ML22095A053
| ML22095A053 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/17/2022 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | |
| Brown, C, ACRS | |
| References | |
| NRC-1886 | |
| Download: ML22095A053 (282) | |
Text
Official Transcript of Proceedings NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Title:
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Non-Power Production & Utilization Facilities Open Session Docket Number: (n/a)
Location: teleconference Date: Thursday, March 17, 2022 Work Order No.: NRC-1886 Pages 1-173 NEAL R. GROSS AND CO., INC.
Court Reporters and Transcribers 1716 14th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 234-4433
1 1
2 3
4 DISCLAIMER 5
6 7 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 8 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 9
10 11 The contents of this transcript of the 12 proceeding of the United States Nuclear Regulatory 13 Commission Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, 14 as reported herein, is a record of the discussions 15 recorded at the meeting.
16 17 This transcript has not been reviewed, 18 corrected, and edited, and it may contain 19 inaccuracies.
20 21 22 23 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1323 RHODE ISLAND AVE., N.W.
(202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-3701 www.nealrgross.com
1 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 + + + + +
4 ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS 5 (ACRS) 6 + + + + +
7 NON-POWER PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION FACILITIES 8 SUBCOMMITTEE 9 + + + + +
10 THURSDAY 11 MARCH 17, 2022 12 + + + + +
13 The Subcommittee met via Teleconference, 14 at 8:30 a.m. EDT, Ronald G. Ballinger, Chair, 15 presiding.
16 17 COMMITTEE MEMBERS:
18 RONALD G. BALLINGER, Chair 19 VICKI M. BIER, Member 20 CHARLES H. BROWN, JR. Member 21 VESNA B. DIMITRIJEVIC, Member 22 GREGORY H. HALNON, Member 23 JOSE MARCH-LEUBA, Member 24 DAVID A. PETTI, Member 25 JOY L. REMPE, Member NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
2 1 ACRS CONSULTANTS:
2 DENNIS BLEY 3 STEPHEN SCHULTZ 4
5 DESIGNATED FEDERAL OFFICIAL:
8 9
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
3 1 C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S 2 PAGE 3 Opening Remarks and Objectives 6 4 Staff Opening Remarks 9 5 Chapter 1 and 2 by Tracy Radel from SHINE 11 6 Chapter 1 by Mike Balazik from NRC Staff 34 7 Chapter 2 by Ken See from NRC Staff 39 8 Chapter 5 by Ian Soderling from SHINE 61 9 Chapter 5 by Adam Rau from NRC Staff 78 10 Presentation by Eric Edwards 97 11 Chapter 6 by Alexander Newell . . . . . . . . . 106 12 Chapter 4 and 6 by NRC Staff . . . . . . . . . 123 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
4 1 P R O C E E D I N G S 2 8:30 a.m.
3 CHAIR BALLINGER: The meeting will now 4 come to order. This is a meeting of the NPUF 5 Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Reactor 6 Safeguards. I'm Ron Ballinger, Chairman of today's 7 Subcommittee meeting.
8 The ACRS Members in attendance are Charles 9 Brown, Greg Halnon, Vicki Bier, Joy Rempe, Dave Petti, 10 Jose March-Leuba, and I think Vesna's on the line.
11 Matt Sunseri might be on the line, and we have our 12 consultants, Steve Schultz and Dennis Bley.
13 If I've missed anybody, please let me 14 know. Chris Brown of ACRS Staff is the designated 15 federal official for this meeting. During today's 16 meeting the Subcommittee will receive a briefing from 17 the NRC Staff on SHINE Medical Isotopes.
18 The Subcommittee will hear presentations 19 and hold discussions with the NRC Staff, SHINE 20 representatives, and other interested persons 21 regarding Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and the quality 22 assurance program from Chapter 12.
23 I might remind the Members that please 24 send your feedback through Chris to myself within one 25 week of this meeting so that we can stay on our NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
5 1 schedule.
2 In part of the presentations by the 3 Applicant at an NRC Staff meeting closed in order to 4 discuss information that is proprietary to the 5 licensee and its contractors pursuant to 5 U.S.C.
6 552BC4.
7 Attendance at the meeting that deals with 8 such information will be limited to the NRC Staff and 9 its consultants, SHINE and those individuals and 10 organizations who have entered into an appropriate 11 confidentiality agreement with them.
12 Consequently, we need to confirm that we 13 have only eligible observers and participants in the 14 closed part of the meeting, and the closed part of the 15 meetings will be if necessary in the afternoon.
16 The rules for participation in all ACRS 17 meetings including today's were announced in the 18 Federal Register on June 13, 2019.
19 The ACRS Section of the U.S. NRC public 20 website provides our charter, bylaws, agendas, letter 21 reports, and full transcripts of all full and 22 Subcommittee meetings including slides presented in 23 the meeting notice. And the agenda for this meeting 24 was posted there.
25 We have received no written statements or NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
6 1 requests to make an oral statement from the public.
2 The Subcommittee will gather information and analyze 3 relevant issues and facts, and formulate proposed 4 positions and actions as appropriate for deliberation 5 by the full Committee.
6 The rules for participation in today's 7 meeting have been announced as part of the notice of 8 this meeting previously published in the Federal 9 Register.
10 Today's meeting is being held over 11 Microsoft Teams, which includes a telephone bridge 12 line, a line for participation for the public over 13 their computer using Teams or by phone.
14 Additionally, we have made an MS Teams 15 link available on the published agenda.
16 The transcript of today's meeting is being 17 kept, therefore, we impress that meeting participants 18 on Teams and on the Teams call-in line identify 19 themselves when they speak and to speak with 20 sufficient clarity and volume that they can be readily 21 heard.
22 Likewise, we request that meeting 23 participants keep their computer and/or telephone 24 lines mute when not speaking to minimize disruptions 25 and feedback. The chat feature on the Teams should NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
7 1 not be used for technical exchanges.
2 I'll make sure that everybody is muted.
3 I want to note that SHINE has an NRC-approved QAPD 4 issuance of the permit and has only revised it on the 5 line few years.
6 The Staff can certainly answer any 7 questions that the Subcommittee has on QAPD. The 8 discussion of the QAPD will be minimal. I'll proceed 9 and call on Sean Anderson, who is sitting over there 10 for acting Deputy Director in NRR for opening remarks.
11 Sean?
12 MR. ANDERSON: Thank you, good morning, 13 Chairman and ACRS Members. My name is Sean Anderson 14 and I'm the acting Deputy Director in the Division of 15 Advanced Reactors and Non-power Production and 16 Utilization Facilities.
17 We appreciate the ACRS ongoing support for 18 the schedule flexibility and the review of the 19 application. As you mentioned, the goal here is to 20 review the first batch of chapters provided to ACRS.
21 SHINE will provide the design of the 22 review and the Staff will present their review 23 approach and their conclusions. Some chapters will 24 also focus on the changes since the construction 25 permit.
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8 1 Specifically, Chapter 2 and QAPD.
2 We also appreciate the feedback that the 3 ACRS has provided from the overview meeting that we 4 held previously and also any subsequent questions and 5 documents requests that have been requested prior to 6 the meeting so that we can sufficiently prepare both 7 SHINE and the Staff accordingly for your questions 8 today.
9 If there's any unanswered questions we'll 10 make sure we take them back and provide you the 11 answers appropriately and schedule an official meeting 12 as necessary.
13 And while the Staff is working towards an 14 aggressive schedule, we will not make a final decision 15 unless we have the information needed to come to a 16 reasonable assurance of adequate protection federal.
17 This is a risk-informed review that 18 considers the size and risk of the facility. The 19 application of this approach will also be touched on 20 by the Staff as appropriate in their presentations 21 today.
22 Finally, while some reviewers will touch 23 on the phased approach in their presentations, the 24 phased approach review will also be discussed at a 25 future ACRS meeting. Thank you.
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9 1 CHAIR BALLINGER: One more thing, I would 2 be remiss if I didn't thank the SHINE folks for being 3 extraordinarily forthright in establishing this 4 Committee's ability to access files through this box.
5 And so I want to thank the SHINE people for doing 6 that.
7 Okay, so who is the presenter for SHINE?
8 Is it Jeff?
9 MR. BARTELME: Tracy Radel, our VP of 10 engineering, will be starting the presentation this 11 morning.
12 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you, the floor is 13 yours.
14 MS. RADEL: Thank you, we're going to 15 start off today with a facility overview with Chapter 16 1 and then move into Chapter 2, where we're going to 17 cover the analyses that have changed since the 18 construction permit PSAR phase, which include the 19 chemical hazard analysis and the aircraft hazard 20 analysis.
21 Next slide.
22 The SHINE site is located outside of 23 Janesville, Wisconsin.
24 Our radiologically controlled area is 25 divided into two regions, the radiation facility which NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
10 1 contains eight accelerator-driven subcritical assembly 2 irradiation units and supporting equipment for those 3 irradiation units, and then the radioisotope 4 production facility which contains the target solution 5 preparation, target solution storage, three processing 6 lines for isotope extraction, and waste handling 7 processes.
8 The structure is seismically qualified and 9 we use geometrically favorable equipment where 10 practicable to ensure passive safety and reduced risk.
11 The structure systems and components whose 12 intended functions are to prevent accidents that could 13 cause undue risk to health and safety of workers and 14 the public or mitigate the consequences of such 15 accidents are classified as safety-related SSCs.
16 Next slide.
17 Listed here are major operations that are 18 performed in the SHINE facility.
19 These include target solution preparation 20 from the raw feed material, irradiation of target 21 solution, moly extraction from irradiated target 22 solution, purification, target solution adjustments, 23 and solidification of radioactive liquid waste.
24 The IU Cell Safety Actuation automatically 25 transitions the units to a safe state if there are NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
11 1 upset conditions.
2 In this actuation, we de-energize the 3 neutron driver, open redundant target solutions dump 4 valves that drain the target solution to geometrically 5 favorable TSV dump tank, and isolate the primary 6 system boundary.
7 Any questions on the facility overview?
8 Otherwise, we'll move into the chemical hazard 9 analysis.
10 Okay, accidents involving detonations of 11 chemicals or fuels were considered for facilities and 12 activities onsite and offsite. Allowable standoff and 13 actual distances of hazardous chemicals transported or 14 stored near the facility were determined in accordance 15 with Reg Guide 1.91.
16 Stationary explosions at the source and 17 vapor cloud explosions were considered. The 18 stationary explosion evaluation used the TNT 19 equivalence method described in Regulatory Guide 1.91.
20 The vapor cloud explosion evaluation used 21 ALOHA computer program. Where the postulated 22 explosion has a standoff distance greater than actual 23 distance, a probabilistic analysis was used.
24 The conclusions of this analysis were that 25 no chemical explosion hazards were found to pose an NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
12 1 unacceptable risk to the SHINE facility.
2 Next slide.
3 Moving to toxic chemicals, chemical 4 hazards within five miles of the SHINE site including 5 onsite were evaluated for their potential toxicity.
6 Chemical hazards not screened out in the screening 7 criteria were evaluated using ALOHA.
8 CHAIR BALLINGER: Folks, we're getting 9 some feedback from somewhere. Hopefully we can 10 correct it. Okay, keep going, thank you.
11 MS. RADEL: If concentrations in the 12 facility control room for a chemical release exceeded 13 the evaluation criteria, a probabilistic --
14 CHAIR BALLINGER: Can you be a little bit 15 louder? We're having trouble hearing you.
16 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: You are very garbled.
17 Can you try again? Say something, we'll see if it's 18 fixed.
19 MS. RADEL: If concentrations in the 20 facility control room --
21 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: You are very low, low 22 volume. Speak louder, thank you.
23 DR. BLEY: It has an echo, kind of like 24 we're getting feedback from a speaker back into your 25 microphone.
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13 1 MS. RADEL: I'm not sure how to turn it up 2 or fix feedback.
3 MEMBER REMPE: Can you get closer to the 4 microphone?
5 MS. RADEL: I'll try to speak a lot 6 louder. Is that better?
7 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yes, it's better.
8 CHAIR BALLINGER: Give it a try.
9 MS. RADEL: If concentration in the 10 facility control room for a chemical release exceeds 11 the evaluation criteria, a probabilistic evaluation 12 was performed.
13 A simple probabilistic analysis was not 14 sufficient to eliminate ammonia from consideration as 15 a hazard to the site, however, in the most limiting 16 case assuming the most limiting location of release, 17 maximum inventory of release, worst-case wind 18 directions and five percent annual exceedance maximum 19 wind speeds and atmospheric stability class, the 20 facility control room operators will still have two 21 minutes to take self-protective actions.
22 Next slide.
23 MEMBER BROWN: Can you go back to the 24 protected actions slide? Two minutes. Does that mean 25 just leave and close the door? Is there something NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
14 1 else that has to be done?
2 MS. RADEL: The two minutes would be 3 sufficient time for the operators to place the 4 facility in safe condition prior to donning the 5 protective equipment and exiting the control room.
6 Placing the facility in safe condition is 7 not required for safety, just something they would do 8 per their procedures prior to leaving their control 9 room.
10 MEMBER BROWN: So, something tells them 11 there's a problem, something alerts them to this, 12 right? And all they do is get up and walk out the 13 door, that's what they have to do, close it?
14 MS. KOLB: This is Catherine Kolb, 15 Director of Plant Operations for SHINE.
16 That is the scenario that we've postulated 17 there, that if they needed to leave the control room 18 for any reason, we will have emergency procedures that 19 direct them to push down processes that are in process 20 and leave the control room.
21 So, that is what that's referring to, the 22 two minutes, they would have enough time to do that 23 and if needed to use any kind of PPE that they might 24 need.
25 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg. Could you NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
15 1 describe the actions that have to take place in two 2 minutes after recognition that they have an ammonia 3 issue and have to initiate --
4 MS. KOLB: Again, the actions are not 5 required for the safety of the facility. This would 6 be the actions that the operators take per their 7 evacuated control room emergency procedure, and that 8 would be to shut down the irradiation units, any of 9 them that are running.
10 That could be accomplished with these 11 single key -- sorry, I think I went on mute there 12 briefly -- switch that we have on the main control 13 board. So, a single action.
14 MEMBER HALNON: How long does it take them 15 to recognize that action needs to be taken? In other 16 words, if you have the ammonia on site and you have I 17 assume detectors that after the alarm is at the two-18 minute countdown?
19 MS. KOLB: We have no chemical detectors 20 that would cause alarms in the control room. We have 21 not done time studies.
22 MEMBER BROWN: How do you know you've got 23 the ammonia?
24 MEMBER HALNON: Yes, how do you know? I 25 know you start smelling it but how do you know when NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
16 1 that two-minute countdown starts? I'm not saying it's 2 a two-minute hard and fast countdown but there's 3 obviously a very short period of time between I smell 4 it and I have to get things done.
5 Seasoned firefighters take about 45 6 seconds to a minute to put on an SCBA and they 7 practice it. So, if you're talking about recognition, 8 taking an action, donning an SCBA, and getting out of 9 the control room, two minutes is not even close.
10 MS. KOLB: We have not evaluated that 11 because the action was not required for the safety of 12 the facility. So, the ammonia in the facility doesn't 13 cause any direct hazard to the facility, it is for the 14 safety of the operators.
15 So, we have not evaluated that or done any 16 time studies.
17 MEMBER BROWN: But what tells them they've 18 got an ammonia problem in the first place? Just they 19 sniff it and that's it, is that the detector?
20 MS. KOLB: The smell, yes.
21 MEMBER BROWN: So, if they're sitting 22 there and they smell it they should halt -- that's a 23 crude way of phrasing it but that's what I would do.
24 MS. KOLB: Yes, they should follow their 25 procedures for any need to evacuate the control room.
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17 1 So, if there was similarly a fire or smoke 2 in the control room for some reason for any reason 3 needing to evacuate the control room, they would 4 follow their evacuate the control room procedure, 5 which they will receive training on as part of their 6 license operator training.
7 MEMBER HALNON: So, the other question is 8 they evacuate the control room, which is probably the 9 most protected spot for people and they go out into an 10 ammonia cloud.
11 Assuming they're all incapacitated at that 12 point, is there anything that has to be done for the 13 safety of the facility post ammonia knock-out?
14 MS. KOLB: No, there is no immediate 15 action required for the safety of the facility.
16 There are no required mitigated actions in 17 any of the scenarios that we've evaluated that the 18 operators need to take in order to mitigate the 19 consequences of accidents.
20 MEMBER HALNON: So, as soon as they hit 21 that key switch, we're in a perennial state safe 22 condition?
23 MS. KOLB: Yes.
24 MEMBER BIER: Another quick question, this 25 is Vicki Bier.
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18 1 Have you thought through what the training 2 would be to ensure that the operators feel essentially 3 entitled to take that action rather than having to 4 call up their supervisor and say something is fishy 5 here, is it okay for me to evacuate kind of thing?
6 MS. KOLB: We are currently in the process 7 of training the operators, we started an initial 8 license training class.
9 We haven't developed the lesson plan for 10 the emergency procedures yet but in terms of their 11 supervisor, the license operators' supervisor or a 12 senior license operator is required to be in the site 13 at all times.
14 So, there would be no need to call anyone 15 offsite if they had questions in any scenario.
16 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger.
17 I guess another way to state the question is who has 18 the primary responsibility?
19 You don't want to get into a conversation 20 with three or four different people to decide 21 something, so who has the responsibility?
22 MS. KOLB: The shift supervisor, that 23 would be a senior licensed operator, the most senior 24 licensed person at the site, which we are calling the 25 shift supervisor.
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19 1 CHAIR BALLINGER: And that person will 2 know that?
3 MS. KOLB: Yes.
4 MEMBER HALNON: So, just a last question, 5 when you finally do your time studies and you find out 6 that you're well over two minutes, and being able to, 7 one, recognize hazardous cloud to decide who can give 8 the order to the shift supervisor to turn the key 9 switch, make a significant decision to evacuate a 10 control room, decide where you're going to go, don 11 SBCAs to prevent incapacitation when you leave the 12 protected environment of a control room.
13 If that's more than two minutes, do you 14 have a backup plan to install toxic gas monitors or 15 any other early warning systems?
16 MS. KOLB: This is Catherine again. We 17 have no plans to conduct time studies because the 18 actions required are not for the safety of the 19 facility, they're not required to mitigate any 20 consequences so we're not doing time studies.
21 MR. LELLI: My name is Joe Lelli, I'm an 22 engineer here at SHINE and I think it might be good if 23 I discuss how we evaluated the ammonia release and 24 talk about the standards we evaluated.
25 So, to be clear, this is not an onsite NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
20 1 release of ammonia. I don't know if we have any 2 anhydrous ammonia onsite.
3 We do not have any anhydrous ammonia 4 onsite, so this is an offsite release and this worst-5 case scenario we're talking about basically a tanker 6 truck full of ammonia that crashes.
7 I think we evaluate a couple hundred 8 meters away from the facility. So, basically right 9 offsite the facility gate you have a bad truck 10 accident that releases ammonia.
11 And so again, we use very conservative 12 meteorological condition, we postulate that the 13 facility air intake is directly downwind of the 14 release at that time, that the meteorological 15 conditions are such that we would expect the maximum 16 concentration at the facility intake point.
17 So, I think we modeled based on one meter 18 per second wind, so very low wind, and a PASCO 19 stability class F, so very stable. So, think of a 20 very narrow dense plume aimed directly at the facility 21 intake.
22 I'll give you a little more perspective.
23 Just to give you a little bit more perspective on how 24 we got this.
25 MEMBER HALNON: Thanks, I think we can NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
21 1 appreciate the low probability and all the conditions 2 that have to line up especially perfect.
3 But the point is you're designing a 4 facility to a certain set of criteria and you've 5 offered this criteria up that operators will have 6 sufficient time in two minutes to take all the action.
7 So, that's what we're questioning, we're 8 not necessarily questioning whether or not this is 9 going to happen and really affect the safety. Take a 10 look at that and really make sure the statements 11 you're making are self-contained and they can stand on 12 their own.
13 This one can't stand on its own. You 14 won't be able to convince me that two minutes is 15 enough time to take the actions you've talked about.
16 So, maybe they don't have to be taken, maybe that's 17 the statement rather than we have two minutes to take 18 the actions.
19 Just think through that.
20 DR. BLEY: This is Dennis Bley.
21 I agree with Greg on what he just said and 22 if you haven't dealt with ammonia, it hits quickly and 23 incapacitates quickly. Maybe you don't have 24 concentrations high enough or I don't know exactly how 25 likely it is that you do.
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22 1 But there seems to be an attitude that if 2 the facility says everything is fine -- but you've got 3 to think about the workers too. That might not be 4 part of the license but it's an important part.
5 MEMBER HALNON: We can move on, I think 6 we've beat this horse.
7 MS. RADEL: Next slide. Fires in adjacent 8 industrial plants and storage facilities, oil and gas 9 pipelines, and fires from transportation accidents 10 were evaluated.
11 Three types of fires were analyzed, 12 boiling liquid expansion vapor explosion, or BLEVE 13 fire balls, pool fires, and jet fires. The three 14 types of fires were analyzed using ALOHA.
15 The limiting fire scenario resulted in a 16 temperature rise on the facility concrete wall of 44 17 degrees Fahrenheit. This is an insignificant 18 temperature rise compared to the ACI standards for 19 short and long-term maximum concrete temperatures.
20 Next slide.
21 MEMBER HALNON: Just real quick on the 22 fires, there is a document out there called the 23 commercial aeronautical activities, it's a standard 24 contract for the airports' fuel capacity.
25 And it states there's always going to be NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
23 1 at least a minimum of 12,000 gallons of jet fuel 2 onsite. One of your tables had less than that as the 3 amount of fuel that is onsite, and I believe it's in 4 either Table 2.215 or 2.216, I'm not sure which one.
5 I don't have it in front of me right now.
6 But maybe you and the Staff can check the numbers and 7 make sure we don't have a number that someone gave you 8 that is not necessarily bounding.
9 If the contract with the fuel vendor says 10 you'll always have a minimum of 12,000 and the maximum 11 is, what you said, onsite, so 11,000 gallons, there's 12 some disconnect there.
13 It's not a big deal, I don't have a 14 problem with the analysis, it's just the correctness 15 of the table.
16 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger 17 again. Whenever I see a number for one of these 18 analyses, it's got two significant figures. Without 19 any uncertainty it makes me wonder.
20 So, 44 degrees, what could it be, or is 21 that the upper limit?
22 MS. KOLB: Joe, are you able to speak at 23 this time to the uncertainty in the calculation or 24 should we follow up on that?
25 MR. LELLI: I think we should follow up so NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
24 1 I can speak with more certainty on that.
2 MEMBER HALNON: One last question on the 3 BLEVE, was the orientation of the tanker trucks, was 4 that factored into the models for the fireball and the 5 BLEVE itself?
6 From the standpoint of a missile, BLEVEs 7 in horizontal tanks tend to have sideways missiles 8 coming out as the tank explodes. Was that part of it?
9 MS. RADEL: Joe, can you speak to that?
10 MR. LELLI: We didn't evaluate the missile 11 hazard of the BLEVE tank.
12 MEMBER HALNON: I know sometimes it's up 13 to a mile. If the BLEVE occurs on the highway nearby 14 it could look at that.
15 So, it may be that the orientation would 16 not be an issue but think through that as you look 17 through this again and see if the BLEVE is a 18 comprehensive evaluation considering the orientation 19 of the tank as well.
20 MS. RADEL: Okay, we can take a look at 21 that. Next slide. The site meteorological data set 22 covered the period from 2005 to 2010 and was developed 23 to support the atmospheric concentration and 24 radiological dose assessments.
25 Met data was taken from the southwest NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
25 1 regional airport which is across the highway from the 2 site. Data taken includes hourly dry-ball 3 temperature, humidity, wind speed, and wind we 4 direction.
5 Pasquill stability class is calculated 6 from the hourly wind data sealing height and sky cover 7 measurements. Winds at the site are predominantly 8 westerly and southerly but there is significance and 9 no variation.
10 Next slide.
11 Joint frequency distributions of wind 12 speed, direction, and Pasquill stability class are 13 used to calculate chi over q values of the site 14 boundary and at the nearest residence.
15 The value was used to calculate the short-16 term chi over q values while NRC dose was used to 17 calculate the long-term chi over q values. ARCON96 18 was used to calculate chi over q values for the 19 control room habitability.
20 And chemical concentration calculations 21 using ALOHA do not take chi over q values so the 95th 22 percentile values for wind speed and atmospheric 23 stability were used as direct inputs.
24 Were there any further questions on the 25 chemical fire atmospheric dispersion sections?
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26 1 Otherwise, we will move to the aircraft hazard 2 analysis, which Catherine will present.
3 Catherine?
4 MS. KOLB: Thank you. As Tracy mentioned 5 previously, the site is located across Highway 51 6 about 0.4 miles to the east of the Southern Wisconsin 7 Regional Airport.
8 When we updated the aircraft hazard 9 analysis for the EPSAR, we used the same methodology 10 as we used in the PSAR that was presented several 11 years ago. We used DOE standard, DOE-STD-3014-96, 12 crash probability for airways overhead for over plate 13 crashers.
14 We used NUREG 0800 methodology for crashes 15 from the nearby airport, of which only the Southern 16 Wisconsin Regional Airport apply those screening 17 criteria.
18 Go ahead.
19 CHAIR BALLINGER: Excuse me, I think I'm 20 remiss. Dennis has his hand raised, and I'm not sure 21 whether it's previous or current. So, Dennis?
22 DR. BLEY: Sorry, that was left over.
23 CHAIR BALLINGER: Sorry, keep going, thank 24 you.
25 MS. KOLB: Non-frequent airport events or NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
27 1 air shows were considered in the hazard evaluation 2 based on an increased number of airport aberrations 3 due to extra planes flying in and out for the air 4 show.
5 And the acceptance criteria for total 6 crash probability was established as 1e to the -6 per 7 year, base time guidance from that same DOE standard 8 3014-96.
9 MEMBER HALNON: When you considered the 10 air shows, did you only increase the increased air 11 traffic activity or did you look at the higher-risk 12 functions or actions of the airplanes themselves since 13 air shows tend to push the edge of the limits of the 14 aircraft?
15 MS. KOLB: We only considered 16 quantitatively an increased number of airport 17 operations due to the air show, planes flying in and 18 out and over flights, things like that.
19 The issue of an increased risk due to 20 aerobatic activities or things that might occur at air 21 shows, that was evaluated qualitatively, the same 22 method that we did at the PSAR stage, which was we 23 looked at the FAA requirements around air shows and we 24 contacted a member of the FFA for confirmation.
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28 1 permitting air shows requires them to take into 2 consideration the nearby facilities population and 3 SHINE's existence would be considered in permitting 4 air shows and allowing the activities at the air show, 5 and setting the location of the aerobatic box if 6 needed.
7 MEMBER HALNON: So, the whole aspect would 8 take into consideration the higher risk of a nuclear 9 facility and push the activity away, is essentially 10 what I heard?
11 MS. KOLB: Right.
12 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger 13 again. Did that consideration include thinking about 14 making the air space over the facility an exclusion 15 area?
16 MS. KOLB: We did not discuss that 17 specifically.
18 MEMBER HALNON: Did it include the extra 19 fuel and other chemicals that would be onsite based on 20 the fact of the higher activity of the aircraft?
