ML18106A382

LER 98-003-00:on 980216,inadequate Surveillance Testing of FW Isolation & P-10 SR Block Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Original Surveillance Tps for Ssps Logic Testing.Revised Ssps Logic Functional TPs.W/980316 Ltr

ML18106A382
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/16/1998
From:	Bakken A, Bernard Thomas Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-98-003, LER-98-3, LR-N980124, NUDOCS 9803230502
Download: ML18106A382 (5)

Text

';*

~*

• 1. * **

OPS~G*- * . (

• .

"'""

~ .

Pu~li<' Service;i Electric and Gas Company, P.O. Box 236. Ha.n<?ock~ Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236

~. "' I ' * .

' ..-

Nuclear Business Unit

. \ . \ : ,~. ; J: .

• MAR 16 1998

.*;*.' .. ; ~ . .~

LR-N980124 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ' .. ; .

. *Doc;:ument. Control Desk .

• • - Washington, DC 20555

.- LER 272/98-003-00 * **

. SALEM GENERATING STATION - UNIT 1 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272

.. Gentlemen:

This Licensee Event Report entitled "Inadequate Surveillance Testing of Feedwater Isolation and P-10 Source Range Block" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 1OCFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

Sincerely, A. C. Bakken Ill General Manager -

Salem Operations Attachment BJT c Distribution LER File 3.7 9803230502 980316 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR The power is in your hands.

95--2168 REV. 6/94

I .

NRC FORM 366-- : -- --

14:961* .:. '; :*_,., ,-'. ;> '-_: ,, - -.*-u.s. N CLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104

I 'E.XPlRE!f 04130198 *~.' .' ..:_.*: , . ',, -' .... '

ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY

• -* .'1*:"' .. ~; INFORMATION COUECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSONS

' LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)_ \

BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTNATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH

• - -- . - .. .. IT-6 F33J,.U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY-COMMISSION; WASHINGTON, DC

-- (See r~~~rs~ tJ; required number of - 20555-0001, AND TO THE-:PAPERWORK REDUCTION *PROJECT *(3160-01041, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC

--:*

.*.*

-** ..  ;.. .. .**. *

• digits/characters for each block) 20603. . * ** 1. . . : * .11,* * ...:**-'*.

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET NUMBER 121 PAGE 131

. SALEM GENERATING .. ..

STATION UNIT 1 05000272 -.

1 OF4

• -*. ...- - *-* .. ..,,. *.*: .~ .*

--

.. ..- *-  :

. TITLE 141

• Inadequate Surveillance Testing of Feedwater Isolation and P-10 Source Range Block EVENT. DATE (5) LER NUMBER,(6). -REPORT* DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED 18)

MONTH, *,_:DAY.:

..

YEAR .YEAR

-

I SEQUENTIAL '

NUMBER

,. REVISION NUMBER MONTH -PAY: i *YEAR FACILITY NAME SALEM UNIT 2 DOCKET NUMBER 05000311 02 16 98 98 - 003 -- 00 . 03 16 98 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER OPERATING' THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT" TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: .!Check one or more) I 11 )

MODEiS)' i: ~ -. 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73(a)(2)(1) 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)

POWER 000 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 60. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71

-

20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50. 73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50. 73(a)(2)(v) Specify In Ab1tract below or In NRC Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 60.36(c)(2) 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

. NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Are* Code)

Brian J. Thomas, Licensing Engineer 609-339-2022 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 113)

~~=-~

.;.... . -i~

-:~

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE  ::::::::~ CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS TONPRDS

~:=:=~

'm

• • • ~

.........*.:*:-.. :-. :::-

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 114) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR XINO SUBMISSION IYES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). DATE (15)

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

In INPO OE 8636, "Inadequate SSPS Surveillance Testing," Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations identified a potential deficiency in the testing of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) logic for the Feedwater Isolation and P-10 Source Range Block circuitry. During the evaluation of OE 8636, on February 16, a review of the SSPS testing circuitry identified that a similar condition existed at Salem Units 1 and 2. As 4

• a result, the bi-monthly channel functional testing being performed to demonstrate compliance with Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.3.2.1.1 was determined to be inadequate.

The cause of this occurrence is attributed-to the inadequate development of the original surveillance testing procedures for SSPS logic testing. The SSPS logic functional testing procedures were revised and testing was satisfactorily completed prior to Salem Units 1 and 2 entering mode 4.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), any condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.-

NRC FORM 366 (4-961

NRC FORM 366A 14-96)

• LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (l:ER)

TEXT CONTINUATION

• U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1 I DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)

SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 y EAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER 2 OF 4 98 - 003 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) ( 17.) ** ,.

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westin~house -Press.urized.Water Reactor * *

• • *. !

• j ' * * ': ' ~ ' I ** ;

Reactor""Control*and Protection'*system (RCP) {JC/-}

• Energy-Industry Identification System (EllS) codes and component function identifier codes appear as

{ss/c.cc}.. . .";' *.'\:;.*.'fr.

fi  ;

I~~ . :~ L* *

.. * * . *"

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE At the time of occurrence, Salem Units 1 and 2 were in Mode 5.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE In INPO OE 8636, "Inadequate SSPS Surveillance Testing," Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations identified a potential deficiency in the testing of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS) logic for the Feedwater Isolation and P-10 Source Range Block circuitry. Due to the design of the SSPS testing circuitry (parallel input circuits), more than the minimum number of inputs required to initiate either the Feedwater Isolation or the P-10 Source Range Block are present at the SSPS logic cards during bi-monthly functional surveillance testing. Therefore the surveillance testing performed by Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations was not adequately demonstrating that all of the logic inputs were functioning properly.

