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{{#Wiki_filter:K) JIM MCKNIGHTUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDSWASHINGTON, DC 20555December 5, 1996NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 96-63: POTENTIAL SAFETY ISSUE REGARDING THESHIPMENT OF FISSILE MATERIAL
{{#Wiki_filter:K) JIM MCKNIGHT UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMMISSION
 
===OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS===
WASHINGTON, DC 20555 December 5, 1996 NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICE 96-63: POTENTIAL
 
SAFETY ISSUE REGARDING
 
THE SHIPMENT OF FISSILE MATERIAL


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensees authorized to possess special nuclearmaterial in unsealed quantities greater than a critical mass.
All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission
 
licensees
 
authorized
 
to possess special nuclear material in unsealed quantities
 
greater than a critical mass.


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice to alertaddressees to an issue with potential safety significance regarding shipments using the fissilematerial exemption provisions and general licenses. It is expected that recipients will review thisinformation for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similarproblems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
 
notice to alert addressees
 
to an issue with potential
 
safety significance
 
regarding
 
shipments
 
using the fissile material exemption
 
provisions
 
and general licenses.
 
It is expected that recipients
 
will review this information
 
for applicability
 
to their facilities
 
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.
 
However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this information
 
notice are not NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.Description
 
of Circumstances
 
An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential
 
situation
 
where one of the fissile material exemptions
 
in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality
 
safety if large amounts of an exempt concentration
 
of fissile material were to be transported
 
in the presence of a special moderating
 
material (i.e., beryllium).
 
A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to process weapons-usable
 
enriched uranium materials.
 
The waste product, a uranium-beryllium
 
filtercake, met the fissile exemption
 
provisions
 
in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence of beryllium
 
in significant
 
quantities
 
in NRC-regulated
 
fissile exempt shipments
 
is extraordinary, and was not considered
 
in the development
 
of the fissile exemptions
 
in the regulations.
 
NRC has reviewed and verified the licensee's
 
calculations, and has concluded
 
that the current regulations
 
need to be revised to preclude criticality
 
in fissile exempt shipments
 
made under 10 CFR 71.53, and fissile shipments
 
made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. This information
 
notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of this potential
 
safety issue, while the regulatory
 
revisions
 
are made.Discussion
 
The licensee proposed to employ the provision
 
in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision
 
in the U.S. Department
 
of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).
 
J//1 961204021 on jl4Pqt PDR ETE OO~tc 99 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements
 
in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e., the additional
 
requirements
 
placed on fissile packages and shipments
 
to preclude criticality), provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material in any 10-liter (610-cubic-inch)
volume. The fissile exemptions
 
appearing
 
in 10 CFR 71.53 are assumed to provide inherent criticality
 
control for all practical
 
cases in which fissile materials exist at or below the applicable
 
regulatory
 
limits (i.e., independent
 
calculations
 
would generally not be expected nor required).
 
Consequently, the fissile exemptions
 
generally
 
do not place limits on the types of moderating
 
or reflecting
 
material present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport
 
index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality
 
control.Further, the fissile material exemptions
 
and general license provisions
 
allow any licensee to make shipments
 
without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic
 
computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium
 
oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be demonstrated
 
to provide adequate nuclear criticality
 
safety. Because the current regulations
 
would allow the possibility
 
of criticality
 
in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no assurance
 
that such shipments
 
will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address exclusion
 
of beryllium
 
and other special moderating
 
material (e.g., deuterium
 
and graphite)
in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be transported
 
in a single consignment.
 
NRC has contacted
 
the U.S. Department
 
of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating
 
materials
 
in question.NRC and DOT are coordinating
 
the revisions
 
to their respective
 
regulations.
 
NRC notes that very few licensees
 
are involved in the shipment of fissile materials
 
with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium.
 
However, for those licensees
 
that are involved in such shipments, it is important
 
that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality
 
safety is provided where fissile materials
 
are transported
 
with materials
 
known or expected to have moderating
 
properties
 
greater than water. As demonstrated
 
by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions
 
cannot be presumed, without independent
 
analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality
 
in all cases.
 
