ML20249C445
| ML20249C445 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/19/1997 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20249C441 | List: |
| References | |
| 8.14, CCS, NUDOCS 9806290369 | |
| Download: ML20249C445 (100) | |
Text
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I Senior Management Meeting l
'i Directive 8.14 l
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Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs j Senior Management Meeting (SMM) q Directive 8.14 e
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Contents !
4 l j j Policy.......................................................... 1 li O bj ec t i ve s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 !
4 l Organizational Responsibilities and Delegations of Authority . . . . . . . . . . 1 i Th e Co m m issio n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 2 l
l Executive Director for Operations (EDO) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ... ..... 2 3
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 i Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS). . . . . ... 2 i Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 i
Director, Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD). . . . 3 j Regional Administrators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ ....... 3 l
Directors of Staff Offices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 !
Chief, Regional Operations Staff, Office of the EDO. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Ap pli ca bili ty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 I t
H a n d bo o k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 i Re fe re n c es . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 I
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l Approved: March 19,1997 iii
&p ucgA I j U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
% ,,,,e Volume 8 Licensee Oversight Programs NRR Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Directive 8.14 Policy (8.14 - 01)
It is the policy of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to have its senior managers conduct serniannual senior management meetings (SMMs) to review the performance of reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and other materials licensees; to focus agency attention on those facilities of highest concern and to monitor licensee efforts to recognize and resolve performance concems; to review the consistency of the agencywide implementation of plant evaluative processes; to review activities in NRC mission areas; and to review agencywide resource issues and emerging technical and policy issues.
Objectives (8.14 - 02)
- To communicate the concerns of senior NRC managers to licensees with poor performance or adverse performance trends. (021)
- To ensure that coordinated courses of action are developed and implemented for licensees of concern before problems reveal themselves as significant events. (022)
- To formally recognize nuclear power plants that have demonstrated superior operational safety performance. (023)
To review significant generic issues affecting nuclear power plants, major fuel cycle facilities, and materials licensees. (024)
- To inform the Commission, the Congress, and the public of senior management decisions. (025)
Approved: March 19,1997 1
Vclume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs .
S:ni::r Mrnagement Meeting (SMM)
Directive 8.14 Organizational Responsibilities and Delegations of Authority (8.14 - 03)
The Commission (031)
Acts on those results of SMMs that have potentially significant public health and safety consequences.
Executive Director for Operations (EDO)
(032) e Oversees SMM activities and conducts the meetings. (a)
- Issuesletters to the nuclear power plants on the Watch List, to those exhibiting adverse performance trends, and to those that have demonstrated superior performance. (b)
- Decides if a special inspection or evaluation is to be conducted at a particular licensee's facility on the basis of discussions at the SMM. (c)
Briefs the Commission on the results following each SMM. (d)
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) -
(033) e Develops guidance for coordinating SMM preparation activities. (a) e Conducts a screening meeting with each regional administrator to identify licensees of plants whose adverse or superior performance warrant discussion before each SMM. (b)
- Participates in the SMM. (c)
Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS)
(034) e Coordinates SMM preparations and discussions pertaining to fuel facilities and other materials licensees within NMSS and among other NRC headquarters and regional offices, as necessary. (a) 2 Approved: March 19,1997
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Directive 8.14 l
i l Director, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) l (034)(continued) e Participates in the SMM. (b) l t
Director, Omce of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES)
(035) e Coordinates SMM preparations among other headquarters and regional offices. (a) e Participates in the SMM. (b) ,l Director, Office for Analysis and Evaluation l of Operational Data (AEOD)
) (036) c Coordinates with program and regional offices in providing input to l both the SMM and SMM screening meetings. (a) e Provides the most current performance indicator data to program i and regional offices. (b) i e Provides an independent analysis of licensee performance at selected operating reactors on the basis of AEOD activities. (c)
. Participates in the SMM. (d)
Regional Adtninistrators (037) e Brief the Director, NRR, at the screening meetings on the performance oflicensees of operating reactors in their respective
! regions. (a) e Coordinate SMM preparations with the program offices. (b) e Lead SMM discussions for operating reactors, fuel facilitiss, and other materials licensees in their respective regions. (c)
Approved: March .19,1997 3
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs .
Senior Management Mccting (SMM)
Directive 8.14 Directors of Staff Offices (038)
Coordinate SMM preparations with program and regional offices. (a) e Participate in the SMM. (b)
Chief, Regional Operations Staff, Office of the EDO (039)
Coordinates SMM preparations among program and regional offices. (a) e Prepares SMM summary and action items. (b)
Applicability (8.14 - 04)
The policy and guidance in this directive and handbook apply to all NRC employees.
Handbook (8.14 - 05)
Handbook 8.14 describes the major components for the SMM program and provides guidance for the preparation and conduct of the SMM.
References (8.14 - 06)
NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0350, " Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval."
--- 2515, " Light Water Reactor Inspection Program-Operations Phase."
NRC Management Directive 8.6," Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)."
--- 8.13, " Evaluating the Safety Performance of Nuclear Power Reactor Licensees."
4 Approved: March 19,1997
9 Senior Management Meeting I
l Handbook 8.14 1 l
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.. Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Parts I - III Contents Part I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... ... ...... ........ ..... ...... . 1 B asis ( A ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Obj e ctives (B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
- Process (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ......... ..... .. ... 2 j Part II l
Preparation for the Senior Management Meeting (SMM). . . . . ........ 4 I G e n e ral ( A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ..... 4 Screening Meetings (B) . . . . . . . . . . . ........ ........ ........ ..... 4 !
l Identification of Discussion Plants (C) . ................... . . .... 6 i j , Final Preparations for Sw1Ms (D) ...... ................... ........ .. 7 g
t Part III Conduct of the Senior Management Meeting (SMM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 l Particip an ts (A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Plant Performance Discussions (B) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...... ........ 8 i
S MM Actions (C) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . 9
! Plants Not Currently on the Watch List (1). . . . . . .. . .......... ..... 9 Plants Currently on the Watch List (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Actions for Plants that Remain on the Watch List for Extended
! Pe riods (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
{ Meetings with Licensee Boards (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Recognition of Superior Performance (5). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Other Discussions and Followup Actions (6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Commission Briefing (E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 G l o s s a ry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Approved: March 19,1997 iii l
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs .
Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Parts I - III Contents (continued)
Exhibits .
1 SMM Nuclear Power Plant Performance Evaluation Template . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 2 Watch List Removal Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 3 Sample Category 2/3 Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................... 22 4 Sample Category 1 Letter . . . . . . . . .............................-.... 23 5 Sample Tren ding Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 6 Sample Letter Informing Licensee of Correction of Adverse Performance Trend......................................................... 25 7 Superior Performance Recognition Matrix. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 8 Sample Superior Performance Recognition Letter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
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I iv Approved: March 19,1997
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting Handbook 8.14 Part I Part I Introduction basis (A)
The fundamental basis for conducting senior management meetings (SMMs) is the NRC's need to ensure the operational safety performance of nuclear power plants. (1)
Following the Davis Besse loss-of-feedwater incident in June 1985, the agency established the SMM process to provide a forum for senior managers to mee: twice a year to evaluate nuclear power reactor operational safety performance. This incident and two other significant operational events in 1985-the San Onofre and Rancho Seco events in November and December 1985, respectively-underscored the need forimproved methods to evaluate operational safety performance. The primary goal of the SMM is to identify declining trends in the operational safety performance of individual plants so that early corrective actions can be implemented. The meetings also include discussions regarding the performance of major fuel cycle facilities and materials licensees and reviews of other NRC mission areas.
Participants in these meetings typically include the Executive Director for Operations; Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Programs; Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Effectiveness, Program Oversight, Investigations and Enforcement; Deputy Executive Director for Management Services; the regional administrators; office directois;of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Nuclear Regulatory Research, Enforcement, Investigation, State Programs; and senior managers from the General Counsel and other support personnel, as directed. (2)
Approved: March 19,1997 1
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Part I l Objectives (s)
The major objectives of the SMM are to-e Review the operational safety performance of power reactors (also referred to as " plants") with poor performance or adverse performance trends, and to communicate the concerns of NRC senior managers to the licensees of those plants (1) e Plan coordinated courses of action for plants of concern before problems reveal themselves as significant events (2) e Identify : plants that have. demonstrated superior safety performance (3) e Discuss significant technical and policy issues (4)
Process (c)
As described in Management Directive 8.13," Evaluating the Safety Performance of Nuclear Power Reactor Licensees," the SMM is part of an integrated evaluative process and is used to provide the highest level of agency review of plants and facilities whose performance is of most concern. In preparing for SMMs, the staff analyzes licensee
- performance information from inspection reports, performance indicators and analyses, enforcement history, and other pertinent data.
The proper integration of this data is essential to the ability of senior managers to accurately characterize operational safe ~ty performance. (1)
Although managers rely on their exp:rience and judgment during the plant performance discussions, the concept outlined in the nuclear power plant performance evaluation template (Exhibit 1 of this-handbook) help guide their deliberations. The template provides a framework for assessing the plant performance information from the various NRC evaluative processes and includes both subjective evaluation criteria, and plant-specific numerical criteria. The subjective criteria evaluate items such as the effectiveness of a licensee's corrective actions; licensee management awareness of, and involvement in, day-to-day plant activities; and the comprehensiveness and accuracy of a plant's licensing basis documentation and how effectively it is maintained. Examples of plant-specific numerical criteria embodied in the template include scrams, 2 Approved: March 19,1997
Volume 8, Licensce Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Part I I
1 Process (C)(continued) safety systems actuations, personnel errors, equipment availability rates, maintenance backlog, and corrective action backlog. (2)
On the basis of SMM discussions, the senior managers may modify the agency's approach to address the performance problems at a plant.
This mayinclude conducting a special team inspection to ascertain the causes of the performance problems, holding discussions between senior officials of both the NRC and the licensee to further enhance the quality of communications, or convening a meeting with the Commission to review plant performance and licensee plans to improm performance. The SMM includes a review ofinspection plans and tc hnical reviews for each facility discussed and often results in I reallocation of resources to address facilitics of concern. However, the '
SMM is not the primary means for allocation of inspection or program resources. The plant performance review is the primary means for development of power reactor inspection plans. (3)
SMMs are conducted on a semiannual basis. Following each SMM, licensees are informed of any NRC decisions or actions that have been taken concerning their plants or facilities and the Commission is briefed on the results of the meeting. (4)
It should be emphasized that this handbook is intended' solely as guidance to NRC officials in exercising their oversight responsibilities for licensee activities. As such, the determination whether to take any of the actions suggested in the handbook is solely within the NRC's discretion. Although most olthe detailed guidance provided in this handbook refers only to nuclear power plants, fuel cycle facilities and materials licensees also are discussed at SMMs when there are significant safety or safeguards issues. (5) i I
Approved: March 19,1997 3 l
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Volume 89 Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting Handbook 8.14 Part II Part II Preparation for the Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
General (A)
There are three significant events in each SMM cycle: screening meetings; the SMM; and a Commission briefing. (1)
The preparations for each SMM will require comprehensive reviews of operating power reactor performance to identify plants that will be discussed at the SMM, and to determine which plants should be recognized for superior performance. (2)
While most of the SMM discussion pertains to the performance of power reactors, licensee performance at major fuel cycle and materials facilities licensed by the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) may be discussed at the SMM when there are significant safety or safeguards issues. In addition, while NMSS facilities are not included on the Watch List or subject to screening meetings, NMSS may identify facilities or licensees needing priority attention as a result of significant performance weaknesses. (3)
Screening Meetings (s)
Within, approximately, the 2-month period before each SMM, each regional administrator will meet with the Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), to identify the plants in their respective regions for which adverse or superior performance justifies their discussion at the SMM. These screening meetings are coordinated by NRR. (1) 4 Apptoved: March 19,1997
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting (SMM) ,
Handbook 8.14 Part II l Screening Meetings (s)(continued) i Regional staff in preparing for screening meetings will coordinate, as !
necessary, with other program offices and will review and summarize !
relevant information on overall plant performance. The main vehicle i for these reviews will be the periodic regional plant performance reviews (PPRs), which are described in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 2515. Information to be reviewed includes-(2) e Plant events (a) e Licensee event reports (b) e Inspection findings (c) ,
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Licensee corrective action effectiveness (d) l e
Enforcement information associated with escalated action (e) s e Allegations (f) e Investigations (g)
In addition, the regional office will incorporate insights from performance indicators, relevant operating experience, individual plant evaluations (IPEs), and analysis of human factors data to arrive at an integrated perspective oflicensee performance. Program offices will coordinate with the regional offices to supply needed information, as appropriate. (3)
The results of the PPRs should be used as the primary information source for screening meeting preparations. Screening meeting briefing materials for each plant will include a PPR summary, performance indicators, a summary of planned inspections, and the plant issues
, matrix, which is a tabulation of object;ve plant performance l
information derived from inspection reports and other publicly available information, such as licensee event reports. (4)
Each regional administrator will lead the plant performance discussions for their respective region at the screening meeting with the Director, NRR. Meeting participants will include senior managers and staff from NRR, the regional offices, the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD), and the Office of Enforcement. (5)
Approved: March 19,1997 5 4
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs '
Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Part II Screening Meetings (s)(continued)
The screening meeting review of each plant will emphasize the discussion of adverse performance trends and the effectiveness of licensee self-assessments and corrective actions for identified problems. The information contained in the plant issues matrix will be used by meeting participants to independently assess plant performance. Future inspection plans also will be reviewed at the screening meetings. (6)
The main objective of discussing each plant at the screening meetings is to conduct integrated reviews of plant performance, focusing on changes in performance since the last SMM. From these discussions, the Director, NRR, and regional administrator will determine which .
plan!r should be discussed at the SMM and which should be considered for st. prior performance recognition. (7)
Identification of Discussion Plants (c)
On the basis of screening meeting analyses, plants will be selected for discussion at the SMM. Selection as a " discussion plant" is not an adverse action, since SMM discussion is primarily a vehicle to permit the assessment of operational plant performance from the senior managers' perspective. (1) l If, after reviewing a plant's performance at the screening meeting, either the regional administrator, Director, NRR, or the Director, AEOD, believe that it would be beneficial, the plant will be selected for SMM discussion. Additionally, the following plants shall be discussed at the SMM: (2) e Plants that are currently in Categories 2 or 3 of the Watch List. (a) e Plants that have been placed in Category 1 during either of the two l preceding SMMs. (b) ,
o Plants that were issued a trending letter at the previous SMM. (c) 1 The Director, NRR, and regional administrators also will identify l additional plants whose performance may be declining to the extent that they warrant discussion at the SMM. (3) 6 Approved: March 19,1997
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Managcment Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Part 11 Final Preparations for SMMS (D) 1 Following the screening meetings, the headquarters and regional staff will work together to develop the information for use at the SMM. ;
NRR will assemble this information into a notebook called the SMM !
Executive Summary. The SMM Executive Summary will include background papers that synopsize the performance of each plant to be ,
discussed at the SMM, tables of relevant technical and regulatory information, summaries of plants to be considered for recognition as l superior performers, a meeting agenda, and other information, as specified by the Executive Director for Operations (EDO). (1)
For each SMM discussion plant, the cognizant regional' office will prepare a narrative summary of plant performance that incorporates insights developed during the screening meeting. The narrative summary will be derived from the PPR summary, and the plant performance evaluation template (Exhibit 1 of this handbook) will be used in its preparation. In addition to the narrative summary, the .
regional office will include an updated plant issues matrix in its SMM materials. A removal matrix (Exhibit 2 of this handbook) will be included for plants that will be recommended for removal from the Watch List, as determined during the screening meeting. (2)
The SMM Executive Summaries will be distributed to SMM participants in advance of the meeting. (3)
The EDO will coordinate the identification of SMM discussion topics and will prepare the agenda for the meeting. (4) 1 l
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l Approved: March 19,1997 7 1
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs '
Senior Management Meeting Handbook 8.14 Part III i
4 Part III Conduct of the Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Participants (A)
The Executive Director for Operations (EDO) will direct the conduct of the SMM. Attendees will typically include the EDO; Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Programs; Deputy Executive Director for Regulatory Effectiveness, Program Oversight, Investigations and Enforcement; Deputy Executive Director for Management Services; the regional administrators; office directors of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data, Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, Nuclear Regulatory Research, Enforcement, Investigation, State Programs; and senior managers from the Office of the General Counsel and other support personnel, as directed.
Plant Performance Discussions (n)
The discussions of plant performance will be led by each cognizant regional administrator with input from the other senior managers.
Plant performance will be evaluated by the senior managers using the information contained in the SMM Executive Summary. Discussions will be guided by the plant performance evaluation template (Exhibit 1 of this handbook) or the Watch List removal matrix (Exhibit 2 of this handbook), as applicable. (1)
To aid in arriving at an independent and objective view of a plant's operational safety performance, senior managers can refer to the inspection data provided in the plant issues matrix, included in the SMM Secutive Summary. To ensure that all discussion plants are i assessed similarly, participants at the meeting should consider the
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various factors included in the template and matrix; however, they also should focus on those factors that are germane to that plant. (2)
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8 Approved: March 19,1997
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Handbook 8.14 Part III Plant Performance Discussions (s)(continued)
To foster consistency throughout the agency in evaluating licensee performance, the senior managers will review efforts to standardize evaluative processes and associated documents and ensure that evaluative processes are appropriately focused on identifying and analyzing trends and patterns. The managers will initiate actions to address any issues that are identified. (3) 1
, SMM Actions (C) !
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On the basis of the SMM review of performance information for individual plants, senior managers may take one of the actions summarized below.
Plants Not Currently on the Watch List (1) j I
For plants that are not currently on the Watch List and who e l performance is discussed at the SMM, one of the following actions may l be appropriate: (a) l e No specific action recommended. Plants may continue to receive NRC inspections in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 2515, " Light Water Reactor Inspection Program-Operations Phase." The SMM may recommend reallocation of NRC inspection and technical program resoures. (i) e Plants may be placed on the Watch List (see Exhibits 3 and 4 of this handbook for sample letters). These plants receive additional regulatory attention (an increase in NRC inspection oversight of licensee activities) from both NRC headquarters and the associated regional office. (ii)
- Plants may be issued a trending letter (see Exhibit 5 of this handbook) that formally communicates NRC management's concerns regarding adverse performance trends. This action, which is taken to inform licensee management that plant performance, if not corrected, may result in the plant being placed on the Watch List at a future SMM, also entails an enhanced NRC oversight of licensee activities. A plant is issued only one adverse trending letter. The adverse performance trend should be assessed at future SMMs. (iii) t Approved: March 19,1997 9 l
Volume 89 Licensee Oversight Programs Scnior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Part III l
SMM Actions (C)(continued)
Plants Not Currently on the Watch List (1) (continued)
Should there be insufficient data during future SMMs for senior managers to determine if the adverse trend has been arrested, the NRC should continue to monitor plant performance and to discuss the plant at SMMs. If the adverse performance trends are observed to continue, the plant should be placed on the Watch List. (b)
If, during a future SMM, the adverse performance trend is et c;idered to have been arrested, this determination will be communicated to the licensee in a letter from the EDO (see Exhibit 6 of this handbook). (c)
Plants Currently on the Watch List (2)
For plants that are currently on the Watch List, one of the following actions may apply:
- On the basis of their review of the Watch List removal matrix, the ,
senior managers may remove a plant from the list if the licensee has taken effective action to correct identified weaknesses. To ensure that an improving trend continues, the performance of a plant removed from the Watch List is reviewed at the next two SMMs. (a)
. If, as a result of the removal matrix evaluation, the senior managers determine that a plant will remain in Category 2 on the Watch List, the actions discussed in Section (C)(3) will be considered for implementation. (b) e Plants in Category 3 must be moved to Category 2 before being considered for placement in Category 1. Typically, the restart of plants that are in Category 3 will be carefully evaluated using the guidance in Inspection Manual Chapter 0350," Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval." (c)
. Should senior managers determine that additional information is needed on a plant to properly assess performance or to evaluate licensee self-asse:sments, they may recommend to the EDO that a specialinspection or evaluation be conducted at the plant before the next SMM. (d) 10 Approved: March 19,1997
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Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Mceting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Part III SMM Actions (C)(continued)
Actions for Plants that Remain on the Watch List for Extended Periods (3)
If a Category 2 plant's problems remain unresolved or its performance does not improve sufficiently to be removed from the Watch List, the senior managers may recommend taking the actions discussed below. !
These options do not supersede the requirements or policies j documented elsewhere for implementing the actions, nor do they l relieve others of their responsibilities to implement necessary actions l separate from the SMM process. The objective of these actions is to I ensure the licensee establishes a plan for improvement that ;
incorporates measurable goals to determine when performance has l improved. These actions incorporate into the SMM process existing agency tools to remediate regulatory concerns. Whether and when to take any one of these actions is a determination within the NRC's sole discretion. l e Conduct regularly scheduled public meetings with licensee management to review corrective actions and plant performance. (a)
. Have the licensee brief the Commission regarding its actions to address continuing poor performance. (b) l
. Establish an oversight panel with headquarters and regional members to closely monitor implementation of corrective action j plans. Meetings with the licensee would be open to the public. (c) .
. Send a letter from the Chairman or the EDO to the licensee if a plant's performance has not shown improvement after having been placed on the Watch List. The letter would express the senior managers' concerns as specifically as possible and would ask the licensee to respond with its actions and measures for determining its improvement. (d) e Issue a confirmatory action letter (CAL). Such a decision would generally be made on the basis ofinformation received in response to a previous executive letter and the NRC's validation of that information. The CALwould confirm the NRC's and the licensee's understanding ofissues and the actions, measures, and schedule to address NRC operational safety performance concerns. (e)
Approved: March 19,1997 11
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Senior Management Meeting (SMM) i Handbook 8.14 Part III 1
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Actions for Plants that Remain on the Watch List for Extended Periods (3)(continued)
. Issue a demand for information. The decision to issue a demand would typically be made on the basis of the licensee's inabi!ity to
, comply with the actions and milestones established in a previous CAL. The demand would require the licensee to show cause why the NRC should not pursue further enforcement action, such as issuing an order or modification, suspension, or revocation of the ,
license, including shutting down the plant. (Demands for information are described in the NRC's Enforcement Manual.) (f) l
- Issue an order to modify, suspend, or revoke a license. A i modification order also may be used to effect changes in licensee management controls. Remedial orders may be issued which would l
require licensees to address underlying problems with poor performance without directly affecting the license. (Orders are :
described in the NRC's Enforcement Manual.) (g)
Meetings with Licensee Boards (4)
On basis of senior managers' assessment of plant performance, the EDO, the Director of NRR, and the cognizant regional administrator may meet, at any time, with a licensee's board of directors (trustees) to directly communicate senior management concerns regarding the performance of a specific plant.
l Recognition of Superior Performance (5) l During the SMM, senior managers will consider whether plants that j have demonstrated superior safety performance will be formally
- recognized. The plant's most recent SALP ratings and the plant's performance since those ratings were issued (see Exhibit 7 to this handbook) are the criteria used to assess the superior performance of the plant. Formal recognition will be provided by a letter from the EDO to the licensee (see Exhibit 8 of this handbook). These letters will be reviewed by the Commission before they are issued and will be placed in the public document room following issuance. No press release will be made.
Other Discussions and Followup Actions (6)
During the SMM, the EDO, regional administrators, and program office directors willlead discussions of selected technical, regulatory, and management topics.
12 Approved: March 19,1997
Volume 8 Licensee Oversight Programs 2
Senior Management Meeting (SMM) l IIandbook 8.14 Part III J
l l
SMM Actions (C)(continued)
Other Discus sions and Followup Actions (6) (continued)
The EDO will formally issue action items to the staff for issues requiring further action that are identified during the SMM. (7)
Following completion of the SMM, the EDO will issue letters to: all i
plants in Categories 1,2, or 3; plants exhibiting adverse performance !
trends (trending letters); and letters to recognize superior ,
performance. (8)
Commission Briefing (E)
The staff will brief the Commission on the SMM results at a public i
meeting after each SMM. The briefing willinclude discussions of the plants that have been placed on or removed from the Watch List and those issued trending letters. Licensee performance at fuel cycle facilities at which there are significant performance issues also will be discussed. The SMM results will be communicated to the NRC's congressional oversight committees the day before the SMM Commission briefing. (1)
Also before the Commission meeting, letters from the EDO will be transmitted by facsimile to the licensees of those plants placed on the Watch List and to those plants with adverse trends. Routine distribution will be deferred until after the meeting with the Commission. (2)
Cognizant regional administrators will inform licensee senior managers of the NRC's concerns regarding those plants that were discussed at the SMM but not placed on the Watch List or issued trending letters. Notification to a licensee about the performance of a special inspection or evaluation at one of its facilities will be issued separately by the cognizant regional office. (3)
Approved: March 19,1997 13
I-___-___-__-__- ..
Volume 8tLicensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting Handbook 8.14 Glossary Glossary Facilities for Priority Attention. Major fuel cycle facilities or materials licensees are placed in this category if they are having, or have had, weaknesses that warrant increased regulatory attention. A licensee will remain in this category until i: demonstrates a period of improved performance.
Major Fuel Cycle Facility. A facility licensed or certified under 10 CFR Parts 70,72, and 76 to possess or process special nuclear material.
Materials Licensee. An entity that has been issued a license under 10 CFR Parts 30,36,39, or 40. Broadly, this category includes general licensees and holders of certificates of compl.iance and quality assurance approvals.
Watch List. A list of nuclear power plants whose licensee performance warrants NRC monitoring beyond that normally required by the inspection program. There are three categories associated with this lir..
plants that are placed in either Category 2 or Category 3 are referrer'. to as being "on the NRC Watch List." Plants that are placed in Category 1 are referred to as having been " removed from the NRC Wa'ch List."
These categories are described below.
Category L Plants removed from the Watch List. These plants were previously designated as " Category 2," and have taken effective action to correct identified weaknesses. No further NRC special attention beyond the current level of monitoring is needed to verify that improvement continues.
. Category 2. Plants authorized to operate that the NRC will monitor closely. Although these plants are being operated in a manner that adequately protects public health and safety, they are having or have had weaknesses that warrant increased NRC attention from both headquarters and the associated regional office. A plant will remain in this category until the licensee either demonstrates a 1
14 Approved: March 19,1997
... Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Glossary Glossary (continued) period ofimproved performance or until a further deterioration of performance results in the plant being placed in Category 3.
- Category 3. Shut down plants requiring NRC authorization to start up and that the NRC will monitor closely. These plants are having or have had significant weaknesses that warrant maintaining the plant in a shutdown condition until the licensee can demonstrate to the NRC that adequate programs have both been established and implemented to ensure substantial improvement. The Commission must approve restart of a plant in a Category 3 status.
Superior Performer. A nuclear power plant that has been assessed as SALP Category 1 in all functional areas during its most recent SALP.
The EDO may formally recognize a superior performer after the first SMM following the issuance of the superior SALP report. Additional guidance on superior performers is contained in Management Directive 8.6," Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance." For
' a plant to receive formal recognition ofits superior performance from the EDO, it must meet other criteria, in addition to its SALP Category I ratings. These criteria are specified in Exhibit 7 of this handbook.
Trending Letter. A letter that alerts senior utility managers of NRC concerns regarding declining trends in performance at their nuclear power plant that, if not corrected, may result in the plant's being placed
, on the Watch List. This early warning expresses agency-level endorsement of concerns that have been documented in previous communications with the licensee, such as letters, inspection reports, SALP reports, and management meetings. The intention of a trending letter is te prompt licensees to take early necessary actions to address the adverse performance trends.
Approved: March 19,1997 15
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting Handbook 8.14 Exhibits Exhibit 1 SMM Nuclear Power Plant Pe.rformance Evaluation Template The questions presented in this template are structured to summarize the root causes of poor performance. In developing the discussion plant narrative summaries for use during the SMM, regional staff should ensure that those factors that are germane to each plant are addressed, and are illustrated with examples from the plant issues lists (PILs) During the SMM, senior managers should use the template to guide discussions of nuclear power plant safety performance. To aid in arriving at an independent and objective view of a plant's operational safety perfo" nance, senior managers should use this template in conjunction with the plant's narrative summary, data summary, NRC performance indicators, and PIL.
L Effectiveness of Licensee Self-Assessment Does the licensee effectively document problems?
Are safety issues identified to the appropriate level of management before they result in events or equipment failures? Does management take the initiative to identify problems and determine their root causes?
Are deficiencies predominantly identified by the licensee or by NRC (or other external entities), or are they self-revealed?
Does the licensee effectively determine the root causes ofidentified deficiencies and the extent of degraded conditions?
Are the licensee's corrective actions effective in correcting the root causes of degraded and/or non-conforming conditions?
Are corrective actions timely, and do they include sufficient measures to prevent recurrence of problems?
What is the trend of the plant's corrective action backlog? How does this backlog impact operational safety?
i How effectively does the licensee employ industry experience, or other pertinent information from outside sources, in its self-assessments?
Is the licensee responsive to self-assessment findings?
Does the licensee have effective corporate management oversight and involvement in problem resolution?
16 Approved: March 19,1997
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting (SMM) l l
Handbook 8.14 Exhibits j 1
l Exhibit 1 (continued) l II. Operational Performance (Frequency of Transients)
How do plant performance indicators for scrams and forced outage rate compare to industry averages and the plant's peer group?
l What insights into operational safety are provided by the number and safety significance of l l
events, equipment failures, or other abnormal occurrences?
Does the licensee staff operate the plant in a conservative, safe and professional manner?
l How effectively does the operations staff control plant activities? j What level of performance has been demonstrated during routine evolutions, outages, events, and response to abnormal alarms?
^i How does the licensee's operation of the balance of plant affect overall safety performance? l Does licensee management demonstrate awareness of day-to-day operational concerns?
Does the licensee tolerate conditions that have the potential to challenge plant operational safety, as demonstrated by the existence of operator work-arounds, temporary procedure changes, temporary jumpers, and nuisance alarms?
Are the licensee's operability determinations conservative, timely, and based on safety considerations?
During outages, does the licensee effectively coordinate activities to minimize shutdown risk?
Are activities such as online maintenance and LCO management properly coordinated? Does the licensee effectively limit unnecessary entry into LCOs or prolonged LCO times?
l Does the licensee intentionally enter into LCOs to perform preventive or corrective maintenance? If so, do they consider the safety benefit that may be obtined from such action, and do they apply risk insights in the decision to conduct on-line maintenance?
l Do licensee procedures provide adequate guidance for safety-related activities?
Are the licensee's practices governing responses to and assessments of operational events clearly articulated?
III. Human Performance How many reportable events over the past year have been attributed to the licensed operator, other personnel, or maintenance cause codes? How do these compare with national averages?
To what extent have human performance problems contributed to reportable events?
How do human performance problems contribute to malfunctions, abnormal conditions, or other activities that may adversely impact safety?
Approved: March 19,1997 17
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs '
Senior Managernent Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Exhibits i
Exhibit 1 (continued)
III. Human Performance (continued)
Dolicensee staff members demonstrate conservatism and an appropriate appreciation ofsafety when planning and performing activities?
Is the licensee's staff appropriately qualified and properly trained?
Are the licensee's procedures adequate and properly used?
Are management expectations clearly articulated to, and understood by, licensee staff?
IV. Material Condition (Safety System Reliability / Availability)
How do licensee performance indicators for safety system failures, safety system actuations, and significant events compare to industry averages and the plant's peer group?
What are the performance trends of plant equipment, including, but not limited to, availability and failure and rework rates?
What is the trend, and impact on operational safety, of the plant's corrective maintenance backlog?
Has the licensee implemented comprehensive and effective plant maintenance, surveillance testing, and test programs?
Are work activities prioritized with appropriate consideration ofimportance to safety?
What effect does the material condition of the balance of plant equipment have on the licensee's ability to safely operate the plant?
V. Engineer ~ng and Design How many reportable events over the last year have been attributed to the design cause code?
How effectively does the licensee's engineering function support pir.nt reliability and operational safety? How well are PRA vulnerabilities factored into these activities?
Do design, construction, and equipment deficiencies exist?
Is the plant's licensing basis and design basis documentation complete and accurate (including FSAR maintenance and the effectiveness of activities conducted under 10 CFR 50.59)?
Does the licensee's engineering function adequately address issues related to plant aging?
Do the licensee's engineering work controls effectively establish and monitor the status and priority of the backlog of engineering work?
Does the licensee's engineering function effectively solve problems without recunence?
Have human-system interfaces resulted in problems that challenge plant safety?
18 Approved: March 19,1997
i Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs 1 Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Exhibits Exhibit 2 Watch List Removal Matrix Plant Name Evaluation Factors for Removal of Plants from the Watch List l i
Evaluation Factors Response Comments
- 1. Root Cause Identified and Corrected Weak performance areas are thoroughly assessed.
Comprehensive and clearly defined )
corrective action program has been developed.
Corrective actions include sufficient measures to prevent recurrence of ;
problems Management has allocated sufficient resources to carry out long-range corrective action programs NRC is satisfied that corrective action program is sufficiently implemented Sustained, successful plant performance has been demonstrated.
II. Improved Self-Assessment and Problem Resolution Evident Program elements that monitor and evaluate effectiveness of conective actions have been instituted Safety issues are being identified to appropriate management level and corrected in a timely manner.
Quality assurance and cafety oversight groups provide timely and effective self-assessments of performance to site and corporate management.
Approved: March 19,1997 19
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Exhibits Exhibit 2 (continued)
Evaluation Factors Response Comments Ill. Licensee Management Organization and Oversight Improved Corporate and plant management teams are fully committed to achieving improved performance Licensee has effective corporate management oversight and involvement in plant operations and problem resolution Management team provides strong direction and fosters a nuclear safety work ethic that is understood at all levels in the organization IV. NRC Assessment Complete Senior NRC management no longer considers the plant as having weaknesses that warrant increased NRC-wide attention Significant NRC inspection and licensing ;
activities are complete and fm' dings properly resolved or understood V. Additional Considerations Overall performance has improved as reflected in the most recent SALP ratings, i Performance Indicators, or results from
}
the Plant Performance Review l Enforcement history has indicated an improving trend
)
Performance has improved as demonstrated by a lack of operational problems Performance has improved as demonstrated by a lack of significant operator errors.
Procedure adherence problems are not evident.
Simulator is operational.
70 Approved: March 19,1997 1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ - . . _ _ _ _ _ - . - . . . _ - - _ . - - - . J
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.- Volume 8, Licens:e Oversight Programs l l Senior Management Meeting (SMM) l l
Handbook 8.14 Exhibits i 1
Exhibit 2 (continued)
Evaluation Factors Response Comments V. Additional Considerations (continued)
Known (i.e., plant specific or industry generic) aging problems have been appropriately addressed.
Licensee has improved its management organization.
Licensee procedures are considered adequate overall.
Licensee has an effective root cause analysis program PRA has been performed.
PRA has been used.
Approved: March 19,1997 21 r
[_ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _._ ._ _ - - - _ - - _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . - - - - -
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Exhibits Exhibit 3 Sample Category 2/3 Letter Dear [name)
On [datej, NRC senior managers met to evaluate the nuclear safety performance of operating reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and other materials licensecs. The NRC conducts this meeting semiannually to determine if the safety performance of various licensees exhibits sufficient weaknesses to warrant increased NRC attention or ifit is trending adversely and requires steps be taken to communicate concerns to the utility's president or board of directors At the [menth and year] Senior Management Meeting, the [ plant name) was discussed.
1 The [ plant name] [(was placed) or (remains)] on the NRC Watch List as a Category 2 plant.
Plants in tais category have been identified has having weaknesses that warrant increased NRC attention until the licensee demonstrates a period of improved performance A summary of NRC discussions related to [ plant name] follows
[ Performance discussion)
[Name], thc NRC Region XXX Administrator, has discussed the bases for our conclusions with regard to the [ plant name} with members of your staff An NRC Commission meeting, open to the public, has been scheduled to be held in the Commissioners' Conference Room in Rockville, Maryland, on [date), to review the results of the latest meeting of NRC senior managers if you have any questions regarding this matter, do not hesitate to call me Sincerely, Executive Director for Operations Docket No. 50-XXX cc. See next page 1
22 Approved: March 19,1997
.' Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs {
Senior Management Meeting (SMM) J Handbook 8.14 Exhibits 1
1 Exhibit 4 '
Sample Category 1 Letter l l
Dear [name):
On [date), the NRC senior managers met to evaluate the operational safety performance of operating reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and other materials licensees. The NRC conducts this meeting semiannually to determine if the operational safety performance of various licensees exhibits sufficient weaknesses to warrant increased NRC attention or if it is trending adversely and requires that steps be taken to communicate concerns to the utility's president or board of directors. At the [ month and year) Senior Management Meeting, the
[ plant name] was discussed.
On the basis of our discussions, we concluded that the (plant name] has demonstrated j sustained improvement sufficient to warrant removal from the NRC Watch List category that ;
requires increased attention from both NRC headquarters and Region XXX. Plants !
removed from the Watch List have taken effective actions to correct identified problems and to implement programs for improved performance A summary of NRC discussions related to the (plant name} follows:
The NRC's inspection program and overview activities have determined that licensee management has substantially corrected the weaknesses and underlying root causes that led l to previous performance problems at the [ plant name). Management has established high standards of performance, implemented improved self-assessment and corrective action programs, and upgraded the material condition of the two units to enhance equipment reliability.
[ Amplifying comments, as necessary)
In summary, licensee actions have been effective in improving the operational safety performance of the [ plant name). Therefore, the NRC has determined that an enhanced level of regulatory monitoring is no longer warranted.
An NRC Commission meeting, open to the public, has been scheduled to be held in the Commissioners' Conference Room in Rockville, Maryland, on [date], to review the results of the latest meeting of NRC senior managers. [name), the Region XXX Administrator, has discussed the bases for our conclusions with regard to [ plant name) with members of your staff.
! If you have questions regarding this matter, do not hesitate to call me.
Sincerely, i
l Executive Director for Operations Docket No. 50-XXX Approved: March 19,1997 23 L________ _ _ - - _ _ __ - _ _ - _ -
Volume 8, Licensee Oversight Programs
)
Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Exhibits Exhibit 5 Sample Trending Letter i
Dear (name]-
On [date], NRC senior managers met to evaluate the nuclear safety performance of operating reactors, fuel cycle facilities, and other materials licensees This meeting is conducted semiannually to determine whether the safety performance of the various licensees warrants increased NRC attention.
l The Commission has directed that,. during these meetings, NRC senior managers also identify those plants whose performance is trending adversely and that steps be taken to communicate concerns to the utility's corporate president or board of directors. This early notification to the highest levels within the utility's organization is intended to allow appropriate measures to be taken by the licensee to address the areas of concern.
I 1 This letter is to advise you that during the [ month and year] Senior Management Meeting, recent trends in the performance at [ plant name] raised sufficient concerns that we believe a meeting with you would be appropriate.
[ Additional armation, if appropriate]
[Name), the NRC Region XXX Administrator in [ City, State], will be contacting you to arrange for a mutually agreeable time and location for a meeting covering [1] performance An NRC Commission meeting, open to the public, h:ts been scheduled to be held in the Commissioners' Conference Room in Rockville, Maryland, on [date], to review the results of the latest meeting of NRC senior managers If you have any questions regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to call me.
Sincerely, 1
1 Executive Director for Operations Docket No 50-XXX cc See next page 24 Approved: March 19,1997
I
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l Volume 8, Licensce Oversight Programs l Senior Management Meeting (SMM) l Handbook 8.14 Exhibits l
l 1 Exhibit 6 i Sample Letter Informing Licensee of Correction of Adverse l Performance Trend l l Dear [name]
In my letter of [date #1], I advised you that recent trends in performance at the (plant name]
raised sufficient concerns that we believed that it would be appropriate to meet with you to discuss the concerns At the [date #2] Senior Management Meeting, NRC managers once again reviewed and evaluated the operational safety performance of operating reactors The discussions regarding [ plant name] considered the additional insights gained from our monitoring of plant performance since the previous SMM. On the basis of these discussions, we concluded that the corrective actions you are taking have been effective in addressing our concerns regarding adverse trends in performance at [ plant name] We noted overallimprovement in
[ performance discussion).
We expect that your efforts to improve performance at [ plant name) will continue, and my staff will monitor your progress. [name], the Region XXX Administrator, has discussed the basis for our conclusions with regard to the [ plant name] with members of your staff If you have any questions regarding this matter, do not hesitate to call me.
