ML23200A229
| ML23200A229 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 01/20/2023 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | DTE Energy |
| Bryan Bergeon | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML22007A059 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML23200A229 (1) | |
Text
Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Fermi 2 Scenario #: 1 Scenario Source:
New Op. Test #: 2023 ILT Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
75%, no equipment out of service, Rod Pattern Adjust (RPA) is in progress Turnover:
Reactor Power is at 75% near the end of a Rod Pattern Adjustment. When you take the shift, you will be expected to withdraw control rods to achieve the target rod pattern in accordance with the rod pull sheets to be provided.
Critical Tasks:
(CT-1, SC-SCRAM) With reactor at power and with a primary system discharging into the secondary containment MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor, before any area exceeds the Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) levels.
(CT-2, SC-ED) With a primary system discharging into the secondary containment and area radiation/temperature/water levels exceed maximum safe operating levels in more than one area, INITIATE Emergency Depressurization.
Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A R (ATC)
Pull Rods to target rod pattern using provided pull sheets 2
C51MF0197 I (ATC)
TS (CRS)
On 3rd rod pull, RBM A failure will occur 3
D11MF0021 I (BOP)
TS (CRS)
FP Vent Exhaust Downscale 4
Multiple C (ATC)
Loss of CRD Suction 5
N30MF0051 C (BOP)
Pressure Regulator Fails Low (auto swap to backup) 6 E41MF0007 E41RF0033 M (ALL)
C (BOP)
MC (BOP)
HPCI Steam Leak, Operator unable to close watertight door in HPCI area, HPCI auto isolation fails, manual isolation partially successful (one valve trips thermal overload and one valve remains 10% open when closed) 7 P603_A048_3 C (ATC)
MC (ATC)
EOP 29.100.01 Sheet 5, Secondary containment entered.
HPCI cannot be fully isolated and reaches max safe.
Mode switch to shutdown BEFORE max safe (CT-1, SC-SCRAM)
Mode switch fails, manual RPS pushbuttons must be actuated.
8 N30MF0070 N30MF0072 B21MF0030 C (BOP)
ED Due to two areas max safe (CT-2, SC-ED)
Bypass Valves failed (cannot anticipate ED), SRV H fails on ED
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 1 of 8 Simulator Scenario Summary INITIAL CONDITIONS / PRE-SHIFT BRIEFING Plant is at 69% power for Rod Pattern Adjustment, with the following:
The Core Monitor is inhibited.
Core flow is approximately 70%.
The Rod Line is approximately 85%.
GOP Section 5.0, Power Decrease, was completed through Step 5.2.13.
o Turbine Flow Limiter is 5% above reactor power.
o CFD H was removed from service.
o East HFP was shut down.
GOP 22.000.03 Section 4.0, Power Increase, is in progress currently at step 4.2.18 (next action to take is at 75% power).
The crew is to continue rod withdrawal when you take the shift.
The STA will perform duties as the Rx Management SRO.
The 3rd LNO will perform duties as the Rod Movement Verifier.
Signed, approved copies of the Reactivity Maneuvering Plan Step Sheets are available. In summary, withdral Group 10/1 rods as follows:
o Group 10/1 from 00 to 12. Predicted power increase is 2% total (0.5% per rod).
o Group 10/1 from 12 to 20. Predicted power increase is 2% total (0.5% per rod).
o Group 10/1 from 20 to 30. Predicted power increase is 2.5% total (0.6% per rod). RBM Upscale may occur during these rod pulls.
o Group 10/1 from 30 to 48. Predicted power increase is 2.0% total (0.5% per rod).
Additional RMP Step Sheets, and guidance for raising Core Flow, will be provided after the above is complete.
Please conduct your Reactivity Management brief, and prepare all procedures to support rod withdrawal, prior to taking the shift.
No additional equipment is out of service.
All licensed operators are in the Main Control Room (MCR).
Normal shift complement of non-licensed operators are available.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 2 of 8 Simulator Scenario Summary
SUMMARY
OF EVENTS Event 1:
Pull Rods to target rod pattern using provided pull sheets Type:
RX When the 12th rod, which is CR 06-31, is selected and withdrawn past position 20, RBM A will fail. The crew will need to respond using ARPs, which will send them to 23.607 to bypass the RBM. The CRS will evaluate Tech Specs.
Event 2:
On 3rd rod pull, RBM A failure will occur Type:
I, TS When the 12th rod, which is CR 06-31, is selected and withdrawn past position 20, RBM A will fail. The crew will need to respond using ARPs, which will send them to 23.607 to bypass the RBM. The CRS will evaluate Tech Specs Event 3:
FP Vent Exhaust Downscale Type:
I, TS East Fuel Pool Division 1 Radiation Monitor downscale failure. This will require entry into Tech Specs.
Event 4:
Loss of CRD Suction Type:
C Loss of CRD Pump suction pressure caused by failure of the CRD Suction Pressure Control Valve. This will cause the running CRD pump to trip. If the standby pump is started, it will also trip. A CRD pump will be restored by directing field actions to manually bypass the CRD pump suction PCV and then starting a CRD pump Event 5:
Pressure Regulator Fault Type:
C An event will occur that will cause a loss of the in-service pressure regulator, due to it failing low, requiring entry into the AOP and taking actions to swap to the backup pressure regulator.