I):K,)IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 This information
 
notice requires no specific action nor written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the individual
 
listed below, or the appropriate
 
NRC regional office.Charles J. Haighney, Actirt Dire Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
 
Technical
 
contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exe@nrc.gov
 
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information
 
Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information
 
Notices o k')~ Gu A 7- Attachment
 
I IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Page 1 of I LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NMSS INFORMATION
 
NOTICES Info rmation Notice No.Date of Issuance Subject Issued to 96-57 96-54 96-53 Incident-Reporting
 
Require-ments Involving
 
Intakes, During a 24-Hour Period that May Cause a Total Effective
 
===Dose Equivalent===
in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)Vulnerability
 
of Stainless Steel to Corrosion
 
===When Sensitized===
Retrofit to Amersham 660 Posilock Radiography
 
Camera to Correct Incon-sistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility
 
Cracked Insertion
 
Rods on Troxler Model 3400 Series Portable Moisture Density Gauges Residual Contamination
 
Remaining
 
in Krypton-85 Handling System After Venting Recordkeeping, Decommis-sioning Notifications
 
for Disposals
 
of Radioactive
 
Waste by Land Burial Authorized
 
Under Former 10 CFR 20.304, 20.302, and Current 20.2002 10/30/96 10117/96 10/15/96 09/26/96 09/11/96 08/19196 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission
 
licensees All material licensees All industrial
 
radiography
 
licensees All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission
 
portable gauge licensees
 
and vendors All material licensees All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission
 
licensees 96-52 96-51 96-47 v>Attachment
 
2 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION
 
NOTICES Information
 
Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 96-62 96-61 96-60 96-59 96-58 Potential
 
Failure of the Instantaneous
 
Trip Function of General Electric RMS-9 Programmers
 
Failure of a Main Steam Safety Valve to Reseat Caused by an Improperly
 
Installed
 
Release Nut Potential
 
Common-Mode
 
Post-Accident Failure of Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers
 
Potential
 
Degradation
 
of Post Loss-of-Coolant
 
Recirculation
 
Capability
 
as a Result of Debris RCP Seal Replacement
 
with Pump on Backseat Incident-Reporting
 
Require-ments Involving
 
Intakes, During a 24-Hour Period That May Cause a Total Effective
 
===Dose Equivalent===
in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rems)11/20/96 11/20/96 11/14/96 10/30/96 10/30/96 10/29/96 All holders of OLs and CPs for nuclear power plants All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized-water
 
reactors All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
Commission
 
licensees 96-57 OL = Operating
 
License CP = Construction
 
Permit
 
K>IN 96-63 v2 December 5, 1996 This information
 
notice requires no specific action nor written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the individual
 
listed below, or the appropriate
 
NRC regional office.ChaSes J. Haugfey Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
 
Technical
 
contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exeenrc.gov
 
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information
 
Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information
 
Notices 96-63.IN*See Previous Concurrence.
 
OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* l c SFPO* I c NRR/OECB*
I c OGC* lc TEditor I NAME RLewis:LMG
 
EEaston SShankman
 
AEChaffee
 
ENJenson EKraus*DATE 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 11/25/96 11/25/96 OFC lIMOB l I SFP t I I l- I NAME KRamsey CJH_ ney DATE 1/27/96 W215196 Ia; v4 i _ _C_ CO E E CO E N L S R O C C =COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NE) CQPT
 
IN 96-##KJ i2 October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport
 
index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality
 
control. Further, the fissile material exemptions
 
and general license provisions
 
allow any licensee to make shipments
 
without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic
 
computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium
 
oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be demonstrated
 
to provide adequate nuclear criticality
 
safety. Because the current regulations
 
would allow the possibility
 
of criticality
 
in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no assurance
 
that such shipments
 
will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address exclusion
 
of beryllium
 
and other special moderating
 
material (e.g., deuterium
 
and graphite)
in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be transported
 
in a single consignment.
 
NRC has contacted
 
the U.S. Department
 
of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating
 
materials
 
in question.
 
NRC and DOT are coordinating
 
the revisions
 
to their respective
 
regulations.
 
NRC notes that very few licensees
 
are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-with
 
beryllium, graphite, or deuterium.
 
However, for those licensees
 
that are involved in such shipments, it is important
 
that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality
 
safety is provided where fissile materials
 
are transported
 
with materials
 
known or expected to have moderating
 
properties
 
greater than water. As demonstrated
 
by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions
 
cannot be presumed, without independent
 
analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality
 
in all cases.This information
 
notice requires no specific action nor written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the individual
 
listed below, or the appropriate
 
NRC regional office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
 
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information
 
Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information
 
Notices Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exe@nrc.gov
 
S:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN
 
See Previous Concurrence.
 