Sincerely, Executive Director for Operations Docket No. 50-XXX cc See next page Approved: March 19,1997 25
i Volume 8g Licensee Oversight Programs l Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Exhibits Exhibit 7 Superior Performance Recognition Matrix Evaluation Factors Response Comments I. SALP Assessment a SALP 1 ratings in all functional areas. I IL Current Performance Level a A superior level of safety performance has been rnaintained since the last SALP, as evidenced by a lack of significant operational problems and operator errors.
- b. The NRC has not initiated any escalated enforcement actions for events that have occurred since the last SALP.
- c. Performance indicators reflect superior overall safety performance since the last SALP.
d The NRC is not conducting any significant inspections or investigations of allegations that, if substantiated, might adversely reflect on overall plant performance.
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26 Approved: March 19,1997
/
Volume 8, Licensce Oversight Programs Senior Management Meeting (SMM)
Handbook 8.14 Exhibits Exhibit 8 Sample Superior Performance Recognition Letter Dear [name]-
On [date], NRC senior managers met to evaluate the operational safety performance of operating reactors, fuel gcle facilities, and other materials licensees. The NRC conducts this meeting semiannually to determine if the operational safety performance of various licensees exhibits sufficient weaknesses to warrant increased hRC attention or if it is trending a&crsely and requires steps be taken to communicate concerns to the utility's president or board of directors In addition, at this meeting, senior managers identify specific plants that have demonstrated a continued high level of operational safety performance that deserves formal NRC recognition At the [ month and year] Senior Management Meeting,
[ plant name) was identified as having achieved such a level of operational safety performance and is being recognized as a superior performer In identifying such plants, NRC senior managers perform an evaluation of performance in many areas against predetermined critcria, including operational safety, self-assessment, problem resolution, .and plant management organization and oversight.
The NRC acknowledges that, to achieve the level of performance demonstrated by [ plant name), there must be management involvement in all phases of plant activities. In addition, the staff must be dedicated, knowledgeable, and fully supportive of plant activitics, and a commitment to safety must exist throughout the organization We commend you and your staff for achieving this high level of operational safety performance. Your achievement is a positive example to the industry.
The greatest challenge that you now face is to maintain the level of performance and not to rest on past achievements. Continued management involvement and support, and dedicated efforts from your staff to identify and promptly correct problems are necessary for you to continue to meet this difficult challenge l
Sincerely, j Executive Director for Operations Docket No. 50-XXX cc. See next page l i l
Approved: March 19,1997 27 l
QUESTION 4. On May 6,1996, the NRC issued a Bulletin tc all owners of boiling water reactor plants confirming the requirement to modify the cooling system's strainers so that they wouldn't become clogged with debris and be unable to properly cool the reactor core. In September,1997, an NRC inspection team discovered an almost identical problem at the Cook pressurized water reactor in Michigan, and the Cook reactors were forced to shut down.
Why did the NRC force the Cook reactors to shut down when 30 boiling water reactors were allowed to continue operating with the same safety deficiency?
ANSWER.
The NRC did not force or order the licensee for D.C. Cook to shut down its reactors. On September 8,1997, as a result of issues related to recirculation of containment spray flow to the containment sump raised by the NRC Architect and Engineering Design Inspection, the licensee itself determined that it had insufficient information to assure its design basis could be met and decided to shut the units down. Subsequent to the shutdown, on September 17,1997, the licensee performed containment walkdowns and determined that fibrous material was present in both unit's containments in sufficient quantity to potentially cause blockage of the containment recirculation sump screen during the recirculation phase of a loss-of-coolant accident. Simply stated, the inspection team's finding upon which the licensee determined to shutdown the units is not the same issue as debris clogging of the recirculation sump screen.
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QUESTION 4.- (continued) - 2 A
' D.C. Cook is a pressurized water reactor and the safety concems associated with potential blockage of the recirculation sump screen are similar, but not identical, to blockage of the emergency core cooling system suction strainer in a BWR. In the case of BWRs, the NRC ~
determined that appropriate compensatory actions could be implemented, in the interim, and the ;
plants continued to operate. In the case of D.C. Cook, the concern with fibrous materials ;
potentially blocking the recirculation sump screen was not identified while the units were operating This concem, if it had been identified while a D.C. Cook unit was operating, would
- have required the licensee to evaluate the potentially nonconforming condition to determine and 1
justify an appropriate course of action. ,
Recently, on May 5,1998, the licensee for DC Cook notified the NRC of an additional concem
- with the containment spray system. Specifically, during aN inspection of the west containment spray header the licensee identified debris inside the containment spray header. The presence of the debris, could have blocked containment spray nozzles and rendered the west containment spray header inoperable.
I l
QUESTION 5. What criteria does NRC use to decide when a reactor must shut down for safety reasons?
ANSWER.
Safety is the fundamental regulatory objective, and compliance with NRC requirements plays a fundamental role in giving the NRC confidence that safety is being maintained. Where needed to ensure reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety, the NRC may demand immediate licensee action, up to and including a shutdown or cessation of licensed activities. Issuance of an order would be warranted when the agency lacks the requisite reasonable assurance that the licensee's current operations could be conducted with no undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
Reasonable assurance of adequate protection is presumptively assured by compliance with NRC requirements. Circumstances may arise, however, where new information reveals, for example, that an unforeseen hazard exists or that there is a substantially greater potential for a known hazard to occur. In such situations, the NRC has the statutory authority to require licensee action above and beyond existing regulations to maintain the level of protection necessary to avoid undue risk to public health and safety.
The NRC has the authority to exercise discretion to permit continued operations-despite the existence of a noncompliance-where the noncompliance is not significant from a risk perspective and does not, in the particular circumstances, pose an undue risk to public health and safety. When a non-compliance occurs, the NRC must evaluate the degree of risk posed by
)
'OUESTION 5. (continued). 2 that non-compliance to determine if specific immediate action is required. Where needed to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, the NRC, as noted above, may demand immediate licensee action,' up to and including a shutdown or cessation of licensed activities. In
- addition, in determining the appropriate action to be taken, the NRC must evaluate the non-compliance in terms of its direct safety and regulatory significance.' Based on the NRC's evaluation, the appropriate action could include taking specific enforcement action, refraining from taking any action, or providing input to other regulatory actions or assessments, such as !
increased oversight (e.g., increased inspection).
l
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. QUESTION 5. What criteria does NRC use to decide when a reactor must shut !
l down for safety reasons?
l 1
I i
ANSWER. j Safety is the fundamental regulatory objective, and compliance with NRC requirements plays a fundamental role in giving the NRC confidence that safety is being maintained. Where needed i
to ensure reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety, the NRC j i
may demand immediate licensee action,. up to and including a shutdown or cessation of licensed -l l
' activities. Issuance of an order would be warranted when the agency lacks the requisite I l
reasonable assurance that the licensee's current operations could be conducted with no undue ~
i risk to the health and safety of the public.
Reasonable assurance of adequate protection is presumptively assured by compliance with NRC requirements. Circumstances may arise, however, where new information reveals, for example, that an unforeseen hazard exists or that there is a substantially greater potential for a known hazard to occur. In such situations, the NRC has the statutory authority to require l licensee action above and beyond existing regulations to maintain the level of protection necessary to avoid undue risk to public health and safety.
The NRC has the authority to exercise discretion to permit continued operations--despite the L
existence bf a noncompliance-where the noncompliance is not significant from a risk perspective and does not, in the particular circumstances, pose an undue risk to public health and safety. When a non-compliance occurs, the NRC must evaluate the degree of risk posed by
QUESTION 5. (continued) 2 l
that non-compliance to determine if specific immediate action is required. Where needed to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety, the NRC, as noted above, may demand immediate licensee action, up to and including a shutdown or cessation of licensed activities. In addition, in determining the appropriate action to be taken, the NRC must evaluate the
- non-compliance in terms of its direct safety and regulatory significance. Based on the NRC's evaluation, the appropriate action could include taking specific enforcement action, refraining from taking any action, or providing inpu: to other regulatory actions or assessments, such as increased oversight (e.g., increased inspection).
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l _-_ - - _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ - - - - - _ _ - - _ - - _ _ _ - .
QUESTION 6. Where are these criteria written?
ANSWER.
Section 186 of the Atomic Energy Act (Act) states that, "Any license may be revoked for any material false statement in the application or any statement of fact required under section 182, or because of conditions revealed by such application or statement of fact or any report, record, or inspection or other means which would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application..." As provided in 10 CFR 2.202, the Commission may issue an order to modify, suspend, or revcke a license for alleged violations of the regulations or for potentially hazardous conditions or other circumstances deemed to be sufficient grounds for the action.
Section VI.C.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NUREG-1600) includes conditions under which an order may be issued. For example, an order may be used to remove a threat to the public health and safety, when a licensee has not responded adequately to other enforcement action, when a licensee interferes with an inspection or investigation, when a licensee is unable or unwilling to comply with NRC requirements, when a licensee refuses to correct a violation, or for any other reason for which revocation is legally authorized (i.e., circumstances that would warrant the Commission to refuse to grant a license on an original application).
QUESTION 7. The Dresden reactors in lilinois have been on the Watch List continuously since 1992.
What actions has the NRC taken to force the licensee into taking effective actions in order to get taken off the Watch List?
ANSWE_B.
Commonwealth Edison (Comed) holds licenses for 13 reactors at six sites. Ten reactors are authorized to operate (including Dresden 2 and Dresden 3) and three units are in tho ;
decommissioning process (Zion 1 & 2 and Dresden 1).
Comed has a history of cyclical safety performance at its plants, including Dresden, which, as noted in the question, has been on the NRC Watch Lict since 1992. As a result of the cyclical safety performance at Comed plants, on January 27,1997, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), the i NRC requested that Comed submit information that would allow the NRC to determine what actions, if any, should be taken to assure Comed could safely operate its nuclear plants while 1
sustaining performance improvement at each plant. The Comed responses to the NRC's request outlined a number of actions that were underway or were being initiated to improve l performance.
NRC established a Comed performance oversight panel consisting of NRC managers from both Region 111 and Headquarters to monitor Comed's performance. The panel meets with Comed representatives approximately every 2 months to evaluate Comed's progress on meeting its l
. J QUESTION 7. (continued) 2 performance improvement objectives. In addition, the Commission has been meeting with Comed and the NRC staff approximately every 6 months to assess the effectiveness of Comed's improvement efforts.
- Dresden's overall performance has improved from its previous levels and in our letter of ;
January 16,1998, we provided our assessment to Comed based on the results of the January 1998 NRC Senior Management Meeting. The NRC informed Comed that although the NRC recognized the improvement efforts at Dresden, it concluded that individual plant, performance should not be separated from the issues identified in the NRC 50.54(f) letter.
The NRC's oversight of Comed facilities to assess the effectiveness of their improvement initiatives as they relate not only to Dresden, but to all of Comed's operating plants will continue.
l Further NRC action will be based on the success of Comed in demonstrating sustained improved performance.
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QUESTION 8. The GAO report states that the NRC can fine licensees by up to
$110,000 per violation per day, while a shutdown costs a licensee between $250,000 - $300,000 per day. Don't you think that one way to ensure that the Dresden licensees take the appropriate actions to get off the Watchlist would be to suspend their license and force them to shutdown? If not, why not?
ANSWER.
No. NRC does not believe that a suspension order is necessary or warranted in this case to ensure that the licensee takes the appropriate actions for removal from the Watch List. As discussed in the answer to question seven, the licensee has outlined a number of actions that are underway to improve performance at all Comed sites, including Dresden. NRC is closely l
monitoring the licensee's progress on meeting its performance improvement objectives. These actions should provide the necessary assurance to conclude whether the licensee's performance has improved and whether removal from the Watch List is warranted.
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Also, consistent with the answer to Question 5, in this particular circumstance of Dresden, there has not been a situation that poses an undue risk to public health and safety, the performance issues at Comed notwithstanding.
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QUESTION 9. Does NRC believe that it is necessary for Northeast Utilities to repair ALL of the safety-significant problems before the reactor gets restarted?
ANSWER. ,
The NRC expects that all safety-significant problems identified at any of the Millstone Units will be corrected before that unit is restarted. The extensive Configuration Management Plan (CMP) implemented by the licensee was designed to identify and correct any such problems. The Confirmatory Order issued by the NRC on August 14,1996, that established the requirement that Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) implement an Independent Correcifve Action Verification Program, was intended to put in place a program that would verify the adequac y of the results of NNECO's efforts to establish adequate design bases and controls, verify system performance, and assure the proper implementation of modifications since the plant was ,
licensed. The NRC is continuing to implement an extensive oversight program to determine the effectiveness of the licensee's efforts to correct problems at Millstone.
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QUESTION 10. In light of the failure of Northeast Utilities to properly identify and correct the safety-significant problem on February 18, do you think that we can be assured that if the reactor is restarted that future problems will be identified and corrected in a timely manner? Please justify your response.
1 ANSWER.
I A major element of the NRC's Restart Assessment Plan at Millstone is to ascertain if the licensee has improved its corrective action program so there is reasonable assurance that future problems will oe ident'iied and corrected in a timely manner. A recent NRC inspection of the L
licensee's corrective action program determined that the program is functioning, though l
l continued management attention is needed to continue to improve the process and ensure its L effectiveness. The NRC's final assessment of NNECO's corrective action program will be l
[ completed in the near future to support the staff's recommendation related to restart readiness of Millstone Unit 3.
L The issue involving the residual heat removal (RHR) pump was the subject of a licensee event report submitted to the NRC on February 18,1998. The issue was first raised by the NRC l .-
during one of its inspections of the licensee's deferred items list (those items that the licensee determined were not required before restart). While the licensee has effected the corrective actions needed to eliminate the potential for such a problem to occur, the safety significance of the issue and the actual potential for it to occur are still being assessed by the licensee. The NRC is following the licensee's efforts in this area. Preliminary analyses perfonned by both
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' Westinghouse and NNECO indicate that the potential valve cycling that could result in damage to the RHR pumps would not have occurred.
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QUESTION 11. Will the independent review process be expanded in order to determine whether the more than 700 Level 4 problems are indicative of an evolving safety problem at Millstone? If not, why not?
ANSWER.
Sargent and Lundy (the independent contractor performing the Independent Corrective Action -
Verification Program (ICAVP)) at Millstone 3 has written 623 preliminary Level 4 disc epancy reports (DRs). Of the 623 Level 4 DRs,432 have been confirmed as discrepancies that had not been previously identified by the licensee and require corrective action. The definition of a Level 4 DR is: System meets licensing and design bases but contains minor calculation errors or inconsistencies of an editorial nature. Although they do not result in the plant being outside its licensing and design bases ( i.e., the ICAVP regulatory standard / acceptance criteria), Level 4 findings will be assessed by the ICAVP contractor, the licensee, and the NRC staff to determine whether trends exist which could raise a question regarding the plant's licensing and design bases. Confirmed Level 4 findings are being assessed initially by the ICAVP contractors to determine if licensee corrective actions are appropriate. The NRC staff, on an ongoing basis, is also reviewing these findings for identification of multiple examples of specific findings and corresponding trends. In its evaluation of possible trends, the NRC staff considers whether or not (1) the findings represent a large fraction of items reviewed; (2) the findings are implementation errors (e.g., program or procedural requirements were properly performed: (3) the findings are concentrated in a particular discipline (e.g., mechanical, electrical, instrument and controls, or structural); and (4) the findings are concentrated in a particular type of document (e.g., operating procedure, calculation, drawing, FSAR, maintenance procedure).
QUESTION 11 (continued) 2
. The staff anticipates that if licensee corrective actions are determined to be effective, and trends which raise questions about the licensing and design bases are not identified, the scope of the -
ICAVP would not be expanded.
Q_UESTION 12. How many Level 4 problems would constitute a need to expand the scope of the independent review process? Please justify your response.
ANSWER.
l As described in the response to Question 11, a key element in determining whether to expand the scope as a result of Level 4 findings is not the number of findings, but whether licensee corrective actions are determined to be effective and whether trenos which raise questions about the licensing and design bases are identified. The response to Question 11 describes in detail the assessment process the staff follo'us in assessing Level 4 DRs for possible adverse trends.
QUESTION 13. How can we be certain that there is no safety problem indicated by the 700 Level 4 problems here if no analysis has been done to verify that?
ANSWER.
As described in the responses to Questions 11 and 12, there is a process to review the Level 4 problems for trends that could raise questions about the licensing and design bases. This analysis is being relied upon to determine if there is an underlying safety issue.
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QUESTION 14. Will the more than 700 Level 4 problems be resolved prior to restart of Millstone? If not, why not?
ANSWER.
Northeast Utilities has committed to correct all safety-significant problems such that they are in
- j. compliance with their licensing and design bases prior to restart. As described in the response to Question 11, Level 4 DRs do not involve findings of non-conformance with the licensing and design bases. Therefore, they are not required to be completed prior to restart. However, the licensee has committed to disposition all Level 4 DRS' prior to completion of the next refueling l outage, which is currently anticipated to begin sometime in the second quarter of 1999. The licensee has already completed a majority of the corrective actions for these Level 4 DRs and will most likely complete more corrective actions prior to restart.
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QUESTION 15. Why is it that the problem of allegers identities being improperly or -
inadvertently released by the NRC staff keeps recurring?
, ANSWER.
i L Past releases of alleger identities were primarily the result of errors in judgement by individual i
staff members in communicating allegers names to licensees. In response to this problem, the staff instituted annual refresher training for all employees involved in handling allegations. The j 1
training emphasizes the need to protect the identity of allegers and uses past mistakes to sensitize employees to situations to avoid in the future. In addition, the staff instituted additional l
1 controls on documents that contain allegers' identities or identifying information to limit their l distribution and increase the staffs awareness of the need for special handling of these documents.
While the recent release of allegers' names and identifying information to the Port St. Lucie News was a recurrence, the circumstances and mechanism of the release were different from previous releases. The release to the Port St. Lucie News was, in part, due to a lack of sensitivity among the working-level staff to the need for balance between, on the one hand,
. allowing public access to information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and, on the l_
l other hand, the NRC policy on protecting the identities of allegers. The FOIA provides an i
exemption that allows NRC to protect allegers identities and identifying information. Allegation documents must be reviewed and redacted to protect allegers' identities and identifying information. For FOIA requests that capture many documents, this is a time-consuming process and the FOlA process has timeliness goals for responding to FOIA requests. In light of the FOIA l
requirements for timely release and DOJ's guidance on the application of FOIA exemptions, the NRC is reviewing the legal aspects of withholding allegation related information when responding to FOlA requests. i The release was also, in part, due to misunderstandings within the NRC staff of the roles of each ,
of the organizations involved in reviewing responses to FOIA requests. The NRC Executive Director for Operations chartered a task force to review the circumstances and root causes of the release to the Port St. Lucie News. The staff is currently developing an action plan to address the recommendations from that study. As part of the action plan, the staff will be reviewing the allegation process and its relation to other NRC programs to determine appropriate corrective actions.
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QUESTION 16. Do the cortinued problems in this area suggest a need for the l
Commission to take additional steps to preserve the confidentiality of whistleblowers?
ANSWER.
The staff believes that additional steps could be useful and action is already under way to determine what steps would be most effective.
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- QUESTION 17. What is the burden on the nuclear industry of IAEA inspection and verification of NRC licensees under the existing voluntary agreement?
ANSWER.
' The effect on the U.S. commercial nuclear industry of the application of IAEA saieguards is negligible. Since the start of safeguards implementation under the U.S. Voluntary Offer Safeguards Agreement in 1981, the IAEA has selected only a commercial fuel fabrication plant
. and two commercial reactors in the same geographical area for the application of safeguards.
However, IAEA under budget restraints, which occurred almost a decade ago, the only U.S.
facilities applying safeguards have been those where the U.S. has requested that safeguards be applied and for which the U.S. has agreed to fund safeguards activities. At present, the blend oown activity associated with highly enriched uranium from Kazakhstan (Project Sapphire) at the B&W Technologies Plant in Lynchburg, VA, is the only commercial activity subject to IAEA safeguards. All costs associated with this special activity are funded by the U.S. Department of Energy.
Under the initial Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement, material accounting data for the five U.S. fuel fabrication plants is reported to the IAEA from the national Nuclear Material Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS). This repcrting is similar to domestic rcportind a,
requirements and has little cost impact on the facilities.
QUESTION 18. What is the anticipated burden of the additional nuclear safeguards protocol on NRC licensees? Does the Commission believe that the additional burden will be minimal?
ANSWER.
The Commission anticipates that the effect on the licensees for implementation of the Additional Protocol to the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement will be minimal.
In accordance with the Additional Protocol, the U.S. Govemment will request a limited amount of specific information from (a) the fuel cycle licensees selected by the IAEA under the Initbl Protocol and the Safeguards Agreement, (b) those licensees possessing source material outside the auspices of intemational safeguards, and (c) those licensees manufacturing i
specifically identified equipment and materials. This information would be provided by the licensee only at the time of implementation of the Additional Protocol and when the reported information changes. This burden is expected to be minimal (approximately 0.1 FTE per year per NRC licensee).
The IAEA has indicated that their principal interest in the implementation of the Additional Protocol in the U.S. will be those facilities involved in intemational commerce with Non-Nuclear i Weapon States. In addition to the obligation to provide the information referenced above, the Additional Protocol authorizes the IAEA to request access to those sites at which a question has arisen regarding the accuracy of the information reported by the U.S. under the Protocol with respect to that site. Because of current IAEA budget limitations, there have been indications l
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' QUESTION 18. (Continued) .2 l 'that the IAEA will request access to U.S. facilities only where that access will assist the IAEA in i .. .
resolving a question relative to a Non-Nuclear Weapon State or a particular U.S. facility. This
' burden is also expected to be minimal.
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QUESTION 19. It is my understanding that the NRC believes that an all-pathways approach to radiation protection standards is appropriate, ar.d that a separate groundwater. standard is unnecessary. How is this consistent with the national policy that current or potential sources of drinking water should be protected at levels that are suitable for drinking (i.e., the EPA maximum contaminant levels [MCLs])?
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ANSWER.
l The current national policy on drinking water, as stated in the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), .
is that water supplied to consumers by large community providers meet specified maximum contaminant levels (MCLs). At the tap, the application of these standards to groundwater is inappropriate in that it does not consider the normal filtration, mixing and dilution that occurs as a function of extracting groundwater and providing it to consumers. i in the case of the nation's most seriously polluted sites [i.'e., those on the National Priority List (NPL) under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)] EPA has decided to impose MCL in groundwater. NRC has not expressed a position with regard to the ' j i
appropriateness of this application for chemical pollutants. However, NRC performed cost benefit analyses for the application of MCL for radionuclides in groundwater at or near i decommissioned sites and has found that it is not appropriate.
l The application of radionuclides MCLs in groundwater may be less protective than NRC's all-pathways standard since: (1) the MCLs are based on a modeling approach that has not been
-l QQESTION 10. . (continued) 2-updated in over 30 years to reflect current understandings of uptake and doses resulting from ingestion of radionuclides through drinking water, (2) MCL requirements do not cover all radionuclides, and (3) MCL does not provide a consistent risk basis for license termination.
While EPA generally refers to radionuclides MCLs as a'"4 mrem /yr standard," use of MCLs1 I - results in calculated doses spanning four orders of magnitude (<0.01 mrem /yr to over 100 mrem /yr) ' For most radionuclides (over 80%), the maximum calculable dose from MCL is a :
- fraction of 1 mrem /yr. For some radionuclides, and combinations of radionuclides, the dose is
. many times the 25 mrem /yr all-pathway, all-radionuclides standard established by NRC for i !
. decommissioned sites.
. EPA has not corrected the inconsistency in risk from application of its MCLs because it believes it is bound by a requirement to amend MCLs only in a more protective direction. So, even L though it is weit understood that the current MCLs for radionuclides are based on obsolete .
1 calculational approaches, EPA has not revised them to reflect the current intemationally supported and accepted calculational methodology.
LThe Commission agrees with the EPA that environmental integrity of the nation's groundwater resources needs to be protected, but, believes the protection of that resource, as well as the ,
public health and safety, is fully afforded by limiting exposure to persons from all potential S sources of radioactive material by limiting the total dose at decommissioned sites to a fraction of '
the limit for dose to members of the public.-
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QUESTION 20. Since the NRC does not believe in protecting groundwater to levels that are consistent with national policy, it is possible that NRC licensees may be contaminating aquifers to levels greater than the MCLs. These aquifers would then need to be cleaned up by a water suppter before the public could be provided with safe drinking water. How does the NRC justify passing the cost of this clean-ept x party (probably the American taxpayer) other than the polluter?
ANSWER.
As discussed in the answer to Qucstion 19, the NRC believes that use of an all-pathways standard for protection of the put,lic would in all cases be adequately protective, and in some cases, be more protective than use of the existing MCLs. This is because: (1) the MCLs are based'on a modeling approach that has not been updated in over 30 years to reflect current understandings of uptake and doses resulting from ingestion of radionuclides through drinking :
water, (2) MCL requirements do not cover all radionuclides, and (3) MCL does not provide a i consistent riek basis for license terminatbn. Further, based on actual groundwater monitoring data, typical operational practices of the majority of nuclear facilities, ond on the behavior of radionuclides in the environment, concentrations of radionuclides in groundwater will rarely exceed an insignificant fraction of the NRC's dose criterion of 25 mrem per year, and would be either below or only marginally above the MCLs codified in 40 CFR 141. This is primarily due to the fact, that for the vast majority of NRC licensees, such as reactors and industrial facilities, the major contaminants are relatively short-lived nuclides such as Co-60 and Cs-137. Since the
' migration of these nuclides through soilis very slow, groundwater contamination of any
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QUESTION 20. (continued) 2-l 'i I
l significance is unlikely. In addition, it is not anticipated that decommissioned nuclear facilities will be located near enough to public water treatment facilities to have any affect on the quality . l of drinking water, in addition, the final rule addressing radiological criteria for license termination requires licensees to demonstrate that residual radioactivity is as far below 25 mrem as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). For any licensee for which there is the potential for groundwater contamination, demonstration of compliance with the ALARA requirement must address the potential for impacting public drinking water supplies. In cases where such a potential exists, this demonstration may indicate that remediation may be required.
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o' QUESTION 21. (A) The NRC regulates low-level radioactive waste disposal sites with a limit of 25 millirem per year to any off-site individual without separate groundwater requirements, and has the same standard for decontamination and decommissioning of licensee facilities.
The EPA requires public water suppliers to not exceed 4 millirem per year from all man-made sources of radioactivity, under health-based limits promulgated under the Safe Drinking Water Act. How l
does the NRC assure that its standard does not result in more
' than 4 milNrem in groundwater contaminated by one of your licensees and used by any public water supplier now and in the .
future?
ANSWER.
As stated above in the answer to Question 19, the current national policy on drinking water, as stated in the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), is that water supplied to consumers by large community providers meet specified maximum contaminant levels (MCLs). The application of these standards to groundwater is inappropriate in that it does not consider the normal filtration, mixing and dilution that occurs as a function of extracting groundwater and providing it to consumers.
While EPA generally refers to radionuclides MCLs as a "4 mrem /yr standard," use of MCLs results in calculated doses spanning four orders of magnitude (<0.01 mrem /yr to over 100 mrem /yr). For most radionuclides (over 80%), the maximum calculable dose from MCL is a
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i- g OUESTION 21(Al (continued) 2 l
l l fraction of 1 mrem /yr. For some radionuclides, the dose is many times the 25 mrem /yr all-pathway, all-radionuclides standard established by NRC.
l L NRC's regulations for land disposal of low-level radioactive waste are contained in 10 CFR I Part 61. Section 61.41 establishes the 25 millirem per year all-pathways standard for releases l
l to the genera! environment. Furthermore, such releases must be as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). Part 61 also requires environmental monitoring during the pre-operational, i operational, and post-operational stages of the facility to ensure that the regulation's performance objectives are met. Such monitoring requirements are established based on site specif;c conditions but would include groundwater monitoring.
l There is no requirement in NRC's regulations to maintain the groundwater dose contribution below those limits established for drinking water under the SDWA because there is no technical i-( justification for this application of the drinking water limits. However, the groundwater monitoring
- . required by 10 CFR 61 would detect groundwater contamination and action could be taken, based on that monitoring.
i The application of radionuclides MCLs in groundwater may be less protective than NRC's all-pathways standard since: (1) the MCLs are based on a modeling approach that has not been updated in over 30 years to reflect current understandings of uptake and Coses resulting from ingestion of radionuclides through drinking water, (2) MCL requirements do not cover all radionuclides, and (3) MCL does not provide a consistent risk basis for license termination.
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- QUESTION 2i!Aj. (continued) 3 i-l The Commission agrees with tiie EPA that the environmental integrity of the nation's ,
1 groundwater resources needs to be protected, but, that protection of that resource, as well as the public health and safety, is fully afforded by limiting exposure to persons from all potenti '
l- sources of radioactive material by limiting the total dose at low-level radioactive waste disposal sites to a fraction of the limit for dose to members of the public.
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QUESTION 21. (B) Furthermore, how would the NRC limit protect families not using public water supplies who get their drinking water from small wells located near waste disposal sites now and in the future?
ANSWER.
NRC's regulations for land disposal of low-level radioactive waste are contained in 10 CFR Part 61. Section 61.41 establishes the 25 millirem per year all-pathways standard for releases to the general environment. The performance assessment conducted during the review of the license models the performance of the site to verify compliance with Part 61. In addition to other pathway analyses, this assessment examines the radionuclides concentrations in groundwater at all potential points down-gradient from the site where a human could come in contact with contaminated water. This would include the analysis of a potential well at the site boundary.
Furthermore, such releases must be as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). Part 61 also requires environmental monitoring during the pre-operational, operational, and post-operational stages of the facility to ensure that the regulation's performance objectives are met. Such monitoring requirements are established based on site specific conditions but would include groundwater monitoring.
There is no requirement in NRC's regulations to maintain the groundwater dose contribution below those limits established for drinking water under the SDWA because there is no technical justification for this application of the drinking water limits. However, the groundwater monitoring required by 10 CFR 61 would detect groundwater contamination and action could be taken, based on that monitoring.
Ol>ESTlON 21(8). (continued) 2 I
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l QUESTION 22. EPA's generic standards for spent fuel, high level waste and transuranic waste provide for a 15 millirem overall standard and separate protection of groundwater. The Waste lsciation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a deep geologic )
l repository in New Mexico, is required b meet this standard. The Greater Confinement Disposal Facility, which is a neighbor of Yucca Mountain on the Nevada Test Site at a distance of about 5 kilometers away is also required to meet this standard. Why is NRC reportedly indicating that the Yucca Mountain repository does not need to meet the same standards?
l ANSWER.
l-l The Energy Policy Act of 1902 directs EPA to issue site-specific standards for the disposal of I high-level waste (HLW) at Yucca Mountain that are based on and consistent with the.
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on the " Technical Bases 4
for Yucca Mountain Standards." NRC is required to implement that standard, and will do so, as i
soon as EPA promulgates it. It is important to note that EPA was required to have a final standard in place almost 2 years ago, and as yet a draft standard has not been published. As l such, NRC has tried to move forward in developing a technical basis for licensing using the best i
scientific information available, and the NAS report, to predict what the final standard will be.
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, The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Land Withdrawal Act reinstated a portion of EPA's generic standards and directed EPA to issue final disposal regulations; this statute excepted Yucca Mountain, which is being characterized under section 113(a) of Public Law 97-425 (Nuclear j Waste Policy Act of 1982), from the reinstated standards and the final disposal regulations.
QUESTION 22. (continued) 2 In June 1997, NRC addmed the issue of EPA's generic standards at WIPP (Paperiello to Weinstock, dated June 2,1997) as they relate to disposal of high level wastes at Yucca Mountain. In that letter, it was noted that the staff had commented extensively during the development of those standards including referencing the fact that the technical community had raised significant concems regarding the scientific basis for and appropriateness of EPA's 1985 standards. The letter further noted that EPA chose, in its 1993 rulemaking, not to accept comments, including those from NRC, on those portions of the standards that were legislatively reinstated. Further, the National Academy of Sciences recommendations on the technical bases for Yucca Mountain standards reiterated some of these concerns.
While NRC objected to the inclusion of a separate groundwater standard at WIPP, it is important to note that WIPP is not required to meet maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) in groundwater since there is no potable water under the site according to EPA's criteria. NRC has believed and continues to believe that the separate groundwater protection requirements in 40 CFR Part 191 are unnecessary because individual protection criteria which take into account all pathways, are sufficiently protective of the groundwater pathway, and represent a more uniform and 1 comprehensive approach to protecting public health and safety. Further, NRC continues to believe that the use of maximum contaminant levela (MCLs) for protection of groundwater in HLW disposal is fundamentally incompatible with the technical basis EPA employed to derive these levels, and is a continuation of EPA's practice of applying the MCLs found in 40 CFR 141 to other activities without justification or cost benefit analysis.
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QUESTION 22. (continued) 3 Regarding the 15 millirem overall standard, the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) and the National C'ouncil on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) 1 i use an approach similar to EPA's in setting an acceptable risk level. ICRP and NCRP are organizations which are chartered, and internationally recognized, for the development of basic radiation protection standards. Their findings are contained in ICRP Publication 60 and in NCRP No.116, respectively. Based on their review of health and societalissues, both documents (while acknowledging the difficulty of setting standards for an " acceptable" public dose limit) arrive at 100 mrem /yr as a level that can be said to be acceptable. Current generally applicable standards for protection of the public, promulgated by EPA, limit doses to members of the public to 500 mrem /yr. In a draft revision to those standards, EPA has recommended a limit of 100 mrem /yr, consistent with intemational and national recommendations, and NRC regulations. Generally, a principle of apportioning this total dose limit is used to constrain specific sources of exposure. NAS reported that various countries allocate high-level waste disposal between 10 and 30 mrem per year as the dose limit. ICRP emphasizes that these partitions of the individual dose standard for individual activities such as waste disposal, are not limits, but rather constraints, above which doses would not be considered unacceptable. NRC believes an all-pathway 30 mrem /yr dose limit is consistent with international practices, other NRC regulated activities, and protective of public health and safety.
The Greater Confinement Disposal (GCD) at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) is being used by the Department of Energy to provide greater confinement than near-surface disposal for specific wastes such as classified transuranic wastes and greater than Class C waste. DOE disposal at the GCD Facility at NTS involves defense waste and is not subject to NRC regulations, thus,
- o QUESTION _2_2. (continued) 4 NRC staff have limited understanding of DOE's justification for requirements for the GCD at NTS and the variety of waste types and forms anticipated for disposal at NTS. The approach for safe disposal of HLW at Yucca Mountain includes a sophisticated container, a well-defined, specific waste form (i.e., spent nuclear fuel and HLW glass), detailed characterization of the Yucca Mountain site and analysis of site performance for 10,000 years considering a wide range of events (e.g., igneous activity). It is NRC's understanding that the approach for disposal of wastes at GCD facility at NTS relies primarily on slow migration in unsaturated alluvium at the NTS. Requirements for the GCD Facility, such as separate requirements for groundwater protection, could be compensating factors for limitations in design (e.g., no sophisticated waste package compared to HLW disposal) and analysis (e.g., limited range of events considered in GCD performance assessments) that are not present in HLW disposal.
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QUESTION 23. Why shouldn't groundwater protection requirements be in place since groundwater is the only known resource in the immediate Yucca Mountain area that could be, or is likely to be, exploited, particularly in light of the population growth projections for the area around the repository site?
ANSWER.
NRC fully supports the protection of groundwater as a unique valuable resource in the desert southwest, but believes this can be accomplished most effectively through the implementation of
. a single, comprehensive individual all-pathway, all-radionuclides standard. Specifically, at the Yucca Mountain site, the groundwater pathway is considered the most likely pathway for human l exposure to radionuclides. Therefore, estimations of tne doses from radionuclides in t
groundwMer will be a critical component in evaluating compliance with an all-pathways criterion.
As noted in the Paperiello to Weinstock letter (dated June 2,1997), NRC believes that the use of maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) for protection of groundwater in HLW disposal is l fundamentally incompatible with the technical basis EPA employed to derive these levels. First, l
l MCLs were never developed for the purpose of groundwater protection. They were developed to be applied to drinking water from public water systems at the water tap after mixing, dilution and filtration / treatment, not directly to groundwater at the point of greatest concentration in an aquifer. Moreover, application of MCLs to estimations of groundwater concentration levels in an aquifer many thousands of years in the future, may significantly increases the complexity of the analysis and the accompanying technical justification in order to demonstrate compliance.
Specifically, determinations of the greatest concentration at a point in an aquifer will need to rely on either sophisticated analyses that require additional site characterization and design features
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QUESTION 23. (continued) 2 or bounding (i.e., worse case) analyses to defend concentration projections many thousands of years in the future. Bounding analyses used to determine the maximum concentration at a point in the aquifer would render a large number of potential sites unsuitable for HLW regardless of the actual risk to those who drink the water at the tap, Sophisticated analysis, to accurately determine the maximum concentration at a point in the aquifer, could place significant site characterization requirenants that may not be implementable at a wide range of sites.
Additionally, the compliance demonstration for geologic disposal of HLW at Yucca Mountain will require estimations of radionuclides releases and groundwater flow and transport over many thousands of years that will lead to estimates of dose or risk to future users of groundwater.
These projections of the future behavior of a repository do not represent actual doses, as in current applications to drinking water from public water systems. Rather they represent a reasonable test of future repository behavior based on our best information about the site today.
Strict compliance with MCLs, which represent near-back' ground concentrations for many
- radionuclides, at sites like Yucca Mountain with potable groundwater sources, imposes a level of accuracy and precision in estimating the behavior of the site and design of the repository that challenges the state-of-the art for making and defending performance estimations and is not a reasonable test of future repository behavior. Therefore, application of MCLs at Yucca Mountain could lead to additional site characterization and design features in attempts to defend these estimations of doses many thousands of years from now when there is little to no increased benefit to public health and safety beyond that provided by compliance with an all-pathway l
standard.
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OUESTION 24, if the standard is more relaxed for the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain, how do you explain to the citizens of Nevada that they are not entitled to the same level of protection as those in New Mexico and that their water is not as important?
ANSWER.
4 Protectine, the health and safety of the citizens of Nevada is the first and foremost goal of all NRC HLW activities. The Energy Policy Act of 1992 directs EPA to issue site-specific standards for the disposal of high-level waste (HLW) at Yucca Mountain that are based on and consistent with the recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report on the " Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards." NRC is required to implement that standard, and will do so, as soon as EPA promulgates it. The people of Nevada will have opportunity to participate in the development of EPA's health-based standard and NRC's rule which implements that standard, through both agency's procedures for the development of similar standards for the protection of the public health and safety and the environment.
It is important to note that EPA was required to have a final standard in place almost 2 years ago, and as yet a draft standard has not been published. As such, NRC has tried to move forward in developing a technical basis for licensing using the best scientific information available, and the NAS report, to predict what the final standard will be.
An all-pathway dose limit, specific to Yucca Mountain, is consistent with the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and the National Academy of Sciences'(NAS) recommendations (Technical Bases for
)
1
- QUESTION 24. (continued) . 2 4
Yucca Mountain Standards). Numerical values for the dose limit, being considered for a Yucca Mountain standard, are consistent with radiation protection recommendations of national and
- intemational organizations and the level of protection afforded other commercial fuel cycle facilities currently subject to EPA standards and NRC implementing regulations.
The Intemational Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) and the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) use an approach similar to EPA's in setting an
. acceptable risk level. ICRP and NCRP are organizations which are chartered, and intemationally recognized, for the development of basic radiation protection standards. Their findings are contained in ICRP Publication 60 and in NCRP No.116, respectively.. Based on
- their review of health and societal issues, both documents (while acknowledging the difficulty of
. setting standards for an " acceptable" public dose limit) arrive at 100 mrem /yr as a level that can be said to be acceptable. Current generally applicable standards for protection of the public, promulgated by EPA,' limit doses to members of the public to 500 mrem /yr. In a draft revision to
- those standards, EPA has recommended a limit of 100 mrem /yr, consistent with intemational and national recommendations, and NRC regulations. Generally, a principle of apportioning this total dose limit is used to constrain specific sources of exposure. NAS reported that various
. countries allocate high-level waste disposal between 10 and 30 mrem per year as the dose limit.
