Information Notice 1986-50, Inadequate Testing to Detect Failures of Safety-Related Pneumatic Components or Systems: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
Line 14: Line 14:
| page count = 4
| page count = 4
}}
}}
{{#Wiki_filter:ORIGINAL SSINS No.: 6835IN 86-50UNITED STATES.NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENTWASHINGTON,,D.C. 20555June 18, 1986IE INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 86-50: INADEQUATE TESTING TO-DETECT FAILURES OFSAFETY-RELATED PNEUMATIC COMPONENTS ORSYSTEMS
{{#Wiki_filter:ORIGINAL SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-50 UNITED STATES.NUCLEAR REGULATORY
 
COMMISSION
 
OFFICE OF INSPECTION
 
===AND ENFORCEMENT===
WASHINGTON,,D.C.
 
20555 June 18, 1986 IE INFORMATION
 
NOTICE NO. 86-50: INADEQUATE
 
TESTING TO-DETECT
 
FAILURES OF SAFETY-RELATED
 
PNEUMATIC
 
COMPONENTS
 
OR SYSTEMS


==Addressees==
==Addressees==
:All nuclear power reactor facilities holding an operating license (OL) or aconstruction permit (CP).
:
All nuclear power reactor facilities
 
holding an operating
 
license (OL) or a construction
 
permit (CP).


==Purpose==
==Purpose==
:This notice is being provided to alert recipients to a potentially significantproblem pertaining to inadequate testing practice relating to air operatedvalves. The NRC expects that recipients will review this notice for applica-bility to their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this notice donot constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or writtenresponse is required.Past Related Correspondence:IE Information Notice No. 82-25, "Failures of Hiller Actuators UponGradual Loss of Air Pressure," July 20, 1982IE Information Notice No. 85-35,- '.Failure of Air Check Valves to Seat,"April 30, 1985IE Information Notice No. 85-84, "Inadequate Inservice Testing of MainSteam Isolation Valves," October 30, 1985IE Information Notice No. 85-94, 'Potential for Loss of Minimum FlowPaths Leading to ECCS Pump Damage During a LOCA," December 13, 1985
: This notice is being provided to alert recipients
 
to a potentially
 
significant
 
problem pertaining
 
to inadequate
 
testing practice relating to air operated valves. The NRC expects that recipients
 
will review this notice for applica-bility to their facilities.
 
However, suggestions
 
contained
 
in this notice do not constitute
 
NRC requirements;  
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Past Related Correspondence:
IE Information
 
Notice No. 82-25, "Failures
 
of Hiller Actuators
 
Upon Gradual Loss of Air Pressure," July 20, 1982 IE Information
 
Notice No. 85-35,- '.Failure
 
of Air Check Valves to Seat," April 30, 1985 IE Information
 
Notice No. 85-84, "Inadequate
 
Inservice
 
Testing of Main Steam Isolation
 
Valves," October 30, 1985 IE Information
 
Notice No. 85-94, 'Potential
 
for Loss of Minimum Flow Paths Leading to ECCS Pump Damage During a LOCA," December 13, 1985 Description
 
of Circumstances:
The NRC has reported previously
 
on instances
 
where safety-related
 
equipment failed to operate as intended when non-safety-related
 
pneumatic
 
systems were unavailable (IE INs 82-25 and 85-35). In these situations, main steam isola-tion valves and containment
 
isolation
 
valves failed to operate properly when control air pressure decreased
 
slowly rather than rapidly as would be expected for an air line break. In the case of IN 85-35, the fault was exposed by a loss of offsite power test, and in the case of IN 82-25, the fault was exposed by a preoperational
 
test designed .to simulate a slow air leak. In both cases, 8606160044 IN 86-50 June 18, 1986 the components
 
in question--an
 
accumulator
 
isolation
 
check valve (IN 85-35) and pneumatic
 
selector valves (IN 82-25)--were
 
not tested adequately.
 