Event 6:
PCI Steam Leak to MSO Type:
MAJ, C, MC Steam leaking from the HPCI system will cause the crew to enter 20.000.02, Abnormal Release of Radioactive Material and 29.100.01 Sheet 5, Secondary Containment Control. Attempts to isolate the steam leak will be unsuccessful and HPCI room temperatures will approach the Maximum Safe Operating (MSO) value
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 3 of 8 Simulator Scenario Summary Event 7:
HPCI>MSO, Mode Switch fails, RPS push buttons work, Div 2 CS Pump area temp rising Type:
C, MC With HPCI room temperatures approaching MSO, the SRO should direct the Mode Switch taken to Shutdown BEFORE the MSO is reached (CT-1).
When the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown, the crew will be informed that the watertight door to the HPCI room is open and unable to be closed. This will cause rising temperatures in the Div 2 Core Spray Pump Room area Event 8:
Anticipate ED, BPV failure, 2 areas > MSO, ED Type:
C With the HPCI watertight door unable to be closed, the crew will attempt to anticipate emergency depressurization by opening Main Turbine Bypass Valves. Both BPVs will fail to operate.
Div 2 CSS Pump Room temperature will begin to rise and eventually exceed Maximum Safe Operating temperature of 210F. This will prompt the crew to emergency depressurize the plant using 5 SRVs, ADS preferred.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 4 of 8 Simulator Scenario Summary A. SIMULATOR SETUP SCENARIO SPECIFIC SETUP:
- 1.
Initialize the simulator to IC-171 or use IC-20 and perform the following (~68% power):
- a. LOWER RR flow to 70% core flow (~57% Speed).
- b. FULLY INSERT Group 10/2 (from 10 to 00).
- c. FULLY INSERT 10/1 (from 48 to 00).
- d. SET Turbine Flow Limiter 5% above Rx Power.
- e. CHECK APRM Vs CTP. If >1.5% difference, ADJUST APRM 1/2/3/4 Gain using C51RF065/066/067/068) for the applicable APRM(s).
- f. REMOVE CFDs, as necessary, to maintain CFD flow >2,000 gpm (Only CFD H was removed from service in IC-171).
- g. REMOVE one HFP from service (East removed in IC-171).
- i.
FREEZE the simulator and save the IC for later use (or in case something happens).
- 2.
PLACE the simulator in RUN.
- 3.
OPEN and EXECUTE lesson ILT 2023 Scenario 1.
- 4.
TRIGGER Setup step
- 5.
For ROD PULL Steps, PRINT and SIGN the following and place on CRSs desk:
- a. The first page of RMP Step Sheets for group 10/1 (from 00 to 12).
- b. Predictor sheet for the rod pulls.
- c. Maneuvering plan.
- 6.
MARK GOP 22.000.03 complete through step 5.2.13 (Power Decrease section).
- 7.
Turn GOP 22.000.03 to page 16, Step 4.2.18 (Power Increase section).
- 8.
REMOVE red CRAM Array dots.
- 9.
REMOVE CRAM Book from MCR.
- 10.
RESET LPRM alarms @ P603 panel on APRM ODAs (Trip Status Screen, push RESET Memory).
GENERIC SETUP:
- 1.
PROVIDE crew a list of available NOs
- 2.
ENSURE that all annunciators are acknowledged and the plant is stable
- 3.
ACKNOWLDGE DCS alarms
- 4.
VERIFY GSW placard is in place and indicates INTERMITTENT.
- 5.
VERIFY CFD placard has current dates (within the last 14 days is acceptable).
- 6.
COMPLETE Attachment 1 of NTWI 5.12
- 7.
ALLOW the operators to enter the room, provide them with a turnover in accordance with Section E, and allow them to walk down the panels
- 8.
ENSURE simulator alarms are NOT silenced
- 9.
TRIGGER steps as directed by the guide/Lead Evaluator
- 10.