NRC believes an all-pathway 30 mrem /yr dose limit is consistent with intemational practices, other NRC regulated activities, and protective of public health and safety.
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,. i I
' OUESTION 24. (continued) 3 The standards applicable to WIPP and the strategy approved by the Commission for the j
,. development of NRC regulations for a Yucca Mountain site (SECY-97-300), provide different strategies for protecting public health and safety. The approach taken in SECY-97-300 is to rely on an all-pathways individual dose limit to protect the public health and the environment (including groundwater that might be used by the citizens of Nevada). This ensures that no single pathway will result in an unacceptable risk to the public health. Therefore, the -
i groundwater will remain a resource for the citizens of Nevada and its use will not pose an j l
unacceptable risk to their health.
I i
The' absence of an additional requirement specific to groundwater does not mean that the 1 groundwater is unimportant or unprotected. NRC has believed and continues to believe that the separate groundwater protection requirements in 40 CFR Part 191 are unnecessary because individual protection criteria which take into account all pathways, are sufficiently protective of the groundwater pathway, and represent a more uniform and comprehensive approach to protecting public health and safety ' Further, NRC continues to believe that the use of maximum contaminant levels (MCLs) for protection of groundwater in HLW disposal is fundamentally incompatible with the technical basis EPA employed to derive these levels, and is a continuation of EPA's practice of applying the MCLs found in 40 CFR 141 to other activities without justification or cost benefit analysis. ' Also, the contemplated approach considers the full range of q reasonably likely events that may result in the citizens of Nevada having an increased exposure
- to releases from Yucca Mountain. In contrast, the individual dose limit applied at WIPP includes a narrower range of events that could lead to elevated releases. Therefore, a direct numerical
.. j QUESTION 24. (continued) 4 comparison of the dose limits should not be used to compare the protectiveness of the two approaches. It is important to note that while NRC objected to the inclusion of a separate groundwater standard at WIPP, WIPP is not required to meet MCL in groundwater since the water under the site is not potable according to EPA's criteria. NRC considers the approach outlined in SECY-97-300 to be appropriate to provide sufficient protection to the public health
! and the environment.
t
QUESTION 25. Does the NRC agree that the nation deserves a uniform approach to protecting the public from unnecessary exposure to hazardous materials, both chemical and radiation? If so, please explain the justification for treating radiation as a privileged pollutant.
ANSWER.
The NRC agrees that a consistent approach to risk management is desirable. However, the -
application of similar dose limits to different situations may not be appropriate due to the different data, assumptions, and uncertainties that underlie dose calculations, as well as the wide range of acceptable risks across society.
t
' Radiation is present in nature, resulting in doses several times the current NRC limits. The air we breath, the materials with which we build our homes, the soil in which we grow our food, and even our own bodies are radioactive. No empirical evidence exists showing higher cancer rates between populations exposed to high background radioactivity as compared to similar populations exposed to low background radioactivity. Limiting exposure to radiation to a small fraction of the natural variability in background radiation levels is unlikely to have a significant affect on cancer rates.
NRC limits radiation dose to individual members of the public to 100 mrem /yr which is five times more restrictive than current EPA Federal Guidance for members of the public of 500 mrem / year
[25 FR 9057,09/26/61). In December,1994, EPA proposed for public comment, changes to its L___________ . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - . _ _ - _ -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
'4, QUESTION 25. (continued) 2 Federal Guidance which would adopt the 100 mrem'yr limit for members of the public. However, this guidance has not been finalized.
1 i
Both EPA and NRC conservatively assume that for radiation protection purposes, any exposure to ionizing radiation may cause biological effects even though there exists no scientific proof at these very low levels (U.S. natural background levels are about three times the 100 mrem /yr limit or 300 mrem /yr). This assumption is called the linear-no-threshold hypothesis (LNT), and uses human epidemiological data from high dose, high dose rate exposures from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs. Although the Committee on Biological Effects of lonizing Radiation (BEIR V) has stated that, "...the possibility exists that there may be no risk from exposures comparable to natural background," most ocientists and regulatory bodies conservatively use this linear assumption for regulatory purposes.
The 100 mrem /yr limit corresponds to about 4x10-3 lifetime risk of cancer (assuming an individual received the full 100 mrem /yr, every year, for a 70 year lifetime, and assuming the validity of the linear-no-threshold hypothesis at very low doses). Furthermore, NRC, based upon national and international recommendations, further constrains dose due to residual radioactivity at decommissioned facilities, fuel cycle facilities, waste facilities, and reactors to less than one-fourth of this lifetime risk (i.e.', no more than 25 mrem in any one year).
Conversely, the hfetime risk of fatal cancer from exposure to suspected chemical carcinogens generally is based upon laboratory studies using mice or rats with little or no human L
..- 1
- QUESTION 25. (continued) 3
' i epidemiological data. The risk range that EPA uses for individual environmental pollutants,104 to 104 for single source standards, was developed by EPA during the 1980's. A rationale for i
EPA's value of 104 can be found in the Federal Register Notice (FRN) for EPA's " National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs)" under the Clean Air Act (54 FR
- 38044, September 14, .1989). The FRN notes that in the Vinyl Chloride decision [ Natural l
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d at 1146 (D.C. Cir.1987)], EPA was directed l
.to letermine an acceptable risk level based on a judgment of what risks are " acceptable in the world in which we !!ve." in response to the Vinyl Chloride decision, EPA compiled a review of - .
societal risks and stated in the FRN that the individual risk of premature death was between 104
. to 101, and that the level of approximately 10' is within the range for individual risk in the survey that comported with many previous health risk decisions by EPA.
No fixed risk level could be identified by EPA as acceptable in all cases and under all regulatory programs for two main reasons. First, in most cases, the calculation of risks depend on different
' data, assumptions, and uncertainties. For example, the risk associated with motor vehicta and other common accidents can be calculated directly from accident records and therefore reflect actual risk; whereas environmental risks are based on estimating procedures and assumptions and therefore are more uncertain. Thus, actuarial and environmental risk estimates cannot be directly compared to determine whether one risk is more or less acceptable than another.
' Second, acceptability of risk is a relative concept and involves consideration of different factors,
! such as: the certainty, familiarity, and severity of the risk; the reversibility of the health effect;
QUESTION 25. (continued) 4 and whether the risk is voluntary (i.e., the medical use of ionizing radiation). Thus, different judgments on acceptability can be made for similar numerical risks.
NRC believes that risk management decisions for both chemical and radiation hazards, including carcinogens, should be guided by a coherent system of protection. Such a system for radiation hazards has been developed by the Intemational Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and in the U.S., by the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP). The NCRP recommendations are consistent with those of ICRP. ICRP recommendations are being adopted worldwide, including by members of the European Community, which must adopt basic safety standards (BSS) by May 13,2000. The BSS follow the ICRP recomme7dations as well. The implementation of this system helps to ensure that the net benefit to society is maximized; the detriment any carcinogens are suspected to pose is
. justified; and the magnitude of individual exposures, the number of individuals exposed, and the likelihood of incurring any exposure is kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
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QUESTION 26. The Superfund National Contingency Plan (NCP) includes the expectation that groundwater be returned to beneficial use wherever practicable.
l l
The NCP clarifies that Maximum Contaminant Levels or non-zero Maximum Contaminant Level Goals established under the Safe Drinking Water Act will typically be considered relevant and appropriate where l l
groundwater are current or potential sources of drinking water. Why did I
the NRC establish a rule for decontamination and decommissioning of licensee facilities that is inconsistent with existing national policy and Superfund legislation?
l ANSWER.
The current national policy on drinking water, as stated in the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),
is that water supplied to consumers by large community providers meet specified maximum contaminant levels (MCLs). The application of these standards to groundwater is inappropriate in that it does not consider the normal filtration, mixing and dilutMn that occurs as a function of extracting groundwater and providing it to consumers.
In the case of the nation's most seriously polluted sites (i.e., those on the National Priority List (NPL) under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)) EPA has decided to impose MCL in groundwater. NRC has not expressed a position with regard to the appropriateness of this application for chemical pollutants. However, NRC performed cost benefit analyses for the application of MCL for radionuclides in groundwater at or near decommissioned sites and has found that it is not appropriate.
QUESTION 26. (continued) 2 The application of radionuclides MCLs in groundwater may be less protective than NRC's all- l pathways standard since: (1) the MCLs are based on a modeling approach that has not been updated in over 30 years to reflect current understandings of uptake and doses resulting from ingestion of radionuclides through drinking water, (2) MCL requirements do not cover all radionuclides, and (3) MCL does not provide a consistent risk basis for license termination.
While EPA generally refers to radionuclides MCLs as a "4 mrem /yr standard," use of MCLs results in calculated doses spanning four orders of magnitude (<0.01 mrem /yr to over 100 )
mrem /yr). For most radionuclides (over 80%), the maximum calculable dose from MCL is a fraction of 1 mrem /yr. For some. radionuclides, and combinations of radionuclides, the dose is many times the 25 mrem /yr all-pathway, all-radionuclides standard established by NRC for decommissioned sites.
EPA has not corrected the inconsistency in risk from application of its MCLs because it believes itself to be bound by a requirement to amend MCLs only in a more protective direction. So, even though it is well understood that the current MCLs for radionuclides are based on obsolete calculational approaches, EPA has not revised them to reflect the current internationally supported and accepted calculational methodology.
i l
i The Commission agrees with the EPA that the environmentalintegrity of the nation's l
- groundwater resources needs to be protected, but, that protection of that resource, as well as l
l the public health and safety, is fully afforded by limiting exposure to persons from all potential i
l
- OUESTION 26. (continued) 3 sources of radioactive material by limiting the total dose at decommissioned sites to a fraction of the limit for dose to members of the public.
As discussed in answers to Questions 20 and 25, the NRC's regulation, setting radiological criteria for license termination, is consistent with recommendations of the leading national and I i
international scientific bodies, and is consistent with the proposed Federal Guidance for )
1 Exposure of the General Public published by EPA in 1994. If NRC had chosen to treat I
groundwater separately there could be cases where the resulting public dose could be higher l than the 25 mrem per year dose for NRC's regulation because the existing MCLs are not based l on current science and therefore the resultant doses are not uniformly protective. Further, the
[ inconsistency in risk associated with use of these MCL values could actually result in net public harm. EPA's own analysis of the risks and benefits of their draft cleanup standard showed there to be net public harm at the low doses associated with some of these MCL values. That is l because, in order to meet MCL in groundwater as opposed to at the tap as the Safe Drinking i Water Act requires, would require excavation, shipping, and disposal of huge volumes of slightly contaminated soil to prevent migration to groundwater. Transport of this soil over the highways can be shown to cause more actual deaths from traffic accidents in the near term than it would f theoretically save in the far distant future based on uncertain and conservative calculations of ,
radiation risk.
l b_ ___ - - - - _ _
QUESTION 27. In NRC staff requirements SECY-97-300 "the staff should: develop radiation standards in the form of an overall facility performance standard that is generally consistent with the 1995 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) report " Technical Bases for Yucca Mountain Standards" as required by the 1992 Energy Policy Act (EPACT),in the absence of the Envirorsnental Protection Agency (EPA) standards and with due consideration given to the implementability of the NAS recommendations under NRC's regulatory process." EPACT clearly gives the authority to set such standards to the EPA. Why is the NRC ignoring current law?
ANSWER.
The Commission does not believe it is ignoring current law. Under the Energy Policy Act (EPACT) of 1992 EPA was required, within cne year following the issuance of the National Academy of Sciences' (NAS) Technical Basis Report for Yucca Mountain Standards, to promulgate site specific standards for a Yucca Mountain HLW repository. Also, under EPACT, NRC has one year to conform its regulations to final EPA Standards for Yucca Mountain.
Although the NAS report was published in August 1995, EPA has yet to propose standards for
. Yucca Mountain. In order not to delay the national program, NRC considers it prudent to commence development of site specific reguls.tions for Yucca Mountain that are consistent with 4
i the recommendations of NAS. Deferral of such development until final EPA standards are in place would make it impossible for NRC to issue final implementing regulations within one year, as required by statute. Irrespective of the level of protection, or who ultimately sets the l i
QUESTION 27. (continued) . 2 standards for Yucca Mountain, NRC will still need to develop a technical basis and regulatory )
[
approach for implementing dose- or risk-based standards for a repository at Yucca Mountain.
- Furthermore, in the face of a clear national need, and the absence of final EPA standards, NRC believes it has an obligation to make public how it would implement dose- or risk-based l standards. Provided that EPA promulgates standards that are consistent with the NAS
. recommendations and consistent with statutory direction in EPACT that such standards shall be l
j' the only health-based standards that are to apply to releases from radioactive materials i
disposed of in a Yucca Mountain repository, NRC's regulations developed in this manner should be generally consistent with EPA's standards.
L in sum, the Commission is amending its regulations to adopt a simpler, site-specific rule to factor -
L in knowledge and experience; it is not amending its rules to set a standard that is EPA's responsibility to establish. Further, under EPACT, NRC is required to conform its rules to EPA's standard within one year; therefore, by taking action now, in parallel, we will be better able to implement EPA's standa.-d within the required one year. When EPA fulfills its obligation to issue a dose-based (or risk-based) standard, NRC will amend its rules as necessary to be consistent.
l l OUESTION 28. In NRC staff requirements SECY-97-300 "the staff should: continue to steadfastly oppose the implementation of a separate groundwater standard and keep the Commission informed of developments in this area." What scientific basis does the Commission have to suggest that irradiated groundwater should not have a radiological protection j standard?
l l
l ANSWER.
The scientific basis for opposing the imposition of a separate and overlapping requirement for groundwater protection is the National Academy of Sciences' (NAS) recommendations, contained in their report " Technical Bases for Yucca Mounta:n Standards." The NAS did not j recommend the application of a separate groundwater protection standard. SECY-97-300 l directs the staff to develop radiation standards consistent with the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and i
the NAS Report, and consideran all-pathway dose standard.
As discussed above, in answers to Questions 22,23, and 24, NRC's use of an all-pathway dose standard is also consistent with the recommendations of the Intemational Commission on
- Radiological Protection (ICRP), the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements l
l- (NCRP), and EPA's proposed Federal Guidance for exposure of the general public published in
! 1994.
1
1
]
\
\
l QUESTION 29. On various occasions, the NRC has defended its position on setting {
l radiation protection standards by stating that the linear no threshold (LNT) model of radiation risk has never been proven. What technical basis does the NRC have for assuming that because this model has not been proven, j it is therefore unnecessarily and excessively protective of human health?
l As I indicated during the hearing, if there is uncertainty in this area, l
why shouldn't we adopt the more protective standard?
]
l l
ANSWER.
l The NRC has in the past and continues to base its decisions regarding the setting of its radiation protection standards in 10 CFR 20 on the recommendations and findings of national and international committees composed of scientists with expertise in the relationship between exposure to radiation and the risk of adverse health effects, including fatal cancers. These committees include the Intemational Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) which !
provides recommendations and guidance on all aspects of radiation protection, the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) which develops recommendations !
regarding radiation protection in the United States, the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) which advises the United Nations on the sources and effects ofionizing radiation, and the National Academy of Sciences Committee on Biological Effects of lonizing Radiation (BEIR) which is charged with evaluating health effects due to ionizing radiation. The NRC has provided funding to such committees to provide l independent advice on matters of radiation protectio't in promulgating the major revisions to 10 l
I
! i
n QUESTION 29.-(Continued) 2 i
' CFR 20 in 1991 (56 FR 23360), the NRC based its regulations on those recommendations of
' the NCRP, and ICRP.which apply to radiation protection of workers and members of the public.
~
'Specifically, these committees recommended that members of the public will be adequately protected provided the total dose from all pathways does not exc eed 100 mrem per year for y, extended periods. The NRC reliance on the LNT hypothesis, and the findings of UNSCEAR and r : the BEIR-V Committee in providing perspectives on risk and uncertainties associated with such
. exposuras were discussed in the 1991 Federal Register Notice. The NRC recognizes that the appropriateness of the LNT assumption as a predictive model in radiation protection has been challenged, particularly for low doses. However, there is no current national or intemational
- recommended attemative for making regulatory decisions. Therefore, as described in the
. response to Question ,30, the NRC uses the I.NT assumption as a conservative upper bound for Jexposures at low doses.
li In 1997, the NRC published its regulations establishing radiological criteria for license
' termination (62 FR 39056).. In establishing the radiological dose criteria for this rule, the
, u l:
- 4 Commission considered the recommendations and findings of the national and intemational committees regarding the use of the LNT and the associated risk coefficients and associated 1
. uncertainties, and concluded that it was appropriate to continue to rely on these concepts in providing a perspective on the risks associated with exposure to low doses of radiation. The FRN from the 1997 rulemaking is attached to provide the most recent summary of the l' a
Commission's views on these matters. The FRN also provides information on the quesnon of i
l 1
.y
,j-a l
- , , I L {
l- ;
1 L ,.
QUESTION 29. (Continued) 3 -1 I
l l why more protective standards than those established in the 1997 revision should not be adopted.
l l
As discussed in the attached FRN, the regulation requires that doses should be further reduced j
~to levels which are as l'ow as is reasonably achievable (ALARA). In some instances, as
. discussed in the generic environmental impact statement accompanying the final rule, achieving a dose due to residual radioactivity that would be less than 25 mrem per year could actually j i-result in net public harm as the increased risk of a fatality. EPA's own analysis of the risks and benefits of their draft cleanup standard showed there to be net public harm at the low doses l
associated with some of these MCL values. That is because, in order to meet MCL in groundwater as opposed to at the tap as the Safe Drinking Water Act requires, would require L excavation, shipping, and disposal of huge volumes of slightly contaminated soil to prevent migration to groundwater. Transport of 7 3 soil over the highways can be shown to cause more l actual deaths from traffic accidents in the near term than it would theoretically save in the far distant future based on uncertain and conservative calculations of radiation risk. In other cases, !
- i the costs of achieving a level of cleanup significantly below 25 mrem per year will be found to l
greatly exceed the benefits of the averted risk. This is particularly true at sites where there are 1
! large variations in background radiation levels when compared to the residual dose due to licensed activities. It was this perspective that led the NRC to only require cleanup to levels
- ~ below 25 mrem per year when it is reasonable to do so'. !
l-
Attachment:
FRN dated 7/21/97 9
h Monday July 21,1997 Mil N LIJ
-m
.h]
[
- z. Part 11
, , Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10 CFR Part 20, et al.
l Radiological Criteria for License
_A J Termination; Final Rule Radiological Criteria for License Termination: Uranium Recovery Facilities; Proposed Rule 1 1 f
e,_l) ,
i Tt i
1
- , l 39058 Federal Register / Vol. 62. No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations NUCLEAR REGULATORY 4 Average member of the entical group. XII Small Busmess Regulatory Enforcement COMMISSION B Cntena for restncted use (proposed rule Fairness Act
$6 20.1402(d) and 201405) .
)
! 10 CFR Parts 20,30,40,50,51,70 and 1 Proposed rule content 1. Introduction 72 2 Comments on acceptability of restncted The Nuclear Regulatory Commission use for decommissioned sites RIN 3150-AD65 3 Response is amending its regulations regarding )
4 Summary of rule revisions on restricted decommissioning oflicensed facilit2cs i Radiolog,i cal Criteria for License use to provide specific radiological enteria Termination C Alternate critena for hcense for the decommissioning of lands and .
termmauon. structures This action is necessary to AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory 1 Codifymg provisions for certam facihties ensure that decommissioning will be Commission that tbc proposed rule suggested carried out without unduo impact on ACTION: Final rule. exemPtmg. public health and safety and the 2 Exclusion of uranium /thonum mills environment
SUMMARY
- The Nuclear Regulatory Proposed in S 201401(a) These criteria apply to the Commission (NRC)is amending its 3 Other exemptions
- ate protectio entena decommissioning oflicensed facilities regulations regarding decommissioning ,po "",d and facilities subject to the NRC's oflicensed facilities to provide specific 1 Proposed rule content junsdiction The Comuussion will apply radiological cnteria for the 2 Use of Environmental Protection Agency these entena 2n determining the decommissioning of lands and dnnking water standards m NRC's adequacy of remediation of residual structures. The final rule is intended to regulation radioactivity resulting from the provide a clear and consistent E. Public participauon (proposed rule possession or use of source, byproduct, regu'latory basis for determining the %S 201406 and 20.1407) and special nuclear material. The c,xtent to which lands and structures can 1. Proposed rule content.
criteria apply to decommissioning of be considered to be decommissioned. 2 Genuat mquirements on notification nuclear facihties that operate through The final rule will result in more and s hcitauon f c mments (proposed their normal lifetime and to those that (flicient and consistent licensing 3. d tional re ments on public may be shut down prematurely, cctions related to the numerous and participation (includmg those for The intent of this rulemaking is to complex site decommissioning activities restncted use, for alternate entena, and Provide a clear and consistent anticipated in the future. for use of site-specific advisory boards regulatory basis for determining the EFFECTIVE DATE:This regulation iPmposed rule 5 201406(b)). extent to which lands and structures becomes effective on August 20,1997. 4 SPecific questions on functioning of site. must be remediated before H: wever, licensees may defer rule specific advisory boards. decommissioning of a site can be implementation until August 20,1998. F. Otter procedural and techmeal issues. considered complete and the license
- 1. State and NRC compatibility.
FOR FURTHER INFORIAATION CONTACT: 2. Grandfathering sites with previously terminated. The Commission believes Cheryl A. Trottier, Office of Nuclear approved plans (proposed rule that inclusion of criteria in the Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear 5 201401(b)). regulations will result in more efficient ,
Regulatory Comrmulon, Washington, 3. Finahty of decommissioning and future and consistent licensing actions related DC 20555-0001, telephone: (301) 415- site reopening (proposed rule to the numerous and frequently 6232, e-mail CAT 1@w gov; Frank S 20.1401(c)). complex site remediation activities Cardile Office of Nuclear Regulato 7 4. Minimization of contamination anticipated in the future. The (proposed rule SS 20.1401(d) and Commission has reassessed residual Research,U.S. Nudear Regulatory 20 1408).
Commission, Washington, DC 20555- contamination levels contained in 5 Provisions for readily removable 0001, telephone: (301) 415-6185: e-mail residual radioactivity ~
existin8 E"idance based on changes in FPC@nrc. gov; Dr. Carl Feldman, Office te standard for radon.
baste radiation protection standards, cf Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. 6.
7.CaSebation of total effective dose hapmvements in remediation, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, equivalent over 1000 years to radiation detection technologies, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone: demonstrate compliance with dose decommissioning experience, public standard, comments received on rule drafts and
[301) 415-6194, e-mail CXF@nrc. gov; or Christine M. Daily, Office of Nuclear G. Other comments. pubhc comments presented at Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear 1. Definitions (pmposed rule $ 20.2003). workshops held as part of the y g idance. zulemaking effort and public comments Regulatory Commission, Washington, dib bil DC 20555-0001, telephone: (301) 415- 4. Consistency with bPCs timeliness rule.
6026, e-mail CXD@nrc. gov. ha rey y ap lied site
- 5. Comments froid power reactor SUPPLERAENTARY INFORhlATION: decommissionmg rulemaking. . release Criteria for dBCommksioning on
- 1. Introduction 6. Mixed waste, hazardous waste, and a site-specific basis using existmg II. Background naturally occumng and accelerator. guidance. Although site-specific III. Overview of Public Comments prcduced radioactive material. situations will still occur, the IV. Summary of Public rhmments. Responses 7. Recycle. Commission believes that codifying to Comments, and Changes From 8. The rulemaking process. radio'ogical criteria for Proposed Rule V. Agreement State Compatibility A. Overall license termination approach decommissioning in'the regulations will VI. Relationship Between the Generic and criteria for unrestricted use Environmental hapact Statement and allow the NRC to more effectively carry (proposed rule SS 20.1402 and 20.1404). Site-Specific Decommi<tioning Actions out its function of protecting public
- 1. Proposed rule content. VII. Final Generic Environmental Impact health and the environment at
- 2. Criteria for unrestricted use, including Statement: Availability decommu.:sfoned sites by providing for total effective dose equivalent, as low as VDI. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement more efficient use of NRC and, licensee reannably achievable,and IX. Regulatory Analysis resources, consistent applicat2on across decommissiomng objective. X. Regulatory Flexibility Certification all types oflicenses, and a predictable
- 3. General comments on the dose enterion. XI.Backfit Analysis basis for decommissioning plannh2g.
Federal Register / Vol. 62. No.139 liMonday, July.21,.'1997. / Rulerand -Regulations. 39059
~
II, Background the following major sub ectareas and Specific requirenients for use o On August 22,1994 (59 FR 43200), sections of the pmpose, rule and are of these two basic metho'ds were,f each the NRC published a proposed rule for Presented in the following subsections: presented in the proposed rule. The comment in the Federal Register to (a) Overalllicense termmation preamble to the proposed rule also amend to CFR part 20 ofits regulations approach (unrestricted use, restricted indicated that there may be certain
" Standards for Protection Against use, exemptions, and alternate criteria),
Radiation" to include radiological and specific issues on criteria for licensees that would seek exe,mptions unrestricted use (including total from the decommissioning cnteria of criteria for license termination. The the proposed rule, although it did not public comment period closed on effective dose equivalent (TEDE), as low January 20,1995. Comments received codify this exemption path.
as is reasonably achievable (ALARA),
on the proposed rule were summarized Secuon IV.A.2 reviews in detail the bjective of decommissioning, average development of unrestricted use criteria; in NUREC/CR--6353. A workshop was member of critical group); and,in doing so it also indicates,in held on December 6-8.1994, to solicit (b) Specific issues on en,teria for additional comments related to site- restricted use (bases for using restricted general, how the overall approach for use, reliance on institutional controls, I license termination has been l specific advisory boards as described in reexamined to consider pubh,c the proposed rule. Comments received mSv (100 mrem) TEDE cap, engineered comments. Specific issues and during that workshop were summarized baniers, Enancial assuranceh in NUREG/CR 63071. A workshop was (c) Specific issues on exemptions and requirements agarding other areas' also held on September 29,1995, to alternate criteria for license termination specifically restricted use, exemptions, (facilities with large volumes of low and alternate criteria, are discussed in specifically discuss methods for '
level wastes, uranium and thorium more detail in Sections IV.B and IV.C of implementing the rule. Additionally' mills, exemptions);
commumcation with the public on the (d) Groundwater protection criteria thisdreambletion S 205402(a) of the pro proposed rule was maintained through rule indicated that the objective of the Electronic Bulletin Board system. (use of Environmental Protection decommissioning is to reduce residual Agency (EPA) drinking water standards III. Overview of Public Comments radioactivity in structures, soils, of 40 CFR 141 in NRC',s ngulation); groundwater, and other media at the site
, Over 100 organizations and (e) Public participation (means of so that the concentration of each individuals submitted comments on the notification, site-specific advisory boards (SSABs)); radionuclides that could contribute to
- proposed rule. The commenters residualradioactivityis '
represented a variety of interests. (f) Other procedural and technical issues (state compatibility- indistinguishable from the background Comments were received from Federal grandfathering, finality, minimization of radiation concentration for that nuclide.
and State agencies, electric utility Section 20.1402(a) further noted that, as licensees, material and fuel cycle contamination, readily removable residual radioactivity, radon, a practical matter, it would be extremely licensees, citizen and environmental difficult to demonstrate that such an groups, industry groups, native calculation of TEDE over 1000 years to demonstrate compliance with dose objective had been met and that a site American oxy,anizations, and standard); and release limit for unrestricted use was individuals. The commenters offered (g) Other comments (definitions.
from I to over 50 specific comments and regulatory guidance; timeliness rule; beingSectionproposed'04 20.14 of the proposed rule represented a diversity of views.The indicated that a site would be wastes; recycle; rulemakina process).
commenters addressed a wide range of The comments received from both considered acceptable for unrestncted !
issues concerning all parts of the rule. pubhc comment and the workshops use if the residual radioactivity that is The reaction to the rule in general and have been factored into the distinguishable from background to specific provisions of the rule was ,
Commission's decisionmaking on the radiation results in TEDE to an average varied. Viewpoints were expressed both final rule and into the technical basis for member of the critical group of 0.15 in support of and in disagreement with guidance documents implementing the mSvly (15 mrem /y)and has been nearly every provision of the rule. final rule The desenption of changes t reduced to levels that are ALARA.
IV. Summary of Public Comments the nnal mie made as a result of the Section 20.1402(d)of the proposed Responses to Comments, and Changes e mments in each of the major subject rule indicated that rslease for From Proposed Rule areas follows each comment / response unrestricted use of a facility is the section preferred approach but that the The following sections describe the alternative of release for restricted use A Overall Ucense Termination would also be allowed ifits use were e p po ed le org da o in Approach and Criteria for Unrestricted justified (see Section IV.B).
to the major subject areas and sections Use Proposed Rule SS20 2402 and I
of the proposed rule), present NRC 2OJ40# A2 Criteria for Unrestncted Use, responses to those comments, and IncludmgTEDE, ALARA,and A.1 Proposed Rule Content Decommissioning Objective explain principal changes to the proposed rule (where they occurlin The proposed rule (S 201402(d)) A27 Comments. Some commenters response to those comments The presented an overall approach for (including EPA) agreed that 015 mSv/
comments are orgamzed according 1 license termmation involving either of y (15 mrem /y) is an acceptable criterion two basic methods, i.e., unrestricted use because it is attainable, provides a
' Copies of NUREGS may be purchased from the or restncted use of sites after license margin of safety, and isn't unjustifiably termination The proposed rule costly The Department of Energy (DOE) kn$n"sIrfc o o7a*7$*2NaI$$ indicated that unrestncted use was 20013-7082 Copies are also available from the agreed that 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) generally preferred, but that restricted could be acceptable if reasonable Nauonal Techmcal Infonnanon semce. s2ss Port use was also permitted because it was Royal Road. Spnngfield. VA 22161 A copy is also scenanos were considered although it recognized that there may be cases preferred 0.25 mSv or 0.3 mSv/y (25 or
$b unwon.212Il$ree$.Yw ,
where achieving unrestricted use would 30 mrem /y) with ALARA. However, Level). Washmgton. DC not be reasonable most commenterr did not agree with the
39060 Fed:ril Regi:t:r / Vol. 62, No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations 015 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) critenon Some evaluated, how flexibihty would be exposures to, or m some cases below, a opposed 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) as incorporated, what degree of 015 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) criterion would being too high and preferred alternatives simphfication of complex models would not generally be unduly burdensome for that reduced the contamination level to be mcorporated, and what final enteria most licensees, although in those cases !
lower levels, including preexistmg would be used where the costs would present an background. The majority of The proposed rule also contained,in l unreasonable burden, release of the site i commenters opposed 015 mSv/y (15 $ 20.1402(a), a decommissioning with restrictions placed on its use mrem /y) as being too low &l gave objective of reducing residual l would provide an alternative means for citernatives that genenily inc.uded radioactivity to levels that are achieving the same level of protection.
increasing the limit to a25,0 ;,0.5, or indistinguishable from background. Achieving levels ofless than 015 mSv/
1 mSv/y (25,30,50, o: 100 mrea/y) Section 20.1402(a) further noted that y (15 mrem /y), including achieving the with further reduction based on such an objective may be difficult to decommissioning objective, was l
ALARA. The categories of reasons given meet as a practical matter. Many generally seen as not cost-effective by commenters opposing 0.15 mSv/y commenters opposed estabhshment of because increasingly larger volumes of (15 mrem /y) as either too high or too the decommissioning objective because l concrete and soil would have to be l low included potential health impacts it is arbitrary, serves no purpose for removed at a greater net risk due to or the lack of demonstrable health mdustnal sites,is costly and a waste of deaths from transportation accidents effects at these levels. consistency with resources,is unlikely to be achieved, and because more difficult survey national and international standards, and cannot be measured. Some measurements would have to be made effect of multiple sources, consistency commenters supported establishmg the with little net benefit m dose reduction.
with other NRC/ EPA regulations, proposed objective because it is The NRC considered altematives t.nalysis of costs vs. benefits, ability to reasonable from a health standpomt, suggested in public comments and measure, effect on disposal capacity, Others suggested altemative objectives reexamined the rationale of the sffect on sites with naturally occurnng such as ALARA or using a dose that is proposed rule. A summary of that r-dioactive material (NORM 1, and indistinguishable from the variation in reexamination, along with a description r;sponsibility for cleanup of sites. background. of particular comments on the rationale, The proposed ruleindicated that A.2 2 Response. The preamble to the is contained in the following licensees would be expected to proposed rule described three broad subsections.
demonstrate that doses are ALARA considerations as providing the overall A.2.2.2 Iovelofrisk andconsistency below the proposed 0.15 mSv/y (15 rationale for the proposed rule's with otherEPA/NRC stondards. Some mrem /y) dose criterion. Some approach to license termination. The commenters criticized the health risk cammenters endorsed ALARA analyses first two considerations were related to associated with a 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /
in specific cases to determine if doses health and safety, i.e., level of risk and y) limit as too high thereby providing should be reduced below 0.15 mSv/y need for a constraint or margin ofsafety inadequate public protection. In (15 mrem /y) and recommended that a below the 1 mSv/y (100 mrem /y) public particular, they objectcd to the NRC's v11ue of 0.03 (or less) mSv/y (3 (or less) dose limit of 10 CFR pa:t 20 to account reliance on ICRP and NCRP because mrem /y) be the ALARA objective. Some for the potential effect of multiple recent research (including findings in of these commenters also requested that sources of radiation exposure. The third the aftermath of the 1986 Chernobyl the NRC explicitly mandate that consideration was related to practicality accident and in the 1990 report on technical and economic analyses be . and reasonableness of costs. The Biological Effects oflonizing Radiation performed. Other commenters indicated preamble to the proposed rule noted (the BEIR V report)) showed risks to be that ALARA principles and analyses that the risk implied by use of the higher than ICRP or NCRP indicated, or should not be required to determine if proposed 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) dose suggested other sources for hmits, cleanup should be performed to reduce is comparable to other standards and including a British standard and a doses below 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) practices of EPA and NRC for areas of National Academy of Sciences because the costs aielarge in unrestricted access in the vicinity of statement on radiation safety.
ccmparison with the small reduction in facilities, and that the proposed 0.15 Commenters also indicated that 0.15 risk. Several commenters indicated, mSv/y (15 mrem /y) standard provides a mSv/y (15 mrem /y) was too high alternatively, that ALARA should be substantial margin of safety (constraint) because it is higher than other NRC or allowed above 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) for a single source below the 1 mSv/y EPA standards such as those for and that the rule should allow ALARA (100 mrem /y) public dose limit in to operating reactors.
analyses to be used to permit a licensee CFR part 20 to account for the potential The majority of commenters criticized to release its site at a value higher than exposure of a member of the public to 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) as too low for 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) (up to 1 other sources. This " constraint" reasons which included that it is far mSv/y (100 mrem /y))if ALARA approach was noted as being consistent below the level at which health effects calculations support this alternative. with generic constraint have been observed in studies, that the Another commenter disagreed and recommendations made by naticaal and risks associated with other EPA and recommended that ALARA analyses be international scientific bodies such as rpplied only to demostrate if NRC standards (including 10 CFR parts the International Commission on 20,60 and 61,40 CFR parts 190 and additional cleanup is required below Radiation Protection (ICRP) and the 191, and EPA's radon action level) are 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y). Some National Council on Radiation higher, and that it is based on the linear commenters stated that guidance should Protection and Measurements (NCRP) non-threshold theory which is not be provided describing how ALARA Requirements related to ALARA, the should be achieved, how doses would appropriate for setting such standards.
decomspissioning objective, and These commenters also criticized the be quantified, how models and restricted use were included in the ruw parameters would be selected, what relationship of the risks implied by this based on the NRC staff analysis in the rule to those implied by standards for S/ person-rem value would be used, how Draft Generic EnvironmentalImpact chemical hazards.
nonradiological risks would be considered, how net risks would be Statement (GE!S) (NUREG-1496) that In general, many commenters stated showed that the costs of reducing that the NRC should work closely with
F;deral.R;gister / Vol. 62, No.139 / Mond:y. July 21,.1997 / Rules and Regulations 390.61 the EPA in developing its Ionizing Radiation (BEIR) and the appropriately in a range of 1'x10 ,2 to decommissioning regulations to assure United Nations Scientific Committee on 1x10 -2 (e.g., the level oflifetime risk that there are no conflicting or duplicate the Effects of Atomic Radiation corresponding to the 1 mSv/y (100 I
requirement.s and that the acceptable (UNSCEAR), and have developed mrem /y) public dose limit of 10 CFR risk levels and associated requirements recommendations regarding limitations Part 20, that is NRC's basic standard for developed by the two a compatible or the same.gencies are on exposure to radiation. In particular, DOE noted that the BEIR Committee conducted major public safety, is about 1.5x10-3).
Several of these commenters also a nonuzriform approach could reviews of the scientific data on health criticized 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y)as significantly impact the DOE risks oflow levels of ionizing radiation too low because the linear non-(environmental restoration program and in 1972,1980,1988, and 1990, and threshold model overestimates the risk that NRC/ EPA regulations will have an aimilar reviews were published by and should not be used in the analysis.
impact beyond NRClicensees. There UNSCEAR in 1977,1982,1986,and in response to comments on the risk was some commenter disagreement as to 1988. As noted in the proposed FRC, level, constant exposure over a 30. year whether EPA or NRC should take the these studies have provided more time period to dose levels of about 0.15-lead in issuance of exposure standards. certainty about radiation risks at high 0.25 mSv/y (15-25 mrem /y), results in In its comments on the NRC's proposed doses and dose rates.gUsing that an estimated lifetime risk of fatal cancer rulemaking. the EPA supported the 0.15 information and assumptions of of about 2.3x10-* to 3.8x10-* which is mSv/y (15 mrem /y) limit linearity with low dose / dose rate at the upper end of the acceptable risk In response, the NRC has considered reduction factors, BEIR V contains range suggested by EPA in their recentinformation and updated risk factors. comments on NRC's proposed rule but recommendations in ICRP Publication Concerning recent information from lower than that in NRC's public dose 60 and NCRP No.116. These documents the Chernobyl accident noted by a limits.2 These estimates are based on are developed by recognized experts in commenter, there are still ongoing the fields of radiation protection and use of thelinearnon. threshold niodel studies of the effects of the accident. A for calculating risk estimates. In health effects and contain reviews of report published by the principal response to specific comments on use of current significant research in radiation international organization studying the linear non-thzeshold modelin health effects. The NCRP is a nonprofit health effects from the accident, the estimating risk, use of the linear non-corporation chartered by the U.S. Organization for Economic Co-operation threshold modelfor estimating Congress to develop and disseminate and Development (OECD), entitled incremental health effec's per radiation information and recommendations "Chernobyl: Ten Years On: Radiological dose incurred is considered a reasonable thout protection against radiation and to and Health Impact," summarized the assumption for regulatory purposes by cooperate with the ICRP and other findings regarding health impacts by international and national scientific national and international organizations noting that scientific and medical bodies such as ICRP and NCRP. The with regard to these recommendations. observation of the population has not principalinternational and national The ICRP has continued to update and revealed any increase in cancers or radiological protection criteria, revise its estimates of health effects of other radiation induced disease that including the NRC's, are based on this radiation since its inception in 1928. In could be attributable to the Chernobyl assumption as a measure of its deliberations,ICRP maintains accident. The only area where an conservatism. NRC's policy regarding relationships with United Nations increase was noted was for thyroid health and labor organizations. use of the linear non-threshold model cancer. However, these effects most was stated in the preamble to the in addition, the NRC evaluated the likely resulted from the release of short- issuance of 10 CFR part 20 (56 FR proposed Federal Radiation Protection lived radioiodine from the accident and 23360; May 21,1991) noting that the Guidance for Exposure of the General the affinity of the thyroid gland for assumptions regarding a linear non.
Public (FRG) as published for comment iodine. Sinular effects would not be threshold dose effect model are on December 23,1994 (59 FR 66414),in applicable in decommissioning because appropriate for formulating radiation which the EPA, under its charter, made radioactive iodine is not expected to be protection standards. Although this recommendations to the President of the a sigmficant contaminant. The report matter continues to be the subject of Umted States concerning recommended fuither notes that, while studies further consideration at this time, there practices for protection of the public continue on long term effects, it is is not sufficient evidence to convince and workers from exposure to radiation unlikely that the exposure to the NRC to alter its policy as part of this Recent recommendations contained in contaminants in the environment will rulemaking.
