Semantic search
Start date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | System | LER | |
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ENS 56494 | 30 April 2023 05:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | Primary Containment Integrity Degraded | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0100 EDT on 04/30/23, it was determined that the primary containment integrity did not meet (Technical Specification) TS 4.6.1.1.d requirement, suppression chamber in compliance with TS 3.6.2.1 due to the inability to establish test conditions for the bypass leakage test in accordance with TS 4.6.2.1.f. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) & 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | Primary containment | |
ENS 53625 | 26 September 2018 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Core Injection (Hpci) System Inoperable | On 9/26/2018 at 1530 EDT, it was discovered that the HPCI system was inoperable due to a blown fuse in the 10C617 Panel, E21-F15A. Therefore, this condition Is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The blown fuse also impacts 'A' channel Residual Heat Removal (RHR) subsystem and 'A' Core Spray (CS) subsystem. These Emergency Core Cooling subsystems have been declared inoperable. Remaining Emergency Core Cooling subsystems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain OPERABLE. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local authorities. | Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Core Spray Residual Heat Removal | |
ENS 52159 | 7 August 2016 05:01:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable | HPCI (high pressure coolant injection) governor valve did not respond as expected. During performance of a planned HPCI valve functional test the HPCI governor valve (FD-FV-4879) did not reposition as expected. The HCPI system has been declared inoperable based on the response per Technical Specification 3.5.1 action C.1. All other emergency core cooling systems and the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. The unit remains at 100% power. The station has initiated an event response team to identify and correct the cause of the failure. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Dispatch. | High Pressure Coolant Injection Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Emergency Core Cooling System | |
ENS 49909 | 13 March 2014 10:31:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Standby Liquid Control System Sample Concentration Outside Technical Specification Limits | On March 13, 2014 at 0631 EDT, sample analysis of the Standby Liquid Control (SLC) System tank yielded a sodium pentaborate concentration outside the technical specification (TS) limits, rendering both subsystems inoperable. The sodium pentaborate concentration was found to be 4 parts per million low, at 13.598% by weight, below the required concentration of 13.6% by weight. The Standby Liquid Control System tank concentration was diluted during restoration activities following planned maintenance of the B Standby Liquid Control System pump. This condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Chemical addition to the Standby Liquid Control System tank is in progress to restore the sodium pentaborate concentration to within Technical Specification limits. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
A subsequent review of the analytical data has determined that the SLC tank sample met the Technical Specification requirement for operability (13.6 weight percent) and therefore, there was no reportable condition. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Burritt). | Standby Liquid Control | |
ENS 49671 | 20 December 2013 18:03:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Both Control Room Air Conditioning Subsystems Inoperable | While the B control room chiller was out of service for planned maintenance, the A control room chiller was manually secured due to excessive fluctuations in load and running current. TS 3.7.2.2 Action a.2 was entered at 1303 (EST) for both control room air conditioning subsystems inoperable. Control room temperature is being maintained below the TS limit of 90 degrees F. The required TS Action is to restore one control room AC subsystem to operable status within 72 hours. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek township.
The B control room chiller was returned to service at 2120 EST. The A control room chiller remains out of service resulting in a 30-day TS LCO. Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis). | 05000354/LER-2013-010 | |
ENS 48897 | 8 April 2013 15:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Hpci Declared Inoperable During Surveillance Testing | On April 8, 2013 at 0908 (EDT), the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable as part of planned Controls Functional Testing. At 1115 (EDT), during the performance of scheduled testing, an initiation signal for the HPCI system was provided and the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump failed to start as expected. The HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump provides the motive force to open the HPCI Turbine Stop and Governor valves during system startup. The inability of the HPCI Turbine Stop and Governor valves to open prevents the HPCI system from fulfilling its design safety function. The HPCI system will remain inoperable until the cause of the failure has been corrected. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. The unit remains at 100% power. The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified. | High Pressure Coolant Injection Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Emergency Core Cooling System | |