RECORD communications with crew members on NTWI 5.12 Attachment 3
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 5 of 8 Simulator Scenario Summary B. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS The following malfunctions and/or remote functions are to be active/activated as indicated in the time line:
MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay insert C11RF0398 Mode SW Failure RESET S1 0
0 insert C71MF0006 ACTIVE 0
0 cd= P603_A048_1 EQ 1 AND H_P804_B002_2 EQ 0 Fail BPVs closed when MS in S/D N/A S2 0
0 insert N30MF0070 ACTIVE 0
5 insert N30MF0072 ACTIVE 0
5 Insert C51MF0197 cd= H_P603_A0550631_2 eq 1 and H_P603_B091_2 eq 1 and P603_A059_3 eq 1 RBM A Failure conditional on rod select ACTIVE 1A 0
0 insert D11MF0021 N010A Fuel Pool Vent D1 East Rad Mon Fail 0.0 3
0 0
insert C103N018ZNPCAP Loss of CRD Suction 30.0 4
0 0
insert C101F412TASTEM 0
0 0
insert C101F412ZMANTYP 1
0 0
insert C101F212ZDIREC TRUE 0
0 insert C101F412TASTEM Manual CRD Suction Control 1.0 4a 0
0 insert C103N018ZNPCAP 0.00143141 0
0 insert C11RF0210 Reset CRD High Temp RESET 4b 0
0 insert N30MF0051 Press Reg Fails LOW 900.0 5
60 0
insert EOPRF0022 Unisolable HPCI Steam Leak DEFEAT 6
0 0
insert E4BDK34TVSP 0
0 0
insert E41MF0007 25 600 0
insert E41MF0008 cd='H_P602_B112_2 EQ 1' 99 0
0
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 6 of 8 Simulator Scenario Summary MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay insert E41RF0033 cd='H_P602_B206_2 EQ 1' OPEN 0
0 insert C71MF0006 cd=H_P603_B211_1 EQ 1 Clears scram MF with RPS Pushbuttons CLEAR 6A 0
0 P603_A048_1 Triggers Event 7/8 steps EQ 1 7/8 0
0 cd=NBKGANA_COND795942 OUT LE 350 AND H_P601_A197_2 EQ 0 Continues Temp Ramp if RPV < 350 psig BEFORE ED N/A 7/8 0
0 insert TA20TEN207TFASIS TRUE 0
0 insert TA20TEN207ZSOUT delay=0 ramp=on=0 off=0 225 300 0
insert TA20TEN206ZSOUT delay=0 ramp=on=0 off=0 225 360 0
cd= TA20TEN207ZSOUT GT 140 Ramps Temp in 2nd area N/A 0
0 insert TA20TEN206TFASIS TRUE 0
0 insert TA20TEN206ZSOUT 225 360 0
cd=H_P601_A197_2 EQ 1 Ramps down Room Temps after ED N/A 0
0 insert TA20TEN207TFASIS TRUE 0
0 insert TA20TEN206ZSOUT 100 600 0
insert TA20TEN207ZSOUT 100 600 0
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 7 of 8 Simulator Scenario Summary C. REFERENCES The following is a list of expected Procedure References used in this scenario:
Procedure Title 1D66 STEAM LEAK DETECTION AMBIENT TEMP HIGH 1D70 STEAM LEAK DETECTION DIFF TEMP HIGH 3D1 CRD PUMP A/B SUCTION PRESSURE LOW 3D5 CRD CHARGING H2O PRESSURE LOW 3D10 CRD ACCUMULATOR TROUBLE 3D13 CRD HYDRAULIC TEMPERATURE HIGH 3D18 IPCS MONITORED INPUTS ABNORMAL 3D27 DIV I/II FP VENT EXH RADN MONITOR DNSCL/INOP 3D34 SEC CONTM TEMP HIGH-HIGH EOP ENTRY 3D96 MOTOR TRIPPED 3D109 RBM UPSCALE/INOP 3D110 RBM DOWNSCALE 3D113 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK 4D91 ELECTRIC GOVERNOR TROUBLE 5D126 NORMAL HOTWELL SUPPLY PUMP AUTO START 16D27 FIRE ALARM 20.000.02 ABNORMAL RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL 20.106.01 CRD HYDRAULIC SYSTEM FAILURE 20.109.02 REACTOR PRESSURE CONTROLLER FAILURE 23.106 CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 8 of 8 Simulator Scenario Summary 23.607 ROD BLOCK MONITORING SYSTEM 23.601 INSTRUMENT TRIP SHEETS 29.ESP.21 DEFEAT OF TORUS WATER MANAGEMENT ISOLATIONS AND TORUS LEVEL CONTROL 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.6.2 Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.7.1 Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) System Instrumentation
Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Fermi 2 Scenario #: 2 Scenario Source:
New Op. Test #: 2023 ILT Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
100%, #4 GSW Pump Out Of Service for repairs Turnover:
Maintain 100% power for the shift. When you take the shift, you will perform a PST to swap CRD pumps.
Critical Tasks:
(CT-1, PC-SCRAM) Upon failure of automatic scram due to High Drywell Pressure, insert control rods by placing the Mode Switch in shutdown.
(CT-2, RPV-HPCI) Start HPCI to maintain reactor water level >
TAF (CT-3, RPV-Injection) Control injection systems to prevent flooding the Main Steam lines.
Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A N (ATC)
PST event for CRD Pump Swap 2
C93RF0001 C97MF1087 C (BOP)
TS (CRS)
Seismic Event 3
C51MF0006 I (ATC)
APRM Flow Failure Bypass 4
C93RF0001 C97MF1087 E41MF0010 C (BOP)
TS(CRS)
Seismic aftershock, HPCI spurious start, shutdown HPCI 5
N20MF0019 R (ATC)
North Condenser Pump trip, lower power <88%
6 C71MF0001 M (ALL)
I (ATC)
MC (ATC)
LOCA, Automatic Scram Failure on High DWP. Mode Switch to Shutdown successful. (CT-1, PC-SCRAM) 7 B31MF0066 C (BOP)
MC (BOP)
Manually startup HPCI to prevent Level <TAF. (CT-2, RPV-HPCI)
Control Systems to prevent flooding MS Lines. (CT-3, RPV-Injection)
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 1 of 7 Simulator Scenario Summary INITIAL CONDITIONS / PRE-SHIFT BRIEFING Power was lowered to 80% at the start of the previous shift for performance of a rod pattern adjustment.