21 MS. KOLB: We did not consider increased 22 fuel locations of the air show in the chemical hazard 23 analysis, no.
24 MEMBER HALNON: Do you think that's 25 appropriate? Clearly, they're going to have a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
29 1 tremendous amount more of flammable fuel there onsite 2 probably in a bust or ground storage.
3 MS. KOLB: We can follow up perhaps later 4 but the frequency of the air shows historically have 5 only been once a year for a couple of days and we 6 would not expect that to increase the total yearly 7 probability by that much but we have not evaluated it.
8 MEMBER HALNON: I think you should at 9 least understand how much more fuel and how long it's 10 going to be there because even though the aircraft may 11 only be there for a couple days, the fuel may be there 12 for weeks.
13 So, that may be something to look at.
14 MS. KOLB: I understand. Next slide.
15 This slide shows the results of our updates, things 16 that we did to update the hazard analysis such as the 17 PSAR.
18 We reevaluated the calculation using an 19 updated number considering operations at the airport 20 that generally decreased.
21 We used the forecasted values for 22 commercial flights for civil and air taxis and air 23 carriers and we've used the historical averages for 24 military because the forecasted amounts for military 25 aircraft was a static forecast in the days that we NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
30 1 had.
2 Another update that we did is we used, 3 instead of one of the largest aircrafts that was 4 manufactured, a more typical aircraft that it was 5 found at the Southern Wisconsin Regional Airport 6 because the one we used previously, a very large Black 7 Hawk, wasn't realistic.
8 And then this isn't directly part of the 9 analysis but since the PSAR we added a second stage-10 related structure, a small structure to the east of 11 the main production facility, our nitrogen purge 12 system structure.
13 That was addressed qualitatively based on 14 its location relative to the main facility and offsite 15 power sources, where it was determined that any 16 aircraft that impacted that small structure based on 17 the location of the site would not also impact offsite 18 power sources due to the degree of separation there.
19 The results where the small non-military 20 aircraft did not meet the acceptance criteria of 1e to 21 the -6 per year, so therefore, the main production 22 facility structure is designed to withstand impact 23 from this type of aircraft.
24 The other categories, large non-military 25 or air carriers and military aircraft, did meet that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
31 1 criteria even considering increased traffic from the 2 postulated air shows.
3 MEMBER HALNON: So, the question here is 4 I understand the structure and I understand the 5 impact. Can the facility withstand the impact? It's 6 more than just a structure being able to withstand it 7 if large-area fires have been looked at.
8 So, the question is did you look at it 9 from an impact perspective or a large-area fire 10 perspective?
11 MS. KOLB: We did not a large-area fire, 12 no. We did not feel that evaluation of a large-area 13 fire was required for the guidance that we had.
14 MEMBER HALNON: I'll explore that later, 15 thanks.
16 MS. KOLB: Are there any other questions 17 regarding the aircraft hazard analysis? This is my 18 last slide.
19 CHAIR BALLINGER: That it?
20 MS. KOLB: Yes.
21 CHAIR BALLINGER: Next up is the NRC Staff 22 and we're pretty much on schedule I think. So, Mike, 23 you are presenting?
24 MR. BALAZIK: Yes, can you hear me loud 25 and clear?
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32 1 CHAIR BALLINGER: Loud and clear, thank 2 you.
3 MR. BALAZIK: Let's go ahead and get 4 started here. Good morning, everyone, my name is 5 Michael Balazik, I'm the Project Manager in the 6 Division of Advanced Reactors and Nonpower Production 7 and Utilization Facilities.
8 And I'm within the Nonpower Licensing 9 Branch so I'll be presenting some background 10 information on the SHINE review and the information 11 contained in Chapter 1 of the safety evaluation.
12 Overall, it's just a general overview and of course, 13 once we get to the --
14 In other chapters we'll be discussing more 15 specific information. Next slide.
16 So, just to go over the apply to real 17 quick, SHINE submitted an operating license back in 18 July of 2019. SHINE has commenced construction at the 19 facility starting in September of 2019.
20 What SHINE has requested is a commercial 21 operating license, which is designated as a 103 22 license for a nonpower utilization and production 23 facility that's located in Janesville, Wisconsin.
24 SHINE proposes to produce molybdenum-99 as 25 well as other isotopes from the fissioning of target NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
33 1 solution in eight irradiation units.
2 Next slide, please.
3 The molybdenum-99 is recovered through the 4 irradiated target solution and the radioisotope 5 production facility, which contains equipment that are 6 located in the hot cells.
7 Recently, we have received a supplement to 8 the license application earlier this year. This 9 describes SHINE's phased construction approach to the 10 facility so operations and construction will be 11 occurring at the same time and the overall 12 construction activities will consist of four phases.
13 SHINE plans on completing Phase 1 in May 14 of 2023. Now I'll just go over our general licensing 15 approach.
16 SHINE's requested a single operating 17 license under Part 50 for their facility, which 18 includes the eight irradiation units which will be 19 licensed at 125 kilowatts each.
20 The hot cells will be licensed as 21 production facilities and all these facilities will be 22 located within a single building. The special nuclear 23 material will be licensed under Part 70 and the source 24 material will be licensed under Part 40.
25 The regulatory guidance that the Staff NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
34 1 used to review this application, it was mainly NUREG 2 1537, which provides guidance on reviewing 3 applications for nonpower reactors.
4 The Staff did develop interim Staff 5 guidance to NUREG 1537.
6 This includes guidance for the review of 7 radioisotope production facilities, aqueous 8 homogeneous reactors and it also includes guidance 9 from NUREG 1537, which is the standard review plan for 10 fuel cycle review.
11 For example, it includes addressing 12 chemical hazards. Of course, other guidance that the 13 Staff used was certain ANSI standards, engineering 14 judgments, and finding and exhibiting permits.
15 So, next I just want to talk about some of 16 the regulations that are required for the SHINE 17 facility. For 10 CFR 5057 for issuance of an 18 operating license, it must meet the following, that 19 the construction has been substantially complete.
20 The facility will operate in conformance 21 with the application and regulations.
22 Reasonable assurance that operation will 23 not endanger public health and safety, that the 24 Applicant is technically and financially qualified, 25 and provisions of Part 140 satisfy the issuance of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
35 1 license will not be inimical to common defense of 2 security.
3 Also, in 10 CFR 5034 which defines the 4 information that needs to be included in the FSAR, the 5 general description of the facility, the design basis, 6 the kinds and qualities of radioactive material 7 expected to be produced by the facility, proposed tech 8 specs, description and plans for the operator 9 requalification program, technical qualifications of 10 chi to engage in the activities, the physical security 11 plan for the facility.
12 Next slide, please.
13 The final analysis and evaluation of 14 design and performance of structure systems and 15 components, financial qualifications, the emergency 16 plan, the relationship to design features to major 17 processes in chemical or mechanical processes involved 18 with the radioactive material.
19 Next slide, please.
20 Today, the Staff will be going over 21 Chapter 1 which is the facility, which is basically an 22 introduction, Chapter 2, site characteristics. We'll 23 also be discussing Chapter 4, which is facility 24 description, Chapter 5, coolant systems, and Chapter 25 6, engineering safety features.
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36 1 As Member Ballinger said earlier, the 2 Staff does not plan on presenting on SHINE's quality 3 assurance plan description known as the QAPD because 4 the plan was approved during the construction permit.
5 And SHINE has made some revisions to the plan since 6 then and the Staff can take any questions on the 7 review if there's changes prior to going into closed 8 session.
9 Next slide, please.
10 So, just a quick summary of Chapter 1, the 11 applicable requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, if 12 Commission regulations have been met. SHINE does not 13 share any systems or equipment with other facilities.
14 I mentioned the guidance of NUREG 1537, 15 it's used mostly for research reactors. There are 16 some research reactors that share facilities such as 17 ventilation and emergency power within a larger 18 building.
19 So, SHINE is in a single building so there 20 are no shared systems or equipment.
21 The production facility processes for the 22 moly purification and uranium recovery are similar to 23 other facilities, specifically the sintacin (phonetic) 24 process, and SHINE does provide a general description 25 of the facility and summarizes major operations.
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37 1 Finally, the SHINE facility will not have 2 any high-level waste or spent nuclear fuel, so the 3 Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 is not applicable to 4 SHINE.
5 So, that's a quick overview of Chapter 1 6 and if there are no questions, we can start discussing 7 Chapter 2.
8 Can you bring up the Chapter 2 slides?
9 Ken, are you online?
10 MR. SEE: Yes, I'm online, found the mute 11 button.
12 MR. BALAZIK: Thank you, Ken.
13 MR. SEE: My name is Ken See, I'm a 14 hydrologist in the Office of Nuclear Reactor 15 Regulation, and I'm going to be presenting the slides 16 on site characteristics.
17 I do want to point out that I was not the 18 technical reviewer for this section. I will be 19 presenting the slides and will do my best to answer 20 any questions. If we can't answer them, we can 21 certainly take them back so we can adequately get you 22 an answer.
23 Next slide, please.
24 For the geography and demography, the 25 Staff reviewed using mapping information, databases, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
38 1 reviewed the information that was submitted by the 2 Applicant, and basically found that the information 3 was sufficient and acceptable.
4 The two bullet points there, where the 5 high-level facilities are going to be located and the 6 size and area of the site. And we found that all to 7 be appropriately presented and an accurate 8 description.
9 Based upon our review of FSAR Section 21, 10 Staff did independent confirmatory review of these 11 features, the topography, et cetera, of the 12 facilities, we find the information that they 13 presented to be accurate.
14 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg. The 15 population was largely based on the 2010 census and 16 translated to today. Did you guys take a look at the 17 2020 census and see if the assumptions were even 18 close?
19 MR. SEE: I looked for that and I didn't 20 see anything regarding 2020.
21 MEMBER HALNON: I didn't either, maybe 22 it's just the results were out too early. It would be 23 interesting to see if the assumptions they made were 24 --
25 MR. SEE: I'm not certain when the 2020 NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
39 1 census results were actually available. I've seen 2 some news headlines but other than that -- we can 3 certainly go back and see if we can update.
4 MEMBER HALNON: I saw a report April of 5 2021. So, it may be out there by that time. When I 6 looked at it, the assumptions seemed to be okay but I 7 didn't take a hard look at it.
8 MR. SEE: We can see if we can go back and 9 look at that number and see if it's close or 10 reasonably close to the projection.
11 MEMBER HALNON: Thanks.
12 MR. SEE: Next slide, please. So, as the 13 bullet says, we went out there and looked at all the 14 facilities. We've already heard from the licensee 15 about some of the airports and roadways, things of 16 this nature.
17 We found that they are basically 18 represented appropriately, they're accurate, we didn't 19 see where the licensee missed anything.
20 We did a pretty comprehensive search and 21 we found, basically, that the information they 22 provided was accurate and reasonable and meets the 23 requirements.
24 MEMBER HALNON: This may be for the SHINE 25 folks but when I went to Google Maps because I had no NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
40 1 idea where this place was, right in the middle of the 2 acres was something called the Hughes Farm.
3 I never saw it mentioned and assumed it 4 was subsumed into the SHINE facility from a property 5 perspective. Would you guys verify that?
6 MR. SEE: No, but we can look into that if 7 SHINE wants to --
8 MEMBER HALNON: Did you guys buy the 9 Hughes Farm in this part of your facility?
10 MS. KOLB: This is Catherine Kolb. The 11 Hughes Farm is still there so the Hughes Farm owns 12 land around the facility. Before starting 13 construction, they farmed the area where the site is.
14 That 91 acres they were doing is a lease 15 agreement with the city, the city owned the property.
16 But the Hughes Farm, right there is a building that is 17 directly south of the main production facility site.
18 MEMBER HALNON: I didn't see that anywhere 19 addressed in the tables of the nearby facilities. Did 20 I miss it or is it there? Because I actually did a 21 word search and couldn't find it.
22 MS. KOLB: I'm not sure we listed all 23 farms in the listing of facilities. It's farm land 24 around the facility owned by various people.
25 MEMBER HALNON: You listed the Walmart so NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
41 1 I had assumed that you would list the farms. I'm not 2 sure why, that being the closest facility, you would 3 leave it out.
4 MS. KOLB: We'll have to get back to you 5 but I don't believe we listed farms as facilities.
6 MEMBER HALNON: There are some farms.
7 MS. KOLB: Yes, there are farms.
8 MEMBER HALNON: Go on.
9 MR. SEE: That's the last slide on manmade 10 hazards I believe we have. Anymore questions on this?
11 We'll look into that as well.
12 Next slide, please.
13 I guess I'm presenting this one unless 14 Kevin --
15 MR. WHITE: No, this is Jason, I'm on the 16 line.
17 MR. SEE: You're on the line, it says 18 plus 47 and I don't know who those 47 people are.
19 Jason, I'll hand it over to you.
20 MR. WHITE: Good morning, everybody, my 21 name is Jason White and I'm a meteorologist in the 22 External Hazards Branch in the Office of Nuclear 23 Reactor Regulation.
24 Today I will be discussing the review of 25 Section 2.3 of the application which addresses NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
42 1 meteorology.
2 Section 2.3 consists of two subsections 3 addressing the general and local climate, and Section 4 2.31, the site meteorology, and Section 3.2.
5 The Staff's review of Section 2.31 6 includes topics related to regional climate, regional 7 data sources, extreme weather conditions, restrictive 8 dispersion conditions, and air quality.
9 NRC Staff reviewed the description of the 10 general climate of the region and meteorological 11 conditions relevant to the design and operation of the 12 facility. The Staff also reviewed the data resources 13 and analytical approaches used by the Applicant to 14 prepare the information.
15 The Staff concluded that the site 16 characteristics associated with meteorology and 17 general local climatology are acceptable and are 18 reasonably representative of the proposed site region.
19 Next slide, please.
20 DR. SCHULTZ: This is Steve Schultz. I 21 think this is the right place to put it because I 22 don't see it coming further in your presentation.
23 My question is, and it may not be you that 24 needs to answer this question, about the application 25 by SHINE of the ALOHA methodology.
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43 1 They've used that for a number of the 2 evaluations that they discussed this morning and when 3 I read the information in the SER, it wasn't clear to 4 me the extent of review that the Staff did on those 5 evaluations.
6 It indicated that the evaluations had been 7 reviewed but the detail of the ALOHA evaluation by the 8 Staff wasn't clear to me from the SER presentation.
9 MR. WHITE: This ALOHA review isn't part 10 of the meteorology review. I'm not sure whose section 11 that falls under, I don't know if they're on the line 12 and are planning to address that later?
13 MR. SEE: This is Ken, that's a manmade 14 hazards review. Like I mentioned earlier, I did not 15 perform the review so we can take that back. Can you 16 repeat your concern?
17 DR. SCHULTZ: My concern is the Staff's 18 review of the evaluations that have been performed by 19 ALOHA. Several detailed evaluations had been done by 20 SHINE about the only indication in the SER is that the 21 Staff looked at the evaluations.
22 But how that was done and the Staff's 23 experience with the ALOHA code applications wasn't 24 clear from the presentation in the SER.
25 MR. SEE: No mention of any confirmatory NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
44 1 analysis or ran the files and ran the code and came up 2 with similar results or any discussion like that?
3 DR. SCHULTZ: No, that's why I'm asking 4 and your description is correct. I appreciate any 5 feedback on that.
6 MR. SEE: I'll go back and talk to the 7 Staff and get an answer to you.
8 DR. SCHULTZ: That's fine, thank you.
9 MR. WHITE: I think we're onto the next 10 slide. The Staff's review of Section 2.32 included 11 topics related to local meteorology and topography, 12 the data sources, the diffusion parameters, and the 13 atmospheric dispersion.
14 The Staff reviewed the meteorological data 15 in the description of the Southwest Regional Airport 16 meteorological tower.
17 The Staff found the meteorological 18 database was suitable for input to ARCAN and PAVAN 19 dispersion models.
20 The Staff also reviewed the diffusion 21 parameters for use in ARCAN and PAVAN dispersion 22 models and found them acceptable.
23 The Staff evaluated the site topography 24 and concluded that no unique topographic features 25 preclude the use of ARCAN and PAVAN models for the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
45 1 SHINE site at the site boundary.
2 And thus the Staff found the proposed chi 3 over q values were acceptable for use in the SHINE 4 FSAR because they are a conservative estimate of the 5 atmospheric dispersion at the proposed SHINE site.
6 Next slide, please.
7 In summary, the Staff finds, based on a 8 review of the application and supplemental information 9 provided through the RAI response, that the 10 Applicant's analysis of meteorological hazards and 11 atmospheric dispersion are sufficient and acceptable 12 as they followed the applicable local state and 13 federal guidelines in accordance with 10 CFR 5035.
14 The Staff concludes that the site is not 15 located where catastrophic meteorological events are 16 likely, that the Applicant considered credible 17 meteorological events in developing the design basis 18 parameters for the facility, and the Applicant 19 provided adequate site characteristics needed to 20 evaluate uncontrolled release of radioactive 21 materials.
22 Next slide, please.
23 That concludes the Staff's presentation.
24 MEMBER HALNON: Before you get off the 25 meteorology, I was interested in the limited use of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
46 1 HMR-51, HMR-52.
2 I'm sure you're aware that obviously after 3 the Fukushima re-evaluation of flooding, that document 4 was almost exclusively used to identify storms, 5 transposition those storms to the site of interest, 6 and come up with the maximum precipitations and lifts 7 and all that.
8 The document they did use, which I think 9 was a Department of Transportation document from 10 Wisconsin, did you compare those with the HMR that we 11 were so used to using in this flooding reevaluations 12 to make sure that they were conservative in the use of 13 the data?
14 MR. WHITE: Yes, in the review I think we 15 did take a look at the document. I don't know that we 16 documented it in the actual safety evaluation, we just 17 said the Staff found the information suitable and 18 representative.
19 But we can go back and double-check that 20 and specifically outline that.
21 MEMBER HALNON: I know the Staff has 22 really experienced now after the reevaluations and 23 storms and storms transpositioning, you have to base 24 that conclusion on something, some standard or some 25 issue that you said was reasonable.
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47 1 Not the fact that the W document said it 2 makes it reasonable but something else has to be used.
3 So, I would appreciate some feedback on the use of 4 HMR-51.
5 And when I looked at the Byron, which is 6 the nearby site, they used HMR-51, HMR-51, and if I 7 transposition those storms and those values to pretty 8 much the same type of topography and region, I don't 9 see a great correlation of numbers.
10 As a matter of fact, I think Byron is more 11 conservative than SHINE.
12 And maybe there's enough margin that 13 doesn't matter but there certainly is a difference 14 there, so that would be something to take a look at to 15 see if the standards we got to -- used to using after 16 the reevaluation process would change the conclusion.
17 MR. WHITE: The Staff can definitely take 18 a look at that.
19 MEMBER BROWN: This is Charlie Brown. I'm 20 going to backfit or backslide, this is meteorology but 21 SHINE says they used the 2005 to 2010 meteorological 22 data with their evaluation.
23 Did the Staff independently go look at the 24 2015 to 2020 to see if they were consistent?
25 That's the question.
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48 1 MR. WHITE: One of my colleagues who 2 actually took a look at the data --
3 MR. QUINLAN: This is Kevin Quinlan, I'm 4 a meteorologist in NRR, Acting Branch Chief for the 5 External Hazards Branch, and I performed that portion 6 of the review.
7 No, I did not go back and compare it 8 against other timeframes but what I did do is take the 9 meteorological data set that they used for the 10 Southwest Regional Airport for that time period, put 11 it through a fairly rigorous internal QAQC process, 12 created my own joint frequency distributions to use as 13 input to the models so that when we compared it 14 against the SHINE results, we had a level of 15 confidence that what they did with the National 16 Weather Service data was what's acceptable for the 17 site.
18 But we did not go back and compare it 19 against other time periods since the time period they 20 used was already adequately long.
21 MEMBER BROWN: But not more current? 2015 22 to 2020, there's a more current period.
23 That's why I asked that question, just to 24 see if the data, not necessarily the analysis but at 25 least the data that was input was consistent relevant NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
49 1 to what's been going on meteorologically.
2 A second question then, for the aircraft 3 hazard did they state the period at which they 4 evaluated aircraft activity? I don't remember that 5 from their presentation a few minutes ago.
6 Was it 10 years ago or was it 5 years ago?
7 Was it 20 years ago?
8 MR. SEE: I'll have to check this, I 9 didn't do the review but I believe it was 2010.
10 MEMBER BROWN: So, 12 years ago and 11 normally air traffic increases.
12 MR. SEE: SHINE's on the phone, maybe they 13 can answer this question.
14 MS. KOLB: This is Catherine, Director of 15 Plant Operations.
16 We did the aircraft hazard analysis for 17 the FSAR and we used the forecasted data from 2019, 18 which forecasted from 2019 through 2045, but the 19 forecast was updated as of 2019 and that is the data 20 set that we used for air carriers and other non-21 military aircraft.
22 That was the latest data set that was 23 available and we submitted the FSAR in 2019. For 24 military aircraft, I'd have to check the calculation 25 but we redid that too that was using a historical NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
50 1 average going back several years, I think 10 but I 2 can't really specifically. But it was starting in 3 2019 also.
4 MEMBER HALNON: I saw some independent FAA 5 numbers that made them look good. Yes, from several 6 different sources I looked at it and they looked 7 pretty consistent.
8 CHAIR BALLINGER: Dennis?
9 DR. BLEY: Thank you. I just want to 10 raise an issue with the Staff. I think it's a small 11 matter here but it's going to be a big matter in some 12 other areas and previews of other applications.
13 And that is from some of the questions 14 Greg raised and other Members, and back when the 15 Committee participated in the review of the 16 construction permit, questions by the Members pointed 17 out areas where things hadn't been thought of and the 18 Staff hadn't delved into them.
19 Greg's BLEVE missiles really come to mind 20 because I know we're mostly nuclear engineers but if 21 you know anything about BLEVES, when you first learn 22 about them it's very surprising the amount of energy 23 that gets generated in those kinds of accidents.
24 I'm rambling a bit but it seems the NRC 25 Staff review is checking the details and seeing the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
51 1 Applicant has done things right.
2 And for the things the Applicant has 3 analyzed, they've gone back and checked the underlying 4 data and the way calculations are done, which is 5 excellent. But I don't see much evidence of the Staff 6 thinking of things that might have been left out.
7 And like I said, the ones here are 8 probably on the minor side but there's going to be 9 other areas where that becomes really important.
10 That's all I wanted to add, Ron.
11 CHAIR BALLINGER: We will continue.
12 MR. SEE: Next slide, please. This is 13 hydrology, this is Ken See, I'm a hydrologist, I spoke 14 earlier. I do want to start off by going back to have 15 discussion on HMR-51 and HMR-52.
16 That typically falls under our area too 17 but we're still going to be working with Jason. But 18 for these types of reactors, typically the 19 requirements are not as conservative, if you will, for 20 large light water reactors.
21 You go back to Part 100-10, there's no 22 requirement, whereas if you look at Part 100-20 for 23 large light water reactors, they do specifically 24 mention the probable maximum precipitation and you 25 have much more reactors.
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52 1 So, I went back and looked at other 2 licensing documents for other research and types of 3 reactors, things of that nature. And you'll find a 4 lot of the precipitation requirements not to be as 5 conservative.
6 So, in NUREG 1537, in my opinion it gives 7 a lot of leeway. If I were the king of the NRC I 8 would update that document, things like that.
9 MEMBER HALNON: It is an old document, 10 there's no doubt.
11 My point is it wasn't written specifically 12 for nuclear plants and we're licensing this under Part 13 50, which is what the other plants are licensed under 14 and a storm doesn't know one nuclear plant from 15 another.
16 So, the data is either good or it's not.
17 If it's not good, we just spent a billion dollars on 18 the rest of the industry for no reason. But 19 nevertheless, I think it's an established well thought 20 of standard and the updating of it I think would be a 21 great idea.
22 That's why we look at the recent storms 23 and we transposition them.
24 MR. SEE: They are currently doing an 25 update at 5152 and they're going to be factoring NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
53 1 climate change. I think one of the pieces of federal 2 legislation gave NOAA a pot of money to do that work 3 so I am happy to report that as being updated.
4 But for this review, other than the 5 storms, as the slide says, we looked at all the 6 patterns, we don't see any catastrophic hydrological 7 events where they would be considered credible, dam 8 failures, things of that nature.
9 I will say when I went back and looked at 10 the construction permit application, they seemed to 11 deal more with the larger storms there about diverting 12 the flows away from the facility, things like that.
13 This application, I know they made changes 14 to the footprint but they dealt more with the drainage 15 system and things of this nature.
16 And I believe they used a 100-year event 17 for that. I didn't do this analysis myself but they 18 applied local building code-type standards and things 19 of this nature for the local facility for drainage.
20 MEMBER HALNON: And my point, we've got a 21 four-inch margin on the buildings over the grade and 22 the grade has a couple feet here and there where I 23 think it was at one point 51 feet from the river 24 flooding.
25 I can't remember all the different things NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
54 1 but you're right, the margins are high but it's also 2 from a corrective perspective.
3 And as Dennis mentioned, down the road if 4 the margins are not so high, are you just going to 5 accept a state Department of Transportation document 6 or are you going to go to something that's been tried 7 and proven when you renew?
8 So, that's the decision you guys have to 9 make and defend.
10 MR. SEE: Yes, I think the safety portion 11 of the components inside the structure are given 12 additional flood protection features, so if water 13 enters the front door, quote, unquote, of the 14 facility, I don't think that's going to be a safety 15 issue, is my understanding as I read the SE.
16 So, that's why they feel like they can use 17 a lower standard, but we're trying to do risk-informed 18 reviews and looking at the requirements. And it takes 19 some judgment to make that call.
20 MEMBER HALNON: And I couldn't assess the 21 impact of the flooding because it's down the road on 22 the systems chapters. It's either plus or minus, 23 black and white, is it flooding or not? So, that's 24 all I looked at.
25 That's what I mean. This facility is in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
55 1 pretty good shape currently but another one may not 2 be. So, it comes down to the technique and what the 3 Staff can defend.
4 MR. SEE: Each review is unique 5 absolutely. We can't just take what we did on this 6 site and apply it to another necessarily.
7 MEMBER HALNON: Okay.
8 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron, I would add 9 that 1537 is indeed old but the ISUs are not and we 10 are in kind of a gray area in that it's not a 11 homogeneous reactor but it's homogeneous. So, you've 12 got to be careful about that part.
13 MR. SEE: So, that's the only slide I 14 have. I don't know what's next. Anymore questions on 15 hydrology? If not, next slide, please. That may be 16 the last one, I don't know.
17 Geology, this will be someone else so I'll 18 step back and let them take over, thank you.
19 MR. HEESZEL: Good morning, this is David 20 Heeszel, I'm a geophysicist in the External Hazard 21 Branch of NRR.
22 For geology, the geologic characterization 23 in the operating license hasn't changed from the 24 construction permit and we didn't identify any new 25 geologic hazards since the time of the construction NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
56 1 permit.
2 So, our conclusion is there's no potential 3 for surface deformation from tectonic or non-tectonic 4 hazards. Next slide, please.
5 When it comes to seismic hazard, the 6 design basis ground motion, they call it here the SSC, 7 is Reg Guide 1.60 spectrum anchored at 0.2g. It's 8 used in the seismic design of SSCs important for 9 safety.