ENS 48274 | 4 September 2012 04:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection Declared Inoperable | At 1320 EDT, on September 4, 2012, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable during performance of HC.OP-IS.BJ-0001, HPCI Main and Booster Pump Set - 0P204 and 0P217 - In Service Test (IST). The HPCI system was being started for the quarterly IST when 1-FD-HV-F001, HPCI Turbine Steam Supply Valve, failed to open per step 5.21.7 of the test. The control room operators returned the system to a standby line up. The Outage Control Center was staffed to investigate the cause of the valve misoperation. Loss of the HPCI system is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The 'A' Residual Heat Removal System was aligned for Suppression Pool Cooling to support the HPCI IST surveillance and was inoperable for Low Pressure Coolant Injection function until realigned to a standby lineup at 1340 EDT. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems or safety-related equipment was inoperable during this time period. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Lower Alloways Creek Township will be notified. | High Pressure Coolant Injection Residual Heat Removal Emergency Core Cooling System Low Pressure Coolant Injection | |
ENS 47745 | 15 March 2012 00:34:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Hpci Inoperable Due to Failure of Turbine Governor Valve | On March 14th, 2012 at 2034 EST the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond as expected to demanded position. With the HPCI system flow controller output signal at zero percent demand the governor valve traveled to the mid position and did not remain closed as expected when the oil system auxiliary pump was started. With this unexpected response the speed and flow control system for the turbine is inoperable. The failure was discovered as part of a planned evolution for oil sampling. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. The unit remains at 100% power. The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified. | High Pressure Coolant Injection Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Emergency Core Cooling System | |
ENS 47585 | 12 January 2012 03:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable | On January 11, 2012 at 22:15 (EST), the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond to demanded position. When demanded to travel to the full closed position, the governor valve remained full open rendering the speed and flow control system for the turbine inoperable. The failure was discovered as part of a planned maintenance evolution. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system remain operable. The unit remains at 100% power. The station has initiated an Event Response Team to identify and correct the cause of the failure. No personnel injuries resulted from the event. The NRC Resident Inspector (has been notified) and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified. The unit is in a 14-day LCO for HPCI inoperability.
The following is a retraction of ENS Notification #47585: On January 11, 2012, Hope Creek Generating Station reported to the NRC that High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable due to a failure of the turbine governor valve to respond to demanded position. This condition was discovered when obtaining an oil sample from the HPCI system. According to the procedure, the HPCI flow controller automatic setpoint was lowered to zero. The procedure set the manual controller setpoint by having the operator lower the demand for a time period rather than verifying the setpoint at zero. The HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump is then started. The governor valve was expected to start to open (intermediate position) and then close. Instead the valve went to the full open position and did not respond to attempts to close the valve from the flow controller. Accordingly, Control Room personnel conservatively initiated ENS reporting under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) in response to the apparent loss of safety function for Unit 1. Subsequent technical evaluation concluded that the performance and response of the HPCI turbine governor control valve was as expected based on the manual controller demand being at 35% when the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump was started to collect a HPCI oil sample. The Engineering review concluded that there are no problems with the HPCI turbine governor control valve response to controller demand. Operating procedures have been revised to provide guidance on verifying manual controller demand at 0% before placing the HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump in service under standby conditions for oil sampling or similar evolutions. Since January 11th, 2012, HPCI has remained available to perform its required safety functions and only became inoperable during planned evolutions to either obtain oil samples or to investigate HPCI turbine governor control valve performance. On this basis, the HPCI system was capable of performing its function to mitigate the consequences of an accident and the issue described in Event #47585 is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloway Creek Township will be notified of this retraction. Notified R1DO (Trapp). | High Pressure Coolant Injection Reactor Core Isolation Cooling Emergency Core Cooling System | |
ENS 44541 | 5 October 2008 08:31:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) System Inoperable | During repair activities associated with the HPCI NUMAC (Nuclear Measurement Analysis And Control) display, the NUMAC drawer failed upon restoration of power. The drawer failure resulted in HPCI isolation signal and (HPCI) turbine trip signal. At the time the HPCI isolation valve was de-energized as planned so the isolation did not occur, but the failure mode resulted in a (HPCI) turbine trip signal, which resulted in an unavailability and inoperability of HPCI. The condition existed for 29 minutes during maintenance activities. Repair activities were unsuccessful and the NUMAC is still inoperable. The event occurred during the restoration of the HPCI steam leak detection system. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. | High Pressure Coolant Injection | |