Power restoration to 100% is in progress with power currently being held at 94% pending an evaluation of the final rod pattern by Reactor Engineering. (NOTE: 94% is required to prevent other condensate pumps from tripping)
- 4 GSW Pump is out of service for repairs with an expected return to service of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
No additional equipment is out of service.
All licensed operators are in the Main Control Room (MCR).
Normal shift complement of non-licensed operators are available.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 2 of 7 Simulator Scenario Summary
SUMMARY
OF EVENTS Event 1:
PST Event for shifting CRD pumps Type:
N Shortly after taking the shift, the crew will perform PST Event WL19 to shift operating CRD pumps.
Event 2:
Seismic event < OBE Type:
C, TS A seismic event will occur, and operators will take actions per 20.000.01. The event will be below the threshold for EAL declaration. The event will require evaluation of the TRM for impact.
Event 3:
APRM #2 flow unit fails upscale Type:
I The APRM #2 flow unit will fail upscale. The crew will investigate and subsequently determine that tracking LCOs are necessary for TS LCO 3.3.1.1 and TR LCO 3.3.2.1. Crew will bypass APRM #2 per 23.605.
Event 4:
Seismic aftershock < OBE / spurious initiation of HPCI Type:
TS, C A seismic aftershock will occur, which causes a spurious start of the HPCI system. Operators will verify that it was not a valid initiation signal and will shut down the HPCI system. SRO will verify Tech Specs for HPCI being inoperable.
Event 5:
North Condenser Pump trip, Lower power < 88%
Type:
RX The North Condenser Pump will trip on overcurrent and will be unavailable due to oil leak. Crew will lower power <88% and verify power to flow map position.
Event 6:
LOCA, Auto Scram Failure on High DWP, Mode Switch successful.
Type:
MAJ, I, MC A 1% LOCA will occur. As drywell pressure rises, an auto scram failure will occur (high drywell pressure trip). The crew should recognize that the reactor does not scram automatically and will take manual action by placing the mode switch in shutdown. (CT-1, PC-SCRAM).
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 3 of 7 Simulator Scenario Summary Event 7:
Manually startup HPCI to prevent Level <TAF, control Systems to prevent flooding MS Lines.
Type:
C, MC HPCI was shut down in a previous event, so it will need to be manually started for it to inject (CT-2, RPV-HPCI). Injection then needs to be controlled to maintain RPV level below the Main Steam Lines (CT-3, RPV-Injection).
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 4 of 7 Simulator Scenario Summary A. SIMULATOR SETUP SCENARIO SPECIFIC SETUP:
- 1.
INITIALIZE the simulator to IC-172 or similar IC with the following attributes:
- a. LOWER RR Flow to achieve 94% Power (approximately 69% speed on the RRMG Sets).
- 2.
PLACE #4 GSW Pump CMC in OFF/RESET.
- 3.
PLACE RT dot next to #4 GSW Pump CMC.
- 4.
PLACE the simulator in RUN.
- 5.
TRIGGER Setup step GENERIC SETUP:
- 1.
PROVIDE crew a list of available NOs
- 2.
ENSURE that all annunciators are acknowledged and the plant is stable
- 3.
ACKNOWLDGE DCS alarms
- 4.
VERIFY GSW placard is in place and indicates INTERMITTENT.
- 5.
VERIFY CFD placard has current dates (within the last 14 days is acceptable).
- 6.
COMPLETE Attachment 1 of NTWI 5.12
- 7.
ALLOW the operators to enter the room, provide them with a turnover in accordance with Section E, and allow them to walk down the panels
- 8.
ENSURE simulator alarms are NOT silenced
- 9.
TRIGGER steps as directed by the guide/Lead Evaluator
- 10.