ICRP 00. NCRP No.116, and the lead to discernible radiation effects in To provide some perspective on the proposed FRG are essentially similar the general population. Thus, this conservatism of considering dose Use of these sources for formulating research does not appear to indicate that criteria in the range of 0.154).25 mSv/
basic radiation protection standards is the Endings of the ICRP and NCRP will c:nsistent with NRC's general approach be shown to underestimate risks. sThe nsb are estunated assumans a nsk regarding risk decisions as is noted in Specifically with regard to the risk coemenent of sxto ~ per rem and a so-year hieume the preamble to issuance of 10 CFR part level, some of the commenters stated y,",",$17,j,be ' '
20 on May 21,1991 (56 FR 23360). The that the nsk of fatal cancers from 0.15 o assumpuon that it is unhkely that an indindual will conunue NRC considers it reasonable and mSv/y (15 mrem /y)is too high in to hve or work m the same ara for more than so appropriate to use the findings of these comparison with risk goals in the range years such an esumate is seeit as prendas a bodies in developing criteria for license 2x10-* to 1x10-6 used by EPA in c nsenativustimate of potennal nsk because land termination to apply to its licensees. Comprehensive Environmental "
The ICRP and NCRP and EPA have
,",",, C ',*" f3 M N " ( ,',"c,' , N'"h 8 Response. Compensation and Liability hmitms dose. and. for most of the facihties covered reviewed current, significant studies Act (CERCLA) regulations. Other by this rule. the 1T.DE is controlled by relauvely made by 'other health research bodies, commenters disagreed and stated that short-hved nuchdes of half-hves of 3o years or less such as the National Academy of precedents from earlier NRC Sciences-National Research Council's rulemakings support a level of risk
[h$*,'[,I,'g*['[r*i$$
, Y,aj ct i "
Committee on the Biological Effects of where much of the contammation is from Co 60 sigmficantly greater than that and more with a half-hfe of s 3 years)
39062 ' Fgdiral Registir / Vol. 62, No.139 /. Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations
- y (15-25 mrem /y). at should be noted suggested that 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y)' investigate all man-made exposures that that, as described in the Final CEIS is too low and indicated that the NRC an individual at the site would be (NUREC-1496) prepared in suppott of limit was inconsistent with ICRP and exposed to so as to demonstrate that the l this rulemakmg, these levels are small NCRP especially with regard to -
total dose does not exceed 1 mSv/y (100 when compared to the average level of - considerations of multiple sources of mrem /y). The clear tmphcation in this natural background radiation in the exposure, and that it would be unusual simple alternative is that, if individual Umted States (about 3 mSv/y (300 - for an individual to be exposed to mrem /y))and the variation of this sources are constrained to 0.25 mSv/y multiple sources approaching the 1 (25 mrem /y). NCRP believes at hkely, L
natural background across the Umted mSv/y (100 mrem /y) limit. These States. In addition, although as noted given the low potential for multiple commenters suggested that 25-30 exposures, that the public dose limits L above NRC s not alterin8 its pohey . percent of 1 mSv (100 mrem) is an will be met. Further reductions regarding use of the linear non- adoquate margin to account for multiple considering ALARA would still be threshold model as part of this sources. considered by NCRP No.116.
rulemaking, there is uncertainty - In response, and by way of (b)ICRP 60, Section 5.5.1. in associated with estimating risks at such background,it is noted that the NCRP in discussing the principles of constramts dose levels. This uncertainty occurs its pubhcation No. Ils (Chapter 15) and limits, notes that it is appropriate to i
because evidence of radiation dose - recommends that, for continuous select dose constraints applied to each hcIlth effects has only been observed at exposure, the effective dose to members source to allow for contributiosis from high dose levels (200 mSv (20,000 of the pubhc not exceed 1 mSv/y (100 other sources so as to snaintain doses mrem) and above) and significant - mrem /y) from all man.made sources, below the 1 mSv/y (100 mrem /y) limit uncertainty in risk estimation is other than medical and not mcluding ICRP 60 does not contain numerical introduced when extrapolating to the natural background sources. Similarly, guidance on dose constraints for '
vuy low dose levels bemg considered in ICRP, in Table 6 ofICRP Publication 60, particular practices, but notes that .
this rulemaking.The health effects recommends a limit of1 mSv/y (100 - cumulativo exposures to individuals resultang from even a dose of 1 mSv mrem /y) as the dose limit for the public, from existing sources near 1 mSv/y (100 (100 mrem) are uncertain. The BEIR and recommendation No. 3 of the draft mrem /y) are rarely a problem primarily Committee stated in its 1990 report EPA Federal Radiation Protection because of the widespread use of =
(BEIR V) that Studies of populations Guidance (FRG) indicates that the source-related dose constraints.
- chronically exposed to low-level combined radiation doses mcurred in Further explanation of the ,
radiation, such as those residing in any single year from all sources of fundamental concepts ofICRP 60 are
' regions of elevated natural background exposure (excluding medical and contained in the paper, "The ICRP radiation, have not shown consistent or natural background) should not Principles of Radiological Protection conclusive evidence of an associated . normally exceed 1 mSv (100 mrem) and and Their Application to Setting Limits increase in the risk of cancer." that continued or chronic exposure of and Constraints for the Public from -
The risk assocsated with a dose an individual over substantial portions Radiation Sources,'* by Professor Roger criterion in the range of about 0.15-0.25 of a lifetime at ornear 1 mSv/y (100 Clarke, Chairman of the ICRP Qanuary mSv/y (15-25 miem/y)is generally mrom/y) should be avoided. Consistent 12,1995; a copy is available in the file c:nsistent with the risk levels permitted with these bodies, the NRC assued 10 for this rulemaking in the NRC Public in the performance objectives forlow. CFR 20 (56 FR 23360)in 1991 that Document Room,2120 L Street NW.
level waste facilities in to CFR 61.41,. estab a public dose limit of 1 (Lower Level), Washington, DC). The
- and for fuel cycle facilities and for spent mSv/y (100 miem/y)in 10 CFR 20.1301, paper notes that the constraint approach fuel and high level waste in EPA's 40 These national and international-CFR 190 and 191. In addition, doses in denves from the optimization principle bodies also note and agree that, of radiation protection in which, for any the range of 0.15-0.25 mSv/y (15 -25 although the limit for the public dose source, individual doses should be mrom/y) are comparable to current NRC should be 1 mSv/y (100 mremly) from ALARA and also be constrained by practices for decommissioning of all man-made sources combined,it restrictions on doses to mdividuals (Le.,
reactors and certain materials facilities would seem appropriate that the dose constraints). The paper further and fuel cycle facilities. S amount that a person would receive reactors have been deco = specifically, from notes that a constraint is an individual
=l==soned in a single source should be further related criterion applied to a single C ce with Regulatory Guide 1.86 reduced to be a fraction of the limit to source to ensure that the overall dose and with an NRClicense termination account for the possibility that an limits are not exceeded, and that a dose letter to Stanford University (April 21, individual maybe exposed to more than constraint would therefore be set at a 1982, Docket No. 50-141). Materials one source of man-made radioactivity, fraction of the. dose hmit as a boundary facilities have been released in thus limiting the potential that an on the optimization of that source.
accordance with the levels for external individual would receive h dose at the Based on the principles presented in the
' radiation for beta /gsame exposurein public dose limit. Recommendations paper, the constraint recommended in NRC's Policy and Guidance Diesctive FC from these bodies, as well as from the the paper for a decommissioned site is 83-23. In addition, a dose criterion in NRC's Advisory Committee on Nuclear 0.3 mSv/y (30 mrem /y) and that further the range of 0.15-0.25 mSv/y (15-25 Waste (ACNW), regarding what the optimization through the ALARA mrom/y)isgenerally at the low end of fraction from a source should be are: principle is appropriate. As is the case the range of values estimated for Option (a) NCRP No.116, Chapter 15 notes for NCRP No.116, the implication of the 1 Cf the 1981 Branch Technical Position that no single source or set of sources paper and ICRP 60 is that the constraint
-(BTP) for sites with uranium and under one's control should result in an levelis a boundary on the dose from thorium and used for Ra-226 in to CFR individual being exposed to more than this source and is sufficient to assure 40, Appendiv A, for uranium mill 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y). This fraction contamination. that members of the public are not A.2.2.2 Effect ofmultiple sources was presented as a simple alternative to exposed to levels in excess of the public having a site operator (w.here a site dose limit.The rationale for this is andmargin ofsafetybelow 2 mSv/7 could expose individuals to levels expressed in Section 5.5.1 ofICRP 60 (100mmm/y).Some commenters greater than 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y)) where it is noted that the critical group
Federal Regist:r / Vol. 62,.No.139 / Monday, July 21, ~1997 / Rules and Regulations 39063 is not normally exposed to the y (100 mrem /y) limit appears.more Full time residence and farming at a constraint level front more than one justified and appropriate based on the decommissioned site,(b) exposure source although it may be exposed to likelihood that no more than 3 or 4 while working in a decommissioned some dose levelless than the constraint separate regulated sources will affect the building, and (c) renovation of a newly level from more than one source. critical group at any instance. ACNW (c) The proposed FRG in decommissioned' building. These further noted that the selection of 0.15 orincipal limiting exposure scenarios recommendation No. 4 indicates that m5v/y (15 mrem /y), that represents individual sources should have are intended to overestimate dose and about % of the annuallimit, assumes
" authorized limits" set at a fraction of also tend to be somewhat mutually that a person will encounter a .
the 1 inSv/y (100 mrem /y) limit for all exclusive; i.e., a person living near a O simultaneous dose from seven different decommissioned nuclear facility would sources combmed. The draft FRG notes regulated sources and that this appears that the basis for this recommendation only receive a dose near the constraint i to them to be unjustified, particularly level if his living pattem includes full-is the various categories of activities because the ALARA principle using radiation that can lead to time residency and farming at the site.
accompanies all such NRC regulatory This living pattern would make it cxposure to members of the pubb,c, and actions.
elso notes the need for broad The recommendations of the difficult for the member of this critical !
assumptions about future activities previously cited organ'izations can be group to also be a member of the critical involvmg radiation use. summarized as suggesting that a group from other licensed or decommiss I The draft FRG does not recommend a constramt value should be set as part of pers level for any one source although it does the process of optimizing the dose from g less n havm.ioned res.dency i than a sources.
full Conve note that setting such a fraction will a particular source and that this tune farmer (e.g., apartment dweller. .
necessarily be a broad judgment based constraint value should be set as a homeowner who works away from the en a general observation of the boundary value below which further site)nught receive doses from other characteristics of existing activities, optimization or ALARA principles sourws but would receive less than the projections for continuing those should be employed. The c nstm,nt value from tne activities in the future, and the potential recommendations also appear to suggest dece aissioned site because the for other uses in the future that can be that setting a source constraint of 25-33 exPmure time and the number of identified now. Thus, the draft FRG percent of the annual dose limit of1 Pathways would be reduced. Thus, notes that,in the case of authorized mSv/y (100 mrem /y) is appropriate and given the assumptions regarding hv,ng i limits for broad categones of sources, adequate to ensure that the dose limit is Patterns made in evaluating comphance the judgments will often necessarily be met, and do not tend to lend support to with the constraint level, it is difficult broad and may lead to somewhat higher 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) as the to envision an individual receiving values, with further implementation of appropriate fraction to which to levels approaching constraint levels the ALARA process left to management constrain the dose from an individual from more than one licensed or ofindividual sources within a category. source because it is not likely that a decommmsioned source. It is The draft FRG does not indicate how that individuals at a decommsioned n,also likely critical group will be exposed to as this judgment is to be made although it many as seven sources. Thus, the site will actually be exposed to doses cites authorized standards for certain recommendations appear to indicate substantially below the constraint level sources that currently exist, including that the constraint value should be set because of ALARA considerations and 40 CFR part 190 for the nuclear fuel using a more reasonable approach. because of the nature of the cleanup cycle, Appendix 1 to 10 CFR part 50 for in discussmg the bases for the 0.15 process itself,i.e., the process of power reactors,10 CFR part 61, and 40 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) dose criterion in the scabbling of concrete removes a layer of CFR part 141. All of these set authorized proposed rule, the Commission noted in concrete which likely contains a large fractions at 25 percent orless of the 1 the preamble (at 59 FR 43219; August fraction of the remaining radioactivity, mSv/y (100 mrem /y) public dose limit. 22,1994) that 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) and the process of soil excavation is a NRC,in its comments on EPA's draft would provide a " substantial" margin of gross removal process that is also likely FRG, questioned what was the safety and be appropriate for to remove large fractions of the
- ppropriate fraction of the public dose decommissioned facilities. As part ofits radioactivity. For example, the Final limit in to CFR part 20 that should be review of the public comments, the GEIS indicates that, for the reference used in setting constraints that would Commission considered the cases analyzed, removal of a layer of become " authorized" limits, recommendations of the standards. concrete by scabbhng will result in (d)in its review of how the principles setting bodies previously cited. Further, doses at levels from 2 to more than In and recommendations of the ICRP, in making a judgment on the times lower than a constraint value. In NCRP, and FRG are relevant to the appropriate value of the fraction, the addition to consideration o.f proposed NRC rule, NRC's Advisory Commission also considered pnnciples decommissioned sources,it is also Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW) of optimization, numbers and types of difficult to envision that an individual noted that 0.15 mSv/y (15 rirem/y) sources, potential for exposure of could come in contact with more than represented an unnecessarily entical groups to more than one source a few other sources as part of normal conservative fraction of the 1 mSv/y at the constramt value, and assumptions living patterns. For example, the NCRP (100 mrem /y) annuallimit. The ACNW regardmg the manner in which a critical in NCRP No. 93, "lonizing Radiation rgreed that the need to partition the group would be exposed NFC renewed Exposure of the Population of the rmnual recommended dose limit among the assumptions of the Draft and Final United States," September 1987, several sources to which a person is CEIS regarding exposure pathways and reviewed likely radiation exposures to hkely to bo exposed appears justifiable also NUREG/CR-5512 upon which the the public from consumer products, air and noted that no exphcit guidance Draft and Fmal CEIS are based NUKEC/ emissions, and fuel cycle facihties from the various nat2onal and CR-5512 provides an analysis of (including nuclear power plants) and mternational bodies on this subject exposure pathways for critical groups at found that, in general, exposure to the (xists. ACNW stated that a constraint of decommissioned facihties. The public is a small fraction of 1 mSv/y (a 25 percent or 30 percent of the 1 mSv/ principal hmiting scenarios melude: (a) few mrem /y). Recent experience on
1 39064 Feder:1 Register / Vol. 62, No.139 / Monday, J'uly 21, 1997 / Rults and Regulations
- nuclear power plant emissions and dose - was inadequate to justify a 0.15 mSv/y in direct exposure and ingestion commitments (NUREG/CR-28501 tends (15 mrem /y) dose criterion because it to support the conclusions of NCRP No. pathways and in the number of persons used an improper approach (i e., exposed and thus the collective 3 93 about power plant exposures. combining the building and soil exposure and net health effects.
i NRC's generic evaluation of uses of analysis). They also believed that it {
and doses from various sources, Based on the comments and i underestimated the amount of information received, additional including decommissioned sources, contamination at reference facihties, as I supplemented by the recommendations . well as the costs of remediation and information has been added to the GEIS.
of the standards setting bodies and Data on contamination submitted by the final sito closecut surveys. commenters were reviewed, compared advisory committee noted above, The Commission considered the suggests that the substantial added with other existing data, including that concerns of commenters who criticized in the Draft CBS, and incorporated into margin of safety provided by the 0.15 inclusion of cost as a consideration in mSv/y (15 mrem /y) value may be too the Final GEIS as appropriate The Final decisionmakmg. NRC methods and restrictive for its intended purpose of GEIS thus considers additional soil policy regarding cost considerations are contamination data as well as soll and constraining doses from this category of stated in NUREG/BR-0058, Rev. 2, and sources in establishing an appropriate building contamination comparable to call for preparation of an appropriate boundary constraint. Rather, the that in the draft GUS. It also considers regulatory analysis in support of evaluation leads NRC to conclude that regulatory decisions. NUREG/BR-0058 the range of disposal costs and survey methods and costs presented in the 25 percent of the public dose limit is a does note that costs cannot be sufficient and ample fraction to use as Draft GEIS, as well as those suggested in considered for regulatory actions the comments. The Commission agrees the hmitation for decommissioned necessary to ensure adequate protection with the commenters that consideration sources. of the health and safety of the pubhc: of soil and buildings separately can Thus, the Commission concludes that however, it further notes that costs can provide added information. Thus the a generic dose constraint or hmitation be a factor in those cases where there for decommissioning sources of 0.25 Final GEIS has used the analysis of the may be more than one way to reach a Draft GEIS, that contained the data for mSv/y (25 mrem /y) for unrestricted level of adequate protection. Thus, the release of a site is reasonable from the performing separate analyses, and has analysis in the GEIS and RA was presented the data more clearly in standpoint of providing a sufficient and prepared in support of the rulemaking revised tables,in addition the knee-in.
ample margin of safety for protection of to provide additionalinformation to public health and safety. It is recognized decisionmakers about the rule criteria curve" figures, that provided general that this conclusion reflects a judgment being considered. information about behavior of costs and regardmg the likelihood of individuals impacts associated with cleanup, have The Commissian has also considered been replaced with a simpler set of being exposed to multiple sources with the concems of those commenters that tables similar to the presentation in the cumulative doses appranching 1 mSv/y criticized the analysis of costs and risks Draft Regulatory Analysis,in Tables 6.1 (t00 mrom/y) rather than an analysis as incomplete and inadequate and and 6.2. In response to comments based on probability distributions for reviewed information submitted in suggesting that the Final CEIS consider such exposures. However, considering support of those comments. In general, the kinds of occupancy time typically more realistic post decomminioning some of the major comments suggested, uses, the Final GEIS considers a range assumed for the average member of the and provided data on, the following:
l critical group at a site,it is highly of possible uses, including residential (a) Additional data from actual farming, denser residential use, unlikely that individuals could decommissioning should be included realistically be expected to experience industrial / office use, and higher '
that would consider variations in site - building occupancy rates.
exposures to other sources with a contamination characteristics, includmg Given the range of possible cumulative effect approaching 1 mSv/y the concentration and volume of (100 mrem /y). parameters, scenarios and site-specific contamination and the profile of the situations, the Final GEIS concludes,in A.2.2.3 Cost andpmeticality of contamination with depth; standard. Comments received on cost a manner similar to the Draft GEIS, that (b) Reevaluation ofremediation and there is a wide range of cost-benefit and practicality were analyzed to survey costs should be conducted. results among the different facilities and determine whether such an analysis can including consideration of variation in within facility types and that there is no provide additional information related waste burial charges, remediation . unique algorithm that decisively to the criteria of this rule. This analysis methods,and survey procedures; produces an ALARA result for all includes how, and to what level, (c) Separate analyses of the cost-ALARA efforts should be made, how the effectiveness of soil removal and facilities. Despite these dif5culties, the Final GEIS and RA provide the proposed dara==asioning objective of building removal should be performed. following results that can be helpful for m= ==
spplied,g and awhat siteprovisions to background should should analyses bewould A cammanter clarify differences illustrated gaming that separate insightin making decisions there be (e.g., restricted use) for sites between costs and impacts of cleanup of regarding ALARA, the deco objective, and whether restricted use ==l==ioning where it is unreasonable or unwise to soils and structures that were not r attain the unrestricted dose criterion. should be,pe,mitted:
obvious in the Draft GEIS. Commenters (a) Ach;enng, as an objecfm of Some comraemers criticized the also suggested deleting the " knee.in-proposed rule for including ALARA, reduction to preexisting curve" approach as not clearly background. The objective of returnmg c:nsiderations of cost-effectiveness, illustrating the information regarding objecting to using cost in a site to preexistingbackground costs and impacts for cleanup of both conditions is consistent with the decision maa Other commenters soils and structures; and criticind the rEle because, although concept of returning a site to the (d) Potential alternative uses of the radiological condition that existed they favored use of cost-benefit analyses site lands and facilities should be In deca'sloa-ma-_ they believed that before its use. However, the question of considered to provide a higher level of whether this objective, as a goal of l
the cost. benefit aisalysis in the draft - realism in the dose estimates.These GEIS and draR Regulatory Analysis (RA) alternative uses can result in variations ALARA, should be codified by rule !
depends on a variety of factors, i
i
- Feder-1 Regist:r / Vol. 62 No.139 / Mondty, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Reguhtions 39065 including cost, practicality (e.g., Decomminioning Management Plan measurability) of achidng the
- Codifying alternate criteria in the (SDMP) (see NUREG-1444, October rule to alleviate the need for exemptions objective, and the type of facility involved. 1993). These sites warrant specific NRC in certain difficult site-specific attention regarding their circumstances.
As noted in Section 7.3.1 of the Draft decommissioning.
GELS, decommissioning is expected to The reasons for these conclusions are For the generic scenarios considered, discussed in the following subsections, be relatively easy for a certain class of the results of the Final GEIS evaluation A.2.3.2 An unrestricted use dose non-fuel-cycle nuclear facilities (i.e.,
indicate that there is a wide range of criterion of 0.25 mSv/y(25 miem/y/
those that use either sealed radioactive possible cost-beneSt ratios. applicable on a generic basis without sources or small amounts of short-lived Nevertheless, there appears to be a 8/f8-8Pecific analysis. For the reasons nuclides), because there is usually no described above, the Commission is residual radioactive contamination to be strong indication that removing and transporting soil to waste' burial establishing a dose of 0.25 mSv/y (25 cleaned up and disposed of, or,if there is any, it should be localized or it can facilities to achieve exposure levels at mrem /y) as an acceptable criterion for the site at or below a 0.25 mSv/y (25 release of any site for unrestricted use be quickly reduced to low levels by mrem /y) unrestricted use dose criterion without further analysis of the potential radioactive decay. Decommissioning is generally not cosl-effective when f r aposures from other man-made operations will generally consist of sources excluding medical. The evaluated using NRC's regulatory disposing of a sealed source or allowing analysis framework presented in Commission concludes that a generic licensed short-lived nuclides to decay in dc,se constreint orlimitation for storage, submitting Form NRC-314, and NUREC/BR-0058 and NUREG-1530.
demonstrating (either through radiation Further, even for a range of cleanup decommissioning sources of 0.25 mSv/
survey or other means such as levels at or above a 0.25 mSv/y (25 y (25 mrem /y) for unrestricted use of a mrem /y) criterion, there can also be site appears reasonable from the calculation of reduction of the standpoint of providing a sufficient ano l contamination levelby radioactive cases where costs are unreasonable in decay) compliance with the con 2parison to benefits realized. ample margin of safety in protection of requirements for license termm.ation. .
(c) AIARA analysisforstructures Public health a;2d safety. This, ,
Because contamination at these facilities containing contamination. Building
. conclusion reflects the Commission's floors and walls at nuclear facilities can judgment that the likelihood of as expected to be negligible or to decay to negligible levels m a short time, be contaminated for a variety of reasons' individuals being exposed to multiple cchieving an objective of returning these including system leaks, spills trackin8' sources with cumulative doses ,
facilities to background would not and activation. The large majority of approaching 1 mSv/y (100 mrem /y)is NRC licensed facilities have zero or quite small. This conclusion is based on t ppear to be an unreasonable objective ofALARA. limited buildmg contamination. consideration of the kinds of occupancy However, in general, for those nuclear Generally, contamination does not times generally expected for the average men:ber of the entical group at typical facilities where contammation exists in Penetrate the surface of concrete and decommissioned sites and the low l soils and/or structures, the Final GEIS can be readily removed by water jets or analysis shows, in a manner similar to concrete scabbbng. If the building is probabili that individuals could the Draft GEIS, that achievingan reused for some new industrial, office, realistica y be expected to experience l r other use after license terminat2on, 8 Enificant exposures to other sources.
ALARA decommissioning objective of
" return to a preexisting background" is Persons can be in direct contact with the particularly with a c.umulative effect not reasonable as it may result in net decommissioned floors and walls. approaching 1 mSv/y (100 mrem /y). In For the range of generic situations view of these perspectives, the detnment or because cost cannot be justiSed because detriments and costs considered, the results of the Final GEIS Commission believes that a generic dose criterion of 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y) associated with remediation and evaluation indicate that there is a wide provides a sufficient and ample, surveys tend to increase signiScantly at range of possible cost-benefit ratios. it although not necessary, margin to low levels, while risk reduction from appears that cleanup of concrete to radiation exposure from criteria near levels at or below 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem / protect A.2.3.2 Considemtions regarding the public.
background ns marginal. y) can be cost effect1ve, depending on (b) ALARA analysisforsoll ALARA, including the decommissioning the number ofindividuals projected to objective. The ICRP, NCRP, and draft contamination Soil contamination can be occupying a building, when usmg the FRG all suggest that, in addition to exist onsite at nuclear facilities because decisionmaking guidelines of NUREGI setting a constraint value for an of a vanety of reasons including spills CR-0058 and NUREG-1530. individual source, achievement of or leaks, deposition from airborne A.2.3 Conclusions regarding overoll exposures that are A1. ARA should effluents, or burial or placement of approach tolicense termmation and system byproducts or other waste continue to be considered as a means of unrestncted dose critenon. Based on the optimization. For this reason and materials in onsite soils. The level of above discussion, the Commission has because the genene analysis of the Fmal soil contamination for the large majority concluded that the overall hcense GEIS tends to indicate that achievmg of NRC-licensed facilities (>6000)is termination approach of this final rule doses below 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y)
I cither zero or minimal (it is expected should include- may be ALARA for some cases, the rule that the large majonty of Agreement
- An unrestricted use dose entenon continues to require an ALARA i State licensees would have similar of 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y) apphcable l
contamination). Certain facilities (e.g., evaluation below the unrestricted dose on a generic basis without site-specific criterion.
power reactors, fuel facilities, industrial analysis; It would be usefulif the analyses in ficilities) may have greater soil . Considerations regarding ALARA, contammation, and certain of these the Final GEIS could have arrived at a including the decommissioning value of ALARA for all facilities or facihties have been identiSed as having objective; classes of facilities so that no further extensive soil contamination (albeit . A tiered approach of unrestricted estimate of ALARA would be needed in g:nerally at relatively low levels) ar d use and allowing restncted use if certain site-specific cases. However, it was not htve been placed in the Site provisions are met, and feasible for the Commissmn to use the l
l
=, ,
'39286 Fedtral R: gilt:r / Vol. 62, No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations results of the Finr'. wIS to determine a health and safety, and other societal and assuring that rostnetions remain in generic optimum AI. ARA dose because socio-economic considerations, place and that public health and safety of the variety of possible scenarios, Although preparation of guidance is in is protected are discussed further in assumptions, parameters, and site- a preliminary stage,it is anticipated that Section IV B in addition,because.
sp:cific conditions that could exist. this guidance would hkcly indicate that restricting sito use can affect the local Navtrtheless, the Final CEIS does ALARA during decommissioning community, Sections IV B and IV E contain information about certam trends should include typical good practice indicate that licensees should seek in impacts and costs of effoTts (e g , floor and wall washmg, advice from such affected parties and,in decommissioning that can be useful m removal of readily removable seeking that advice, provide for. (1) preparation of regulatory guidance - radioactivity in buildings or in soil Participation by representatives of a supportingsite-specific ALARA areas), as well as ALARA analyses for broad cross section of commumty provisions in particular,it is clear from buildings to levels less than 0 25 mSv/ interests (2)an opportunity fora
! the Final GEIS that removal of soil to y (25 mrem /y) based on the number of comprehensive, collective discussion on j achieve dose levels below the 0 25 individuals projected to be occupying the issues, and (3) a publicly available mSv/y (25 mremly) dose criterion is the building, but that an ALARA summary of the results of all such i grntrally unlikely to be cost-effective, analysis below 0 25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y) discussions.
! whsreas it may be for concrete m certam for soil removal would not need to be A234 Codifymg alternate site-
! cases. It is also clear that removal of soil done. It is expected that use of the dose specific criteria m the rule to alleviate or concrete to " pre-existmg criterion of the final rule and the the needfor exemptions in special background" levels is generally not cost - regulatory guidance on ALARA would circumstances.The preamble to the eff;ctive. .
achieve consistency with current proposed rule recognized that there Thus, for those facilities where soil or practices where it is cost-effective to do could be certam difficult sites building contamination exists, it would so. presenting unique decommissioning l be extremely difficult to demonstrate The Commission also believes that, in problems where licensees would seek th:t an objective of return to background any ALARA analysis conducted to exemptions from the rule's had been achieved.Therefore it is support decisions about site cleanup, all requirements. However, as noted in concluded, as was previously done in reasonably expected benents and Section IV.C below, because the ths proposed rule, that for these sites detriments resulting from the cleanup Commission finds that it would be
! use of the unrestricted dose criterion activities should be taken into preferable to deal with those facilities i with appropriate ALARA considerations consideration in balancing costs and under the aegis of a rule rather than as wsuld be appropriate. For restricted benefits. An example of such a exemptions, the Commission has i use, the Final GEIS suggests that detriment would be transportation included in its final rule a provision rJthough removal of soil to acideve dose deaths that might occur as contaminated under which the Commission may
! 1:vils below 0.25 waste is transported away from the site. terminate a license using alternate mSv/y (25 mrem /y) may notbe cost. A.2.3.3 Tiered a of criteria in certain specific cases. In I
i affective, other simple and less costly unrestricted use an wing restn'cted allowing such a provision,it is measures to restrict the use of the site useif certain provisions are met.It nevertheless the Commlaaion's
! such as fancing or barrier plantings may appears reasonable to retain the basic judgment that:(1) Itis generally i be cost-effective and should be structure presented in the proposed rule preferable for sites to reduce doses to i coniidered as part of the ALARA and allow for both unrestricted and 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y) due to the process. For groundwater restricted use of sites. Allowance of uncertainty over the number of sources contamination, as discussed later in - restricted use is appropriate because where nuclides may be resent for a i
Section IV.D. ALARA considerations there can be situations where restricting long time-frame;(2) the majority of sh:uld consider the situation where site use can de protection of public sites can reduce doses to less than 0.25 l populations use groundwater plumes health and by reducing the TEDE mSv/y (25 mrem /y) through restricting
< from a facility as water. to 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y)in a more site use; and (3) permitting large l in actual situations,it likely that, reasonable and cost-effective manner numbdrs oflicensees to propose i sven if no specific analysis of ALARA than unrestricted use. This protection is alternate criteria is not advisable
- l. ' were required for soiland concrete afforded by limiting the time permd that because it would be contrary to one of
! removal, the actual dose will be reduced an individual spends onsite or by the goals of this rulemaking to achieve to below 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y) restricting agricultural or dunking water more efficient and consistent licensing because of the nature of the removal use. For many facilities, the time period actions. Therefore, the Commt== ion has process.For example,the process of needed for restrictions can be fairly limited the conditions under which a l
scabbling of concrete removes a layer of short;i.e.,long enough to allow licensee could apply for ahernate concrete that likely contains a large radioactive decay to reduce griteria and expects that its use would
- fraction of the r-i-i-- radioactivity, radioactivity to levels that permit be ram. A licensee proposing to and the process of soil excavation is a release for ins G.t.d use. For terminate a license at a site-specific groes removal process that also is likely example, at reactors, manufacturing level above 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y)
- to remove large fractions,of the facilities, or broad scope licensees, would be required to:
radioactive . where the princi contaminants can (a) Provide assurance that public To the concept *of ALARA, the have half-hves o 5-30 years (e.g., Co- health and safety would continue to be regulatory guidance to be prepared will 60, Cs-137), restricting site use for about protected by means of a complete and refer to the existing requir===n** of 10-60 years can result in achieving comprehensive analysis of possible
$$ 20.1003 and 20.1101 where ALARA ui. at d uselevels.Thus,'it sources of wyo.- so that it is unWly is defined to include considerations of continues to be appropriate to allow that the dose from all potential man-the state of Mnalogy, economics of restricted use if accompanied by made sources combined, other than improvement in relation to the state of provisions that ensure the restrictions medical,would exceed the 1 mSv/y technology, econames of improvements rammin in place to achieve a dose of 0.25 (100 mrem /y) public dose limit of 10 in relation to benefits to the public mSv/y (25 mrem /y). Considerations for CFR part 20;
,. Fed rl Register / .Vol. 62. No.139 /. Monday. July. 21, 1997 / Ruhs cnd Regulations 39067 (b) Employ, to the extent practical, Regulatory guidance will also be issued a lower criterion such as return to restrictions on site use for minimizing to provide clear' guidance on statistical background would adequately protect exposures at the site using the tests and survey methods available to the public. In response, the NRC agrees provisions for restricted use outlined 16 licensees for demonstrating compliance. with the need to fix responsibility for Section IV.B. below; and The Commission is retaining the (c) Reduce doses to ALARA levels.
decommissionica oflicensed sites.The distinguishable from background planning and financial assurance (d) Seek advice from affected parties provision in the final rule to allow requirements adopted June 27,1988 (53 regarding this approach and,in seeking release of sites when residual such advice, provide for:(1) FR 24018), recognized the responsibility contamination, if any, cannot be oflicensees to plan for the cleanup of Participation by representatives of a distinguished frota background on a broad cross section of community their sites and to provide adequate statistical buis using proper survey financial assurance for that cleanup.
interests who may be affected by the technique.i. In particular, at the levels of Similarly in this regulation, licensees decommissioning, (2) an opportunity for the dose criterion, concentrations of a comprehensive, collective discussion are not permitted to release a facility for uranium and thorium in soil are unrest-icted or restricted public use on the issues, and (3) a publicly extremely low and may not be available sumrnary of the results of all unless the dose criteria stipulated in the distinguishable from background on a rule have been satisfied. As noted in the such discussions, and statistical basis evsn when using proper Final GEIS, further cleanup to levels (e) Obtain the specific approval of the survey techniques. such as background is not generally Commission. The Commission will make its decision on allowing use of A.3 General Comments on the Dose reasonable because it results in very alternate entena in specific cases only Criterion little additional health benefit with very large costs incurred and could result in after consideration of the NRC staff's A.J.! Comments. Comments were recommendations that will address any an increase in the overall risk associated received on the 0.15 mSv/y (15 with cleanup of a particular site when comments provided by the mrem /y) dose criterion that questioned all factors (e.g., estimated fatalities due Environmental Protection Agency and its effect on disposal capacity, the any public comments submitted to transportation accidents during relationship to naturally occumng transport of radioactive wastes) are regarding the decommissioning or radioactive material (NORM), and the considered. Therefore, for the reasons license termination plan. issue of fixing the responsibility for disevssed in Section IV.A.t.2, the A description of these circumstances cleanup.
and potential resolutions on a site. A.J.2 Response. Some comnienters criteria in the final rule are considered appropriate to protect public health and specific basis, short of exempting a were concerned about the effect of o.15 safety and to permit release of the sites facility from this rule, appears in mSv/y (15 mrem /y) criterion on and termination oflicense.
Section IV.C. disposal capacity. As noted in Section If license termination still cannot be IV.A.2.2, several of the assumptions, A.4 Average Member of the Critical met even under alternate criteria,it may models, and approaches in the GEIS and Group be necessary for the site (or a portion Regulatory Analysis have been revised A.4.2 Comment. Some commenters thereof) to be kept under licent in to include additional data and alternate agreed with provisions of the rule that order to ensure that exposures to the waste disposal costs. A complete would apply the dose limit to an public are appropriately monitored. The discussion of these revisions and average member of the critical group evaluation of the maintenance of a site analysis of disposal capacity is in the rather than to the " reasonably or a portion thereof under a continued Final GEIS and the Regulatory Analysis. maximally exposed (RME) individual" license is outside the scope of this Some commenters questioned the because it is consistent with ICRP and rulemakmg because this rule contains relationship of this rule to NORM. In provides an appropriate protection provisions addressing radiological response, the criteria of this rule apply standard. Other commenters objected to criteria that apply to termination of a to residual radioactivity from activities use of"an average member of the license. under a licensee's control and not to critical group." These commenters A.2.4 Summary ofrule revismns on naturally occurring background favored applying the dose limit to the unrestricted use and plansfor radiation Issues related to NRC-licensed most exposed person rather than to an implementorion. The final rule has been sites containing materials that occur in average person. They asserted that this modified to indicate that the dose nature are discussed in Sections IV.B would be consistent with the approach criterion for unrestricted use is 0.25 and IV C used for other licensed activities and mSv/y (25 mrem /y). Requirements that There is a wide variety of sites environmental protection.
a hcensee consider how the ALARA containing NORM subject to EPA A 4.2 Response. Section 20.2003 of requirements of to CFR part 20 can be jurisdiction and not heensed by the the proposed rule defined the term applied to achieve a dose below the NRC The extent to which criteria in this " critical group" as the group of dose entetton have been retained. rule would apply to these sites would be individuals reasonably expected to Regulatory guidance is planned on based on a separate evaluation although receive the greatest exposure to residual how to meet these existing ALARA certain aspects of the rule, for example radioactivity for any applicable set of requirements In addition, to assist in control of sites with restrictions circumstances. For example,if a site implementing the dose entenon, irnposed, could be similar. For further were released for unrestricted use, the regulatory gutdance will also be issued discussion, see also Section IV.G.6 critical group would be the group of to provide clear guidance to licensees With regard to responsibility for individuals reasonably expected to be on how to demonstrate compliance with cleanup, several commenters stated that the most highly exposed considering all the dose criterion by using either. the 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) limit is too reasonable potential future uses of the (a) Screening analyses that use high because licensees should have to site As noted m the preamble to the relatively simple approaches for clean up contamination that they proposed rule (at 59 FR 43218; August demonstrating compliance; or created. Because these are final 22,1994), NUREG/CR- 5512 defines the (b) Site-specific modehog for more licensing actions before releasing the entical group as an individual or complex sites and contamination. site to the public, they stated that only relatively homogeneously exposed
l 39068 Fediral R;gistir / Vol. 62. No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations l group expected to receive the highest would be prohibitively expensive, result B.2.3 The durabihty of mstitutional exposure within the assumptions of a m net public or environmental harm, or controls Several commenters opposed particular scenario and the dosimetric not be technically achievable; or expressed concern about the ability of methods of 10 CFR part 20 The average (4) Obtained advice on the restrictions institutional controls to provide needed member of the critical group is an from the affected community by protection of public health and safety at j l individual wbo is assumed to represent convening a site-specific advisory decommissioned sites because they the most hkely exposure scenario based board, and, cannot be enforced indefinitely into the on prudently conservative exposure (5)'Provided financial as surance to future and can be struck down or assumptions and parameter values ensure the controls remain in place become ineffective Other commenters within model calculations. For example, favored reliance on more flexible the critical group for the building B2 Commmits on Acceptability of
, institutional controls and recommended occupancy scenario can be the group of Restncted Use for Decommissioned that the rule should not assume that S2tes rrgular employees working in a building they will eventually fail. Approaches for that has been decontaminated. If a site A variety of comments was received usmg institutional controls were were converted to residential use, the on the restricted use option. The major suggested including Federal entical group could be persons whose comment categories are listed below. Covernment ownership of sites or occupations mvolve resident farming at Although the comment categories legislative solutaons for complex sites the site, not an average of all residents address somewhat separate issues, they similar to the National Weste Policy Act on the site are listed and answered together to (NWPA) of 1982. .
Although the terms "cntical group" develop a unified response on the issue R.2 4 The 2 mSv/y (f oo mrem /y) cap and " average member" are new terms in of restncted use. //*8tutional controls fail Some NRC regulations, they are consistent B 2.2 The generalconcept of commenters stated that the proposed I, with ICRP practice of defining and using restricted use. Some commenters agreed mSv/y (100 mrem /y) restnction is a entical group when assessing with the proposal to permit restricted umeasonably low when used to assess individual public dose from low levels use of decommissioned sites because it die worst case scenano. They of radioactivity similar to those may be financially impractical to reach recommended that the rule should not sxpected from a decommissioned site. unrestricted levels, especially if health stipulate that a licensee must assume ICRP recommends that such analyses and safety considerations do not that all mstitutional controls wdl should consider exposure to individuals warrant it and because restncted release eventually fail. Alternatively, they representative of those expected to allows realistic land uses to be arc mmended that a 5 mSv/y (500 receive the highest dose using cautious considered. Some commenters opposed mrem /y) backu hmit be allowed if but reasonable assumptions. This the concept of any planned restricted restrictions suc as institutional cpproach has been adopted in the release of decommissioned sites because C c ntr Is r engineered features fail. The pro osed FRG and is also consistent of concerns over the durabihty and wa the recommendations of the effectiveness of institutional controls, 500 n re y i t set National Academy of Sciences on the and because license termination should other re8ulations'since residential use Yucca Mountain Standards (August 1995). ,,
be a final action with full hcensee responsibility for site disposition and h"
commenters g"c spe u ve everal objected to the last A.4 3 Summaryofrule revisions. cleanup costs previously considered.