Several recent events have indicated
 
continuing
 
problems of similar nature. These events are discussed
 
below.On February 13, 1986, the licensee at Turkey Point Unit 3 first reported to tht NRC a concern that the component
 
cooling water (CCW) system might fail to meet its functional
 
requirements
 
for a design-basis
 
accident.
 
One part of the concern involved the CCW heat exchanger
 
outlet control valve. This valve regulates
 
flow of intake cooling water (ICW) to this heat exchanger.
 
Loss of control air, coincident
 
with a loss of offsite power, a valid engineered
 
safeguards
 
features (ESF) actuation
 
signal, and a loss of an emergency
 
diesel generator (EDG) would cause this valve to fail closed. If this happened, the CCW heat exchanger
 
would not receive sufficient
 
flow of ICW. This situation was discovered
 
during a design review of the ICW system. Earlier disclosure
 
might have been possible if ICW operation
 
had been considered
 
or tested with non-safety-related
 
control air secured, coincident
 
with loss of electrical
 
power.On January 7, 1986, the licensee at Robinson Unit 2 reported a concern with the air-operated
 
valves in the safety injection (SI) pump minimum-flow
 
recircula- tion line from the pump discharge
 
to the refueling
 
water storage tank (RWST).This concern evolved from review of IN 85-94. Two such valves had been insert-ed in series in this line and had been designed to fail closed on loss of non-safety-related
 
air or loss of electrical
 
power to the valves. The purpose of the valves is to protect the RWST (outside containment)
from highly radioac-tive reactor coolant during the long-term
 
circulation
 
phase of accident recov-ery. In the event of SI initiation
 
under small-break
 
loss-of-coolant-accident
 
conditions
 
concurrent
 
with closure of either of these valves, the SI pumps would be operating
 
with no flow until reactor pressure decreased
 
below their shutoff head. This would damage the SI pumps after only a short time. The licensee's
 
remedy was to put mechanical
 
blocks on the air operators
 
so the valves would fail as-is (open). Again, if SI operation
 
had been considered
 
or tested with non-safety-related
 
control air secured, the fault might have been disclosed
 
earlier.On December 9, 1985, the licensee at Catawba Unit 2 reported finding that one of the two valve closure springs was missing on one of the pressurizer
 
power-operated
 
relief valves (PORVs). Thus, with loss of air the valve would not have closed against system pressure.
 
The other two PORVs had their normal complement
 
of springs. The valve with the missing spring had been found satisfactory
 
in preoperational
 
tests. During the preoperational
 
loss of air test, the valve closed because system pressure was not present; during the hot functional
 
test, the valve closed because actuator air pressure was present.This is clearly a case in which a fail safe valve was tested without all actuator power secured (IN 85-84).
 
IN 86-50 June 18, 1986 No specific action or written response is required by this information
 
notice.If you have any questions
 
about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator
 
of the appropriate
 
regional office or this office.;d~waA tJordan, Director Divisi of Emergency
 
===Preparedness===
and E gineering
 
Response-~ Office of Inspection
 
and Enforcement
 
Technical
 
Contact: Vern Hodge, IE (301) 492-7275 Attachment:
List of Recently Issued IE Information
 
Notices
 
Attachment
 
1 IN 86-50 June 18, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION
 
NOTICES Information
 
Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-49 86-48 86-47 Age/Environment
 
Induced Electrical
 
Cable Failues Inadequate
 
Testing Of Boron Solution Concentration
 
In The Standby Liquid Control System Feedwater
 
Transient
 
With Partial Failure Of The Reactor Scram System Improper Cleaning And Decon-tamination
 
===Of Respiratory===
Protection
 
Equipment Potential
 
Falsification
 
Of Test Reports On Flanges Manufactured
 
By Golden Gate Forge And Flange, Inc.6/16/86 6/13/86 6/9/86 6/12/86 6/10/86 86-46 86-45 86-44 All power reactor facilities
 
holding an OL or CP All BWR facilities
 
holding an OL or CP All BWRs and PWRs facilities
 
holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities
 
holding an OL or CP and fuel fabrication
 
facilities
 
All power reactor facilities
 
holding an OL or CP and research and test facilities
 
All power reactor facilities
 
holding an OL or CP and research and test reactors All power reactor facilities
 
holding an OL or CP All power rector facilities
 
holding an OL or CP All byproduct material licensees Failure To Follow Procedures
 
