ML22004A378

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Comment (46) of Kevin Kamps on Notice of Intent to Conduct Scoping Process and Prepare Environmental Impact Statement NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2
ML22004A378
Person / Time
Site: Point Beach  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 01/03/2022
From: Kamps K
Beyond Nuclear
To:
Office of Administration
References
86FR62220 00046, NRC-2020-0277, NUREG-1437 S23
Download: ML22004A378 (69)


Text

1/4/22, 4:28 PM blob:https://www.fdms.gov/687882d2-f6d5-401b-9330-bb6b62903e0f SUNI Review Complete As of: 1/4/22 4:28 PM Template=ADM-013 Received: January 03, 2022 E-RIDS=ADM-03 PUBLIC SUBMISSION Status: Pending_Post ADD: Phyllis Clark, Tracking No. kxz-n792-ptcj Stacey Imboden, Mary Neely Comments Due: January 03, 2022 Comment (46) Submission Type: Web Publication Date:

11/9/2021 Docket: NRC-2020-0277 Citation: 86 FR 62220 Notice of Intent to Conduct Scoping Process and Prepare Environmental Impact Statement NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2

Comment On: NRC-2020-0277-0194 NextEra Energy Point Beach, LLC; Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Document: NRC-2020-0277-DRAFT-0242 Comment on FR Doc # 2021-24407

Submitter Information

Email: kevin@beyondnuclear.org Organization: Beyond Nuclear

General Comment

Comments attached

Attachments

1 3 22 11-30pm FINAL Coalition Pt Beach NRC DEIS Comments

blob:https://www.fdms.gov/687882d2-f6d5-401b-9330-bb6b62903e0f 1/1 January 3, 2022

Office of Administration Mail Stop: TWFN-7-A60M U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 ATTN: Program Management, Announcements and Editing Staff Submitted via email to: <PointBeach-SLRSEIS@nrc.gov>

Coalition Public Comments re: NRCs DSGEIS on NextEra Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant Subsequent License Renewal, Docket ID NRC-2020-0234, NUREG-1437, Supplement 23, Second Renewal, Draft

To Whom It May Concern,

On behalf of the undersigned organizations and individuals, please find below and attached our coalitions public comments regarding Docket ID NRC-2020-0234, the Draft Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (DSGEIS) for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 23, Second Renewal, Regarding Subsequent License Renewal for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Draft Report for Comment (NUREG-1437),

November 2021 (DSGEIS).1

Comment 1: The NRC DEIS compounds NextEras Environmental Report error, in failing to consider a reasonable range of alternatives to the proposed action because of a failure to analyze thermal pollution mitigation as a means of reducing aquatic biota and migratory and year-round resident bird impingement, entrainment, and damage from thermal pollution, as required by NEPA and the NRC

The NextEra Environmental Report (ER, § 7.3) failed to comply with 10 C.F.R. §§

1Docket ID NRC-2020-0234, the Draft Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement

for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, Supplement 23, Second Renewal, Regarding Subsequent License

Renewal for Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Draft Report for Comment (NUREG-1437),

November 2021 (DSGEIS), < https://adamswebsearch2.nrc.gov/webSearch2/main.jsp?

AccessionNumber=ML21306A226 >

-!1-51.45(c) and 51.53(c)(3)(iii) because it failed to consider an alternative under which the

unmitigated once-through cooling system of Units 1 and 2 would be replaced with a closed-cycle

cooling tower system to reduce the adverse environmental effects related to the once-through

cooling system, including massive impingement and entrainment of aquatic organisms and even

birds, and thermal pollution whereby the water temperature of Lake Michigan is significantly

elevated. NRCs Draft Supplemental Generic Environmental Impact Statement (abbreviated

DSGEIS, and further abbreviated to DEIS hereafter) continues and compounds this error. The

ER, and now the DEIS, fail to include an accurate or complete analysis of alternatives available

for reducing or avoiding adverse environmental effects and because it does not contain an

adequate consideration of alternatives for reducing adverse impacts... for all Category 2

license renewal issues.2 The ER, and now the DEIS, unlawfully fail to consider replacement of

the once-through cooling system with cooling towers as a reasonable alternative that would

reduc[e] or avoid[ ] adverse environmental effects relating to the Category 2 issues described

below.3 NRC regulations at 10 CFR § 51.45( c) require that the environmental report to include

an analysis that considers and balances the environmental effects of the proposed action, the

environmental impacts of alternatives to the proposed action, and alternatives available for

reducing or avoiding adverse environmental effects. NEPA, and NRCs implementing

regulations, require the agency to correct such errors as in the NextEra ER, in the EIS, and yet

NRC has failed to do so.

210 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iii).

310 C.F.R. § 51.45( c).

-!2-B. Scope

This comment is within the scope of this subsequent license renewal EIS public comment

proceeding because it concerns environmental impacts. The scope of the required NEPA

environmental review is established by 10 CFR Part 51 and the GEIS for license renewal cases.4

This comments challenges the sufficiency of the environmental analysis in the NextEra

Environmental Report within the parameters set by the GEIS, and NRCs continuation of this

violation in the DEIS. Matters of mitigation of thermal pollution, entrainment and impingement

are encompassed within Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A. That regulation treats the

impacts of impingement and entrainment of aquatic organisms at plants with once-through

cooling systems as a Category 2 site-specific issue where the effects might be deemed SMALL,

MODERATE, or LARGE. The impacts of impingement and entrainment are small at many

plants but may be moderate or even large at a few plants with once-through and cooling-pond

cooling systems, depending on cooling system withdrawal rates and volumes and the aquatic

resources at the site. And as to thermal impacts, Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A also

classifies the issue as site-specific and under Category 2, concluding that thermal impacts on

aquatic organisms at plants with once-through cooling systems may be SMALL, MODERATE,

or LARGE. Most of the effects associated with thermal discharges are localized and are not

expected to affect overall stability of populations or resources. The magnitude of impacts,

however, would depend on site-specific thermal plume characteristics and the nature of aquatic

4Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC (Vermont Yankee), LBP-06-20, 64 N.R.C. 131,

148-49 (2006).

-!3-resources in the area.

C. Concise Statement of Facts

The basis for this comment is that the NextEra ER considered only two alternatives: (1)

the preferred alternative (renew the operating licenses for Units 1 and 2 and keep operating) and

(2) the no-action alternative (to not renew the operating licenses and, instead, implement

replacement power sources).5 There was no consideration of the alternative of continued

operations at Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) with closed-cycle cooling systems as

mitigation. NRCs DEIS has inadequately corrected these errors and violations.

The current problem is that PBNP Units 1 and 2 are super predators in terms of their

recurring effects of killing aquatic organisms and even birds. Nuclear power plants are the most

thermodynamically inefficient way of producing electricity (Carnot efficiency). As such, they

discharge an enormous amount of waste heat (hot water), and they consume a massive amount of

cold water.6

In addition, PBNP has undergone two thermal uprates in the past two decades to

accommodate the use of high burnup fuel. Mitigation in the form of mechanical draft or passive

cooling tower systems would sharply reduce the thermal pollution discharges to Lake Michigan,

but as importantly, the volume of water withdrawn from the Lake would shrink by about 95%

and with that decrease, far fewer animals and plants would be sacrificed for the generation of

electricity.

5ER at 7-1.

6Gundersen Declaration at ¶ 9.9.

-!4-Withdrawing surface waters through cooling water intake structures (CWISs) at power

plants causes adverse environmental impacts by pulling large numbers of fish, larvae, eggs, and

other small aquatic organisms into a facilitys cooling system. Once pulled in, they may be killed

by heat, stress, or chemical exposure (entrainment). Larger fish, crustaceans, and even marine

mammals may be killed or injured when they are trapped against screens at the front of an intake

structure by the force of water being drawn into the system (impingement). According to the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA), 2.1 billion fish, crabs, and shrimp are killed by

impingement and entrainment annually.7

The environment may also be affected when the cooling water is discharged. Because the

temperature of the effluent is higher than that of the receiving water, it may negatively affect

plant growth, ecosystem composition, and fish reproduction and migration.8

The PBNP ER provides very limited historical data on the plants aquatic and wildlife

killing in Lake Michigan as a result of impingement and entrainment at the plant intakes. NRCs

DEIS has inadequately addresses such errors and violations.

A 7.5-month long study in 1975 suggested that 2,082,525 fish larvae were entrained at

PBNP during the study period, including 20% (416,505) alewife, 61% (1,270,340) rainbow

smelt, 17% (354,029) sculpin, and 2% (41,651) longnose sucker. An estimated 4,661,410

7U.S. EPA Office of Inspector General, EPA Oversight Addresses Thermal Variance and Cooling

Water Permit Deficiencies But Needs to Address Compliance With Public Notice Requirements, Report

No. 13-P-0264 at 1 (May 23, 2013). https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-09/documents/

20130523-13-p-0264.pdf

8Id.

-!5-fertilized alewife eggs were entrained.9 In a one-year impingement study conducted at PBNP in

1975-76, over 313,000 fish from 31 species were collected in impingement samples generally

obtained every fourth day of plant operation.10 Total estimated impingement for the year was

1,056,724 fish.11 Alewives and rainbow smelt constituted over 99 percent of all fish impinged

during the study.12 The estimated 161,389 rainbow smelt impinged at PBNP during the 1975 to

1976 study had an equivalent weight of 973 kg (2,145 lb). 13

In a 2005-2006 impingement study, 1.6 million fish and crayfish were collected,

weighing approximately 6,134 kilograms. 14

A 2017 entrainment study from April through September resulted in 32,477 organisms

collected, representing five shellfish taxa and five ichthyoplankton taxa.15

Point Beach has also entrained or impinged waterfowl. In 1990 the intakes killed double-

crested cormorants.16 From 2001-2003, 33 birds were trapped, mainly gulls.17

9NUREG-1437, Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear

Plants, Supplement 23. (Regarding Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2), ML052230490, at pp. 4-11 12.

10Id. at 4-15.

11Id.

12Id.

13Id. at 4-16.

14ER (2020) at 3-129.

15Id. at 3-128.

16NUREG-1437 at 2-30.

17Id. at 4-19.

-!6-Respecting thermal pollution caused by PBNP, the plant withdraws cooling water from

Lake Michigan at a peak rate of about 1,080,000,000 gallons per day for both units.18 Since 2002

there have been two thermal uprates at PBNP. In 2003, PBNP underwent a 1.4 percent power

uprate, which increased the rated thermal output to 1,540 MW(t) and increased the gross

electrical power to 545 MW(e) (518 MW[e] net).19 At that time PBNP switched to high burnup

fuel, enriched to contain a nominal 5.0 weight percent of uranium-235.20 The 2005 Supplemental

Environmental Impact Statement (NUREG-1437) does not indicate that any study was conducted

prior to that uprate to predict the thermal effects and lethal implications for aquatic life. The

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES, in Wisconsin called the

WPDES) at that time required monitoring and reporting of PBNP discharges to the Lake, but

imposed no thermal water-quality standards for compliance.21 The WPDES permit also required

a study of the cooling-water intake to assess any potential adverse impacts in future permits.22

Ahead of the next uprate, as required by the WPDES permit, NextEra in 2004 had EA

Engineering compile a study, Point Beach Nuclear Plant Evaluation of the Thermal Effects Due

to a Planned Extended Power Uprate, which modeled temperature increases for potential plant

upgrades and determined that the plume predicted area, volume, and behavior will not be

18ER p. 4-25.

19Id. at p. 2-4.

20Id.

21Id. at 4-20.

22Id. at 2-19, (citing WDNR 2004a).

-!7-substantially different from previous conditions.23 The extended power uprates (EPUs) were

estimated to result in a 2°C (3.6°F) increase in discharge temperature. Pre-uprate, the month of

August, which typically showed the highest water temperatures, saw an average discharge

temperature of 19.3°C (66.74°F). The maximum temperature increase over intake temperature as

a result of the uprate at 1,000 feet offshore (within the security zone) was predicted to be 8.57°C

(15.43°F) with an assumed along-shore current of 0.2 feet/second. This increase, when added to

the average temperature at the intake for August (19.3°C (66.74°F)), resulted in an estimated

average temperature of 27.9°C (82.2°F) at the approximate end of the security zone.24 The

average August discharge temperatures for years 2014-2018 for Units 1 or 2 (whichever was

higher) were 82.2°F, 75.6°F, 84.8°F, 87.7°F, and 84.0°F, and the highest average daily discharge

temperature for August 2019 was 88.8°F.25

PBNPs present WPDES permit limits waste heat rejected to Lake Michigan to a weekly

average of 8,273 MBtu per hour. The permit requires reporting of intake and discharge

temperatures to allow for the calculation of the heat rejection.26 In a 2012 internal memo entitled

Approval of the alternative effluent temperature limit for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant,27 the

Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources noted that a 2009 study commissioned by PBNP

23ER (2020) at 4-25, 10-4.