Based on this discussion, the proposed sentence of proposed S 20.1405(d), that rule has not been changed.
B.2.2 The needforlicensees to stated that licensees may not assume demonstrate that restricted use is any benefits from an earthen cover, B. Criteria for Restricted Use (Proposed appmpriate for their sites. In allowing other earthen barriers, or engineered Rule SS20.1402(d)and 20.2405) restricted use, the proposed rule would controls in complying with the 1 mSv/
have required licensees to demonstrate y (100 mrem /y) cap unless speciScally B.1 Proposed Rule Content the appropriateness of restricting site authorized by the Commission and As described in the proposed use for their particular situation by recommended that the sentence be k rulemaking and restated in Section showing that it would be " prohibitively deleted. Some commenters IV.A.2.2, there are potential situations expensive," " technically unachievable," recommended that the rule specify the under which termination of a license or cause " net public or environmental extent to which licensees may take under restricted conditions could be harm" to achieve unrestricted use credit for engineered barriers. Other used in the decommissioning of a site. (proposed S 20.1405(a)). Some commenters stated that 1 mSv/y (100 Proposed S 20.1405 indicated that a site commenters supported the restricted mrem /y)is too high and that a lower would be considered acceptalde for use of sites but indicated that the value (e.g.,0.15,0.3,0.5,0.75 mSv/y license termination under restricted proposed requirements for (15,30,50, or 75 mrem /y)) should be conditions if the licensee: demonstrating its appropriateness were applied because institutional controls (1) Made provisions for institutional unreasonably restrictive. These are uncertain, concerns over health controls that provide reasonable commenters stated that the provisions effects would exist, and doses in excess f.ssurance that the TEDE to the average in proposed S 20.1405(a) were of 40 CFR Part 190 are unreasonable.
member of the critical group would not structured so narrowly that few sites Some commenters agreed with exceed the unrestricted use dose would be able to qualify forlicense establishing a maximum TEDE of 1 criterion; l termination uader restricted conditions. mSv/y (100 mrem /y)in the event 1 (2) Reduced residual radioactivity at Commenters stated that these terms institutional controls are no longer in i the site so that,if the controls were no should be explained, deleted, or effect. l longer in effect, there is reasonable replaced with a less onerous B.2.5 Financialossumncefor assurance that the TEDE would not requirement allowing restricted use if restricted use. Some commenters cxceed 1 mSv/y (100 mrem /y); justified by an ALARA analysis or if questioned the need for financial (3) Demonstrated that consplying with there were continued ownership and assurance provisions and suggested that the unrestricted use dose cnterion industrial use of the site. more Dexibility be provided for .
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. : Fedtral R:gister / Vol. 62. No.139 / Monday. July 21. 1997 / Rules and Regulations 39069 1 r
lictnsees. Other comment'ers questioned in Section IV.B.3.1. the proposed rule appropriate for determining whether whether the financial assurance - - allowed restricted use because release of restricted use should be permitted.
? provisions were adequate. One a site under restricted conditions can be Therefore, th- Commission has
- comm:nter stated that there should be an appropriate method of modified the rule to incorporate an mora detail on financial assurance decommissioning from both health and ALARA standard rather than prohibitive '
Provided in the rule. safety, and cost-benefit bases, especially . costs as the basis for selecting restricted B.3 ? Response i r certain facilities with soi! - use. To support a request for restricted
', ~ contamination. Nevertheless it did so use. a licensee would perform an B.3.1 Thegeneralconcept of under the philosophy (stated in ALARA analysis of the risks and restricted use. Current NRC regulations 520.1402(d)) that, in general, benefits of all viable alternatives and 1
, pert .ining to decommissioning.-issued termination of a license for unrestricted include consideration of any detriments.
cn June 27.1988 (53 FR 24018), do not use is preferable because it requires no This could include estimated fatalities .
contain provisions for release of a additional precautions or limitations on from transportation accidents that might !
- ficility for restricted use but limit a use of the site after licensing control occur as the result of transport of wastes
. lictnsee s options in decommissioning ceases, in particular for those sites with from cleanup activities and societal and ta r11 ease of a facility for unrestricted long-lived nuclides. In addition. there socioeconomic considerations such as use. Experience with decommissioning may be societal or economic benefits the potential value to the community of cf f cilities since 1988 has indicated related to future value of the unrestricted use of the land.
, that for certain faellities, achieving unrestricted use of the land to the The proposed rule also noted that unrestricted use might not be community.Thus,520.1405(a) of the because the net public or environmental CPPiopriate because there rnay be net damage through removal, transport. and proposed rule stated the provisions the l public or environrnental harm in disposal of materials could be larger NRC would consider in evaluating a l achieving unrestricted use, or because than the benefit in dose reduction at the request for termination of a site under l
. -ected future use of the site would restricted conditions, including tha. . is site, it may be more reasormble for the lasly preclude unrestricted use, or material to remain onsite. The Final -
- because the cost of site cleanup and
.. prohibitively expensive" or there is
.. net public or environmental harm" in GEIS Illustrates when it may be wists disposal to achieve unrestricted inappropriate, when considering such use is excessive compared to achieving achieving unrestricted release.
The Commission continues to believe relative impacts.to completely the same dose criterion by restricting remediate a site to an unrestricted level use cf the site and eliminating exposure .that unrestricted use is generally that assumes activities such as farming pathways. The input received from the Preferable for the reasons noted. or residence and then, as would be the rulImaking workshops held from However, the NRC has reexamined the case for a number of currently licensed January through May 1993 confirmed provisions for allowing restricted use sites, actually employ a commercial or this experience and indicated that because of the potential benefits. In industrial use that would eliminate l restricted use of a facility,if properly . explaining the provision of s gnificant pathways of exposure I
. designed and if proper controls were in Prohibitive cost the proposed rule Specific examples include reactors or plies, was a reasonable means for noted (at 59 FR 43220) that costs to . other materials facilities where the dose t:rminating licenses at certain facilities. achieve unrestricted use may be is controlled by relatively short-lived Current NRC licensed sites that might " excessive." indicating that this means nuclides (e.g. Co-60 and Cs-137 with request restricted use are largely there may be situations where removal half Inves of 5.3 and 30 years.
industrial sites. It is reasonable for them and disposal oflarge quantities of . respectively) that will decay to to remain industrial because of their material is simply "not reasonable" locations and previous siting from a cost standpoint. Consistent with ': unrestricted period of institutional dose levels in a finite control (e.g.. time this. the proposed rule noted in about 10-60 years). For these facilities.
considerations.
be inr.ances where, Nevertheless, there if a site had high - may ' S 20.1402(d) that the Commission there may be net public or culturd value, such considerations - expected licensees to make every environmental hagn from removing and
.wculd be presented as part of the public reasonable effort to achieve unrestricted transporting soll to achieve unrestricted input that is part of the process of : ' release. The specific cost that would be use compared to restricting use for a tr.stricted use (see Section IV.E) and considered excessive. not reasonable, or period of time associated with a could be considered as a socioeconomic prohibitive was not included in the reasonable decay period (see the Final eff:ct under the A1 ARA process. proposed rule.This value depends on GEIS. Chapter 6). Thus, the' The proposed rule thus provided for costs of unre ,tricted and restricted use. consideration of potential detriments both unrestricted and restricted use of and on an evaluation of these from cleanup activities and the sit:s. Both the Draft and Final CEIS , alternatives using the regulatory possibility of net harm have been prtvide discussions of the analysis framework presented in retained in the final rule. Both terms, environmentalimpact of NUREG/BR-0058 and NUREG-1530. net public harm and net environmental decommissioning for the reference sites - NUREG/BR-0058 provides a harm. are retained in the final rule to
' cnd cf the costs related to decisionmaking tool for deciding indicate that a licensee's evaluation decommissioning. From this it may be between regulatory attematives. As should consider the radiological and c:ncluded that release of certain noted in the discussion below. restricted nonradiologicalimpacts of f:cilities for restricted use is an use with appropriate institutional decommissioning on pemons who may appropriate option assuming the controls (accompanied by sufficient be impacted. as well as the potential presence of the specific provisions provisions for ensuring their impact on ecological systems from described below to ensure that effectiveness) can provide protection of- decommissioning. activities.
appropriate controls are in place so that public health and safety because the B.3.3 The durability ofinstitutional the restrictions on use remain in effect. dose level will be reduced to the same contmis. As described in Sections
- B.J.2 The need for licensees to 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y) criterion as for IV.B.3.1 and IV.B.3.2 use of restrictions demonstrate that restricted use is unrestricted use. Thus, use of the that employ institutional controls ,
appropriate for their sites. As described . guldelines in NUREC/BR-0058 is appears appropriate in specific
39070 Fed:r:1 Regist:r / Vol. 62, No.139 / Mondry. July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations situations. However, an important reasonably be expected to be effective 0.3, or 0 85 Sv/y (15,30, or 85 question raised in the public comments into the foreseeable future. mrem /y)) or higher than the proposed rllates to the durabdity of mstitutional To provide added assurance that the cap.
controls, i.e., whether the controls puthe will be protected, the Snal rule The Commission has reviewed the provide reasonable assurance that the incorporates provisions (S 20.1405(c)) comments suggesting that the specific exposure will be limited to the dose for financial assurance to ensure that the cap value be set at levels other than I criterion in the rule over the periods in controls remam in place and are
~ mSv/y (100 mrem /y). The rationale for question. effective over the period needed With setting the cap at 1 mSv/y (100 For many types of decommissioned these provisions, the Cornmission mrem /y) presented in the proposed rule sites released under restricted believes that the use of reliable (at 59 FR 43221) was that the value of conditions where potential doses to an institutional controls is appropnate and the cap coincides with NRC's public individual are caused by relatively that these controls will provide a high dose limit of 10 CFR Part 20. This value short-lived nuclides, the radiation level of assurance that doses will not was premised on the assumption that exposure that could potentially be exceed the dose criterion for circumstances could develop in which received were controls to fall will unrestricted use, the restrictions might no longer be grrdually decrease to below the Although the Commission believes effective in limiting the exposure unrestncted dose criterion so the that failure of active and passive scenarios or pathways. Although this restrictions on use would no longer be institutional controls with the occurrence need not be assumed for necessary. Examples of facilities with appropriate provisions in place will be planning purposes, a safety net is nuclides of this type include reactors or rare, it recognizes that it is not possible needed to prevent exposures in excess m:terials facilities for which the to preclude the failure of controls of the public dose limits. A cap using principal dose contributing nuclides Therefore,in the proposed rule, the the public dose limits would provide an aft:r decommissioning are Co-60 or Cs. Commission included a requirement additional level of protection in the 137 (half-lives 5.3 and 30 years, that remediation be conducted so that unlikely event that restrictions were not respectively), or other similarly short- there would be a maximum value effective. Although, as noted in Section liv:d nuclides. The Commission has (" cap") on the TEDE from residual IV.A.2, the. Commission has used a ,
considered the effectiveness of radioactivity if the institutional controls fraction of the public dose limit in institutional controls for up to 100 years were no longer effective in limiting the setting the 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y) dose in similar contexts such as low-level possible scenarios or pathways of limit for dammmu sioning,it indicated waste disposal sites. Because exposure. The cap included in the in the proposed rule that. In the case of decommissioned facilities will have proposed rule was 1 mSv/y (100 the " cap" or " safety net "it did not minimal contamination compared to mrem /y), whichis the public dose limit believe that fractionation, i.e., settiog a large volumes buried at low-level codified in 10 CFR part 20. Pubhc cap value less than 1 mSv/y (100 disposal sites, the Commluion believes comments on the proposed rule because:
that institutional controls using suggested other values for the cap, both mrem(a)The/y), would 1 mSv/y bemrem (100 necessary/y) cap is relatively simple deed restrictions can higher than and lower than the less than values suggested in the provide reasonable assurance that the proposed value. The analysis of those proposed FRG for members of the public TEDE will be below the 0 25 mSv/y (25 comments, and their potential effect on in unusual circumstances and less than miem/y) dose criterion with restrictions the institutional controls used,is values used for other types of facilities in place. discussed in Section IV.B.3.4. where some type ofinstitutlanal control In a limited number of cases,in The Commission believes, based on is used:
particular those involving large the discussion in this section on the (b) The Commicsion believes that quantities of uranium and thorium viability of controls and on the failure of all site restrictions at contamination, the presence of long- provisions for Snancial assurance and decommissioned sites is a highly lived nuclides at decommissioned sites for a " cap " desenbed in Sections unlikely event; and will continue the poteitial for radiation IV.B.3.4 and IV.B.3.5, that the provision (c) Radioactive decay for relatively cxposure beyond the 100-year period. for restricted use and institutional short-lived nuclides (e.g., Co-60 and Cs-More stringent institutional coratrols controls will provide a high level of 137), that are the principal dose will be required in these situations, assurance that public health and safety contributing contaminants at the large such as legally enforceable deed will be protected. Licensees seeking majority of NRC licensed facilities, will restrictions and/or controls backed up restricted use will be required to actually reduce the dose level over a by State and local government control or demonstrate, to NRC's satisfaction, that period of time for most sites that will ownership, engineered barriers, and the institutional controls they propose provide an additional margin of safety Federal ownership, as appropriate. are comparable to those discussed equivalent to fractionation of the limit.
Federal controlis authorized under above, are legally e' nforceable, and are The rationale for setting a cap value Section 151(b) of the National Waste backed by financial assurance. at 1 mSv/y (100 mrem /y) continues to P:licy Act (NWPA). Requiring absolute Licensees will also be required to appear appropriate. In addition, setting proof that such controls would endure demonstrate that the cap will be met. a cap at a lower value does not appear cv:r long periods of time would be The Commission believes that the warranted because:(1)It appears difficult, and the Commission does not provision for restricted use should be arbitrary to assume that the same person l Int:nd to require this oflicensees. retained in the final rule. would be an average member of the
! Rather, institutional controls should be B.3.4 The 1 mSv/y(100 mrem /y) cop critical group both near a facility where
'l established by the licensee with the ifinstitutionolcontrolsfall. A " cap"of there was failure of controls and near objective oflasting 1000 years to be 1 mSv/y (100 mrem /y), corresponding to another decommissioned facility; and consistest with the time-frame used for the public dose limit, was proposed in (2) the failure of restrictions would be calculations (and discussed in Section S 20.1405(d) of the pro infrequent and therefore it is likely that IV.F.7). Having done this, the licensee Various possible " cap" valuesposed were rule. the overall lifetime risk to the critical would be expected to demonstrate that, suggested by the commenters, both group would still be maintained at the institutional controls could lower than (e.g., values such as 0.15, levels comparable to unrestricted use t
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.' Federal Regist',r / Vol. 62 No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rults and R:gulations 39071 while providing a more cost-effective Based on this existing requirement, effectiveness ofinstitutional controls at use of resources. the Commission has incorporated a the site every 5 years after license Although the Commission did not specific provision in the final rule under termination to ensure that the fractionate the cap, it did include in the which a licensee could propose institutional controls are in place and proposed rule, and continues to include exceeding the I mSv/y (100 mrem /y) the restrictions are working, and that in the final rule, a provision that would cap in unusual site-specific there is financial assurance to require exposures to be below the cap to circumstances if,in addition to the reestablish controls if the recheck a degree that is ALARA. The purpose of normal provisions of restricted use,it indicates otherwise. This 5-year recheck this requirement is that licensees would also met the following additional is consistent with 10 CFR Part 20 and not simply leave behind contamination stringent, provisions: also with the FRC, Recommendation corresponding to the value of the cap (a) A hcensee would have to No. 4, that states that in some unusual but would evaluate the level below the demonstrate that it cannot meet the 1 situations the 1 mSv/y (100 mrem /y) cap that is cost effective and reduce the mSv/y (100 mrem /y) cap because of net may be exceeded temporarily in contamination to that level. This will Pubhc or environmental harm or situations that are not anticipated to provide a requirement that will prohibitive costs by means of a site- recur. It is alse consistent with the effectively fractionate the doses and specific evaluation of the issues approach for institutional controls used result in doses not dissimilar from those associated with complying with the 1 in CERCLA that allows for release of suggested by the commenters ifit is mSv/y (100 mrem /y) cap. The NRC sites without a cap providing there is cost-effective to do so. This approach is expects that only a very few facilities continuous checking on the status of the consistent with the current (e.g., sites with soil contaminated with controls.
requirements in to CFR part 20. naturally occurring radionuclides in The NRC would retain the authority Based on its experience with sites small radioactivity levels but large to take appropriate action in those with difficult contamination issues,in v lumes, certain SDMP sites) could, unusual situations when both the 5 particular those sites treated in NRC's Provide sufficient rationale for seekmg a mSv/y (500 mrem /y) cap was in effect SDMP,and as described in the Final nigher cap. Although the proposed rule and the controls had failed' This action CEIS, the Commission anticipates that contained a reference to the use of might include oversight of actions there may be sites wbere compliance Prohibitive cost. it did not quantify or needed to reinstate the controls and any with the 1 mSv/y (100 mrem /y) cap define these costs beyond noting that necessary cleanup and/or monitoring could cause impacts resulting from they would be excessive or act2ons unreasonable. The Commissian believes B.J.5 Financialassumnce. As a i d strialo fca e s i ted it appropriate to consider a prc,hibitive second provision for ensuring that the with removing or transporting waste) cost to be one that would be an order institut2onal controls provide protection that exceed the benefits of avertmg of magnitude greater than that contained of public health and safety, financial radiation exposure (thus causing a net as part of the decisionmaking guidelines assurance requirements were included in NUREC/BR-0058, although a lower to ensure that funds will be available to n zent) or di n h tfie net I^#* '.rnay be appropriate in specific enable an independent third party.
benefit to where costs of cleanup would situations when a licensee could including a governmental custodian of a be prohibitive compared to the net become financially incapable of carrying site, to implement and ensure continued benefit. Although the NRC recognizes out decommissiomng safely; effectiveness of institutional controls.
(b) Under these circumstances, the Some commenters questioned whether that it is always the licensee's licensee would be required to reduce these provisions were necessary while responsibility to clean up the contamination that it has caused, the contamination so doses would be no others questioned whether they went far appropriate course of action should not greater than the 5 mSv/y (500 mrem /y) enough. In response, the Commission value currently contained in continues to believe the proposed result in net public or environmental $ 20.1301fa) Also, the actual dose level harm from a cleanup, and it is not clear provisions are reasonable and adequate -
to which the licensee would have to for their purpose. The provisions are that it is beneficial if resources are spent clean the site would be less than that consistet with financial assurance in a manner prohibitive in relation to value based on an ALARA evaluation of requirements currently in 10 CFR Parts other benefits which could be achieved. the site. This provision is consistent 30,40,50,61,70, and 72 which call for or if a licensee is put into a financial with existing requirements in position where it cannot continue to financial assurance to provide funds for
$ 20.1301(c) that permit levels up to decommissioning in cases when perform the cleanup safely. values of 5 mSv/y (500 mrem /y) for licensees might otherwise be financially Although a cap higher than 1 mSv/y sp(ecific cases; unable to remediate a site. Reference to (100 mrem /y) would result in using a c) Durable institutional controls must an independent third party is necessary value in excess of the public dose limit be in place. These controls could in the regulations because after the in $ 20.1301(a), existing requirements in include significant engineered bairiers license is terminated, the hcensee may 6 201301(c) permit levels up to values and/or State, local, or Federal no longer be the party ensuring the of 5 mSv/y (500 mrem /y), provided that Govemment control of sites or effectiveness of the controls. Because e licensee would apply to the maintenance of site deed restrictions so the purpose of this provision is to Commission for permission to operate at that site access is controlled. Under provide broad requirements for financial that level. subnut reasons why it is Section 151(b) of the NWPA of1982, the assurance necessary to ensure that the necessary, and indicate procedures to DOE has already been authonzed to take~ controls continue to limit the dose, mamtain doses ALARA. The proposed possession of waste disposal sites in nore specific details are not included in FRG, Recommendation No 4, states that certam situations A similar provision in the rule. The level of detail in the rule the dose from all sources should not Section 151(c) was used as the vehicle is similar to that in other similar NRC exceed 1 mSv/y '00 mremly) although to transfer custody of the Amax site regulations on financial assurance. As it may be exceeud temporarily in from Amax to DOE; requested by a commenter, the funding unusual situations that are not expected (d) A 12censee would inake provisions provisions include a trust fund (or to recur. for a verification of the continued similar funding mechanism) for
39072 Fedtral Registir / Vol. 62. No 139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations I
surveillance and enforcement of the C Alternate Cntena for Lcense In addition, as discussed m Section j institutional controls. The financial Termmation IV.A, the Commission has concluded l assurance requirements must be m place C1 Codifying Provisions for Certain that for any site where the 0.25 mSv/y before the license is terminated and be Facihties That the Proposed Rule (25 mrem /y) dose entenon is met, there l flexible enough to allow for the will be a very low likehhood that Suggested Exemptmg ;
necessary site-specific details. 2ndividuals who use the site will be C.2 2 Proposed rule content. The exposed to multiple man-made sources B.4 Summary of Rule Revisions on preamble to the proposed rule noted Restricted Use combmed, excluding medical, with that there were several existing licensed cumulative doses approachmg 1 mSv/y Based on the discussions above, sites where public health and the (100 mrem /y) Thus, the discussion in
- "'I' "" *"I "*? 8t be protected by restricted use has been retained in the Section IV A of this notice establishes final rule. Based on its analyses in the use of alternate criten.a, although these this level as a sufficient and ample, but Final GEIS and its expenences with situations were not codified in the not necessary, margin of safety.
actual decommissioned sites, the proposed rule; rather,it was thought Based on these considerations, the- '
that these facilities might seek Commission has included in the final Commission recognizes that, although exemptions (under $ 20.2301) from the I
unrestricted use is generally preferred- rule a provision under which the critena of this rule Commission may terminate a license restncted use (when properly designed in accordance with the rule's provisions C22 Comments. Some commenters using alternate criteria in its final rule. 1 recommended that the rule should not The Commission expects the use of I discussed in Section IV B.3) can provide apply to any facility that possesses large alternate critena to be confined to rare a cost-effective alternative to volumes of low-lev'el contaminated situations Therefore, for the reasons unrestricted use for some facilities and wastes (including SDMP sites) and i
maintain the dose to the average previously listed in Section A.2.3.4, the 1 should provide a specific exemption or Commission has limited the conditions member of the pertinent critical group at exemption procedures for the " tens" of under which a hcensee would apply to the same level. Thus, the Commission existing facilities for which application the NRC for, or be granted use of, has replaced the prohibitively expensive of the proposed criteria is inappropriate alternate criteria to unusual site-specific provision for justifying restricted use and too restrictive. Commenters circumstances subject to the following with a reasonable cost provision.The suggested that guidance is needed on provisions:
net harm provision remains the same. sites that should be turned over to the (a) A licensee must provide assurance The general cap value has been retained Federal Government after license that, for the site under consideration,it tt 1 mSv/y (100 mrem /y)as has the termination and sites that should be is unlikely that the dose to an average requirement that licensees reduce the kept ur. der license. Commenters also member of the critical group for that site tctual level of contamination to levels recommended that NRC ask Congress to from all potential man-made sources es far below the cap as is AIARA, where amend the NWPA of1982 to allow combined, other than medical, would appropriate. The rule has been modified Federal ownership of extensively exceed the 1 mSv/y (100 mrem /y) to allow for exceeding the 1 mSv/y (100 contammated sites. Other commenters public dose limit of 10 CFR Part 20. The mrem /y) cap in site-specific situations objected to exempting facilities from the Commission envisions that a licensee tnd under specific provisions.No Proposed radiological criteria and stated proposing to use alternate criteria will change has been made to the financir_1 that the rule should cover all have to provide a complete and assurance provisions of the rule. decommissioning cases, comprehensive analysis that would A number of comments were also C.I.3 Response. For the very large build upon generic considerations such received on public participation aspects majority of NRC-licensed sites, the as those discussed in Section IV.A.2 of restricting site use. The final rule will Commission believes that the 0.25 and also include site-specific mSv/y (25 mrem /y) unrestricted and considerations. To guide the require that licensees proposing t decommusion by restricting use of a site restricted use dose criterion in the rule Commission in its review of such is an appropriate and achievable analyses, the NRC is continuing to shall seek advice from individuals and institutions in the community who may criterion for decommhsioning. develop generic information on the be affected by the decommI==ioning and However the Commksion is potential for exposure to radioactivity that,in seeking that advice, the licensee concerned about the possible presence ~ from various sources, including shall provide fon (1) Participation by of certain difficult sites presenting decommissioned sources, to supplement representatives of a broad cross section unique decommissioning problems. currently available knowledge, and is cf community interests who may be I.icensees of these sites who would have planning to make this information sought exemptions to the proposed publicly available through publication affected by the decommksioning; (2) an rule's criteria would have had to follow of a NUFIG report. Site-specific factors opportunity for a comprehensive- processes similar to the other facilities ecliective discussion on the issues by that the CommMion might review in covered by the rule. In addition, such cases could include soil and the participants represented; and (3) a licensing efficiency, consistency of aquifer characteristics, the nature of the publicly cvailable summary of the application of requirements, and results of all such discussions, critical groups likely to use the site, the oversight of these facilities can best be detailed nature of the contamination including a description of the achieved by codifying application of patterns at the site, and the individual viewpoints of the criteria to all facilities. Therefore, the characteristics of residual radionuclides participants on the issues and the extent Commazion believes that it is preferable remaining at the site, including of agreement and disagreement among to codify provisions for these facilities considerations related to whether the the participants on the issues.The under the aegis of the rule rather than nuclides are long-lived or short-lived; details of the comments received and requiring licensees to seek en exemption (b) A licensee will employ, to the the rationale for the public participation process outside the rule as was extent practical, restrictions on site use aspects of the final rule are discussed in contemplated in the, pro;iosed for minimizing exposure at the site Section IV.E. rulemaking. using the provisions for restricted use i
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Federal Regist:r / Vol. 62, No.139 / hioriday,' July- 21, 1997 / Rults and R gulations 39073 outlined in IV.B.above, and in specialized circumstances and under
$ 20.1403; although, in actual practice, cleanup of the provisions described above. uranium mill tailings results in radium (c) A licensee willindicate that a i comprehensive analysis had been C.2 Exclusion of Uranium /Thon.um levels lower than the 10 CFR part 40 1 performed of the risks and benefits of all Mills Proposed in $ 20.1401(a) standards, and radium is usually !
vi:ble alternatives and consideration of removed to background levels during C.2.1 Proposed rule content. The cleanup of uranium and thorium to the any detriments, such as transportation proposed rule stated that, for uranium fatalities that might occur as the result levels in existieg NRC guidance mills, the criteria of the rule apply to the documents, of cleanup activities, to reduce the facility but do not apply to the disposal However,in other mill and ISL site residual radioactivity at the site to levels of uranium mill tailings or to soil areas proximate to locations where !
that are ALARA: cleanup. The~ proposed rule referred to '
(d) A licensee will seek advice from radium contamination exists (e.g., under 10 CFR Part 40. Appendix A, where the mill buildmg,in a yellow cake i cffected parties regarding this approach. criteria already exist (6 20.1401(a)).
In seeking such advice, the licensee will storage area, under/around an ore pad, !
C.2.2 Comments. Comments on the and at ISLs in soils where spray provide for: (1) Participation by proposed rule generally agreed with the irrigation has occurred as a means of representatives of a broad cross section exclusion for disposal of mill ta!!ings disposal), uranium or thorium would be of community interests who may be and soil cleanup. Commenters also i the radionuclides of concern. A difficulty affected by the decommissioning: (2) an recommended that the rule exempt in applying 10 CFR part 40. Appendix opportunity for a comprehensive, conventional thorium and uranium mill A, as a standard for uranium and ccliective discussion on the issues by facilities and in situ leach (ISL) tha participants represented; and (3) a (specifically uranium solution thorium, is that it does not have any cleanup standards for soil publicly available summary of the extraction) facilities from the scope of results of all such discussions, contamination from radionuclides other coverage because they stated that the than radium. Application of the including a description of the decommissioning of these sites is individual viewpoints of the decommissioning dose criterion of the I covered by Appendix A to 10 CFR part final rule to these areas (while retaining participants on the issues and the extent 40 and 40 CFR part 192. the 10 CFR 40, Appendix A, standard of agreement and disagreement among C 2.3 Response Currently,there are for radium) would result in a situation the participants on the issues (the regulations applicable to remediation of where the cleanup standard of that rationale for these public participation both inactive tailings sites,inchdinS small portion of the mill site would be aspects are discussed in more detailin vicinity properties, and active uranium Section IV.E); and lower than the standard for the large and thorium mills. Under the Uranium windblown tailings areas where radium (e) A licensee will obtain the specific Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act approval of the Commission for the use (UMTRCA) of 1978, as amended. EPA is the nuclide of concern. This would ,
tf alternate criteria. The Commission result in situations of differing criteria i has the authority to set cleanup being applied across essentially the will make its decision after standards for uranium mills and, based consideration of the NRC staff's same areas and would be a problem for on that authority, issued regulations in contamMation existing both in uranium recommendations that will address any 40 CFR part 192 which contain . mill soils and buildings.
comments provided by the remediation criteria for these facilities. The Commission has considered the Favironmental Protection Agency and NRC's regulations in 10 CFR part 40, most appropnate means to address any public comments submitted Appendix A, apply to the requirements for cleanup at uranium regarding the decommissioning or decommissiorung ofits licensed and thorium mills and ISLs (collectively license termination plan, facilities and conform to EPA's referred to as UR facilities) for If thelicense termmation conditions standards for uranium mills. At ISLs, unrestricted release of the site other under alternate criteria cannot he met, it the decommissioning activities are than tailings disposal and reclamation may be necessary for the site (or portion similar to those at uramum mills and subject to the requirements of 10 CFR thereof) to be kept under license to consist mainly of the cleanup of part 40, Appendix A. One way would be gnsure that exposures to the public are byproduct material as defined in to include critena for UR facilities as appropriately monitored. The Section 11e.(2) of the Atomic Energy part of this rulemaking. However, as l
mluation of maintenance of a site or a Act of 1954, as amended.
noted above, there are complexities rtion of that site under continued Thus, applicable cleanup standards associated with decommissioning of Ficense is outside the scope of this already exist for soil cleanup of radium these umque facilities which could rulemaking because this rule contains in to CFR part 40, Appendix A, cause practical problems in applymg the provisions, including radiological Cnterion 6(6). Radium is the main standards of this rulemaking'to UR critena, that apply to termination of a contaminant at mills in the large areas facilities. Therefore, the Commission hc;nse. (20-400 hectares (50 to 1000 acres) for With regard to the comment on the has decided to exclude UR facilities uramum mills) where windblown from the scope oi this rulemaking.
i NWPA,it should be noted that Section contamination from the tailings pile has
' To allow for full consideration by the 151(b) of the NWPA already authorizes occurred, and at ISLs (in holding Commission and affected parties of the ownership by the U S. Department of ponds) These standards require that the issues associated with decommissioning En:rgy,if NRC rnakes certain concentration of radium in those large UR facilities and of the regulatory d; terminations. Therefore, no further areas not exceed the background level options listed above, the Commission is legislation is needed to grant this by more than 0.19 Bq/gm (5 pCi/gm) in pubhshing a separate notice in this cuthonty. The rule language has been the first 15 cm (6 inches) of soil, and Federal Register reopening the clarified to ensure that this authority 0 56 Bq/gm (15 pCi/gm) for every 15 cm comment period to specifically request may be implemented by NRC and DOE. (6 inches) below the first 15 cm (6 additional comment on the regulatory C 2.4 Summory ofrensions to nile inches) Cleanup of radium to these options for decommissioning cntena for on codifymg prowsionsfor cenam concentrations would generally result in UR facilities. The Commission is not focihties. The rule has been modined to doses higher than the unrestncted use reopening the comment penod for any include the use of alternate criteria in dose enterion of this rulemaking, other issue discussed in this Federal
l 39074
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Fcd:ral Regitt:r / Vol. 62 No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations !
l Register notice In the mterim, the numerically similar to the existing low- D.2 Use of EPA Drinking Water Commission will continue its current level waste disposal criteria m 10 CFR Standards in NRC Rule ptrctices for decommissioning UR part 61, the Commission beheves that.
facihties. as a whole, the regulations applicable to D.2 2 Comments A number of l C24 Summary of rule revisionsfor low-level waste disposal sites are much commenters disagreed with the uromum/thonum mills The inclusion of a separate groundwater more restrictive than those applicable t (
Commission is excluding uranium / onsite burials.The pathway parameters requirement. In response to the specific thorium mills from the scope of this questions asked, many of these ortwbich NUREG-1101 is based may i ruitmaking and is publishing a separate not be comparable to those used to commenters stated that a separate l requirement for groundwater was not notice requestmg additional comment define the rule's unrestncted release !
on the specific standard for license necessary if the rule included an all- !
criteria. Nevertheless, case-by-case '
termination of UR facilities- pathways standard. A commenter also analysis of the potential radiological noted that application of Maximum C.3 Other Exemptions impacts could mdicate that leavmg the burials in place could be consistent with Contammant Levels (MCLs) to C.3 1 Comments Commenters groundwater was inappropnate because suggested certain other exemptions be unrestncted or restricted release of the affected site For Past bunals that have the MCLs of EPA's dnnkin8 water specifically provided for in the rule involved long-hved nuclides, site- standards were based on outdated Specific modeling may also gustify dostmetry (ICRP2) and were applicable (1) Licensees that possess and hold to public water systems rather than to only sealed sources or limited leaving these bunals m, place Thus, the Commission sees rio mason to groundwater directly. Other quintities; and commenters supported establishing a (2) Radioactive waste materials SPecifically exempt these bunals from separate groundwater requirement as disposed ofin accordance with NRC consideration under this final rule but being consistent with the EPA standard, regulations in formerly used $5 20.302 w uld continue to requiro an analysis of D 2.2 Response. As noted in Section and 20 304 because ALARA was applied S*I' specific overallimpacts and costs in deciding whether or not exhumation of N D.1, the NRC's proposed rule on a site-specific basis for these included separate requirements for ficilities previ us buned waste is necessary for groundwater protection. The NRC staff Other commenters disagreed and specific sites. In addition, the general has reviewed the public comments on attted that all such waste must be exemption provisions of to CFR part 20 its proposed rule, including the EPA decommissioned. In addition, there are available to consider unique past comments supporting the separate were commenters who stated that bunals on a case-by-case basis: . requirement, has reviewed the bases and z=mption procedures should be spelled With regard to specific provisions in rationale for a separate groundwater out. tile nty f r exemptions.yhe standard, and has conducted further C.3.2 Response. No exemption from Commission is not conymced that a tha rule for sealed source or limited signiacant number of exemptions to the technical analyses of groundwater protection in the Final GEIS.
quantity users is necessary. Under unrestricted or restricted use provisions f the final rule will be necessary. The As described in some detailin Section provisions of to CFR Parts 30,40,and W.A.2.2, there were three broad 70, $$ 30.36(c)(1)(v),40.42(c)(1)(v), and Commission believes that the options in this rule for release under alternate considerations that provided the overall 70.38(c)(1)(v), the licensee could cnteria and the flexibility contamed in
. rationale for the proposed rule's provide assurance that building or soil contents. The first two considerations contamina6cn has never occurred or the rule includm, g the use of realistic were related to the health and safety d:monstra*.e that the level of radioactive site-specific screening and modeling aspects, and the third was related to cost material contamina' ion in the facility rovide licensees with sufficient
{atitude. and practicality aspects. As was done in conforms with scaning criteria. Section W.A.2.2, regarding the With regard to burials, as discussed in D. Groundwater Protection Criteria establishment of unrestricted and the preamble to the proposed rule, the (Proposed Rule $20.H03) restricted dose criteria, this section determination of whether the licensee reenmines these three considerations meets the radiological criteria of the D.1 Proposed Rule Content in the context of determining final rule includes consideration of all The proposed rule (5 20.1403(d)) appropriate groundwater cleanup residual radioactivity at the site, indicated that a licensee must ,
requirements for decommissioning.
including burials made in conformance demonstrate a reasonable expectation With regard to the first two with 10 CFR part 20 (both existing that residual radioactivity from the site considerations, as described in Section
$ 20.2002 and formerly used $$ 20.302 will not cause the level of radioactivity W.A.2.2, above, this final rule contains and 20.304).This is consistent with in groundwater that is a current or acceptable criteria (including the dose prior Commwion statements made in potential source of.drmking water to criterion for unrestricted use, and j the preamble to the 1988 rulemaking on exceed the limits specified in 40 CFR provisions for ALARA. restricted use, gened recluirements for part 141. This groundwater requirement and alternate site-specific criteria) to decomcMioning (53 FR 24018; June would have been in addition to the protect the public from radiation from 27.1988)and in promulgation of the proposed dose criterion for unrestricted all of the pathways that they could be final rule on timeliness of use and was included as part of the exposed to from a decommissioned decommissioning (59 FR 36026: July 15, proposed rule on EPA's facility (e.g., direct exposure to 1994). More recent past burials (1981 to recommendation. The preamble to the radiation, ingestion of food, inhalation present) were frequently made in proposed rule solicited responses to of dust, and drmking water). The bases conformance with guidelines defined in three specific questions on this used in selecting the dose criterion for "Onsite Disposal of Rrdoactive Waste," proposal, including whether a separate this final rule are stated in Section
, NUREG-1101, Volumes 1 through 3. standard was appropriate as a N.A.2.
l This guidance was based on a maximum supplement to an overall radiological The dose criterion codified in Ennual whole body or critical organ dose criterion that a $ 20.1402 of this final rule limits the l dose of 0.25 mSv (25 mrem). Although exposure pathways,pplies to all amount of radiation that a person can 1
1 1
_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ __ _.____._.______)
l Fed;ral Regist;r /.Nol. 62,-No.139f, Mon ~ day,: July;21,"1997 / ~Rults.and Regul:tions 39075 potentially receive from all possible protected. Nonethe[ess, it is the.
sources at a decommissioned facility. because this resource can be used in a Commission's position that protection variety of public uses away from the site Therefore,it is an "all-pathways" of public health and safety is fully being decommissioned. The Final GEIS standard. Examples of these pathways include: afforded by limiting exposure to persons draws from NRC's experience and the (e) Direct exposure to radiation from from all potential sources of radioactive public comments regarding materialby means of a TEDE at a contaminated sites. In particular, material on the soil surface; (b) Eating food grown in the soll and decommissioned facility. There is, considerations with regard to eating fish from surface waters; therefore, no compelling reason to groundwater remediation include (c) inhalation of dust from soi l impose a separate limit on dose from the potential remediation methods such as surfaces; and drinking water pathway, and the rule removal of soil to preclude prospective (d) Drmking water obtained from the has been modified to delete a separate contamination, pump and treat groundwater. groundwater standard. To make clear processes for the cleanup of existing Because equivalent doses received NRC's concern over the importance of groundwater contamination, and the through any pathways of exposure protecting this resource as a source of supply of alternate sources of drinking would involve equivalent risks to the potential public exposure, the rule has water, as well as a consideration of erson er, posed. NRC concludes the also been modified to include a direct administrative costs associated with ollowing with regard to the need to set reference to the groundwater pathway in predicting and measuring levels of the all-pathways unrestricted use dose contaminated groundwater.
a separate standard for groundwater: criterion in $ 20.1402.