6/10/86 When Working In High Radiation Areas 86-43 Problems With Silver Zeolite Sampling Of Airborne Radio-iodine 86-42 Improper Maintenance
 
Radiation
 
Monitoring
 
Of Systems 6/10/86 6/9/86 6/9/86 86-41 Evaluation


==Description of Circumstances==
===Of Questionable===
:The NRC has reported previously on instances where safety-related equipmentfailed to operate as intended when non-safety-related pneumatic systems wereunavailable (IE INs 82-25 and 85-35). In these situations, main steam isola-tion valves and containment isolation valves failed to operate properly whencontrol air pressure decreased slowly rather than rapidly as would be expectedfor an air line break. In the case of IN 85-35, the fault was exposed by aloss of offsite power test, and in the case of IN 82-25, the fault was exposedby a preoperational test designed .to simulate a slow air leak. In both cases,8606160044 IN 86-50June 18, 1986 the components in question--an accumulator isolation check valve (IN 85-35) andpneumatic selector valves (IN 82-25)--were not tested adequately. Severalrecent events have indicated continuing problems of similar nature. Theseevents are discussed below.On February 13, 1986, the licensee at Turkey Point Unit 3 first reported to thtNRC a concern that the component cooling water (CCW) system might fail to meetits functional requirements for a design-basis accident. One part of theconcern involved the CCW heat exchanger outlet control valve. This valveregulates flow of intake cooling water (ICW) to this heat exchanger. Loss ofcontrol air, coincident with a loss of offsite power, a valid engineeredsafeguards features (ESF) actuation signal, and a loss of an emergency dieselgenerator (EDG) would cause this valve to fail closed. If this happened, theCCW heat exchanger would not receive sufficient flow of ICW. This situationwas discovered during a design review of the ICW system. Earlier disclosuremight have been possible if ICW operation had been considered or tested withnon-safety-related control air secured, coincident with loss of electricalpower.On January 7, 1986, the licensee at Robinson Unit 2 reported a concern with theair-operated valves in the safety injection (SI) pump minimum-flow recircula-tion line from the pump discharge to the refueling water storage tank (RWST).This concern evolved from review of IN 85-94. Two such valves had been insert-ed in series in this line and had been designed to fail closed on loss ofnon-safety-related air or loss of electrical power to the valves. The purposeof the valves is to protect the RWST (outside containment) from highly radioac-tive reactor coolant during the long-term circulation phase of accident recov-ery. In the event of SI initiation under small-break loss-of-coolant-accidentconditions concurrent with closure of either of these valves, the SI pumpswould be operating with no flow until reactor pressure decreased below theirshutoff head. This would damage the SI pumps after only a short time. Thelicensee's remedy was to put mechanical blocks on the air operators so thevalves would fail as-is (open). Again, if SI operation had been considered ortested with non-safety-related control air secured, the fault might have beendisclosed earlier.On December 9, 1985, the licensee at Catawba Unit 2 reported finding that oneof the two valve closure springs was missing on one of the pressurizerpower-operated relief valves (PORVs). Thus, with loss of air the valve wouldnot have closed against system pressure. The other two PORVs had their normalcomplement of springs. The valve with the missing spring had been foundsatisfactory in preoperational tests. During the preoperational loss of airtest, the valve closed because system pressure was not present; during the hotfunctional test, the valve closed because actuator air pressure was present.This is clearly a case in which a fail safe valve was tested without allactuator power secured (IN 85-84).
Exposure Readings Of Licensee Personnel


IN 86-50June 18, 1986 No specific action or written response is required by this information notice.If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the RegionalAdministrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.;d~waA tJordan, DirectorDivisi of Emergency Preparednessand E gineering Response-~ Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Dosimeters