24ER at 3-212.

25Id.

26Id.

27The August 29, 2012 memo is an attachment to PBNPs current WPDES permit, ER at p.

639/705 of.pdf, et seq.

-!8-showed that the area of water elevated more than 1°C increased by 28% to 1170 acres)

extending approximately 1.8 miles downshore and a maximum of 1.5 miles offshore. The area of

the 2°C contour increased 24% to 390 acres and the area of the 5°C contour increased 41% to 44

acres or roughly a circle with a diameter of 1900 feet.28 The agency determined:

After reviewing the available temperature data and the temperature preferences of the representative important species, there appears [sic] to be portions of the mixing zone that will not be suitable for all life stages of these species. Although the discharge plume may cause some negative impacts to the fish community of the immediate area or to the localized ecology of the area, the Department has concluded that the thermal plume created at 8,273 MBTU/hr will cause minimal impacts to the fish and invertebrate communities on the representative important species list.29

The analysis performed by NextEra in the ER is incomplete and insufficient to support

the determination to not consider a closed-cycle cooling tower alternative, for several reasons.

NextEra essentially considers the impact of PBNPs thermal discharge in isolation, and does not

consider the cumulative impacts of its thermal discharge together with all other significant

impacts on the species affected.30 [A] determination of the thermal discharge cannot be made

without considering all other effects on the environment, including the effects of the intake (i.e.,

entrainment and entrapment).... In re Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. (Seabrook Station, Units I & II),

1977 EPA App. LEXIS 16, *19-20; 1 E.A.D. 332 (Adm'r 1977). NRCs DEIS has not adequately

addressed these shortcomings.

Also, NextEras analysis inappropriately assumes the aquatic community to include all

28Id. at 640 of ER.

29Id. at 641 of ER.

30See ER at 4-25, WI DNR analysis at ER pp. 639/705 of.pdf.

-!9-of Lake Michigan, whereas a proper analysis should focus on specific, localized site conditions.

See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1372 (4th Cir. 1976) (upholding EPA's

interpretation of § 316(a)31 as providing for consideration of specific site conditions in the

setting of thermal limitations for individual power plants and that even where a discharge might

satisfy state temperature standards, such discharge might nevertheless cause serious harm to a

particular spawning ground, for example, located just below the plant's discharge point.). NRCs

DEIS has not adequately addressed these errors.

Additionally, PBNP relied largely on ancient (1975) data in conducting its analysis in the

ER, and applied only a list of a few representative important species (CRIS) in the

retrospective on the plant's 2012 thermal uprate. There is insufficient analysis of the impacts of

the thermal discharge between 1975 and 2020 (an omission PBNP attempts to account for by

relying on data from other power plants on Lake Michigan). Even PBNPs spotty data from the

past 45 years suggests substantial changes to the aquatic community. NRCs DEIS has not

corrected this error.

Notwithstanding these distinct scientific weaknesses in its analysis, and the changed

regulatory view of the need to impose closed-cycle cooling to stop power plant carnage, NextEra

concluded in the ER that [b]ecause there are no planned operational changes during the

proposed SLR operating term that would increase the temperature of PBNs existing thermal

discharge, impacts are anticipated to be SMALL and mitigation measures are not warranted.32

31Clean Water Act § 316 is codified as 33 U.S.C. § 1326.

32ER at 4-26.

-!10-NextEras trivialization of the effects of its once-through, unmitigated thermal pollution system

is evident where despite the 10 CFR 51.53(c)(3)(iii) mandate that the ER must contain a

consideration of alternatives for reducing adverse impacts, as required by 51.45(c) for all

Category 2 license renewal issues, PBNP asserts there are no significant adverse effects that

would require consideration of additional alternatives. Therefore, NEPB [NextEra Point Beach]

concludes that the impacts associated with renewal of the PBN OLs [Point Beach Nuclear

operating licenses] would not require consideration of alternatives for reducing adverse

impacts....33 (Emphasis added). NRCs DEIS has inadequately addressed NextEras ER

shortcomings.

Meanwhile, the passage of time has seen retrofits being forced on older nuclear power

and other plants. Palisades Nuclear Plant, an 800-MWe plant across Lake Michigan from PBNP,

converted from a once-through cooling system to a closed-cycle wet cooling tower system after a

significant period of operating utilizing the once-through system.34 At least five other power

plants have also been required to convert to a closed-cycle system.35 One is the Indian Point

complex in New York. See Indian Point Nuclear Facility (NY): Pursuant to Section 316(b) of

the CWA,36 and 6 NYCRR Part 704.5, the Department has determined that the site-specific best

technology available (BTA) to minimize adverse environmental impact of the Indian Point Units

33ER at 7-39.

34U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Technical Development Document for the Proposed

Section 316(b) Phase II Existing Facilities Rule (Apr. 2002), at 4-1 (hereinafter EPA 2002 TDD).

35EPA 2002 TDD, at 4-1 to 4-6; Cooling Tower Feasibility Assessment, at 28-29 & n. 138.

3633 U.S.C. § 1326(b).

-!11-2 and 3 cooling water intake structures is closed-cycle cooling.37 On January 9, 2017, Entergy

Corporation, the State of New York, and environmental groups agreed to close the Indian Point

Units 2 and 3 nuclear reactors in 2020 and 2021, rather than install cooling towers for Entergys

proposed licensure venture.

Oyster Creek Generating Station (OCGS), located on Barnegat Bay in New Jersey and

owned by Exelon Corporation, applied for and received a 20-year license extension from the

NRC in 2009, but was denied the ability to discharge its waste heat into the Bay at the State

permit level. See, Oyster Creek Generating Station (NJ):38 Further, this draft renewal permit

incorporates NJDEPs determination pursuant to Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act

regarding the best technology available for the cooling water intake structure. Specifically, the

Department has determined that closed-cycle cooling (i.e. cooling towers) constitutes best

technology available for the OCGS in accordance with best professional judgment.39

Consequently, environmental groups, the State of New Jersey, and Exelon then negotiated an

agreement that the plant would close by 2019 rather than operate until 2029, and Exelon would

not install cooling towers for Oyster Creek. Exelon chose to give up the additional 10-years of

37Fact Sheet, New York State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) Draft Permit

Renewal with Modification (Indian Point Electric Generation Station, Buchanan, New York) 0004472 -

Rev. January 2017, https://www3.epa.gov/region1/npdes/schillerstation/pdfs/AR-392.pdf

38Draft Surface Water Renewal Permit Action, Category: B-Industrial Wastewater NJPDES

Permit No. NJ0005550, Oyster Creek Generating Station, Lacey Twp, Ocean County, http://

www.state.nj.us/dep/dwq/pdf/draft_permit100107.pdf

39Id.

-!12-operation of Oyster Creek and those profits rather than installing cooling towers.40

NRC has not addressed these facts in its DEIS.

Perhaps the most damning evidence that cooling towers are de rigeur is in the NextEra

ER itself. The three alternatives postulated by NextEra include: an Advanced Light Water

Reactor (ALWR) with mechanical draft cooling towers located at the PBN site; a cluster of

small modular reactors (SMRs) with mechanical draft cooling towers located at the PBN

site; and a Combination Alternative involving natural gas combined cycle units with

mechanical draft cooling towers located at the PBN site backing up an expanded photovoltaic

installation there.41 NRC has not acknowledged this evidence in the DEIS.

Yet NextEra does not compare its preferred alternative of continued operations without

closed-cycle cooling tower systems against an alternative where operations continue, but such a

cooling system is built. NRC repeats this error in its DEIS.

PBNP indulges a fiction that the annual destruction of 6,134 kg of fish biota - 12.75 short

tons - is a small impact simply because there are no further temperature uprates planned for

the 2030-2050 period. But the fish killed at Point Beach in 2011 were calculated to reduce the

yield of Lake Michigan's fisheries by an estimated 10,625 pounds a year, or about 4.5 percent of

the annual commercial fishing catch by weight.42 But regardless of that, it is absurd to treat the

recurring, known and completely predictable and voluminous future impacts of once-through

40Gundersen Declaration at ¶ 9.6; also, see https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/Oldest-US-

Reactor-Oyster-Creek-Closed.html

41ER at 7 7-4.

42https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-met-great-lakes-fish-kills-20110614-story.html

-!13-cooling at PBNP as small. The carnage will go on, unabated, producing hundreds more tons of

senseless animal deaths during the extension period. NRC has inadequately addressed this in its

DEIS, in violation of NEPA, Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) guidance, and the

agencys own implementing regulations.

Cooling tower mitigation is also within the scope of the NRC DEIS public comment

proceeding because NRCs NEPA regulations require a plant-specific assessment of cumulative

impacts in the applicants Environmental Report, as well as the NRCs own DEIS and FEIS.43

The NRC recognizes that impacts from individually minor actions may be significant when

considered collectively over time.44 According to the 2013 GEIS:

Impacts typically result from activities (e.g., water withdrawal, effluent discharges...)

... associated with... industrial and commercial development.... Perhaps the most important source of surface water impacts is the withdrawal of water for plant cooling systems (both once-through and closed-cycle). These impacts relate to water use conflicts with other users.45

The Union of Concerned Scientists estimates that recirculation cooling systems on

nuclear plants withdraw about 5% of the water volume that once-through systems like Point

Beach require.46

Point Beach is not the only mass water intake and discharge system on Lake Michigan.

Palisades, D.C. Cook, coal burning power plants, and municipal water systems also cause

4310 CFR Part 51, Subpt. A, App. B.

44ER at 4-49 (referencing 2013 GEIS § 4.13).

45§ 4.13.4 of the 2013 GEIS.

46https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/water-power-plant-cooling (table).

-!14-impingement, entrainment and in the case of power plants, thermal pollution and resulting

wildlife casualties.

It is obvious that NextEra must analyze mitigation in the ER, just as NRC must do so in

the EIS. According to 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iii), the environmental report must contain

consideration of alternatives for reducing adverse impacts, as required by § 51.45(c), for all

Category 2 license renewal issues in Appendix B to subpart A Part 51. And 10 CFR § 51.45(c)

commands that The environmental report must include an analysis that considers and

balances... alternatives available for reducing or avoiding adverse environmental

effects. (Emphasis added). Irrespective of whether entrainment, impingement and thermal

pollution entail small, medium or large impacts, the mass killing of aquatic biota and birds is an

adverse environmental impact that must be accounted for and analyzed under NEPA. Yet, NRC

has inadequately done so in the DEIS, continuing NextEras error in the ER. Mitigating thermal

pollution will draw enormously less water from Lake Michigan and will kill fewer creatures

drawn into the PBNP intakes.

Indeed, the NRCs mitigation discussion and disclosure obligations are underscored by

the obligation in 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(1) and (2), which require the environmental report to

discuss in this report the environmental impacts of alternatives and any other matters described

in § 51.45, bringing § 51.45(c)s command that there be alternatives available for reducing or

avoiding adverse environmental effects into play, again. NEPA and NRCs implementing

regulations require NRC to correct such errors by NextEra in the ER. Yet, NRC has failed to do

so in the DEIS.

-!15-The NRCs NEPA regulations require that alternatives be presented in comparative

form to aid the Commission in developing and exploring, pursuant to section 102(2)(E) of

NEPA, appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which

involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.47 Agencies

must, to the fullest extent possible, [s]tudy, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to

recommended courses of action in any proposal... 48 There must be examination of every

alternative within the nature and scope of the proposed action,49 sufficient to permit a reasoned

choice.50 NEPA requires a discussion of alternatives that must [r]igorously explore and

objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives.51 The existence of a viable, but unexamined

alternative renders an environmental impact statement inadequate.52 NRCs DEIS is thus

inadequate.