ENS 44263 | 4 June 2008 06:57:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable | On 6/04/08 at 0257, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI pump was placed in service to evaluate HPCI pump start performance. The HPCI pump tripped on low suction pressure when started. An Event Response Team is assembled to investigate the cause of the low suction trip of HPCI. Loss of the HPCI system is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems or Safety Related equipment was inoperable during this time period. The licensee is in a 14 day LCO due to TS 3.5.1. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 6/04/08 at 0758 (EN# 44263). The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI pump was placed in service to evaluate HPCI pump start performance. The HPCI pump received a momentary low suction pressure trip signal in the test configuration alignment. Since the initial report, failure mode cause technical evaluation has determined that the HPCI was always able to satisfy its design safety function. Additional instrumentation was added and data collected from seven HPCI test runs was analyzed. As evidenced by the successful completion of its IST test and the detailed review of multiple HPCI runs, the HPCI system was always able to perform its design function because: --- HPCI restarted on its own with no operator action. --- HPCI would meet its injection time requirements. --- Required flows and required pressures were reached on all HPCI runs . Therefore HPCI was never inoperable. The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction. R1DO (Henderson) notified. | High Pressure Coolant Injection Emergency Core Cooling System | |
ENS 44154 | 22 April 2008 12:41:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Loss of Safety Function Due to Blown Fuse | At 0841, the Control Room received an alarm indicating an issue with the CD481 1E inverter. Upon walkdown, it was noted that the main power fuse had failed and the inverter channel was powered from a backup non-1E AC source. IAW HCGS procedures, the C EDG was declared inoperable because it would not start in response to a LOCA signal. Electrical output of the CD 481 inverter was available through the event and no transient or actuations occurred. All require Technical Specification surveillance tests for TS 3.8.1 were completed within the required time-frame. Additional equipment that was tagged for scheduled maintenance included the D EDG which is currently in an outage window and inoperable. This resulted in 2 of the 4 HCGS EDGs inoperable. With the C and D EDGs inoperable, both Control Room Emergency Filtration Systems (CREF) would be without diesel back-up power supplies in the event of a LOCA and thus inoperable. With no operable CREF systems, Technical specification 3.0.3 applies. A loss of both CREF systems would constitute a loss of function of a safety system designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)). Replacement of the CD481 1E inverter main power fuse and assessment of inverter function was completed at 10:36. The inverter was placed back in its normal alignment. All related Technical Specification equipment is operable with the exception of the D EDG, which remains in the scheduled maintenance outage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Control Room Emergency Filtration System | |
ENS 43920 | 19 January 2008 16:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 'A' and 'B' Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Overspeed Stops Found Set High (Non-Conservative) During Surveillance Testing | During the Performance of the 18 month surveillance requirement to demonstrate operability of the reactor recirc pump motor set scoop tube mechanical and electrical stop over-speed set points to be less than or equal to 109 percent and 107 percent, respectively, the 'A' and 'B' MG set stops were found non-conservatively high. The electrical and mechanical stops have been adjusted to meet surveillance requirements as of 1538 (on) 1/19/2008. The potential impact of this condition would be a function of the reactor recirc 'run-out' transient. If that analyzed transient were to have occurred, the potential existed for the flow dependent Minimum Critical Power Ratio to have been exceeded. This could result in exceeding the safety limit (MCPR) under the most limiting postulated conditions. Evaluation of the potential cause of the improper settings is underway. The 'A' Recirc Pump and Motor were replaced during the last refueling outage. (November 2007) The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee will notify Lower Alloways Creek Township. | ||
ENS 43779 | 11 November 2007 21:39:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Hpci Inoperable Due to Valve Failure During Quarterly Surveillance | On 11/11/07 at 1639, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable. The quarterly HPCI System Valve In-Service Surveillance was in progress. During the performance of the surveillance, the Suppression Chamber supply check valve was unable to be cycled open in accordance with the surveillance procedure. Loss of the HPCI system is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The plant is stable in Operational Condition 2, no other Emergency Core Cooling or Safety Related systems are inoperable and plant start-up activities are in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.