===Technical Contact:===
OL = Operating
Vern Hodge, IE(301) 492-7275Attachment: List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices


Attachment 1IN 86-50June 18, 1986LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDIE INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date ofNotice No. Subject Issue Issued to86-4986-4886-47Age/Environment InducedElectrical Cable FailuesInadequate Testing Of BoronSolution Concentration In TheStandby Liquid Control SystemFeedwater Transient WithPartial Failure Of TheReactor Scram SystemImproper Cleaning And Decon-tamination Of RespiratoryProtection EquipmentPotential Falsification OfTest Reports On FlangesManufactured By Golden GateForge And Flange, Inc.6/16/866/13/866/9/866/12/866/10/8686-4686-4586-44All power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll BWR facilitiesholding an OL or CPAll BWRs and PWRsfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP andfuel fabricationfacilitiesAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP andresearch and testfacilitiesAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CP andresearch and testreactorsAll power reactorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll power rectorfacilities holdingan OL or CPAll byproductmaterial licenseesFailure To Follow Procedures 6/10/86When Working In High RadiationAreas86-43Problems With Silver ZeoliteSampling Of Airborne Radio-iodine86-42Improper MaintenanceRadiation MonitoringOfSystems6/10/866/9/866/9/8686-41Evaluation Of QuestionableExposure Readings Of LicenseePersonnel DosimetersOL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit
License CP = Construction


}}
Permit}}


{{Information notice-Nav}}
{{Information notice-Nav}}

Revision as of 13:00, 31 August 2018

Inadequate Testing to Detect Failures of Safety-Related Pneumatic Components or Systems
ML031220684
Person / Time
Site: Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date: 06/18/1986
From: Jordan E L
NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-86-050, NUDOCS 8606160044
Download: ML031220684 (4)
v • d • e


ORIGINAL SSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-50 UNITED STATES.NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION

AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON,,D.C.

20555 June 18, 1986 IE INFORMATION

NOTICE NO. 86-50: INADEQUATE

TESTING TO-DETECT

FAILURES OF SAFETY-RELATED

PNEUMATIC

COMPONENTS

OR SYSTEMS

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities

holding an operating

license (OL) or a construction

permit (CP).

Purpose

This notice is being provided to alert recipients

to a potentially

significant

problem pertaining

to inadequate

testing practice relating to air operated valves. The NRC expects that recipients

will review this notice for applica-bility to their facilities.

However, suggestions

contained

in this notice do not constitute

NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.Past Related Correspondence:

IE Information

Notice No. 82-25, "Failures

of Hiller Actuators

Upon Gradual Loss of Air Pressure," July 20, 1982 IE Information

Notice No. 85-35,- '.Failure

of Air Check Valves to Seat," April 30, 1985 IE Information

Notice No. 85-84, "Inadequate

Inservice

Testing of Main Steam Isolation

Valves," October 30, 1985 IE Information

Notice No. 85-94, 'Potential

for Loss of Minimum Flow Paths Leading to ECCS Pump Damage During a LOCA," December 13, 1985 Description

of Circumstances:

The NRC has reported previously

on instances

where safety-related

equipment failed to operate as intended when non-safety-related

pneumatic

systems were unavailable (IE INs 82-25 and 85-35). In these situations, main steam isola-tion valves and containment

isolation

valves failed to operate properly when control air pressure decreased

slowly rather than rapidly as would be expected for an air line break. In the case of IN 85-35, the fault was exposed by a loss of offsite power test, and in the case of IN 82-25, the fault was exposed by a preoperational

test designed .to simulate a slow air leak. In both cases, 8606160044 IN 86-50 June 18, 1986 the components

in question--an

accumulator

isolation

check valve (IN 85-35) and pneumatic

selector valves (IN 82-25)--were

not tested adequately.

Several recent events have indicated

continuing

problems of similar nature. These events are discussed

below.On February 13, 1986, the licensee at Turkey Point Unit 3 first reported to tht NRC a concern that the component

cooling water (CCW) system might fail to meet its functional

requirements

for a design-basis

accident.

