Information Notice 1986-35, Fire in Compressible Material at Dresden Unit 3

Fire in Compressible Material at Dresden Unit 3

ML031250020
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, 05000000, Zimmer, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant, Skagit, Marble Hill
Issue date:	05/15/1986
From:	Jordan E L NRC/IE
To:
References
IN-86-035, NUDOCS 8605130022
Download: ML031250020 (3)

Ls LSSINS No.: 6835 IN 86-35 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION

OFFICE OF INSPECTION

AND ENFORCEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 May 15, 1986 IE INFORMATION

NOTICE NO. 86-35: FIRE IN COMPRESSIBLE

MATERIAL AT DRESDEN UNIT 3

Addressees

All nuclear power reactor facilities

holding an operating

license (OL) or a construction

permit (CP).

Purpose

This notice is being issued to advise recipients

of the circumstances

surrounding

a fire which occurred at Dresden Unit 3 on January 20, 1986. It is expected that recipients

will review the information

for applicability

to their facilities

and consider actions, if appropriate, to determine

whether a similar fire hazard exists at their facilities.

No specific action or response is required by this notice.Description

of Circumstances:

Dresden Unit 3 is a 773 MWe BWR with a typical "light bulb" Mark I drywell, which includes a free-standing

steel containment

vessel. A reinforced

concrete shield wall surrounds

the containment

vessel. To allow for thermal and pressure expansion

and contraction

under design-basis

conditions, an annular space of about 2 inches is provided between the vessel and the shield wall. After the vessel was erected and pressure tested, a composite

urethane foam and fiberglass

sheet was glued to the external surfaces of the vessel. This method of application

provides a compressible

fill in the space between the vessel and the concrete to ensure that adequate freedom for motion is maintained.

Dresden Unit 3 is replacing

certain pipe that is part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

In connection

with this work, a pipe which penetrates

the shield wall was being removed using a arc-air cutting technique.

The sleeve in the shield wall through which the pipe passes slopes downward from the outside;hot slag from the pipe cutting inadvertently

ran through the sleeve and contacted the urethane foam. The small fire which started was thought to have been promptly extinguished.

Some time later, personnel

working inside the drywell noted that the inner surface of the vessel was heated by a continuing

fire such that the paint was discolored

in sizeable local areas. The station fire brigade reviewed plant records and identified

the presence of the combustible

foam in the annular space. Water was applied through the penetration

where the fire apparently

8605130022

'

, -' ,IN 86-35 May 15, 1986 started as well as through adjacent penetrations.

• The temperature

of the inside surface of the steel drywell was monitored

and was determined

to have returned to normal about 12h hours after the fire was first detected.Discussion:

The licensee is committed

to provide to the NRC an extensive

evaluation

of damage that may have been done by the fire and the repairs (if any) that may be required, the methods of accomplishment, the consequences

of a recurrence

of a fire in this or any similar space where a significant

fraction of the local volume may be occupied by combustible

foam, and methods of detection

and suppression

of any potential

future fire. The NRC also has requested

that the licensee consider and discuss the matter of conformance

to Appendix R of 10 CFR 50. When the requested

information

is received the NRC will consider whether further action is required.The reactor was shut down and defueled at the time of the fire, and resolution

of NRC concerns will be required before restart. The event is discussed

in greater detail in NRC Inspection

Report No. 56-249/86006 (DRSS).*No specific action or written response is required by this information

notice.If you have any questions

about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator

of the appropriate

regional office or this office.a irector Divisi n f Emergency

Preparedness

and Edineering

Response Office of Inspection

and Enforcement

Technical

Contact: James Henderson, IE (301) 492-9654 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued IE Information

Notices*NRC Inspection

Report 50-249/86006 (DRSS), available

for review at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H St. NW, Washington, DC; the NRC Local Document Room, Morris Public Library, 604 Liberty St., Morris, IL 60450; and the NRC Region III Document Room, 799 Roosevelt

Road, Glen Ellyn, IL 60137.

Attachment

1 IN 86-35 May 15, 1986 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED; IE INFORMATION

NOTICES Information

Date of Notice No. Subject Issue Issued to 86-34 86-33 86-32 86-31 86-30 86-29 86-28 86-27 Improper Assembly, Material Selection, And Test Of Valves And Their Actuators Information

For Licensee Regarding

The Chernobyl Nuclear Plant Accident Request For Collection

Of Licensee Radioactivity

Measurements

Attributed

To The Chernobyl

Nuclear Plant Accident Unauthorized

Transfer and Loss of Control of Industrial

Nuclear Gauges Design Limitations

of Gaseous Effluent Monitoring

Systems Effects of Changing Valve Motor-Operator

Switch Settings 5/13/86 5/6/86 5/2/86 5/6/86 4/29/86 4/25/86 All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP Fuel cycle licensees and Priority 1 material licensees All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or a CP All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or a CP All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or a CP 4/28/86 Access Control at Nuclear Facilities

4/21/86 All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP, research and nonpower reactor facilities, and fuel fabrication

& pro-cessing facilities

86-26 Potential

Problems In Generators

Manufactured

By Electrical

Products Incorporated

4/17/86 All power reactor facilities

holding an OL or CP.OL = Operating

License CP = Construction

Permit