10 The seismic characterization in the 11 operating license application is based on the U.S.G.S.
12 National Seismic Hazard Map of 2008. We looked at the 13 2014 maps and the results are very similar.
14 In addition, we performed a confirmatory 15 analysis using RO1 models and codes and used the 16 site-specific subsurface profile provided during the 17 desertion permit.
18 Next slide, please.
19 As you can see here on the left, the 20 yellow line is the design basis ground motion and then 21 the blue line and the orange line are for seismic 22 design Classifications 3 and 4 under ASE, SEI-4305.
23 You see there's a lot of margin between 24 the probabilistic analysis and the design basis ground 25 motion. Based on that, the Staff finds that SHINE has NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
57 1 adequately characterized seismic hazards at the site.
2 And that is it for seismology and geology.
3 MR. XI: Good morning, I'm Zuhan Xi, 4 geotechnical engineer at the Civil and Geotechnical 5 Engineering Branch, Division of Engineering and 6 External Hazards of NRR. I'm the geotechnical 7 reviewer for the site.
8 Geotechnical site characterization was 9 based on the results of field investigation and the 10 laboratory tests conducted for construction permit 11 application.
12 Staff confirmed that field investigation 13 and the laboratory tests were sufficient to determine 14 the soil properties at the site. Staff confirmed that 15 the soil properties used in the geotechnical 16 evaluation and the soil structure interaction analysis 17 are reliable and reasonable.
18 Staff verified the stability of the 19 foundation and subsurface material on the information 20 Applicant provided in the FSAR and II response, as 21 well as detailed analysis through regulatory audit.
22 Staff reviewed the liquefaction analysis, 23 Staff verified the soil underlying the site is not 24 considered to be potential liquefiable.
25 In accordance with the guidance of Reg NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
58 1 Guide 1.198, Staff reviewed bearing capacity 2 calculation and found that the applied method is 3 widely acceptable and used by industry.
4 The assumption used in the calculation is 5 conservative. The Staff confirmed that soil-bearing 6 capacity is adequate for design structures. Staff 7 verified that the conservative structure is designed 8 to accommodate the potential differential and total 9 settlement of the foundation.
10 The Staff reviewed analysis for static, 11 active, and passive lateral soil pressure and verified 12 that proper consideration of later soil pressure 13 towards the soil wall has been given to the structure 14 analysis and design.
15 In summary, Staff confirmed the 16 geotechnical evaluation and analysis for shown site 17 are reasonable and conservative and are therefore 18 acceptable. Thanks.
19 MR. BALAZIK: This is Mike Balazik, that's 20 the end of the presentation on Chapter 2. Are there 21 any questions?
22 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay, if there aren't 23 any other questions, we can shift over to Chapter 5.
24 SHINE folks are up and I'm not sure who's going to do 25 the presentation.
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59 1 MR. SODERLING: Good morning, my name is 2 Ian Soderling and I'll be presenting Chapter 5. Are 3 you pulling up the slides? Like I said, good morning, 4 my name is Ian Soderling, I'm a mechanical engineer in 5 the auxiliary systems group.
6 I'll be presenting the cooling systems 7 here at SHINE. Next slide, please. Just as a basic 8 outline, we'll be talking about the primary closed 9 loop cooling system, PCLS, first and then we'll move 10 on to the radioisotope process facility cooling 11 system, RPCS.
12 Then the processed chilled water system, 13 which is PCHS and then facility demineralized water 14 system, which is FDWS. Next slide, please. So, the 15 first system is the primary closed loop cooling 16 system, and again, that's PCLS.
17 So some of the non-safety-related 18 functions that PCLS performs, the biggest one is 19 obviously cooling the water to the target solution 20 vessel, the neutron multiplier, and then the light 21 water pool as well using forced convection.
22 Just as an added note, the PCLS cooling 23 itself is a non-safety-related function. It regulates 24 water to a design temperature range uses RPCS as the 25 cooling water to that system and PCLS itself cools the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
60 1 subcritical assembly and the components within it.
2 Two pumps are normally used for full-flow 3 operation but you can operate with a single pump, just 4 at a reduced capacity.
5 And then in Chapter 5 there's also details 6 about a cleanup side stream for the PCLS, and that 7 includes a deionizer bed and then free and post 8 filters to maintain ESTM Type 2 water purity 9 standards.
10 And that's to limit corrosion, product 11 activation, any sort of contamination that you might 12 get in the process stream. The other secondary 13 function that PCLS has, one of the major ones, is to 14 provide purge gas flow from confinement.
15 PCLS itself does not have any motive 16 force, it's simply the flow path the purge gas takes.
17 So, PCLS has an air separator that removes drained, 18 dissolved, and free gases in the PCLS process stream 19 and it sends it to an expansion tank.
20 And that expansion tank also collects air 21 from the irradiation units and the TOGS cell 22 atmospheres. And then from the expansion tank, 23 there's piping that goes to the radiological 24 ventilation Zone 1 exhaust.
25 Are there any questions on this slide? If NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
61 1 not, we can move to the next one. Some of the 2 safety-related functions that PCLS has is equipping 3 the expansion tank with a flame arrester to preclude 4 any sort of hydrogen degradation or detonation events.
5 There is closure of PCLS confinement 6 isolation valves, there's three solenoid valves, 7 there's one check valve, and it's for a variety of 8 reasons. IU cell safety actuation will cause these 9 valves to close.
10 One of the bigger events that is 11 postulated is any sort of water intrusion into the 12 TSV. And then you have several trips that can occur 13 as a result of the PCLS instruments.
14 You have the high PCLS temperature so 15 that's the applied temperature to the subcritical 16 assembly. You also have low PCLS temperature, and 17 again, that's supplied.
18 And then you have low PCLS flow and that 19 flow is actually on the return, so it's downstream of 20 the subcritical assembly.
21 Are there any questions?
22 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: There is a question, 23 this is Jose. This might be a Chapter 4 question 24 probably but eventually, you are going to have to 25 calibrate -- the power of the facility is measured NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
62 1 using ex-core neutron detectors.
2 And you are going to have to likely 3 calibrate them with power on the PCLS, right? Is that 4 done? How is the power for the facility measured?
5 MS. KOLB: This is Catherine Kolb.
6 We are not using a calometric method for 7 a calibration, we're going to use an isotopic method 8 by analyzing the fission products in the target 9 solution for initial calibration of the neutron 10 detectors.
11 And we could get into that more in later 12 sessions if you would like.
13 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I'll wait for Chapter 14 4. Was your answer there is no calometric measurement 15 on the PCLS?
16 MS. KOLB: There is no calometric 17 calibration for the PCLS.
18 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: We'll talk in Chapter 19 4 about that calibration.
20 MEMBER REMPE: This is Joy and I guess I 21 have a follow-up on that because somewhere I thought 22 I read that actually, as you start to come to power, 23 you will make some changes as you try to calibrate 24 things.
25 And I guess I would like to hear more how NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
63 1 that's done. And I was real puzzled in the Staff's 2 review of Chapter 4, and I went back to 1537 and it 3 looks like Chapter 4 is kind of an inventory of 4 information in the Staff's review.
5 And so I'm real curious where the Staff 6 has information on determining how I wouldn't call 7 them fudge factors but how changes to that calibration 8 are determined accurately.
9 Because the Chapter 4 Staff review, and 10 actually, it's allowed in 1537, is just to make sure 11 information is complete and consistent with other 12 places. But all of the evaluations, there's nothing 13 in the SER about did they do independent calculations 14 or anything like that.
15 It's an inventory. And I think that's 16 what 1537 allows but I will be curious and I think I'd 17 like to encourage Members to help me compile a list of 18 questions that they want to follow up in other 19 chapters for the review.
20 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I'm glad to wait 21 until the closed session for Chapter 4 this afternoon 22 because probably we'll get into proprietary, but there 23 is an implication that there is an MCMP calculation 24 that gives you what the efficiency of those ex-core 25 neutron detectors is.
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64 1 MEMBER REMPE: And maybe there is but it's 2 not in the SER for Chapter 4.
3 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: What I'm curious 4 about is what's the uncertainty on the conclusion 5 because that's a notoriously difficult calculation.
6 MEMBER REMPE: Anyway, it isn't the time 7 to bring it up but I just was puzzling about that and 8 finally came to my own conclusion. I may be wrong but 9 --
10 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I'm not the Applicant 11 but I would suggest we wait until the closed session 12 this afternoon.
13 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is going to come up 14 later on as well probably more than a few times. It's 15 the issue of deflagration detonation for a problem.
16 This PCLS tank, can it survive a deflagration where 17 you get a pressure increase of probably a factor of 2?
18 Whereas a detonation is more like a factor 19 of 20.
20 MR. SODERLING: The flame arrester filter 21 and the associated piping to and from the expansion 22 tank is safety-related.
23 So, any air that enters that expansion 24 tank goes through that flame arrester, which will 25 preclude any sort of deflagration or detonation.
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65 1 CHAIR BALLINGER: What if it doesn't work?
2 MR. SODERLING: I'm not sure I understand.
3 CHAIR BALLINGER: What I'm saying is 4 you've got a component there that's containing things.
5 If you get a deflagration in the expansion tank, what 6 happens to the tank?
7 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy Radel with 8 SHINE. The passive features there, the flame arrester 9 is safety -related, as Ian said. We have no evaluated 10 a deflagration or detonation in that system.
11 There is air flow through there to 12 maintain the hydrogen concentration below the 13 deflagration limits, so that system combined with the 14 flame arrester is a sufficient ensurer of safety.
15 It was not evaluated for deflagration of 16 that tank.
17 CHAIR BALLINGER: You've got two things 18 going for you, you've got maintaining the 19 concentration below the limit and then using the flame 20 arrestor?
21 MS. RADEL: Correct.
22 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you.
23 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: This is Vesna. I 24 have a question about this isolation function of the 25 PCSL. Does this reservation activate every time when NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
66 1 you get the trip from the TSV protection system?
2 Yes is the answer?
3 MS. RADEL: I think safety actuation and 4 using isolation valves would isolate every time.
5 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, every time you 6 open the valves that system isolates, right?
7 MS. RADEL: I think normal operation 8 termination of irradiation and opening of the dump 9 valves, you would not isolate the primary system 10 boundary, the cooling loop would continue to run until 11 it was no longer needed.
12 The isolation function is towards IU cell 13 safety actuation so if the safety system determined 14 there was a concern of release into the primary 15 confinement boundary, it would initiate that isolation 16 function, which is to prevent radionuclides from 17 exiting the primary confinement boundary.
18 Because the PCLS did within the cooling 19 rooms, the entire skid is not safety-related and so we 20 have those isolation valves to maintain that primary 21 confinement boundary.
22 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: My question was if 23 you're talking about operating valves, there is this 24 post-irradiation, right, mode, I think it's Mode 3, 25 where the TSV dump valves open and the solution NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
67 1 starts.
2 And that happens on this protection 3 signals listed here, the temperature, the low flow or 4 whatever, the other thing initiates.
5 MS. RADEL: Yes, the unit will transition 6 to Mode 3 and dump the solution on any of those 7 signals.
8 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, in that case the 9 function of the cooling of the pool is never used in 10 any abnormal conditions, right?
11 MS. RADEL: Correct, the light water pool 12 provides sufficient cooling for any of those 13 conditions.
14 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Thanks.
15 MR. SODERLING: The next system, the 16 secondary loop in the 3-loop system here in SHINE is 17 the radioisotope process facility cooling system.
18 And again, that's RPCS. It removes heat 19 loads from around the IF, or the irradiation facility, 20 as well as the radioisotope conduction facility, which 21 is the RPF.
22 So, like I said, it acts as a secondary 23 cooling loop. It removes heat from the PCLS heat 24 exchanger and that next bullet point is a big list of 25 heat exchangers and systems that it removes heat from.
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68 1 So, just some examples are the target 2 solution vessel off gas system, or TOGS, process 3 vessel vent system, PVVS, neutron driver assembly 4 system, NDAS, and then other heat exchangers that are 5 listed there as well.
6 This is not performed or maintained in any 7 safety functions in any capacity. By that I mean it 8 doesn't perform any sort of safety-related cooling 9 there in the safety-related trip signals. It's a 10 wholly non-safety-related system.
11 And then ultimately, it rejects heat to 12 the PCHS, the process chilled water system, through 13 the RPCS heat exchanger, and we'll talk about this a 14 little bit later but the RPCS maintains a pressure 15 that's higher than the PCLS or any other system that 16 it serves and that's to prevent any sort of spread of 17 contamination around the system and facility.
18 Just as a last bullet point, there are 19 three pumps in this system, it's configured as an N+1 20 type system. You'll always have two pumps running and 21 then a third pump further down in NC.
22 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: This is Jose again.
23 I'm curious, for the PCLS you have only two pumps and 24 for the RPCS you have N+1. Is there any logic to 25 that, any reason?
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69 1 MR. SODERLING: Like I said before, the 2 PCLS can run with a single pump, it's ideal to run 3 with two but you can still run with one single pump.
4 And that comes down to how much space is available in 5 the cooling room.
6 We can comfortably fit two pumps on the 7 cooling skid.
8 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: So, there's a logic 9 to the madness. There are space requirements.
10 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg. What's the 11 cooling mediums of treated water or untreated water?
12 MR. SODERLING: If you want me come back 13 with what the type of water in the future I can bring 14 that back. There are certain standards we took from an 15 IAEA tech doc and that's what's being applied to this 16 system.
17 I don't have that information on hand but 18 it is treated, yes.
19 MEMBER HALNON: What I was putting it to 20 is if there was some contamination based on a whole-21 system trip and back leakage, would it be a mixed 22 waste issue? Just a curiosity at this point.
23 MR. SODERLING: Sure.
24 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: This is Vesna again, 25 you have the one PCS and the PCLS per unit, right, per NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
70 1 deviation unit? And RPSCS is common for facility, 2 right?
3 MR. SODERLING: You have one PCLS unit per 4 IU cell.
5 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So, you have eight 6 of them, right?
7 MR. SODERLING: That's correct.
8 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: And one RPCS, right?
9 MR. SODERLING: One single RPCS, that's 10 correct. It sounded like there was another question.
11 MEMBER BROWN: Yes, you said something on 12 the previous slide relative to the different 13 terminology. I guess that's what I'm questioning. I 14 can find the slide again now. It was Slide for where 15 you talked about the closure of the confinement 16 isolation valves.
17 MR. SODERLING: Yes, that's the slide 18 that's currently up on the screen.
19 MEMBER BROWN: Let me finish my question 20 and make sure you heard me. In looking at Chapter 6, 21 is that the same as the primary system boundary?
22 MR. SODERLING: No, it is not.
23 MEMBER BROWN: If you look at that overall 24 diagram, 6A2.2-1, the primary containment boundary of 25 confinement, and then it talks about primary system NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
71 1 boundaries in one of the others.
2 And I'm starting to get confused as to 3 where the primary system boundary is relative to the 4 confinement boundary?
5 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy, I can take that 6 one. The primary system boundary is the boundary that 7 directly contains the target solution and fission 8 product gases during irradiation.
9 So, the process boundary directly, the 10 primary confinement boundary is the irradiation unit 11 cell, along with TSB off gas system cell, and so those 12 confinement boundaries that contain the radionuclides 13 in case of a breach of the primary system boundary.
14 MEMBER BROWN: You just lost me.
15 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yes, you don't have 16 a cartoon of that, right?
17 MEMBER PETTI: Charlie, the confinement 18 boundary is a hot cell.
19 MEMBER BROWN: It's an irradiation unit 20 and a TOGs.
21 MR. BARTELME: This is Jeff Barnum. We 22 have a figure in the Chapter 4 closed session slides 23 that we might --
24 (Simultaneous speaking.)
25 MEMBER BROWN: I was ahead of you. I got NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
72 1 lost in Chapter 6 trying to figure out what was what 2 on the computer with no paper. Go ahead, we'll wait, 3 or I'll wait.
4 MR. SODERLING: The tertiary loop here at 5 SHINE is the process chilled water system, PCHS. It 6 removes heat from the RPCS heat exchanger and then 7 rejects it to the environment with air-cooled chillers 8 that are external to the facility.
9 It does not perform any safety functions 10 either, there are three chillers and three chilled 11 water pumps and that's the N+1 configuration applied 12 to both the cooling and to the mode of force behind 13 the system.
14 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Are the chillers 15 common to multiple units?
16 MR. SODERLING: Yes. There are elements 17 or RPCS that are unit-specific and then parts of it 18 that are unit zero or common. But the PCHS is common 19 to the entire facility.
20 Sounds like we can go to the next slide.
21 This is about the cooling system pressure cascade, so 22 just to recap how the process works, you have heat 23 that's generated in a subcritical assembly neutron 24 multiplier.
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73 1 will have some heat added to it. The PCLS removes 2 that heat from both systems and circulates it back to 3 the primary cooling room which is where the SKID is.
4 RPCS water enters the PCLS heat exchanger 5 and then removes heat from PCLS, which in turn the 6 RPCS rejects heat to the PCHS, and then you have PCHS 7 supply and return headers that are routed back and 8 forth from the non-RCA, we call it the administrative 9 annex, to the RPCS heat exchanger room, which is in 10 the RCA.
11 And then that ultimately ends up outside 12 the facility where the PCHS chillers are. And so like 13 I detailed before, the pressure cascade prevents any 14 contamination from the PCLS moving towards RPCS or 15 PCHS.
16 So, you have PCLS which is at a relatively 17 lower pressure, RPCS at a higher pressure, and then 18 PCHS at a higher pressure than that.
19 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: You're using so many 20 -- what's the RCA?
21 MR. SODERLING: The radiologically 22 controlled area.
23 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Thank you.
24 MR. SODERLING: The diagram to the right 25 shows relatively where all the systems are. The PCLS NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
74 1 is in the RCA, the radiologically controlled area, the 2 RPCSs as well, and then PCHS is a system that goes 3 back and forth between the RCA, the non-RCA, and 4 outside the facility.
5 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: You also have to 6 prevent the contamination between the makeup, which is 7 the demineralized water system, which reminds makeup 8 for the PCLS, right? Because that is only direct.
9 All other contact happens through the heat exchangers, 10 right?
11 MR. SODERLING: We'll talk about the FTWS 12 next, the mineralized water makeup but for PCLS 13 specifically, there's a reduced pressure backflow 14 preventer, so there's an actual air gap that exists 15 between PCLS and demineralized water systems.
16 And that prevents contamination from 17 getting into the makeup system.
18 I think we can move to the next slide.
19 This system is a facility to mineralized water system, 20 or FTWS. This system also performs non-safety-related 21 function of providing makeup to the process systems.
22 You have reversed osmosis water that is 23 used mostly in the administrative annex portion of the 24 facility. It does also serve the QC and analytical 25 lab sinks.
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75 1 You also have deionized water, ASTM Type 2 II, which is a primary source of makeup for a lot of 3 the systems within the RCA or just the process systems 4 in general I should say.
5 And then you have ultra-pure deionized 6 water, which is ASTM Type I, and that's provided to 7 the quality control of the QC and analytical labs as 8 well as the MEPS hot water system and the molybdenum 9 in the extraction purification system, that's what 10 MEPS is.
11 And then the FTWS has a water to air heat 12 exchanger and it's just simply there to reject some of 13 the heat from pump operation and any other equipment 14 that would create heat.
15 MEMBER HALNON: And is the molybdenum 16 water the reverse osmosis?
17 MR. SODERLING: So, in the administrative 18 annex to the non-RCA, you have potable water that's 19 fed to an RO skid, a reverse osmosis skid. So, you 20 have a reverse osmosis tank in that room as well.
21 And then you have a supply to the RCA 22 where you have another skid that circulates water to 23 the RCA to systems that are within it, and you purify 24 it to these ASTM Type II and Type I deionized water 25 using various polishers and systems throughout.
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76 1 So, as an example, outside of each cooling 2 room there's a deionizer polisher that cleans up water 3 that's supplied to PCLS. So, before water is ever 4 made up to PCLS, it goes through that polisher.
5 MEMBER HALNON: So, you don't have a pure 6 molybdenum water tank that is the supply of potable 7 water from city going to whatever processing institute 8 to meet those standards?
9 MR. SODERLING: There are two storage 10 tanks, one in the RCA and one in the non-RCA.
11 MEMBER HALNON: Approximate volume of 12 those?
13 MR. SODERLING: I don't have that on hand.
14 MEMBER HALNON: Big, little, medium? I'm 15 pretty easy.
16 MR. SODERLING: Relative to our facility, 17 I would say they're big. I believe it's something 18 like 200 gallons.
19 MEMBER HALNON: Hundreds of gallons versus 20 -- thanks.
21 MR. SODERLING: If there aren't any other 22 questions, I believe that concludes my slides.
23 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you then. By our 24 agenda we're scheduled for a break and we're darn near 25 on schedule. I'm sure that will change. So, we will NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
77 1 take a recess until -- let's be specific -- 10:35 a.m.
2 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 3 off the record at 10:17 a.m. and resumed at 10:35 4 a.m.)
5 CHAIR BALLINGER: We're back online. The 6 staff, where is the staff? Mike, are you up for this?
7 Who? That looks good, except I can't hear anything.
8 MR. RAU: Hi, can you hear me?
9 CHAIR BALLINGER: Yes, thanks.
10 MR. RAU: My name is Adam Rau. I'm a 11 technical reviewer in the Nuclear Systems Performance 12 Branch in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation and 13 I'll be presenting the NRC Staff's review of the 14 cooling systems.
15 So, I should also mention that although 16 I'm presenting, I didn't perform the majority of this 17 review. That was done by Muhammad Razzaque, my former 18 coworker who retired at the end of last December.
19 Additionally, I'll be presenting systems 20 review by the Nuclear Systems Performance Branch.
21 There are additional systems that were reviewed by the 22 Containment and Plant Systems Branch as well that are 23 here to answer any potential questions.
24 Next slide, please. The systems I'll be 25 discussing today include the target solution vessel, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
78 1 the primary closed-loop cooling system, target 2 solution vessel dump tank and light water pool system, 3 and the radioisotope process facility cooling system.
4 There's a bit to say about the thermal 5 hydraulic and testing calculation as well as the safe 6 shutdown thermal hydraulic analysis. I'll try to 7 speed through the sections of this that SHINE have 8 already discussed as well.
9 Next slide, please. So, for the review 10 methodology, the NRC Staff used the augmented interim 11 staff guidance for the radioisotope production 12 facilities, the augmented guidance to NUREG 5037.2.
13 The NRC Staff reviewed docketed 14 correspondence including the final safety analysis 15 report response to request for additional information 16 in addition to docket correspondence.
17 For understanding, NRC Staff also reviewed 18 SHINE calculations by the reading room.
19 Journal publications that were referenced 20 in these calculations and in the safety analysis 21 report, and performed a few simple confirmatory 22 calculations just to understand some of the 23 sensitivities in the system.
24 Next slide, please. Moving through the 25 systems, there's more nuance to the target solution NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
79 1 vessel that I believe will be discussed in Chapter 4, 2 but from the perspective of cooling systems, the 3 target solution vessel is an annular vessel.
4 It's cooled by the primary closed-loop 5 cooling system and multiple surfaces. The acceptance 6 criteria for this design are intended to prevent 7 boiling of the target solution and ensure the 8 integrity of the primary boundary.
9 And these are that the bulk target 10 solution temperatures should be less than 80 degrees 11 Celsius and the peak target solution multiple should 12 be less than 90 degrees.
13 I should mention that the second criterion 14 listed on the slide, the bulk target solution 15 temperature, applies to the main operation analysis 16 and its initial condition to the safe shutdown 17 analysis.
18 Next slide, please.
19 So, it's been discussed already but the 20 PCLS is an irradiation-unit-specific system. I should 21 also mention the light water pool system and the TSV 22 dump tank are also irradiation unit-specific systems.
23 And it's designed to remove 110 percent of TSV power 24 during normal operation.
25 Next slide, please. SHINE's analysis, NRC NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
80 1 Staff found that SHINE's analysis demonstrated that 2 overheating of the target solution was not expected 3 for any anticipated operating conditions.
4 Additionally, departure from nuclide 5 boiling is not expected either of the target solution 6 or of the primary closed-loop cooling water.
7 I should last mention that the PCLS system 8 also cools the neutron multiplier and SHINE has 9 confirmed there's adequate margin to prevent departure 10 from nuclide boiling on this surface as well.
11 Next slide, please.
12 The role of the TSV dump tank has already 13 been discussed, it's a horizontal annular tank that's 14 submerged within the light water pool system. Next 15 slide, please.
16 The geometry of the tank facilitates decay 17 heat removal from the target solution fluid because of 18 the large heat transfer area associated here. SHINE's 19 analysis shows that peak target solution temperature 20 inside the dump tank does not exceed 90 degrees 21 Celsius.
22 During a shutdown scenario, appropriate 23 pool level is maintained and also to emphasize here 24 that this analysis assumes that PCLS is lost too.
25 Next slide, please.
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81 1 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: This is Jose. This 2 is lost and drained, so this a vacuum? What state are 3 the PCLS tubes in and annulus?
4 MR. SODERLING: I can answer that 5 question. When a PCLS shuts down, the water stays 6 within the system so the cooling loop would just turn 7 off whenever the operators turn it off. But the water 8 stays in the tube and the subcritical assembly.
9 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Maybe I'll hold my 10 question for the closed session. I know you have some 11 backup slides with some drawings, I'll wait until this 12 afternoon. Thank you.
13 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy, I just want to 14 clarify, the PCLS isn't credited for removal of any 15 heat in that safety basis analysis. It just looks at 16 the target solution dumping into the dump tank there 17 so the PCLS would not factor into that analysis.
18 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: My concern is that if 19 you drain some components you may prevent heat 20 transfer but it's easier if you see the drawing in the 21 screen so I'll ask you the question this afternoon 22 again.
23 MR. RAU: Thank you. Next slide, please.
24 The dump tank is submerged in the light water pool.
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82 1 tank through natural convection, no forced cooling or 2 heat exchanges.
3 And it achieves this without boiling of 4 the target solution or the water from the light water 5 pool. Next slide, please.
6 MEMBER BROWN: Is there makeup water?
7 You're heating it, is it an enclosed pool? The pool 8 sounds like it's open to the atmosphere, is that 9 right?
10 MR. RAU: That's my understanding. If 11 SHINE wanted to weigh in?
12 MEMBER BROWN: My question is if that's 13 used to cool something, you're going to get 14 evaporation and is there a makeup of that water based 15 on some levels in the tank? I don't remember seeing 16 that.
17 MS. RADEL: I think it's probably best to 18 save the real detailed discussion on the safety basis 19 so that we don't approach any of the proprietary 20 information in that analysis.
21 MEMBER BROWN: I just thought having water 22 go into the tank wasn't necessarily proprietary. But 23 that's fine, I'll wait if I can remember that long.
24 Go ahead.
25 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Will this pool also NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
83 1 be covered in Chapter 4? Because it wasn't really 2 included in Chapter 5, the cooling system. And I 3 looked at that in Chapter 4.
4 So, would you have a discussion again of 5 the pool when we go to Chapter 4?
6 MS. RADEL: This is SHINE, we will have a 7 discussion on the pool in Chapter 4.
8 MR. BALAZIK: This is Mike Balazik from 9 the NRC Staff. There is a discussion in the SE on 10 Chapter 4 on the pool.
11 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Thanks, we can ask 12 more questions about control of the level of 13 instrumentation and the makeup to it. Okay.