Moreover, agencies must study... significant alternatives suggested by other agencies or

4710 CFR § 51.45(b)(3).

4842 U.S.C. § 4322(2)(E); Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1519-20 (9th

Cir. 1992).

49California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982).

50Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1987).

51Union Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 564, 569 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting 40 C.F.R. §

1502.14).

52Idaho Conservation League, supra; Natural Res. Defense Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d

797, 813 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also City of Grapevine v. Dept of

Transp., 17 F.3d 1502, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (agency must consider all feasible or reasonable

alternatives[.]).

-!16-the public....53 Even an alternative which would only partially satisfy the need and purpose of

the proposed project must be considered by the agency if it is reasonable,54 because it might

convince the decision-maker to meet part of the goal with less impact.55

If the agency has not adequately studied the issue, the courts may substitute their

judgment of the environmental impact for the judgment of the agency.56

Clearly, a genuine dispute existed between PSR WI (Physicians for Social Responsibility

Wisconsin) and NextEra on a material issue of law or fact, in the NRC ASLB extreme license

extension proceeding. NRC has continued the error in the DEIS, hence our related comments

here now. The harm NEPA seeks to prevent commenced at the point that NextERA concluded

that there were no adverse environmental consequences from 50 years of once-through cooling at

PBNP and that consequently there need be no consideration of mitigation.57 The injury of an

increased risk of harm due to an agency's uninformed decision is precisely the type of injury

[NEPA] was designed to prevent.58 And yet, NRC has perpetuated NextEras errors and

violations, throughout both the environmental scoping, and now the DEIS, stages.

A hard look for a superior alternative is a condition precedent to an agency licensing

53DuBois v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1286 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1567

(1997).

54Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 93 (2nd Cir. 1975).

55North Buckhead Civic Assn v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 1542 (11th Cir. 1990).

56Crounse Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Commn, 781 F.2d 1176 (6th Cir. 1986).

57Sierra Club v. Marsh, 872 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1989).

58Comm. to Save the Rio Hondo v. Lucero, 102 F.3d 445, 448-49 (10th Cir. 1996).

-!17-determination that an applicant's proposal is acceptable under NEPA.59 In the NRC ASLB

licensing proceeding, petitioner PSR WI had articulated an admissible contention that there must

be analysis in the ER (and ultimately the NRC Environmental Impact Statement) of the

alternative of continued operation of PBNP with closed-cycle cooling towers. Despite this, the

PSR WI contention fell on deaf ears at the ASLB. NRC has now compounded this error and

violation in the DEIS.

The above comment is relevant to the following sections of the NRCs supplemental

DEIS (that is, the DSGEIS, namely NUREG-1437, Supplement 23, Second Renewal, Draft):

Section 3 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES, AND

MITIGATING ACTIONS; 3.5 Water Resources, specifically 3.5.1 Surface Water Resources; 3.7

Aquatic Resources, especially 3.7.1 Lake Michigan; 3.8 Special Status Species and Habitats,

particularly 3.8.1 Endangered Species Act: Federally Listed Species and Critical Habitats; and

3.16 Cumulative Impacts, particularly 3.16.2 Water Resources. In terms of the underlying GEIS,

namely the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants

(NUREG-1437), the above comment is relevant to the following sections: 2. Description of

Nuclear Power Plants and Sites, Plant Interaction with the Environment, and Environmental

Impact Initiators Associated with License Renewal; 2.2 Plant and Site Description and Plant

Operation; 2.2.3 Cooling and Auxiliary Water Systems; 2.3 Plant Interaction with the

Environment, especially 2.3.2 Water Use, 2.3.3 Water Quality, and 2.3.5 Aquatic Resources; 3.

59 Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2), ALAB-471, 7 NRC

477, 513 (1978).

-!18-Environmental Impacts from Nuclear Power Plant Refurbishment, including 3.4 Surface Water

and Groundwater Quality, and 3.4.1 Surface Water; 3.5 Aquatic Ecology; 3.9 Threatened and

Endangered Species; and 4. Environmental Impacts of Operation, including the entirety of 4.2

Once-Through Cooling Systems, as well as 4.3 Cooling Towers.

Comment 2: Point Beachs continued operation violates 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 14 because the reactor coolant pressure boundary has not been tested so as to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, of rapidly propagating failure, and of gross rupture, and the aging management plan does not provide the requisite reasonable assurance.

The following comment is relevant to the following sections of the underlying GEIS:

much of 5. Environmental Impacts of Postulated Accidents, especially including the entirety of

5.2 Plant Accidents, 5.3 Accident Risk and Impact Assessment for License Renewal Period, and

5.4 Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternatives (SAMDAs).

In recent years, the NRC has systematically removed conservative calculational aspects

of the embrittlement process to allow continued operation. The NRC has not incorporated the

actual data from coupons/capsules in the remaining five worst embrittled atomic power reactors

in the country, one of which is Point Beach Unit 2, for analysis which could be used to assess

whether the Point Beach reactors should be allowed continued operation. Significantly, once

Palisades in Michigan closes for good, by May 31, 2022, Point Beach Unit 2 will be the single

worst embrittled reactor pressure vessel in the United States. The NRC has allowed Point Beach

and its cohorts to use analytical techniques that ignore the data from sample coupons it could

readily test. There is no scientific basis by which the Point Beach reactors should continue

-!19-operating without a complete physical analysis of the coupons from its reactors and the five other

reactors that are its embrittled cohorts. Point Beachs continued operation violates 10 CFR Part

50, Appendix A, Criterion 14 because the reactor coolant pressure boundary has not been tested

so as to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, of rapidly propagating failure,

and of gross rupture.

A. Within the Scope

This comment is within the scope of this DEIS proceeding and material to the findings

the NRC must render. After all, a safety risk, like reactor pressure vessel embrittlement, carries

with it related, consequent, and inescapable environmental risks. For a license renewal

proceeding, 10 C.F.R. Part 54 establishes the scope of the proceeding for safety concerns.60

NEPA, of course, sets the rules and requirements for related, inextricably interlinked

environmental concerns. NRC regulations promulgated pursuant to the AEA at 10 CFR §

54.29(a) requires that a renewed license may be issued by the Commission if [a]ctions have

been identified and have been or will be taken... that there is reasonable assurance that the

activities authorized by the renewed license will continue to be conducted in accordance with the

CLB [current licensing basis], including managing the effects of aging during the period of

extended operation on the functionality of structures and components that have been identified to

require review under § 54.21(a)(1)....61 NRCs failure to address these safety risks in the

60PPL Susquehanna, LLC (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-07-4, 65 NRC

281, 306 (2007).

6110 CFR § 54.29(a).

-!20-ASLB proceeding have now been continued and compounded by NRCs failure to address these

same safety risks in this DEIS proceeding, a violation of NEPA because these safety risks have

inescapably connected environmental risks. This comment is thus material to the findings

NRC must make,62 because it is an issue that would make a difference in the outcome of the

proceeding.63 This included the DEIS public comment proceeding, for unless NRC corrects its

errors, NEPA, CEQ guidance, and agency implementing regulations will be violated. Also, there

is a significant link between the claimed deficiency and either the health and safety of the public

or the environment.64 If pressurized thermal shock were to occur within one of the Point Beach

reactors, as explained below, it could result in a Class 9 accident. The consequent release of

catastrophic amounts of hazardous ionizing radioactivity would of course cause LARGE,

negative impacts on the environment and public health, downwind, downstream, up the food

chain, and down the generations. For NRC to ignore such LARGE potential impacts, as it does in

the DEIS, gratuitously violates NEPA.

B. Concise Statement of Evidence

Petitioner PSR WIs expert witness for this contention is Arnold Gundersen, who has more than

6210 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iv).

63Rules for Practice for Domestic Licensing ProceedingsProcedural Changes in the Hearing

Process, 54 Fed. Red. 33,168, 33,172 (Aug. 11, 1989).

64Vermont Yankee, 60 NRC 548, 557 (2004).

-!21-50 years of experience in Nuclear Engineering.65 He has a Bachelor s Degree in Nuclear

Engineering (BSNE) from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI) cum laude and a

Master s Degree in Nuclear Engineering (MENE) from RPI via an Atomic Energy

Commission Fellowship. He studied cooling tower operation and cooling tower plume

theory for his Master s. Mr. Gundersen progressed in his career from reactor operator and

instructor to the

ASLB petitioner PSR WIs expert witness for the contention related to this comment, is

Arnold Gundersen. Gundersen has more than 50 years of experience in Nuclear Engineering.66

He has a Bachelor s Degree in Nuclear Engineering (BSNE) from Rensselaer Polytechnic

Institute (RPI) cum laude and a Master s Degree in Nuclear Engineering (MENE) from RPI via

an Atomic Energy Commission Fellowship. He studied cooling tower operation and cooling

tower plume theory for his Master s. Mr. Gundersen progressed in his career from reactor

operator and instructor to the position of Senior Vice President for a nuclear licensee prior to

becoming a nuclear engineering consultant and expert witness. He has considerable experience

testifying as an expert witness to the NRC ASLB and the Advisory Committee on Reactor

Safeguards (ACRS), in federal court, before the State of Vermont Public Service Board, the

65Mr. Gundersens curriculum vitae is attached to the Declaration of Arnold Gundersen

(Gundersen Declaration) filed with this comment, just as it was to the intervention Petition in the NRC

ASLB proceeding.

66Mr. Gundersens curriculum vitae is attached to the Declaration of Arnold Gundersen

(Gundersen Declaration) filed with this comment, just as it was to the intervention Petition in the NRC

ASLB proceeding.

-!22-State of Vermont Environmental Court, the Florida Public Service Commission, and the

California Public Utility Commission (CPUC). He is an author of the first edition of the U.S.

Department of Energy (DOE) Decommissioning Handbook. His five decades of professional

nuclear experience include Cooling Tower Operation, Cooling Tower Plumes, Consumptive

Water Loss, Nuclear Plant Operation, Nuclear Management, Nuclear Safety Assessments,

Reliability Engineering, In-service Inspection, Criticality Analysis, Licensing, Engineering

Management, Thermohydraulics, Radioactive Waste Processes, Decommissioning, Waste

Disposal, Structural Engineering Assessments, Nuclear Fuel Rack Design and Manufacturing,

Nuclear Equipment Design and Manufacturing, Prudency Defense, Employee Awareness

Programs, Public Relations, Contract Administration, Technical Patents, Archival Storage and

Document Control, Source Term Reconstruction, Dose Assessment, Whistleblower Protection,

and NRC Regulations and Enforcement.

In short, our comment on the environmental risks due to embrittlement of the reactor

pressure vessels at Point Beach, is based on the expertise of a nationally and internationally

renowned expert. NRC should take our comment on this subject matter most seriously in its EIS,

which thus far it has utterly failed to do.

Even before Point Beach's design, scientists had discovered that neutron radiation from

inside the nuclear core would gradually weaken, and even destroy, the thick metal nuclear reactor

that surrounds that core. This phenomenon, called neutron embrittlement, can be problematic

because if embrittlement becomes extensive, the dense metallic nuclear reactor can shatter like

-!23-glass and cause a Class 9 radiological accident, the worst nuclear catastrophe category.67 Such a

catastrophe would clearly have LARGE impacts on human health and the environment, making

it relevant to NEPA public comment proceedings like this one.

Neutron embrittlement of metal cannot be halted. In the nuclear industry, in order to

create a viable means of monitoring its progress in nuclear reactor vessels and components,

engineers have placed numerous samples of the same exact metal the vessels are made of inside

each reactor prior to operation. These samples are called coupons or capsules, and they are

withdrawn periodically and measured in a laboratory to determine the progression and extent of

embrittlement.68

Engineers designed the Point Beach reactors to operate for 40 years, and the reactors

contained enough sample coupons to last for 40 years of operation, but now that the PBNP

reactors are licensed to operate for 60 years, there are not enough coupons in the reactor core to

test for embrittlement, let alone for an additional 20 years out to 80 years of Point Beach

operations, as NextEra proposes, and NRC is considering approving, the very scheme that

initiated this NEPA proceeding in the first place.69 If a nuclear reactor were to suddenly shut

down during one of the dozens of atomic power mishaps that nuclear reactor design engineers

and the NRC anticipate could happen, the safety system would immediately inject cool water

into the reactor vessel in an attempt to cool the reactor core in hopes of preventing a meltdown.70

67Gundersen Declaration at ¶¶ 7.4.1, 7.4.4.