Further investigation revealed that the existing steps of the controlling surveillance procedure did not consistently equalize pressure across the HPCI suction check valve and therefore did not establish adequate test conditions. The surveillance procedure was revised to ensure adequate test conditions were established and the valve was successfully stroked. Evaluation of the initial assessment of operability determined that the suction check valve was not inoperable. Therefore the HPCI system was also not inoperable as initially declared and continued to be able to perform its safety function. Based on this additional information, the associated non-emergency 8-hour notification made on November 11, 2007, is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township. Notified the R1DO (Barkley). | High Pressure Coolant Injection | |
ENS 43537 | 31 July 2007 04:51:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable | On 7/31/07 at 0051, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI valve quarterly IST was in progress and the BJ-HV-8278 HPCI to Feedwater injection valve failed to respond to an open signal during stroke timing. Loss of the HPCI system is reportable under 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems are inoperable. The D Safety Auxiliary Cooling System (SACS) pump is inoperable for motor replacement. The licensee is in a 14 day Hot Shutdown LCO. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Feedwater High Pressure Coolant Injection Emergency Core Cooling System | |
ENS 42422 | 14 March 2006 21:59:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Loss of Control Room Emergency Filtration | On 03/14/06 at 1655 hours, the 'A' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system was removed from service to address a high oil level and subsequent high bearing drain oil temperatures. The 'A' CREF train was declared inoperable and a 7-day LCO was entered. While placing the 'B' CREF train in-service the chiller did not respond as expected. The chiller failed to properly load and supply cooling. At 1659 hours the 'B' CREF train was declared inoperable. This resulted in both 'A' and 'B' trains of CREF (being) unable to perform their design safety function and thus unable to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This failure placed the Hope Creek Station in a Technical Specification 3.0.3 condition requiring a unit shutdown. Oil level was restored to normal band for the 'A' CREF train at 1732 hours and the 3.0.3 condition was exited prior to any actions being initiated to start reducing reactor power to achieve a Hot Shutdown condition. A 8 hour report is being made under ECG Section 11.2.2.b, an Event/Condition could have prevented certain safety functions IAW 10.CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). At the time of event all safety systems were operable. The license has notified the NRC resident inspector.
This is a retraction of the event notification made on 3/14/06 at 20:21 (ET) hours. This event (#42422) was initially reported as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The safety function of the system is to ensure that the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system. Further review has determined that the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) chiller system maintained its capability to complete its specified safety function. During the event, the chilled water and affected room temperatures increased only minimally and remained well below the maximum allowable temperatures. The proceduralized in-progress activity to address the 'A' chiller high oil level condition promptly re-established full system cooling prior to approaching any required temperature limits. The procedure was completed in a timely manner with no complications. Therefore, the temperature limits of the Control Room and equipment rooms would not have been challenged had an event occurred during the time 'A' chiller oil level was being adjusted and the safety function of maintaining room ambient air temperature within limits would have been accomplished. The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector. R1DO(Holody) notified. | ||
ENS 41995 | 15 September 2005 01:38:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Failed Surveillance Testing | On 9/14/05 at 2138, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCl) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI Pump In Service Surveillance Test was in progress with system flow and speed being adjusted to establish surveillance test conditions. Speed and flow oscillations were observed when turbine speed approached 3900 rpm. Since speed and flow oscillations prevented the establishment of surveillance test conditions, HPCI was declared inoperable. Evaluations of these speed and flow oscillations are ongoing. Loss of the HPCI is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems or Safety Related equipment was inoperable during this time period. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Evaluation of the HPCI system speed and flow oscillations concluded that the HPCI system was capable of mitigating the consequences of an accident. Therefore this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a loss of a single train safety function and is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Silk) notified. | High Pressure Coolant Injection Emergency Core Cooling System | |
ENS 41852 | 19 July 2005 07:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable | On 7/19/05 at 0345, maintenance technicians were performing a voltage check during an I&C surveillance when a lead slipped, making inadvertent contact within the panel. This resulted in shorting of a power connection and blowing a fuse. This fuse supplied initiation and trip logic components associated with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, the 'A' Core Spray system, and the 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system. Loss of the HPCI system is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Hope Creek entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 for HPCI inoperability with one Core Spray and one RHR system inoperable. Actions to replace the fuse and restore operability of the HPCI system were completed at 0909 on 7/19/05, allowing exit from TS 3.0.3. Actions to commence staffing for a shutdown and implement required procedures were implemented, however a power reduction was not initiated based on successful restoration. The remaining retest activities associated with fuse restoration were completed for the 'A' Core Spray Loop and the 'A' RHR system at 0923 on 7/19/05, clearing the remaining Limiting Conditions for Operation associated with the fuse failure. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems or safety related equipment was inoperable during this time period. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloways Creek Township.