RECORD communications with crew members on NTWI 5.12 Attachment 3
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 5 of 7 Simulator Scenario Summary B. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS The following malfunctions and/or remote functions are to be active/activated as indicated in the time line:
MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay cd=P807_A008_2 EQ 0
- 4 GSW Pump Blown Fuse N/A S1 0
0 PAACFU_01CC 1
0 0
PAACFU_02CC 1
0 0
C71MF0001 High DWP Scram Fail ACTIVE S2 0
0 C97MF1087 Seismic Event 1
Event 2 0
0 C97MF1087 2
0 60 C93RF0001 ON 0
0 C51MF0006 APRM #2 Flow Unit Failure 130 Event 3 0
0 C97MF1087 Seismic Aftershock - HPCI Spurious Start 1
Event 4 0
0 delia C97MF1087 2
0 60 C93RF0001 ON 0
0 E41MF0010 ACTIVE 0
0 N20MF0019 N. Cond Pump Trip ACTIVE Event 5 0
0 B31MF0067 1% LOCA 1.0 Event 6 300 0
N20MF0018 N20MF0020 Condenser Pump C/N/S Trip ACTIVE N/A 60s
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 6 of 7 Simulator Scenario Summary C. REFERENCES The following is a list of expected Procedure References used in this scenario:
Procedure Title 2D28 HPCI STEAM LINE DIFF PRESS HIGH 2D57 HPCI ISO TURBINE TRIP PUSHBUTTON ARMED POS 2D59 HPCI PUMP DISCH FLOW LOW 2D62 HPCI CNDR VAC TANK PRESSURE HIGH 2D64 HPCI OIL FILTER DIFF PRESSURE HIGH 2D93 HPCI TURBINE TRIPPED 3D18 IPCS MONITORED INPUTS ABNORMAL 3D111 RBM TROUBLE 3D113 CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK 3D115 APRM FLOW UPSCALE 3D164 FEEDWATER CONTROL DCS TROUBLE 5D144 MOTOR TRIPPED 6D69 SEISMIC SYSTEM EVENT/TROUBLE 20.000.01 ACTS OF NATURE 20.000.21 REACTOR SCRAM 23.106 CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 23.107 REACTOR FEEDWATER AND CONDENSATE SYSTEMS 23.138.01 REACTOR RECIRCULATION SYSTEM 23.202 HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM 23.206 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 7 of 7 Simulator Scenario Summary 23.208 RHR COMPLEX SERVICE WATER SYSTEMS 23.413 CONTROL CENTER HVAC 23.601 INSTRUMENT TRIP SHEETS 23.605 AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITORING (APRM) SYSTEM 23.612 SEISMIC MONITORING 23.702 EQUIPMENT AND FLOOR DRAINAGE SYSTEM TR 3.3.7.2 Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation TR 3.3.2.1 Control Rod Block Instrumentation 3.3.1.1 Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation 3.5.1 ECCS - Operating
Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Fermi 2 Scenario #: 3 Scenario Source:
New Op. Test #: 2023 ILT Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
100%, RFP Lube Oil Pump OOS, North ST Cooler High Vibes Turnover:
Swap Steam Tunnel Coolers due to high vibes Critical Tasks:
(CT-1, ATWS-ADS) Prevent Automatic ADS initiation.
(CT-2, ATWS-Power) Control power by controlling RPV water level and inserting rods to prevent exceeding the HCL.
Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A N (BOP)
Swap Steam Tunnel Cooler per SOP 2
C11MF0741 C (ATC)
TS (CRS)
Control Rod 38-31 Drift out of the core 3
T41MF0004 C (BOP)
TS (CRS)
Trip of Div 2 CCHVAC Return Air Fan. AOP 20.413.01 entry. BOP starts Div 2 CCHVAC. SRO evaluates LCO 3.7.3 and 3.7.4.
4 P50MF0014 P502PSE_N415TFASIS C (BOP)
MC (BOP)
West SAC Unloader Failure, standby fails to start automatically, must be started manually.
5 NB06N2102C002_PBTVBRVIB NB06N2102C015_TB_BTVTBGVIB NB06N2102C015_TB_CTVTBGVIB C (BOP)
RFP High Vibes, no auto trip. BOP trips 6
B31RF0031 B31RF0033 C (ATC)
MC (ATC)
North (A) Recirculation pump fails to run back on RFP trip; must be manually run back 7
N/A R (ATC)
Evaluate P/F Map and insert cram array (due to RFP trip) 8 C11MF0393 C11MF0207 C (ATC)
Multiple rods drift, place the Mode Switch in Shutdown (Immediate Action) 9 EOPRF0011/12/13/14 P603_A019(20/21/22)_3 0 C71MF0006 C41MF0002 M (ALL)
C (ATC)
Electric ATWS Prevent Automatic ADS Initiation (CT-1, ATWS-ADS)
BOP controls RPV water level and ATC steps through ESP to insert rods manually (CT-2, ATWS-Power)
SLC fails to start
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 1 of 9 Simulator Scenario Summary INITIAL CONDITIONS / PRE-SHIFT BRIEFING The plant is at 100% Power with the South RFPT East Lube Oil Pump A tagged out for motor replacement.
Expected return to service is 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />.
After the crew takes the shift, the operating Steam Tunnel Cooler will be shifted from North to South per SOP 23.414.
No additional equipment is out of service.
All licensed operators are in the Main Control Room (MCR).
Normal shift complement of non-licensed operators are available.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 2 of 9 Simulator Scenario Summary
SUMMARY
OF EVENTS Event 1:
Steam Tunnel Cooler shift Type:
N The crew will perform the normal evolution of shifting the in-service Steam Tunnel Cooler, from the North to the South, in accordance with 23.414, Steam Tunnel Cooling.
Event 2:
CR 38-31 drifts out of core Type:
C, TS Control Rod 38-31 will drift out of the core requiring operators to enter AOP 20.106.07 and perform immediate actions to insert the drifting control rod. Operators will then disarm the control rod and evaluate the impact on Technical Specifications.
Event 3:
Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan trip Type:
C, TS Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan will trip. The crew will identify the alarms associated with the failure and review the applicable ARPs. The CRS will enter AOP 20.413.01. The crew will start D2 CCHVAC and shutdown D1.
The CRS will evaluate TS LCO 3.7.4 & 3.7.3.
Event 4:
West SAC unloads and Center SAC fails to auto start Type:
C, MC The unloader valve will fail for the in-service (West) Station Air Compressor (SAC) and the standby (Center)
SAC will not auto start. The crew will recognize this failure and act, either directly or upon entry into AOP 20.129.01, Loss of Station and Control Air, to start the standby SAC to restore air system parameters.