OFC SFPON* c SFPO l c SFPO
 
* c NRR/OECBh*
I c OGCN lc TEditor I NAME RLewis:LMG
 
EEaston SShankman
 
AEChaffee
 
ENJenson EKraus *DATE I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 1 11/25/96 1 11/25/96 I--OFC IMOB I SFP lL,/ I l _NAME KRamseyeK
 
CJHa_ _ _DATE 1I9 196 12- ?79 _6 _,,___. __ _ ________C -COVER E = COVER & LNULUbUKIt
 
N = Nu iurO
 
>-considerations
 
and shipping experience
 
indicate that the criticality
 
of fissile exempt packages is not an immediate
 
threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibility
 
of criticality
 
in fissile exempt shipments
 
has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to address the possible inclusion
 
of beryllium
 
and other special moderating
 
material (e.g., deuterium
 
and graphite)
in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material which can be transported
 
in a single consignment.
 
NRC staff has also contacted
 
the Department
 
of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, as DOT regulations
 
contain a parallel provision
 
to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).NRC and DOT are coordinating
 
the revisions
 
to their respective
 
regulations.
 
In practice, operating
 
and administrative
 
limits and procedures
 
should prevent the collection
 
of fissile materials
 
in amounts or geometries
 
which could achieve criticality
 
as a result of any single change in the conditions
 
necessary
 
for criticality
 
safety. Nevertheless, NRC notes that until the expedited
 
regulatory
 
revisions
 
are made, good practice would be for licensees
 
to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials
 
with materials
 
known or expected to have moderating
 
properties
 
greater than water; or (2)single consignments
 
of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or 180 grams of other fissile radionuclides.
 
As demonstrated
 
by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions
 
cannot be presumed, without independent
 
analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality
 
in all cases.This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the technical
 
contact listed below, or the appropriate
 
NRC Regional Office.William D. Travers, Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
 
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information
 
Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information
 
Notices Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8527 S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN
 
See Previous Concurrence.
 
OFC lSFPO l -SFPO l f-0 e-O NRR/OECB l OGC l TEDITOR I NAME RLeg -sAG EEas aman b affee WReamer EKraus lATVS I J.JIIAIg -I -&.10 & I 0 I la;: I a lIda I I , -I I /on LO#% IV. I(V U l TO'I 1J1_IU 1 v IU Iva % I I I Ef %I OFC DWM I IMOB l SFPO I SFP NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney
 
WDTravers DATE I/ /96 / /96 / /96 I /96 l C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE
 
N = NO COPY 2 IN 96-##/ H October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport
 
index (see §71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality
 
control. Further, the fissile material exemptions
 
and general license provisions
 
allow any licensee to make shipments
 
without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic
 
computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium
 
oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be demonstrated
 
to provide adequate nuclear criticality
 
safety. Because the current regulations
 
would allow the possibility
 
of criticality
 
in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no assurance
 
that such shipments
 
will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion
 
of beryllium
 
and other special moderating
 
material (e.g., deuterium
 
and graphite)
in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material which can be transported
 
in a single consignment.
 
NRC staff has contacted
 
the U.S. Department
 
of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating
 
materials
 
in question.
 
NRC and DOT are coordinating
 
the revisions
 
to their respective
 
regulations.
 
NRC notes very few licensees
 
are involved in the shipment of fissile materials
 
with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium.
 
However, for those licensees
 
that are involved in such shipments, it is important
 
that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality
 
safety is provided where fissile materials
 
are transported
 
with materials
 
known or expected to have moderating
 
properties
 
greater than water. As demonstrated
 
by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions
 
cannot be presumed, without independent
 
analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality
 
in all cases.This information
 
notice requires no specific action or written response.
 