68Id. at 7.4.5.

69Id. at 7.4.6.

70Id. at 7.5.1.

-!24-However, in a seriously embrittled reactor like Point Beach, when that cool water is injected and

comes in direct contact with the hot reactor vessel, it can cause Pressurized Thermal

Shock (PTS). After this, the 8-inch thick steel reactor vessel may crack, through-wall, from

PTS, causing it to break open and release massive radioactivity into the surrounding area and the

environment.71 Clearly, such risks are not only safety related, but also relevant to NEPA, per the

law itself, CEQ guidance, and agency implementing regulations. Thus NRC should have

adequately addressed such risks in its DEIS, but has utterly failed to do so.

This rapid cooling and sudden pressurization sequence can cause a radioactive disaster.72

There have been several historical precursor sequences showing that abrupt temperature and

pressure changes do occur at operating nuclear power plants.73

One of the Point Beach units is officially regarded as the most embrittled reactor still

operating in the United States. Of the six most embrittled nuclear reactors in the U.S., one is

already closed, four more are slated to close by 2024, and only Point Beach plans to continue

operations beyond 2024 - and that is until 2053. (NRC acknowledged in April 2013 that Point

Beach Unit 2, and Palisades, are tied for worst embrittled reactor pressure vessels in the country.

See point number four, on page 5 of 15 on the PDF counter, of the following document:

Giessner, J., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.,

"Summary of the March 19, 2013, Public Meeting Webinar Regarding Palisades Nuclear Plant,"

71Id. at 7.4.5.

72Id. at 7.5.2.

73Id. at 7.5.4. See also Gundersen Declaration ¶¶ 7.5.4.1 and 7.5.4.2.

-!25-dated April 18, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13108A336).)

Thus, once Palisades shuts down by May 31, 2022, Point Beach Unit 2 will be the single

worst embrittled reactor pressure vessel in the U.S. The other three worst embrittled reactor

pressure vessels in the U.S. include Indian Point Unit 3 (permanently closed in April 2021), a

unit at Beaver Valley in Pennsylvania, and a unit at Diablo Canyon in California (scheduled to

close for good by 2024-2025 at the latest). Point Beach Unit 2s sister reactor, Unit 1, also raises

serious embrittlement concerns, of course.

The NRCs approach to increasing neutron embrittlement has been to develop new

operator administrative controls. These administrative controls are requirements that the atomic

reactor operators at Point Beach must implement during a reactor emergency to avoid cracking

the 8-inch thick steel atomic power reactor vessel.74 These administrative controls require the

reactor operators to raise the reactor's temperature before increasing the pressure, and unless the

operators implement these controls perfectly, the reactor vessel will experience cracking.75

To measure embrittlement, when the Point Beach reactor vessels were manufactured,

identical metallic coupons, also called capsules, were manufactured as well and were installed in

the Point Beach reactors when the reactors were built.76 Since Point Beach was designed and

anticipated to operate for only 40 years, only 40 years worth of coupon samples were installed in

the reactors. Now there are not enough sample coupons to remove from the reactor and test for

74Id. at 7.6.1.

75Id. at 7.6.1.1.

76Id. at 7.7.1.

-!26-embrittlement during the 60-year period of operations, let alone for an additional 20 more years

out to 80 years, as NextEra seeks to do.77 PBNP is storing two capsules in the spent fuel storage

pool at the reactor site, one from each unit.78 They were removed from the reactors in 1994 and

1997, respectively and have apparently not been tested. Testing now, 25 years after removal, will

provide no useful data as to current embrittlement conditions. In addition, each reactor still

contains a Capsule N inside the two reactor units, noted as being held on standby.79 PBNP

has not announced when it will remove or test either one, if ever.

Instead of performing metallurgical tests on the coupons/capsules, the NRC has instead

modified its calculations to allow aging, embrittled nuclear power reactors to continue to operate

well past their lifespans and certainly into risky uncharted territory.80

Even though neutron embrittlement of the Point Beach reactors presents a clear and

present danger one that will worsen even more significantly over the course of 80 years of

operations the NRC and Point Beach have relied upon error-prone analytical calculations

rather than use all the tools available to identify just how serious the embrittlement treatment has

become as Point Beach ages. Mr. Gundersens review of the publicly available files in the

NRCs ADAMS database indicates that the NRC has granted waivers for each of the four most

embrittled reactors still operating (as mentioned above, Indian Point 3 closed earlier this year) to

77Id. at 7.7.2.

78Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Subsequent License Renewal Application (Public

Version), November 2020 (ML20329A247), p. 1208/1528 of.pdf.

79Id.

80Gundersen Declaration ¶ 7.7.3.

-!27-avoid testing their actual embrittlement through the measurement of their actual metallurgical

coupons. At Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, the NRC has allowed the unit to avoid testing any

coupon samples for almost two decades, and at Palisades, Indian Point (since closed in April

2021), and Point Beach, he could find no record of coupon samples being tested for at least ten

years.81 The NRC did not require that when the Yankee Rowe reactor in western Massachusetts

was completely dismantled in 1992, the reactor vessel was not tested to determine how

significant its embrittlement was.82

Mr. Gundersen concluded in his NRC ASLB proceeding expert witness testimony:

As the US nuclear fleet ages, the NRC has systematically removed conservative calculational aspects of the embrittlement process to allow continued operation. The NRC has not incorporated the actual data from coupons in the remaining five worst atomic power reactors in the U.S. to be used for the embrittlement analysis applied to NextEras Point Beach reactors to allow their continued operation. Instead of evaluating Point Beachs specific metallurgy, the NRC has allowed Point Beach and its cohorts to use analytical techniques that ignore the data from sample coupons it could readily test.

Additionally, there is no scientific basis by which the Point Beach reactors should continue operating unless there is a complete physical analysis of the coupons from its reactors and the five other reactors that are its embrittled cohorts.83 Therefore, I conclude that Point Beachs continued operation violates 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, Criterion 14.84

Criterion 14 requires that [t]he reactor coolant pressure boundary shall be designed,

fabricated, erected, and tested so as to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, of

rapidly propagating failure, and of gross rupture.

81Id. at 7.8.1.

82Id.

83Id. at 7.8.2.

84Id. at 7.8.3.

-!28-As previously mentioned in this comment, such gross safety risks and violations are

relevant under NEPA, due to the inextricably interlinked LARGE negative impacts on human

health, the environment, and the economy that would result, if reactor pressure vessel

embrittlement at Point Beach results in a through-wall crack, resulting in catastrophic releases of

hazardous radioactivity. Thus, this should be adequately addressed in NRCs DEIS, but has not

been.

Mr. Gundersen offered this further professional conclusion in his NRC ASLB proceeding

expert witness declaration:

During the last 50 years of operation, Point Beach has failed to develop an adequate coupon program to physically test the integrity of the RPV [reactor pressure vessel] for PB's operational life. As defined in Appendix A Criterion 14, testing obviously does not include analytical techniques prone to error. There is inadequate coupon data specific to PB to justify its continued operation beyond its 50th year, let alone until it reaches 80. PB has been violating GDC 1485 by not testing coupons, and relying on analytical handwaving instead!86

The NRC already knows the PB reactor vessel to be the most embrittled vessel in

the nation, as previously noted above. PB was not designed and fabricated to have an

extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, of rapidly propagating failure, and of

gross rupture. Thus the NRCs acknowledgment proves that the Point Beach reactors fail

to meet Criterion 14.

This unaddressed safety risk in the NRC ASLB proceeding, has now gone

unaddressed in NRCs DEIS. This is a violation of NEPA, CEQ guidance, and agency

85General Design Criterion 14, supra.

86Id. at 7.8.4.

-!29-implementing regulations.

C. Materiality to Findings/Relevance to DEIS

The NRC license renewal safety review focuses on potential detrimental effects of aging

that ongoing regulatory oversight programs do not routinely address. If an aging-related issue is

adequately dealt with by regulatory processes on an ongoing basis, it will not warrant review at

the time of a license renewal application.87 The evidence strongly suggests that embrittlement at

Point Beach has not been adequately dealt with by regulatory processes, hence it warrants

review in this subsequent license extension proceeding.

As mentioned previously in this comment, safety risks are also environmental risks, and

thus relevant to NRCs DEIS. NRC has failed to adequately address this LARGE, negative,

potentially catastrophic environmental risk in the DEIS.

The NRC-commissioned, Sandia National Lab-conducted CRAC-II analysis emphasizes

this point. CRAC-II is both a computer code (titled Calculation of Reactor Accident

Consequences) and the 1982 report of the simulation results performed by Sandia National

Laboratories for the NRC. The report is sometimes referred to as the CRAC-II report because it

is the computer program used in the calculations, but the report is also known as the 1982 Sandia

Siting Study or as NUREG/CR-2239.

CRAC-IIs figures, for casualties and property damage, at Point Beach due to a reactor

meltdown catastrophe (as due to PTS resulting from RPV embrittlement), are shocking. If a

87PPL Susquehanna, LLC (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-07-4, 65 NRC

281, 307-09 (2007).

-!30-meltdown at one unit leads to a domino-effect meltdown at the second unit, casualties and

property damage could be expected to double in severity. Such a domino-effect, multiple reactor

meltdown took place at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan, beginning in mid-March, 2011, of course.

The fallout, to health, environment, and economy, continues still, more than a decade later.

Tellingly, the Japanese government and nuclear power industry chose to shutdown that countrys

worst embrittled reactor Genkai Unit 1 in the aftermath of Fukushima, when a capsule pull

there revealed that embrittlement was significantly worse than optimistic hypotheses had

predicted. NRC would be wise to apply such lessons learned at Point Beach, and shut it down,

rather than approve an extreme license extension out to 80 years of operations.

CRAC-II reported that a meltdown at one unit at Point Beach would result in up to 2,000

peak early fatalities (acute radiation poisoning deaths), 9,000 peak early radiation injuries, and

7,000 peak cancer deaths (latent cancer fatalities). Again, a meltdown at one unit then causing a

meltdown at the second unit could be expected to double such casualties.

In terms of property damage, CRAC-II reported that a meltdown at a single Point Beach

unit would result in $41.4 billion in property damage, as expressed in 1982 dollar figures.

Adjusting for inflation alone, the figure would surmount $112.5 billion, as expressed in 2021

dollar figures.

But these figures can be considered significant underestimates. Associated Press

investigative reporter Jeff Donn, in his 2011 four-part series entitled Aging Nukes, reported

that populations have soared since 1982 around nuclear power plants like Point Beach. (See the

entire series, posted online here: <https://www.ap.org/press-releases/2012/aging-nukes-a-four-

-!31-part-investigative-series-by-jeff-donn>.) Thus, deaths and injuries from a meltdown at one or

both reactors at Point Beach would now be much worse, in terms of numbers of people thus

impacted, than even the shocking figures reported by CRAC-II in 1982. Tellingly, Donns top

example of high-risk NRC regulatory retreat at Aging Nukes was in regards to the weakening

of reactor pressure vessel embrittlement safety standards, given the ever worsening age-related

degradation problem.

Similar to casualty rates, CRAC-II, published in 1982, does not account for economic

development in the past four decades. Thus, property damage from a meltdown at one or both

Point Beach reactors would now be much worse than the $112.5 to $225 billion figure (when

adjusted for inflation from 1982 to 2021 dollar figures) reported by CRAC-II.

Clearly, a safety risk at Point Beach that could kill or injure many tens of thousands of

residents downwind, downstream, up the food chain, and down the generations (certain

radioactive isotopes remain hazardous for at least a million years, as the US EPA acknowledged

in its court-ordered rewrite of Yucca Mountain regulations in 2008), is also an environmental

risk. It should be rigorously addressed by NRC in the DEIS. NRC has utterly failed to do so

adequately, a violation of NEPA law, CEQ guidance, and agency implementation regulations.