14 MEMBER REMPE: This is Joy and at the 15 beginning of this presentation you said Staff did some 16 hand calculations to confirm the adequacy of some of 17 the information related to this application.
18 There's nothing in Chapter 4 that I saw in 19 the SE that identified what calculations were done.
20 Could you elaborate either here or in the 21 closed session what exactly the staff did to confirm 22 that the information like the instrumentation would 23 give the appropriate signals to ensure the safety of 24 the facilities operation?
25 MR. RAU: I can absolutely elaborate in NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
84 1 the closed session on the confirmatory analysis that 2 was done.
3 MEMBER REMPE: I'm sorry I interrupted 4 you, go ahead.
5 MR. RAU: I can't speak to other technical 6 reviewers, I know that myself I didn't perform any 7 confirmatory analysis on the instrumentation to 8 confirm that was adequate.
9 MEMBER REMPE: When I looked at Chapter 4 10 and the importance of some of the instrumentation, I'm 11 worried about the calibration and have they considered 12 the cycling and all the environmental things?
13 And I think I mentioned that in our 14 overview discussion whenever we had that a while back 15 here, and I was told that'll come in Chapter 7.
16 So, again, I'm just trying to understand 17 and make sure everything got done with the questions 18 that folks are thinking are going to get answered in 19 4 because I don't think we're going to get answers for 20 calculations done to support information in 4.
21 I think it's going to have to be done in 22 other chapters when I looked at what I saw in Chapter 23 4. Is that a true assumption on how this review was 24 done? And maybe I should ask the Chapter 4 reviewers 25 instead of you.
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85 1 MR. RAU: If they're here and they wanted 2 to?
3 MR. STAUDENMEIER: This is Joe 4 Staudenmeier, I worked on the Chapter 4 review and the 5 instrumentation is really Chapter 7 so we did not 6 review the instrumentation in Chapter 4 other than if 7 they have instrumentation that appears functional to 8 measure what they need to measure.
9 MEMBER REMPE: Right, and I think that's 10 true for the analysis too, that it's done in other 11 chapters.
12 But anyway, let's hear what Chapter 5 13 folks did for analysis in the closed session, but I 14 just wanted to give Vesna a heads-up that if there's 15 something that's got a question that's technical about 16 the adequacy of the design, this is the chapter to ask 17 the questions.
18 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Yes, for Chapter 4 I 19 did some simple hand calculation-type analysis but 20 yes, nothing in great detail.
21 MEMBER REMPE: Thank you, go ahead.
22 MR. RAU: Thank you. Next slide, please.
23 Here, this is just to mention that the light water 24 pool does receive some heat during normal operation.
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86 1 in the target solution vessel, some of it travels and 2 heats the light water pool directly. The credit for 3 removal of this heat is from the submerged PCLS 4 components within the pool.
5 So, the expectation is that the pool 6 temperature would rise slightly above the PCLS 7 temperature during normal operation. And so the 8 temperature and the water level are monitored as well 9 and there's also a technical specification limit on 10 the water level in the pool.
11 Next slide, please.
12 Just to talk a little bit about the SHINE 13 calculations, there were some heat transfer and other 14 correlations used in the SHINE safety-related 15 calculations.
16 These were derived from public literature 17 and where an applicable correlation was not valuable 18 in the literature, SHINE did perform some specific 19 tests. And so NRC Staff reviewed these correlations 20 and found they're valid and applicable to the SHINE 21 facility in the way they're used.
22 Next slide, please.
23 I'll discuss a bit more about the safe 24 shutdown thermohydraulic analysis. The NRC Staff 25 finding on this was based in part on the number of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
87 1 conservative simplifying assumptions in this analysis.
2 And due to this and the simplicity of the 3 system, NRC Staff found the safe shutdown of long-term 4 cooling can be achieved passively for any anticipated 5 operating condition.
6 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: This is Jose. Remind 7 us again, the ultimate heat sink is the pump or is 8 there any heat transfer through the environment?
9 MR. RAU: I don't believe the safe 10 shutdown analysis assumes any heat transfer to the 11 environment.
12 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: So, it's just the 13 pool is so large and the power is so small that it 14 doesn't get to heat up in the allowed time, correct?
15 MR. RAU: Right, and it's a time-limited 16 analysis if I'm remembering correctly.
17 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or longer?
18 MR. RAU: I think it's longer than that.
19 I should probably look and make sure so I'm not giving 20 you false information but yes.
21 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Thank you.
22 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: They said five days 23 in the calculation. So, there are eight pools, 24 they're all separate per unit, right?
25 MR. RAU: Right. Next slide, please.
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88 1 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: They're not so big, 2 they're corrected to the -- I mentioned in the 3 beginning some big pool but they're actually just in 4 deviation unit pools limited by unit size.
5 Next slide, please.
6 So, I won't go into much more detail than 7 SHINE did about the radioisotope process facility 8 cooling system. I think they've described the purpose 9 of the system already.
10 Next slide, please.
11 NRC Staff findings were related. This is 12 not a safety-related system, not credited with 13 preventing or mitigating any design basis events. And 14 if active cooling for the radioisotope process 15 facility cooling system were lost, then irradiation of 16 the target solution would be suspended through other 17 means.
18 Additionally, the pressure cascade that 19 SHINE discussed to maintain and prevent the spread of 20 contamination is consistent with the interim Staff 21 guidance for aqueous homogeneous reactors.
22 Next slide, please.
23 Finally, the review of the phased approach 24 is underway. This review is partially simplified 25 because the component design for many of the cooling NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
89 1 systems are irradiation-unit-specific, so unaffected 2 by the phase approach.
3 But SHINE has submitted information on how 4 these irradiation-unit-specific components and non-5 irradiation-unit-specific components are isolated from 6 each other as well.
7 MEMBER PETTI: I have a question on that.
8 I remember reading that they're all independent but 9 there were some geometrical discussion about 10 installing the N+1 unit, showing yourself that you're 11 not causing an interference with the other operating 12 units.
13 I can't remember what chapter that was in 14 but I'm assuming we're going to get into that a little 15 bit? I'm just not sure this is the right chapter.
16 MR. RAU: Yes, I wouldn't have considered 17 that for the cooling systems chapter.
18 MEMBER PETTI: So, I recall there's a 19 figure that shows the physical location of the cells 20 and how they're going to build them out.
21 So, the concern is things are being moved, 22 somewhat heavy equipment, how do you make sure the 23 operating ones aren't affected when you're installing 24 the next unit, the sixth one, the seventh one.
25 I know I read it, it's in one of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
90 1 chapters, I just don't remember what chapters it was.
2 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Even some units in 3 real life, I have Internet connection in my 4 neighborhood and the other neighborhood, next time 5 when they connect Internet to the other neighborhood 6 they disconnect me.
7 That's what you're saying?
8 MEMBER PETTI: Yes.
9 MEMBER HALNON: We talked about this at 10 another meeting because I questioned the sequence as 11 well and the answer I believe was that the heavier 12 components were already installed, they were in place, 13 just not totally there.
14 I think that was the answer. Maybe we can 15 talk more in closed session about how that worked.
16 Because we were talking about the missile shields, 17 what I call missile shields they called floor plugs.
18 And they were all in place before the 19 first operation.
20 MEMBER REMPE: I remember your asking the 21 question that responds to that too but in the schedule 22 that we have for reviewing, Ron, are we going to talk 23 at all about phased construction?
24 The Staff said they're reviewing it so 25 this is coming up in a subsequent session?
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91 1 We'll have an opportunity?
2 MEMBER PETTI: There will be a focus on 3 that specific topic.
4 MR. ANDERSON: This is Shaun from the 5 Staff. I know this is one area that has been 6 discussed amongst the Staff in terms of movement of 7 equipment. So, we can make sure we address that.
8 MR. RAU: Thank you. Should I resume?
9 CHAIR BALLINGER: Yes.
10 MR. RAU: Next slide, please. That 11 actually covers my slides here. I can go over the 12 conclusions again.
13 The NRC Staff review found that adequate 14 cooling capacity exists for the primary closed-loop 15 cooling system to cool the TSV without boiling of the 16 target solution or departure from nuclide boiling.
17 Next slide, please.
18 Review of the thermal hydraulic 19 calculations found the contained and adequate number 20 of simplified and conservative assumptions still 21 included safety margin and doubted expected operating 22 scenarios.
23 During a shutdown decay heat would be 24 passively removed from the target solution inside the 25 dump tank by the large thermal mass of the light water NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
92 1 pool. Next slide, please.
2 The pressure cascade is maintained between 3 cooling systems to prevent spread of potential 4 contamination and review of the phased approach as it 5 relates to cooling systems is still underway.
6 MEMBER REMPE: This is Joy, and, again, 7 when I look at these conclusions, they imply that some 8 calculations were done independently by the Staff, not 9 just that you did what I think you're allowed to do in 10 Chapter 4 about reviewing the assumptions and the 11 adequacy of the information.
12 And I've looked ahead at the closed 13 slides, I don't see anything that tells me what the 14 Staff did. Is there something you can say in the open 15 session about your calculations that gave you the 16 confidence to say that adequate cooling capacity 17 exists?
18 Did you just review what they did and 19 said, okay, the inputs are good, they said they had 20 bounding assumptions? Nobody took their calculator 21 out and wrote some equations and did some analysis?
22 What was done?
23 MR. RAU: I'm not sure what I can say 24 about it in the --
25 MEMBER REMPE: Okay, that's fine in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
93 1 closed session, but you did some calculations, you can 2 say that at least in the open session, that gave you 3 this confidence, right?
4 MR. RAU: Right, and part of it was also 5 based on the conservatisms of the assumptions in the 6 calculations as well.
7 I think from a cooling system perspective, 8 some confirmatory analysis was done to rule out issues 9 that might otherwise have been looked into more, if 10 that helps.
11 MEMBER REMPE: We'll explore it more in 12 the closed session, I just was puzzled.
13 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: And before you go, 14 for the long-term cooling, I assume you assumed that 15 all the solution had been dumped into the dump tank, 16 is that correct?
17 MR. RAU: That's right.
18 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: This is not Chapter 19 5 or 4, this is more the old Chapter 19, what happens 20 if the damp valves fails to open? It's very low 21 probability event but the solution remains in the TSV.
22 Very low probability event, did you 23 evaluate if that is a safe configuration?
24 MR. RAU: No, I don't believe this was 25 evaluated, I think that SHINE has redundant dump NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
94 1 valves if I'm remembering correctly so a single 2 failure wouldn't cause that to occur.
3 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: One way to handle 4 this situation is to say the frequency, the 5 probability frequency, is so low that we don't need to 6 look at it. Another way is to look at it and say even 7 if it fails we handle it.
8 So, I don't know, I would have preferred 9 to make sure that -- because I think we can handle it.
10 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: My question here is 11 again, the cooling here is not a safety function, 12 right? Because the cooling system is not a safety 13 system, so the main safety function is defined in the 14 SHINE slides, maintaining valve, that is whatever, 15 containment pressure, system boundaries.
16 And controlling the H2 concentration. So, 17 did you guys concentrate on those, reviewing this?
18 You said there is the pressure cascade maintained but 19 I'm not sure, let's say that takes care of integrity 20 or maintaining integrity.
21 But did you analyze these other functions, 22 the H2 function, chemistry quality control function, 23 to prevent corrosions, things like that? Did you 24 review those things too?
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95 1 just on the cooling and cooling is not a safety 2 function of this system.
3 MR. RAU: I myself didn't review those 4 items.
5 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: They're covered in 6 the SER, I was just wondering because they're not 7 covered in your presentation, so I was just curious 8 about it.
9 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay.
10 MR. RAU: Thank you very much, that's all 11 I have.
12 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you. Are there 13 any questions from the Members? As the lady once 14 said, strap yourself in, we're now on Chapter 4. So, 15 are the SHINE folks ready to go?
16 MS. RADEL: Before we start Chapter 4 17 here, I just wanted to make a quick clarification on 18 something that was mentioned earlier.
19 I did want to note that we did a 20 comparison of the atmospheric meteorological data from 21 2000 to 2010 against the 2007 to 2017 data and showed 22 there is no significant difference between the 23 distributions of wind speed or the Pasquill stability 24 class.
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96 1 jump in Chapter 4 here.
2 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you. That closed 3 us out with questions.
4 MS. RADEL: I'm going to turn it over here 5 to Eric Edwards, our clinical process systems manager, 6 to cover Chapter 4.
7 MR. EDWARDS: This is Eric Edwards, as she 8 said. For Chapter 4 we're going to go through the 9 radiation facility site for 4A and then we'll go 10 through the radioisotope production facility for this 11 outline.
12 So, go ahead to the next slide.
13 This slide shows the interaction of the 14 various systems in the irradiation facility in a block 15 diagram format.
16 The irradiation unit contains a light 17 water pool and accelerator neutron driver, the 18 subcritical assembly, the neutron multiplier, the dump 19 tank and then other support equipment.
20 So, the main equipment that supports the 21 irradiation unit outside of the irradiation unit cell 22 concludes the target solution vessel off gas system 23 and the primary closed-loop cooling system, which we 24 just discussed.
25 And then Tracy?
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97 1 MS. RADEL: Yes, before we move to the 2 next slide, I just wanted to try to clarify the 3 difference between the primary system boundary and the 4 primary confinement boundary, as was asked earlier.
5 The primary system boundary would be -- I 6 don't know if you can see the mouse there but the 7 lines that run from the target solution vessel through 8 the TOGS condensers to the TOGS skid and back around 9 into the dump tank and back into the TSV as well.
10 So, that's the primary system boundary, 11 piping and component boundary for the primary 12 confinement boundary, which is made up of the 13 irradiation unit cell, the TOGs shielded cell, as well 14 as the recirculation RVZ, radiological ventilation 15 zone and recirculation subsystem here.
16 So, that's a secondary boundary in case of 17 a release. Are there questions on the difference 18 between those two?
19 MEMBER HALNON: This is Greg. We have the 20 confinement boundary going through white space there 21 just below the IU cell supplemental cooling subsystem.
22 What is that? Is that a wall there, or what is that?
23 MS. RADEL: The confinement boundary there 24 is the actual components within the RVC 1R system 25 itself, so the piping, those units, that unit is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
98 1 seismically qualified in the farthest part of the 2 boundary.
3 MEMBER HALNON: Thank you.
4 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: What does that 5 supplemental cooling unit do?
6 MS. RADEL: That's just a closed system 7 that maintains the temperature and humidity within the 8 IU cell and TOG cell within a range for optimum 9 equipment time. It is not safety-related, it performs 10 no safety-related functions other than confinement.
11 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: So, would you call it 12 the air conditioning system?
13 MS. RADEL: Yes.
14 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: And another question, 15 the primary confinement, there is one for each unit 16 cell so we have eight of those?
17 MS. RADEL: Correct.
18 MEMBER BROWN: Is the dotted red line the 19 confinement boundary?
20 MS. RADEL: Correct.
21 MEMBER BROWN: And this other thing called 22 the system boundary is an invisible line going around 23 through TSV up through the TOGS and out to the off 24 gas?
25 MS. RADEL: The primary system boundary is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
99 1 made up of the actual piping and components that 2 directly contain the target solution and off gases for 3 the system. So, it's represented by the lines between 4 the boxes and the boxes themselves.
5 MEMBER BROWN: The purple boxes?
6 MS. RADEL: Correct, purple boxes and the 7 lines between the purple boxes.
8 MEMBER BROWN: Including the ones in the 9 bottom? There are five purple boxes so it's all those 10 that are the primary system boundary?
11 MS. RADEL: Correct.
12 MEMBER BROWN: And the lines going in and 13 out?
14 MS. RADEL: Correct.
15 MEMBER BROWN: That's interesting because 16 when you read Chapter 6 there's references to the PSB 17 and it's very difficult to tell what's being isolated 18 or not.
19 So, it would be nice to define that a 20 little bit better than what you've done. Something 21 similar to the red line would be very nice, a green 22 line going around the purple items to show the system 23 boundary.
24 It's tough when you're reading to try to 25 figure out what you're talking about. That's all, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
100 1 just a comment.
2 MS. RADEL: And as we move into the 3 Chapter 6 slides, we can definitely clarify wherever 4 there is anything confusing about what we're referring 5 to there. I'm going to turn it back over to Eric for 6 the remainder of the Chapter 4 discussion.
7 MR. EDWARDS: This is Eric again. Next 8 we're going to talk about the Neutron Driver Assembly 9 System, or NDAS. The neutron driver creates deuterium 10 ions that are accelerated into a tritium gas that 11 creates fusion events, which creates helium, neutrons, 12 and releases energy.
13 These other neutrons drive the subcritical 14 assembly, where the molybdenum is created.
15 Components of the accelerator go through 16 the accelerator stage on top that creates that ion 17 beam, a pumping stage in the center that pumps out low 18 pressures and puts that into higher-pressure areas for 19 transport of the ion beam.
20 And then the target stage where the 21 tritium gas is and diffusion occurs.
22 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Do you have an 23 estimate of the lifetime of these accelerators, an 24 experience that will last several years?
25 MS. RADEL: We can discuss that during NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
101 1 closed session.
2 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Sorry about asking 3 that.
4 MS. RADEL: It's okay.
5 MR. EDWARDS: As I said, the accelerator 6 drives the Subcritical Assembly System, specifically 7 the target solution vessel. So, the target solution 8 vessel contains the target solution which creates the 9 moly in the reaction that was driven by the 10 accelerator.
11 That's part of the Subcritical Assembly 12 System, which also includes the neutron multiplier, 13 the target solution dump tank, and the structure. The 14 TSV drains to a geometrically favorable tank and 15 that's how the system is shut down.
16 And it sounds like we are talking a bit 17 about the passively cooling of that dump tank in the 18 light water pool previously. Actually, this slide was 19 covered a bit so I'm just going to go quickly over it.
20 Heat is created in the fission process 21 which is removed by the primary closed-loop cooling 22 system using force convection to cool a target 23 solution. The size to remove all the heat produced 24 are 10 percent over license power.
25 And then the whole subcritical assembly NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
102 1 sits in the light water pool and that's where we have 2 the heat capacity to cool the target solution vessel 3 dump tank.
4 The target solution vessel off gas system 5 is used to maintain the hydrogen gas concentration, 6 which is formed by water radiolysis at an acceptable 7 level.
8 As we discussed a little at the beginning, 9 TOGS is part of the primary system boundary and also 10 has a function to provide iodine gas to control dose.
11 TOGS runs slightly below atmospheric and 12 is designed to minimize the water hold-up in its own 13 system and element material in its own system.
14 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Can you say that 15 again? Is this to minimize the hold-up?
16 MR. EDWARDS: Yes, it's designed to 17 minimize the hold-up.
18 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I think you have some 19 drawings in the closed session? You can tell us where 20 the water holds and how much of it and how long does 21 it take to fill up? I'll ask this later.
22 MR. EDWARDS: We do talk a little bit 23 about how this affects our activity management. All 24 equipment in the irradiation facility that produces 25 radiation is shielded by the irradiation cell NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
103 1 biological shielding or ICBS.
2 That includes the IU irradiation unit 3 cells, the target solution vessel off gas system 4 cells, primary cooling rooms, and the Neutron Driver 5 Assembly System service cell.
6 In that analysis of our shielding, 7 geometry is explicitly modeled to mean that we would 8 explicitly model penetrations and voids that are not 9 scenario materials, as they call it, in most cases at 10 least.
11 Dose rates are limited in occupied area in 12 the analyses and then we have also shown in our 13 analysis that the shielding material itself is not 14 damaged over the lifetime from the radiation that it's 15 protecting from.
16 That's the end of the irradiation 17 facility.
18 So, moving onto the radioisotope 19 production facility, this is where isotope separation 20 is performed with molybdenum by extraction of moly 21 with the purification system and the iodine and xenon, 22 and separated in the iodine and xenon purification 23 and packaging system.
24 Those are MEPS and IXP. There are three 25 MEPS processing lines in the super cell, which is a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
104 1 series of hot cells and moly is separated from the 2 target solution there.
3 Following separation, the target solution 4 is staged for subsequent irradiation in a system 5 called the target. The teachable lessons, we'll have 6 a subsequent slide here.
7 Purification is performed on manipulators 8 of a large scale in a separate hot cell so there's 9 actually three extractions and three purifications.
10 And then iodine and xenon are also separated in a 11 separate hot cell by using some of the confinement 12 systems.
13 Next, the TSSS, which is the target 14 solution staging system, is a series of below-grade 15 tapes. There are eight whole tapes, one for each 16 radiation unit, and then you have two target solution 17 storage tanks which are essentially spare tanks.
18 Any of the MEPS processing, once the 19 extraction is complete, it can go to any of the TSSS 20 tanks or subsequent irradiation so we don't have to 21 keep going back to the same tank we got it from.
22 It's for operational flexibility. The 23 moly isotope production path system, or MIPS, is an 24 additional two hot cells where the product is put into 25 fission containers and exported for shipping offsite.
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105 1 And then some other process systems, these 2 will be covered more heavily in Chapter 9 but the 3 process vessel event system, I want to cover this 4 because it interacts with some of the other systems, 5 this is the system that mitigates the formation of 6 hydrogen and the RPF tanks.
7 This is significantly less hydrogen than 8 the irradiation unit cell so we don't see the system 9 that is target solution vessel off gas system. And 10 then this system also captures iodine and delays the 11 release of radioactive gases reportedly harmful at 12 least to the environment.
13 Radio-elective liquid waste storage, or 14 RLWS, collects liquid waste from different systems 15 where it can be sampled, blended, and then transferred 16 to the radioactive liquid waste and mobilization 17 system, where it's solidified for disposal.
18 And then the radioactive liquid waste 19 mobilization system, or RLWI, receives the waste from 20 RLWS and solidifies it.
21 It also has the ability to remove 22 classification-driving radioisotopes, meaning it can 23 separate cesium and strontium, for example, so that 24 the waste can meet the system's lower classification 25 level for exclusion.
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106 1 That is the end of the Chapter 4 open 2 session slides. Are there any questions on the open 3 session slides?
4 CHAIR BALLINGER: Hearing none, let's 5 continue.
6 MR. NEWELL: My name is Alexander Newell, 7 I'm the criticality safety lead. I'm going to be 8 going over the Chapter 6 presentation.
9 In the presentation we're going to cover 10 confinement systems and combustible gas management and 11 the IRF and RPF, as well as process vessel event 12 isolation.
13 The purpose of confinement systems is to 14 limit the release of radiological material to the 15 occupied or uncontrolled areas during and after design 16 basis accidents in order to mitigate radiological 17 consequences to the facility staff, the public, and 18 the environment.
19 The principal objective of SHINE's 20 confinement systems is protection of onsite personnel, 21 the public, and the environment with a secondary 22 objective to minimize reliance on the administrative 23 or active engineering controls.
24 The confinement systems were designed with 25 the goal of as simple and fail-safe as reasonably NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
107 1 possible.
2 I want to begin, as we had discussed 3 earlier, by noting that each IU cell is independent of 4 the other IU cells, and the primary confinement 5 boundary utilizes passive and active features and 6 consists primarily of the IU cell, the TOG cell, and 7 the IU and TOG cell HVAC enclosures.
8 The RVZ1e subsystem is a credit to 9 redundant dampers or valves that close on the 10 confinement actuation signal. The piping systems 11 penetrating the primary confinement boundary, and 12 capable of excessive leakage or equipped with one or 13 more isolation valves.
14 This satisfies SHINE design criteria in 15 33. Lines from outside the confinement that penetrate 16 the primary confinement boundary and are connected 17 directly to the primary confinement boundary are 18 provided with redundant isolation capabilities.
19 This satisfies SHINE design criteria in 20 34. Note that isolation valves outside of the 21 confinement are located as close to the confinement as 22 practical and state acquisition providing greater 23 safety to the parts of actuating power.
24 The N2PS and PVVS are equipped with 25 appropriate isolation capabilities and to take the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
108 1 position of greater safety on the parts of actuating 2 power.
3 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger, 4 these design criteria are in Chapter 3 and we're not 5 --
6 MR. NEWELL: Yes, that's correct.
7 CHAIR BALLINGER: We're not reviewing that 8 chapter here but might it be appropriate for you to 9 tell us what design criteria 33 is as well as design 10 criteria in 34?
11 MR. NEWELL: Let me pull that up for you, 12 just one second. I have them in front of me now.
13 SHINE design criteria in 33 is piping systems 14 penetrating confinement.
15 Piping systems penetrating confinement 16 boundaries that have the potential for excessive 17 leakage are provided with isolation capabilities 18 appropriate to the potential for excessive leakage.
19 Piping systems that pass between 20 confinement boundaries are equipped with either one, 21 a locked closed manual isolation valve, or two, an 22 automatic isolation valve that takes the position that 23 provides greater safety upon loss of actuating power.
24 Manual isolation valves are maintained and 25 locked shut for any conditions requiring confinement NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
109 1 valve drain integrity.
2 And then Criterion 34 is confinement 3 isolation. Lines from outside confinement that 4 penetrate the primary confinement boundary and are 5 connected directly to the primary system boundary are 6 provided with redundant isolation capabilities.
7 Ventilation, monitoring, and other systems 8 that penetrate the primary process, level locks, or 9 hot cell confinement boundaries are connected directly 10 to the confinement atmosphere and are not normally 11 locked closed, have redundant isolation capabilities, 12 or are otherwise directed to structures, systems, and 13 components capability of handling any leakage.
14 Isolation valves outside the confinement 15 boundaries are located as close to the confinement as 16 practical. And upon loss of actuating power, 17 automatic isolation valves are designed to take the 18 position that provides greater safety.
19 Manual isolation valves are maintained to 20 locked shut for any conditions requiring confinement 21 boundary integrity. All electrical connections from 22 equipment external to the confinement boundaries are 23 sealed to minimize air leakage.
24 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you.
25 MR. NEWELL: No problem.
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110 1 MEMBER BROWN: Can I ask a question? It's 2 Charlie Brown again.
3 Going back to your Chapter 4 picture, 4 based on what you define as the primary system 5 boundaries, it looks like there's only one valve 6 associated with that and all the rest of them are 7 general confinement penetration, excuse me, two 8 valves.
9 So, does your block diagram accurately 10 represent what you just said with these? I'm trying 11 to differentiate between confinement and system again 12 to make sure I understand that.
13 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy, there are 14 significantly more valves than representative in that 15 block diagram. That's a simplified diagram showing 16 some of the key isolation valves.
17 MEMBER BROWN: So, there's more. Okay, 18 thank you.
19 MR. NEWELL: Okay, picking up, the N2PS, 20 I believe I already said this but I'll just repeat 21 myself, and PVVS are equipped with appropriate 22 isolation capabilities and take the position of 23 greater safety on locks of actuating power.
24 Moving on to the tritium confinement 25 boundary, similar to primary confinement boundary, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
111 1 each TPS train is independent of the other two. The 2 tritium confinement boundary is comprised of passive 3 and active components.
4 The passive components include the TPS 5 flow boxes, the secondary enclosure cleanup process 6 boundary and the TPS to NDAS interface lines to the 7 interface with the primary confinement boundary.