(a, There is no reason from the Because of the range of possible standpoint of protection of public health .in actual situations, based on typical parameters, scenarios, and site-specific and safety to have a separate, lower dos operational practices of most nuclear situations,Section IV.A.2 notes that the enterion for one of the pathways (e.g., ' facilities and on the behavior of analyses in the Final GEIS indicate that drmking water) as long as, when radionuclides in the environment for there is a wide range of cost-benefit ccmbined, the dose from all the the very large majority of sites, results and there is no unique algorithm pathways doesn't exceed the total dose concentrations of radionuclides in the that is a decisive ALARA result for all standard established in the rule; groundwater will be well below the facilities. This finding is especsally true (b) A standard imposed on a single dose criterion of this final rule and for groundwater contamination where pathway, such as drinking water, may would be either below or only the behavior of radionuclides in soil and have been appropriate in the past for marginally above the MCLs codified in in the aquifer is highly site-specific; site cleanups when a dose-based 40 CFR Part 141 as referenced in the much more so than in concrete. The standard for decommissioning did not proposed NRC rule. For example, results of the overall considerations of exist. It may also be appropnate for because the large majority of NRC Section IV.A.2 for all pathways would chemical contamination when no total licensees either use sealed sources or be applicable to the groundwater limit on exposure exists. However. have very short-lived radionuclides, it is component. As pointed out in Section highly unlikely that contamination from IV.A.2.3.2, it is intended that the NRC's final rule on decommissioning w uld issue an overall TEDE criterion these facilities would reach the regulatory guidance to be developed to groundwater. Even for facilities like support the final rule will provide l for all radionuclides combined and for reactors or certain industrial facilities, 1
cll pathways of exposure combined- guidance on these considerations.
whose major contaminants are relatively Although preparation of this guidance is including drinking water, thus removin8 short-lived nuclides like Co-60 or Cs- in a preliminary stage, it is anticipated the need for a single-pathway standard for groundwater, This is a more unifonn 137, the migration of these nuclides ' that this guidance would likely indicate method for protecting public health and through soil is so slow that it precludes that reducing doses to values less than safety than was contained in NRC's groundwatercontamination of any the dose cnterion of 0.25 mSv (25 significance. In addition, at is not mrem /y)is generally not likely to be proposed rule that set separate anticipated that decommissioned cost-effective when evaluated using requirements using the MCLs contained nuclear facilities will be located near NRC's regulatory analysis framework in 40 CFR part 141. This is because the enough to public water treatment MCL requirements do not cover all presented in NUREG/BR-0058 and facilities so that treatment facilities NUREG-1530, although there may be r:dionuchdes and do not provide a would be affected by the potential c:nsistent risk standard for different ALARA considerations for sites with a groundwater contammation from relatively large population obtaining all r'dionuclides as will be provided by decommissioned facilities, l adoption of a single dose critenon in the their drinking water from the site As further described in Section plume.
k final rule. In addition, the MCLs are IV.A.2, the Commission is basing its based on a modeling approach that has D.2.3 Summary ofrule revisions on decision on analyses in the Final GEIS, groundwaterand plansfor not been updated to reflect current that consider cost and practicahty j
implementation Based on the above, understandings of the uptake and doses factors, to provide additional the Commission concludes that i resulting from ingestion of information regardmg decisions on application of a separate groundwater i radionuchdes through drinkmg water. issues such as achieving ALARA levels protection limit, in addition to the all The Commission agrees with the below the dose entenon of 5 201402 pathways dose hmit, ts not necessary or commenters that exposures from and allowmg restricted use These dnnking contammated groundwater lustified and has deleted this I analyses also consider how these issues requirement from its final rule need to be controlled: with the EPA's relate to groundwater cleanup, As noted above, regulatory guidance groundwater protection principles includmg how, and to what nevel, to be prepared in support of the final contained in the document " Protecting ALARA efforts should be made, and if, rule will likely desenbe site-specific the Nation's Groundwater, EPA Strategy and m what manner, restrictions on use conditions under which an ALARA for the 1990's," 212-1024 (July 1991), should be considered. The analysis of analysis could identify the need to and with the EPA position that the impacts to populations and the cost of consider reducing the dose below the environmental mtegrity of the nction's remedisung those impacts is unrestncted use dose cnterion (e g .
groundwater resources needs to be particularly important for groundwater large existing population derivmg its u- _. . _ _ - _ _
r, 39076 Fediral Regist2r / Vol. 62, No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations i
drinking water imm a downstream - participate effectively in all entitled " Decommissioning of Nuclear supply using a downstream plume).
)
decommissioning cases, not just those Power Reactors" that was published on i
.E PublicParticipation (ProposedRulo related to SSABs. Other specific July 29,1996 (61 FR 39278), the '
comments addressed the type and Commission has held public meetings
$$ 20.2406 and 20.2407) timmg of the notification, meetings to be and mformal hearings for plants E.1 Proposed Rule Content held, who should bear the cost of public undergoing decommissiomng, even The proposed rule included a general participation, the availability oflicensee though limited formal uirements M9".irement in S 20.1406(a) that upon documents, NRC's role, and the need for exist for this type ofin vement To
- receipt of a decommissioning plan or exemptions. codify those activities, that rule requires proposal for restricted use from a E.2.2 Response. A variety of a public meeting to be held at the time I licensee, the NRC must notify and comments have been provided on tlus of submittal of a reactor licensee's Post- I issue dunng all phases of this Shutdown Decommissioning Activities j solicit comments from local and State governments and Indian nations in the rulemaking from the earliest workshops Report (PSDAR) and requires that this through comments on the NRC staff meeting be noticed in a local public vicinity of the site and publish a notice m a forum that is readily accessible to draft rule (February 2,1994; 59 FR 4868) forum and held in the vicimty of the and the proposed rule, and in a facility. The PSDAR must also be made persons in the site vicinity to solicit comments from affected parties.
workshop on public participation available for public review and* -
aspects of the rule held m December comment In addition 's licensee is The proposed rule also contained 1994. Comments provided in these required to hold a public meeting on the additional requirements,in
$$ 20.1406(b) and 20.1407, for forums have been similar to those noted License Termination Plan (LTP), that for above. A common theme of the power reactors now replaces the >1 decommissioning when the h,censee .
does not propose to achieve unrestricted December 1994 workshop was that there decommissioning plan, m the vicmaty of ralease (1 e.,instead restrict site use after are many approaches for involving the the facility following notice of the license termination). In those cases, the pubhc in the decommissioning pmcess. meeting in a local public forum. The Participants generally favored LTP is also required to be made licensee would be required to convene exploration of site-specific alternatives available for public comment with full a site-specific advisory board (SSAB) for as opposed to generally mandated hearing rights under Subpart G or L of the p of obtaining advice from processes,like SSABs. Many affect parties on the 10 CFR 2.1201, depending on the commenters suggested that there was disposition of the spent fuel.
decommiami . The Commi== ion merit to having a public participation . Similarly, for materials facilities savisioned that advice obtained plan developed by the licensee in involving signi6 cant decommissioning w:uld address issues as to whether: cooperation with interested parties so efforts, the Commission has (a)Then are ways to achieve the public's participation could be implemented efforts to inform and unrestricted release that would not be tailored to the needs of the community involve the public in the process. These Prohibitively expensive or cause not and the licensee.
public or enviranmaatal harm: efforts were intended to provide early >
The Commission agrees that public and ma=ainsful opportunities for public (b) Institutional controls proposed by participation can be an important involvement in the decommissioning tha licensee will provide rossonable component for informing and involving process. For example, the NRC staff has essurance that the TEDE does not the public. The Commiamion recognizes Initiated public information meetings at exceed the dose criterson, will be the potential benefit for all the Parks Township shallow land ;
enforceable,and will not impose an decommissioning and site releases of disposal area and the Sequoyah Fuels :
undue burden on affected parties; and significant community concern to keep Corporation facility and conducted (c) Thereis sufBcient financial the public informed and educated about public information roundtables at assurance to maintain the institutional the status of decommissioning at a various sites. Stakeholder contro's. particular site and to elicit public representatives are routinely invited to Public comments received on the concerns about the decommissioning participate in roundtable discussions general requirements related to process at that site. Based on the and information exchanges on the status notification and solicitation are comments received and on a and issues associated with the discussed in Section IV.E.2. r%-ts consideration of current Commission decommissioning project.These l received on the additional requirements practices, the general provisions in initiatives are consistent with the NRC l on public participation for restricted use $ 20.1405 that provide for notification of staff's blic responsiveness plan in are discussed in Section IV.E.3. the public and government entities and R-0199. Where appropriate, ;
E.2 General D '
- tson solicitation of comment have not been the Commission plans to use these
~
Notiftratlan and Solicitation of modified although a specific reference public involvement mechanisms and .
Comments (Proposed Rule $ 20.1406(a)) to notifying and solicitin comments other public information meetings and from the EPA has been ded to involvement efforts, such as community E.2.2 Comments. Several $ 20.1405.The reason that the general informationboards, at other facilities in commenters supported the public provisions of $ 20.1405(a) have not been the future on a site-speciBe basis to notiBeation requirements in inWd modified in response to the public address specific needs that existin S 20.1406(a). Other commenters stated wmments received is because existing affected communities.
thit the proposed notification Commission policies and practices, Based on these considerations, k requirements exceeded requirements of coupled with the provisions of this rule current practices and procedures and th) AdministrativeProcedures Act and a recent rulemaking on power existing rule provisions are appropriate (APA)and that NRC has not reactor decommissioning, appear to provida for public 'cipation in the demonstrated a health and safety need reasonable by providing for public l decommissioning license '
for these nsquirements. Suggestions for participation in the decommiazioning termination process and to provide l public participation offered by some and site release process. Specifically in sufBcient flexibility to accommodate ccamenters included that the public i the case of power reactors, as is noted different situations, and therefore the n:t only be informed but be able to !
in the preamble to the separate final rule general requirements of $ 20.1405 on l
l
Feder:1 -Registir / Nob 62. No.139./ Mondty, July.21.1997 / Rules.and . Regulations 39077..
notification and solicitation of would be needed; that a need for SSABs appropriate into the LTP or conunints have been retained. Sections has not been demonstrated; and that decommasioning plan before the plan is 20.1405 (a) and (b) provide for the SSABs are inconsistent with Federal " submitted to the NRC for review. The notification of speclfic government . Advisory Committee Act, licensee is the appropriate entity to satitirs and the public in the vicinity of Administrative Procedures Act, and accomplish this.
the sits when a licensee submits a LTP Atomic Ei.ergy Act requirements. In considering a requirement to or decommissioning plan for any of the Commenters suggested alternatives to convene a SSAB or similar group, the license termination approaches mandatory SSABs, such as addressing Commission has considered alternatives
- described in Section fV.A.2.3 or the need for a board in a public regarding the most effective way to specifically proposes to use restricted participation plan or providing more ensure that the licensee considers the ,
use (see Section fV.B) or alternate flexibility in deciding when to use diversity of views in the community. !
crit:ria (see Section IV.C). The NRC will SSABs. Some commenters indicated Small group discussions can be a more review public comments gathered by the that use of SSABs should be extended effective mechanism than written t
licznsee prior to final NRC actions on to the unrestricted use of sites. comments or large public meetings for
- tha lic2nsee's request for license E.J.2 Response. One of the major articulating the exact nature of
! t:rmination. A specific reference has issues raised by the comments and in community concerns, determining how been tdded in $ 20.1405(a) to provide the workshop discitssions on the SSAB much agreement or disagreement there for specific notification and solicitation was the advisability of mandating a is on a particular issue, and facilitating of comment from EPA where the specific pubhc involvement mechanism the development of acceptable solutions licinsee proposes to use alternate such as a SSAB as opposed to to issues. Also, the type of close crit:ria. To the extent that EPA has an establishing broad performance criteria interaction resulting from a small group interest in commenting on proposed that would allow the licensee flexibility discussion could serve the licensee well decommissioning other than those in selecting the appropriate public in developing a credible relationship und tr alternate criteria, EPA comments involvement mer hani=m for a particular with the community in which it is ~
< would be considered under the general site. There was general agreement that operating.
i notics t.nd comment provisions of flexibility was always desirable, in Use of public participation methods is consistent with a variety of initiatives
$ 20.1405. establishing meaningful performance Specific additional requirements for criteria. However,it should be being undertaken both within NRC and public participation in cases where emphasized that some of those who at other Federal agencies regarding restricted use or alternate criteria are supported the use of performance stakeholderinvolvement in the proposxd by a licensee are discussed criteria did so only in the context of the decommissioning process. Examples of l furth r in Section IV.E.3. expansion of the scope oflicensee community involvement at NRC-E.2 3 Summary of rule revisions on public tavolvement requirements, licensed sites being decommissioned generalrequirements on public including an SSAB, to cover facilities under the SDMP are described above in
, participation and notifications. No beyond the restricted use category. An Section IV.E.2.2. Similarly, several l
ovar:Il changes were made to the additionalissue of concern to Federal agencies (including EPA DOE, provisions for public notification in the commenters was whether it was more the Department of Defense (DOD)) that l finil rule, except to include specific appropriate for the licensee to establish make up the Federal Facilities r:f;r:nce to notifymg and soliciting the SSAB, as contemplated by the Er dronmental Restoration Dialogue comments from the EPA where the proposed rule, or whether the Committee,in their evaluation of the licensee proposes to use alternate Commission should establish the SSAB. cleanup of Federal facilities, have crittria for license termination. The resolution of this issue depends not prepared a set of" Principles for only n the objectives that the Environmental Cleanup of Federal l E.3 Additional Requirements ort Commission believes will be served by Facilities,, dated August 2,1995.
Public Participation (Including Those an SSAB, but also on what the Pnnciple No.14 notes the need for for Restncted Use, for Alternate Cnteria, Commission's broader responsibilities agencies to provide for involvement of and for Use of SSABs)(Proposed Rule ublic involvement area. This, public stakeholder from affected
$ 20.1406M are inrethe fates to another issuec~mmunities in turn, raised in facility cleanup E.3 2 Comments. Comments were by the commenters: the scope and decisionmaking. It also notes that rather specifically submitted on the duration of a SSAB's responsibilities than being an impediment, meaningful requirement in $ 20.1406(b) for the use In proposmg a requirement for stakeholder involvement has, m many of SSABs. These comments were obtaintng advice from affected parties instances, resulted in significant submitted both in response to the on restricted use, the Commission's cleanup cost reductions.
proposed rule, as well as in connection objective is to involve diverse The Commission envisions that a with the NRC workshop on SSABs held commumty mterests directly with the process for obtaining advice from on December 6-8,1994 (see NUREG/ heensee in the development of the LTP affected interests would provide the CR-6307 for a summary of the or decommissioning plan for a proposed opportunity for public involvement in I wtrkshop). restricted use decommissioning the important issues related to restricted !
S me commenters supported the Commumty concerns, as well as use of a site similar to those described proposed requirement in $ 201406(b) community-based knowledge on the in Section IV.E 2.2. In particular, one of thit would require licensees to convene appropriate selection of mstitutional the important issues would likely be the a SSAB for restricted release of a site. controls, risk issues, and economic unavailabihty of the site for full Othrr commenters objected to the use of development, can be potentially useful tmrestricted public use. In its a SSAB in each case involving a in the development of the LTP or dehberations on the rule, the restncted release of a site These decommissiomng plan. For Commission Commission has envisioned that the commsnters expressed concern that use and licensee resources to be used following should occur-of SSABs was mconsistent with the efficiently, the Commission believes '(1) The hcensee would present timsliness rule or that exemptions or that this type of mformation should be information to, and seek advice from, othzr relief from the timeliness rule considered and incorporated as affected parties on the provisions for
39078 Fed;rcl Regist:r / Vol. 62, No.139 / Monday. July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regrlattons
- limiting the dose to meet the enteria in rationale for how use of restrictions can affected parties to be considered and the rule (e.g., limiting use to eliminate exposure pathways (e.g . for will allow licensees additional commercial / industrial use with uranium, elimmation of the resident flexibthty in determining the best elimination of the resident pathway), farmer pathway greatly reduces the dose methods for obtaining that advice based how the restrictions would be enforced because most of the dose received from on site-specific consideration's. For (2.g , use of deed restnctions, uranium is through the agncultural example, there may be situations where engineered barriers, State or Federal phthway); the nature of the institutional the creation of a SSAB may not be control or ownership), the effect on the controls expected to restrict use over appropriate as in cases where an community, and the adequacy of the extended time penods (e.g , deed existing orgamzation is already in place level of financial assurance (e.g., restrictions, engmeered barriers such as to assume this role, or where it is clear sufficient funds for maintenance of the fencing, restncted cells, etc , and/or that the commumty is willing to rely on deed or of fencing). In seeking such government control of the restricted local government institutions to interact advice, a broad cross section of the area); and other special provisions such with the licensee. Appropriate affected parties in the community as penodic rechecks of the restricted mechanisms for seeking advice from would be involved and there would be area and the continued effectiveness of affected parties could melude a pubhc opportunity for a comprehensive institutional controls (see Section meeting or series of meetings, a specific discussion of the issues by those parties IV.B 3). As discussed previously in process for obtaining written or The information presented would be Section IV.E 2.2, because community computerized pubhc comment by rinular to that which the rule would involvement already exists either intemet or web-site means, or by require the licensee to prepare and formally or informally at a number of convening small groups such as a SSAB, submit to NRC to demonstrate the complex sites, this provision would not Any of these processes would result in appropriateness and safety aspects of change the situation at these sites an opportunity for a comprehensive, the restrictions on site use. collective discussion of the issues by the As an example, in the specific case sig(mficantly.
- 2) Following solicitation of advice affected parties. All of these approaches where the nuclides involved are from affected parties, the licensee will have been used in prior relatively short-lived (e g., Co-60 and include the recommendations from decommissioning.
Cs-137), as discussed in Section IV.B.3, j these parties in the LTP or To ensure that there will continue to ,j calculations could demonstrate that it is decommissioning plan and indicate be significant opportunity for public preferable to restrict use of the site for how those recommendations were involvement in the decommissioning e finite time period to allow for addressed along with the technical basis process, the modified final rule has radioactive decay than it is to ship large for addressing them. The technical basis retained the principal objectives of an quantities of soil. These calculations for dealing with the recommendations SSAB from $ 20.1407 of the proposed would also show the length of time that would presumably derive from the rule, namely that a licensee seeking th) restrictions would need to remain in presentation made to the affected parties community advice on the proposed force to allow for radioactive decay to described above and is the type of restricted use will provide for:(1) reduce residuallevels below the analysis that would be necessary to Participation by representatives of a unrestricted dose criterien. In addition, demonstrate to the NRC the broad cross section of community these calculations could show that acceptability of restricted use interests who may be affected by the restricting the site to industrial use provisions. decommissioning: (2) an opportunity for through deed restrictions during this Based on the above,it appears a comprehensive, collective discussion time period would eliminate or decrease reasonable to retain the requirement for on the issues by the participants certain pathways and limit the dose to sites to seek advice from individuals represented; and (3) a pubhcly available less than the 0.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y) and institutions in the community who summary of the results of all such dose criteria in the rule. Finally, such an may be affected by the decommissioning discussions, including a description of analysis could indicate that continued where restricted use is proposed. In the individual viewpoints of the use of the site for an industrial purpose retalning this requirement, the participants on the issues and the extent similar to its currently existing use Commi" ion has decided to modify the of agreement and disagreement among should not adversely impact the rule to include general provisions that the participants on the issues.
c:mmunity. Consideration of require that such advice be sought on Advice sought from affected parties in community advice on appropriate the fundamental performance objective the manner noted above would be institutional controls for controlling of institutional controls, namely that ec- '%ed in development of the LTP access to the site during this decay they function to provide reasonable or decommissioning plan, and the NRC period would provide the licensee with assurance that the TEDE does not will review public comments gathered useful information in developing the exceed the dose criteria of the rule, that by the licensee prior to final NRC action necessary institutional controls. As part they are enforceable, and that they will on the licensee's request for license of the process of public participation, not impose undue burdens on the local termination.
the licensee wopld make public a community.This general provision As discussed in Section IV.C. the summary of the advice received and the replaces the specific reference contained Commission included requirements for results of the discussions on that advice. in the proposed rule ($ 20.1406(b)) that consideration of alternate criteria for For more complex cases where large advice must be obtained by convening certain difficult sites because inclusion v:lumes of uramum/ thorium a SSAB. The rationale for this of such requirements is preferablo to contamination would remain under a modification derives from the having these facilities apply for form of restricted use, the long-lived discussion above on site flexibility, exemptions. To ensure that there is full .
nature of these nuclides would result in protecting public health and safety, and public participation in any decision the restrictions having to remain in ensuring community involvement. regarding such sites, licensees will be force in the community for a long pen'od Specifically,it is anticipated that these required to seek advice regarding this ci time. The information presented by requirements will contain the beneficial approach from affected parties in the l the licensee would be similar to that for provisions of ensuring timely and same manner as described above for shorter-lived nuclides. including the meaningful opportunity for advice from restricted use and described in detailin
l Fed:ril Regist;r / Vol. 62; No.139 / Mariday,' July 21,-1997 / Rules and Regulations 39079 Section IV.C.3. In addition, use of the licensee. One commenter stated that i
altrrnate criteria will only be considered the SSAB would be unique assite. presently
. SDMP sites, for example the Cush by the Commission after review of the proposed because it does not appear to E.4.3 Summaryofrule revisions on l
NRC staff's recommendations that fully be accountable to its employer. functioning ofSSABs. As noted in l I
address any comments provided by the Cornments were received regarding how Sections E.3.2 and E.4.2 above, the public and EPA regarding the l SSAB costs would be contained and principal objectives of SSABs have been '
decommissioning or license termination how they would be paid, including plan. retained in $ 20.1403(d) which mplaces E.3.J Sununary ofrule revisions on costs of technical consultants to the the detailed prov:: ions in proposed SSABs. Specific text referring to SSABsexperts. SSAB or independent SSAB labs and S 20.1407 (b) through (f) of the proposed has been replaced with a requirement rule.The guidance that the NRC th:t licensees seek community (4) With regard to SSAB meetings and develops to implement the final rule records, comments were provided willinclude additional guidance on involvement and advice on any plans for restricted use or alternate criteria for concerning frequency advertisement seeking advice from affected parties, and openness of meetings, and access to including establishing and using SSABs.
m ds slequ tin u s at re p o the p Ic e an
" ## "" " "I" provisions for spo 1cally how that #
cdvice is to be sougut and documented those that contain proprietary or other i l
' con 6dentialinformation: F.1 State and NRC Compatibility latorygu a pl N ch (5) With regard to use of SSAB results, F.2.2 w include criteria for establishing and c mments were received concerning the stated that Comments. Some commenters States should have the uring the processes.for seeking such actams expected to be taken by the authority to demand stricter radiation cdvice. including establishing SSABs licensee and the NRC on the advice or protection standards than the Federal and for delineating those situations ij mmments of ee SSAB3ese achns Government. Some commenters which an SSAB may not be appropriate. Include a licensee s analysis of SSAB recommended that States not be allowed Th2 guidance will discuss that the remmmendatins, the need to obtain e SSAB s consensus on aspects of the to set less stdct conditions. Other expected starting pointin providing an opportunity for public involvement is decommissioning plan. and the effect on commenters stated that radiological criteria should be an area of strict tha establishment of an SSAB: however, time restramts of submitting a compatibility and States should not be the provisions of the rule provide decommissioning plan reconcih,ng permitted to impose more stringent liccnsoes the flexibility to use other SSAB advice-standards. Specific comments raised
.E.4.2 Response. Based on the tpproaches where appropriate included questions as to which standard discussion m Section IV.E 3.2 regarding would applyif there was a conflict.
E.4 Specific Questions on Functioning the need to explore site-specific of SSABs whether a State would need NRC alternatives as opposed to generally approval to require more strict E.4.2 Comments. A number of mandated SSABs, the rule contains standards, application of ALARA comments were received on the broad provisions for obtaining provisions, who should pay for costs if functioning of SSABs including their community advice and more strict State standards are applied, responsibilities, membership, recommendations through such bodies.
exemptions, and grandfathering independence and support, meetings. The purpose of the reqturements on provisions similar to those in Section and results. public involvement is to obtain IV.F.2.
(1) Some commenters recommended meaningful public input into F.2.2 Response.The proposed rule thit SSABs should be given preparation of the plan for did not propose a compatibility responsibilities beyond those specified decommissioning the site when in proposed $ 20.1407(a). Other determination because the Commission restrictions on future use or proposals was in the process of developing a commcaters stated that the rule should for attemate criteria are planned. To compatibility policy. Instead, comments restrict SSAB activities to a specific allow for flexibility,Section IV.E.3.2 were requested on compatibility and the mission which is advisory only and indicates that the final rule has been nontechnical. comments received were divided on this modified to establish general issue.
(2) With regard to membership in requirements for obtaining such advice The current compatibility policy SSABs. a number of comments while retaining the principal objectives categorizes rules into four " divisions."
recommended specifically how the of an SSAB from $ 20.1407(b)-(f) of the SSAB and its membership should be Division 1 rules are those that proposed rule. The details, sach as Agreement States must adopt, constituted. Some commenters stated specific issues of size, membership, essentially verbatim,into their th.st many of the proposed SSAB issues responsibilities, administration, regulations.These rules include that are listed appear to require meetings, and records requested in these provisions that form the basic language specialized expertise that members of comments are more appropriately of radiation protection and include the general public might not have. Some contained in regulatory guidance With commenters questioned whether NRC technical definitions and basic radiation regard to assues of funding public protection standards such as public cad other Government agencies should involvement, reasonable efforts towards dose hmits, occupational exposure be prohibited
- rom participating in obtainmg advice from affected parties limits and ef0uett release limits.
SSABs because of confhet ofinterest should be undertaken by the licensee, Division 2 rules address basic principles quistions Other commenters stated that such as sponsoring and holding of radiation safety and regulatory l
' the NRC shculd be ofScially represented community meetings and distnbuting functions. Although Agreeraent States on the SSAB.
information at those meetm, gs regarding must address these principles in their (3) With regard toindependence of the rationale for and nature of the regulations, the use of language
{ cad support for SSABs, sorpe comments restricted use. Examples of these l rec :ved stated that an SSAD should be meetings are those held for reactor identical to that in NRC rules is not necessary if the underlying principles s;lected and operated independently of facilities and those held for seven! are the same Also, the Agreement States
39080 Fcd:rrl Regist:r / Vol. 62. No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations msy adopt requirements more stnngent the final stages of preparation or of NRC required for the Commission to issue a ;
than NRC rules. review. From a health and safety record of decision.
, Because the dose criterion in the rule perspective, the NRC believes the is not a " standard in the sense of the In submittmg the decommissioning cnteria identified m the SDMP Action plan for the licensed activities that are public dose 4tmits of 10 CFR part 20 but Plan are reasonably consistent with the is a constramt within the public dose to cease on Portions of sites, the licensee final rule's doso criteria The ,
hmit that provides a sufficient and must identify the areas associated with contamination levels defined in the emple margin of safety below the limit. SDlCIP Action Plan are within the range the ceased operations These areas must it is reasonable that the rule would be of measurable values that could be be remediated to achieve acceptable a Division 2 level of compatibility under derived through the site-specific radiological critena for release, en,tber ths current policy. This means the screening and modehng approaches those in the final rule or previous Agreement States would be required to defined m guidance supporting this acceptance criteria that would achieve cdopt the regulation but would have final rule. The Commission believes the comparable protection as the enteria in significant flexibihty in language, and grandfathering approach will facihtate the final rule. The area for continuing would be allowed to adopt more the timehness of decommissionmg and licensed operations could continue to stringent requirements- ensure licensees that resources spent to contam radioactivity above the The Commission has not yet approved develop and implement a radiological criteria. When the a new final policy on compatibility that decommissiomng plan are justified, continuing operations cease, the r: vises the current policy.,although it is With regard to criteria other than the radiological critena of the final rule currently considen,ng the implementmg SDMP Action Plan, the grandfathering would then be required to be met for the procedures for this policy (SECY provision in the proposed rule was portion of the site for which operations 213 dated October 3.1996). Until the had most recently ceased. The decision ntw policy becomes effective, NRC will conditioned on the license being tenninated in accordance with the on grandfathering previously released continue to apply the current criteria identified in the SDMP Action Agreement State compatibility poh.ey. portions of the site depends on whether Plan, because those criteria are the criteria previously used are still F.2. Grandfathering Sites With cons.istent with the final rule. However, acceptable (e.g., part of the SDMP Prmviously Approved Plans (Proposed the grandfathering provision does not Action Plan) and whetherit can be '
Rule 20.1401(b)) extend to any former decommissioning demonstrated that these areas have not F.2.2 Proposed rule contents. actions in general because that would been affected by the continued Section 20.1401(b) of the proposed rule n t provide assurance that such actions operations. NRC intends to develop
+
indicated that the criteria do not apply were adequate to protect the public. As comprehensive guidance on how to sites already covered by a Part ofits overall upgrading ofits, licensees should address previously d: commissioning plan approved by the oversight of decommbsloning actions. released portions of license d sites in Commission before the ehective date of NRC has conducted a systematic review demonstrating complianer with the thi final rule and in accordance with of a large number of h, cense dose criteria.
terminations to identify sites with tha criteria identified in the SDMP ,
significant contamination and has Not all h,censees are required to Action Plan of April 16* 1992 (57 FR identified a number of sites warranting submit decommissioning plans, and ,
.2 Comments. Some commenters additional NRC attention. Broademng instead, may submit appropriate {
supported the provision of the grandfathering exclusion in the rule documentation including a report of the i grandfathering sites covered by a would not be consist.at with the results of the radiation survey of the j decomrnissioning plan approved by the biectives of this comprehensive regency premises (see for example,10 CFR Commission (and suggested extending it review and is not supported by existing 30.36). Because the rationale discussed to plans under review) because it is information and experience. above applies m general to all facilities, consistent with previou's NRC The NRC staff anticipates that , these grandfathermg provisions apply to statements in the SDMP Action Plan. grandfathering would occuras follows: alllicensees, independent of the type of Some commenters suggested that (1) Licensees would have up to 12 documentation for license termination criteria other than those in the SDMP months after the effective date of the that has received NRC approval.
Action Plan should also be used for rule to submit sufficient LTPs or An aspect of grandfathering is those grandfathering. Other commenters decommissiomng plans (if required) in sites that were not previously licensed e pposed grandfathering because criteria accordance with the SDMF Action Plan but are discovered to have radioactivity used in those cases would be different criteria; levels that are licensable or are in excess than those in the rule. (2) The NRC staff would have up to of the levels presented here as Commenters recommended that the 24 months after the effective date of the appropriate for unrestricted site use. '
rule address how the criteria would rule to approve those plans; These cases have arisen as part of the apply to portions of sites. Some (3) Any plan submitted after 12 months or approved after 24 months of SDMP and are desenbed in NUREG-commenters recommended that the grandfathering provision cover an NRC. the effect2ve date would have to be 1444. It is intended that the criteria of epproved decommissmning plan even if consistent with the new rule; and this rule will also apply, as appropriate, it is for a rtion of a site. (4) There would be provisions for day. to residual radioactivity at sites that F.2.3 sponse.The Commmion for-day extension if an EIS is required wem n t previously licensed.
continues to believe that sites beitig in the submittal; i.e., if development of F.2.4 Summary ofrule ruisions on i decommissioned under previously an EIS is required before NRC can reach gmndfathering The Enal rule has !
approved decommissioning plans a decision lugarding the retained the grandfathering provision.
should be grandfathered from the decommissioning, then the 12-month However,it has been modified to provisions of the final rule. Similarly window for submitting an LTP or -
include facilities whose plans are in the provisions should apply to licensees decommissioning plan would be final stages of decommissioning plan l whose decommissioning plans are in extended by the same number of days preparation and decision.
1
I
, Fed:rd Regist:r2/ Vol. 62 No.139 / Monday, July 21,1997, /,Ruhs,and.Regul tions t 39081 i F.3 Finality of Decommissioning and not require specific definition or rule a o.25 mSv/y (25 mrem /y) dose Future Site Reopening (Proposed Rule l clariScatha. The reason lies in the fact crite' rion which would apply to all ;
5 20.1401(c)) that under the provisions'of the rule, a crposure pathways including ;
I F.3.2 Proposed rule contents. licensee is allowed to demonstrate growidwater, an alternate criteria l Proposed $ 20.1401(c) stated that after a c mpliance with the doce criteria provision for certain difficult cases to l, thmugh use of several screening and site has been decommissioned and the reduce the need for requests for license terminated in accord with the m deling approaches. Each approach exemptions, and provisions for I criteria of the proposed rule, the has a degree of conservatism associated wida die relationship of the measurable substantive participation by the public, 1 Commission will require additional including EPA. }
cleanup only 1f, based on new eve ntami an information,it determm, ed that residual g
's dose As described in some detailin j r: bioactivity remalmng at the site could critesion. Because of the surveys SectionsIV.A-NE, the Commission '
required of the licensee and believes that the overall approach to .
F 3.2 omm ts. o e c mmetiters connnnatory surveys mutinely Ham tenninadon in Es Enal rule j stated that decommissioning a nuclear Performed by NRC, the chances of (that includes unrestricted and .
facility and rele'asing a site should be restricted use dose criteria, alternate
{revi ing usly unidentified discovered contammation would be expected to j accomplished as a final regulatory criteria,and ALARA considerations) ;
action unless new information indicates be smaR Also ,conwninatma,that pmtects public health and safety, and ;
there is a significant health and safety wu se a signtScant pubhc nsk that the approach to dnnking water i risk and net benefit to future cleanup. above e levels implied by the dose protection in the final rule provides an Cnteri n is expected to be smaller still. {
These commenters cited financial appropriate and more consistent level of '
reasone.bleness, the low risk associated Protection of public health and safety l with the critoria, and the incentive to stu es 1 ea to co usion tfiat than use of MCLs. In addition, as is complete dccomminioning. Other an increased risk associated with a given exposure to radiation exists. furdier described in those sections, it is commenters stated that they did not Although such an increase can occur as anticipated that in the large majority of agree that these actions should be final situations the coinbination of ALARA indicated by the continuing studies of }
and that the site should be cleaned uP Japanese atomic bomb survivors, the c nsiderations.the nature of the 1 to account for mistakes, discovery of Commission believes that demographic concrete and soil removal processes, the contamination, or new health findings. studies of populations exposed to use of mstrictions on site use where i It was noted that the terms "significant differing background exposure levels appmpriate, and the effects of !
pebuc risk" and "new information" provide a defensible bound on the radionuclides decay and transport used in proposed $ 20.1401(c) needed to magnitude of any inc'rease in the dose mechanisms in the environment will be explained and appropriately de 'ined. to risk conversion factor. Taken alone, result in the large majority of NRC F.3.3 Response.The wording of final any such increase would not be licensees meeting the criteria preferred
$ 20.1401(c) states that the Commission expected to affect finality decisions.
will require additional cleanup only if, by EPA. Those sections also clearly Thus, because any challenge to indicate that altemate criteria will be based on new information,it determines finality is likely to involve some confined to rare situations and require I that residual radioactivity remaining at unexpected combination of factors, the specific Commluion approval of the the site could result in significant pubh,c Commission believes that attempting to license termination in those cases. In
)
nsk. The low level of estimated risk specifically define what constitutes associated with the final rule s dose addition, the Commission believes that "new information" or "significant the provisions of the final rule as criteria, coupWd with the conservatism public risk" is ill-advised because the in the methodologies that convert these determmation would be made on a case- described in Section W.E provide for a dose enteria to levels of measurable by-case basis. substantive level ofPublic involvement d contamination in the envimament, As noted in Sections W.A and IV.D. In the decommissioning process. -
abould minimize the likelihood that there are issues that have been raised by Thus the Commission believes that !
new information, including errors EPA regarding the acceptability of the the criteria of this final rule provides )
during the decommissioning processes, unrestncted (lose criterion as well as the protection comparable to that preferred I would signidcantly impact the inclusion of a separate groundwater by EPA and that therefore it would be i protection of public health and safety or standard. These issues were raised reasonable for EPA to find NRC's rule I the environment. during the public comment period as sufficiently protective. !
The Commission believes the well as during a pubhc meeting held I fundamental reason for requiring Apnl 21,1997 to explore differences Licensees should be aware that if theY !
cdditional cleanup would hinge on the between NRC and EPA on certain issues terminate a license using the enten.a of 1 public risk associated with the m the Enal rule. As noted in those this rule, there is some potential that the remaining radioactivity at the site. The sections. EPA h as indicated that it license termination may be revisited as cxistence of additional contamination or preferred a 0.15 mSv/y (15 mrem /y) Part of an EPA proceeding,although n: incompliance with the TEDE dose criterion for unrestricted use such an action would not seem decommissioning plan at a levelin and inclusion of a separate groundwater reasonable for the_same reasons that site excess of the dose entena but less than standard as were proposed in NRC's cleanups noted above would not be the public dose limits in 10 CFR Part 20 proposed rule. At the Apnl 21,1997 revisited, i e., it is not believed that would not, by themselves, be sufEcient meeting. EPA also indicated that it had significant public risk would be to invalidate the finality provision. concerns with inclusion of alternate , determined to exist.
Therefore, the wording of $ 20.1401(c) cnteria and with certain public ccptures the fundamental issue. F.3 4 Summary ofrule revisions on participation aspects of the rule. For the finalny. Based on this discussion, the
( The Commission believes the terms reasons described in some detailin "significant pubhc nsk and new Sections IV A, IV C, IV D, and IV.E. the rule has not been changed with regard mformation," as used in S 20.1401(c), do Commission has included in the final to the finality issue ^
39082 ' Fedartl Register / Vol. 62, No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations I
F.4 ? Minimization of Contamination - including renewals, to minimize regardmg "readily removable" has been (Proposed Rule SS 20.1401(d) and contamination. Specific minimization deleted from the final rule 20.1408) requirements contained in the proposed F.4.2 Proposedrule contents. rule am directed towards those making F.6 Separate Standard for Radon Proposed $ 20.1401(d) indicated that application for a new license because it F.6 2 Proposed rule contents.
applicants forlicenses, other than - is more likely that consideration of Proposed S 20.1404(a) did not contain a renewals, would be requimd to describe des and o as cts se s in the application process how facihty C mment . ome ommenters design and procedures for operation can k cost-dfective at that time indicated that the rule should will minimize contamination of the . compared to such considerations during speciScally include reference to radon facility and the environment, facihtate the license renewal stage where the, _ g eventual decommissioning, and existi g design and previous operations - gg i minimize the generation of radioactive ma maj
, on e n $ bel eve that the complications introduced by these 4.'2 Comments. Some commenters the emphasis should dbatinue to be L recommended that the requirements for directed at such new designs and, [ F.6.3 un d ni els Response. Radon is so high' a
describing facility design and therefore, the requirement for
,. procedures for weste minirnization minimization has been retamed as radioactive gas formed by the l should apply to all license applicants PMPosed. - radioactive decay of radium. Radaum is L and not only to applicants for new F.4.4 Summary ofrule revrsions on a member of the naturally-occumng l'
lican===. One commenter recommended minimization ofconfonunation. The uranium-238 radioactive decay chain.
that the rule ram =In as proposed and not requirement in the proposed rule for Radionuclides from this decay chain are i apply to renewallicenses. imposition of the requuement on found in natural background in various !
F.4.3 Response.The intent of this applicants for new licenses has been concentrations in most soils and rocks.
provision is to emphasize to a license - retained in the final ruk in S 20.1406 Estimation of redon dose is a applicant the importance, in an early but has not been further extended. consideration for this ral=== kine only ~
stage of 1=anI*F, for facilities to be at those very few facilities which have desi F.5 Provisions for Readily Removable been cont ==le=ted with radium as a and operated in a way that Residual Radioactivity wo minimina the amount of result ofli-ad activities.
F.5.2 Proposed rule contents. Followmg the approach taken in the radioactive con *==In= tion generated at proposed rule, this final rule includes the site during its operstmg lifetime and Nyosa $ 20.1403(c) indicated that radiological criteria for residual w:uld minimi== the generation of . licensens are to take reasonable steps to remove all readily removable residual radioactivity that is distingninhahle radioactive waste during from background. Because of natural decontamination. Applicants and radioactivity from the site.
transport of redon gas in outdoor areas existing H , including those F.5.2 Comments.Some commenters due to diffusion and air currents, doses making license renewals, are already reco==aadad either dektion, modification, or clarification of the from exposure to redan in outside areas required by to CFR part 20 to have rad *=tian protection programs aimed due to radium in the soil are negligible.
