NRC-89-0255, LER 89-031-00:on 891120,both Div II Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) & Emergency Equipment Svc Water Sys Pumps Tripped Immediately.Caused by Inadequacies in Stated Procedures.Procedures revised.W/891220 Ltr

LER 89-031-00:on 891120,both Div II Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) & Emergency Equipment Svc Water Sys Pumps Tripped Immediately.Caused by Inadequacies in Stated Procedures.Procedures revised.W/891220 Ltr

ML19332F809
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	12/20/1989
From:	Anthony P, Orser W DETROIT EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
CON-NRC-89-0255 LER-89-031, NUDOCS 8912190081
Download: ML19332F809 (5)

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o ce der 2o 2989 NRC-89-0255 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 References- ~ Fermi 2 NRC Docket No. 50-341 ,

Facility Operating License No. NPF-43 i'

Subj ec t s . Licensee _ Event Report fLER) No. 89-031-00 Please find enclosed LER No. 89-031-00, dated December 20, 1989. for a reportable event that occurred on November 20, 1989. A copy of this LER is also being sent  ;

to the Regional Administrator. USNRC Region III. l If you have any questions, please contact Patricia  ;

Anthony at (313) 586-1617. -;

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Sincerely,  !

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Enclosure:

NRC Forms 366, 366A j, cc: A. B. Davis J. R. Eckert R. W. Defayette/W. L. Axelson ,

W. G. Rogers i J. F. Stang i i

Wayne County Emergency Management Division  ;

1 8912190081 891220 PDR ADOCK 05000341

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Inadequate Surveillance Procedure Renders Emergency Equipment Cooling Water l Emergency Equipment Service Water Inoperable '

EVENT DATE 15) LER NUMBER (8) REPORT DATE (71 OTHER F ACILITi&S INVOLVED 18)

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NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Patricia Anthony, Compliance Engineer ' " ' ' ' '

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On November 20, 1989, at 1805 hours0.0209 days <br />0.501 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.868025e-4 months <br />, the Division I Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System (EECW) pump and valve operability test was being performed. Both the Division II EECW and Emergency l_ Equipment Service Water System (EESW) pumps tripped immediately L

when manually initiating the Division II EECW. The manual initiation signal was reset and the trip lights cleared.

l Investigation determined that the 52XX relays in the control I

circuit for the Division I and II EECW/EESW pumps were not reset following performance of the Engineered Safety Feature load i

shedding verification tests approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> before. This defeated the automatic start capability of the pumps and therefore, rendered both systems inoperable. The procedures for performing the load shedding test were revised to specify resetting the 52XX relays in the future, i RC e . m (08Ji  !

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Initial Plant conditions:

Operational Condition: 4 (Cold Shutdown)

Reac't or- Powe r : O percent.

Reactor Pressure: 58 psig (Integrated Leak Rate Test in progress)

Reactor _ Temperature: 96 degrees Fahrenheit

.j Description of Occurrence:

On: November 20, 1989,_at'1605 hours0.0186 days <br />0.446 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.107025e-4 months <br />, the Division I Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System pump and valve [(EECW)(BI)(P)(V)]

operability test was being performed. During-the test both the Division II EECW and the Emergency Equipment Service Water System

-[(EESW)(BI)] pumps tripped immediately when Division II EECW was a manually initiated per the procedure. The manual initiation signal was reset by cycling the CMC switches (HS) for the pumps j .and the trip lights were cleared.

1 Surveillance procedures - 24.305.01 and 24.305.02.. Division I and--II  !

480V Engineered Safety Features Bus Load Shedding.Verif_ications, had been performed the previous day. Investiration determined that specific' steps in 24'.305.02 are performed to' preclude the tripping'._of'the Division .Il EECW pump, but they_also defeat the automatic-start feature of the EECW pump by " dropping out" the 52XX relay (RLY) by operating undervoltage relay 4NT94 ( 27 ) .

Similar relay logic exists in the Division I EECW and Divisions I and II of'EESW. This condition'had existed for approximately 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> following completion.of the surveillance testing.

Both divisions of EECW and EESW were rendered inoperable por Technical Specifications by this condition. Therefore, the cooling-support these system provide to Low Pressure Cooling Inj ection (BO), Shutdown Cooling (BO). Core Spray System (BM) and the _ Statidby Gas Treatment System (BH) was unavailable, which would i have affected'the operability of several safety functions.

. Technical Specifications require that Secondary Containment integrity-be established within eight hours when in this <

c o tid i tio n . Since entry into the Technical Specification action statement was not recognized in the 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> following the sutveillance, no actions were taken to verify Secondary Containm-ent integrity; but the Reactor Building (NG) was intact at i

the time. Once the condition was recognized, prompt actions were l taken to restore EECW and EESW to operable status.

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TEXT (# more ap.co d. #seu.ov, es, seweener NRC Fonn JESA W (1h Cause of Event:

This event was caused by inadequacies in procedures 24.305.01 and 24.305.02. The test procedure did not include steps for cycling the CMC switches from " auto" to "off reset" and then back to  ;

a u t o " for.the pumps so that the 52XX relays would1be reset.

Analysis of Event:

There were no safety consequences from this event. During the

• period of time EECW and EESW were inoperable in which the plant was in Cold Shutdown, no events occurred requiring their function such as Loss of Coolant Accidents and Loss of Offsite Power.

Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water System (RBCCW) was in operation to support the components needing cooling and the heat loads present in the reactor and associated cooling systems were very low. In addition, although inoperable by the Technical Specifications, the EECW/EESW systems were still " functional" in that operator action to manually start these pumps could have been taken, if needed. Based upon these circumstances, it can be concluded that adequate cooling was available.

If EECW and EESW had been inoperable during power operation and their function had been required during a design basis event, the safety consequences could have been more severe due to the higher heat loads on the safety systems serviced by EECW/EESW. With the EECW and EESW inoperable, cooling of the Emergency Component Cooling Systems would have been dependent on the RBCCW (a

non-safety grade system) if available or operator actions to restore the pumps. Without these options. the components could have been thermally damaged. Thus, the function of these systems following a design basis accident would have been dependent on the availability of RBCCW and/or operator action to start EECW/EESW.

Corrective _Actionsi

. Surveillance procedures 24.305.01 and 24.305.02 were revised to ensure that the 52XX relays will be reset for the EECW and EESW pumps.

Other loads from buses 72B. 720 72E. 72F. 72EA. 72EA. 72EC and 72ED. which are affected by surveillances 24.305.01 and 24.305.02, were reviewed for similar conditions. No further problems were found for the other buses. This was the first time these surveillances were performed. The need for these surveillances was identified during the Technical Specification Improvement Program in 1988 and a sequence of events was performed to verify the operability at that time.

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0131 1 - q0 0l4 or 0 l11 TEXT f# mwe ausse e segured, est eeWWpW 44C Fwm W's1 H76 Previous Simi16r E entst This is the only instance where inadequate instructions for resetting equipment resultea in systems being left inoperable following a surveillance. In Licensee Fvent Report 87-015. an

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event. where inadequacies in boron concentration surveillant.es i

allowed the Standby Liquid Control System to be outside its Technical Specification limits for several months, was reported.

In that case, the system was functional but not operable per Technical Specifications.

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