If you have any questions
 
about the information
 
in this notice, please contact the individual
 
listed below, or the appropriate
 
NRC Regional Office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
 
Attachments:
1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information
 
Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information
 
Notices Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exe@nrc.gov
 
S:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN


==Description of Circumstances==
*See Previous Concurrence.
An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential situation where one of the fissile materialexemptions in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality safety if large amountsof an exempt concentration of fissile material were to be transported in the presence of a specialmoderating material (i.e., beryllium). A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to processweapons-usable enriched uranium materials. The waste product, a uranium-beryllium filtercake,met the fissile exemption provisions in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence ofberyllium in significant quantities in NRC-regulated fissile exempt shipments is extraordinary, andwas not considered in the development of the fissile exemptions in the regulations. NRC hasreviewed and verified the licensee's calculations, and has concluded that the current regulationsneed to be revised to preclude criticality in fissile exempt shipments made under 10 CFR 71.53,and fissile shipments made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. Thisinformation notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of thispotential safety issue, while the regulatory revisions are made.DiscussionThe licensee proposed to employ the provision in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision in theU.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).J//1961204021 on jl4PqtPDR ETE OO~tc 99 IN 96-63December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e.,the additional requirements placed on fissile packages and shipments to preclude criticality),provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material inany 10-liter (610-cubic-inch) volume. The fissile exemptions appearing in 10 CFR 71.53 areassumed to provide inherent criticality control for all practical cases in which fissile materialsexist at or below the applicable regulatory limits (i.e., independent calculations would generallynot be expected nor required). Consequently, the fissile exemptions generally do not place limitson the types of moderating or reflecting material present in fissile exempt packages, nor thenumber of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do notrequire that a transport index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control.Further, the fissile material exemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee tomake shipments without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages, asloaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the current regulationswould allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is noassurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to addressexclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g., deuterium and graphite) in theshipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can betransported in a single consignment.NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is ashipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials in question.NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials with beryllium,graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in such shipments, it isimportant that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality safety is provided wherefissile materials are transported with materials known or expected to have moderating propertiesgreater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile materialexemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality inall cases.


I):K,)IN 96-63December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or theappropriate NRC regional office.Charles J. Haighney, Actirt DireSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsTechnical contact:Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.govAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Noticeso k')~ Gu A 7- Attachment IIN 96-63December 5, 1996Page 1 of ILIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNMSS INFORMATION NOTICESInformationNotice No.Date ofIssuanceSubjectIssued to96-5796-5496-53Incident-Reporting Require-ments Involving Intakes,During a 24-Hour Periodthat May Cause a TotalEffective Dose Equivalentin Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)Vulnerability of StainlessSteel to Corrosion WhenSensitizedRetrofit to Amersham 660Posilock RadiographyCamera to Correct Incon-sistency in 10 CFR Part 34CompatibilityCracked Insertion Rodson Troxler Model 3400Series Portable MoistureDensity GaugesResidual ContaminationRemaining in Krypton-85Handling System AfterVentingRecordkeeping, Decommis-sioning Notifications forDisposals of RadioactiveWaste by Land BurialAuthorized Under Former10 CFR 20.304, 20.302,and Current 20.200210/30/9610117/9610/15/9609/26/9609/11/9608/19196All U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licenseesAll material licenseesAll industrial radiographylicenseesAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission portable gaugelicensees and vendorsAll material licenseesAll U.S. Nuclear RegulatoryCommission licensees96-5296-5196-47 v>Attachment 2IN 96-63December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to96-6296-6196-6096-5996-58Potential Failure of theInstantaneous Trip Functionof General Electric RMS-9ProgrammersFailure of a Main Steam SafetyValve to Reseat Caused by anImproperly Installed ReleaseNutPotential Common-Mode Post-Accident Failure of ResidualHeat Removal Heat ExchangersPotential Degradation ofPost Loss-of-CoolantRecirculation Capabilityas a Result of DebrisRCP Seal Replacement withPump on BackseatIncident-Reporting Require-ments Involving Intakes,During a 24-Hour PeriodThat May Cause a TotalEffective Dose Equivalentin Excess of 0.05 Sv(5 rems)11/20/9611/20/9611/14/9610/30/9610/30/9610/29/96All holders of OLsand CPs for nuclearpower plantsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for nuclear powerreactorsAll holders of OLs orCPs for pressurized-waterreactorsAll U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commissionlicensees96-57OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
OPP3 OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* lc SFPO* I c NRR/OECB*
I c OG TE TOR I NAME RLewis:LMG


K>IN 96-63v2 December 5, 1996 This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, or theappropriate NRC regional office.ChaSes J. HaugfeyCharles J. Haughney, Acting DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsTechnical contact:Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exeenrc.govAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information Notices96-63.IN*See Previous Concurrence.OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* l c SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OGC* lc TEditor INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus*DATE10/10/9610/10/9610/10/9610/10/9611/25/9611/25/96OFC lIMOB l I SFP t I I l- INAME KRamsey CJH_ neyDATE 1/27/96 W215196 Ia; v4 i _ _C_ CO E E CO E N L S R O CC =COVERE = COVER & ENCLOSUREN = NE) CQPT
EEaston SShankman