8 The active components include the 9 isolation of the helium supply, the glove box pressure 10 control exhaust, the vacuum and impurity treatment 11 subsystem process vent, and process connections to the 12 NDAS.
13 Active components are initiated to the 14 safe configuration via the SFAS which initiates either 15 a TPS train isolation on detection of high TPS glove 16 box tritium concentration or high target chamber 17 supply or exhaust pressure, or a TPS process vent 18 actuation on the detection of high TPS exhaust to 19 facility staff tritium.
20 And active components take their safe 21 state on a loss of actuating power. So, here is a 22 slide demonstrating the efficacy of our safety 23 features.
24 I'll hold for a minute to give you time to 25 digest the slide and ask any questions.
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112 1 CHAIR BALLINGER: I have one, this is Ron 2 Ballinger. I'm sure there's an obvious answer to this 3 but if you look at Column 1, the public TEDE, versus 4 Column 2, the worker TEDE, the public dose is higher 5 than the worker dose.
6 I'm sure there's an obvious answer but I 7 just don't know what it is.
8 MR. NEWELL: That would be because the 9 worker dose in the unmitigated and mitigated cases are 10 accounted for ten minutes based on our calculation of 11 evacuation time.
12 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay, thank you.
13 MR. NEWELL: Any other questions?
14 Moving on, the principal objective of 15 combustible gas management in the IF is to prevent the 16 conditions required for a hydrogen deflagration within 17 the primary system boundary piping that results in 18 over pressure exceeding the pressure safety limit of 19 the primary system boundary.
20 Hydrogen gas is monitored and maintained 21 below the LFL using the TOGS and if the TOGS becomes 22 unavailable the N2PS is actuated to limit the build-up 23 of hydrogen gas.
24 The N2PS provides passive, pressure-driven 25 nitrogen sweep gas in the event of a loss of normal NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
113 1 combustible gas management function.
2 The system utilizes both primary system 3 boundary and PVVS piping to perform its hydrogen 4 mitigation function and is actuated based on a loss of 5 normal sweep gas flow 180 seconds after a loss of 6 power, and on additional inputs that indicate a loss 7 of TOGS functionality.
8 The capacity of the N2PS is sufficient to 9 provide at least three days of flow to maintain 10 hydrogen concentration within acceptable limits with 11 additional margin.
12 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron Ballinger, 13 I'll pick up on the first bullet again, deflagration 14 versus detonation. If you have an event where you get 15 a deflagration, will the system handle that pressure 16 jump?
17 I know you're not supposed to have one and 18 you're preventing one, but what happens if you get 19 one?
20 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy. Our founding 21 deflagration analysis does -- we do exceed the LFL in 22 our bounding combustible gas management analysis 23 there. The pressure that is generated does not exceed 24 the pressure of the primary system boundary.
25 The primary analysis is done in an NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
114 1 extremely conservative way, assuming that dump valves 2 don't open, assuming we lose blowers, maximum response 3 times.
4 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thanks, and I'm assuming 5 the physical design of the system prevents detonation?
6 MS. RADEL: Yes, I'd have to look at the 7 analysis to confirm whether that maximum over pressure 8 event was classified as a deflagration or detonation.
9 But we can confirm. The over pressure generated 10 though was not sufficient to exceed the primary system 11 boundary.
12 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you.
13 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: On the gas management 14 system, you have active instrumentation, you're 15 mentioning all these concentrations, correct?
16 MS. RADEL: Correct, we have 17 instrumentation measuring hydrogen as well as oxygen.
18 The hydrogen measurement is not safety-related but the 19 oxygen one is.
20 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: And does it have 21 safety-related power or do you dump the TSV before it 22 becomes an issue of used power?
23 MS. RADEL: For the instrumentation the 24 monitoring is on the uninterruptible power supply 25 system. We do dump in the case of if any of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
115 1 readings exceed the set points, so both of those are 2 true.
3 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: And can you go into 4 details in the open session about why is the oxygen 5 safety-grade and not the hydrogen?
6 MS. RADEL: For the hydrogen, it was 7 determined there was no degradation mechanism that 8 would cause a set change in performance on the 9 recombiners because they are pretty passive in their 10 function so they're sitting there.
11 We do have the heaters that heat those re-12 combiners on the safety system just to make sure they 13 maintain the temperature needed.
14 So, with no identified mechanism to cause 15 a step change in their ability to recombine the 16 nitrogen and the oxygen, it was determined that flow 17 and other parameters were sufficient to ensure safety.
18 The oxygen is a safety-related measurement 19 and early on within the radiation cycle, oxygen will 20 be held up within the solution from the radiolysis.
21 Some of the oxygen early on does not escape the 22 solution at the same rate the hydrogen does and so you 23 need to ensure there's sufficient oxygen for that 24 recombination.
25 And we do have an oxygen system that NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
116 1 injects oxygen early on in the irrigation cycle.
2 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: And the safety action 3 is if the oxygen gets too low to compensate for the 4 hydrogen production or the other way around?
5 MS. RADEL: Correct, if the oxygen gets 6 too low it will trip the unit.
7 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Okay, thank you.
8 MR. NEWELL: Okay. Next slide. Thank 9 you. Moving on to the supercell confinement in the 10 RPF now. The supercell confinement is also made of 11 passive and active components. Passive components 12 include the stainless steel box that provides 13 confinement of materials and process equipment. The 14 active components include the supercell ventilation 15 that during normal operations keeps the supercell at 16 a negative pressure relative to the general area and 17 has filtration on both the inlet and the outlet.
18 Upon detection of high radiation by the 19 induct radiation monitors, isolation dampers or valves 20 close on the ventilation system inlet and outlet of 21 the affected cells. And a MEPS heating loop isolation 22 and VTS safety actuation are initiated. All active 23 components required to function to maintain the 24 confinement barrier are actually ESFAS.
25 MEMBER PETTI: This is Dave. Just a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
117 1 question on the steel boxes. It's not the hot cells 2 aligned with steel. But there's actual boxes so 3 things are separated, different processes.
4 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy. Each of the 5 cells has their own confinement box that sits within 6 the supercell structure. So there's a framework that 7 supports each of the ten boxes. But it's that steel 8 box or steel -- it's called -- we refer to it 9 sometimes as a liner, but it's a steel box within that 10 structural framework.
11 MEMBER PETTI: So there's ten boxes?
12 MS. RADEL: Correct, ten boxes.
13 MEMBER PETTI: And so like many hot cells, 14 both steel boxes separate the different operations to 15 prevent cross contamination and the like?
16 MS. RADEL: Yes, so there are --
17 (Simultaneous speaking.)
18 MEMBER PETTI: Okay.
19 MS. RADEL: -- between some of the cells.
20 But the doors are the pass-throughs are designed to 21 maintain the integrity of the individual boxes.
22 MEMBER PETTI: Right. Thank you.
23 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: And this might be 24 because of my ignorance. But tritium is very easy to 25 handle by itself. It's just hydrogen. But when it NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
118 1 leaks into a large volume of light water, then it 2 becomes a problem because you cannot distinguish it 3 from the other hydrogen. Are there paths for the 4 tritium to leak into light water which then will 5 become contaminated? What happens with confinement 6 then?
7 MS. RADEL: So this is Tracy again. There 8 is no tritium on the radioisotope production facility 9 side. The tritium is all located within the radiation 10 facility side. One interface where tritium is 11 adjacent to water with a single boundary between would 12 be the target chamber -- the tritium target chamber.
13 And that does have a dedicated loop to it to minimize 14 the amount of contamination that would occur in that 15 case.
16 (Simultaneous speaking.)
17 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yeah, so if some 18 corrosion or hole or break or something happened, you 19 could contaminate the PCLS.
20 MS. RADEL: No, the dedicated cooling for 21 the target chamber isolates it from the PCLS.
22 (Simultaneous speaking.)
23 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: So it's a smaller 24 volume? Okay.
25 MS. RADEL: Correct.
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119 1 (Simultaneous speaking.)
2 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yeah, that's a good 3 design.
4 MS. RADEL: We also changed the target 5 chamber between the PSAR stage and the FSAR to 6 stainless steel to minimize permeation of tritium 7 through the target chamber.
8 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Thank you.
9 MR. NEWELL: Moving on to the below grade 10 confinement in the RPF, the below grade confinement is 11 primary comprised of the structural components of the 12 boundary. Each part of the subgrade is equipped with 13 a concrete cover plug and gaskets or other non-14 structural features already used as necessary to 15 provide ceiling where components meet. The pipe 16 trench, annular tank vaults, and valve pits with 17 equipment containing fissile material are equipped 18 with drip pans and drains that lead to the RDS. Where 19 process equipment processes the confinement boundary 20 into non-confinement, appropriate isolation 21 capabilities are provided.
22 And again, we'll pause for a minute so you 23 can take a look at this table and ask any questions.
24 DR. SCHULTZ: This is Steve Schultz.
25 Could you describe briefly the unmitigated versus NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
120 1 mitigated dose values that you have? What is meant by 2 unmitigated here? And these are shown in Chapter 11.
3 Is that correct?
4 MR. NEWELL: No, these are shown in 5 Chapter 6.
6 DR. SCHULTZ: All right. I got you.
7 Thank you.
8 MR. NEWELL: Yeah, do you still want me to 9 describe the difference between the unmitigated and 10 mitigated?
11 DR. SCHULTZ: Yes, thank you.
12 MR. NEWELL: Yeah, so the unmitigated 13 consequence is essentially a release of the 14 corresponding material, quote-unquote, and then the 15 open field. So it's only considered to have the most 16 bounding chi of q applied to it. There's no kind of 17 credit taken for any kind of holdup on the gases that 18 may occur as it leaks out of the confinement into the 19 general area and then from the general area out to the 20 environment.
21 DR. SCHULTZ: And for the worker, is that 22 the same type of definition?
23 MR. NEWELL: That is correct, yes. There 24 assumed to stand in the cloud or the release of 25 material for ten minutes. And then that's where the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
121 1 analysis stops so we can get a one-to-one comparison 2 between the unmitigated dose and the mitigated dose to 3 demonstrate the efficacy of the safety features.
4 DR. SCHULTZ: Okay. Thank you.
5 MR. NEWELL: So moving on to the RPF 6 Combustible Gas Management. The principle objective 7 of the combustible gas management and the RPF prevents 8 the conditions required for a hydrogen declaration in 9 the gas spaces of the RPF tanks. During normal 10 operations, the PVVS provides sweep gas to the tanks 11 and the RPF and provides an outlet path for gas 12 generated in a primary system boundary.
13 If the PVVS becomes unavailable, the 14 buildup of hydrogen gas is limited using the N2PS to 15 establish sweep gas flow through the process vessels, 16 process system piping, and PVVS piping. The capacity 17 of the N2PS is sufficient to provide at least three 18 days of flow to maintain hydrogen concentration within 19 acceptable limits with additional margin. And 20 finally, we'll discuss the process vessel vent 21 isolation.
22 During normal operations, radioactive 23 components of the PVVS gas stream are removed or 24 delayed via condensation, acid adsorption, mechanical 25 filtration with HEPA filters, and adsorption in the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
122 1 carbon beds. SHINE utilizes two types of carbon beds, 2 guard and delay beds. The PVVS guard and delay beds 3 are equipped with isolation valves that isolate the 4 affected guard bed or group of delay beds and 5 extinguish a fire. The isolation values also serve to 6 prevent the release of radioactive material to the 7 environment.
8 Note that the guard bed isolation is a 9 nonsafety-related function. The PVVS is equipped with 10 instrumentation that detects fires and provides 11 indication to ESFAS. Redundancy in the beds and the 12 ability to isolate individual beds allows the PVVS to 13 continue operating following isolation. And that's 14 the last slide of Chapter 6.
15 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you. Any 16 questions from the members before we -- we have 17 scheduled for lunch between 12:00 and 1:00 and we're 18 a bit early. I think we have to meet that schedule.
19 MEMBER PETTI: We still have the staff.
20 CHAIR BALLINGER: Huh?
21 MEMBER PETTI: We still have the staff.
22 CHAIR BALLINGER: Yeah, but the staff is 23 --
24 MEMBER PETTI: Oh, okay.
25 CHAIR BALLINGER: The staff is --
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123 1 (Simultaneous speaking.)
2 MEMBER PETTI: I had a question.
3 CHAIR BALLINGER: Oh, okay.
4 MEMBER PETTI: How often do you anticipate 5 having to replace your carbon beds?
6 MR. EDWARDS: This is Eric Edwards. The 7 beds are the life of plant.
8 MEMBER PETTI: Oh, okay. Thanks.
9 CHAIR BALLINGER: Any other questions?
10 Okay. I think we really need to recess 11 until 1:00 o'clock because of our schedule. So we 12 will recess for lunch and be back here at 1:00 13 o'clock.
14 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 15 off the record at 11:45 a.m. and resumed at 1:00 p.m.)
16 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay. It's 1:00 17 o'clock, and we're ready to reconvene. And the staff 18 is up for Chapter 4 and 6. Mike, are you up? You 19 are.
20 MR. BALAZIK: This is Mike Balazik, and 21 we'll be presenting Chapter 4A. Joe Staudenmeier is 22 going to start off the presentation. Joe, are you on?
23 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Yeah, I'm here.
24 MR. BALAZIK: Yeah? Okay.
25 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Okay. Chapter 4A, the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
124 1 irradiation facility description, at some point in the 2 slides, I'm going to hand it over to Nate Hudson to 3 talk about the final slides. Let's move on to the 4 first slide. Okay. Just this is while I work on the 5 facility description, if there's any questions about 6 it, feel free to ask.
7 But I think we're short on time for the 8 amount of slides we have. So maybe we can move on.
9 And also the review standards have been presented 10 before. So let's go to the SHINE system overview.
11 MEMBER REMPE: So this is Joy. And before 12 we breeze past the review standards, could you talk a 13 little bit about -- because I kept looking through the 14 SER to kind of try and understand what exactly the 15 staff did. Because throughout the SER in Chapter 4, 16 it talks about the staff evaluated, the staff 17 assessed.
18 And finally, I got curious and I went back 19 1537. And it said really all that the staff does on 20 Chapter 4 is make sure the background information is 21 complete and is available for other -- they want to 22 make sure it's consistent with what's in other 23 chapters. But it's background information used by 24 others. Is that -- am I right or are there some 25 calculations you did --
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125 1 (Simultaneous speaking.)
2 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Yeah, I mean I've done 3 calculations. We've done more than that. I guess my 4 history in these AHRs, I started working on them back 5 when we put together the interim staff guidelines 6 which I think was -- I don't remember -- back in, 7 like, 2009 or 2010. And then there was another 8 company that was in for pre-application review that 9 ultimately decided not to come in with a licensing 10 application that a lot of actually the interim staff 11 guidelines were based on some things and their 12 conceptual design for what they were going to have.
13 That was an actual reactor, not a 14 subcritical facility. But I guess through that time, 15 I've gone through lots of calculations, read lots of 16 background material. And as part of the review, I did 17 some simple calculations, checking on things. At one 18 point, I had a TRACE calculation looking at the 19 cooling system to check on some numbers they had for 20 that. So there's --
21 MEMBER REMPE: So where is that documented 22 that you did a TRACE calculation in Chapter 4 in the 23 SER?
24 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Nowhere. I mean, I 25 didn't write up a report on it. I did some NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
126 1 calculations just to check that their numbers looked 2 okay with an independent calculation. So I did not 3 document that. And the cooling system actually --
4 review actually got handed over to NRR during Chapter 5 5 for the cooling of the TSV. But I can talk a little 6 bit about it when we get to that slide if you'd like.
7 MEMBER REMPE: So again, like, I mean, 8 there was a place you talked about that you had -- you 9 were concerned about or someone was talking about they 10 were concerned about the stagnant flow location --
11 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Yeah.
12 MEMBER REMPE: -- and different things 13 like that. It'd be good to understand. But again, 14 when I asked the folks in Chapter 5 how they had 15 confidence that there was a lot of margin, and we'll 16 be talking about it in the closed session, I kind of 17 thought that the calculations would be more a Chapter 18 5 thing is what I came away with after looking at the 19 guidance that you didn't have to do stuff.
20 And now you're saying, well, yeah, I did 21 stuff. But I didn't document it. I'm wondering if 22 ACRS is curious about things, where do we bring it up?
23 Like, the instrumentation should be 24 brought up in Chapter 7. Should we be bringing up the 25 concerns about the coolant system and the heat NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
127 1 transfer or the reactivity and heat transfer response 2 combined? Should that be a Chapter 4 issue or should 3 it be a Chapter -- some other chapter issue?
4 MR. STAUDENMEIER: I think it should be 5 Chapter 4.
6 MEMBER REMPE: Oh, really? Okay.
7 MR. STAUDENMEIER: I can answer those 8 questions.
9 MEMBER REMPE: Okay.
10 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Yeah, I mean, the 11 stagnant flow, I mean, you just have to look at a 12 drawing of the facility and you can see that there's 13 going to be a stagnant flow region. And I can present 14 a picture like that because it's proprietary. But you 15 can examine it and know that there's not going to be 16 a flow sweeping in a certain area, so --
17 MEMBER REMPE: But yeah, as you go through 18 -- again, in a closed session because I don't want to 19 get into proprietary stuff -- be very specific and 20 tell us exactly what calculations you did. Okay?
21 MR. STAUDENMEIER: I was going to say the 22 cooling system isn't very challenging. It's sub-cold 23 water and single phase heat transfer and fixed flow 24 rate. I mean, you look at CHF, there's one other 25 thing related to the cooling systems that you have to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
128 1 look at since there's these parallel flow channels.
2 You have to make sure that there isn't vapor 3 generation in one of the channels because if you do 4 that, then it will starve that channel a flow because 5 they're connected in parallel across two plenums 6 essentially.
7 So that's something beyond CHF that you 8 have to be concerned about because if that did happen, 9 again, if it didn't go in the CHF and you're a 10 standalone calculation, that would possibly cause 11 things to go into CHF. But I mean, the outside of the 12 TSV, the temperatures are too low to even generate 13 vapor. They're below the onset of nuclear boiling.
14 So there's -- I mean, if you look at temperatures 15 involved in the system, you don't have to --
16 MEMBER REMPE: Then sometimes --
17 MR. STAUDENMEIER: -- worry about that 18 stuff. And I discuss that stuff with Adam Rau, their 19 reviewer that presented Chapter 5. So he was aware of 20 that situation also.
21 MEMBER REMPE: If you get through, let us 22 know what kind of calculations you did and where. And 23 then also a lot of times I saw things about, well, 24 this is whatever instrumentation and it gives you 25 competence that there's adequate time to do stuff.
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129 1 And I just would like to know how that all worked.
2 And I'll try and look for those locations 3 too or ask you at the end. But I was puzzled in what 4 I was given to review and how I was going to review 5 it. So thank you.
6 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Okay. Yeah, I mean, 7 probably, yeah, I could discuss more calculations in 8 the proprietary session because I wouldn't trust 9 myself not to spit out a number that's not proprietary 10 because there's a lot of numbers that are, so --
11 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: This is Jose. Isn't 12 the TSV at the lower pressure than the ECLS, the 13 cooling channel?
14 MR. STAUDENMEIER: It is. It is at a 15 lower pressure. So --
16 (Simultaneous speaking.)
17 MR. STAUDENMEIER: -- if you have a leak, 18 water would leak into it, yeah.
19 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: I'm thinking about in 20 order for the cooling channel to boil, the TSV, the 21 solution would have to boil first to reduce the 22 pressure, right -- the temperature?
23 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Yeah, that's correct.
24 Yeah, that's correct. The temperature inside the TSV 25 is below what the onset of nuclear boiling temperature NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
130 1 would be in the cooling system.
2 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It's physically 3 impossible to have CHF on the cooling channel.
4 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Right. On the cooling 5 channel, you couldn't. The neutron multiplier, it 6 could be possible if there was enough power going into 7 the neutron multiplier, if there would be a 8 possibility there I guess. But --
9 (Simultaneous speaking.)
10 MR. STAUDENMEIER: --- you have to get 11 that surface cold also.
12 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Thank you.
13 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Okay. Let's move on.
14 Well, let's see. Let me see if there is any point I 15 forgot that I didn't say. Yeah, I think -- the 16 facility is described enough, all the major 17 components, design basis for the equipment and how 18 they're going to control it during normal operation 19 and items that relied upon for safety.
20 And a lot of these details will make it 21 into things forming the accident analysis in Chapter 22 13. Okay. Next slide. Okay. Yeah, it's a low power 23 pressure and temperature system that's driven -- it's 24 subcritical driven by a neutron source. Can't talk 25 about the multiplication factor. That's proprietary.
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131 1 But you get a gain over the neutrons 2 you're putting in through the multiplication. It has 3 a lot in common with aqueous homogeneous reactors. I 4 guess the main difference is you're driving the 5 neutrons with your accelerator here as a neutron 6 source where in AHR, you would get the neutrons for 7 free, I guess.
8 You'd also have a reactivity control 9 system you'd have on as part of that. But that's the 10 main difference. But both would have to have to have, 11 like, a system to handle the offgases and otherwise 12 they'd be similar.
13 The solution properties are similar. The 14 solution composition in power density are within the 15 existing experience base for solution reactors. If 16 you go -- the reference I have in parenthesis is kind 17 of the bible of solution reactors.
18 But if you go back and look, you can see 19 people have tried all sorts of solutions, just about 20 any kind of acid you can think of that will dissolve 21 uranium. That is the basis for solution reactors.
22 And there's actually quite a bit of operating 23 experience and experimental work showing the feedback 24 characteristics from small and large reactivity 25 insertions and AHRs would bound anything that happens NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
132 1 in this facility.
2 And as I said, the unique feature to this 3 system is the accelerator driven neutron source.
4 Okay. Next slide. Major systems and components, I 5 have arranged in a little bit different order than it 6 was in the SAR to try to think, I guess, logically 7 about it. And the first components I listed are the 8 ones inside the primary system boundary.
9 And that's what contains the solution and 10 the radioactive gases and off gases that are 11 generated. So in the target solution vessel, there's 12 a surveillance and inspection for radiation, damage, 13 and corrosion. There's overflow lines to the TSV dump 14 tank that keeps a clear gas space so the TOGS can keep 15 operating, that you don't cover up the TOGS in the 16 lines. The dump tank is criticality safe.
17 It's substantially lower k-effective than 18 what the TSV is. So there is a big shutdown margin in 19 the TSV dump tank. And that's really the scram 20 system. You have two dump flow paths, and there's two 21 overflow paths from the TSV to the dump tank.
22 Like, the drain rate to the TSV dump tank 23 is something that will be tested. It has to meet 24 certain criteria. The TOGS, the TSV offgas system, 25 the main function of that is to keep hydrogen NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
133 1 concentrations below flammability limits.
2 And the TSV and TSV dump tank, there's two 3 trains of TOGS. Only one of the trains provides a 4 sweep gas to the dump tank. The hydrogen 5 concentration, it's not a safety measurement. But 6 there is an alarm associated with that that goes off 7 at a certain concentration to alert the operator that 8 it's on the rise.
9 And if you see the -- once you get to see 10 the accident analysis, there were hydrogen ignition 11 events that the pressure limits says quite a bit below 12 what the design limit is on the primary system 13 boundary. In normal operation, it maintains pressure 14 within the operating limit. So there's an operating 15 band that you're trying to maintain the pressure 16 within, hence the limit water hold up because taking 17 water out of the system --
18 (Simultaneous speaking.)
19 DR. BLEY: So this is Dennis. I got 20 knocked off for a while and didn't hear anything. Did 21 that happen to everybody?
22 MEMBER REMPE: No, Dennis. We can hear 23 you.
24 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Okay. Can everyone 25 hear me?
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134 1 Okay. And also removes iodine to try to 2 keep a limit on the source term for iodine release.
3 Next slide.
4 MEMBER REMPE: Okay. So on this prior 5 slide is I guess a good place. Again, I'm curious 6 again. The staff and I, when I read this, like, do we 7 have confidence that the instrumentation is going to 8 provide enough of an indication, whether it's the 9 hydrogen concentration or the flex levels and all 10 these other things?
11 Did you just read it and say, yeah, they 12 put the instrumentation in a good place? Or did you 13 do any sort of analysis? And again, if you want to 14 talk about the analysis in the closed session, that's 15 fine. But that's one of the -- again, when I was 16 reading it, I was puzzled why you had the confidence.
17 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Okay. So yeah, I don't 18 know. Maybe I might keep it to the proprietary 19 session. But there are -- I mean, there's 20 instrumentation. And I don't know if you've looked at 21 the instrumentation and the safety trip system.
22 But there's things related to flow and 23 oxygen concentration for the TOGS system. In the TSV, 24 there's a bunch of thermocouples that are used to get 25 a temperature. That's also there's high temperature NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
135 1 limits. And essentially, anything exceeding limits, 2 you'll end up shutting off the neutron driver and 3 dumping the solution into the dump tank.
4 MEMBER REMPE: So some things I can 5 understand why the instrumentation is placed at a good 6 place. And I don't know what I can say here. But 7 other things because of data that was cited and 8 testing. But other things I wasn't sure.
9 And so did you think about, yeah, where 10 they've put it is a good place. I don't have to worry 11 about stratification in this particular location for 12 this particular sensor. I'm just kind of kicking the 13 tires to say did you ask those kind of questions when 14 you were going through the review? Or you just, 15 again, I've got a sensor and I assume they put it in 16 the right place?
17 MR. STAUDENMEIER: I mean, I guess I 18 thought about the processes going on there. Like, in 19 the TSV, there's going to be circulation of the fluid 20 because, I mean, you're going to get higher buoyance 21 in the high power region for more generation of gas.
22 So there's going to be some natural circulation flow 23 pattern keeping it mixed.
24 And there's also some experiments that 25 were run, Wisconsin by Professor Corradini. There NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
136 1 used to be a YouTube video up of him presenting it as 2 a seminar. I don't know if that's still on --
3 (Simultaneous speaking.)
4 MEMBER REMPE: Yeah, that one, I got. But 5 I'm thinking, like, hydrogen. Did you think about 6 stratification and where it might accumulate?
7 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Well, the hydrogen, the 8 flow rate in the loop I think is high enough to keep 9 it from accumulating or stratifying. So there's a 10 force flow going around the TOGS loop. It's not 11 natural circulation going around the TOGS loop.
12 So there's forced blow or flow going 13 around the TOGS loop that should keep it from being 14 stratified. And if you look at the hydrogen 15 concentration compared to the sweep gas that's going 16 around, it's going to be small, I guess. So it's a 17 small fraction of the total sweep gas flowing around.
18 But I don't want to say numbers. So I --
19 (Simultaneous speaking.)
20 MEMBER REMPE: That's fine.
21 MR. STAUDENMEIER: -- numbers are 22 proprietary or not. Okay.
23 MEMBER REMPE: Thanks.
24 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Okay. Next slide.
25 Okay. Then moving beyond the primary boundary of a NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
137 1 secondary confinement boundary, and that's the 2 Subcritical Assembly Support Structure. And that's 3 where the cooling water flows through to cool off the 4 TSV and the neutron multiplier. It's a higher 5 pressure than the TSV.
6 So if the TSV got a leak, you would have 7 water flowing into the TSV. And that is a negative 8 reactivity insertion when that happens. And you've 9 already seen the review of the ECLS from Chapter 5.