In the case of the Feedwater Isolation logic, due to the test circuitry wiring configuration, three inputs would be present at all times to SSPS logic card A213 during testing. Since SSPS logic card A213 is essentially a 2-out-of-4 logic, having three inputs present at the input of the logic card at all times during the surveillance testing does not adequately test the 2-out-of-4 function. A failure of one of the inputs into the logic card could go undetected. Failure to detect the failure of one of the inputs to the logic card would mean that if a Feedwater Isolation was required as the result of either a high-high Steam Generator water level or a Safety Injection, Feedwater Isolation would not occur unless a Reactor Trip signal was present.

During the evaluation of OE 8636, on February 16, a review of the SSPS testing circuitry identified that a similar condition existed at Salem Units 1 and 2. As a result, the bi-monthly channel functional testing being performed to demonstrate compliance with Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification surveillance requirement 4.3.2.1.1 was determined to be inadequate. Since Salem Units 1 and 2 were in mode 5, the Feedwater Isolation and P1 O Source Range Block logic circuitry is not required to be operable in this mode. The SSPS logic functional testing procedures S1(2).IC-ST.SSP-0008(Q) and S1(2).IC-ST.SSP-0009(Q) were revised on February 16, to adequately test the above logic functions. Surveillance testing using the revised procedures was satisfactorily completed prior to Salem Units 1 and 2 entering mode 4.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

~

NRC FORM 366A 14-96)

• LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION

• U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME 11 I DOCKET NUMBER 121 LER NUMBER 161 PAGE 131 SALEM GENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER 3 OF 4 98 - 003 - 00 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) ( 111 ,.

CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE The cause* of this occurrence is attributed to the inadequate development of the original surveillance testing procedures for SSPS logictest,ing .

. -, . .*, .*- - - *

PRIOR SIMILAR OCCURRENCES A review of LERs for Salem. Units 1 and 2 issued in the last two years identified twenty-nine LERs (272/96-003, 272/96-004., 272/96.,005, 272/96-.006, 272/96-008, 272/96-016, 272/96-022, 272/96-023, 272/96-024, 272/96-029, 272/96-035, 272/96-039, 272/96-040, 272/97-001, 272/97-004, 272/97-005, 272/97-006, 272/97-008, 311/96-003, 311/96-005, 311/96-007, 311/96-010, 311/96-011, 311/96-013, 311/96-016, 311/97-001, 311/97-007, 311/97-011, and 311/97-018) that were a result of missed surveillances due to inadequate implementation of Technical Specification requirements. The identification of these programmatic issues resulted in the initiation of the Technical Specification Surveillance Improvement Program _(TSSIP) described in LER 311/95-008. The TSSIP should ensure that Technical Specification surveillance*

requirements are adequately implemented.

The issue identified in this LER was identified as a result of PSE&G's Operating Experience review program.

INPO OE 8636 was initiated by Catawba Nuclear Station to identify a deficiency in SSPS testing. This issue was identified by Catawba after consulting with McGuire Nuclear Station engineering personnel and consultation with the vendor (Westinghouse). Identification of this testing deficiency required an intricate level of knowledge of the internal configuration of the SSPS system.

Salem's TSSIP project had reviewed the SSPS logic testing procedures identified in this LER prior to the issuance of INPO OE 8636. The cause for the TSSIP review not identifying this issue is attributed to personnel error. The scope of the TSSIP project included surveillance procedure review to determine the possibility of masking test results by parallel circuits, paths, or bypasses. The individual performing the review of the SSPS logic testing procedures indicated that this review had been completed and no parallel path testing concerns were identified with the SSPS logic testing procedures. The individual that performed the review of the SSPS logic testing procedures is no longer working for PSE&G. This event was identified subsequent to the departure of this individual from PSE&G.

SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS Although the bi-monthly functional surveillance testing of the SSPS logic required by TS 4.3.2.1.1 was not being adequately performed for the Feedwater Isolation and P-10 Source Range Block logic, proper operation of the logic cards associated with these functions was being demonstrated during 18-month response time testing. Also, bi-monthly functional surveillance testing of the SSPS logic after revision of the surveillance testing procedures, to address the surveillance testing deficiencies, demonstrated that the logic cards were operating satisfactorily. Therefore the health and safety of the public were not affected.

NRC FORM 366A (4-95)

(4-96)

• NRC- FORM 3'6'6:A'*

• LICENSEE EVENT: REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION

• U$. NUCLEAR':REGULlATORY COMMISSION

• FACILITYiNAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER ~(2) LER NUMBER*i(6) PAGE(3)

SALEMGENERATING STATION UNIT 1 05000272 .YEAR I.

SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I"REVISION"

• NUMBBl.; ;. 4. OF 4 98 - 003 00 TEXT (If more space Is required~l use* additional copies of NRC Form 366A) ( 17)

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:* - ** ' * *

1. Surveillance test proeedures S1(2).IC-ST.SSP-0008(Q) and S1(2).IC-ST.SSP-0009(Q) were revised on February 16, 1998, to adequately test the Feedwater Isolation and P-10 Source Range Block logic

• -t: circuitry.: *:. - I * ~ .~. * , ; ** * *. *'.*

'2.

• Sury~illance testing using the-revised procedures was satisfactorily completed prior to Salem .Units 1 and

• .'

• 2 entering mode 4.

3. A lessons learned discussion will be conducted with the personnel completing the remaining TSSIP reviews. This lessons learned discussion will be completed by March 20, 1998.

4. A review of a sample of the remaining logic circuits with a memory latch (similar to the Feedwater Isolation and P-10 logic circuits) was performed to identify other parallel inputs into the SSPS logic cards. No other

. testing deficiencies were identified by this* review.

• NRC FORM 366A (4-95)