Event 5:
RFP High Vibes, RFP fails to trip Type:
C High Vibration on the South Reactor Feedwater Pump (RFP) Pump and Turbine will cause the crew to evaluate alarms and indications and then trip the S. RFP.
Event 6:
North RRMG Set auto runback failure Type:
C, MC Event 7:
Evaluate P/F Map and insert CRAM array Type:
RX The North RRMG Set fails to run back to Limiter 3 following trip of the S. RFP. The ATC will recognize this failure and manually run back the RRMG set. The ATC will plot position on the P/F Map and insert the CRAM Rods to restore operation outside of the Stability Awareness Region
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 3 of 9 Simulator Scenario Summary Event 8:
Multiple rods drift, place the Mode Switch in Shutdown Type:
C Event 9:
Electric ATWS, SLC fails to start Type:
MAJ, C Multiple rod drifts will require a reactor scram per immediate actions of 20.106.07. When the Mode Switch is taken to Shutdown, RPS will fail to actuate requiring performance of ATWS Actions. ARI will also fail to initiate, resulting in an electronic ATWS. Operators will control level, inject SLC and manually insert control rods to control reactor power. Control rod insertion will occur when either the scram fuses are pulled or the scram air header is vented.
CT-1, ATWS-ADS - With a reactor scram required, reactor not shutdown, INHIBIT ADS to prevent an uncontrolled RPV depressurization, and to prevent causing a significant power excursion.
CT-2, ATWS-Power - When directed by the EOPs, TAKE ACTION TO REDUCE POWER BELOW 3% by injecting SLC or Boron using the alternate means; -OR-lowering RPV water level; -OR-inserting control rods prior to exceeding the Heat Capacity Limit curve (HCL).
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 4 of 9 Simulator Scenario Summary A. SIMULATOR SETUP SCENARIO SPECIFIC SETUP:
- 1.
Initialize the simulator to IC-173 or an IC set up with the following attributes: 100% power
- 2.
PLACE the simulator in RUN.
- 3.
OPEN lesson ILT 2023 Scenario 3.lsn.
- 4.
EXECUTE the lesson.
- 5.
ENSURE the CMC Switch for South RFPT East Lube Oil Pump A is in OFF-RESET.
- 6.
PLACE an RT DOT next to the CMC for the South RFPT East Lube Oil Pump A.
- 7.
PLACE the CMC switch for South RFPT West Lube Oil Pump B in RUN
- 8.
TRIGGER Setup step to:
- c. Insert ATWS malfunctions
- 9.
Verify the CRAM array book is correct and free from marks.
GENERIC SETUP:
- 1.
PROVIDE crew a list of available NOs
- 2.
ENSURE that all annunciators are acknowledged and the plant is stable
- 3.
ACKNOWLDGE DCS alarms
- 4.
VERIFY GSW placard is in place and indicates INTERMITTENT.
- 5.
VERIFY CFD placard has current dates (within the last 14 days is acceptable).
- 6.
COMPLETE Attachment 1 of NTWI 5.12
- 7.
ALLOW the operators to enter the room, provide them with a turnover in accordance with Section E, and allow them to walk down the panels
- 8.
ENSURE simulator alarms are NOT silenced
- 9.
TRIGGER steps as directed by the guide/Lead Evaluator
- 10.
RECORD communications with crew members on NTWI 5.12 Attachment 3
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 5 of 9 Simulator Scenario Summary B. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS The following malfunctions and/or remote functions are to be active/activated as indicated in the time line:
MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay EOPRF0011 Electric ATWS DEFEAT S1 EOPRF0012 DEFEAT EOPRF0013 DEFEAT EOPRF0014 DEFEAT EOPRF0041 DEFEAT EOPRF0042 DEFEAT EOPRF0043 DEFEAT EOPRF0044 DEFEAT P603_A019_3 0
P603_A020_3 0
P603_A021_3 0
P603_A022_3 0
R11RF0321 S. RFP West LO Pump OFF S2 C11MF0741 CR 38-31 Drifts OUT ACTIVE 2
C11MF0741 Disarm CR 38-31 CLEAR 2a T41MF0002 Trip Div 1 CCHVAC Return Fan 1
3 P50MF0014 West SAC Unloader Failure 1.0 4
P502PSE_N415TFASIS Stby SAC Fails to Start TRUE NB06N2102C002_PBTVBRVIB S. RFP Pump vibe MF to 0.5 = 2.2/1.7 mils => no alarm 0.5 300 NB06N2102C015_TB_BTVTBGVIB S. RFP Turb Vibe MFs to 0.5 = 2.5 mils => no alarm 0.5 300 NB06N2102C015_TB_CTVTBGVIB 0.5 300 NB06N2102C015_TB_BTVTBGVIB 0.7 5
720
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 6 of 9 Simulator Scenario Summary MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay NB06N2102C015_TB_CTVTBGVIB Turb Vibe MFs to 0.7 = 3.2 mils => above alarm 0.7 800 NB06N2102C015_TB_BTVTBGVIB Turb Vibe MF to 1.0 = 4.4 mils -- NOT enough to TRIP 1.0 5a 150 NB06N2102C015_TB_CTVTBGVIB 1.0 150 NB06N2102C015_TB_CZCTBGVIB Vibration Failure Intensity -