IN 96-##KJ i2 October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can beshipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see 10CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile materialexemptions and general license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments withoutfirst seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages,as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the currentregulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and sincethere is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10CFR Part 71 to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount offissile exempt material that can be transported in a single consignment.NRC has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOEis a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials inquestion. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes that very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-withberyllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in suchshipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticalitysafety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expectedto have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in thiscase, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independentanalysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action nor written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, orthe appropriate NRC regional office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.govS:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.OFC SFPON* c SFPO l c SFPO
AEChaffee


* c NRR/OECBh* I c OGCN lc TEditor INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee ENJenson EKraus *DATE I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 1 11/25/96 1 11/25/96I--OFC IMOB I SFP lL,/ I l _NAME KRamseyeK CJHa_ _ _DATE 1I9 196 12- ?79 _6 _,,___. __ _ ________C -COVERE = COVER & LNULUbUKItN = Nu iurO
_____enson


>-considerations and shipping experience indicate that the criticality of fissile exemptpackages is not an immediate threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibilityof criticality in fissile exempt shipments has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, toaddress the possible inclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material (e.g.,deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount offissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.NRC staff has also contacted the Department of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, asDOT regulations contain a parallel provision to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.In practice, operating and administrative limits and procedures should prevent thecollection of fissile materials in amounts or geometries which could achieve criticality as aresult of any single change in the conditions necessary for criticality safety. Nevertheless,NRC notes that until the expedited regulatory revisions are made, good practice would befor licensees to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials withmaterials known or expected to have moderating properties greater than water; or (2)single consignments of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or180 grams of other fissile radionuclides. As demonstrated by the licensee in this case, theexisting fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independent analysis, topreclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listedbelow, or the appropriate NRC Regional Office.William D. Travers, DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8527S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN See Previous Concurrence.OFC lSFPO l -SFPO l f-0 e-O NRR/OECB l OGC l TEDITOR INAME RLeg -sAG EEas aman b affee WReamer EKrauslATVS I J.JIIAIg -I -&.10 & I 0 I la;: I a lIda I I , -I I /onLO#% IV. I(V U l TO'I 1J1_IU 1 v IU Iva % I I I Ef %IOFC DWM I IMOB l SFPO I SFPNAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTraversDATE I/ /96 / /96 / /96 I /96 lC = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NO COPY2 IN 96-##/ H October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport index (see §71.4) beassigned to packages for criticality control. Further, the fissile material exemptions andgeneral license provisions allow any licensee to make shipments without first seeking NRCapproval.A fairly realistic computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium oxide waste packages,as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not bedemonstrated to provide adequate nuclear criticality safety. Because the currentregulations would allow the possibility of criticality in fissile exempt shipments, and sincethere is no assurance that such shipments will not occur, NRC intends to revise10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion of beryllium and other special moderating material(e.g., deuterium and graphite) in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amountof fissile exempt material which can be transported in a single consignment.NRC staff has contacted the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating materials inquestion. NRC and DOT are coordinating the revisions to their respective regulations.NRC notes very few licensees are involved in the shipment of fissile materials withberyllium, graphite, or deuterium. However, for those licensees that are involved in suchshipments, it is important that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticalitysafety is provided where fissile materials are transported with materials known or expectedto have moderating properties greater than water. As demonstrated by the licensee in thiscase, the existing fissile material exemptions cannot be presumed, without independentanalysis, to preclude nuclear criticality in all cases.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If you have anyquestions about the information in this notice, please contact the individual listed below, orthe appropriate NRC Regional Office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting DirectorSpent Fuel Project OfficeOffice of Nuclear Material Safetyand SafeguardsAttachments:1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information Notices2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information NoticesContact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS(301) 415-8520e-mail: exe@nrc.govS:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN *See Previous Concurrence. OPP3OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* lc SFPO* I c NRR/OECB* I c OG TE TOR INAME RLewis:LMG EEaston SShankman AEChaffee _____enson EKrausDATE I /196 / /96 1 1/96 I /196 1 196 I /196OFC DWM I IMOB l FlO I Sl FPO I jINAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney WDTraversDATE I/ /96 I /96 1 /196 / /96 J .I.. ==_C = COVERE = COVER & ENCLOSUREN = NU COPlY
EKraus DATE I /196 / /96 1 1/96 I /196 1 196 I /196 OFC DWM I IMOB l FlO I Sl FPO I jI NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney


}}
WDTravers DATE I/ /96 I /96 1 /196 / /96 J .I.. ==_C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NU COPlY}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 14:08, 31 August 2018

Potential Safety Issue Regarding the Shipment of Fissile Material
ML031050508
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/06/1996
From: Haughney C J
NRC/NMSS/SFPO
To:
References
IN-96-063, NUDOCS 9612040215
Download: ML031050508 (9)
v • d • e


K) JIM MCKNIGHT UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555 December 5, 1996 NRC INFORMATION

NOTICE 96-63: POTENTIAL

SAFETY ISSUE REGARDING

THE SHIPMENT OF FISSILE MATERIAL

Addressees

All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

licensees

authorized

to possess special nuclear material in unsealed quantities

greater than a critical mass.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to alert addressees

to an issue with potential

safety significance

regarding

shipments

using the fissile material exemption

provisions

and general licenses.

It is expected that recipients

will review this information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions

contained

in this information

notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action nor written response is required.Description

of Circumstances

An NRC licensee recently informed NRC of a potential

situation

where one of the fissile material exemptions

in 10 CFR 71.53 would not have provided adequate criticality

safety if large amounts of an exempt concentration

of fissile material were to be transported

in the presence of a special moderating

material (i.e., beryllium).

A recent contract was awarded to the licensee to process weapons-usable

enriched uranium materials.

The waste product, a uranium-beryllium

filtercake, met the fissile exemption

provisions

in 10 CFR 71.53 and 49 CFR 173.453. The presence of beryllium

in significant

quantities

in NRC-regulated

fissile exempt shipments

is extraordinary, and was not considered

in the development

of the fissile exemptions

in the regulations.

NRC has reviewed and verified the licensee's

calculations, and has concluded

that the current regulations

need to be revised to preclude criticality

in fissile exempt shipments

made under 10 CFR 71.53, and fissile shipments

made underthe general licenses in 10 CFR 71.18 and 10 CFR 71.22. This information

notice is being issued to provide additional, timely notice, to licensees, of this potential

safety issue, while the regulatory

revisions

are made.Discussion

The licensee proposed to employ the provision

in 10 CFR 71.53(d), or the parallel provision

in the U.S. Department

of Transportation (DOT) regulations, 49 CFR 173.453(d).

J//1 961204021 on jl4Pqt PDR ETE OO~tc 99 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Section 71.53(d) exempts fissile material from the requirements

in 10 CFR 71.55 and 71.59 (i.e., the additional

requirements

placed on fissile packages and shipments

to preclude criticality), provided the package does not contain more than 5 grams (0.18 ounces) of fissile material in any 10-liter (610-cubic-inch)

volume. The fissile exemptions

appearing

in 10 CFR 71.53 are assumed to provide inherent criticality

control for all practical

cases in which fissile materials exist at or below the applicable

regulatory

limits (i.e., independent

calculations

would generally not be expected nor required).

Consequently, the fissile exemptions

generally

do not place limits on the types of moderating

or reflecting

material present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport

index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality

control.Further, the fissile material exemptions

and general license provisions

allow any licensee to make shipments

without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic

computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium

oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be demonstrated

to provide adequate nuclear criticality

safety. Because the current regulations

would allow the possibility

of criticality

in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no assurance

that such shipments

will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address exclusion

of beryllium

and other special moderating

material (e.g., deuterium

and graphite)

in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be transported

in a single consignment.

NRC has contacted

the U.S. Department

of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating

materials

in question.NRC and DOT are coordinating

the revisions

to their respective

regulations.

NRC notes that very few licensees

are involved in the shipment of fissile materials

with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium.

However, for those licensees

that are involved in such shipments, it is important

that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality

safety is provided where fissile materials

are transported

with materials

known or expected to have moderating

properties

greater than water. As demonstrated

by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions

cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality

in all cases.