10 But it's a closed loop cooling system 11 which is -- that's one of the, I guess, fairly big 12 changes from the re-application -- or the PSAR version 13 of this which PSAR version had the TSV open to the 14 pool where an accident could dump the TSV into the 15 pool. But now a leak in the TSV would put it into 16 another confinement system which also has a fairly 17 substantial pressure boundary -- peak pressure. Okay.
18 Detection for -- there's detection for leakage from 19 the TSV or the neutron multiplier.
20 And the neutron multiplier also has a 21 in it for any 22 in the neutron multiplier. That uranium 23 metal and aluminum cladding. And there's a 24 .
25 I don't know if you've seen a picture of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
138 1 it. Okay. Next slide. Okay. Light water pool, each 2 light water pool has about 19,000 gallons of water, I 3 think, somewhere in that. I think that's the number.
4 And I'm sure that's not proprietary.
5 And so if you figure out what the heat 6 capacity of that and the decay heat from 125 7 kilowatts, can figure out pretty quickly that the 8 temperature rise over many days is going to be low.
9 So that's one of the two functions is to provide decay 10 heat cooling for the dump tank under normal operations 11 and for the whole system under emergency operations.
12 So you can dump it in there, leave it in the pool for 13 a very long time and not get much of a temperature 14 rise.
15 There's a minimum pool level that's 16 required for shielding. That minimum level is a 17 controlled number. And then there's -- the cooling 18 was evaluated at actually a much lower level than a 19 shielding minimum level. And so there's a lot lower 20 number needed for provide for the cooling and the long 21 term and limit heat ups.
22 And there's -- yeah, there's just still a 23 lot of water and even after you lower it to that 24 level. And water has a high heat capacity and the 25 power is not very high for the amount of water that's NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
139 1 there. Okay. Next slide. Okay. Neutron driver 2 assembly systems, so this is the source of the 3 neutrons. They use DT fusion reaction to provide the 4 neutron source for the subcritical assembly. There's 5 trips to shut down --
6 (Simultaneous speaking.)
7 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Sorry, before you go 8 to there, I wanted to ask you. Couldn't find my 9 microphone. This control level for shielding, so what 10 happening that is alarm connected to that level? I 11 mean, what happens the water goes below that shielding 12 level --
13 (Simultaneous speaking.)
14 MR. STAUDENMEIER: I think you would have 15 to shut down if you couldn't make it up.
16 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: Shut down but don't 17 dump it in the tank. Is that --
18 (Simultaneous speaking.)
19 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Well, dump it in the --
20 shut down means turn off the accelerator and dump it 21 in the tank.
22 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: So dump it in the 23 tank even there is a low level?
24 MR. STAUDENMEIER: I'd have to go back and 25 look at the control system for that. I don't want to NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
140 1 say yeah. I would need to go back and confirm the 2 details on what it is. There's probably some time 3 that's allowed for that. But there's a tech spec for 4 minimum pool level.
5 MEMBER DIMITRIJEVIC: And I assume that 6 activates the makeup system, right, which is also non-7 safety system, right?
8 MS. RADEL: So this is Tracy with SHINE.
9 The pool heights are proprietary. And so it'd 10 probably be best to discuss in closed session. But 11 there is no active makeup system and there is none 12 required for safety. So we can talk about more the 13 details of the scenarios with the light water pool in 14 closed session.
15 MEMBER REMPE: Since we kind of 16 interrupted you, I was just thinking about the 17 Wisconsin tests a bit more. Were they subject to some 18 sort of QA, like, a real reactor or large reactor 19 would be if there were testing that came into play?
20 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Okay. Could you repeat 21 that again?
22 MEMBER REMPE: Well, I know that you --
23 and I did read the paper given about the Wisconsin 24 tests. And I was just curious about QA on something 25 like that. If you're relying on a heat transfer NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
141 1 coefficient from a university experiment, it's 2 subjected to the same kind of QA that you would for, 3 like, NQA-1 or something? What kind of QA do you 4 require on something like this where it's just in 5 IMBA?
6 MR. STAUDENMEIER: We did not check on any 7 QA requirements put in place for that test. I guess 8 the one thing is I guess safety is not really 9 important to that specific correlation. If you look 10 at the heat transfer coefficients that come out of 11 that. I mean, they're not very high.
12 You can look at other related correlations 13 and look at differences between them. And if they are 14 off on that heat transfer correlation, if they were 15 too low and it caused the temperature to get higher, 16 then it would just trip and dump the system. So I 17 would say that heat transfer correlation is not 18 safety-related.
19 MEMBER REMPE: Thanks.
20 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Okay. So yeah, there's 21 trips to shut down the neutron driver. There's an 22 interlock to prevent operation during maintenance 23 activities. And there's a system to detect tritium 24 leakage. So next slide.
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142 1 solution parameters are controlled to prevent 2 precipitation of uranium out of the system, 3 temperature limit to prevent boiling, and natural 4 convection cooling enhanced by bubble buoyancy.
5 Evaporation cooling is not credited in this system 6 when they're doing the heat transfer correlations, 7 even though if you look at the vapor pressure 8 associated with the temperature it's at, there's going 9 to be -- it's not insignificant I'd say. So you could 10 get some more margin if you took that into account.
11 Next --
12 CHAIR BALLINGER: This is Ron. I'm 13 assuming that if you got precipitation, it would go to 14 the bottom of the tank and you'd see it right away?
15 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Well, you can't really 16 see the precipitation.
17 CHAIR BALLINGER: I don't mean see it.
18 Notice it --
19 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Okay.
20 CHAIR BALLINGER: -- on some 21 instrumentation.
22 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Well, I mean --
23 CHAIR BALLINGER: I don't mean you have a 24 gremlin down there.
25 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Yeah, I mean, the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
143 1 boundary to precipitation, they stay well below the 2 precipitation boundary when they're doing start up.
3 So it's by controlling the system parameters to keep 4 it away from the precipitation boundary. But you 5 would probably notice it in the neutron signal, I 6 think, because that would change the reactivity in the 7 system if you precipitated some of it to a different 8 location.
9 You would probably indirectly notice it 10 through that. But it's really prevented by keeping 11 operating parameters away from the known precipitation 12 boundary. And that's power density and temperature 13 are the two main parameters for that.
14 MEMBER REMPE: What about fouling of 15 surfaces? I vaguely remember this was brought up in 16 the construction permit review or at least I think I 17 remember that. And I thought we were told that 18 somehow rather that the surfaces are monitored. Did 19 that come up in your review this time?
20 MR. STAUDENMEIER: There is inspection of 21 the surfaces periodically. So there is visual 22 inspection. In terms of -- there are some fouling 23 assumptions in the heat transfer resistance that's 24 included for that. But there will be visual 25 inspections periodically.
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144 1 MEMBER REMPE: And if they see something, 2 can they clean off what they see? Or what would they 3 do?
4 MR. STAUDENMEIER: I guess they would have 5 -- I do not know how they would clean it. But maybe 6 SHINE could answer that question if they have a way 7 that they would clean it. But I think the tanks are 8 also maybe periodically rinsed out.
9 MS. RADEL: Hi, this is Tracy. Based on 10 the chemistry of the solution, we don't expect 11 significant fouling. So fouling is considered in the 12 thermal hydraulics safety basis, thermal hydraulics 13 analysis. We have not yet developed any procedures 14 related to how we -- if it did happen, how we may go 15 about cleaning the surfaces, that's not been evaluated 16 at this point. Based on the chemistry, we would not 17 expect that.
18 MEMBER REMPE: But if you would, then I 19 guess you stop things and discuss it with the NRC and 20 do something about it?
21 MS. RADEL: We would stop operation in 22 that unit and assess what the next action -- correct 23 actions would be on that.
24 MEMBER REMPE: So then the question is, 25 how much is enough to stop? I mean, I guess, is this NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
145 1 discussed anywhere with the NRC that, yeah, if you see 2 a little bit, it's not a big deal. Or if you're off 3 on your heat transfer assumption, somehow or other by 4 some percent, you know there's a trigger to this is 5 too much? How do you decide what to do?
6 MS. RADEL: So we would compare it to our 7 safety basis analysis. And if we're outside of our --
8 or approaching our safety basis analysis, that would 9 be when we would consider next steps and reevaluate.
10 Yes, we did include margin in our analyses or 11 following other considerations. So we would evaluate 12 against those.
13 MEMBER REMPE: So let me put words in your 14 mouth. If you ever were approach -- exceeding -- or 15 reducing your safety margin that's allowed in your 16 FSAR, then you would shut down. So there is a trigger 17 point. It's the margin, right?
18 MS. RADEL: Yes.
19 MEMBER REMPE: Thanks.
20 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Okay. Next slide.
21 Okay. This is where Nate is taking over.
22 MR. HUDSON: Thanks, Joe. Hi, good 23 afternoon. This is Nate Hudson, NRC Research. I redo 24 the biological shield for the irradiation facility.
25 It's a thick concrete shield. It's designed to limit NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
146 1 exposures within the standard 10 CFR 20 limits and 2 ALARA considerations.
3 There are obviously radiation sources in 4 the TSV, the dump tank if there's a trip, activation 5 products and the TOGS and the ECLS. The shielding is 6 designed to shield. It's a concrete shield that's the 7 water shields the neutrons and gammas to the concrete.
8 And it was constructed an analyzed for NRC 9 and concrete standards, NUREGs, standards that define 10 the criteria for flux and temperature and a cumulative 11 dose to the concrete to make sure that the shielding 12 function is maintained and the concrete stays -- the 13 integrity stays. It doesn't collapse or getting 14 embrittled with coolant. Next slide, please.
15 Nuclear design reactivity control, with 16 the information that's been presented so far, it's a 17 subcritical system. No excess reactivity, so no need 18 for chemical and mechanical shim or reactivity 19 control, no control rods. The introduction of 20 solutions controlled by the reactor -- the operator, 21 excuse me.
22 The lift tank is a limited capacity, and 23 the flow rate is limited by an orifice. All the 24 physical properties that I the staff could see in the 25 relationships, the reactivity balance were described, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
147 1 calculated, analyzed, and supported in the text with 2 tables and figures. The TSV can be shut down through 3 a trip, reactivity protection system, into the dump 4 tank which is designed to be an annular dump tank and 5 subcritical.
6 And the flow rate, there's two redundant 7 dump valves in parallel that passively open. Be 8 energized on a trip. So the flow rate is greater than 9 the fill rate for the TSV. So the variables that 10 influence reactivity are clearly understood, and some 11 are monitored and controlled with tech specs or 12 monitoring a solution prior to irradiation. And 13 obviously, the neutron multiplication is monitored on 14 startup with the flux detectors we have out.
15 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Nate, this is Jose.
16 Did the staff perform any confirmatory calculations on 17 criticality, k-effective, or reactivity coefficients?
18 MR. HUDSON: No, we didn't. Based on --
19 I mean, based on everything that's presented and in 20 the reading room and SAR and historical references I 21 reviewed, it was -- we didn't -- I didn't see a need 22 to do confirmatory for the MCNP.
23 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Okay. Thanks.
24 MR. HUDSON: I was satisfied based on what 25 -- I mean, my reading of everything, I was satisfied NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
148 1 there was a negative temperature, negative fuel 2 solution coefficient. And I wasn't confident that it 3 would add too much to the finding to do a confirmatory 4 calculation for the reactivity.
5 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Well, in this case, 6 it would've added confidence if you had reviewed the 7 input decks for MCNP to make sure they didn't make a 8 mistake.
9 MR. HUDSON: True. We could've -- I 10 could've done that.
11 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Okay, thanks. Not 12 complaining.
13 MR. HUDSON: Like, in the case of the dunk 14 tanks, there were a lot of MCNP models that were put 15 in the reading room for dose calculations and 16 criticality of the dump tanks. So there were some 17 analysis there. I can't remember if the account 18 notebooks are supplied in the reading room. But I 19 mean, we perhaps could've found in there --
20 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: It's clear what you 21 did. I have concerns about the temperature treatment 22 on the MCNP models because I haven't seen the models 23 either. So I will ask more details on the closed 24 session.
25 MR. HUDSON: Okay. Next slide. Yeah, NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
149 1 with their MCNP analysis, they calculated a bounding 2 -- like, all the contributors to the power coefficient 3 were calculated and analyzed to indicate that it was, 4 like a self-damping system with a negative void and 5 temperature coefficient and a solution. The kinetics 6 parameters at the beginning of life, end of life for 7 the fuel solution were calculated and understood, 8 like, the beta effect. The uncertainties on the 9 neutron multiplication and reactivity coefficients 10 with respect to uncertainties and state parameters 11 calculated within confidence intervals.
12 And the reactivity coefficients with 13 solution multiplier were evaluated at nominal and 14 limiting conditions. And they also did reactivity 15 additions and static changes in the core components, 16 like, during startup and irradiation. I think, like, 17 at the head space and the multipliers supplied it or 18 if there's water in the dump tank that can 19 overmoderate the criticality.
20 So a lot of criticality calculations are 21 considered things that would bound the calculation and 22 demonstrate if the k-effective was critical in the TSV 23 or in those components external to the TSV.
24 Subcritical margins were calculated in several 25 different scenarios. And a limiting core NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
150 1 configuration in terms of thermohydraulic limits was 2 calculated for the solution volume and uranium 3 concentration was determined. Next slide, please.
4 MEMBER REMPE: Well, I guess I have --
5 MR. HUDSON: I'm sorry.
6 MEMBER REMPE: -- a question too. We 7 talked about earlier today about when you're starting 8 up this device. And I've forgotten now where it was 9 -- what chapter it was. But I thought that again they 10 realize that there's a different between what they 11 think would be critical as they approach criticality 12 versus what their models predict.
13 Or a difference in the instrumentation 14 versus the models that things will adjusted. Is there 15 any interaction that would occur with the staff if 16 that happened? And again, if their margin is reduced 17 significantly and how much is significant before they 18 would go back to the regulator and say, well, it was 19 a bit more off than what we expected?
20 And again, I mean, I saw in your SER that 21 the staff again said that there was reasonable 22 competencies that if there are oscillations that they 23 would be small and self-limiting due to low power 24 density and negative void and temperature 25 coefficients. Again, you're basing it on some data as NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
151 1 well as prior experience with other devices. And I'm 2 just wondering when there's always some uncertainty 3 and when this uncertainty becomes significant and 4 people need to think about it.
5 MR. HUDSON: So as far as the detectors 6 being calibrated, I didn't personally review that.
7 But that is a good question. I hadn't thought about 8 it in a year, if there are tech spec limits on uranium 9 concentration and I think lower volume of the TSV. So 10 if the system is not behaving during start up testing, 11 if it departs from what's controlled, then I would 12 think there'd be some interaction during the startup 13 program for this system it's outside what was analyzed 14 and determined what's on the docket.
15 MEMBER REMPE: So again, if I were a 16 regional inspector and I was cognizant of those tech 17 specs that I would know that this is a trigger point 18 and the licensee will know this is a trigger point 19 where we need to stop and have some discussions with 20 NRC. Is that what you're telling me?
21 MR. HUDSON: There were uncertainty bands 22 on the startup detector, so -- the three detectors.
23 So if it's outside those uncertainty bands, I would 24 assume a regional inspector would note that.
25 MR. BALAZIK: Yeah, this is Mike Balazik NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
152 1 from the NRC staff. Also, this information I believe 2 is in the FSAR. And the licensee would have to 3 evaluate any changes under 5059. And there's the 4 possibility that they would have to notify us if they 5 were wanting to make a change to that.
6 MEMBER REMPE: Thank you.
7 MR. BALAZIK: And also in 5059 is also 8 inspected by the inspectors, any evaluations they do.
9 MEMBER REMPE: Thank you.
10 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: This is Jose. While 11 we're talking about detectors, I want to do it in the 12 open session. My concern is it feels to me -- feel 13 because I haven't seen the exact wording anywhere --
14 that we are calibrating the detectors at least for the 15 first startup just on a calculation using MCNP.
16 I mean, it's the only way I know how to do 17 it. And detectors age. Their efficiency changes with 18 time. You don't know what the efficiency of that 19 detector is, and you don't know the exact location 20 because it can be a couple of millimeters off.
21 It's a calculation that has a very large 22 uncertainty. And we -- at least on the startup in 23 cycle one, we are going to the one over M, upper case 24 M, measurement to ensure we don't go over a critical 25 k-effective. But without knowing efficiency of the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
153 1 detectors, it's hard to do.
2 I mean, we can be off significantly. The 3 beauty of M is it goes to infinity when you hit M 4 equal one. So you can be off a little bit and still 5 be okay.
6 I'm just putting that on the record that 7 maybe -- I'm sure SHINE already knows that for the 8 first startup, they have to go very easily and very 9 slowly. And if they're trying to go to a k-effective 10 or XXX, they'll probably for the first cycle go to XXX 11 minus two or something like this. That's my concern 12 that predicting the response of a detector especially 13 in the next core detector with any accuracy is not 14 easy.
15 MS. KOLB: This is Catherine Kolb from 16 SHINE. I appreciate the points, and that is part of 17 our startup testing plans as we have them written out 18 to do low power, very short runs and for the express 19 purposes of calibrating the detectors. So we can talk 20 more about that. I believe that will be in Chapter 7 21 to be specific.
22 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: My concern of the 23 power, you can always turn off the accelerator. My 24 concern is that where you filling the tab you go over 25 k-effective of one or get very close to it, much NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
154 1 closer than you thought, because you're measuring your 2 one over M and you overshoot. Because, of course, it 3 requires two failures.
4 It requires a failure of calculating k-5 effective accurately with MCNP, the level at which you 6 have to stop. And then a failure of the calibration 7 of the tape.
8 It requires two failures to have an 9 accident -- not an accident, an event. But I would 10 recommend that for the first startup, you fill it up, 11 I don't know, 20 liters less than what you were 12 expecting to and live with a lower multiplication 13 factor for a while. That's -- yes --
14 (Simultaneous speaking.)
15 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy with SHINE.
16 Part of our startup plan is to start with low 17 concentration, significantly lower than the expected 18 nominal concentration. Also, the one over M process 19 stopping five percent by volume below critical is 20 always going to ensure a certain margin to critical 21 because you're mapping out that ratio. And the 22 detector -- parameters on the detector will cancel out 23 in that ratio as you're doing that individual startup.
24 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: The point I'm trying 25 to make is that you have a five percent margin to the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
155 1 critical value you calculated with MCNP before you run 2 any experiment. Or on the startup, I will go with a 3 15 percent margin instead of 5 percent just in case 4 your MCNP calculation was off. Don't go with a margin 5 with power. Go to a margin to k-effective.
6 MS. RADEL: Right, yeah. Our margin, 7 yeah, is relative to k-effective. And our first two 8 steps are below which we could go critical. And so 9 we'll be comparing every step.
10 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: My point is your 11 margin is the k-effective that you pre-calculated, not 12 --
13 (Simultaneous speaking.)
14 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Yeah, I leave you 15 with that concept in mind so you're careful when you 16 start. Thanks.
17 MR. EDWARDS: This is Eric Edwards. We're 18 going to talk a little bit about fill, too in this 19 closed session here. I do just want to stress that 20 we're not filling to the MCNP predicted height. We're 21 filling based on the one over M. And we can talk 22 about that in more detail in the closed session too.
23 MEMBER REMPE: I'm sorry. I couldn't 24 quite hear. You said you were basing it on, what was 25 the phrase?
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156 1 MR. EDWARDS: The one over M plot is where 2 we would --
3 (Simultaneous speaking.)
4 MR. EDWARDS: -- based on, not -- we're 5 not going to fill to a level predicted by MCNP.
6 MEMBER MARCH-LEUBA: Correct. And that's 7 what my previous comment about the efficiency of the 8 detectors. You're going with a shut off on the one 9 over M that MCNP calculated for you. I'm trying to be 10 a little kind of insulting to see if I make the point 11 that the first time we startup cycle one.
12 We have a safety level that is based on 13 the k-effective calculation with MCNP and a safety 14 level which is based on the one over M using the 15 efficiency of detectors calculated by MCNP.
16 Everything is calculations. One over M is a really 17 good measurement or the same, M goes to infinity and 18 k goes to one. So you cannot be very wrong. But this 19 says be careful, an extra margin on the first step.
20 That's all I'm saying.
21 MS. RADEL: Understand. Thank you for the 22 feedback, though. We will consider it. Thank you.
23 MR. HUDSON: Okay. Next slide. So based 24 on our findings and conclusions, based on what we 25 reviewed, the irradiation facility systems have been NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
157 1 described on principle design according to -- and the 2 principle design criteria were listed and described in 3 the criteria for reviewing the SAR was known and the 4 principle design criteria for whether the system is 5 safe are known.
6 We didn't have to search for anything.
7 The biological shield analysis with reasonable 8 assurance, the dose would be known and it'll maintain 9 its function and limit radiation exposures and 10 reasonable assurance that the facility will operate --
11 be operated safely without undue risk to the public as 12 far as Chapter 4. Next slide. I don't know if that 13 was the last slide.
14 MR. STAUDENMEIER: Yeah, that's the end of 15 the presentation. I guess one thing I meant to say is 16 I think earlier somebody asked a question or made a 17 statement about that it wasn't clear that the staff 18 will look into any ideas of their own or probe things.
19 And I think the place you would have to look for that 20 to see what was probed or questions that were asked or 21 things that come up with by staff would be the RAIs.
22 I don't know if you were given access to the RAIs that 23 were asked.
24 But the old style of writing SERs used to 25 be you would discuss the RAIs and resolution with the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
158 1 licensee. But the new standard for SERs is that is 2 not part of it. They want to limit discussions of 3 RAIs and back and forth with the licensee and write it 4 like there was a clean final SAR that included all the 5 RAI answers. So that's just a comment that if you 6 really wanted to see where the staff probed or looked 7 for things or brought up issues that they thought 8 needed to be addressed, it would be in the RAIs and 9 the RAI answers.
10 MEMBER REMPE: So I'll go back and look at 11 the RAIs. But it'll say, hey, I did an independent 12 TRACE calculation and I got something different.
13 It'll talk about the calculations that the staff did.
14 MR. STAUDENMEIER: The RAI, it could have 15 that if the RAI was based on some independent 16 calculation the staff did. But in general, that would 17 not be the case. It would be the staff asking a 18 question of something they didn't think was addressed 19 fully in the SAR and asked the licensee to provide or 20 the applicant to provide more information of that.
21 MEMBER REMPE: Thank you.
22 CHAIR BALLINGER: Is that the right 23 presentation?
24 MR. BALAZIK: Yes, this is Mike Balazik 25 from the NRC staff. Yeah, so now Section 4B which is NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
159 1 for the --
2 (Simultaneous speaking.)
3 CHAIR BALLINGER: Oh, I get it.
4 MR. BALAZIK: Yeah, all right. Yawar, are 5 you online?
6 MR. FARAZ: Yes.
7 MR. BALAZIK: Okay.
8 DR. BLEY: Hey, Ron. Ron, this is Dennis.
9 Before you go ahead, can I sneak something in?
10 CHAIR BALLINGER: Sneak in whatever you 11 want.
12 DR. BLEY: Well, that last comment is 13 certainly true. And I didn't realize that was the way 14 you're supposed to do the SEs these days. But when 15 the staff comes to the committee giving us some of 16 those areas where, in fact, they probed and found 17 things would be most appropriate. And I hope they 18 would do that in the future. That's all.
19 CHAIR BALLINGER: Yeah, I think what he 20 means is what we're reviewing is no open items. So 21 all these chapters have no open items. So it's one 22 step beyond the process of the so called earlier 23 standard review process. But the RAIs are all 24 available.
25 MEMBER REMPE: So I guess I probably NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
160 1 motivated the comment. But the problem I had was the 2 SE basically regularly says the staff assessed and the 3 staff evaluated. And I could not figure out how the 4 staff did that. And I went back to 1537, and it said, 5 well, all you have to do is make sure the information 6 is complete and it's consistent with what's found 7 elsewhere.
8 And now today I'm hearing, well, we did 9 some evaluations. And it would be nice to know 10 exactly. And I'm hoping in a closed session I'll 11 learn more what exact calculations were done. An 12 undocumented TRACE calculation doesn't always give one 13 confidence, I guess.
14 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay. If there are no 15 other questions, can we continue?
16 MR. FARAZ: Okay. So my name is Yawar 17 Faraz. I'm a senior PM in NMSS. I replaced the 18 primary reviewer for Chapter 4B several months ago.
19 And I have other staff that are available who might do 20 a better job at responding to any specific questions 21 that the ACRS may have.
22 The slides that I'll be presenting pertain 23 to the Radioisotope Production Facility, or the RPF.
24 The description is in Chapter 4B. As was mentioned 25 before in the morning, the main functions of the RPF NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
161 1 is to extract, notify, package, and ship medical 2 isotopes and to prepare target solution. Next slide, 3 please. So these are the regulatory requirements that 4 apply to Chapter 4B, and Mike Balazik went through 5 those in the morning. So I'll just go to the next 6 slide.
7 And then the regulatory guidance that 8 applied in 1537, Parts 1 and 2. Next slide. And then 9 the ISGs to NUREG 1537, so ISG Part 2 would be the 10 primary guidance document used in Chapter 4B. Next 11 slide. So the areas of review for Chapter 4B include 12 the design of the facility and its operation.
13 We looked at schematics to understand the 14 RPF's physical features and processes. Then we review 15 the biological shielding of the RPF, the radioisotopic 16 structure and clarification process, and then the 17 irradiated and unirradiated SNM, Special Nuclear 18 Material, processing and storage. Next slide. So 19 Nate Hudson provided this slide and the four in one.
20 And I'll be presenting them on the biological shield.
21 So the staff reviewed the engineer features to support 22 the ALARA requirement.
23 So the staff reviewed the biological 24 shield and material and its thickness, below grade 25 solution transfers, access plugs, and minimization of NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
162 1 streaming paths due to penetrations with the 2 engineered features, those gates. Next slide, please.
3 The staff found SHINE's use of MCNP to conduct 4 shielding calculations adequate. Reg Guide 1.69 was 5 used as guidance to ensure that the dose and the RPF 6 reduce adequately and that the structure requirements 7 of the shielding will be maintained. Specifically, 8 ENS and ACI standards referenced in Reg Guide 1.69 9 were used for shielding and dose determination and 10 structural integrity of the shield.
11 And you had used NUREG-7171 as guidance to 12 address the potential impacts of gamma rays on the 13 structural integrity of the concrete shielding. The 14 NRC staff also determined the adequacy of the 15 ventilation system and its associated tech spec for 16 ensuring confinement to negative pressure. Do you 17 have any questions on the biological shielding?
18 Okay. Next slide, please. So here are 19 the primary systems that pertain to the RPF that were 20 described in Chapter 4B. They were described in the 21 morning, their functions were described. And so I 22 won't go through all of them, but basically that's the 23 lesson there.
24 There are a couple more that apply to both 25 the RPF and the radiation units. These are the main NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
163 1 ones. Next slide. So in terms of SNM processing and 2 storage, the staff reviewed the process descriptions 3 by included the controls, the criticality, and 4 chemical protection. Next slide.
5 And then you have the same for the 6 unirradiated SNM processing. Next slide. And that's 7 our findings and conclusions. The staff has 8 determined that Chapter 4B acceptably provides the 9 staff a general understanding of the RPF processes.