To Trip 5.8 300 NB06N2102C002_PBTVBRVIB Pump vibe MF to 0.7 = 3.0 mils 0.7 300 cd=P805_B028_2 EQ 1 AND P805_B028_3 EQ 1 Removes High Vibes AFTER Trip NB06N2102C015_TB_BTVTBGVIB 0.1 30 NB06N2102C015_TB_CTVTBGVIB 0.2 20 NB06N2102C015_TB_CZCTBGVIB 0.0 30 NB06N2102C002_PBTVBRVIB 0.0 10 B31RF0031 Set #2 and #3 Limiters to 64.79 for North RRMG 64.79 6
B31RF0033 64.79 C11MF0055 Multiple rod drifts ACTIVE 8
C11MF0219 ACTIVE C11MF0549 ACTIVE cd=P603_A048_1 eq 1 Clears Rod Drifts when MS in Shutdown C11MF0055 CLEAR C11MF0219 CLEAR C11MF0549 CLEAR EOPRF0007 29.ESP.11 defeat 8a EOPRF0010 defeat EOPRF0048 Remove Scram Fuses 1
8b 0
EOPRF0050 1
10
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 7 of 9 Simulator Scenario Summary MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay EOPRF0049 1
20 EOPRF0051 1
30 EOPRF0052 1
70 EOPRF0053 1
90 EOPRF0054 1
100 EOPRF0055 1
130 EOPRF0048 Install Scram Fuses 2
8b1 0
EOPRF0050 2
10 EOPRF0049 2
20 EOPRF0051 2
30 EOPRF0052 2
70 EOPRF0053 2
90 EOPRF0054 2
100 EOPRF0055 2
130 C103ANA_COND_C11GAIN Vent Scram Air Header 0
8c
Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline Facility:
Fermi 2 Scenario #: 4 Scenario Source:
New Op. Test #: 2023 ILT Examiners:
Applicants/
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
90%, maintenance completed on #2 GSW pump. Switch pumps following power ascension.
Turnover:
Raise power to 100% using flow. Swap GSW Pumps.
Critical Tasks:
(CT-1 PC-Torus) With reactor at power and suppression pool water level cannot be maintained greater than -38, MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor before reaching -38 (CT-2 PC-Torus ED) When suppression pool water cannot be maintained greater than -38, ANTICIPATE ED and/or ED Event No.
Malf No.
Event Type*
Event Description 1
N/A R (ATC)
Raise power to 100% using flow 2
N/A N (BOP)
GSW Pump swap 3
C102SENSOR 571916TVNOISE C (ATC)
MC (ATC)
P41MF0006 C (BOP)
GSW Pump trip 5
P80MF0015 C (BOP)
TS (CRS)
EFP spurious start, S/D 6
C32MF0025 I (ATC)
FW Flow Instrument failure Return to 3-element 7
B21MF0030 C (BOP)
TS (CRS)
ADS SRV H fails open Close SRV via pulling fuses 8
E11MF0047 G51RF0016 M (ALL)
C (BOP)
MC (BOP)
Torus Leak Scram the reactor when Torus leak cannot be isolated (CT-1, PC-Torus)
Torus leak / ED (CT-2 PC-Torus ED)
TWMS fails to isolate, can be isolated manually
- (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Tech Spec, (MC)Manual Control
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 1 of 6 Simulator Scenario Summary INITIAL CONDITIONS / PRE-SHIFT BRIEFING The plant is at 90% following rod pattern adjustment and turbine valve testing. After taking the shift, the crew will raise power to 100% using Reactor Recirculation Flow. Currently in 22.000.03 through step 4.2.21.
- 2 GSW pump is out of service. Maintenance was completed on #2 GSW pump. Following power ascension, the crew will shift GSW pumps per the SOP.
No additional equipment is out of service.
All licensed operators are in the Main Control Room (MCR).
Normal shift complement of non-licensed operators are available.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 2 of 6 Simulator Scenario Summary
SUMMARY
OF EVENTS Event 1:
Raise power to 100% using flow Type:
RX The plant is at 90% power following a rod pattern adjustment and turbine valve testing. After the crew takes the shift, power will be raised to 100% using Reactor Recirculation flow.
Event 2:
GSW Pump swap Type:
N GSW Pumps #3, #5 and #6 are in service. Work has been completed on GSW Pump #2 and it is desired to place that pump in operation. Transfer GSW Pumps in accordance with 23.131 Section 6.6 to place GSW Pump #2 in service and remove GSW Pump #6 from service. The outside rounds NO has been briefed and is standing by in the GSW pump house. Chemistry has been previously contacted and NPDES requirements will not be exceeded by operating GSW strainers as specified in the SOP.
Event 3:
Noisy CRD FCV controller Type:
C, MC The crew will identify a noisy CRD flow controller that is causing oscillations in CRD system flow. The crew will enter AOP 20.106.03, CRD Flow Control Valve Failure, and take manual control of the CRD Flow Control Valve controller and then restore CRD system parameters to normal. Manual CRD flow control will remain in effect for the remainder of the scenario.
