ML21033B071

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Correction of Amendment Nos. 352, 346, 141, and 47 Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specification Task Force Traveler, TSTF-569, Revision 2, Revise Response Time Testing Definition
ML21033B071
Person / Time
Site: Watts Bar, Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 02/16/2021
From: Michael Wentzel
Plant Licensing Branch II
To: Jim Barstow
Tennessee Valley Authority
Wentzel M
References
EPID L-2020-LLA-0133, TSTF-569, Rev 2
Download: ML21033B071 (7)


Text

February 16, 2021 Mr. James Barstow Vice President, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs and Support Services Tennessee Valley Authority 1101 Market Street, LP 4A-C Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801

SUBJECT:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2; AND WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 - CORRECTION OF AMENDMENT NOS. 352, 346, 141, AND 47 REGARDING THE ADOPTION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TASK FORCE TRAVELER, TSTF-569, REVISION 2, REVISE RESPONSE TIME TESTING DEFINITION (EPID L-2020-LLA-0133)

Dear Mr. Barstow:

On January 25, 2021, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued Amendment Nos. 352 and 346 to Renewed Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-77 and DPR-79, for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively; and Amendment Nos. 141 and 47 to Facility Operating License Nos. NPF-90 and NPF-96 for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, respectively. The amendments revised the Technical Specifications (TSs) to adopt Technical Specification Task Force Traveler, TSTF-569, Revision 2, Revise Response Time Testing Definition. During issuance of the amendment, the NRC staff used a version of TS page 1.1-6 for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2, that inadvertently omitted the number 42 from the list of amendments in the footer of the page.

In addition, the NRC staffs safety evaluation included the following statement on page 2:

[] and for RPS [reactor protection system] RESPONSE TIME [i]n lieu of measurement, response time may be verified for selected components provided that the components have been evaluated in accordance with an NRC approved methodology.

RPS RESPONSE TIME applies only to Combustion Engineering-designed plants and is not applicable to either Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, or Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.

The purpose of this letter is to issue a correction to Watts Bar, Unit 2, TS page 1.1-6 to include the number 42 in the list of applicable amendments in the footer of the page. In addition, the NRC staff is issuing a revised page 2 of its safety evaluation to delete the inapplicable discussion. A copy of the Watts Bar, Unit 2, TS page 1.1-6, and page 2 of the safety evaluation for Amendment Nos. 352, 346, 141, and 47 is enclosed. The NRC staff concludes that the enclosed corrections do not change the staffs previous conclusion in the safety evaluations for Amendment Nos. 352, 346, 141, and 47, nor do they affect the no significant hazards considerations, as published in the Federal Register on August 25, 2020 (85 FR 52374).

J. Barstow If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at (301) 415-6459 or by e-mail at michael.wentzel@nrc.gov.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Michael J. Wentzel, Project Manager Plant Licensing Branch II-2 Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-327, 50-328, 50-390 and 50-391

Enclosures:

1. Corrected Technical Specification Page 1.1-6
2. Corrected Safety Evaluation Page 2 cc: Listserv

ENCLOSURE 1 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 DOCKET NO. 50-391 CORRECTED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGE 1.1-6

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ENCLOSURE 2 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-327, 50-328, 50-390, AND 50-391 CORRECTED SAFETY EVALUATION PAGE 2

initiates necessary safety systems, based on the values of selected unit parameters, to protect against violating core design limits and the RCS pressure boundary and to mitigate accidents.

The RTT verifies that the individual channel or train actuation response times are less than or equal to the maximum values assumed in the accident analyses. The RTT acceptance criteria are under licensee control. Individual component response times are not modeled in the accident analyses. The analyses model the overall or total elapsed time, from the point at which the parameter exceeds the trip setpoint value at the sensor to the point at which the equipment reaches the required functional state (e.g., control and shutdown rods fully inserted in the reactor core).

2.2 Proposed Changes to the Technical Specifications Sequoyah and Watts Bar Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.2 requires the ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in TS Table 3.3.2-1, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation, to be OPERABLE. To assure the LCO is met, Sequoyah SR 3.3.2.9 and Watts Bar SR 3.3.2.10 require the licensee to verify that ESFAS RESPONSE TIMES are within limits. Similarly, Sequoyah and Watts Bar LCOs 3.3.1 require the RTS instrumentation for each Function in TS Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, to be OPERABLE, and Sequoyah SR 3.3.1.14 and Watts Bar SR 3.3.1.15 requires the licensee to verify that RTS RESPONSE TIMES are within limits. Section 1.1 of the TS define ESF RESPONSE TIME and RTS RESPONSE TIME, state acceptable means to measure each response time, and provide an alternative that may be used [i]n lieu of measurement.

In its application, the licensee stated that it requests adoption of NRC-approved TSTF-569. The only revision of TSTF-569 that is NRC approved is Revision 2. As described in Section 1, Summary Description, of Revision 2 of TSTF-569:

The proposed change revises the definitions to eliminate the requirement for prior NRC review and approval of the response time verification of similar components, while retaining the requirement for the verification to be performed using the methodology contained in Attachment 1, titled, Methodology to Eliminate Pressure Sensor and Protection Channel (for Westinghouse Plants only) Response Time Testing. The proposed change will permit licensees to verify the response time of similar component types using the methodology contained in Attachment 1, without obtaining prior NRC approval for each component.

Accordingly, as shown in the licensee's LAR, the proposed changes would add an additional in lieu of measurement, alternative to measuring ESF RESPONSE TIME and RTS RESPONSE TIME for Sequoyah and Watts Bar. The additional alternative for ESF RESPONSE TIME would be [i]n lieu of measurement, response time may be verified for selected components provided

... the components have been evaluated in accordance with an NRC approved methodology.

Similarly, for RTS RESPONSE TIME, [i]n lieu of measurement, response time may be verified for selected components provided that ... the components have been evaluated in accordance with an NRC approved methodology.

The application stated that the licensee concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF-569 and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to Sequoyah and Watts Bar

ML21033B071 *by e-mail OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPLII-2/PM NRR/DORL/LPLII-2/LA* NRR/DSS/STSB/BC*

NAME MWentzel BAbeywickrama VCusumano DATE 02/10/2021 02/10/2021 02/05/2021 OFFICE NRR/DORL/LPLII-2/BC* NRR/DORL/LPLII-2/PM*

NAME UShoop MWentzel DATE 02/16/2021 02/16/2021