10 With regards to biological shielding, the staff 11 concludes that the described designs, supporting 12 analysis, and proposed tech specs offer reasonable 13 assurance that exposures would be within power -- any 14 limits and ALARA guidelines.
15 And then with regard to MEPS which is the 16 extraction of moly -- the process of extracting moly, 17 the staff concludes that the descriptions provide the 18 staff confidence that the SNM and fission products can 19 be controlled. And then finally, the staff includes 20 as described in 4B and in conjunction with the staff's 21 reviews and for the rest of the application that the 22 processing of irradiated and unirradiated SNM will be 23 done safety in the RPF. So that's the end of my 24 presentation. Any questions?
25 CHAIR BALLINGER: Thank you. I guess NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
164 1 we're now -- oh, we have to do Chapter 6.
2 MR. KARIPINENI: Hello. Can you hear me?
3 CHAIR BALLINGER: Yes.
4 MR. KARIPINENI: Okay. Next slide, 5 please. My name is Rao Karipineni. Rao is my middle 6 name. It's the easiest way for me. I'm a safety and 7 plant systems engineer in the containment and plant 8 systems branch. Next slide, please.
9 Engineer safety features is the previous 10 licensee was saying there are reactive or passive 11 features designed to mitigate the consequences for 12 accidents to keep the radiological exposures to the 13 public, to facility staff, and the environment within 14 acceptable values. This concept in general from the 15 nuclear industry evolved from the defense-in-depth 16 philosophy of multiple layers of design features to 17 prevent or mitigate the release of radioactive 18 materials to the environment during accident 19 conditions. However, in the case of SHINE, the need 20 for a (audio interference) is really determined by the 21 SHINE severe accident analysis. Next slide, please.
22 Listing of some regular requirements and 23 the acceptance criteria. You heard it so many times, 24 so I'll skip this slide. Next slide, please. We can 25 start the design criteria in Chapter 3 of the FSAR and NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
165 1 came up close to four or five criteria in one way or 2 another and reply to the various systems we were 3 reviewing. And they doing the safety evaluation when 4 they are done.
5 A couple new ones that were in there that 6 were not in the previous slides you saw about the 7 SHINE and design criteria 929, about the barrier, hot 8 cells, glove boxes, and everything. Maybe it was 9 included in the top, but I didn't remember seeing it 10 on the slide. And then we also have included hydrogen 11 mitigation for Criteria 39 as one of the requirements 12 also. It was one of the criteria that we would look 13 at. Next slide, please.
14 Hold on. Go back. Go back. Go back.
15 Yeah, actually, this is the one that I was going to 16 discuss a little bit more after the discussion this 17 morning. We have -- the engineer safety features is 18 not really limited to any one system. It's really a 19 conglomeration of many systems that you would have to 20 review in all the chapters and go to the discussion 21 contained therein to write a safety evaluation.
22 But it was only one person was the 23 allocator for this job and I did what I could. I 24 reviewed all those chapters and then compared the 25 discussion in the chapter's analysis with the NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
166 1 remaining chapter such as the instrumentation and 2 controls in Chapter 7, accident analysis in Chapter 3 13, et cetera, to see that there is some consistency 4 and get a feeling for what is being included and see 5 if anything is missing and to the best of my ability.
6 Finally, we also reviewed the technical 7 specifications.
8 There were, like, four or five them we 9 came up with and reviewed the -- what they were doing, 10 what ELCO (phonetic), and what -- how much time 11 they're taking to fix the problem and the surveillance 12 requirements, et cetera. Next slide, please. So the 13 Irradiation Facility ESFs is broadly divided into 14 three categories: primary confinement boundary, 15 tritium confinement boundary, and combustible gas 16 management. It's truly speaking, the RPF is also the 17 same way, except there is no -- there is a little bit 18 of tritium confinement there but mostly combustible 19 gas management with the PVVS and the N2PS nitrogen 20 purge.
21 And also there is some confinement 22 boundary. We can call it primary also because there's 23 some target solution there. The way the review was 24 done is -- rather the way the licensee has presented 25 the ESF features is they came up with the broad NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
167 1 diagrams to indicate what are the active, what are the 2 passive features that are considered. If they're 3 active features, which parts of those active features 4 are actually included in the assessment in ESF.
5 And finally, it also includes the 6 components and systems names that come for that 7 particular ESF. And then we would go into those 8 discussions contained for those systems and determine 9 if they are complete in the sense -- in addition to 10 what they have should there be something more there or 11 not. And that's the way I proceeded with the 12 analysis.
13 And I did not come up with any new items 14 that needs to be included there. In the discussion 15 this morning, we had the feature irradiation facility 16 boundary drawing that we saw which was a little 17 confusing for me. And I decided that the HVAC unit 18 that was there that was shown as part of the 19 confinement -- the boundary.
20 It kind of extends this wall really, 21 around that unit basically. I still don't understand 22 the drawing because the drawing is -- the dotted lines 23 we saw was far from the HVAC units. The way I saw it 24 -- I heard this morning was that the unit extension is 25 just part of the IF boundary. I don't know if NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
168 1 everybody understood the same way I did or if I'm 2 missing something. I'm not too sure.
3 But if that is so, one thing I didn't 4 really consider is if this is an extension of that 5 boundary, should this whole HVAC unit where the 6 leakage possibilities from these units, how are they 7 construed into the design and those things are not 8 fully clear. So that's one thing that we may be 9 discussing this later on this closed session to make 10 it more easily understandable for somebody like me.
11 So combustible gas systems and PVVS systems, they're 12 pretty elaborate discussion of those two systems in 13 the USAR and separate sections, more details and all 14 those things.
15 So I only look at the confinement features 16 of those systems and insert into the design. But when 17 we get to the point of ACRS presentations for those 18 systems, a lot more details can be discussed in my 19 opinion at that time. So when I consider all of these 20 things, both for the IF, irradiation facility, and the 21 RPF, the design that were submitted were clearly 22 understandable for me.
23 It was -- in my opinion, it is complete to 24 the extent I could determine. And it kept giving me 25 the basic information needed to see that these NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
169 1 confinements were effective to perform as they were 2 intended to. This is basically my presentation, 3 because I made it at a slot (phonetic) -- because 4 after the discussion this morning, I revised my 5 discussion. And I'm open for any questions now.
6 DR. SCHULTZ: Ron, this is Steve Schultz.
7 And I don't know if this is the right place to ask 8 this question or not or to bring this up. The staff 9 finds that the mitigated doses meet the targets that 10 are set by SHINE and that they are acceptable in the 11 discussion in Chapter 6, SER.
12 Then the staff also remarks that the staff 13 finds that the dose consequences in some cases would 14 be unacceptable without the mitigation by the engineer 15 and safety features. And my question, when I look at 16 the tables that were presented by SHINE this morning, 17 in each of those cases, I don't see any of the results 18 in the unmitigated cases which would be acceptable.
19 So I'm concerned about that phase, in some cases.
20 Perhaps there's other design basis accidents where 21 they might be acceptable without the mitigating 22 features of the engineer and safety features. So it's 23 just really a comment there, something that --
24 (Simultaneous speaking.)
25 MR. KARIPINENI: Yeah, I did look into NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
170 1 that. And I had to make sure that the pages say 2 exactly same what you are looking at.
3 DR. SCHULTZ: Yes.
4 MR. KARIPINENI: And I had a little 5 difficulty. And I finally understood how that table 6 came up when I talk to the Chapter 13 folks and 7 confirm what I was saying. And I looked at it again 8 because I'm not in a position to exactly explain to 9 you right away. But I had to look at the table again, 10 and --
11 (Simultaneous speaking.)
12 MR. KARIPINENI: -- I can do that. And I 13 will take that as an open item and let you know.
14 DR. SCHULTZ: There is -- as you know, 15 there's a large difference between the mitigated and 16 the unmitigated results, a factor of 100 about. And 17 so therefore, there's a large benefit. It 18 demonstrates the benefit and the necessity of the 19 engineer and safety features. Was there any look 20 either by the staff -- well, actually, we ask SHINE 21 too -- trying to -- not trying to, but identifying the 22 benefit of the passive features verses the active 23 features?
24 MR. KARIPINENI: No, I did not do any look 25 in that manner.
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171 1 DR. SCHULTZ: It's just a question I would 2 ask myself given the benefit of unmitigated features.
3 But that hasn't been --
4 MS. RADEL: This is Tracy with SHINE. We 5 did not evaluate failure or taking away one or the 6 other. The active and passive components together 7 really they act together to create the confinement 8 boundary. So --
9 DR. SCHULTZ: Okay.
10 MS. RADEL: -- we didn't see that it would 11 make sense to evaluate those separately. And so 12 there's a single evaluation. We're not crediting any 13 of the confinement.
14 DR. SCHULTZ: Okay. I understand your 15 comment. Thank you.
16 CHAIR BALLINGER: Are there other 17 questions from the members?
18 MR. BALAZIK: Sorry, Professor. This is 19 Mike Balazik from the NRC staff. Rao, I just wanted 20 to make sure. Are those all your slides, or do you 21 have more slides in the presentation?
22 MR. KARIPINENI: I have more slides. But 23 really the information is pretty similar to the other 24 presentations. I can do that if you want. You want 25 to go to the next slide?
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172 1 MR. BALAZIK: Well, can you just summarize 2 it really quickly so we can go through the rest of the 3 presentation?
4 MR. KARIPINENI: Yeah, the summary, the 5 application has provided information necessary to 6 conclude that the, you know, the requirements we have 7 about the -- that's in front of the SERs are 8 reasonably satisfied in our opinion. And the 9 operating license 257, all the information is there.
10 As far as how we -- how together would 11 perform for different analysis that were done in all 12 the accident analysis, et cetera, that would be there 13 in Chapter 13. I took a look at it, and I was okay 14 with what was done. I was satisfied with what was 15 done.
16 CHAIR BALLINGER: Are we now complete?
17 MR. KARIPINENI: Unless Mike, you want me 18 to the other slides, I will. But that's the basic 19 information we're talking about.
20 MR. BALAZIK: Rao, if you're done -- this 21 is Mike Balazik from NRC staff. If you're done, then 22 let's go ahead and we can wrap this up.
23 MR. KARIPINENI: Okay.
24 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay. So now we're 25 about to transition to the closed session. And before NEAL R. GROSS COURT REPORTERS AND TRANSCRIBERS 1716 14th STREET, N.W., SUITE 200 (202) 234-4433 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009-4309 www.nealrgross.com
173 1 we do that, we need to ask for public comments. So 2 given our team's scheme of doing things, I presume 3 that anybody that wants to make a public comment 4 already is online.
5 So if you have a public comment, you're a 6 member of the public and you'd like to make a comment, 7 please state your name and make your comment. I don't 8 do five minutes. I do five seconds.
9 Okay. I guess hearing none, then what we 10 need to do then is to rely on staff and SHINE folks to 11 verify that there isn't anybody present on the Teams 12 that does not belong there. And I guess it'd have to 13 be up to the staff and the applicant to do the 14 checking.
15 MR. BROWN: No, we're going to transition 16 to the other Teams number.
17 (Laughter.)
18 MR. BROWN: Yes, I will come over. I will 19 come over and do that.
20 CHAIR BALLINGER: Okay. Well, I've been 21 chastised roundly. We need to end this session and 22 then have a new line. So we'll take a ten-minute 23 break to get this to happen.
24 (Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went 25 off the record at 2:17 p.m.)
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Chapter 1 - The Facility Chapter 2 - Site Characteristics TRACY RADEL, VICE PRESIDENT OF ENGINEERING CATHERINE KOLB, DIRECTOR OF PLANT OPERATIONS
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Outline Chapter 1 o Facility Overview Chapter 2 o Chemical Hazard Analysis o Aircraft Hazard Analysis
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Facility Overview The SHINE site is located on the southern edge of the city of Janesville, Wisconsin The radiologically controlled area (RCA) within the main production facility is divided into two regions o Irradiation facility (IF): contains eight accelerator-driven subcritical assembly irradiation units (IUs) and their supporting equipment o Radioisotope production facility (RPF): contains target solution preparation, target solution storage, three processing lines for isotope extraction, and waste handling processes Seismically qualified structures, geometrically favorable equipment, and gravity drain of solutions are passive safety features used reduce risk Structures, systems, and components (SSCs) whose intended functions are to prevent accidents that could cause undue risk to health and safety of workers and the public, or mitigate the consequences of such accidents, are classified as safety-related SSCs
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Facility Overview The major operations to be performed in the SHINE facility are as follows:
o Target solution preparation from raw feed material o Irradiation of target solution o Molybdenum (Mo) extraction from irradiated target solution o Mo purification o Target solution adjustments o Solidification of radioactive liquid waste An IU Cell Safety Actuation automatically transitions the unit to a safe state in the case of upset conditions, without the need for operator action o De-energizes the neutron driver o Opens redundant target solution vessel (TSV) dump valves to drain target solution to geometrically favorable TSV dump tank o Isolates the primary system boundary
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Chemical Explosions Accidents involving detonations of chemicals or fuels were considered for facilities and activities on-site and off-site.
Allowable (standoff) and actual distances of hazardous chemicals transported or stored near the facility were determined in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.91 (1 psid of peak overpressure).
Two types of explosions are considered: stationary explosion at the source, and a vapor cloud explosion.
o Stationary explosion evaluation uses the TNT equivalence method described in RG 1.91.
o Vapor cloud explosion evaluation uses the ALOHA computer program.
Where a postulated explosion has a standoff distance greater than the actual distance from the source of the chemical to the nearest safety-related building, a probabilistic analysis is used.
o These analyses show the rate of exposure to a peak positive incident overpressure in excess of 1 psid (6.9 kPa) is less than 1E-6 per year, when based on conservative assumptions, or 1E-7 per year when based on realistic assumptions.
No chemical explosion hazards were found to pose an unacceptable risk to the SHINE facility.
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Toxic Chemicals Chemical hazards within 5 miles of the SHINE site, including on-site, were evaluated for their potential toxicity and ability to affect control room personnel in the event of an accident.
o Some chemicals were screened out from quantitative evaluation.
Chemical hazards not screened are evaluated using ALOHA against the chemicals National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH) value, or Protective Action Criteria (PAC)-2 value if no IDLH value is available, or against qualitative toxicity information if quantitative information is unavailable.
If concentration in the facility control room for a chemical release exceeds evaluation criteria, a probabilistic evaluation is performed.
o The acceptance criteria for releases evaluated in this manner is 1E-6 releases per year.
A simple probabilistic analysis is not sufficient to eliminate ammonia from consideration as a hazard to the site. However, in the most limiting case, facility control room operators will have 2 minutes to take self-protective actions.
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Fires Fires in adjacent industrial plants and storage facilities, oil and gas pipelines, and fires from transportation accidents were evaluated as events that could lead to high heat fluxes.
Three types of fires are analyzed for high heat flux: boiling liquid expansion vapor explosion (BLEVE) fireballs, pool fires, and jet fires.
Fires evaluated as to whether they can cause damage to a SHINE building All three types of fires are analyzed using ALOHA Limiting fire scenario (i.e., pool fire from gasoline truck on U.S. Highway 51) resulted in a temperature rise on the facilitys concrete wall of 44°F.
o This is an insignificant temperature rise compared to American Concrete Institute (ACI) 349-13 standards for short- and long-term maximum concrete temperatures.
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Site Wind and Atmospheric Stability Site meteorological data set covering the period 2005-2010 was developed to support relative atmospheric concentration (/Q) and radiological dose assessments.
Surface met data taken from automated weather station at Southern Wisconsin Regional Airport (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA] station identifier KJVL).
Data taken includes hourly dry bulb temperature, humidity, wind speed, and wind direction.
Pasquill stability class is calculated from hourly wind speed, ceiling height, and sky cover measurements.
Annual wind rose shows winds at the site predominantly westerly and southerly, but there is significant seasonal variation.
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Atmospheric Dispersion Joint frequency distributions of wind speed, direction, and Pasquill stability class are used to calculate /Q values at the site boundary and at the nearest residence.
PAVAN used to calculate short-term /Q values used in radiological accident dose calculations.
XOQDOQ module of NRCDose used to calculate long-term /Q values used in normal radiological dose calculations.
ARCON96 used to calculate /Q values for control room habitability (between facility release point and control room ventilation intake).
Chemical concentration calculations using ALOHA do not take /Q values; rather, 95th percentile values for wind speed and atmospheric stability are used directly as inputs.
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Aircraft Hazard Site is located approximately 0.4 mi east of the Southern Wisconsin Regional Airport (KJVL)
Same methodology as PSAR o DOE Standard DOE-STD-3014-96 crash probability methodology used for airways o NUREG-0800 methodology used for crashes from nearby airports o Non-frequent airport events (air shows) considered based on increased number of airport operations (originally addressed in PSAR request for additional information [RAI])
o Acceptance criteria for total crash probability (airways + airports) established as 1E-6 per year (based on DOE-STD-3014-96)
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Aircraft Hazard Aircraft hazard analysis updates since PSAR:
o Number of operations at airports (decreased) o Largest typical military helicopter used at KJVL considered for crash probability (vs. largest manufactured) o Nitrogen purge system (N2PS) structure addressed qualitatively, based on location relative to main facility and off-site power sources Large Non-Military Small Non-Military Military Aircraft Aircraft Aircraft Total Probability 1.10E-7 3.92E-4 1.99E-7 Total Probability 1.90E-7 N/A 5.37E-7 Considering Air Shows Small non-military aircraft crash probabilities do not meet the 1E-6 acceptance criterion; therefore, the main production facility structure is designed to withstand impact from this type of aircraft.
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Chapter 4 - Irradiation Unit and Radioisotope Production Facility Description (Open Session)
ERIC EDWARDS, CHEMICAL PROCESS SYSTEMS MANAGER
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Outline Irradiation Facility (IF) o Irradiation Facility Overview o Neutron Driver Assembly System (NDAS) o Subcritical Assembly System (SCAS) o Heat Removal Systems o Target Solution Vessel (TSV) Off-Gas System (TOGS) o Irradiation Cell Biological Shielding (ICBS)
Radioisotope Production Facility (RPF) o Isotope Separation o Other Process Systems
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Irradiation Facility Overview IRRADIATION FACILITY
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Neutron Driver Assembly System (NDAS)
IRRADIATION FACILITY Basics o Creates fast neutrons using a deuterium (D or 2H) ion beam incident upon a tritium (T or 3H) gas target 4
o D+T He + n + 17.6 MeV o Neutrons delivered to subcritical assembly system (SCAS) where medical isotopes are produced Components o Accelerator Stage: Creates deuterium ion beam o Pumping Stage: Keeps pressures low to allow formation and transport of ion beam o Target Stage: Location where fusion occurs
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Subcritical Assembly System (SCAS)
IRRADIATION FACILITY SCAS major components:
o TSV o Neutron multiplier o TSV dump tank o Subcritical assembly system support structure (SASS)
TSV maintains fissile solution in a subcritical, but highly multiplying configuration during the irradiation process.
TSV dump tank holds fissile solution in a geometrically favorable configuration as it is passively cooled by the light water pool.
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Heat Removal Systems IRRADIATION FACILITY Primary closed loop cooling system (PCLS) o Cools the TSV and multiplier by forced convection with water through annular channels o Circulates deionized water upward from the lower plenum, through the TSV, and out of the upper plenum o Capacity to remove the maximum multiplier and TSV thermal power (137.5 kW from TSV, 20 kW from multiplier)
Light water pool o SCAS sits in a light water pool o Cools the annular TSV dump tank by natural convection o Sufficient to remove 100% of thermal power from TSV dump tank o Contact area with PCLS piping rejects heat, in addition to conduction through concrete
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Target Solution Vessel Off-Gas System (TOGS)
IRRADIATION FACILITY Safety functions:
o Maintains hydrogen concentrations below values which could result in an overpressure capable of rupturing the primary system boundary (PSB) o Provides confinement of target solution and fission products as part of the PSB to prevent release of radioactive material o Removes a portion of the iodine from the sweep gas to mitigate the dose consequences of accidents involving loss of PSB integrity Additional functions:
o Maintains the pressure within the PSB slightly sub-atmospheric during normal conditions o Captures target solution droplets entrained in the sweep gas and returns them to the TSV to minimize buildup of fissile material in TOGS o Condenses water vapor generated by the target solution in the TSV and returns the condensate to the TSV to limit water holdup in TOGS to less than 3 liters
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Irradiation Cell Biological Shielding (ICBS)
IRRADIATION FACILITY Comprised of the following concrete enclosures:
o IU cells (including light water pools) o TOGS shielded cells o Primary cooling rooms o Neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) service cell Analysis includes o Neutron and gamma dose rates to areas that could be occupied o Penetrations and voids o Radiation effect on shielding materials
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Isotope Separation - Molybdenum and Iodine RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY Molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) and iodine and xenon purification and packaging (IXP) separate fission products from irradiated target solution.
Three MEPS processing lines are provided in the supercell.
o Molybdenum is separated from irradiated target solution.
Following isotope separation, target solution is staged for subsequent irradiation cycles via the target solution staging system (TSSS).
Manual process with laboratory glassware is used to finish purification of molybdenum prior to packaging in the molybdenum isotope product packaging system (MIPS).
Iodine is separated from target solution and purified.
Xenon isotopes are collected on a cryotrap.
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Other Process Systems RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY Target solution staging system (TSSS) o Below grade storage tanks - 8 target solution hold tanks, 2 target solution storage tanks o Any MEPS processing line can drain to any TSSS tank o Provides an area for target solution storage, staging prior to transfer into TSV, and allows sampling of target solution Molybdenum isotope product packaging system (MIPS) o Product bottle, secondary container, and type B shipping container o Product is loaded in the hot cell and shipping containers exported using the drum transfer system
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Other Process Systems RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY Process vessel ventilation system (PVVS) o Mitigates radiolytic hydrogen generated in RPF tanks o Captures radioiodine and delays release of radioactive noble gases in off-gases to the environment Radioactive liquid waste storage (RLWS) o Collect liquid radioactive wastes from MEPS, IXP, vacuum transfer system (VTS), PVVS, and non-routine operations o Wastes are sampled and blended together prior to transfer to the radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) system Radioactive liquid waste immobilization (RLWI) system o Receives liquid wastes from the RLWS for immobilization in cementitious mixture o Selectively removes classification-driving isotopes (e.g., Cs, Sr) o Located in an above-grade shielded enclosure in the RPF
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Chapter 5 - Cooling Systems IAN SODERLING, AUXILIARY SYSTEMS ENGINEER
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Outline Primary Closed Loop Cooling System (PCLS)
Radioisotope Process Facility Cooling System (RPCS)
Process Chilled Water System (PCHS)
Facility Demineralized Water System (FDWS)
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Primary Closed Loop Cooling System (PCLS)
Nonsafety-related functions of the PCLS:
o Provides cooling water to target solution vessel (TSV), neutron multiplier, and light water pool for a single unit PCLS cooling is a nonsafety-related function Regulates water to design temperature range and rejects excess heat from the subcritical assembly system (SCAS) to the RPCS Two pumps are used for full-flow operation, but a single pump may be used to allow the unit to continue operating at a reduced capacity Deionizer bed and filters maintain ASTM Type II water purity standards to limit corrosion, product activation, and radiological contamination of the process stream o Provides purge gas flow from confinement The PCLS includes an air separator that removes dissolved, entrained, and free gases from the irradiation unit (IU) cell and TSV off-gas system (TOGS) cell atmospheres o Air separator routes gas to the expansion tank for purging o Gases from IU cells and TOGS cells are drawn into the PCLS expansion tank by radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust (RVZ1e)
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Primary Closed Loop Cooling System (PCLS)
Safety-related functions of the PCLS:
o Installation of the PCLS expansion tank with a flame arrestor to preclude hydrogen deflagration/detonation o Closure of PCLS confinement isolation valves to prevent PCLS water intrusion into the TSV in the event of a leak o Closure of PCLS confinement isolation valves to maintain confinement boundary during abnormal conditions o Generate a TSV reactivity protection system (TRPS) signal on high PCLS temperature o Generate a TRPS signal on low PCLS temperature o Generate a TRPS signal on low PCLS flow
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Radioisotope Process Facility Cooling System (RPCS)
Removes heat from loads around the irradiation facility (IF) and radioisotope production facility (RPF) o Acts as the facility secondary cooling loop by removing heat from the PCLS heat exchanger o Target solution vessel off-gas system (TOGS), Process vessel vent system (PVVS), neutron driver assembly system (NDAS), target solution preparation system (TSPS), molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS), radiological ventilation zone 1 recirculation unit (RVZ1r), and radiological ventilation zone 2 recirculation unit (RVZ2r) heat exchangers within the radiologically controlled area (RCA) and non-RCA areas Does not perform or maintain safety functions in any capacity Rejects heat to the PCHS through the RPCS heat exchanger RPCS pressure is maintained higher than serviced systems to prevent the spread of contamination around the system and facility Three pumps are provided in an N+1 configuration to maintain normal operations during a complete loss of a pump
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Process Chilled Water System (PCHS)
Removes heat from the RPCS heat exchanger and rejects it to the environment by air-cooled chillers that are external to the facility Acts as the tertiary cooling loop in the facility Does not perform or maintain safety functions in any capacity Three chillers and three chilled water pumps provide design redundancy to maintain normal operations with a complete loss of chiller and/or pump
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Cooling System Pressure Cascade Heat generation occurs in the SCAS and neutron multiplier of RCA LOW the SCAS during and post-irradiation Primary Closed Loop Cooling The PCLS removes heat from the SCAS and light water pool System PRESSURE CASCADE through forced convection RPCS provides cooling to the PCLS via the PCLS heat exchanger on the PCLS cooling skid Radioisotope PCHS removes heat from the RPCS via the RPCS heat Process Facility exchanger (within the RCA) Cooling System (RPCS)
PCHS supply and return headers are routed through the non-RCA (administrative annex) and to the PCHS chillers (outside facility)
Process Chilled Pressure cascade prevents contamination from the PCLS NON-RCA Water System onward by maintaining the RPCS pressure higher than the OUTSIDE (PCHS)
PCLS pressure and the PCHS pressure higher than the FACILITY HIGH RPCS pressure
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Facility Demineralized Water System (FDWS)
The nonsafety-related FDWS provides makeup water to process systems o Reverse osmosis water is provided to systems with lower water quality requirements such as the facility chilled water system, process chilled water system, and facility ventilation zone 4 (FVZ4)/radiological ventilation zone 2 (RVZ2) humidifiers o Deionized water (ASTM Type II) is provided to systems around the facility that require higher purity water to maintain system cleanliness and to preclude product activation for systems that are exposed to radiation o Ultrapure deionized water (ASTM Type I) is provided to the quality control (QC) and analytical labs as well as the MEPS hot water system The FDWS uses a water-to-air heat exchanger to reject heat from pump and equipment operation and to the RCA atmosphere
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Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features ALEXANDER NEWELL, CRITICALITY SAFETY LEAD
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Outline Irradiation Facility (IF) o Confinement Systems o Combustible Gas Management Radioisotope Production Facility (RPF) o Confinement Systems o Combustible Gas Management Process Vessel Vent Isolation
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Purpose of Confinement Systems Confinement systems are designed to limit the release of radiological material to occupied or uncontrolled areas during and after design basis accidents (DBAs) to mitigate consequences to the facility staff, the public, and the environment.