One part of the concern involved the CCW heat exchanger

outlet control valve. This valve regulates

flow of intake cooling water (ICW) to this heat exchanger.

Loss of control air, coincident

with a loss of offsite power, a valid engineered

safeguards

features (ESF) actuation

signal, and a loss of an emergency

diesel generator (EDG) would cause this valve to fail closed. If this happened, the CCW heat exchanger

would not receive sufficient

flow of ICW. This situation was discovered

during a design review of the ICW system. Earlier disclosure

might have been possible if ICW operation

had been considered

or tested with non-safety-related

control air secured, coincident

with loss of electrical

power.On January 7, 1986, the licensee at Robinson Unit 2 reported a concern with the air-operated

valves in the safety injection (SI) pump minimum-flow

recircula- tion line from the pump discharge

to the refueling

water storage tank (RWST).This concern evolved from review of IN 85-94. Two such valves had been insert-ed in series in this line and had been designed to fail closed on loss of non-safety-related

air or loss of electrical

power to the valves. The purpose of the valves is to protect the RWST (outside containment)

from highly radioac-tive reactor coolant during the long-term

circulation

phase of accident recov-ery. In the event of SI initiation

under small-break

loss-of-coolant-accident

conditions

concurrent

with closure of either of these valves, the SI pumps would be operating

with no flow until reactor pressure decreased

below their shutoff head. This would damage the SI pumps after only a short time. The licensee's

remedy was to put mechanical

blocks on the air operators

so the valves would fail as-is (open). Again, if SI operation

had been considered

or tested with non-safety-related

control air secured, the fault might have been disclosed

earlier.On December 9, 1985, the licensee at Catawba Unit 2 reported finding that one of the two valve closure springs was missing on one of the pressurizer

power-operated

relief valves (PORVs). Thus, with loss of air the valve would not have closed against system pressure.

The other two PORVs had their normal complement

of springs. The valve with the missing spring had been found satisfactory

in preoperational

tests. During the preoperational

loss of air test, the valve closed because system pressure was not present; during the hot functional

test, the valve closed because actuator air pressure was present.This is clearly a case in which a fail safe valve was tested without all actuator power secured (IN 85-84).

IN 86-50 June 18, 1986 No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice.If you have any questions

about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator

of the appropriate

regional office or this office.;d~waA tJordan, Director Divisi of Emergency

Preparedness

and E gineering

Response-~ Office of Inspection

and Enforcement

Technical

Contact: Vern Hodge, IE (301) 492-7275 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information

Notices

Attachment

1 IN 86-50 June 18, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-49 86-48 86-47 Age/Environment

Induced Electrical

Cable Failues Inadequate

Testing Of Boron Solution Concentration

In The Standby Liquid Control System Feedwater

Transient

With Partial Failure Of The Reactor Scram System Improper Cleaning And Decon-tamination

Of Respiratory

Protection

Equipment Potential

Falsification

Of Test Reports On Flanges Manufactured

By Golden Gate Forge And Flange, Inc.6/16/86 6/13/86 6/9/86 6/12/86 6/10/86 86-46 86-45 86-44 All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP All BWR facilities

holding an OL or CP All BWRs and PWRs facilities

holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP and fuel fabrication

facilities

All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP and research and test facilities

All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP and research and test reactors All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP All power rector facilities

holding an OL or CP All byproduct material licensees Failure To Follow Procedures

6/10/86 When Working In High Radiation Areas 86-43 Problems With Silver Zeolite Sampling Of Airborne Radio-iodine 86-42 Improper Maintenance

Radiation

Monitoring

Of Systems 6/10/86 6/9/86 6/9/86 86-41 Evaluation

Of Questionable

Exposure Readings Of Licensee Personnel

Dosimeters

OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit


Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=Information_Notice_1986-50,_Inadequate_Testing_to_Detect_Failures_of_Safety-Related_Pneumatic_Components_or_Systems&oldid=1010388"