Event # 41852, which was made by Hope Creek on July 19, 2005, at 1053, is being retracted. Although HPCI was declared inoperable in accordance with the instrumentation Technical Specification due to the instrumentation that was inoperable as a result of the blown fuse, a subsequent review of the HPCI control circuitry determined that HPCI remained capable of automatically performing its safety function in response to any event for which it is credited. Since HPCI was able to perform its safety function, it is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and this notification can be retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Gray). | High Pressure Coolant Injection Core Spray Residual Heat Removal Emergency Core Cooling System | |
ENS 40876 | 16 July 2004 14:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | Technical Specification Shutdown/Loss of Single Safety Function | A Unit shutdown was initiated at 1100 (ET 07/16/04) to comply with Technical Specifications. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System was declared inoperable at 1000 on 7/16/04 due to an inability to demonstrate that it is capable of meeting its design flow and pressure requirements identified during an extent of condition review being conducted in conjunction with an ongoing Safety System Design Inspection. Concurrently, the `D' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was inoperable due to an in-progress surveillance. This rendered the `D' Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) subsystem and `B' Core Spray subsystem inoperable resulting in entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 requiring within 1 hour initiating action to place the unit in at least startup within the next 6 hours, hot shutdown within the following 6 hours and cold shutdown within the subsequent 24 hours. Power ascension was in progress with reactor power at 95%. Power ascension was suspended. Preparations for power reduction were initiated. Actions were taken to restore the `D' EDG to an operable, standby alignment, which was complete at 1145 rendering `D' LPCI subsystem and `B' Core Spray subsystem operable. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. No power reduction was conducted. The HPCI system remains inoperable constituting a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The investigation is ongoing including a determination of the need for any physical modifications that may be required. Prior to the event, the `C' Station Service Water pump, `D' Filtration Recirculation, Ventilation System recirculation fan, and `B' Primary Containment Instrument gas compressor were out of service for scheduled maintenance. There were no personnel injuries as a result of this event. The NRC Resident inspector was notified of this event. | Service water High Pressure Coolant Injection Emergency Diesel Generator Primary containment Core Spray Low Pressure Coolant Injection | |
ENS 40648 | 6 April 2004 00:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Offsite Electrical Power Sources and 1E 4Kv Distribution Buses Inoperable | On 04/05/04 at 2030 hours, Engineering personnel informed Operations personnel of an issue affecting the ability of the offsite power sources to provide adequate 1E bus voltage consistent with the design basis. Operating procedures currently contain non-conservative values for minimum voltage on 1E 4 kV buses. In addition, the transformer auto load tap changer (LTC) is currently set to regulate at approximately 4200 VAC, a value that is below the required 1E 4 kV bus lower voltage design limit. Adequate voltage from the offsite power sources is required IAW General Design Criteria 17 to ensure that vital buses remain connected to their preferred power source and adequate terminal voltage exists at the load end device during accident conditions. The ability of the Emergency Diesel Generators to perform their design function is not affected by this condition. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function because it affects the ability of both offsite power sources to provide adequate voltage to all 1E buses to properly mitigate the consequences of an accident. Both offsite electrical power sources and all four 4 kV distribution buses have been declared inoperable and the appropriate Technical Specification Actions have been entered. The current voltage readings for all 1E 4 kV buses are between 4204 and 4263 VAC. The plant will remain in Operational Condition 4 until this condition is corrected. Engineering and Operations personnel are evaluating this condition to determine required corrective actions. All other plant systems are available to support Operational Condition change and reactor startup. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and will notify the local township. | Emergency Diesel Generator | |
ENS 40539 | 23 February 2004 06:52:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown | Technical Specification Required Shutdown Started Due to Grass Intrusion | At 0152 on February 23rd the station service water system at Hope Creek experienced elevated differential pressure due to grass intrusion. At the time of the grass intrusion the `C' Service Water Traveling Screen was removed from service for an inspection. The grass intrusion resulted in the `A' Service Water strainer breaker tripping open de-energizing the strainer. Differential pressure on this strainer was pegged high and flow was reduced to 1900 gallons per minute (17,000 normal; 15,500 minimum). The combination of these conditions resulted in inadequate cooling water flow to the `A' Station Auxiliaries Cooling Water system, and consequently inadequate cooling for the `A' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) unit. With the `B' CREF fan already inoperable for a scheduled maintenance window, this resulted in entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3. This report is to document starting a unit shutdown to comply with Technical Specifications 3.0.3. Power reduction for Unit shutdown was commenced at 0407 (ET). Unit shutdown was terminated at 0424 when `C' Service water pump was returned to service restoring cooling water to `A' SACS loop, restoring it to an OPERABLE status. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as a four hour report. The Control Room Ventilation System provides heating, cooling, ventilation, and environmental control for the control room and adjacent areas. Under accident conditions, the Control Room Emergency Filtration Unit (CREF) ensures that the control room will remain habitable during and following all design basis accidents. Because the CREF system is required to automatically respond in the event of a design basis accident, having both trains of CREF inoperable at the same time impacted the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event is also being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) to comply with the requirements of an 8 hour report. At the time of the event the following Tech Spec related equipment was inoperable. `C' Service Water for screen inspection and `B' CREF for chiller maintenance work. Currently all safety related equipment is operable with the exception of the `A' Service Water Loop. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | Service water | |
ENS 40225 | 5 October 2003 07:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Inoperable Trains of Control Room Emergency Filtration at Hope Creek | While performing common mode failure testing of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG), the 'C' EDG was declared INOPERABLE for planned installation of required test equipment. Concurrent with the inoperability of the 'C' EDG, the 'B' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System has been INOPERABLE for emergent corrective maintenance since 10/2/03 at 0502. Because the 'C' EDG is the emergency power supply for the 'A' CREF train, 'A' CREF was also declared INOPERABLE and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered as of 0300 hrs on 10/05/03. At 0430 hrs on 10/05/03, the test equipment was removed from 'C' EDG, thereby restoring it and 'A' CREF to an operable status, and Technical Specification 3.0.3 was exited. Testing did verify the absence of a common mode failure and all EDG's are operable. The Control Room Ventilation System provides heating, cooling, ventilation, and environmental control for the control room and adjacent areas. Under accident conditions, CREF ensures that the control room will remain habitable during and following all design basis accidents. Because the CREF system is required to automatically respond in the event of a design basis accident, having both trains of CREF inoperable at the same time impacted the ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The plant is currently in HOT SHUTDOWN for repair of an emergent turbine hydraulic fluid leak, with decay heat removal to the main condenser via turbine bypass valves. The NRC resident inspector was notified by the licensee.
At the time of the original notification, both trains of Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) were declared inoperable impacting the ability of CREF to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The "B" train was inoperable for emergent corrective maintenance and the "A" train was declared inoperable when test equipment was connected to the "C" emergency diesel generator (EDG). The "C" EDG provides emergency power to the "A" train of CREF. Subsequent to this event, an evaluation of the test equipment impact to the "C" EDG was performed and determined that the "C" EDG would still be capable of providing emergency power to the "A" CREF train in the event offsite power is lost. Therefore, the "A" CREF train remained available to respond to a design basis accident. Thus, the safety function would have been fulfilled." R1DO (Brain McDermott) notified. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified of this retraction by the licensee. | Emergency Diesel Generator Decay Heat Removal Main Condenser | |
ENS 40107 | 27 August 2003 13:24:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | Control Room Access Door Latch Was Determiend to Be Not Fully Engaging. | At 09:24 am on 08/27/03, a Control Room access door latch was determined to be not fully engaging. The door and latch provide the following functions: maintain the integrity of the Control Room boundary which is a design feature to maintain Control Room habitability following a design bases accident, and provide a security barrier to restrict access into the Control Rom complex to only those personnel with preapproved security clearance. With the latch not engaged, the door was not capable of performing these functions. The appropriate security contingencies were implemented, requiring posting of a Security Force Member at the door controlling access to the Control Room Complex. Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered due to the inability of either Control Room ventilation system to maintain Control Room habitability, as required by TS 3.7.2. At 10:20, the door latch was replaced to re-establish the integrity of the Control Room habitability boundary and TS 3.0.3 was exited. The ability of the latch to properly operate for access and egress was not established; access through the affected door remained restricted until repairs can be completed (there are additional doors to the Control Room that remain fully functional). At 14:00, the door was again impaired for repair of the door latch. Full functionality of the door was restored at 14:41. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
At the time of the original notification the ability to maintain Control Room habitability, as required by TS 3.7.2 was not assured. Subsequent evaluation has determined that if a postulated accident had occurred during the time that the door latch was impaired, control room dose would be less than the acceptance criteria specified in 10CFR50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183 and bounded by our current analysis. The site boundary doses were never affected. The dose impact of the condition as it existed would be bounded by the current analysis. Thus, the safety function would have been fulfilled. Notified R1DO (L. Doerflein) |