ENS 42422
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ENS Event | |
|---|---|
21:59 Mar 14, 2006 | |
| Title | Loss of Control Room Emergency Filtration |
| Event Description | On 03/14/06 at 1655 hours0.0192 days <br />0.46 hours <br />0.00274 weeks <br />6.297275e-4 months <br />, the 'A' Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) system was removed from service to address a high oil level and subsequent high bearing drain oil temperatures. The 'A' CREF train was declared inoperable and a 7-day LCO was entered. While placing the 'B' CREF train in-service the chiller did not respond as expected. The chiller failed to properly load and supply cooling. At 1659 hours0.0192 days <br />0.461 hours <br />0.00274 weeks <br />6.312495e-4 months <br /> the 'B' CREF train was declared inoperable. This resulted in both 'A' and 'B' trains of CREF [being] unable to perform their design safety function and thus unable to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This failure placed the Hope Creek Station in a Technical Specification 3.0.3 condition requiring a unit shutdown. Oil level was restored to normal band for the 'A' CREF train at 1732 hours0.02 days <br />0.481 hours <br />0.00286 weeks <br />6.59026e-4 months <br /> and the 3.0.3 condition was exited prior to any actions being initiated to start reducing reactor power to achieve a Hot Shutdown condition.
A 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> report is being made under ECG Section 11.2.2.b, an Event/Condition could have prevented certain safety functions IAW 10.CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). At the time of event all safety systems were operable. The license has notified the NRC resident inspector.
This is a retraction of the event notification made on 3/14/06 at 20:21 (ET) hours. This event (#42422) was initially reported as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The safety function of the system is to ensure that the ambient air temperature does not exceed the allowable temperature for continuous duty rating for the equipment and instrumentation cooled by this system. Further review has determined that the Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) chiller system maintained its capability to complete its specified safety function. During the event, the chilled water and affected room temperatures increased only minimally and remained well below the maximum allowable temperatures. The proceduralized in-progress activity to address the 'A' chiller high oil level condition promptly re-established full system cooling prior to approaching any required temperature limits. The procedure was completed in a timely manner with no complications. Therefore, the temperature limits of the Control Room and equipment rooms would not have been challenged had an event occurred during the time 'A' chiller oil level was being adjusted and the safety function of maintaining room ambient air temperature within limits would have been accomplished. The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector. R1DO(Holody) notified. |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Hope Creek  New Jersey (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+-1.63 h-0.0679 days <br />-0.0097 weeks <br />-0.00223 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Edward Casulli 20:21 Mar 14, 2006 |
| NRC Officer: | Joe O'Hara |
| Last Updated: | Apr 22, 2006 |
| 42422 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Hope Creek with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 564942023-04-30T05:00:00030 April 2023 05:00:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded Primary Containment Integrity Degraded ENS 536252018-09-26T04:00:00026 September 2018 04:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Core Injection (Hpci) System Inoperable ENS 521592016-08-07T05:01:0007 August 2016 05:01:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable ENS 499092014-03-13T10:31:00013 March 2014 10:31:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Standby Liquid Control System Sample Concentration Outside Technical Specification Limits ENS 496712013-12-20T18:03:00020 December 2013 18:03:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Both Control Room Air Conditioning Subsystems Inoperable ENS 488972013-04-08T15:15:0008 April 2013 15:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Declared Inoperable During Surveillance Testing ENS 482742012-09-04T04:00:0004 September 2012 04:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection Declared Inoperable ENS 477452012-03-15T00:34:00015 March 2012 00:34:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Inoperable Due to Failure of Turbine Governor Valve ENS 475852012-01-12T03:15:00012 January 2012 03:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable ENS 445412008-10-05T08:31:0005 October 2008 08:31:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) System Inoperable ENS 442632008-06-04T06:57:0004 June 2008 06:57:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable ENS 441542008-04-22T12:41:00022 April 2008 12:41:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Loss of Safety Function Due to Blown Fuse ENS 439202008-01-19T16:52:00019 January 2008 16:52:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 'A' and 'B' Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Overspeed Stops Found Set High (Non-Conservative) During Surveillance Testing ENS 437792007-11-11T21:39:00011 November 2007 21:39:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Inoperable Due to Valve Failure During Quarterly Surveillance ENS 435372007-07-31T04:51:00031 July 2007 04:51:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable ENS 424222006-03-14T21:59:00014 March 2006 21:59:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Loss of Control Room Emergency Filtration ENS 419952005-09-15T01:38:00015 September 2005 01:38:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Failed Surveillance Testing ENS 418522005-07-19T07:45:00019 July 2005 07:45:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable ENS 408762004-07-16T14:00:00016 July 2004 14:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Technical Specification Shutdown/Loss of Single Safety Function ENS 406482004-04-06T00:30:0006 April 2004 00:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Offsite Electrical Power Sources and 1E 4Kv Distribution Buses Inoperable ENS 405392004-02-23T06:52:00023 February 2004 06:52:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Technical Specification Required Shutdown Started Due to Grass Intrusion ENS 402252003-10-05T07:00:0005 October 2003 07:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Inoperable Trains of Control Room Emergency Filtration at Hope Creek ENS 401072003-08-27T13:24:00027 August 2003 13:24:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Control Room Access Door Latch Was Determiend to Be Not Fully Engaging. 2023-04-30T05:00:00 | |
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