Event 4:
GSW Pump trip Type:
C A trip of GSW pump #2 will occur. This will cause the crew to enter AOP 20.131.01, Loss of GSW AOP, and take actions to stabilize GSW header pressure.
Event 5:
EFP spurious start, S/D Type:
C, TS An EFP spurious start will occur. The crew will recognize the conditions and take action per 7D10 to shut down the pump Event 6:
FW Flow Instrument failure, return to 3-element Type:
I The A Feedwater Flow Instrument will fail downscale, due to repositioning the flow element bypass valve.
This will cause Feedwater DCS to transfer to Single Element. The crew will ensure the valve is restored closed and then restore Feedwater DCS to 3-Element Control
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 3 of 6 Simulator Scenario Summary Event 7:
ADS SRV H fails open, close SRV via pulling fuses Type:
C, TS SRV H will fail open due to a fault with its control circuit. The crew will enter 20.000.25, SRV failure, and direct actions to pull fuses for SRV H. The crew will also place RHR in Torus Cooling to address rising Torus Water Temperature. When the fuses are pulled, SRV H will close. This will require follow-up actions in the AOP and an evaluation of Tech Specs by the SRO.
Event 8:
Torus Leak, ED, TWMS fails to isolate Type:
MAJ, C, MC An unisolable leak from the Torus will occur. The leak will cause a high Torus Room Sump level condition, and both sump pumps to run, which is an EOP entry condition. The operators will implement a leak isolation strategy; however, the torus leak is unisolable, requiring a reactor scram before Torus Water Level lowering below -38. TWMS will fail to isolate requiring operator action to isolate. The crew will anticipate Emergency Depressurization (ED) by fully opening the Main Turbine Bypass Valves. The crew will eventually ED by opening 5 SRVs when TWL cannot be kept greater than -38 CT-1, PC-Torus - With reactor at power and suppression pool water level cannot be maintained greater than
-38, MANUALLY SCRAM the reactor before reaching -38.
CT-2, PC-Torus ED - When suppression pool water cannot be maintained greater than -38 inches, INITIATE ED.
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 4 of 6 Simulator Scenario Summary A. SIMULATOR SETUP SCENARIO SPECIFIC SETUP:
- 1.
Initialize the simulator to IC-174 or an IC set up with the following attributes: 90% power
- 2.
PLACE the simulator in RUN.
- 3.
OPEN lesson ILT 2023 Scenario 4.lsn.
- 4.
EXECUTE the lesson.
- 5.
SET OUT and MARKUP GOP 22.000.03 Steps 4.2.20, 4.2.21
- 6.
Verify the CRAM array book is correct and free from marks.
GENERIC SETUP:
- 1.
PROVIDE crew a list of available NOs
- 2.
ENSURE that all annunciators are acknowledged and the plant is stable
- 3.
ACKNOWLDGE DCS alarms
- 4.
VERIFY GSW placard is in place and indicates INTERMITTENT.
- 5.
VERIFY CFD placard has current dates (within the last 14 days is acceptable).
- 6.
COMPLETE Attachment 1 of NTWI 5.12
- 7.
ALLOW the operators to enter the room, provide them with a turnover in accordance with Section E, and allow them to walk down the panels
- 8.
ENSURE simulator alarms are NOT silenced
- 9.
TRIGGER steps as directed by the guide/Lead Evaluator
- 10.
RECORD communications with crew members on NTWI 5.12 Attachment 3
Nuclear Training Work Instruction Instruction 1.21 Initial License Operator Exam Development Revision 20 0 Page 5 of 6 Simulator Scenario Summary B. LIST OF MALFUNCTIONS The following malfunctions and/or remote functions are to be active/activated as indicated in the time line:
MF/RF/PO/LBL Description Target Value Step No.
Ramp Delay C102SENSOR571916TVNOISE (cd=P603_B087_4 EQ 0)
ONLY when in AUTO 0.4 3
delia C102SENSOR571916TVNOISE (cd=P603_B087_4 EQ 1)
Clears noise when in Manual 2
3a P41MF0006 Trip #2 GSW / Start EFP ACTIVE 4/5 P80MF0015 ACTIVE 5
P80RF0003 Local Actions to Shutdown EFP ACTIVE 5a delia P80MF0015 2
C32MF0025 A Feed Flow Inst Failure 1.0 6
delia C32MF0025 Restore A FW Flow Inst 2
6a B21MF0030 SRV H Fails Open 50.0 7
BAAQF3HCC Pull SRV H Fuses -
SRV Closes TRUE 7a BAAQF7HCC TRUE 30 B21MF0030 0.0 30 D123COMP513966REV RHRSW Rad Monitor Sample Pump in service TRUE 7b D123COMP513966REV FALSE 5
delia D123COMP513966REV 2
10 E11MF0047 Torus Leak / TWMS fail 40 8
120 G51RF0016 DEFEAT EOPRF0064 29.ESP.21 DEFEAT 8a EOPRF0062 DEFEAT G51RF0016 DEFEAT G5ATG51M416TVSP 1
EOPRF0063 DEFEAT EOPRF0061 DEFEAT