, on behalf of the Union of Concerned Scientists (the Petitioner), requested that the NRC issue a demand for information (DFI) to all licensees of BWRs with Mark I or Mark II containment designs. 1 The Petitioner requested that the DFI compel the licensees to describe how their individual facilities comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion (GDC) 44, "Cooling Water," and/or with 10 CFR 50.49, "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants." The request was based on the need to transfer the heat from the SFP to an ultimate heat sink or account for the effects of potential boiling of the SFP following a design-basis event on the temperature, humidity, and submergence conditions within the reactor building.
The NRC staff initially considered this petition to be within the scope of issues that may be addressed as a result of the NRC's post-Fukushima actions because the request involved SFP boiling, which was an area of concern at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant following the March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and resultant tsunami. However, the focus of post-Fukushima actions has been on the protection of the fuel within the pool following beyond-design-basis events, rather than the potential for boiling in the SFPs to affect other systems and components essential for accident mitigation or safe shutdown following design-basis events.
The NRC staff has completed an initial evaluation of the petition request using information contained in each subject facility's safety analysis report, and has concluded that additional information is necessary from certain facilities in order to evaluate the response of the facilities following design-basis events. Specifically, the NRC staff has selected facilities that share a common secondary containment surrounding two SFPs for its initial information request 1
See Letter from David Lochbaum, Director, Nuclear Safety Project, Union of Concerned Scientists, to R.
William Borchardt, Executive Director for Operations, NRC (July 29, 2011) (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML11213A030).
M. Pacilio because these facilities are more likely to have a high decay heat load due to refueling in one of the SFPs at a time when other equipment within the secondary containment may be essential for accident mitigation or safe shut down of an adjacent, operating unit. Some facilities in this group had sufficiently detailed information in the associated safety analysis report to indicate that forced SFP cooling could be reestablished to even an isolated SFP using high quality equipment designed to function following the facility design-basis earthquake. However, other facility safety analysis reports had descriptions indicating that reestablishment of forced SFP cooling was not assured because, for example, connections from the residual heat removal (RHR) system to the SFP were not seismically qualified or the system was not configured to both draw water from and return cooled water to the SFP.
The NRC staff believes, based on information in the safety analysis reports at Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3 (Dresden), and Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 (Quad Cities), that a reliable means of SFP forced cooling may not exist at these facilities.
Since the RHR system may not be configured to provide reliable forced cooling to the SFP and the normal SFP cooling system was not safety-related at the Dresden, and Quad Cities facilities, the NRC staff believes that a sustained loss of forced cooling to the SFPs at these facilities could be a potential consequence of a design-basis earthquake with an associated loss of offsite power. The configuration of the secondary containment at these facilities may allow accumulation of evolved steam or condensed water in reactor building areas housing safety-related equipment that could result in inoperability of this safety-related equipment.
In order to better understand the reliability of the SFP cooling systems, the expected response of the affected facilities to their loss, and the safety significance of the SFP cooling function at the Dresden and Quad Cities facilities, please respond to the request for additional information provided in the enclosure to this letter. Please provide the response within 90 days of the date of this letter. If you have any questions regarding this request, please contact the petition project manager, Mr. John Lamb, at 301-415-3100.
Sincerely, Patrick L. Hiland, Director Division of Engineering Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 50-254 and 50-265
Enclosure:
Request for Additional Information cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION RELIABILITY OF FORCED SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING 2.206 PETITION FROM UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 2 AND 3 QUAD CITIES NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 EXELON GENERATION COMPANY DOCKET NOS. 50-237, 50-249, 50-254 AND 50-265 Please respond to the following requests for information for each requested facility. The performance of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) should consider standard accident analysis methods and assumptions used in the safety analysis report, including loss of function under conditions beyond those considered in the design of the SSC and consideration of additional single failures. Operator actions may be included when the action is specified in existing operating, alarm response, or emergency procedure and the personnel expected to execute the action have been properly trained.
- 1. Describe the ability to maintain forced cooling of the spent fuel pool (SFP) using installed equipment following a design-basis earthquake with consequential loss of offsite power.
Please consider SFP configurations encountered during routine refueling and normal operating conditions. The normal SFP cooling system and the SFP cooling assist mode of the residual heat removal system should be considered at a minimum, and, if a sustained loss of forced SFP cooling is expected, identify the expected range of times for the pool to reach saturation conditions.
- 2. If the response to the above request determines that the SFP would experience a sustained loss of SFP forced cooling, describe the expected changes in environmental conditions within each affected secondary containment ventilation zone. Address the expected response of operators to manage environmental conditions, consistent with existing procedures, and describe the survivability of ventilation systems, such as the standby gas treatment system. Identify any secondary containment areas that could experience a harsh environment (i.e., an environment significantly more severe than the environment that would occur during normal plant operation with respect to radiation, temperature, humidity, or submergence of equipment as a result of accumulated condensate) as a result of the sustained loss of SFP forced cooling.
- 3. If the response to the above request identifies harsh environmental conditions in any area of the facility secondary containment, describe the effect of these environmental conditions on important-to-safety electrical equipment within those areas necessary to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, the capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition or the capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in potential offsite exposure.
Enclosure
- 4. If the response to the above request identifies that electrical equipment necessary to shut down the reactor and maintain safe shutdown conditions could be adversely affected by a sustained loss of SFP forced cooling potentially resulting from a design-basis event, describe any corrective actions that will be implemented at the affected facility and the basis for concluding that those actions would acceptably resolve the described condition.
ML13269A287 OFFICE DORULPLI-2/PM DORULPLII-2/LA DORULPLII-2/BC DSS/SBPB/BC DE/EEEB/BC NAME Jlamb A Baxter VRodriguez GCasto JZimmerman DATE 10/23/2013 10/22/2013 10/23/2013 10/30/2013 11/05/2013 OFFICE OGC- NLO DORUD DSS/D DE/D NAME JWachutka MEvans TMcGinty PHiland DATE 11/07/2013 11/21/2013 11/21/2013 11/25/2013