The Commission has concluded that the only issue where the regulatory process may

not maintain a plants current licensing basis involves the potential detrimental effects of

aging on the functionality of certain systems, structures, and components in the period of

-!32-extended operation.88 The scope of a safety review for license renewal is thus limited to (1)

managing the effects of aging of certain systems, structures, and components (SSCs)89 with the

aim being to provide reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the renewed license

will continue to be conducted in accordance with the CLB;90 (2) review of time-limited aging

evaluations; and (3) any matters for which the Commission itself has waived the application of

88Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station),

CLI-10-14, 71 NRC 449, 454 (2010).

8910 CFR § 54.29(a)(1).

9010 CFR § 54.3(a) defines current licensing basis (CLB) as the set of NRC requirements

applicable to a specific plant and a licensee's written commitments for ensuring compliance with and

operation within applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis (including all

modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the license) that are docketed and in

effect. The CLB includes the NRC regulations contained in 10 CFR parts 2, 19, 20, 21, 26, 30, 40, 50, 51,

52, 54, 55, 70, 72, 73, 100 and appendices thereto; orders; license conditions; exemptions; and technical

specifications. It also includes the plant-specific design-basis information defined in 10 CFR 50.2 as

documented in the most recent final safety analysis report (FSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71 and the

licensee's commitments remaining in effect that were made in docketed licensing correspondence such as

licensee responses to NRC bulletins, generic letters, and enforcement actions, as well as licensee

commitments documented in NRC safety evaluations or licensee event reports.

-!33-these rules.91 Three general categories of SSCs fall within the initial focus of license renewal

review as outlined in 10 CFR § 54.4.92 And 10 CFR § 54.21 provides standards for license

renewal applicants to determine which of the components within the three general categories

defined in § 54.4 require aging management review.93 With respect to each structure, system, or

component requiring aging management review, a license renewal applicant must demonstrate

that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended function(s) [as defined

in § 54.4] will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended operation.94

While some SSCs perform more than one function, the license renewal application is only

required to provide reasonable assurance that SSCs will perform such that the intended

functions, as delineated in §54.4, are maintained consistent with the CLB.95

Additionally, SSCs subject to an aging management review perform an intended function

in a passive fashion (without moving parts or without a change in configuration or

91Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power

Station), LBP-08-22, 68 NRC 590, 598-600 (2008); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point Nuclear

Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 152 (2001); Entergy Nuclear Generation Co.

And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64 NRC 257, 276,

277 (2006).

92 Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power

Station), CLI-10-14, 71 NRC 449, 456 (2010).

93Id.

94Id. (quoting 10 C.F.R. 54.21(a)(3)).

95Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., supra at 71 NRC 456.

-!34-properties96) and are not already subject to replacement based on a qualified life or specified

time period.

NextEra must demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that

the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended

operation.97 The evidence shows that the capacity for the PBNP reactor vessels to become

embrittled unmistakably exists, but that the reactor coolant pressure boundary has not been

tested so as to have an extremely low probability of abnormal leakage, of rapidly propagating

failure, and of gross rupture for perhaps more than 20 years, and that both Point Beach reactors

contain a coupon/capsule that might shed relevant light on whether the two units should be given

consideration for licensure beyond 2030 and 2033, respectively.

Notably, 10 CFR § 54.4 considers plant systems, structures, and components within the

scope of Part 54 to include SSCs that are relied upon to remain functional during and following

design-basis events... to ensure... [t]he integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary;

... [t]he capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or

... [t]he capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in

potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to in § 50.34(a)(1), § 50.67(b)(2), or §

100.11 of this chapter, as applicable.98 The embrittled Point Beach reactor vessels are thus SSCs

requiring the utmost attention to ascertain detrimental effects of aging on the functionality

96Id.

97Id.

9810 CFR § 54.4(a) (1)(i-iii).

-!35-of certain systems, structures, and components in the period of extended operation.99 Since

NextEra cannot make such a showing, the subsequent license extension application should have

been denied by the ASLB in the intervention proceeding. Petitioner PSR WI had depicted a

compelling issue of fact with the license extension application, in great detail, backed by a

nationally and even internationally renowned expert witness, and this contention should have

been admitted for hearing. Instead, NextEra and NRC staff attacked the contention, and the

ASLB rejected it outright, denying even a hearing on the merits. NRC staff s utterly inadequate

treatment of reactor pressure vessel embrittlement risks at Point Beach, in the DEIS, continues

and compounds such prior errors, further violation NEPA law itself, CEQ guidance, and agency

implementing regulations.

Comment 3: The PBNP Environmental Report, as well as the NRC DEIS, utterly fail to adequately evaluate the full potential for renewable energy sources, such as solar electric power (photovoltaics) to offset the loss of energy production from PBNP, and to make the requested license renewal action from 2030 to 2053 unnecessary.

Violating 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iii) and 10 CFR § 51.45, the PBNP Environmental

Report treated all of the alternatives to license renewal as unreasonable except for new nuclear

and the combination of natural gas combined cycle and 25MW of on-site solar, and does not

provide a substantial analysis of the potential for significant alternatives, such as widespread

solar power plus storage in the Region of Interest for the requested relicensing period of 2030 to

2053. The scope of the ER (which, we feared, would also occur in the DEIS) was improperly

99Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., supra at 454.

-!36-narrow. The intrinsic need for PBNP to be available to provide power during the period of

subsequent license extension is weak and eroding by the day, in light of continuing positive

developments in the growth of solar power.

Our fears were borne out, when NRC staff utterly failed to adequately address the great

potential for renewables to replace Point Beach nuclear plant by the end of 60 years of operations

(that is, by 2033), let alone by the end of 80 years of operations (that is, by 2053).

NextEra postulated only two alternatives: either renew the PBNP operating licenses for

20 more years, or close the plant (the no-action alternative). The no-action scenario, then, called

for identifying replacement power sources for the loss of PBNP generation.100 According to

NextEra, only three alternatives were deemed reasonable enough to be worthy of

consideration:

Option 1: ALWR with mechanical draft cooling towers located at the PBN site.

Option 2: Cluster of small modular reactors (SMRs) with mechanical draft cooling towers

located at the PBN site.

Option 3: A Combination Alternative involving a configuration of natural gas

combined cycle units with mechanical draft cooling towers located at the PBN site and

expansion of the Point Beach solar facility using the identified alternative array location.101

NRC staff have continued and compounded such errors violations of NEPA law, CEQ

guidance, and agency implementation regulations in the DEIS.

100ER at 7.1.

101ER at 7.2.1.

-!37-In its ER, NextEra rejected all three alternatives as unable to competitively replace PBNP.

It was Petitioner PSR WIs position in the NRC ASLB proceeding, however, that the

consideration by NextEra of an ALWR plant and creation of an SMR farm were chimeras that

NextEra should have fully realized are economic impossibilities. NextEras refusal to recognize

the considerable genuine prospects for solar photovoltaic replacement power is astounding, given

the firms solar expansion investments in multiple states, including some nearby Midwestern

locations.

Sadly and most unfortunately, NRC staff have compounded and continued such errors

and violations in the DEIS.

The 2013 Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of

Nuclear Plants contemplates a discussion of alternatives in the applicant ER, and hence the

agency DEIS, that covers replacement power if PBNP were to have its licenses terminated in a

decade. There are firm expectations:

The following sections describe alternatives identified by the NRC as capable of meeting the purpose and need of the proposed action (license renewal) or replacing the power generated by a nuclear power plant. A reasonable alternative must be commercially viable on a utility scale and operational prior to the expiration of the reactor s operating license, or expected to become commercially viable on a utility scale and operational prior to the expiration of the reactor s operating license. As technologies improve, the NRC expects that some alternatives not currently viable may become viable at some time in the future. The NRC will make that determination during plant-specific license renewal reviews. The amount of replacement power generated must equal the baseload capacity previously supplied by the nuclear plant and reliably operate at or near the nuclear plants demonstrated capacity factor.102

As PSR WI showed during the NRC ASLB proceeding, the Petitioner met that standard

102GEIS, NUREG-1437 (2013) at 2.3.

-!38-in its presentation. However, NextEra and NRC staff attacked it, and the ASLB itself rejected the

contention, not even granting a hearing on the merits. NRC staff cannot now compound and

continue such errors and violations in the DEIS.

A. Within the Scope/Relevant

The scope of the environmental review is defined by 10 C.F.R. Part 51, the NRCs

Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-

1437 (May 1996), and Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of

Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-1437, Vols. 1 & 3, Rev. 1 (June 2013) (GEIS). It is also

defined by NEPA law, CEQ guidance, and NRC implementation regulations, as stated previously.

As the immediately above quotation suggests, this comment is well within the scope of this

subsequent license renewal (SLR) DEIS public comment proceeding, just as PSR WIs related

contention was within the scope of the SLR NRC ASLB proceeding, and should have been

granted a hearing on the merits, but inexplicably and unjustly was not.

This comment, as with the related earlier contention on which it is based, is material to

the findings NRC must make103 because its determination would make a difference in the

outcome of the proceeding.104 This means that there should be some significant link between

the claimed deficiency and either the health and safety of the public or the environment.105

10310 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iv).

104Rules for Practice for Domestic Licensing ProceedingsProcedural Changes in the Hearing

Process, 54 Fed. Red. 33,168, 33,172 (Aug. 11, 1989).

105Vermont Yankee, 60 NRC 548, 557 (2004).

-!39-B. Concise Statement of Facts

In the NRC ASLB licensing proceeding, Petitioner PSR WI provided expert reports from

two witnesses in support of its contention related to this comment, Dr. Alvin Compaan, a

physicist with considerable solar power expertise, and Dr. Mark Cooper, an expert in utility

economics. Dr. Compaan destroyed NextEras hollow discounting of solar photovoltaic, while

Dr. Cooper wrecked the notion, not just of ALWR or SMR replacement power generation, but of

any alleged economic justification for the continued operation of PBNP today through the early

2030s, let alone the early 2050s. However, NextEra and NRC staff attacked the contention, and

the experts declarations. The ASLB sided with such attacks, rejecting a hearing on the merits.

Such errors and violations this time of NEPA law, CEQ guidance, and NRC implementing

regulations should not and cannot be repeated by NRC staff at this DEIS stage.

1. Dr. Alvin Compaan on the photovoltaic alternative

Dr. Alvin Compaan resides in the Toledo, Ohio metropolitan area.106 He holds a Ph.D. in

Physics from the University of Chicago and is a Professor Emeritus of Physics from the

University of Toledo. He currently is President of Lucintech Inc., a research and development

company with numerous patents in photovoltaics technology and thin-film neutron detectors. Dr.

Compaan has extensive academic and practical experience in photovoltaic solar power and its

commercial applications, both land-based and aerospace-based. He has been active in educating

the public through TEDx and similar talks and through scientific presentations across the nation,

around the State of Ohio, and to the Ohio legislature. Dr. Compaan is the inventor of 12 patents

106Declaration of Alvin Compaan (Compaan Declaration) ¶ 1.

-!40-in the area of solar and nuclear detectors and has authored more than 270 publications in refereed

professional journals and conference proceedings. Between 1987 and 2009 at the University of

Toledo he was the principal advisor to 20 Ph.D. and M.S. students and 13 postdoctoral fellows.

Dr. Compaans curriculum vitae was attached as Exhibit 7 to his Declaration in the NRC ASLB

licensing proceeding, and both the CV and Declaration are again attached to this comment on the

DEIS.

Dr. Compaan contends that the NextEra Point Beach (NEPB) Environmental Report (ER)

fails to adequately evaluate the full potential for renewable energy sources, such as solar electric

power or photovoltaics (hereinafter solar power), to offset the loss of energy production from

NEPB, and to make the requested license renewal action from 2030 to 2053 unnecessary.

Calling PBNPs ER discussion of the solar power alternative hollow, cursory, and often

out-of-date,107 Dr. Compaan exposed in his Declaration how NextEra has grossly failed to

adequately assess the solar option. NRC staff have made similar to identical errors, and

committed similar to identical violations, in its DEIS on this same point.

Dr. Compaan agrees with NextEra the array of solar panels needed to replace the power

from Point Beach would of necessity occupy 65.7 square miles,108 but articulates a realistic

vision as to how that will occur pretty painlessly.

Using a National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) computational tool called

SLOPE, Dr. Compaan calculated that there are thousands of available rooftops which are

107Compaan Declaration ¶ 4.

108Id. at ¶ 17.