I):K,)IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 This information

notice requires no specific action nor written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the individual

listed below, or the appropriate

NRC regional office.Charles J. Haighney, Actirt Dire Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Technical

contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information

Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information

Notices o k')~ Gu A 7- Attachment

I IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 Page 1 of I LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NMSS INFORMATION

NOTICES Info rmation Notice No.Date of Issuance Subject Issued to 96-57 96-54 96-53 Incident-Reporting

Require-ments Involving

Intakes, During a 24-Hour Period that May Cause a Total Effective

Dose Equivalent

in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rem)Vulnerability

of Stainless Steel to Corrosion

When Sensitized

Retrofit to Amersham 660 Posilock Radiography

Camera to Correct Incon-sistency in 10 CFR Part 34 Compatibility

Cracked Insertion

Rods on Troxler Model 3400 Series Portable Moisture Density Gauges Residual Contamination

Remaining

in Krypton-85 Handling System After Venting Recordkeeping, Decommis-sioning Notifications

for Disposals

of Radioactive

Waste by Land Burial Authorized

Under Former 10 CFR 20.304, 20.302, and Current 20.2002 10/30/96 10117/96 10/15/96 09/26/96 09/11/96 08/19196 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

licensees All material licensees All industrial

radiography

licensees All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

portable gauge licensees

and vendors All material licensees All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

licensees 96-52 96-51 96-47 v>Attachment

2 IN 96-63 December 5, 1996 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED NRC INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to 96-62 96-61 96-60 96-59 96-58 Potential

Failure of the Instantaneous

Trip Function of General Electric RMS-9 Programmers

Failure of a Main Steam Safety Valve to Reseat Caused by an Improperly

Installed

Release Nut Potential

Common-Mode

Post-Accident Failure of Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers

Potential

Degradation

of Post Loss-of-Coolant

Recirculation

Capability

as a Result of Debris RCP Seal Replacement

with Pump on Backseat Incident-Reporting

Require-ments Involving

Intakes, During a 24-Hour Period That May Cause a Total Effective

Dose Equivalent

in Excess of 0.05 Sv (5 rems)11/20/96 11/20/96 11/14/96 10/30/96 10/30/96 10/29/96 All holders of OLs and CPs for nuclear power plants All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for nuclear power reactors All holders of OLs or CPs for pressurized-water

reactors All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission

licensees 96-57 OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit

K>IN 96-63 v2 December 5, 1996 This information

notice requires no specific action nor written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the individual

listed below, or the appropriate

NRC regional office.ChaSes J. Haugfey Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Technical

contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exeenrc.gov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information

Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information

Notices 96-63.IN*See Previous Concurrence.

OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* l c SFPO* I c NRR/OECB*

I c OGC* lc TEditor I NAME RLewis:LMG

EEaston SShankman

AEChaffee

ENJenson EKraus*DATE 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 10/10/96 11/25/96 11/25/96 OFC lIMOB l I SFP t I I l- I NAME KRamsey CJH_ ney DATE 1/27/96 W215196 Ia; v4 i _ _C_ CO E E CO E N L S R O C C =COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NE) CQPT

IN 96-##KJ i2 October ##, 1996 present in fissile exempt packages, nor the number of fissile exempt packages that can be shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport

index (see 10 CFR 71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality

control. Further, the fissile material exemptions

and general license provisions

allow any licensee to make shipments

without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic

computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium

oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be demonstrated

to provide adequate nuclear criticality

safety. Because the current regulations

would allow the possibility

of criticality

in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no assurance

that such shipments

will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71 to address exclusion

of beryllium

and other special moderating

material (e.g., deuterium

and graphite)

in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material that can be transported

in a single consignment.

NRC has contacted

the U.S. Department

of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue. DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating

materials

in question.

NRC and DOT are coordinating

the revisions

to their respective

regulations.

NRC notes that very few licensees

are involved in the shipment of fissile materials-with

beryllium, graphite, or deuterium.

However, for those licensees

that are involved in such shipments, it is important

that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality

safety is provided where fissile materials

are transported

with materials

known or expected to have moderating

properties

greater than water. As demonstrated

by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions

cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality

in all cases.This information

notice requires no specific action nor written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the individual

listed below, or the appropriate

NRC regional office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information

Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information

Notices Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

S:WPROJRXL1FIZ.IN

See Previous Concurrence.

OFC SFPON* c SFPO l c SFPO

  • c NRR/OECBh*

I c OGCN lc TEditor I NAME RLewis:LMG

EEaston SShankman

AEChaffee

ENJenson EKraus *DATE I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 I 10/10/96 1 11/25/96 1 11/25/96 I--OFC IMOB I SFP lL,/ I l _NAME KRamseyeK

CJHa_ _ _DATE 1I9 196 12- ?79 _6 _,,___. __ _ ________C -COVER E = COVER & LNULUbUKIt

N = Nu iurO

>-considerations

and shipping experience

indicate that the criticality

of fissile exempt packages is not an immediate

threat to worker and public health and safety, the possibility

of criticality

in fissile exempt shipments

has prompted NRC to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to address the possible inclusion

of beryllium

and other special moderating

material (e.g., deuterium

and graphite)

in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material which can be transported

in a single consignment.

