ENS 41852
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ENS Event | |
|---|---|
07:45 Jul 19, 2005 | |
| Title | |
| Event Description | On 7/19/05 at 0345, maintenance technicians were performing a voltage check during an I&C surveillance when a lead slipped, making inadvertent contact within the panel. This resulted in shorting of a power connection and blowing a fuse. This fuse supplied initiation and trip logic components associated with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system, the 'A' Core Spray system, and the 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system. Loss of the HPCI system is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
Hope Creek entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 for HPCI inoperability with one Core Spray and one RHR system inoperable. Actions to replace the fuse and restore operability of the HPCI system were completed at 0909 on 7/19/05, allowing exit from TS 3.0.3. Actions to commence staffing for a shutdown and implement required procedures were implemented, however a power reduction was not initiated based on successful restoration. The remaining retest activities associated with fuse restoration were completed for the 'A' Core Spray Loop and the 'A' RHR system at 0923 on 7/19/05, clearing the remaining Limiting Conditions for Operation associated with the fuse failure. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems or safety related equipment was inoperable during this time period. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and Lower Alloways Creek Township.
Event # 41852, which was made by Hope Creek on July 19, 2005, at 1053, is being retracted. Although HPCI was declared inoperable in accordance with the instrumentation Technical Specification due to the instrumentation that was inoperable as a result of the blown fuse, a subsequent review of the HPCI control circuitry determined that HPCI remained capable of automatically performing its safety function in response to any event for which it is credited. Since HPCI was able to perform its safety function, it is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and this notification can be retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Gray). |
| Where | |
|---|---|
Hope Creek  New Jersey (NRC Region 1) | |
| Reporting | |
| 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
| Time - Person (Reporting Time:+3.13 h0.13 days <br />0.0186 weeks <br />0.00429 months <br />) | |
| Opened: | Mark Shaffer 10:53 Jul 19, 2005 |
| NRC Officer: | Pete Snyder |
| Last Updated: | Aug 5, 2005 |
| 41852 - NRC Website
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Unit 1 | |
|---|---|
| Reactor critical | Critical |
| Scram | No |
| Before | Power Operation (100 %) |
| After | Power Operation (100 %) |
Hope Creek with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | |
WEEKMONTHYEARENS 564942023-04-30T05:00:00030 April 2023 05:00:00
[Table view]10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded Primary Containment Integrity Degraded ENS 536252018-09-26T04:00:00026 September 2018 04:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Core Injection (Hpci) System Inoperable ENS 521592016-08-07T05:01:0007 August 2016 05:01:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable ENS 499092014-03-13T10:31:00013 March 2014 10:31:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Standby Liquid Control System Sample Concentration Outside Technical Specification Limits ENS 496712013-12-20T18:03:00020 December 2013 18:03:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Both Control Room Air Conditioning Subsystems Inoperable ENS 488972013-04-08T15:15:0008 April 2013 15:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Declared Inoperable During Surveillance Testing ENS 482742012-09-04T04:00:0004 September 2012 04:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection Declared Inoperable ENS 477452012-03-15T00:34:00015 March 2012 00:34:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Inoperable Due to Failure of Turbine Governor Valve ENS 475852012-01-12T03:15:00012 January 2012 03:15:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable ENS 445412008-10-05T08:31:0005 October 2008 08:31:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection (Hpci) System Inoperable ENS 442632008-06-04T06:57:0004 June 2008 06:57:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable ENS 441542008-04-22T12:41:00022 April 2008 12:41:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Loss of Safety Function Due to Blown Fuse ENS 439202008-01-19T16:52:00019 January 2008 16:52:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 'A' and 'B' Recirculation Pump Motor Generator Overspeed Stops Found Set High (Non-Conservative) During Surveillance Testing ENS 437792007-11-11T21:39:00011 November 2007 21:39:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Hpci Inoperable Due to Valve Failure During Quarterly Surveillance ENS 435372007-07-31T04:51:00031 July 2007 04:51:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable ENS 424222006-03-14T21:59:00014 March 2006 21:59:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Loss of Control Room Emergency Filtration ENS 419952005-09-15T01:38:00015 September 2005 01:38:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Failed Surveillance Testing ENS 418522005-07-19T07:45:00019 July 2005 07:45:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident High Pressure Coolant Injection System Inoperable ENS 408762004-07-16T14:00:00016 July 2004 14:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Technical Specification Shutdown/Loss of Single Safety Function ENS 406482004-04-06T00:30:0006 April 2004 00:30:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Offsite Electrical Power Sources and 1E 4Kv Distribution Buses Inoperable ENS 405392004-02-23T06:52:00023 February 2004 06:52:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown Technical Specification Required Shutdown Started Due to Grass Intrusion ENS 402252003-10-05T07:00:0005 October 2003 07:00:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Inoperable Trains of Control Room Emergency Filtration at Hope Creek ENS 401072003-08-27T13:24:00027 August 2003 13:24:00 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident Control Room Access Door Latch Was Determiend to Be Not Fully Engaging. 2023-04-30T05:00:00 | |
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