Principle objective of confinement systems is to protect on-site personnel, the public, and the environment.
Secondary objective of confinement systems is to minimize reliance on administrative or active engineering controls.
o Goal of as simple and fail-safe as reasonably possible
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Primary Confinement Boundary IRRADIATION FACILITY - CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS The boundary for each irradiation unit (IU) is independent of other IUs Utilizes active and passive features Consists primarily of:
o IU cell o The target solution vessel (TSV) off-gas system (TOGS) cell o IU cell and TOGS cell heating ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) enclosures (radiological ventilation zone 1 recirculating [RVZ1r] subsystem)
Connection to radiological ventilation zone 1 exhaust (RVZ1e) subsystem is equipped with redundant dampers or valves that close on a confinement actuation signal
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Primary Confinement Boundary IRRADIATION FACILITY - CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS Piping systems penetrating the primary confinement boundary and capable of excessive leakage are equipped with one or more isolation valves. (Design Criterion 33)
Lines from outside confinement that penetrate the primary confinement boundary and are connected directly to the primary system boundary are provided with redundant isolation capabilities. (Design Criterion 34) o Isolation valves outside confinement boundaries are located as closed to confinement as practical and take the position providing greater safety upon the loss of actuating power.
o The nitrogen purge system (N2PS) and process vessel ventilation system (PVVS) are equipped with appropriate isolation capabilities and take the position of greater safety on a loss of actuating power.
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Tritium Confinement Boundary IRRADIATION FACILITY - CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS Each tritium purification system (TPS) train is independent of the other two Passive components:
o TPS gloveboxes o Secondary enclosure cleanup process boundary o TPS-neutron driver assembly system (NDAS) interface lines (up to interface with primary confinement boundary)
Active components:
o Isolation of:
Helium supply Glovebox pressure control exhaust Vacuum/impurity treatment subsystem process vent Process connections to NDAS o Active components are initiated to their safe configuration via the engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS)
Engineered safety features actuation system (ESFAS) TPS Train Isolation occurs on detection of high TPS glovebox tritium concentration or high target chamber supply or exhaust pressure ESFAS TPS Process Vent Actuation occurs on detection of high TPS exhaust to facility stack tritium
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Engineered Safety Features Effectiveness IRRADIATION FACILITY - CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS
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Irradiation Facility - Combustible Gas Management TOGS AND N2PS Principal objective: prevent conditions required for hydrogen deflagration within the primary system boundary (PSB) piping that results in overpressure exceeding the pressure safety limit of the PSB Hydrogen gas is monitored and maintained below the lower flammability limit (LFL) using the TOGS.
If TOGS becomes unavailable, the buildup of hydrogen gas is limited using the N2PS.
The N2PS provides passive, pressure-driven nitrogen sweep gas flow in the event of a loss of normal combustible gas management function.
o N2PS utilizes both PSB and PVVS piping to perform its hydrogen mitigation function o Actuation occurs on a loss of normal sweep gas flow, 180 seconds after a loss of power, and on other additional inputs that indicate loss of TOGS functionality o Capacity of the N2PS is sufficient to provide at least three days of flow to maintain hydrogen concentration within acceptable limits with additional margin
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Supercell Confinement RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY - CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS Passive components:
o Hot cells are fitted with stainless steel boxes for confinement of materials and process equipment Active components:
o Supercell ventilation is fitted with radiation monitoring instrumentation to detect off-normal releases Upon indication, isolation dampers or valves close on both the inlet and outlet to isolate the affected cells from the ventilation system, as well as a molybdenum extraction and purification system (MEPS) heating loop isolation and vacuum transfer system (VTS) safety actuation o Active components required to function to maintain the confinement barrier are actuated by ESFAS
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Below Grade Confinement RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY - CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS In the event of radiological release, material is confined primarily by structural components of the boundary.
Passive components:
o Each part of the subgrade is equipped with a concrete cover plug o Gaskets and other non-structural features are used, as necessary, to provide sealing where components meet o The pipe trench, annular tank vaults, and valve pits with equipment containing fissile material are equipped with drip pans and drains that lead to the radioactive drain system (RDS)
Active components:
o Where process equipment crosses the confinement boundary into non-confinement, appropriate isolation capabilities are provided
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Engineered Safety Features Effectiveness RADIOISOTOPE PRODUCTION FACILITY - CONFINEMENT SYSTEMS
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Radioisotope Production Facility - Combustible Gas Management PROCESS VESSEL VENTILATION SYSTEM (PVVS) AND NITROGEN PURGE SYSTEM (N2PS)
Principle objective: prevent the conditions required for a hydrogen deflagration in the gas spaces in the RPF process tanks During normal operation, the PVVS provides sweep gas to tanks in the RPF and provides an outlet path for gas generated inside the PSB.
If PVVS becomes unavailable, the buildup of hydrogen gas is limited using the N2PS to establish sweep gas flow through process vessels.
o The flow path also uses the process system and PVVS piping Capacity of the N2PS is sufficient to provide at least three days of flow to maintain hydrogen concentration within acceptable limits with additional margin.
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Process Vessel Vent Isolation Radioactive components of the gas stream are removed or delayed via condensation, acid adsorption, mechanical filtration with high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, and adsorption in carbon beds.
o Two types of carbon beds are used: guard beds and delay beds The PVVS guard and delay beds are equipped with isolation valves that isolate the affected guard bed or group of delay beds and extinguish a fire.
o The isolation valves also serve to prevent the release of radioactive material to the environment.
Guard bed isolation is a nonsafety-related function o The PVVS is equipped with instrumentation that detects fires and provides indication to ESFAS.
o Redundancy in the beds and the ability to isolate individual beds allows the PVVS to continue operating following an isolation.
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Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Non-Power Production or Utilization Facility Subcommittee SHINE Medical Technologies, LLC Operating License Application Review Michael F. Balazik, Project Manager Non-Power Production and Utilization Facility License Branch Division of Advanced Reactors and Non-power Production and Utilization Facilities Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 17, 2022
SHINE Operating License Application
- SHINE Medical Technologies LLC (SHINE) submitted operating license application on July 17, 2019
- SHINE commenced construction of the facility in September 2019.
- SHINE has requested a commercial operating license for a non-power utilization and production facility (RPF)located in Janesville, Wisconsin
- SHINE proposes to produce molybdenum-99 (99Mo) and other isotopes from the fission of low enriched uranium target solution in an Irradiation Facility consisting of 8 irradiation units 2
SHINE Operating License Application (cont.)
- 99Mo is recovered through irradiated target solution processing in a Radioisotope Production Facility consisting of hot cells
- SHINE submitted a supplement to the license application on January 27, 2022, providing information on phased construction and operation of the facility Operations and construction occurring simultaneously Consists of four phases
- SHINE plans to complete Phase 1 in May 2023 3
SHINE General Licensing Approach
- SHINE requested a single operating license under 10 CFR Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities Irradiation units licensed as utilization facilities Hot cells for separation of irradiated target solution as production facility Housed in a single building
- Special nuclear material will be licensed under 10 CFR Part 70, Domestic Licensing of Special Nuclear Material
- Source material is licensed under 10 CFR Part 40, Domestic Licensing of Source Material 4
Regulatory Guidance and Acceptance Criteria
- Safety reviews for operating license applications conducted in accordance with Commissions regulations
- NUREG-1537, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors
- Interim Staff Guidance Augmenting NUREG-1537 Radioisotope production facilities Aqueous homogeneous reactors Incorporates relevant non-reactor guidance from NUREG-1520, Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle Facility, Rev. 1
- Other guidance (e.g., regulatory guides and ANSI/ANS standards) and engineering judgment used, as appropriate, to make construction permit findings 5
Basis for Issuing Operating License
- The findings of 10 CFR 50.57, Issuance of operating license, must be made to issue an operating license.
Construction has been substantially complete Facility will operate in conformity with application and regulations Reasonable assurance that operation will not endanger public health and safety Applicant technically and financially qualified Provisions of 10 CFR Part 140 satisfied (Financial Protection Requirements)
Issuance of license will not be inimical to common defense and security 6
Additional Regulatory Requirements
- 10 CFR 50.34, Contents of applications; technical information, requires the contents of the final safety analysis to include:
the general description of the facility; the design bases, the limits on facility operation, and the safety analysis of the structures, systems, and components and of the facility as a whole; the kinds and quantities of radioactive materials expected to be produced in the operation of the facility and the means for controlling and limiting radioactive effluents and radiation exposures within the limits in 10 CFR Part 20 and as low as is reasonably achievable; the proposed technical specifications for the facility; the description and plans for implementation of an operator requalification program; the technical qualifications of SHINE to engage in the proposed activities; the physical security plan for the facility; 7
Additional Regulatory Requirements (cont.)
- 10 CFR 50.34 requires the contents of the final safety analysis to include:
the final analysis and evaluation of the design and performance of structures, systems, and components with respect to assessing the risk to public health and safety resulting from operation of the facility; the financial qualifications; the emergency plan for the facility; the relationship of specific facility design features to the major processes the major chemical or mechanical processes involving licensable quantities of radioactive material.
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NUREG-1537 Review Areas
- 1. The Facility/Introduction 11. Radiation Protection and Waste Management
- 2. Site Characteristics
- 12. Conduct of Operations
- 3. Design of Structures, Systems, and Components 13. Accident Analyses
- 4. Facility Description 14. Technical Specifications
- 5. Coolant Systems 15. Financial Qualifications
- 6. Engineered Safety Features 16. Other License Considerations
- 7. Instrumentation and Control 17. Decommissioning
- 8. Electrical Power Systems 18. Uranium Conversions
- 9. Auxiliary Systems 19. Environmental Review
- 10. Experimental Facilities BOLD - Chapters presented to ACRS Subcommittee 9
Summary of Chapter 1 Review
- Applicable requirements of Atomic Energy Act and Commission regulations have been met
- SHINE facility does not share any systems or equipment with other facilities
- SHINE provides a general description of the facility and summarizes major operations
- SHINE facility will not have high-level nuclear waste or spent nuclear fuel, so Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 is not applicable 10
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Meeting on SHINE Medical Isotope Production Facility Operating License Application Chapter 2 Site Characteristics U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 17, 2022
Geography and Demography
- The NRC staff finds, based on the review of the application and supplemental information provided, that the applicants analyses of geography and demography are sufficient and acceptable
- The SHINE facility is located in the city of Janesville, Rock County, Wisconsin. The SHINE site boundary encloses approximately 0.37 km2 (91acres). All safety related structures, systems, and components of the SHINE facility are centrally located in a square area, in order to minimize distance to the site boundary.
- Based on its review of the information in the FSAR Section 2.1 and independent confirmatory review of prominent, natural, and manmade features of the area as found in publicly available documentation, the staff finds the information provided by the applicant with regard to the SHINE site location and description adequate and acceptable.
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Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facilities
- The NRC staff finds, based on the review of the application and supplemental information provided that the applicants analyses of man-made hazards are sufficient and acceptable
- The staffs review covered:
- Locations of transportation facilities and routes in relation to the SHINE site, including airports and airways, roadways, railways, pipelines, and navigable bodies of water
- The presence of military and industrial facilities
- The staff reviewed the information provided and, for the reasons discussed in the SER, concluded that the SHINE applicant has provided adequate and reasonable information that established site characteristics and design parameters acceptable to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 and all applicable guidance provided in determining the acceptability of the SHINE site.
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Meteorology - General and Local Climate
- The review of this section included the following topics:
- Regional Climate
- Regional Data Sources
- Extreme Weather Conditions
- Restrictive Dispersion Conditions
- Air Quality
- NRC staff reviewed the description of the general climate of the region and meteorological conditions relevant to the design and operation of the facility.
- NRC staff reviewed the data resources and analytical approaches used by the applicant to prepare the information.
- The staff concluded that the site characteristics associated with meteorology, and general and local climatology are acceptable and reasonably representative of the proposed site region.
Meteorology - Site Meteorology
- The review of this section included the following topics:
Local Meteorology and Topography Data Sources Diffusion Parameters Atmospheric Dispersion (/Q values)
- The staff reviewed the meteorological data and the description of the Southwest Regional Airport (SWRA) meteorological tower. The staff found the meteorological database suitable for input to the ARCON and PAVAN dispersion models.
- The staff reviewed the diffusion parameters for use in the ARCON and PAVAN dispersion models and found them acceptable.
- The staff evaluated the site topography and concluded that no unique topographic features preclude the use of the ARCON and PAVAN models for the SHINE Site at the site boundary.
- Thus, the staff finds the proposed /Q values acceptable for use in the SHINE FSAR because they are a conservative estimate of the atmospheric dispersion at the proposed SHINE Site.
Meteorology - Summary
- The staff finds, based on the review of the application and supplemental information provided through the RAI response, that the applicants analyses of meteorological hazards and atmospheric dispersion are sufficient and acceptable as they followed the applicable local, state, and federal guidelines in accordance with 10 CFR 50.35. The staff concludes that the site is not located where catastrophic meteorological events are likely, that the applicant considered credible meteorological events in developing the design basis parameters for the facility, and that the applicant provided adequate site characteristics needed to evaluate uncontrolled release of radioactive materials.
Hydrology
- The NRC staff finds, based on the review of the application, as supplemented, that the applicants analyses of hydrologic hazards are sufficient and acceptable
- Staff finds:
- The NRC staff determined that the hydrologic descriptions in FSAR Section 2.4 are adequate to understand the local hydrology and drainage patterns for the proposed site.
- SHINE site is not located where catastrophic hydrologic events are credible
- The applicant considered credible hydrologic events in developing the design basis flood parameters for the facility
- The applicant provided adequate site characteristics needed to evaluate an uncontrolled release of radioactive materials in the event of a credible hydrologic occurrence.
Geology
- The geologic characterization is unchanged from the Construction Permit Application
- NRC staff confirmed that there are no new geologic hazards identified since the CP review
- No potential for surface deformation from tectonic or nontectonic hazards
Seismology
- Used in seismic design of SSCs important to safety
- Based on USGS National Seismic Hazard Mapping project results (2008)
- Staff confirmed that 2014 NSHMP results are consistent
- Staff performed confirmatory PSHA
- Used up-to-date NRC approved methods and models
- Used site-specific subsurface profile
Seismology
- Shine SSE envelopes site-specific PSHA results for both seismic design classification (SDC) 3 and 4 facilities using guidance in ASCE/SEI 43-05
- NRC staff finds that SHINE adequately characterized seismic hazards at site
Geotechnical Engineering
- Geotechnical site characterization based on the results of field investigations and laboratory tests conducted for Construction Permit Application
- Staff confirmed that soil parameters used in the geotechnical evaluation and SSI analysis are reliable and reasonable.
- Staff verified the stability of the foundations and subsurface materials
- Staff verified that the soil underlying the site is not considered to be potentially liquefiable in accordance with the guidance of RG 1.198
- Staff verified that the soil bearing capacity is adequate for designed structure
- Staff verified that facility structure is designed to accommodate the potential differential and total settlements of the foundation
- Staff verified that lateral earth pressure to the subgrade walls are properly considered in the structural analysis and design
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Meeting on SHINE Medical Isotope Production Facility Operating License Application Chapter 4a Irradiation Facility Description U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 17, 2022
Facility Description
- Addresses the primary operations at the irradiation facility (IF), the description of the IF, design descriptions of major systems and components, biological shield, and operating processes
- The design description includes the design basis, equipment design, process control strategy, and items relied upon for safety
- The design description provides details important to accident analysis and parameters controlled through technical specifications.
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SHINE System Overview
- Low power, pressure, and temperature neutron source driven, liquid fueled sub-critical system.
- The system has a lot in common with Aqueous Homogenous Reactors (AHRs).
- Solution composition and power density are within existing experience base for solution reactors. (see Fluid Fueled Reactors, Part 1 Aqueous Homogenous Reactors, James A Lane, Editor, ORNL).
- The feedback characteristics after small and large reactivity insertions in AHRs are understood from testing.
- Unique feature is accelerator driven neutron source.
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Major Systems and Components Primary System Boundary
- Target Solution Vessel (TSV)
- surveillance and inspection for radiation damage and corrosion
- overflow lines to TSV dump tank
- TSV Dump Tank
- criticality safe
- 2 dump flow paths and 2 overflow paths from TSV
- TSV Off-Gas System
- maintains pressure within operating limits
- limit water holdup
- remove iodine 4
Major Systems and Components Secondary Confinement Boundary
- Subcritical Assembly Support Structure (SASS)
- aligns and contains the TSV, neutron multiplier, and provides the cooling channels for them
- subcooled liquid cooling
- higher pressure than TSV
- Primary Closed Loop Cooling System (PCLS)
- Part of Chapter 5 review
- Detection for leakage from TSV or neutron multiplier 5
Major Systems and Components Light Water Pool
- Provides shielding
- minimum level controlled
- Cooled by heat exchange to SASS cooling system piping inside pool during normal operation
- Provides emergency cooling
- large thermal capacitance to absorb decay heat 6
Major Systems and Components Neutron Driver Assembly System
- Uses deuterium-tritium fusion reaction to provide neutron source for the subcritical assembly
- Trips to shut down neutron driver
- Interlock to prevent operation during maintenance
- System to detect leakage 7
Major Systems and Components Target Solution
- Solution parameters are controlled to prevent precipitation
- Temperature limit to prevent boiling
- Natural convection cooling enhanced by bubble buoyancy (evaporation cooling not credited) 8
Major Systems and Components Biological Shield
- Thick concrete shield designed to limit radiation exposures to within 10 CFR Part 20 limits and meet ALARA considerations
- TOGS and PCLS in separate enclosures 9
Nuclear Design - Reactivity Control
- Subcritical -- No excess reactivity or chemical/mechanical reactivity control
- Introduction of solution controlled by operator (the lift tank has a limited capacity, and the fill rate is limited by an orifice)
- Physical processes and their relationships to reactivity balance are described, calculated, and supported with tables and figures
- TSV can be shut down through the TRPS and dump tank (the dump flow rate is greater than the fill rate)
- Variables that influence reactivity are understood and some are monitored and controlled
- Neutron multiplication monitored on startup with flux detectors and subcritical neutron source 10
Nuclear Design - Properties
- Kinetics parameters calculated with solution life
- Power coefficient negative over range of expected system conditions - self damping effects
- Calculated uncertainties on neutron multiplication factor and reactivity coefficients with respect to uncertainties in state parameters
- Reactivity coefficients for solution and multiplier evaluated at nominal and limiting conditions
- Reactivity additions induced by drastic changes to core components are studied for startup and irradiation
- Subcritical multiplication margins were calculated with several different scenarios
- Limiting Core Configuration (for power density) in terms of solution volume and Uranium concentration was determined 11
Evaluation Findings and Conclusions Accordingly, SHINE has met the following requirements for issuance of an operating license for Chapter 4a:
- Irradiation facility systems have been described, including the principal design and operating criteria
- Biological shield analysis offers reasonable assurance that design will limit radiation exposures to within 10 CFR Part 20 limits and meet ALARA considerations
- Reasonable assurance that the proposed facility can be constructed and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public 12
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Meeting on SHINE Medical Isotope Production Facility Operating License Application Chapter 5 Cooling Systems U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 17, 2022
Introductions
- Presenter:
- Adam Rau, Ph.D Nuclear Systems Performance Branch Division of Safety Systems Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- Primary Reviewer:
- Muhammad Razzaque, Ph.D (Retired)
Nuclear Systems Performance Branch Division of Safety Systems Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 2
Review Scope
- Target Solution Vessel (TSV)
- Primary Closed Loop Cooling System (PCLS)
- TSV Dump Tank
- Light Water Pool System (LWPS)
- Radioisotope Process Facility Cooling System (RPCS)
- Thermal-hydraulic Testing & Calculation
- Safe Shutdown TH Analysis 3
Review Method
- Cooling systems were evaluated against the acceptance criteria delineated in ISG to NUREG-1537, Part 2
- NRC staff reviewed FSAR, RAIs, SHINE calculations (via reading room), journal publications, and performed simple confirmatory calculations 4
Target Solution Vessel (TSV)
- TSV is an annular vessel cooled by PCLS flow on multiple surfaces
- TSV cooling designed such that:
- Peak target solution temperature < 194°F (90°C)
- Bulk target solution temperature < 176°F (80°C)
- These criteria prevent boiling of target solution and ensure integrity of the primary system boundary 5
Primary Closed Loop Cooling System (PCLS)
- There are 8 Irradiation Units (IU) in SHINE Facility
- Each PCLS is separate and independent for an IU
- Each PCLS can remove up to 137.5 kW of heat by forced convection from each TSV during normal operation (Licensed power is 125 kW) 6
PCLS (contd.)
- Heat flux at any cooling surface does not exceed Critical Heat Flux (CHF) in worst-case scenario
- Adequate margin exists to prevent Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB)
- Overheating of target solution not expected for anticipated operating conditions 7
TSV Dump Tank
- If PCLS not available, target solution is dumped from TSV into Dump tank
- Dump tank is a horizontal annular tank completely submerged in water inside the light water pool system (LWPS) 8
TSV Dump Tank (contd.)
- Tank geometry facilitates decay heat removal with large heat transfer area
- Peak target solution temperature inside dump tank does not exceed 194°F (90°C) provided that appropriate pool level is maintained 9
Light Water Pool System (LWPS)
- LWPS has no forced cooling or heat exchangers
- Performs passive cooling of Dump tank by natural convection
- Pools large thermal mass serves as heat sink
- Designed to remove decay heat from Dump tank without boiling target solution or pool water 10
LWPS (Contd.)
- Temperature is maintained between 50°F (10°C) and 95°F (35°C) during normal operation
- Radiation heating from TSV heats pool slightly above PCLS temperature
- Pool heat is removed through submerged PCLS piping
- Pool water temperature & level are monitored 11
Thermal-Hydraulic Testing & Calculation
- Correlation-based methodology used for safety-related calculations
- Heat transfer correlations were derived from published literature & SHINE-specific tests
- Published correlations are valid and applicable 12
Safe Shutdown TH Analysis
- Adequate conservatism built into calculational methodology for passive decay heat removal during shutdown
- Calculated temperatures are bounding
- Safe shutdown & long-term cooling is achieved passively from any anticipated operating condition 13
Radioisotope Process Facility Cooling System (RPCS)
- RPCS is an intermediate closed loop forced liquid cooling system
- Removes heat from PCLS and within radiological control area (RCA)
- Rejects heat to process chilled water system (PCHS) 14
RPCS (contd.)
- Not a safety-related system and not credited with preventing or mitigating design basis events
- If active cooling to TSV and neutron multiplier not available due to loss of RPCS, irradiation of target solution is suspended
- Pressure cascade maintained between cooling systems to prevent contamination 15
Phased Approach
- Review underway
- IU-specific component design unaffected by phased approach:
- Target Solution Vessel (TSV)
- Primary Closed Loop Cooling System (PCLS)
- TSV Dump Tank
- Light Water Pool System (LWPS) 16
Conclusions
- Adequate cooling capacity exists for PCLS to cool TSV
- DNB in any cooling surface and/or overheating of target solution leading to loss of PSB integrity is not expected to occur during anticipated operating conditions or shutdown 17
Conclusions (contd.)
- Thermal-hydraulic calculations and assumptions are adequately conservative, include adequate safety margin and are bounding
- Decay heat is passively removed from target solution inside Dump tank by large thermal mass of pool water 18
Conclusions (contd.)
- Pressure cascade maintained between cooling systems to prevent potential contamination
- Review of phased approach underway 19
Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Meeting on SHINE Medical Isotope Production Facility Operating License Application Chapter 6 Engineered Safety Features U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 17, 2022
Introductions
- Nageswara (Rao) Karipineni - Safety and Plant Systems Engineer, Containment and Plant Systems Engineer, Division of Safety Systems, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 2
Facility Descriptions
- Addresses the engineered design features (ESFs) of the irradiation facility (IF) and radioisotope production facility (RPF), designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents and events to keep radiological exposures within acceptable limits.
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Regulatory Basis and Acceptance Criteria
- Regulatory Requirements
- 10 CFR 50.34, Contents of applications; technical information, paragraph (b), Final safety analysis report.
- 10 CFR 50.36, Technical Specifications.
- 10 CFR 50.40, Common Standards.
- 10 CFR 50.57, Issuance of operating license.
- 10 CFR 20.1201, Occupational dose limits for adults.
- 10 CFR 20.1301, Dose limits for individual members of the public.
- Acceptance Criteria
- NUREG-1537 and ISG, Part 2, Guidelines for Preparing and Reviewing Applications for the Licensing of Non-Power Reactors, Standard Review Plan and Acceptance Criteria.
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Areas of Review
- Applicable SHINE design criteria considered in the design
- Confinement features included in the design, as described in the applicable figures and tables included in the FSAR
- Actuation of the isolation features and consistency with I&C portions of isolation descriptions in Chapter 7
- Inclusion of the features in the technical specifications 5
Summary of Application Irradiation Facility ESFs Broadly divided into three categories (FSAR figure 6a2.1-1):
- primary confinement boundary
- tritium confinement boundary
- combustible gas management Description of the design features and the SSCs that are part of the confinement, passive and active.
Drawings, block diagrams and tables included in the FSAR to allow a clear and general understanding of the confinement features.
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Summary of Application Irradiation Facility ESFs Confinement:
- IU cell, TOGS shielded cell, HVAC system enclosure cell.
- PCLS and expansion tank design to vent radiolysis gases to RVZ1 system.
Tritium confinement boundary:
- TPS glove boxes.
- Secondary enclosure cleanup system
- Isolation valves Combustible gas management:
- PVVS and nitrogen purge (N2DS) 7
Summary of Application (cont.)
Radioisotope Production Facility ESFs Broadly divided into three categories (FSAR Table 6b.1-1):
- supercell confinement
- process vessel ventilation system (PVVS)
- combustible gas management Description of the design features and the SSCs that are part of the confinement, passive and active.
Drawings and block diagrams included in the FSAR to allow a clear and general understanding of the confinement features.
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Summary of Application (cont.)
Radio Isotope Production Facility ESFs:
Confinement:
- Supercell confinement.
- Below grade confinement.
PVVS:
- Captures or provides holdup for radioactive particulates, iodine, and noble gases.
Combustible gas management:
- PVVS and nitrogen purge (N2DS) 9
Summary of Application (cont.)
Technical Specifications:
- LCO 3.4.1 addresses primary confinement boundary or primary system boundary valves.
- LCO 3.4.2 addresses check valves.
- LCO 3.4.3 addresses confinement boundary valves for TPS glove boxes.
- LCO 3.4.5 addresses shiel plugs.
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Review Procedures and Technical Evaluation The staff compared the design features with the descriptions in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 and determined they were consistently applied.
The staff performed an evaluation of the technical information presented in Chapter 6 of the SHINE final safety analysis report (FSAR), including the tables and block diagrams, to assess the sufficiency of the final design and the description of the engineered safety features in support of the issuance of an operating license.
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Evaluation Findings and Conclusions
- Accordingly, SHINE has met the following requirements of 10 CFR 50.57 for issuance of an operating license:
- 1) Irradiation facility and radioisotope production facility ESFs have been described, including the principal design criteria
- 2) Reasonable assurance, based on Chapter 6 review, that the activities authorized by the operating license can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public.
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