NRC staff has also contacted

the Department

of Transportation (DOT) on this issue, as DOT regulations

contain a parallel provision

to 10 CFR 71.53 (i.e., 49 CFR 173.453).NRC and DOT are coordinating

the revisions

to their respective

regulations.

In practice, operating

and administrative

limits and procedures

should prevent the collection

of fissile materials

in amounts or geometries

which could achieve criticality

as a result of any single change in the conditions

necessary

for criticality

safety. Nevertheless, NRC notes that until the expedited

regulatory

revisions

are made, good practice would be for licensees

to exercise caution in deciding whether to ship: (1) fissile materials

with materials

known or expected to have moderating

properties

greater than water; or (2)single consignments

of fissile exempt packages in excess of 290 grams of uranium-235 or 180 grams of other fissile radionuclides.

As demonstrated

by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions

cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality

in all cases.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the technical

contact listed below, or the appropriate

NRC Regional Office.William D. Travers, Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information

Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information

Notices Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8527 S:IPROJIRXLFIZ.IN

See Previous Concurrence.

OFC lSFPO l -SFPO l f-0 e-O NRR/OECB l OGC l TEDITOR I NAME RLeg -sAG EEas aman b affee WReamer EKraus lATVS I J.JIIAIg -I -&.10 & I 0 I la;: I a lIda I I , -I I /on LO#% IV. I(V U l TO'I 1J1_IU 1 v IU Iva % I I I Ef %I OFC DWM I IMOB l SFPO I SFP NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney

WDTravers DATE I/ /96 / /96 / /96 I /96 l C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE

N = NO COPY 2 IN 96-##/ H October ##, 1996 shipped in a single consignment, and do not require that a transport

index (see §71.4) be assigned to packages for criticality

control. Further, the fissile material exemptions

and general license provisions

allow any licensee to make shipments

without first seeking NRC approval.A fairly realistic

computer model of the enriched uranium-beryllium

oxide waste packages, as loaded for shipment into a sea-land container, and at 0.5 grams per liter, could not be demonstrated

to provide adequate nuclear criticality

safety. Because the current regulations

would allow the possibility

of criticality

in fissile exempt shipments, and since there is no assurance

that such shipments

will not occur, NRC intends to revise 10 CFR Part 71, to address exclusion

of beryllium

and other special moderating

material (e.g., deuterium

and graphite)

in the shipment of fissile materials, and to limit the amount of fissile exempt material which can be transported

in a single consignment.

NRC staff has contacted

the U.S. Department

of Energy (DOE) and the DOT on this issue.DOE is a shipper of fissile material, which could include the special moderating

materials

in question.

NRC and DOT are coordinating

the revisions

to their respective

regulations.

NRC notes very few licensees

are involved in the shipment of fissile materials

with beryllium, graphite, or deuterium.

However, for those licensees

that are involved in such shipments, it is important

that programs be assessed to ensure that adequate criticality

safety is provided where fissile materials

are transported

with materials

known or expected to have moderating

properties

greater than water. As demonstrated

by the licensee in this case, the existing fissile material exemptions

cannot be presumed, without independent

analysis, to preclude nuclear criticality

in all cases.This information

notice requires no specific action or written response.

If you have any questions

about the information

in this notice, please contact the individual

listed below, or the appropriate

NRC Regional Office.Charles J. Haughney, Acting Director Spent Fuel Project Office Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS Information

Notices 2. List of Recently Issued NRR Information

Notices Contact: Earl P. Easton, NMSS (301) 415-8520 e-mail: exe@nrc.gov

S:IPROJIRXLIFIZ.IN

  • See Previous Concurrence.

OPP3 OFC SFPO* I c SFPO* lc SFPO* I c NRR/OECB*

I c OG TE TOR I NAME RLewis:LMG

EEaston SShankman

AEChaffee

_____enson

EKraus DATE I /196 / /96 1 1/96 I /196 1 196 I /196 OFC DWM I IMOB l FlO I Sl FPO I jI NAME RJohnson KRamsey CJHaughney

WDTravers DATE I/ /96 I /96 1 /196 / /96 J .I.. ==_C = COVER E = COVER & ENCLOSURE N = NU COPlY


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