-!41-oriented properly and free of shading and other obstructions to serve as suitable locations for

solar rooftop installations. He found that the State of Wisconsin has residential rooftops capable

of providing suitable space for average generation (over 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />) of 1,382 MWe of solar electric

(total annual energy generation of 12,111,240 MWh).109 He identifies commercial rooftop space

suitable for solar panels that could deliver average generation of 1,760 MW (total annual energy

generation of 15,415,280 MWh).110 Dr. Compaan showed that the NREL/SLOPE tool shows

that residential and commercial solar - and at that, either residential rooftops alone or

commercial rooftops alone -- could host solar panels sufficient to cover all of the yearly

electricity energy output of the PBNPs 1,200 MWe (full year of 8,760 hours0.0088 days <br />0.211 hours <br />0.00126 weeks <br />2.8918e-4 months <br /> and total electric

energy of 10,512,000 MWh.).111

Dr. Compaan also found that the federal farmland Conservation Reserve Program has

nearly 100,000 enrolled acres, which if solarized completely would result in more than 18,000

MWe of solar generation power three (3) times the annual energy output of PBNP. 112 Dr.

Compaan pointed out that realistically, solar will be deployed in a mix of locations, from

conventional solar farms to high voltage power line transmission easements, awnings, parking lot

canopies, landfills, brownfields, and on highway rights-of-way, as well as rooftop installations

and installations on Conservation Reserve land. 113

109Id. at 21.

110Id.

111Id.

112Id. at ¶ 22.

113Id. at ¶ 24.

-!42-His testimony further showed that solar is low cost and available, that the supply of

modules is growing rapidly and the cost of solar power has been falling dramatically so that

today solar power is the lowest cost electricity in many regions of the U.S. and internationally,

even when compared to the cost of established nuclear power.

He found that solar is suited to Wisconsin and particularly within PBNPs distribution

territory because solar availability in Wisconsin is comparable to that of northern California.

Respecting the intermittency of solar, Dr. Compaan wrote about battery storage, since the

technology of large-scale batteries for electricity energy storage has been improving rapidly and

the costs have been dropping quickly. He pointed out in his report the brand-new Florida Power

& Light (FPL) solar-charged battery storage project, believed to be the worlds biggest. FPL is a

subsidiary of NextEra Energy; the plant will be 409MWe/900MWh in Manatee County,

Florida.114

Dr. Compaan found that with recent advances in battery storage technology, increasing

manufacturing scale, and reductions in costs, battery energy storage is a very viable option to

combine with solar to provide a durable and reliable solution to the limited capacity factor of

solar.115

Dr. Compaan explained that the solar + storage approach is scalable and adaptable

because the delivery of solar power closely follows the time-of-day demand curve, which can

mitigate some of the need for baseload power. He observes that even baseload nuclear plants

114Id. at ¶ 29.

115Id. at ¶ 30.

-!43-are not available 100% of the time, and that the utility grid must be able to fill in for the periods

when refueling and other outages occur and nuclear power is not available, sometimes for many

weeks.116 Moreover, he stated that nuclear plants are unable to follow the demand curve of usage

which typically peaks in the daytime and is very low at night.117 Dr. Compaan illustrated that the

inclusion of large scale wind and solar power into the California grid tends to offset the need for

large baseload plants to provide peak power at the highest-demand times of day.118 Dr.

Compaan opined that as the amount of solar and wind increase, this minimum demand could go

all the way to zero so that no baseload power would be required in the middle of the day, for

some days....119 He points out that there is too much thermal energy stored in a 600 MW

energy generation facility to dial back the steam generation so quickly. So it is quite possible that

by 2030 a 1200 MW supply of baseload power to replace PB Nuclear may be entirely

superfluous.120

Dr. Compaan showed that solar power has minimal environmental impacts even when

compared with existing nuclear plants. His survey of the scientific literature showed that the best

estimate of greenhouse gas emissions from already-constructed nuclear power plants is 66 grams

of CO2 equivalent per kWh, mostly from mining, milling, enrichment, waste management and

disposal, and decommissioning. While solar power causes some emissions during manufacture,

116Id. at ¶¶ 25-26.

117Id. at 31.

118Id. at 33 (discussing Compaan Exh. 6).

119Id.

120Id.

-!44-mining, milling and purification, there are no emissions during power generation.121 Dr.

Compaan found that crystalline silicon wafer-based solar modules had greenhouse gas emissions

of 50g of CO2-equivalent and thin-film cadmium telluride modules had only 20g of CO2-

equivalent emissions per kWh, and that because since 2008, the average manufactured module

efficiencies have increased by about 20%, the emissions per kWh are estimated for solar as

ranging from 16 to 40 grams of CO2-equivalent, well below that of nuclear power.122

Dr. Compaan decisively layed out the case for the ongoing photovoltaic revolution:

[O]ver the last decade technological advancements, manufacturing growth, deployment experience, and rapidly dropping prices have all established solar photovoltaics and battery storage as the most attractive technologies for grid power in Wisconsin. Not only does solar plus battery storage have compelling economic advantages today, solar plus battery storage has the lowest environmental footprint of any technology. It can power todays modern grid with the flexible and nimble response times that are demanded from a modern grid where voltage and frequency stability are of utmost importance. For these reasons and all the other environmental issues presented in the preceding discussion, we contend that the 20-year subsequent operating license renewals for the Point Beach Nuclear Plant units 1 and 2 should be denied.123

Just as Dr. Compaans cutting edge insights should have been given the time of day in the

NRC ASLB licensing proceeding (but inexplicably and unjustifiably were not), they should be

given a rigorously adequate hard look by NRC staff in this DEIS, per NEPA law, CEQ

guidance, and agency implementing regulations.

121Id. at ¶ 35.

122Id.

123Id. at ¶ 37.

-!45-

2. Dr. Mark Cooper on Baseload Myopia

Dr. Mark Cooper is a Senior Fellow for Economic Analysis at the Institute for Energy and

the Environment at Vermont Law School. He holds a Ph.D. from Yale University. He is also

Director of Research at the Consumer Federation of America, where he served for two decades

as Director of Energy. He has testified over 400 times on energy and telecommunications issues

at federal and state regulatory and legislative bodies in over forty jurisdictions in the U.S. and

Canada. His curriculum vitae was attached to his Declaration as MNC-1 in the NRC ASLB

proceeding, and are attached again to these comments on the DEIS.124

Dr. Cooper asserted that Nuclear power is far too costly to include in a 21st century

electricity system based on efficiency, distributed and renewable resources that deliver lower cost

and much less pollution while effectively decarbonizing the sector.125 According to him,

Wisconsin is underperforming in efficiency and renewables. Under the purchased power

agreement [between PBNP and We Power], I estimate that compared to 21st century alternatives,

ratepayers will bear unnecessary charges of about $5 billion.126 The reason, he said, is:

Once the direction of a least-cost route to a decarbonized economy is set by the superiority of renewables, it becomes impossible for nuclear power to participate in the ultimate portfolio. The idea of pursuing an all-of-the-above scenario runs afoul of the fundamental differences between the 20th-century baseload fossil fuel approach and 21st-century renewable energy approach. The two technologies simply do not mix well because nuclear is not flexible. The vigorous attack on renewables launched by advocates of nuclear power in an effort to secure favorable treatment of aging reactors is testimony

124The Declaration of Mark Cooper, Ph.D. (Cooper Declaration) was filed with the PSR WI

Petition in the NRC ASLB licensing proceeding, and is attached to these comments as well.

125Cooper Declaration at 3.

126Id.

-!46-to the incompatibility between the two...127

The large and inflexible performance of nuclear reactors, old or new, Dr. Cooper said,

makes them a burden, not a benefit in the 21st century system.128 Noting the basic economic

evidence of the prospective superiority of the alternatives, the professor commented that the

great threat of maintaining the output of nuclear reactors is the obstacle they present to the

development of the alternative. The longer they continue their massive, inflexible output with

uneconomic subsidies, such as the Point Beach Purchased Power Agreement and/or unjustified

preference in dispatch, the more difficult it is for the alternatives to take root and achieve their

potential.129

Dr. Cooper accused NextEra of being afflicted with baseload myopia en route to

determining that lead time necessary to ensure the operation of a 21st century system is more

than adequate between now and 2030 (for Point Beach Unit 1) and 2033 (for Point Beach Unit

2), not to mention the two decades of operation during the license extension.130 (Emphasis

added).

The expert laid out significant long-term economic trends that are eviscerating nuclear

power as an option: [T]he costs of solar and batteries are projected to decline about 5 percent

per year in the 30 years from 2000 to 2030. The cost of wind is estimated to decline by over 2

127Id.

128Id.

129Id. at 4-5.

130Id. at 5.

-!47-percent per year for the 50-years between 1980 and 2030. In contrast, the cost of nuclear power

has increased by almost 3 percent per year over that same, 50-year period.131 On this

foundation, he broke more bad economic news for the nuclear industry, that the technologies of

grid management, information, computer capacity, and advanced control technologies have made

it possible to manage and integrate demand, matching it more closely with supply with much

greater precision. This has directly lowered the costs of the system, but it has also yielded a

transformation dividend, a reduction in the size of the system needed to meet demand.132

Further, the link between electricity consumption and economic growth has been broken.133

There is now an inverse relationship between GDP growth and electrical consumption, where

electricity consumption per unit of GDP growth has been declining recently.134

Just as NextEras ER was blind to such facts and truths, NRCs DEIS is as well. This

cannot stand.

Noting the suggestion of using Small Modular Reactors as a replacement for baseload

power from PBNP, Dr. Cooper said Promises that a new generation of small modular nuclear

technologies will do better are doubtful at best. They will be much more expensive than the

alternatives already available and take decades to deploy. Their costs will likely create pressures

to demand priority in dispatch, which frustrates flexibility. They leave serious doubts about

131Id. at 6.

132Id.

133Id. at 7.

134Id. at 7.

-!48-security and pollution. Dr. Cooper described a nightmare scenario with SMRs.135 According

to him, Nuclear power should be held to strict economic standards, without any subsidies. If it

cannot compete on cost, it cannot be part of the 21st century energy sector.

Dr. Cooper s review of relevant literature supported the notion that difficulties in the

integration of distributed supply and actively managed demand are quite small has become

mainstream thinking and is reflected in U.S. DOE analysis. DOEs Wind Vision analysis argues

that wind generation variability has a minimal and manageable impact on grid reliability and

related costs. DOE believes that operational challenges arising from much higher levels of wind

power construction can be easily overcome by expanding the use of tried techniques such as

increased system flexibility, greater electric system coordination, faster dispatch schedules,

135Id. at 22-23: Hyped as the dream solution, [SMRs] turn into a nightmare. Small modular

reactors that have been on the drawing board for at least a decade exhibit all of the characteristics of

failure. Like the nuclear renaissance before it, the initial estimates of cost have doubled before they go

into construction and cost overruns really only begin when construction does. While they can find

companies to back them and governments to support them, and academics to explain the theory of why

they should work, the one thing they cannot do is deliver low cost power.

While they claim to be safer than large units, they achieve that goal not by solving safety

problems, but by being excused from safety rules (like exclusion zones). While they are low in carbon

emissions during operation, they suffer from the problem that, even if the production of small units will

be possible in the future, they will arrive long after the battle against climate change is lost. While they

are small, they still need must run status and large numbers of units shipped in order to lower their cost.

Small modular reactors are likely to be between three and five times as costly as the already available

technologies to build a low cost, low carbon, low pollution electricity sector.

-!49-improved forecasting, demand response, greater power plant cycling, and in some cases, storage

options.136 He thinks that the prospect of achieving reliability that equals or exceeds current

levels with the alternative approach is increasingly seen as quite good.137

Dr. Cooper sees the confrontation between large baseload providers such as PBNP and

distributed energy sources as inevitable frontal assaults by nuclear advocates on alternative

resources and the institutions that support them. He warned that responsible policymakers should

reject the all of the above argument because the severely restricted market created by the

forced presence of nuclear power will strangle the ability of non-hydro renewables to expand,

which is likely to drive the market clearing price down, as resources compete for a smaller

market.138

But Dr. Cooper s harshest criticism was for the Purchased Power Agreement keeping

Point Beach afloat:

[T]he purchased power agreement is totally uneconomic. In 2020, the price is

$20/MWh higher than the bundle of alternatives analyzed above. The overcharge mounts steadily to almost $100/MWh through 2030. The average excess is $55/MWh. The cumulative excess cost imposed on ratepayers is almost $5 billion for the period ending in 2030, which works out to over $3,000 per electricity customer, or $300 per year.