Provision for readily removable residual Within buildings, wide variation in
- towards reducing exposure and radioactivity, minims ing waste. In ular, local eaarantrations of naturally F.5.3 Reeponse.The provision for ._.__ ..: indoor redon, well in =r===
5 20.1101(a) requires pment and removal of "readily removable" residual of the 055 msvly (25 mrom/y) dose implementation of a radia*ian radioactivity was intandad to provide pensar'ian plan ca==aaan' ate with the guidance on what matenals should be criterion discussed in Section IV.A.
have been observed in all regions of the and extent oflic===ad activities removed even if the removal would samelant to ensume compliance United States. The d=i==~ factor in have little effect on dose. The intent of deteraming indoor redon levels are the
- with the provisions of to CFR part 20. this provision is to define the basic design featuses of any structures at a site Section 20.1101(b) requires licensees to rev==di= that are a matter of" good where radium is t in the soil.
use, to the extent practicahia, practice" such as common Certain procedures and "- M controls to =-n ? =-ing M - ' ._ (e.g., washing energy saving measures that reduce eir features, including achieve public dosIss that are ALARA. In with moderate amounts of detergent and =vehang. with the outside, can have the addition, lessons learned and water) that do not generate large dan === mad in effect of trapping redon gas within a such as NUREG- volumes of radioactive waste requiring building,thus aBowag buildup of 1444 have a**==*ian on the need subsequent diapa=1 As noted in the redan to ehrvated levels. In addition,
- to =1=1=1== and control waste pr===hla to the proposed rule, removal indoor redon levels can vary generation during operations as part of of this materialis considered a signincantly over time due to secsonal f A tof therequiredradiation aaea=='y and r==-bla step toward changes and the rate of air flow in peotection plans. Furthersnore, the ensunng that da==a to the public from rooms.
n===eial assurance --- >= Etsissued residual =diametivity are ALARA. These Another variable in redon levels is in toe January 27,1988 (s3 FR 24018), - considerations should be considered as introduced by the use of redon rule on planning for d=ea==lulaning part of an ALARA evaluation for require C __ to provide adequate mitigation planning deco ==i== ming activities in which can have the effect techniques in buildings, of reducing
' -M for daea==i==tandag. These a lic===='s radiation protection radon levels by deliberate venting of the funding % '_ create great program as required by $ 20.1101(b). gas 20 outside areas. la many parts of the i.e=,**ve to =i=i=i== ea=*==i==tian. F.5.4 9- y of, rule revisionsfor country, local building codes have been and the amount of funds set aside and imodDyremovableis L ,ehioy.Because anne *=d for the ofreducing expended on cleanup there as no purpose in duplicating an Thus, current requuements requim redon levels in mes,in particularis aheady existingEd ~-t for areas where there are high levels of.
both applicants and existing licensees, ALARA, the specific provision naturally occurring radium and redon,
j .
Federil!Jtegister VWol. 62hNo. '139t/tMond y4uly121,s199Z!/ R61es andtjReguls.tlonte '4908.3-The variations in redon levels with 10 CFR part 40, Appendix A, and not be speciBed in the definition of described above make it very difficult to 10 CFR part 61 that use times of 200- decommissioning because it is a distinguish between naturally occurring 500 years. separate issue'from decommissioning.
redon and redon resulting from licensed F.7.3 Response. As pre'viously - Some commenters stated that licenses material. In addition, it is impractical to discussed in the preamble to the should be terminated only when sites predict pros ve doses from exposure proposed rule, the Communion believes ' are given unrestricted release and that to indoor on due to problems in use of 2000 years in its calculation of restricted use should not be, permitted predicting the design features of future maximum dose is reasonable based on orincluded in the deBaltion.
building construction. Because of these the nature of the levels of radioactivity (3) Othercomments were also variations and the limitation of at decommaaloned sites and the received requesting clariScation of other measurement techniques, the potential for changes in the physical definitions contained in the rule, rammienion believes thatitis not characteristics at the site over long including inclusion of radonin the practical for licensees to distinguish periods of time. Unlike analyMs of definition of background and the between redon from licensed activities - situations where large quantities of definitions of critical group, restricted et a dose com ble to a 0.25 mSv/y long-lived radioactive material may be use. release of portions of sites.
- (25 mreni/y) criterion and radon involved (e.g., a high-level waste indi=Ha-ieble from background, which occurs naturally. Therefore, in re itory) and where distant future readily removable radioactivity, and
~ implementing the final rule, licensees culations may provide some ln' sight SSABs.
will not be expected to demonstrate that into consequences, in the analysis for C.2.2 Resp nse.The only redon from bconsed activities is decommianwning, where the . modification that the proposed rule t ='u- = " '-le from background on a consequence of exposum to residual snede to the masting deEnition of site.speisific basis. Insteed this may be radioactivity at levels near background backgrund in 10 CFR part 20 was the considered to have been demonstrated are smaH and peak doses for inclusion of the phrase "or from past en a generic basis when radium, the radionuclides ofinterest in nuclear accidents like Chernobyl that principal precursor to redon, meets the - dacammi==laning occur within 1000 contribute to background radiation and requirements for unrestncted release. years, long term modeling thousands of are not under the control of the without including doses from the redon years into the future of doses that are licenset"The remn for &is pathway. near background may be vutually mdi8 cation was to fureer clarify se in some instances it may not be meaningless. In 10 CFR part 40 existing g----- - nt regardmg sources reasonable to achieve levels of residual Appendix A makes reference to both a of radiation and radionuclides that can concentratius of redon precursms 200-year and 1000-year time frame.10 be excluded frena licensee evaluation.
within the limit for unrestncted use. As Aftwmyiew of es canments, se discussed in Section IV.B for cases such CFR part 61 references the design of a Commission continues to beheve that h
P ysicalbarrierratherthana as these, restricting site use by use of calculation of exposure. the inclusion in backgmund of global institutional controls could be - F.7.4 Summ fallout from weapons testing and ofrulerevisions' censidered by a licensee as a means to : This provision has been atained in accidents such as Cheinobylis limit the doses from procures by *PPropriate. No empelling reason was limiting access to the site. Under the S 20.1401(d) of the final rule.
presented that would indicate that restricted use provisions of the rule, G. Other Comments remediation should include material these doses are required to be further - over that the licensee has no control and G.1 Definitions (Proposed Rule ]
reduced based on ALARA principles. In S 20'1003) that is present at comparable levels in dtveloping guidance on the application the environment both on and offsite.
of ALARA in such cases, the G.2.2 Cmaments.There were ,
The existing deBaltion of Comminalon will also consider the . comments on several de6nitions in decommissioning in 10 CFR parts 30,-
practicality of requiring as part of S 20.1m of the pmposed rule including 40,50,70, and 72 was incorporated into controls the use of redon mitigation the following: the regulations on June 27,1988 (53 FR techniques in existing or future (1) With regard to the definition of 24018). The Commission continues to structures. background radiation,several believe that " decommissioning"is a F.s4 Summary ofrule revisions. No commenters opposed defining term for a process which ultimately change to the final rule has been made. " background radiation"in terms of leads to termination of an NRC license currently existing levels and proposed for unrestricted use. The only change to F.7 - Calculation of TEDE Over 1M defining it at the level existing when the existing definition made by the
~ Years to Demonstrate Compliance With human beings and other organisms proposed rule would be adding " release
. Dose Standard (Proposed Rule evolved;i.e., man-made sources of
- 5 20.1403(a)) of property under restricted conditions" radiation should not be considered to be to the process of termination of the
. F.7.2 Proposed rule contents. a part of " background radiation." One license. In response to commenters who Proposed S 20.1403(a) stated that when commenter suggested that the term disagreed with permitting restricted use, calculating the TEDE, the licensee shall " naturally ocsialiig radioactive Section IV.B contains a detailed review
- base estimates on the TEDE expected material " that is used in the definition of issues on acceptability of restricted withm the Brst 1000 years after of " background radiation," should also use. Based on that review, the final rule decommissioning. be defined. This commenter also continues to per: nit restricted use.
F.72 Comments. Some commenters suggested that the word "like." that Therefore, the definition in the
- - objected to the proposed loco-year time precedes "Chernobyl," should be pro _ posed rule is not changed.
frune for calculating dose and wanted it replaced with the words "such as" to- The remaining comments on lengthened to better predict health clearly indicate that an example is being definitions reflect specific technical affects over the hazardous life of each - provided. concerns regarding use of the terms L isotope. Other commenters wanted the (2) With regard to the definition of rather than the definition itsell These proposed 1000-year time frame decommissioning, several commenters concerns are discussed in detail in the shortened because it is inconsistent recommended that license termination responses to the technicalissues I
l
=
' 390M Fsdzral Reghtzr / Vol. 62 No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations addressed in Sections IV A through G.4 Consistency with NRC's supplemental environmental review IV.F . Timeliness Rule requirement for a licensee that intends G.2 J Summary ofrule revisions.
The only change to $ 201003 is a C.d.1 Comments Some commenters to decommission to unrestncted release indicated that the rule is inconsistent conditions as required in this final rule change in the wording of the definition and has decided to contmue to retata of background to replace the word with NRC's timeliness rule (59 FR 36026; July 15,1994). s aqitarnen& Gmnssion "like" with the words "such as" before C.4.2 Response. The timehness rule musiders this necessary for an "Chernobyl" as suggested by a Particular site to determine af e comunenter. requires licensees to notify the Commission promptly when a decision geneng analysis enwmpasses b range G.2 Need for Regulatory Guidance is snade to permanently cease pn.ncipal of environmentalimpacts at that -
activities or whenever principal Particularsite.The rationale for t G.2.2 Comments'.Commenters retaining this requhant was activities have ceased for 24 months
. requested that additional regulatory Further,it requires licensees to exPl amed in the preamble to the
- guidance be provided on a number of Proposed rule and has not changed.
complete decommissioning withm 24 subjects including decommissioning months.The Commi== ion may approve C6 Mixed Waste, Hazardous Waste, planning for sites and portions of sites, methods for demonstrating compliance an alternate schedule to complete and Naturally Occurring and with the dose criteria and with ALARA. decommissioning provided sufficient ' Accelerator-Produced Radioactive means for complying with restricted use justification is provided by the licensee. Material Although this rule includes options 1 provisions (including SSAB operations), for license termination or transfer to G.6.1 Comments.Some commenters !
~ and contents of a public participation stated that the rule should address the another entity, licensees will sttil be Pl an. Specific comments were received cleanup of sites with mixed wastes.
regarding need forgnidance on expected to initiate and complete decommi==ioning in a timely mannae. If Other commenters recommended that
- modeling (including methods for NRC should not regdate any
- translating contamination levels to dose) a licensee intends to use the restricted nonradioactive hazardous material and surveys (including measurement of release option, the licensee is expected beyond its authority.There was to promptly assess its site disagreement over whether NRC's contamination at low levels), and rh m,. intics, submit a clarification of several terms. approval of a lican=aa's decommissioning plan if required, decommi==ioning activities should be G.2.2 Response. Regulatory guidance provide Anancial assurance, and is being developed in the areas include appro dependent on the licensee fulfilling
, requested. Regulatory guidance being in its decisio=priate
=W= public Because participation the other agencies' obligations, especially prepared on dose calculations and where accelerator produced materials surveys for radiol criteria for requirements aHow licensees 12 months may exist. Some commenters stated that -
decommissioning to submit this information to the the rule criteria are incompatible with hos acceptable Co=====ian, sufhcient time should be survey methods that heansees can use. naturally occurring and accelerator-This guidance describes methods that available.The Commission may grant produced radioactive material (NARM).
additionaltimeif thelicensee - G.6.2 Response.The final rule on licensees can use to convert site -
demonstrates that the reliefis not e radiological criteria for con ==ination to dose for the purpose of detrimental to the public baalth and deco ==i==ioning applies to residual-c:mpliance with the rule criteria and for safety and is in the public interest. lf a radioactivity from alllicensed and estimating ALARA.The guidance is the licensee is n==hla to demonstrate that further development of NUREG-1500 unlicensed sources used by the licensee release of a site would not prevent a but excludes 1dem iradiation. As issued with the proposed rule and member of the public from receiving a such, the NRC or Agr===an presents an approach for assessmg dose dose in excess of the^ oublic dose limit, whether actag as the lead r o,t State, coupled with the ability to incorporate the site would not be released but site-specific parameteorFurther cooperating agency in working with the would be transferred to a Government licensee to ensure appropriate guidance on public participation and entity or maintained under license. remediation of a contaminated site, restric ed use is also being considered to These cases are expected to be rare and would not release a site from its license suppc'.t this rule. ,
will be handlied on a case.by-case basis. unless the rule's radiological criteria G.3 Need for Flairihility G.5 en== ants From Power Reactor "
- GJ.2 Comments. r-==nters Deco ==i==ioning Ra -- b" NRC responsibility forlicente indic=*=d that it is important to provide termination at a site with hasardous or flarthility in compliance with rule ' G.5.2 Cosnments. r====ts were mixed waste onsite is principally to received on the power reactor determine that the radiological
< requiresnents by use of site. specific deca ==i==ioning rtde that was recently component of the mixed weste (e.g..
conditions, impl==an*=tian ALARA, of the and exemptions in finallawi and puhlinhad on July 29,1996 contaminated soil) cosnplies with the criteria. (61 FR 39278), re rule's radiolog' ical criteria. Other GJ.: N r_-1 Use of site-specific rn== == ton can= questing that the idar the elimination of regulatory agencies are responsible for conditions, especiauy in calculation of theenu s atalreviewrequhement acceptable contamination levels based control of the hazardous constituents at the license termination stage and must be notified and accept on site-specific parameters, ($ 50.82(aM9XilXG) and S 51.53(b)) for conem=Instion levels and volumes, and responsibility for appropriate ..
daea==l== inning to unrestrictsi release - managaroent of the released site. The usage of the site,is permitted in conditions. In response, the com same ap would be followed in with the regulations. This ra==i== ion indicated that it would will discussed more fully in the poten ' y releasing a site with consider these cam-ts in the groundwater contamination exceedmg regulatory guidance. Furthermore, the rul==alring on radiological criteria for applicable ==vimum contaminant final rule provides for etablishinF dara= =i=='ani"g
- levels of nonradiological substances, alternate license termination criteria C.5.2 Response.Theen==tanian based on site-specafic considerations, Note that under the Uranium and Mill has considered the elimination of the Tailings Recovery and Control Act
.. _ Federzl skegister /.J01.062, No. >139 (Mond y, July 421,1997 / Rules 'and Eegul:tions 390.85 (UMTRCA), NRCis responsible for the and practices. Current practices include extensive effort at enhancing regulation of cenain nonradioactive radiation surveys to document the participation inJthe early stages of this hazardous materials. absence'of licensed radioactive material, rulemaking process through a series of With regard to NARM, NRC's general guidance for reactors contained workshops and environmentalimpact legislative and regulatory authority in Regulatory Guide 1.86 or similar statement scoping meetings for affected extends to those2naterials and facilities guidance issued for materials facilities,. interests that solicited public comment under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, and site-specific technical specifications with regard to radiological criteria for as amended, and not to accelerator and license conditions. Although these decommissioning. The extent of these produced materials or naturally criteria were not originally cretived for meetings was discussed in the preamble occurring radioactive material, except as the case of recycle, they have been to the proposed rule.
11is d fined as source materialin 10 applied for many years in a wide variety The workshops and the scoping CFR part 40.4.Section IV.A. notes that, of contexts, meetings were not designed to seek although some commenters questioned Continuation of the case-by-case the relationship of this rule to NARM, " consensus" in the sense that there is procedure in the future may not be agreement on how each issue should be the critena of this rule apply to residual practical because ofincreased quantities resolved but rather to ensure that, with radioactivity from activities under a of material expected from larger facility informed discussion, relevant issues licensee's control and not to background decommissioning Also,interestin have been identified and information radiation (that includes radiation from recycling slightly contammated material exchanged on these issues. 1 na+urally occurring radioactive material is growing both in the United States and Subsequent to the workshops and (NORM)).There are a wide variety of in other countries as a means of scoping meetings, the Commission sites con:aining NORM subject to EPA conserving resources by limiting the developed the policies and jurisdiction and not licensed by the amount of new raw materials that are requirements that were deemed NRC. The extent to which the criteria in necessary to produce new products and appppriate for a rule on radiological this rule would apply to these sites equipment and by reducing the costs of criteria for decommMinning.
would bebased on a separate disposing oflarge volumes of slightly Information and concepts developed in evaluation. However, the considerations contaminated material that may pose the workshops were factored into this and analyses done for this rulemaking very small risks to the general public. process. For example, a number of in the Final GEIS and regulatory Codifying criteria would allow NRC to themes from the workshops, such as analysis regarding large fuel cycle and more effectively deal with these issues. consideration of restricted use options, non-fuel cycle facilities containing large Regulatory action separate from this increased public participation in the site quantities of naturally occurring decommissit ning action by NRC, that decommissioning process, and a desire nuclides such as uranium and thorium would provide clear, consistent criteria to return sites to levels are appropriate for certain NORM sites, in this area,is being considered. indistinguishable from background, and the broad provisions of the rule Specifically, the NRC b cooperating were considered during the rulemaking.
(such as control of sites with restrictions with the EPA in developing the The Commission also considered the imposed,use of alternate cap values, technical basis for a recycle rulemakmg. approaches of scientific bodies such as use of alternate criteria, and public At presere the EPA is developing its the ICRP and NCRP, precedents ofits participation aspects) may be useful in plans for sut.b a rulemaking. The NRC othee rulemakmgs with regard to considerations regarding NORM sites. ]
will determine what course of action it radiation protection such as 10 CFR part G~7 R*'7#La will take regarding rulemakmg related 20, input from EPA regarding to recycle after cons;deration of EPA appropriate risk levels, technical input G.7.1 Comments. Commenters plans. Full opportunity for early public from NRC contractors regarding recommended that recycling of involvement and comment regarding equipment or materials be addressed in capability to measure at low radiation ,
rnore depth in the final rule. Several that regulatory action is anticipated, levels, and the costs and impacts of Because of this background, no revision achieving alternate levels.
commenters stated that recycling of to this decommissioning rule to Preliminary conclusions regarding contaminated materials that results in consider recycling is being made, this effort were contained in the NRC increased exposures to members of the G.8 The Rulemaking Process staff's draft rule (59 FR 4868. Feb4uary public is unacceptable. Other 2,1994) that was sent to Agreement commenters favored establishment of G.8.1 Comments. Several States, workshop participants, and other criteria for recycled materials. commenters expressed satisfaction with interested parties The intent of this G.7.2 Response.The proposed rule the enhanced rulemaking process informal comment period in advance of did not specifically address the recycle undertaken by the NRC for the a proposed rule was to provide an of material or equipment decommissioning rule. Of those opportunity for interested parties to decontaminated as a result of the commenters who opposed the+roposed comment on the adequecy of the draft decommissioning process. The decommissioning standards for not criteria.
Commission has a separate being sufSciently restrictive, some were Resolution of comments from the consideration underway of the issues critical of the rulemahng process and workshops and from circulation of the related to cases when the beensee suggested that the NRC had ignored NRC staff draft was discussed in the proposes to intentionally release their earlier participation. Other preamble of the proposed rule material containing residual commenters expressed dissatisfaction published on August 22,1994 (59 FR radioactivity that could become with the proposed standards because 43200). The preamble indicates the cvailable for reuse or recycle. they are overly restrictive The DOE evolution of the NRC's approach to this Because current NRC regulations do stated that it supported the NRC effbrt rulemaking as a result of the workshops not contain exphcit radiological criteria to issue the rule and the joint efforts of and the other activities noted above.
for release of equipment and matenals, the EPA and the NRC to coordinate their Clearly, there are a number of specinc release from licensed facilities is respective rulemaking proceedings. areas which remain difficult to resolve currently determined by NRC on a case- G.8.2 Response. The NRC has or on which to reach a " consensus."
by-case basis using existing guidance conducted what it considers to be an These areas include the precise level of
39086 Fed;rd Registir / Vol. 62, No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations.
permissible radiological criteria for independent environmental review for to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 decommissioning, restricted use as a each site-specific decommissioning (44 U.S C. 3501 et seg ) These means for terminating a license, and'the decision where land use restrictions or requirements were approved by the '
extent of public participation. it is the institutional controls are relied on by Office of Management and Budget, NRC's consideration that the rulemaking the licensee or where alternats criteria approval number 3150-0014.
process has allowed an airing of are proposed. The pubhc reporting burden for this differing opmions mth regard to these The CEIS indicates that the collection ofinformation is estimated to cs well as other issues. dec6mmissioning for certain classes of average 31.6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> per response, licensees (e.g., hcensees using only including the time for reviewing V. Agreement State Compatibility sealed sources) will not individually or instructions, ser.rching existing data The Commission has determined that cumulatively have a significant effect on sources, gathering and maintaining the this rule will be a Division 2 matter of the human environment. Therefore, the data needed, and completing and compatibility. For the discussion on the Commission is amending S 51.22 of the reviewing the collection of information.
basis for this determination, see Section Commission's regulations to specify that Send comments on any aspect of this IV.F.1, the decommissioning of these types of collection of information, including VI. Relatieaship Between the Generic Ucenses are actions eligible for suggest2ons for reducing the burden, to Environr eatalImpact Statement and categoncal exclusion from the the information and Records Site-Speci5c Decommissioning Actions . Commission's environmental review Management Branch (T--6 F33), U.S.
process.
- Nuclear Regulatory Cor.2 mission, The Generic EnvironmentalImpact Statement (GEIS) prepared by the VIL Final Generic Enm.onmental Washington DC 20555-0001, or by Commission on this rulemaking Impect Statement: Availability db BIS 1@NRC. GOV; and to the Desk svaluates the environmental impacts As required by the National associated with the remediation of Officer. Office ofInformation and i Environmental Policy Act of 1969,as . Regulatory Affairs NEOB-10202, '
several types of NRC-licensed facilities amended, and the Commission's to a range of residual radioactivity (3150-0011 and 3150-0093), Office of
' 1:vels. The Commission believes that regulations in Subpart A of to CFR part , Management and Budget, Washington, 51, the NRC has prepared a final generic DC 20503.
the generic analysis will encompass the environmentalimpact statement impacts that will occurin most i (NUREG-1496) on this proposed rule. Public Protection Not@cotion '
Commission decisions to decommission The final generic environmental The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, I an individual site where the licensee impact statementis available for proposes to release the site for and a person is not required to respond inspection in the NRC Public Document to, a collection ofinformation unless it l unrestricted use.Therefore, the Room,2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), displays a currently valid OMB control Commission plans to rely on the GEIS Washington,DC Single copies of the i to satisfy its obligations under the - number. !
final generic environmentalimpact '
National Environmental Policy Act statement (NUREG-1496) may be M.Regnlatwy Analysis regarding individual decommissioning obtained by written request or telefax The Commission has prepared a decisions that meet the 0.25 mSv/y (25 (301-415-2260)imm: Office of regulatory analysis on this final mrem /y) criterion for unrestricted use. Administration Attention:Distnbution regulation. The analysis examines the
- However, the Commission will still . and Services Section, U.S. Nuclear costs and beneSts of the alternatives initiate an environmental assessment Regulatory Commission, Washington, considered by the Commission. The regarding any particular site, for which DC 20555-0001. analysis is available for inspection in e categorical exclusion is not applicable, Background documents on the the NRC Public Document Room,2120 to determine if the generic analysis rulemaking. including the text of the L Street NW. (Lower Level),
tacompasses the range of environmental final rule, the final GEIS, and the ' Washington, DC. Single copies of the impacts at that particular site. regulatory analysis, are also available for analysis may be obtained by written' The rule also provides for the '
downloading and viewing on the NRC remaest from the Radiation Protection tennination of thelicense and the Enhanced Participatory Rulemaking on release of a site under restricted use and Health Effects Branch (RPHEB)
Radiological Criteria for Secretary, Office of Nuclear Regulatory conditions if the licensee can Decommissioning Electronic Bulletin Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory demonstrate that land use restrictions or Board,1-600-880-4091 (see 58 FR Commission, Washington, DC 20555.
other types ofinstitutional controls will 37760 Quly 13,1993)). The bulletin Background documents on the provide reasonable assurance that the board may be accessed using a personal rulemaking, including the text of the 0.25 mSv/y(25 mrom/y) limit can be computer, a modem, and most final rule, the final CEiS, and the met. The types of controls and their commonly available 1: communications regulatory analysis are also available for contribution to providing reasonable software packages. The communications downloading and viewing on the NRC assurance that the 0.25 mSv/y (25 software should have parity set to none. Fnbn-i Participatory Rulemaking on
. mism/y) limit can be met for a data bits to 8land stop bits to 1 (N,8,1) Radiological Criteria for particular site will differ for each site in and use ANSI or VT-.100 terminal D-==i==ioning Electronic Bulletin this category. Similarly, the rule also emulation. For more information call Board (see Section VIL above).
provides that termination of the license Ms. Christine Daily, U.S. Nuclear under alternate criteria will be Regulatory Commission, Washington, y Regulat,ry' Flaibility Mcation considered by the Commission in DC 20555. Phone (301) 415-6026: FAX As required by the Regulatory certain site-specific situations that (301)415-5385. Flexibility Act of 1980,5 U.S.C. 605(b),
would aleo tilffer for each site in this the Cnmmia= ion certifies that this rule, category. Therefore, the environinental VIIL Paperwwk Reduction Act if adopted, will not have a significant impacts for these cases cannot be Statement economic impact upon a substantial analysed on a generic basis and the - ~
This final rule amends information number of small entities. Although the enmminalan will conduct an - collection requirements that are subject - final rule would cover all 22,000 . *
< J Feder:1,Regist;r.. /..Vol. 62. .No.139 (Monday,Jul'y,21.- 1997e/ 13nles and Regulations.t 39087 lic:nsees regulated by the NRC and Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear nuclear explosive devices or from past Agreement States, small entities covered power plants and mactors, Radiation nuclear accidents suchas Chernobyl by this rule are primarilylicensees that - protection, Reactor siting criteria, that contribute to background radiation possess and use only materials with Reporting and recordkeeping and are not under the contml of the short half-lives or materials only in requirements. , licensee. " Background mdiotion" does sealed sources. Deco ==lazioning efforts not include radiation from soun:e, for these licensees are simple and 20 CFR Part 52 byproduct, or special nuclear materiah ,
. require only that sealed sources are Administrative practice and. regulated by the Commission.
l properly disposed of or that short-lived procedure, Environmentalimpact . . . . .
maten'als are allowed to decay. statements. Environmental regulations. Critical Group means the group of
' Complete details of the cost analysis are assessments and reports,NEPA individuals reasonably expected to centained in the regulatory analysis. procedures, Nuclear materials, Nuclear receive the greatest exposure to residual Power plants and reactors, Reporting radioactivity for any applicable set' of XI.BackSt Analyses and recordkeeping requirements. circumstances.
c . The NRC has 'ia'ar=taed that the * * '* *
- i hackfit rule,10 CFR 50.109, does not 20 Ghrt 70 ssion means to mmwe a cpply to this final rule and therefore, a ' Criminal penalties, Hazardous facility r site safely from service and hackfit analysis is not required for this materialstransportation Material final rule because these amendments do control and accounting, Nuclear t notinvolve reactor operations and - materials, Packaging and containers, ,g g, g, (3
l therefore do not involve any provisions Radiation protection Reportag and unnstnad um t hf b l that would impose backfits as defined in recordkeeping requirements, Scientific gge,,,. ,,
l 10 CFR 50.109(a)(1). equipment Securitymeasures,Special (2) Release of the property under i 'XII. SmaallBusiases Regulatory nuclear material. restricted conditions and termination of Enfor====8 Fairmees Act 20 CFR Arrt 72 the limna. ,
I - In a.w.J.a with the Small Manpower training programs, Nuclear
- .""" ulefrom background Balaa.a Regulatory Enforcement materials, Occupational safety and Fairness Act of 1996, the NRC has health, Reponting and recordkeeping means that the detectable concentration dstermined that this action is not a of a radionuclides is statistically different requirements, Security measures, Spent
" major" rule and has verified this fuel' from &ebacksmund concentradon of determination with the OfHee of that radionuclides in the vicinity of the 3
" the s e w, n the can of strummes,in Information and Regulatory Affairs. Preamb e an[und t e suthority of the similar mawrials using adequaw Office of M =t and Bud8*t.
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; measurement technology, survey, and 1.iet of Subjects the Reorgamzation Act of 1974' staM techmques.
l as amen ed and 5 U.S.C.552 and 553: * *
- 10 NM 20 the NRC is adopting the following - *'...*
f Residmil,m.--- untymeans Byproduct material, Criminal . amendments to 10 CFR parts 20,30,40, . ndiondivny in stmauros,anaWs, penalties,1,1 censed material, Nuclear 50,51,70, and 72. 4 materials, Nuclear power plants and soils, groundwater, and other media at reactors, Occupational and public dose PART 20 -STANDARDS FOR a site asulting from activities under the limits, Occupational safety and health, PROTECTION AGAINSTRADIATION licensee's control.This includes Packaging and containers Permissible radioactivity from alllicensed and 1.The authority citation for part 20 unlicensed sources used by the licensee, doses, Radiation protection, Reporting continues to read as follows: but excludes background radiation. It and recordkeeping requirements, Aether #y: Secs 53,63,65,81,103.104, also includes radioactive materials Respiratory protection, Special nuclear material, Source material. Surve s and 161,1s2,186, se stat 930,933,935,936, remmnmg at tha site as a result of
' 937,948,953. 955, as amended (2 U S C routine or accidental releases of ,
monitoring, Waste treatment an 2073. zu s, 2n5, 2111, 2133, 2134, 2201, disposal.
radioactive material at the site and 2232,2236), secs. 201, as amended. 202, 20s, previous burials at the site, even if those 20 CFR Ptut 30 as stat 2242, as amended.1244,1246 (42 burials were made in accordance with U S C 5841,5s42,5846)
B oductmaterial Criminal the provisions of 10 CFR part 20.
pena es, Government contmets,- 2 in $ 20.2003,the definition of . . . . .
Intergovernmental relations, Isotopes. Background rodmtion is revised and 3. In $ 20.1009, paragraph (b) is Nuclear materials, Radiation protection, new definitions Critica1 Group, revised to read as follows:
" Rsporting and recordkeeping Decommission, Dutinguishoblefmm requirements. background, and Ressdualradioactivity 5201009 Informasson conecuan are added in alphabetical order to read requemenum appsowal.
. Jo CFR Part 40 . . . . .
,, gogio,,,
" Criminal penalties, Government (b) The approved information
$ 20.1003 Definitions, collection requirements contained in contracts Hazardous materials * * *
- transportation, Nuclear materials, this part appear in $$ 20.2003,20.1101,
. Rxporting and recordkeeping Background mdiation means 20.1202,20.1203,20.1204,20.1206, requirements, Source material, radiation from cosmic sources; naturally 20.1208,20.1301,20.1302,20.1403, Uranium. occurring radioactive material, 20.1404,20.1406,20.2501,20.1601, including radon (except as a decay 20.1703,20.1901,20.1902,20.1904, 20 CFR Part 50 product of source or special nuclear 20 1905,20.1906,20.2002,20.2004, Antitrust, Classified information, . material); and global fallout as it exists 20.2006,20.2102,20.2103,20 2104, Cnminal penalues, Ftre protaction, 2n the environment from the testing of 20.2105,20.2106,20.2107,20.2108, l
l 1
I
-39088 Fedtrcl Registir / Vol. 62 No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rults and Regulations 20.2110,20.2201,20 2202,20.2203, enteria m this subpart, the Commission (1) Funds placed into an account 20.2204, 20.2205, 20.2206, 20.2301, and will require additional cleanup only if, segregated from the licensee's assets and (
Appendices F and G to 10 CFR Part 20. based on new information, it determines outside the licensee's administrative that the enteria of this subpart were not . control as described in S 30 35(f)(1) of 4iA new subpart E entitled met and residual radioactivity ' this chapter:
" Radiological Criteria for License remaining at the site could result in (2) Surety method, insurance, or other Termination," is added to 10 CFR part significant threat to public health and guarantee method as described in
. safety S 30 35(f)(2) of this chapter;
! 20 to read as follows: ,
(d) When calculating TEDE to the (3) A statement ofintent in the case Subpart E Y'-Ocal Criteria for average member of the critical group the of Federal, State or local Government License Terminatio.) licensee shall determine the peak heensees, as described in S 30.35(f)(4) of annual TEDE dose expected within the this chapter; or 2 401 General provisions and scope, first 1000 years after decommissioning. (4) When a governmental entity is 20 1402 . Radiological cnteria for $ 20.1402 Radiological ortleria for assuming custody and ownership of a
- unrestricted use unrestncted use. site, an arrangement that is deemed 20.1403 Criteria for license termmation 8 *Ptable by such governmental entity.
under restricted conditions. A site will be considered acceptable for unrestricted use if the residual (d)The licenree has submitted a
' 20.1404 Alternate enteria for license decommissiming plan or License teraunation. . . radioactivity that is distinguishable 2o.14o5 Pubite notification and pubhc from background radiatnon results in a Termination Plan (LTP) to tie particapsuon. TEDE to an average member of the Commlesion indicating the licensee's 20.1406 Minunization of contamination, cnticalgroup that does not exceed 25 intent to decommic< ion in accordance with $$ 30.36(d),40.42(d),50.82 (a) and 520.1401 General provisions and scope. """g [25 m ng (b),70.38(d), or 72.54 of this chapter, (a) The criteria in this subpart apply drinking water,and the residual and specifying that the licensee intends to the decommissioning of facilities radioactivity has been reduced to levels to decoinmission by restricting use of licensed under parts 30,40,50,60,61 that are as low as reasonably achievable the site. The licensee shall document in 70, and 72 of this chapter, as well as 6e N,or decommissioning plan how
. other facilities subject to the (ALARA). Determination of the levels which are ALARA must take into the advice ofindividuals and Commission's jurisdit: tion under the acco t derati f instinitions in the conununity who may Atomic Energy Act . 1954, as amended. detr en s ch as deaths from be afected by the decomndesioning has cnd the Energy Reorganization Act of been seglat and inmporated,as transportation accidents, expected to 1974, as amended. For high-level and potentially result from decontamination *PPmpriate, following analysis of that 1:w-level waste disposal facilities (10 and waste disposal. *d *** "
- CFR parts 60 and 61), the criteria apply (1) Licensees proposing to ,
only to ancillary surface facilities that - 52o.140s creeeria ser sioense tennenation restricting use of the support radioactive waste disposal under restrioned condletona. decommissiongvice site shall seek from such affected ]
i retivities. The criteria do not apply to A site will be considered acceptable Parties i . - % the following matters uranium and thorium recovery facilities for license termination under restricted concerning the proposed clready subject to appendix A to 10 CFR conditions if: decommissioning- 4 part 40 or to uranium solution -
(a) The licensee can demonstrate that (1) Whether pmvisins for extraction facilities. furtherreductions in residual institutional controls proposed by the .
(b) The criteria in this subpart do not radioactivity necessary to comply with licensee; apply to sites which: the provisions of $ 20.1402 would result (A) Will provide reasonable assurance (1) Have been decommissioned prior in net public or environmental harm or that the TEDE from residual to the efective date of the rule in were not being made because the radioactivity distingmehable from ew d With criteriaidentifiedin residuallevels ===aci=ted with restricted background to the average member of the Sitenacam-i==w ing W s_-ent conditions are ALARA. Deterndnation the critical group willnot exceed 25 Plan (SDMP) Action Plan of Ali ril16, of thelevels which are ALARA must mrom (0.25 mSv) TEDE per year:
1992 (57 FR 13389); take into account consideration of any (B) Will be enforceable; and (2) Have pawviously submitted and detriments, such as traffic accidents, (C) Will not impose undue burdens on received Comml== ton appmval on a expected to potentially result from the local community or other affected license termin=tian plan (LTP) or decontamination and waste disposal; parties.
- deca ==taalaning plan that is (b)Thelicensee has made provisions (ii) Whether the licensee has provided compatible with the SDMP Action Plan for legally enforceable institutional sufBcient financial assurance to enable
- criteria; or controls that provide r===an=hle an independent third party, including a (3) Submit a sufBclent LTP or assurance that the TEDE from residual governmental custodian of a site, to decommissioning plan before August radioactivity distinguinhahle from assume and carry out responsibilities for 20,1996 and such LTP or background to the average member of any necessary control and maint= nance dara===i==ianing plan is appmved by the critical group will not exceed 25 of the site;
. the f'a==I== ion before August 20,1999 mrem (0.25 mSv) per year; (2)In seeking advice on the issues and in es. d-we with the criteria (c) The licensee has pmvided identified in S 20.1403(d)(1), the identified in the SDMP Action Plan, sufficient financial assurance to enable licensee shall provide for:
except that if an EIS is required in the an independent third party, including a (i) Participation by representatives of submittal, there will be a provision for governmental custodian of a site, to a broad cross section of community day-for-day extension. assume and carry out responsibilities for interests who may be affected by the (c) After a site has been any nee ====ry control and maintenance decommianioning; deca ==hatan=d and the license of the site. Acceptable financial (ii) An opportunity for'a" ter=inat=d in accordance with the assurance --ek==i-= are- comprehensive, collective discussion on
1
(
l s
. Jederal',Rsgistir~CV.o'1';4CNo'?.'139"L. Monday.Muly;2G1997_C. Rules Juid,Reguhtl66s. 39089 the issues by the participants potentially result from deco 6tamination foiuin, that is readily accessible to
~
l represented; and
' ~
and wasto disposal. individuals in the vicinity of the site, (iii) A publicly available summary of . (4) Has submitted a decomrnissioning and solicit comments from affected the results of all such discussions. Pl an or License Termination Plan (LTP) parties.
including a description of the to the Commission indicating the mdividual viewpoints of the licensee s intent to decommission in S 20.1406 Minimizauon of contamination.
participants on the issues and the extent accordance with SS 30.36(d),40.42(d), Applicants for licenses, other than of agreement and disagreement among 50.82 (a) and (b),70.38(d), or 72.54 of genewals, after August 20,1997, shall tha participants on the issues; and this chapter, and specifying that the describe in the application how facility (e) Residual radioactivity at the site licensee proposes to decommission by design and procedures for operation has been reduced so that if the use of alternate criteria. The licensee will minimize, to the extent practicable, l institutional controls were no longer in shall document in the decommissioning contamination of the (acility and the Effect, there is reasonable assurance that plan or LTP how the advice of environment, facilita'.e eventual i the TEDE from residual radioactivity individuals and institutions in the decommissioning, and mimmize, to the i distinguishable from background to the community who may be affected by the extent practicable, the generation of cverage member of the critical group is decommissioning has been. sought and radioactive waste. i as low as reasonably achievable and addressed, as appropriate, following 5. In $ 20.2402, paragraph-(b)is {
wruld not exceed either- analysis of that advice. In seeking such revised to read as follows:
(1) 100 mrem (1 mSv) per year; or )
advice, the licensee shall provide for:
(2) 500 mrem (5 mSv) per year (i) Participation by representatives of $ 20.2402 cominai penattles.
provided thelicensee- a broad cross section of community * * * * * {
(i) Demonstrates that further interests who may be affected by the (b) The regulations in 59 20.1001 reductions in residual radioactivity decommissioning; through 20.2402 that are notissued necessary to comply with the 100 (ii) An opportunity for a under Sections 161b,1611, or 161o for mrem /y (1 mSv/y) value of paragraph comprehensive, collective discussion on the purposes of Section 223 are as
(:)(1) of this section are not technically the issues by the participants follows: $$ 20.1001,20.1002,20.1003, achievable, would be prohibitively represented; and 20.1004,20.1005,20.1006,20.1007, expensive, or would result in net public (iii) A publicly available summary of 20.1008, 20.1009, 20.1405, 2Q.1704', I or environmental harm; the results of all such discussions, 20.1903,20.1905,20.2002,20.2007, 'I (11) Makes provisions for durable including a description of the 20.2301,20.2302,20.2401, and 20.2402.
institutional controls; individual viewpoints of the . I (iii) Provides sufficient financial participants on the issues and the extent PART 30-RULES OF GENERAL i assurance to enable a responsible of agreement and disagreement among APPLICABILITY TO DOMESTIC government entity or independent third the participants on the issues. LICENSING OF BYPRODUCT '
party, including a governmental (b) The use of alternate criteria to MATERIAL -
custodian of a site, both to carry out terminate a license requires the periodic rechecks nf the site no less approval of the Commission after
- 6. The authority citation for part 30 frequently than every 5 years to assure e ntinues to read as follows: {
consideration of the NRC staff's that the institutional controls remain in recommendations that will address any Authority: Secs.81,82,161,182,183,186, .
place as necessary to meet the criteria of co' mments provided by the 68 Stat. 935. 948,953,954,955, as amended. 1 S 20.1403(b) and to assume and carry Environmental Protection Agency and sec. 234,83 Stat 444, as amended (42 U.S C cut responsibilities for any necessary control and maintenance of those any public comments sub'nitted pursuant to $ 20.1405' 2112.2201 9 ,, 2,23
,d 20" 2j .
h controls. Acceptable financial assuranc 1242, as amended 1244,1246 (42 U.S.C mechanisms are those in paragraph (c) 20.1405 Public notification and public 5841,5842,5846).
of this section. participation. Secuon 30 7 also issued under Pub. L 95-Upon the receipt of an LTP or 601, sec.1o,92 Stat. 2951 as amended by 520.1404 Attemate criteria for heense Pub. L 102-486, sec. 2902.106 Stat 3123 (2 1 decommissioning plan from the termination, U.S.C 5851). Section so.34(b) also issued q licensee, or a proposal by the licensee under see 184,68 Stat 954, as amended (42 (a) The Commission may terminate a for release of a site pursuant to U S.C 2234) Section 30.61 also issued under license us*mg alternate criteria greater $$ 20.1403 or 20.1404, or whenever the sec 187,68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C 2237).
than the dose criterion of $9 201402, Commission deems such notice to be in 20.1403(b), and 20.1403(d)(1)(1)(A), if the public interest, the Commission 0 .
the licensee- shall: g , on s se o ad as {
(1) Provides assurance that public f I; ws:
(a) Notify and solicit comments from; health and safety would continue to be (1) local and State governments in the S 30.4 Definitions.
protected, and that it is unlikely that the vicinity of the site and any Indian . . . . .
dose from all man-made sources Nation or other indigenous people that combined, other than medical, would be have treaty or statutory nghts that could Decommission means to remove a more than the 1 mSv/y (100 mrem /y) be affected by the decommissiomag, facility or site safely from service and limit of subpart D, by submittmg an and reduce residual radioactivity to a level analysis of possible sources of exposure: (2) the Environmental Protection that permits--
(2) Has employed to the extent Agency for cases where the licensee (1) Release of the property for practical restrictions on site use proposes to release a site pursuant to- unrestricted use and termination of the according to the provisions of 5 20.1403 $ 20.1404. license; or in minimizing exposures at the site; and (b) Publish a notice in the rederal (2) Release of the property under (3) Reduces doses to ALARA levels, Register and in a forum, such as local restricted conditions and ternunation of t* king into consideration any detriments newspapers, letters to State or local the hcense such as traffic accidents expected to organizations, or other appropriate * * * *
- 39090 Fr.d:rel Register / Vol. 62, No.139 / Monday, July 21, 1997 / Rules and Regulations .,
- 8. In S 30.35, 2233. 2236,2282): sec. 274, Pub. L 86-373, manner that the premises are suitable and paragraph (paragraph g)(3)(iv) as revised(f)(5) to is added 73 Stat 688 (42 U S C. 2021); secs 201, as for release in accordance with the read as follows: smended. 202,206,88 Stat.1242. as amended, 1244,1246 (42 U.S.C 5841,5842 enteria for decommissioning in 10 CFR
$ 30.35 Fmancial assurance and 5846). sec 275. 92 Stat 3021, as amended by part 20, subpart E. The bcensee shall, as l recordkeeping for. decommissioning. Pub L 97-415.96 Stat 2067 (42 U S.C aPPr0Pste-
, , . . . . 2022)
... Section 40.7 also issued under Pub. L 95-sot (k) * * *
(5) When a governmental entity is (3Xi) A radiation survey has been assuming custody and ownership of a p b L 102 486 2902 toNat 123.