With $5 billion and the remaining time between the early-2030s expirations of Point Beach Units 1 and 2, the net expected power generation from the plant during that period could be completely obviated by construction of renewables and implementation of efficiency. Given the current cost of alternatives, the output of Point Beach would cost ratepayers over twice as much as a least cost, low carbon, low pollution approach. Thus, the purchased power agreement for Point Beach imposes enormous excess costs on Point Beach ratepayers and is unconscionable. By 2030 and 2033, but for the PPA, efficiency

136Id. at 14.

137Id.

138Id. at 21.

-!50-and renewable energy sources could have expanded and displaced this myopic baseload power plant. By 2030, Point Beach Units 1 and 2 will be completely redundant and obsolescent.139

In the face of harsh economic realities in the form of a collapsing baseload market and

the onslaught of ever-cheaper photovoltaic solar, the NRCs Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

should have admitted this contention for adjudication, but inexplicably and unjustly did not.

According to 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(iii), the environmental report must contain consideration

of alternatives for reducing adverse impacts, as required by § 51.45( c). (Emphasis added). And

10 CFR § 51.45( c) commands that The environmental report must include an analysis that

considers and balances... alternatives available for reducing or avoiding adverse environmental

effects. Also, 10 C.F.R. §§ 51.53(c)(1) and (2) require the environmental report to discuss in

this report the environmental impacts of alternatives and any other matters described in § 51.45,

bringing § 51.45(c)s command that there be alternatives available for reducing or avoiding

adverse environmental effects into play, again.

Such errors and violations of NEPA law, CEQ guidance, and agency implementing

regulations cannot be allowed to be repeated by NRC staff at this DEIS stage. NRC staff must

take a hard look, per NEPA, at the renewable alternatives, as described by PSR WIs nationally

renowned expert witnesses above and attached.

The NRCs NEPA regulations require that alternatives be presented in comparative

form to aid the Commission in developing and exploring, pursuant to section 102(2)(E) of

NEPA, appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which

139Id. at 24 (Emphasis added).

-!51-involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.140 Agencies

must, to the fullest extent possible, [s]tudy, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to

recommended courses of action in any proposal... 141 There must be examination of every

alternative within the nature and scope of the proposed action,142 sufficient to permit a reasoned

choice.143 NEPA requires a discussion of alternatives that must [r]igorously explore and

objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives.144 The existence of a viable, but unexamined

alternative renders an environmental impact statement inadequate.145

Moreover, agencies must study... significant alternatives suggested by other agencies or

the public....146 Even an alternative which would only partially satisfy the need and purpose

14010 CFR § 51.45(b)(3).

14142 U.S.C. § 4322(2)(E); Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1519-20 (9th

Cir. 1992).

142California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 1982).

143Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 815 (9th Cir. 1987).

144Union Neighbors United, Inc. v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 564, 569 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting 40 C.F.R.

§ 1502.14).

145Idaho Conservation League, supra; Natural Res. Defense Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.

3d 797, 813 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also City of Grapevine v. Dept of

Transp., 17 F.3d 1502, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (agency must consider all feasible or reasonable

alternatives[.]).

146DuBois v. U.S. Dept. of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1286 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct.

1567 (1997).

-!52-of the proposed project must be considered by the agency if it is reasonable,147 because it

might convince the decision-maker to meet part of the goal with less impact.148

It is incumbent on the NRC to not indulge in a self-imposed ignorance, the turning

of a blind eye or actual censure of expert opinion and material fact to define otherwise

reasonable alternatives out of existence. NEPA's requirement for forecasting environmental

consequences far into the future implies the need for predictions based on existing technology

and those developments which can be extrapolated from it.149 As NextEra was not free to favor

bad technical information over legitimate technical information (but was allowed to do so in the

licensing proceeding), NRC staff are not free to do so at this DEIS stage.150

The reasonable alternatives for license renewal proceedings must be feasible technically

and available commercially.151 Solar photovoltaic fulfills all of these criteria. [W]hen a

reasonable alternative has been identified, it must be objectively considered by the evaluating

agency so as not to fall victim to the sort of tendentious decisionmaking that NEPA seeks to

147Natural Resources Defense Council v. Callaway, 524 F.2d 79, 93 (2nd Cir. 1975).

148North Buckhead Civic Assn v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 1542 (11th Cir. 1990).

149Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Vermont Yankee

I), 547 F.2d 633, 637, 6 ELR 20615 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Vermont Yankee

Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 8 ELR 20288 (1978).

150Seattle Audubon Society v. Espy, 998 F.2d 699, 703-04 (9th Cir. 1993) (overturning decision

which rests on stale scientific evidence, incomplete discussion of environmental effects... and false

assumptions).

151Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Indian Point, Units 2 and 3), LBP-08-13, 68 NRC 43, 205

(2008).

-!53-avoid."152

Clearly, a genuine dispute existed between PSR WI and NextEra on multiple issues of

law and fact and this contention should have been admitted for adjudication in the licensing

proceeding, but was instead attacked by NRC staff and rejected by the ASLB. The NRC staff

should not and cannot be allowed to continue and compound such errors and violations of NEPA

law, CEQ guidance, and NRC implementing regulations, at this DEIS stage.

The above comment is relevant to the NRC DEIS Section 2, ALTERNATIVES

INCLUDING THE PROPOSED ACTION, and its subsections, 2.2 Proposed Action, 2.3

Alternatives, specifically 2.3.2 Replacement Power Alternatives, namely 2.4.1 Solar Power, and

2.4.3 Wind Power. And the above comment is relevant to the following sections in the underlying

GEIS: 8. Alternatives to License Renewal, including 8.2 Environmental Impacts of the No-

Action Alternative, 8.3 Environmental Impacts of Alternative Energy Sources, especially 8.3.1

Wind, and 8.3.2 Photovoltaic Cells.

Comment 4: PBNP has an elevated risk of a turbine missile accident owing to the poor

alignment of its major buildings and structures.

The following comment is relevant to the following sections of the underlying GEIS:

much of 5. Environmental Impacts of Postulated Accidents, especially including the entirety of

152Private Fuel Storage, L.L.C. (Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation), LBP-01-34, 54

NRC 293, 302 (2001), citing I-291 Why? Association v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, 253 (D. Conn. 1974),

aff d 517 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1975).

-!54-5.2 Plant Accidents, 5.3 Accident Risk and Impact Assessment for License Renewal Period, and

5.4 Severe Accident Mitigation Design Alternatives (SAMDAs).

As mentioned above, safety risks have inextricable connections to environmental risks,

and thus are relevant under NEPA, as in this NRC DEIS. This is true here.

Historically, Point Beach and many other early reactors have a turbine hall that is

dangerously aligned relative to the reactor buildings and control rooms. This alignment was

inexpensive and was later determined to be unsafe and is no longer an acceptable design

anywhere in the world.153 The PBNP design is unsafe, because a turbine failure will send 600 lb.

pieces of shrapnel hurtling at 600 mph into the containment, safety-related components, and the

control room.154

Construction of reactors built after Point Beach changed the turbine hall's orientation to

be radially outward from the containment to protect the control room and its operators, the

safety-related components, and the containment from the threat of turbine shrapnel.155 This

realignment of the turbine hall to the radially outward design meant that shrapnel would fly into

the parking lot rather than the safety-related equipment, control room, and containment building

in the event of a turbine failure. 156

Turbine failures are likely events. Fermi 2 in Michigan experienced turbine failure, as

153Gundersen Declaration ¶ 7.3.3.

154Id. at ¶ 7.3.4.

155Id. at ¶ 7.3.5.

156Id. at ¶ 7.3.7.

-!55-have other nuclear plants and airplane jet engines.157

On Christmas Day, December 25, 1993, at Fermi Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, the main

turbine automatically tripped due to an erroneous mechanical overspeed signal caused by high

vibrations. The reactor, which was operating at 93 percent power, received an automatic scram

signal triggered by the turbine trip. The high vibration was caused by catastrophic failure of the

turbine blades.158 Ejected blade parts ripped through the turbine casing and severed condenser

tubes and other piping. The rupture of piping supplying hydrogen gas to the generator for cooling

caused a large fire. The plants fire brigade took 37 minutes to muster, dress, and enter the

turbine building to fight the fire.159 Their efforts were hindered by numerous communication

problems, including malfunctions of personnel motion detectors (e.g., man down alarms160).

About 500,000 gallons of water from broken general service water piping and turbine building

closed cooling water piping flooded the radwaste building basement to a depth of approximately

six feet.

Workers were slow to isolate the systems with broken piping to terminate the flooding,

due to the lack of procedures for a turbine building internal flood.161 The severed condenser

157Id. at ¶ 7.3.8.

158Augmented Inspection Team, FERMI 2 TURBINE GENERATOR FAILURE, December 25,

1993, INSPECTION REPORT NUMBER 50-341/93029(DRS) (2/4/1994) (ML20069J693), pp. 6-8,

10-11, 16-17/72 of.pdf.

159Id., p. 42/72 of.pdf.

160Id., p. 28/72 of.pdf.

161Id.

-!56-tubes permitted water from Lake Erie to flow into the condenser hotwell, from where it was

pumped to the condensate storage tank and thence the standby feedwater system pumped water

from the condensate storage tank to the reactor vessel. The lake water caused conductivity and

chloride levels of the reactor vessel water to significantly exceed specifications.162

Nuclear engineer Gundersen of Fairewinds expert witness for PSR WI in the NRC

ASLB licensing proceeding has reviewed publicly available photos of the PBNP turbine hall

and sees no indication that shielding from turbine missiles has been implemented.163 A search

through the Point Beach Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 Subsequent License Renewal Application

(Public Version), November 2020164 turned up dozens of results respecting aging management to

guard against missiles from fragmented components, but none of them appear to involve steam

turbine shafts or blades. PBNP appears to recognize the possibility of pump shafts breaking up,

but not the large turbines: Missiles can be generated from internal events such as failure of

rotating equipment or external events. Inherent nonsafety-related features that protect safety-

related equipment from internal and external missiles are within the scope of SLR per

10 CFR 54.4(a)(2).165

Mr. Gundersen observed that While PB cannot rotate its entire turbine hall to assure that

a turbine failure does not result in safety-related consequences, there is a solution. To mitigate

the impact of a turbine failure, PB could install an inexpensive Energy Absorbing Turbine

162Id. at p. 34/72 of.pdf.

163Gundersen Declaration ¶ 7.3.9.

164ADAMS ML20329A247.

165Id. at p. 2.1-14 (p. 68/1528 of.pdf).

-!57-Missile Shield, US Patent #4397608A. I conclude that to reduce the risk of damage to safety-

related systems, structures, and components, PB should be required to install an energy-

absorbing turbine missile shield around its turbine.166

The NRC license renewal safety review focuses on potential detrimental effects of aging

that ongoing regulatory oversight programs do not routinely address. If an aging-related issue is

adequately dealt with by regulatory processes on an ongoing basis, it will not warrant review at

the time of a license renewal application.167 The evidence strongly suggests that turbine missiles

at Point Beach have not been adequately dealt with by regulatory processes, hence it warrants

review in this subsequent license extension proceeding.

The Commission has concluded that the only issue where the regulatory process may

not maintain a plants current licensing basis involves the potential detrimental effects of

aging on the functionality of certain systems, structures, and components in the period of

extended operation.168 The scope of a safety review for license renewal is thus limited to (1)

managing the effects of aging of certain systems, structures, and components (SSCs)169 with

the aim being to provide reasonable assurance that the activities authorized by the renewed

166Gundersen Declaration ¶

167PPL Susquehanna, LLC (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 & 2), LBP-07-4, 65

NRC 281, 307-09 (2007).

168Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power

Station), CLI-10-14, 71 NRC 449, 454 (2010).

16910 CFR § 54.29(a)(1).

-!58-license will continue to be conducted in accordance with the CLB;170 (2) review of time-limited

aging evaluations; and (3) any matters for which the Commission itself has waived the

application of these rules.171 Three general categories of SSCs fall within the initial focus of

license renewal review as outlined in 10 CFR § 54.4.172 And 10 CFR § 54.21 provides standards

for license renewal applicants to determine which of the components within the three general

17010 CFR § 54.3(a) defines current licensing basis (CLB) as the set of NRC requirements

applicable to a specific plant and a licensee's written commitments for ensuring compliance with and

operation within applicable NRC requirements and the plant-specific design basis (including all

modifications and additions to such commitments over the life of the license) that are docketed and in

effect. The CLB includes the NRC regulations contained in 10 CFR parts 2, 19, 20, 21, 26, 30, 40, 50, 51,

52, 54, 55, 70, 72, 73, 100 and appendices thereto; orders; license conditions; exemptions; and technical

specifications. It also includes the plant-specific design-basis information defined in 10 CFR 50.2 as

documented in the most recent final safety analysis report (FSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71 and the

licensee's commitments remaining in effect that were made in docketed licensing correspondence such as

licensee responses to NRC bulletins, generic letters, and enforcement actions, as well as licensee

commitments documented in NRC safety evaluations or licensee event reports.

171Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear

Power Station), LBP-08-22, 68 NRC 590, 598-600 (2008); Florida Power & Light Co. (Turkey Point

Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 3 & 4), LBP-01-6, 53 NRC 138, 152 (2001); Entergy Nuclear

Generation Co. And Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), LBP-06-24, 64

NRC 257, 276, 277 (2006).

172 Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power

Station), CLI-10-14, 71 NRC 449, 456 (2010).

-!59-categories defined in § 54.4 require aging management review.173 With respect to each structure,

system, or component requiring aging management review, a license renewal applicant must

demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that the intended

function(s) [as defined in § 54.4] will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of

extended operation.174 While some SSCs perform more than one function, the license renewal

application is only required to provide reasonable assurance that SSCs will perform such that

the intended functions, as delineated in §54.4, are maintained consistent with the CLB.175

Plant systems, structures, and components within the scope of 10 CFR Part 54 are-

(1) Safety-related systems, structures, and components which are those relied upon to remain functional during and following design-basis events (as defined in 10 CFR 50.49 (b)(1)) to ensure the following functions--

(i) The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary; (ii) The capability to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; or (iii) The capability to prevent or mitigate the consequences of accidents which

could result in potential offsite exposures comparable to those referred to in § 50.34(a)

(1), § 50.67(b)(2), or § 100.11 of this chapter, as applicable.176

NextEra must demonstrate that the effects of aging will be adequately managed so that

the intended function(s) will be maintained consistent with the CLB for the period of extended

173Id.

174Id. (quoting 10 C.F.R. 54.21(a)(3)).

175Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., supra at 71 NRC 456.

17610 CFR § 54.4(a)(1).

-!60-operation.177 Cracking and suddenly crumbling turbine blade shrapnel can easily impair or

destroy SSCs from performing in a crisis. Section § 54.4 considers plant systems, structures, and

components within the scope of Part 54 to include SSCs that have [t]he capability to prevent or

mitigate the consequences of accidents which could result in potential offsite exposures

comparable to those referred to in § 50.34(a)(1), § 50.67(b)(2), or § 100.11 of this chapter, as

applicable.178 Since NextEra cannot make a showing that it has mitigated the possibilities of

major damage from a turbine missile event, the current licensing basis may not be sustained. It is

no longer permissible to align turbine halls and critical reactor operations equipment and features

as was done in the late 1960's when PBNP was constructed. NRC ASLB licensing proceeding

Petitioner PSR WI had demonstrated an issue of fact with the license extension application, and

this contention should have been admitted for hearing by the ASLB, but was not.

Such an error, and violation of NEPA law, CEQ guidance, and NRC implementing

regulations, should not and cannot be allowed at this DEIS stage. As was stated above, in the

comments re: reactor pressure vessel embrittlement, safety risks and environmental risks are

inextricably interconnected. If a turbine failure at Point Beach led to a reactor core meltdown, the

catastrophic release of hazardous radioactivity into the environment would have LARGE,

negative impacts on people and property downwind, downstream, up the food chain, and down

the generations for as long as a million years (as mentioned above, US EPA has acknowledged a

million year hazardous persistence associated with irradiated nuclear fuel, the very substance that

177Id.

17810 CFR § 54.4(a) (1)(i-iii).

-!61-would melt down in the reactor core, and escape into the environment during such a catastrophe).

For this reason, NRC staff should take a hard look at the environmental risks of a turbine

failure and turbine missile leading to one or more meltdowns (as via domino-effect multiple

meltdowns on the same nuclear power plant site, as happened at Fukushima Daiichi, Japan) at

Point Beach nuclear power plant. NRC staff have not done so in the DEIS.

Re: Comments 1-4:

As previously mentioned above, the three experts (Arnie Gundersen, Dr. Al Compaan,

and Dr. Mark Cooper) declarations from the NRC ASLB licensing proceeding in 2021, which

form the basis for the four comments above, will be attached to these coalition comments. They

should be incorporated by reference as if rewritten here in their entirety.

Comment 5: Re: Misuse by Misinterpretation and Misrepresentation of 10 CFR 51.53(c)(3)

We the undersigned organizations and individuals also endorse comments filed on December 29,

2021 by Paul Gunter, Director of the Reactor Oversight Project at Beyond Nuclear, re: an error

of law committed by both the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as NextEra.

Beyond Nuclears comments are posted online at < http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/

356082/28492118/1640938822827/12+29+21+20211229_POIN_slra_.bn-cmts_dsgeis.pdf?

token=FdIscMMS8US3i1SVrhM1d7%2FpE1I%3D > and are incorporated into these coalition

comments as if rewritten in their entirety herein.

-!62-Conclusion

The No-Action Alternative should be the preferred alternative. That is, the Point Beach

Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, should be shut down for good. The subsequent license

renewal, out to 80 years of operations, should not be approved. After closure of Point Beach

nuclear power plant, the proposed renewable energy alternatives, namely solar photovoltaic and

wind, can readily provide replacement electricity supply, as spelled out in great detail by the

expert witness reports cited above, and attached.

Thank you for considering our comments.

If you have any questions regarding these coalition comments, please contact: Kevin

Kamps, Radioactive Waste Specialist, Beyond Nuclear, at kevin@beyondnuclear.org, or (240)

462-3216. He can also be written to at: Beyond Nuclear, 7304 Carroll Avenue, #182, Takoma

Park, MD 20912. You can also contact Terry Lodge, attorney in Toledo, OH, who serves as legal

counsel for PSR WI, at tjlodge50@yahoo.com, or (419) 205-7084.

The comments above have been submitted by the following organizations and individuals:

ORGANIZATIONS (in alphabetical order, by organization name)

Alliance for Environmental Strategies Rose Gardner, Co-Founder, Eunice, NM

Ban Michigan Fracking LuAnne Kozma, President, Charlevoix, MI

Beyond Nuclear Kay Drey, President of the Board of Directors, & Kevin Kamps, Radioactive Waste Specialist, Takoma Park, MD

-!63-Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility Dr. Gordon Edwards, President, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

Citizens Awareness Network Deb Katz, Executive Director, Shelburne Falls, MA

Citizens Resistance at Fermi Two (CRAFT)

Jessie Pauline Collins, Co-Chair, and Jesse Deer In Water, Community Organizer, Redford, MI

Coalition for a Nuclear Free Great Lakes Michael J. Keegan, Chairman, Monroe, MI

Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety Joni Arends, Co-Founder and Executive Director, Santa Fe, NM

Council on Intelligent Energy & Conservation Policy (CIEC)

Michel Lee, Chairman, Scarsdale, NY

Dont Waste Arizona Stephen Brittle, President, Phoenix, AZ

Don't Waste Michigan Alice Hirt, Board of Directors, Holland, MI

Heart of America NW Peggy Maze Johnson, Board Member, Seattle, WA

Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc.

Manna Jo Greene, Beacon, NY

Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition Marilyn Elie, Co-Founder, Cortlandt Manor, NY

Lone Tree Council Terry Miller, Chairman, Bay City, MI

Los Angeles Alliance for Survival Jerry Rubin, Director, Santa Monica, CA

Manhattan Project for a Nuclear-Free World Mari Inoue, Esq., Co-Founding Member, New York, NY

-!64-Michigan Safe Energy Future Iris Potter, Coordinator, Kalamazoo, MI

Mid-Missouri Peaceworks Mark Haim, Columbia, MO

Native Community Action Council Ian Zabarte, Secretary, Las Vegas, NV

Northern Michigan Environmental Action Council (NMEAC)

Ann Rogers, Chair, Traverse City, MI

Nuclear Energy Information Service Dave Kraft, Director, Chicago, IL

Nuclear-Free World Committee of the Dallas Peace and Justice Center Mavis Belisle, Co-Chair, Dallas, TX

Nuclear Information and Resource Service Diane DArrigo, Radioactive Waste Project Director, Takoma Park, MD

Nuclear Watch South Glenn Carroll, Coordinator, Atlanta, GA

Nukewatch Kelly Lundeen and John LaForge, Co-Directors, Luck, WI

On Behalf Of Planet Earth Sheila Parks, EdD, Founder, Watertown, MA

Peace Action Maine Martha Spiess, Chair, Portland, ME

Peace Action WI Pamela Richard, Of"ce Manager, Milwaukee, WI

Peace Farm Lon Burnam, Chair, Amarillo, TX

Physicians for Social Responsibility - Kansas City Ann Suellentrop, MS RN, Project Director, Kansas City, KS

Physicians for Social Responsibility Wisconsin Hannah Mortensen, Executive Director, Madison, WI

-!65-The Progressive Foundation Kelly Lundeen and John LaForge, Co-Directors, Luck, WI

Occupy Bergen County Sally Jane Gellert, Member, Woodcliff, NJ

Ohio Nuclear Free Network Pat Marida, Coordinator, Toledo, OH

Safe Energy Rights Group (SEnRG)

Nancy S. Vann, President, Peekskill, NY

San Clemente Green Gary Headrick, Co-Founder, San Clemente, CA

San Francisco Bay Physicians for Social Responsibility.

Robert M. Gould, MD, President, San Francisco, CA

San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace Jill ZamEk, Board Member (Secretary and Oversight Treasurer) and Molly Johnson, Board Member

Snake River Alliance Leigh Ford, Executive Director, Boise, ID

Straits Area Concerned Citizens for Peace, Justice & Environment David & Anabel Dwyer, Members, Mackinaw City, MI

Sustainable Energy and Economic Development (SEED) Coalition Karen Hadden, Executive Director, Austin, TX

Toledo Coalition for Safe Energy Terry Lodge, Esq., Convenor, Toledo, OH

United For Clean Energy Tina Volz-Bongar, Community Organizer, Peekskill, NY

Vermont Yankee Decommissioning Alliance Debra Stoleroff, Steering Committee Chair, Montpelier, VT

Womens International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF)-Milwaukee Mary Laan, Co-President, Milwaukee, WI

-!66-INDIVIDUALS (in alphabetical order, by last name)

Lee Blackburn, Pataskala, OH

Carolyn Croom, Austin, TX

Darlene DeHudy, Norton Shores, MI

Jeri Devlin, Muskegon, MI

Marilyn Elie, Cortlandt Manor, NY

Alice M. Evans, Ph.D., Waitsfield, VT

Audrey Famette, Montpelier, VT

Sally Jane Gellert, Woodcliff, NJ

Connolly Jenkins, Muskegon, MI

Stephen Kent, Rhinebeck, NY

Connie Kline, Past Ohio Sierra Club Nuclear Committee Chair, Willoughby Hills, OH

Vic Macks, St. Clair Shores, MI

Mitchell Maricque, Menominee, MI

Pat Marida, Columbus, OH

Ed & Mary McArdle, Waterford, MI

Timothea C. Papas, Evanston, IL

Cecile Pineda, Berkeley, CA

Amanda Santos, Muskegon, MI

-!67-Lee Sprague, Plainwell, MI

Debra Stoleroff, Plainfield, VT

John Tate, Austin, TX

Byron Toben, Montreal, Quebec, Canada

Mary Valentine, Muskegon, MI

Nancy S. Vann, President, Peekskill, NY

Laura Watchempino, Pueblo of Acoma, NM

Charles Weaver, Kalkaska, MI

Jill ZamEk, Arroyo Grande, CA

-!68-