(42 U S C 5851). Section 40.31(g) also issued Puformed which demonstrates that the site, an arrangement that is deemed under see 122. 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S C. 2152) Premises are suitable for release in acceptable by such governmental entity, Section 40.46 also issued under sec.184. 68 accordance with the criteria for (g) * *
- Stat. 954, as amended (42 U.Sc 2234) decommissioning in 10 CFR part 20, (3) * *
- Section 40 71 also issued under see 187,68 subpart E; or (iv) All areas outside of restricted Stat. 955 (42 U S.C 2237) areas that contain material such that, if (ti) Other information submitted by
- 11. In $ 40.4, the definition of the licensee is sufficient to demonstrate the license expired, the licensee would be required to either decontaminate the Decommission is revised to read as that the premises are suitable for release follows: in accordance with the criteria for area to meet the entena for decommissiomng in 10 CFR part 20, $ 40.4 Definitions. decommissioning in 10 CFR part 20
- subpart E, or apply for approval for . . = =
- subpart E.
disposal under 10 CFR 20.2002.
= * * *
- Decommission means to remove a facility or site safely from service and
- 9. In $ 30.36, the introductory text of PART 50-DOMESTIC UCENSING OF reduce residual radioactivity to a level PRODUCTION AND UTILIZATION paragraph 0)(2) and paragraph (kX3) are that permits-- FACILITIES revised to read as follows: (1) Release of the proper +y for
, g g unrestricted use and termination of the 14. The authority citation for part S0 tioenees and C+- license; or continues to read as follows:
-M.ii of slees and separate hundings or outdoor areas. (2) Release of the property under Authoriry: Secs.102.103,104,105,161,
. . . . . restricted coaditions and termmation of 1s2.183,1ss,1s9,58 Stat. 936,937,918.
g) . . . the license.
948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. . . 234, a3 Stat.1244, as .= vied (42 U.S.C l (2) Conduct a radiation survey of the premises where the licensed activities 12. In 640 36, paragraph (eX5)is 213 33 2 01,2232,2233,
]
were carried out and submit a report of added and paragraph (f)(3)(iv) is revised 20L 206, as Sm.12R as amendedM, p the results of this survey, unless the to read as follows: ,
1246 (42 U.St 5a41, sa42,5846).
licensee demonstrates in some other Section 50.7 is also issued under Pub. L manner that the premises are suitable $4436 Financial assurance and recordkeeping for decommissioning.95-601, sec. Io,92 Stat 2951 as amended by for release in accordance with the . .. . . Pub. L 102-486, sec. 2902,106 Stat. 3123 (42
! criteria for decommissioning in to CFR U.Sc 5a51). Section sato also issued under part 20'subpart E. The licensee shall, as le). . . secs.101, ta5, as Stat. 936,955, as amended appropnate--
(5) When a governmental entity is (42 U.Sn 2131,2235); sec.102, Pub. L 91-
- * * *
- assuming custody and ownership of a 190. 82 Stat. a53 (42 U.Sc 4332). Sections site, an arrangement that is deemed 5&13, so.54(dd), and 50.103 also issued (k) * * *
(3)(i) A radiation survey has been acceptable.by such governmental entity, unda sec. los, es Stat. 939, as amended (42 (g) . . U.Sn 21381 performed which demonstrates that the Section sa23, sa35, sa55, and sa56 also Premises are suitable for release in (3) . . . issued under sec.185,68 Stat. 955 (42 U.Sn eri for (iv) All areas outside of restricted a,cco ce with areas that contain material such that, if **
q h D unda " P i8 Part ,
the hcense expired, the licensee would 02 Pub 9 ,
i sub, or as Stat. ass (42 U.Sn 4332). Sections.50.34
( g,g by be required to either decontaminate the and 50.54 also issued under sec. 204, as Stat.
area to meet the enteria for 1245 (42 U.Sc 5s44). Sections 50.58, sa91, the licensee is sufficient to demonstrate that the mises are suitable for release decommMioning in to CFR part 20, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L.97-415.
in acco with the critena for subpart E, or apply for approval for 96 Stat. 2073 (42 U.SE 2239). Sectson 50.7s disposal under 10 CFR 20.2002. also issued under sec.122, os Stat. 939 (42 decomminaioning in 10 CFR part 20, , , .. . . U.Sn 2152). Sections so.ao-50-ei also subpart E. issued under sec.184, sa Stat. 954, as '
l . . . . . 13, in 940.42, the introductory text of amended (42 U.SE 2234). Appendix F also l Paragraph QX2) add paragraph (k)(3) are issued under sec. ts7, sa Stat 955 (42 U.Sc PART 40-. DOMESTIC UCENSWG OF sevised to read as follows: 2237).
SOURCE MATERIAL. $ 40.42 Expiration and torniinstion of 15. In S 50.2, the definition of
- 10. The authority citation for part 40 llooneseand ^ -,, of attes and Decommission is revised to read as continues to read as follows: 88P8n88 Mudin98#r888888f8'*88- follows:
Authority: Secs.62,63,64,65.81,161, g) . . . $ 50.2 Dolentuons.
1sz, tas,1ae, sa Stat. 932,933,935,94a* * * * *
(2) Conduct a radiation survey of the *
,'$'L,3jo'492 (N, ( 8* '
- Premises where the licensed activities Decommission means to remove a
. mt.A 3039, sec. 234, as Stat. 444, as were carried out and submit a report of facility or site safely from service and
.==adad (42 US.C. 2014(eX2),2092,2093, the results of this survey, unless the reduce residual radioactivity to a level 2094,2095,2111,2113,2114,22o1,2232, licensee demonstrates in some other that permits-- j j
l
I
' Federal Q "~; _y 62-l;i . M F%,4 i. L 1, W, 3W + Rules-and-Regulations .89091 (1) Release of the property for- (20) Namml*sioning of sites where . the license expired, the licensee would unrestricted use and termination of the licensed operations have been Ihnited to be required to either deconenmin,te the license; or the use of- area to meet the criteria for (2) Release of the property under (1) Small quantities of short. lived decommisdoning in to CFR part 20 restricted conditions and termination of radioactive materials; or ,
subpart E.or apply for approval for the license. . (ii) Radioactive materials in' sealed disposal under 10 CFR 20.2002.
. . . ' .- . sources, provided there is no evidence . . . . .
- 16. In S 50.a2. paragraphs (a)(11)(li) fI of radioactive material from 22. In S 70.38, the introductory text of and (b)(6)(li) are revised to read as . these se ed sources, paragraph (j)(2) and paragraph (k)(3) an follows: ,
revised to read as follows:
$50.a2 Yonminadon of Heense PART 70--DORAESTIC UCENSING OF 570.38 Empiraten and tenninstion of SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL hoeneasand' ,of m and i
(,) . . . . t espersee tweidings er ouesser areen.
l g... 19.The authority citation for . . . . .
continues to read as fellows: , part 70 ,
(ii) N miminal radiation survey and (j) . . . .
. associated -47 ==tation demonstrates Authestty: Secs. 51. 53.161.142.183. 68 (2) Conduct a radiation survey of the that the facility and site are suitable for Stat. 929. 930. 94a. 953 m. as ==== dad. promises where the licensed activities sec. 234. s3 Stat. 444, as -d-d (42 U.S.C releasdn accMance with b cdteria were carried out and submit a report of for decommissioning in 10 CFR part 20, $1*b***$2;o*,**h2282
, , . , the results of this survey.unla= the subp) 1242. as ====d-d,1244.1245.124s (42
- hcensee demonstrates in some other (b
- art* *E.
- U.S.C 5e41. 5442. 5e45. 5s46). "*"""' that the premises are suitable (6) * *
- Sections 70.1(c) and 70.20a(b) also issued for release in accordance with the (11) The terminal radiation survey and under m m.135.141. Pub. L 97-425.96 Stat. criteria for deco--taat"=8== in 10 CFR amant inted documentation demonstrate 2232,2241 (43 U.S.C 1o155.10161). Section part 20. subpart E. The hcensee shall, as that the facility and site are suitable for M.7 also issued uder Pub. L 95-6cb sec. appropriate ~
rolesse in accordance with b critada 10. 92 Stat. 2951 as a=-ad-d by Pub. L 102- . . . . .
486 sec. 2902,106 Stat 3123 (42 U.S.C for decommissioning in to CFR part 20, 5s51). Secnon 70 21(g) also issued under sec. (k) * * *
, subpart E. (3)(1) A radiation survey has been 122. se Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C 2152). Section
~ 70.31 also issued under sec. 57d, Pub. L 93- Performed which demonstrates that the 377, s8 Stat. 475 (42 U.S.C 2077). Sections premises are suitable for release in PART S1--ENVIRONMENTAL 70.36 and 70.44 also issued under sec.1s4. accordance with the criteria for PROTECTION REGULATIONS FOR 6e Stat 954, as ===ad-d (42 U.S.C 2234). decommissioning in to CFR part 20 DOedESTIC LICENSING AND RELATED Section 7a61 also issued under secs.186.
' subp) art E; or REGULATORY FUNCTIONS h6s n 62 *fas undi E 1 O (h Otherinformation submitted by
- 17. The authority citation for part 51 Stat 939, as ==-ad-d (42 CS.C 213sh continues to read as follows:
that e are ui e e
- 20. In S 70.4. the definition of in accordance with the criteria for Authority: Sec.161, os Stat. 948, as Decommission is revised to read as A.cammia*ioning in 10 CFR part 20,
====d-d (42 U.S.C 2201); secs. 201, as followS: subpart E.
==== dad. 202. 8a Stat.1242, as amended, 1244 (42 U.S.C 5441,5842). gyg4 . . . . .
Subpart A also issued under National
- Environ ==*1 Pobcy Act of1969, secs.102 Decommission means to remove a PART 72--UCENSING
- 104.105, as Stat. a53-854. as amended (42 facility or site safely from service and REQUIREMENTS FOR THE U.S.C 4332.4334.4335); and Pub L 95-604, reduce residual radioactivity to a leveh Title H,92 Stat. 3033-3o41: and sec.193 IS NUCLEAR FUEL AND HIGH-LEVEL Pub. L 101-575.104 Stat. 2835 (42 U.S.C thatfRYease (1 f theo.
property for RAMOACTIMASM 22 )S 5 1 30 1 5 , , tricted use and termination of the 23. The authority citation for part 72 141. Pub. L 97-425. 96 Stat. 2232, 2241. and ~ cense,or continues to read as follows:
sec.148. Pub. L 100-203,101 Stat.1330-223 (2) Release of the property undey 3.ut hority: Secs. St. 53,57. 62. 63, 65. 69, (42 U.S.C 10155.10161,10168) Section restricted conditions and termination of 51.22 also issued under sec 274. 73 Stat 688, the hcense. 81.161.182.183.184.186.187.189. 68 Stat
- 929,930,932,933.934,935,948,953.954.
as amended by 92 Stat. 3o3e-303a (42 U S.c * * *
- 955, as amended. sec. 234. as Stat. 444, as 2021) and under Nuclear Weste Pohey Act of 21. In S 70.25, paragraph (f)(5) is 1982, sec.121. Se Stat. 2228 (42 U.S.C amended (42 U.S.C 2071. 2073. 2077. 2092.
added and paragraph (g)(3)(iv) is revised 2093.2095,2099.2111,2201.2232. 2233
. 10141). Sections 5143,5167. and 51.109 to read as follows, 2234, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2282); sec. 274. Pub.
Liso issued under Nuclear Weste Policy Act L 86-373,73 Stat. 688, as amended (42 sti1982.see 114(fl.96 Stat 2216 as $70.2s Financialassurance and U.S C 2021); sec 201, as amended. 202. 206.
amended (42 U S C.101M(f)). ;--r J ng for decommissioning. 88 Stat.1242, as amended.1244.1246 (42
- =
- 18. In $ 51.22, paragraph (c)(20) is . . . U S C 5841,5842,5846): Pub L 95-601 sec.
- ""d ** foll .
(f) * . . 10. 92 Stat. 2951 as amended by Pub. L 102-(5) When'a governmental entity is - 486 sec 2902.106 Stat. 3123 (42 RS C
$ 51.22 Crteenon for categerleal eaciusion; ass'iming custody and ownership of a 5851): sec.102. Pub. L 91-190. 83 Stal 853
) identificanon of W and mgulatory site, an 8ement that is deemed
( '
- L *# ' * *
- acpops shghie for 137,141. Pub. L 97-.425,96 Stat. 2229,22' 30 I
~
.w; eactusion or ac 1 table,by such governmental entity. 2232. 2241. sec 148. Pub L.100-203.101 '
,,, Stat 1330-235 (42 U S.C 10151,10152.
. . * * . 10153,10155.10157,10161.10168)
(iv) All areas outside of restricted Section 72.44(g) also inued under secs.
l . (c) * *
- areas that contain material such that,if 142(b) and 148 (c). (d). Pub. L 100--203.101 I
m_________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ __. J
l 39092 Fed:r:'l Regist:r / Vol. 62, No.139 / Monday, July 21. 1997 / Rules and Regulations Stat 133&232,1330-236 (42 U S C (2) Release of the property under 10162(b).10168 (c),(d)) Section 72 46 also hcensee demonstrates in some other restricted conditions and termination of manner that the premises are suitable issued under sec 189. 68 Stat 955 (42 U.S.C the license, 2239),sec 134. Pub L 97-425.96 Stat. 2230 .
for release in accordance with the criteria for decommissioning in 10 CFR (42 U.S.C 10154). Section 72 96(d) also 25. In 6 72 30, paragraph (c)(6) is issued under sec 145(g). Pub L 100-203 part 20. subpart E. The licensee shall, as 101 Stat.1330-235 (42 U S.C 10165(g))
added to read as follows: appropriate-Subpart J also assued under secs. 2(2). 2(15). $ 72.30 Financial assurance and (m) * *
- 2(19). 217(e) 141(h). Pub. L.97-425. 96 Stat mcordimeping for decommissionmg. (2)(1) A radiation survey has been 2202. 2203. 2204. 2222. 2244. [42 U.S.C. . . . . . performed which demonstrates that the 10101.10137(a).10161[h)) Subparts K and L (c) * *
- Premises are suitable.for release in are also issued under sec.133. 98 Stat. 2230 (6) When a governmental entity is accordance with the cnteria for (42 U S C.10153) and Sec. 218(a) 96 Stat ~
assuming custody and ownership of a decommissioning in 10 CFR part 20, 2252 (42 U S C.10198). site, an arrangement that is deemed subpart E; or acceptable by such governmental entity. (ii) Other information submitted by
- 24. In $ 72.3, the definition of . . . . .
Decommission is revised to read as the licensee is sufficient to demonstrate
. follows: 26. In S 72 54. the introductory text of that the premises are suitable for release paragraph (1)(2) and paragraph (m)(2) in accordance with the criteria for 5 72.3 mh are revised to read as follows: decommictioning in 10 CFR part 20,
- *
- subpart E.
- * $ 72.54 Expiration and termination of . . . . .
Decommission means to remove a [uilde outdoor Dated at Rockville. Maryland, this 1st day facility or site safely from service and of July 1997.
reduce residual radioactivity to a level (g) . . . For the Nuclear Regulatory Co==itaion.
that permits-- John C. Hoyle.
(2) Conduct a radiation survey of the (1) Release of the property for premises where the licensed activities Secretaryof the Commisdon.
unrestricted use and termination of the .were conducted and submit a report of IFR Doc. 97-17752 Filed 7-18-97; 8:45 am) license; or the results of this survey, unless the satmo coot nes-es.*
.> )
e ;
f QUESTION 30. Is it not also possible that the model underestimates the human health l 1
risks at low doses? If not, why not?
t
' ANSWER.
While it is possible, the preponderance of published health effects research and data reported
' by the National Academy Sciences, UNSCEAR, and NCRP leads to a conclusion that the linear, non-threshold (LNT) model does not underestimate health risks at low doses.
Most scientists agree that the LNT hypothesis represents, for radiation protection purposes, an upper bound for the dose response relationship for low dose and low dose rate radiation exposures expected from NRC licensed activities. The linear, non-threshold dose-effect relationship implies that the potential health risk from ionizing radiation is proportional to the dose received and that there is an incremental health risk associated with even very small doses. Although the appropriateness of this assumption as a predictive modelin radiation '
protection has been challenged, the ICRP noted that it could not see a practical altemative to the LNT model and has subsequently reaffirmed using the LNT model as a basis for its 1990 recommendations on radiation protection. The NCRP also reaffirmed in 1995 the LNT model as an underlying principle of radiation protection, but noted that, at low levels, risk estimates are uncertain and a threshold cannot be excluded.
In using the LNT model the NRC has also used a slope for the linear curve that is recommended by the NAS-BEIR, UNSCEAR, and NCRP. The slope of the LNT model is used to describe the risk of fatal cancer per unit of dose. This slope is the same as that used by EPA in setting
l QUESTION 30. (Continued) 2 l
radiation standards for the general public. The value chosen for use in setting radiation '
protection standards for the public is applicable for X-ray, gamma, and beta radiation, and for low dose rates only. While this value is used in NRC's radiation protection standards in 10 CFR Part 20, it is generally thought to be conservative for the general population. However, there are
. hypothetical situations for which this value for the slope would not be conservative, such as, in addressing a unique group like certain radio-sensitive individuals.
At present, there is no conclusive evidence that low doses of radiation, on the order of 100 mrem /yr, are associated with increased cancer risk. In fact, the final Wingspread Conference Report, issued March 1998, which represents the consensus views of the Council of Scientific Presidents, states that the lowest life +ime dose associated with statistically significant radiogenic risk is about 10 rem. It also should be noted that naturally high background areas show no '
empirical evidence of increased risk from exposure to background radiation.
]
QUESTION 31. It is my understanding that the NRC has commissioned a scientific evaluation of the LNT model from the National Council on Radiation
~
Protection and Measurements (NCRP), When will this report be completed?
A_NSWER.
In February 1995, the NCRP submitted an unsolicited proposal to the NRC entitled, Critical Evaluation of the Linear-No Threshold Assumption. The objective of the NCRP proposalis to review all of the available literature, research developments, experimental data, and radiobiological theories of effects in the low-dose and dose rate region, and then to produce an NCRP report which summarizes this review. In September 1995, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) awarded a three year grant to the NCRP to conduct this literature review.
The period of performance extends from October 1,1995, through September 30,1998.
The NCRP committee is expected to complete the draft report prior to the end of the .
1 performance period. This draft report will be made public in order that five to seven NCRP members and the collaborative organizations will have the opportunity to review the draft report and make comment. Collaborating organizations include scientific and professional societies and associations and govemment agencies. NRC and EPA are both collaborating organizations. All submitted comments are addressed by the NCRP committee and NCRP staff.
The revised draft report is submitted to the entire NCRP membership for review and subsequent
- vote. The approved report is then distributed to the public. The distribution date for the final report cannot be ascertained until the revised report is approved by a consensus of the NCRP h_________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
e QUESTION 31. (Continued) 2 membership.
1 QUESTION 32. Please provide any preliminary reports or drafts of the NCRP study, i
ANSWER.
l The NCRP plans to submit a draft report entitled," Critical Evaluation of the Linear-No Threshold Assumption," to the NRC during the fourth quarter of 1998. No preliminary reports or drafts of the NCRP study are available. A draft report is expected prior to the end of the performar.ce period.
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QUESTION 33. Please provide a list of the individuals responsible for preparing the NCRP study. Are any of these individuals currently or formerly affiliated with any NRC licensee, or are any of them a current or former recipient of any grants or contracts from such licensees?
ANSWER.
The individuals participating in the sub-committee for the NCRP study are:
Name Affiliation Adelstein, S. James Harvard Medical School Brenner, David Columbia University, Center for Radiological Research Clifton, Kelly H. Univ Wisconsin Clinical Cancer Center - Madison Finch, Stuart C. Univ of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey I Hall, Eric J. Columbia University, Center for Radiological Research Kronenberg, Amy Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, Life Sciences Division Liber, Howard L.- Harvard School Public Health, Dept of Cancer Biology i Painter, Robert B. University of California, San Francisco (ret)
Preston, R. Julian Chemical Industry Institute of Toxicology -
Shore, Roy E. New York University School of Medicine Upton, Arthur C. New York University School of Medicine (ret)
Beckner, William NCRP staff Kearsley, Eric. NCRP staff L_-_-___--___- _
- s QUESTION 33. (Continued) 2 Many of these individuals have been affliated with NRC or Agreement State licensees because radioisotopes regulated by the NRC or the Agreement States are frequently used in research
! into radiation health effects. The individuals that serve on NCRP scientific committees are selected by the NCRP on the basis of their expertise in radiation protection issues and are drawn from public and private universities, medical centers, national and private laboratories, and industry. These scientific committees draft proposed recommendations. These recommendations are then submitted to the full membership of the Council for careful review and approval before being published. Reports produced by the NCRP solely reflect the views of -
the Council. Membership on the Council is determined by the Council itself, although collaborating organizations, such as the NRC, EPA, DOE, and NASA are asked to submit nominations yearly. Current NCRP Council membership is included in the attached sheet.
NRC did not initiate the request to re-evaluate the LNT hypothesis, rather NCRP submitted an unsolicited proposal. It should also be noted, that in the past, most of these scientists and physicians have endorsed the LNT model. There is no reason to believe that they will change their endorsement at this time due to any past or current status as an NRC licensee or grant recipient.
- ~ --~ - ~ - - ~ ~~
' 052*ww.ncrp.ew)c ocaw
.. 1 1998 CouncilMembers \
l l
1 John W. Poston, Sr.
l Ethel S. Gilbert Andrew K. '
John D. Graham Poznanski I S. James Ahlstem LarryE. Anderson Joel E. Gray R.Julian Preston '
Raymond A. Genevieve S.
Lynn R. Anspaugh Guilmette Roessler
. Baum Eric J. Hall Marvin Rosenstein Harold L. Beck Naomi H. Harley Lawrence N.
Chae ^' d f* G9 dBlaYI William R. Hendee Rothenberg David G. Hoel Henry D. Royal Bruce B.Boecker John D. Boice, Jr. F. Owen Hoffman Michael T. Ryan An Geoffrey Howe Jonathan M. Samet BouvHle Leslie A.Braby Donald G.Jacobs Stephen M. Seltzer Kenneth R. Kase Roy E. Shore '
John W. Brand Amy Kronenberg Kenneth Skrable David J. Brenner Charles E. Land David H. Sliney -
Antgne L. Broob Richard W. Leggett Patricia A.BufDer PaulSlovic Chung-Kwang Chou Howard L. Liber Louise Strong John B. Little Richard A.Tell James E. Cleaver Richard A.Luben William L.
J. Donald Cossain Allen G. Croff Roger O. McClellan Templeton Paul M. DeLuca John E.Till Barbara J. McNeil Lawrence W.
Gail de Planque Charles B. Townsend Sarah Donaldson
. Meinhold Robert L. Ullrich William P. Dornsife Fred A. Mettler, Jr. Richard J. Vetter Keith F. Eckerman Mam Edwards Charles W. Miller David Weber H. Keith Florig Kenneth L. Miller F. Ward Whicker David Myers Chris Whipple Thomas F. Gesell Ronald Petersen J. Frank Wilson Susan Wiltshire Marvin C.Ziskin Council Members i Honorary Members l Consociate Members Officers and Board of Directors l Scientific Vice Presidents ISig((
Scientific Committees l Administrative Committees Collaborative Organizations l Soecial Liaison Orcanitations ! Cornorate Soonsors 3 of 2 05/04/98 10:36:
o' QUESTION 34. Please provide information regarding the status of the tritium production test currently underway at the Watts Bar nuclear reactor. Please include all information regarding any malfunctions, evidence of potential or
)
confirmed tritium leaks or other safety concems associated with the test.
ANSWER.
TVA is conducting a lead test assembly (LTA) demonstration at its Watts Bar facility as a l
i confirmatory test designed to demonstrate the feasibility of tritium production in commercial light-water reactors. Four LTAs containing a total of 32 tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) were placed in the Watts Bar core at the beginning of Cycle 2, which began on October 19,1997. As of April 25,1998, the reactor has operated for 181 days. To date, Watts Bar has not experienced any problems attributable to the irradiation of LTAs containing TPBARs. TVA has conducted monthly neutron flux mapping and weekly primary coolant sampling for tritium since the reactor began Cycle 2 and has concluded that the rods are performing their neutron absorption function as designed and that no detectable release of tritium from the rods has occurred. Thus, tnere have been no indications of malfunctions, tritium leaks, or other safety concerns associated with the demonstration.
L _ _ __ _ _ _______ -_ _ -
- a QUESTION 35. When will the test be completed?
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ANSWER The irradiation of the tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs) in the Watts Bar reactor is expected to be completed when the unit starts its next regularly scheduled refueling outage, currently estimated for Spring 1999. After that outage, the TPBARs will be removed
, from Watts Bar and transferred to the Department of Energy's possession for transportation to l DOE facilities for post-irradiation examination and analysis.
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QUESTION 36. Do you believe that the test should be completed and analysis performed on the results of the test prior to any down-selection by the Department of Energy of a method for tritium production? If not, why not?
ANSWER.
The DOE decision-making process regarding selection of a method for tritium production is separate from and beyond the purview of the NRC. The NRC's role is to ensure that any activities undertaken at commercial nuclear power reactors are consistent with protection of the health and safety of the public and protectiori of the environment, in accordance with the Commission's regulations.
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QUESTION 3. The Spent Fuel Project Office is responsible for ensuring the safety of existing spent fuel storage sites, and is also responsible for reviewing the generic design, established by DOE, for a spent fuel storage installation, several dual-purpose canister applications, and applications for amendments to currently certified systems.
(A) What is the forecasted workload for the SFPO over the next three years?
How will the forecasted workload be divided among NRC FTEs and l
contractor assistance?
L 1
ANSWER.
I The Spent Fuel Project Office (SFPO) was originally created in April 1995 with the primary purpose to review the Department of Energy (DOE) design for a multi-purpose canister (MPC) for the transportation, storage and disposal of spent fuel. After the creation of SFPO, the MPC l program was canceled, and DOE replaced its MPC program with a policy to rely on private-l sector development of dual-purpose canisters (transportation and storage). Thus, instead of the review of a single MPC technology, the SFPO staff is now reviewing seven dual-purpose ,
L canisters. Further, practically all of the nation's nuclear power plants are now seeking (or will seek) licenses for dry cask storage, as their spent fuel pools fill and they risk the loss of full-core off-load capability. These factors, along with the delays inherent in the development and licensing of an emergent technology has added greatly to SFPO's workload and to the time it has taken both the industry and SFPO to progress through the regulatory process.
i
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i Question 3 (A)(Continued) 2 SFPO is responsible for the licensing and certification of facilities and technologies associated with the safe storage and transportation cf spent fuel from the nation's nuclear utilities, for the certification of transportation packages for other nuclear materials, for safety inspections of dry storage and transport package licensees, certificate holders, applicants, designers and fabricators, and for the review of quality assurance programs for the fabrication and use of transportation packages. In addition to reviewing the applications for certification of dry cask i
storage and transportation systems, the licensing of independent spent fuel storage installations (ISFSI) and conducting safety inspections, the staff also approves spent fuel transportation routes, interacts with the International Atomic Energy Agency on safety issues, and where .
l required, develops environmental assessments and environmental impact statements. l l
l The SFPO received 26 applications for storage and transportation of spent fuel in FY 1997, is forecasting receipt of 36 applications in FY 1998,42 applications in FY 1999 and 47 applications in FY 2000. However, there is a great deal of uncertainty in forecasting the future workload.
The uncertainties over the next few years are associated with licensees' available spent fuel pool storage capacity, the ability of the vendors / fabricators to meet the needs of the licensees, the need to amend licenses and certificates, and the potential increase in the number of
- Department of Energy applications. The staff will reevaluate the budget receipt projections based upon industry input and make appropriate changes as indicated, i
l The NRC's FY 1997 budget included approximately $3.0 million dollars in contractor metance
( and 56 staff members for SFPO activities. Of the total, approximately $2.6 million dollars in E
l
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Question 3 (A)(Continued) 3 p
l contractor assistance and 33 staff members were responsible for the licensing and certification of facilities and technologies associated with the safe storage and transportation of spent fuel from the nation's nuclear utilities; approximately $0.3 million dollars in contractor assistance and 13 staff members were responsible for the certification of transportation packages for all other nuclear materials (non-spont fuel); and approximately $0.1 million in contractor assistance and
]
i 10 staff members were responsible for safety inspections of dry storage and transport package I
licensees, certificate holders, applicants, designers and fabricators, and for the review of quality l a6surance programs for the fabrication and use of transportation packages. !
1 The NRC's FY 1998 budget included approximately $2.8 million dollars in contractor assistance and 56 FTE staff for SFPO activities. Of the total, approximately $2.4 million dollars in contractor assistance and 32 staff members were responsible for spent fuel storage and transportation licensing and certification; approximately $0.3 million doilars in contractor assistance and 10 staff members were responalbie for the certification of transportation packages for all other nuclear materials (non-spent fuel); and approximately $0.1 million dollars in contractor assistance and 14 staff members are responsible for safety inspections.
The NRC's FY 1999 budget request is approximately $3.2 million dollars in contractor i
assists.nce and 57 FTE staff for SFPO activities. Of the total, approximately $2.7 million dollars l in contractor assistance and 33 staff members are responsible for spent fuel storage and transportation licensing and certification; approximately $0.3 million dollars in contractor l l
ssistance and 11 staff members are responsible for the certification of transportation packages ;
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' Question 3 (A)(Continued) 4 i for all other nuclear materials (non-spent fuel); and approximately $0.2 million dollars in contractor assistance and 13 staff members are responsible for safety inspections.
I l
The NRC is currently developing the FY 2000 budget request for submission to OMB in September, and funding and staff levels are still being developed.
Hcr.sver, it should be noted that the staff has encountered specific problems with individual I applications (e.g., poor quality of the applications; proposed new design features under i consideration; proposed reduction in heretofore established design safety margins; and tardy ,
and insufficient respbnses by the applicant to staff requests for additional information) which have delayed the various technical reviews. Additionally, emergent activities, such as event response,' emergency amendment requests and unanticipated applications related to the Department of Energy, have also impacted technical review schedules. As a result, the NRC is considering staff increases during the remainder of FY 1998 and FY 1999 to accelerate the technical review process.
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. QUESTION 3 (B) How many applications do you have currently pending for spent fuel storage and/or transportation systems? How many applications for site-specific spent fuel storage facilities? How many additional applications do you anticipate receiving over the next five years?
ANSWER The Spent Fuel Project Office (SFPO) currently has 41 applications pending for spent fuel storage and transportation. There are 11 commercial spent fuel transportation applications,6 ,
I Department of Transportation revalidation and Department of Energy applications,9 l
independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) applications,13 spent fuel storage system design applications, and 2 Department of Energy topical reports. Included in the numbers above, are 7 dual-purpose cask applications (i.e., Holtec Hi-STAR, Nuclear Assurance Corporation's STC/MPC and UMS, Sierra Nuclear Corporation TRANSTOR, Transnuclear-68, Transnuclear-West MP-187, and Westinghouse WESFLEX), 3 site-specific (at reactor) ISFSI license applications from Trojan, North Anna, and Rancho Seco, and 1 away-from-reactor ISFSI application from Private Fuel Storage, LLC, which plans to locate its facility at the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indians in Tooele County, Utah.
Current projections for receipt of applications are discussed below. However, there is a great deal of uncertainty in forecasting the future workload. The uncertainties over the next few years are associated with licensees' available spent fuel pool storage capacity, the ability of the vendors / fabricators to meet the needs of the licensees, the need to amend licenses and certificates, and the potentialincrease in the number of Department of Energy applications. The staff will reevaluate the projections based upon industry input and make appropriate changes as l
+. Question 3 (B). (Continued) - 2 ;
i necesSary.
The SFPO is forecasting receipt of 36 applications in FY 1998. Of the total,11 are commercial spent fuel transportation applications,7 are Department of Transportation revalidation and Department of Energy applications,9 are site-specific, independent spent fuel storage l .
l' installation (ISFSI)' applications, 5 are spent fuel storage system design applications, and 4 are for general license independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) applications.
The SFPO is forecasting receipt of .42 applications in FY 1999. Of the total,13 are commercial spent fuel transportation applications,8 are Department of Transportation revalidation and l Department of Energy applications,10 are site-specific, independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) applications, 5 are spent fuel storage system design applications, and 6 are for general license, independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) applications. ~ I l
The SFPO is forecasting receipt of 47 applications in FY 2000. Of the total,12 are commercial spent fuel transportation applications,8 are Department of Transportation revalidation and Department of Energy applications,14 are site-specific, independent spent fuel storage l
l installation (ISFSI) applications,7 are spent fuel storage system design applications, and 6 are for general license, independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) applications.
The SFPO is forecasting receipt of 51 applications in FY 2001. Of the total,16 are commercial spent fuel transportation applications,11 are Department of Transportation revalidation and l
Department of Energy applications,12 are site-specific, independent spent fuel storage )
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1 Questbn 3 (B). (Continued) 3 installation (ISFSI) applications,6 are spent fuel storage system design applications, and 6 are for general license, independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) applications.
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QUESTION 3 (C) How many staff are currently assigned to the review of these applications? Has this staffincreased over the past three years? Do you plan to allocate additional staff resources to this area over the next five years?
ANSWER The Spent Fuel Project Office (SFPO) currently hac 32 staff assigned to the review of spent fuel storage and transportation applications. In FY 1995, the Spent Fuel Project Office was created to review the anticipated multi-purpose canister application from the Department of Energy. The initial SFPO staff members were principally obtained by transfer from other parts of the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards; later, additional staff members were obtained from other offices within the agency to ensure a multi-disciplined experience base. Since its inception, the SFPO staff has roughly doubled in strength to the current FY 1998 staff allocation of 56 full-time equivalents (FTEs). The NRC's FY 1999 budget request includes an increase of 1 FTE for the SFPO.
The NRC is currently developing the FY 2000-2001 budget request for submission to OMB in September and staff levels are still being developed.
H' QUESTION 3 (C). (continued) 2 However, it should be noted that the staff has encountered specific problems with individual J applications (e.g., poor quality of the applications; proposed new design features under consideration; proposed reduction in heretofore established design safety margins; and tardy j and insufficient responses by the applicant to staff requests for additional information) which j have delayed the various technical reviews. Additionally, emergent activities, such as event response, emergency amendment requests and unanticipated applications related to the Department of Energy, have also impacted technical review schedules. As a result, the NRC is i considering staff increases during the remainder of FY 1998 and FY 1999 to accelerate the technical review process.
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[- QUESTION 3. (D) What is the average time required currently to process an application at the SFPO? Please provide a breakdown of the average time, excluding potential hearings and lawsuits, historically and predicted, to complete review for the following: a) spent fuel storage casks; b) spent fuel ;
- transport casks; c) dual-purpose casks
- d) at-reactor spent fuel storage installations; e) private away-from-reactor L
l spent fuel storage installations; and f) DOE centralized interim storage facilities.
i i
ANSWER L lt is not possible to predict with accuracy how long a review will take. Each application has unique design considerations and must be judged on its own merit so that public health and safety is protected. Ideally, the staff anticipates that each new license or certificate of compliance application for either a spent fuel transportation or storage cask may take 18 to 24 months from receipt of the application, assuming a technically sound design and a high quality application. In all cases, staff review involves considerable interaction with the applicant during l
the entire review process and may involve extensive confirmatory analyses. However, based on l
recent experience, the NRC staff notes that a new application review may take 24 to 36 months l
or longer depending upon many factors that are specifically related to the application, such as: I poor quality of the applications; proposed new design features under consideration; proposed reduction in heretofore established design safety margins; and tardy and insufficient responses by the applicant to staff requests for additional information. Historically, single-purpose storage
1 I-p- . i l
QUESTION 3 (D). (continued) 2 i l
1 l
cask designs have taken an average of 36 months to review; the most recent certificate of compliance issued for a transportation cask entailed a review of 48 months; and site-specific independent spent fuel storage installations have taken an average of 27 months. l l
No dual-purpose cask has yet completed the regulatory certification and licensing processes for both storage and transportation approval. However,7 dual-purpose applications are under review at this time. NRC staff anticipates that if the staff review does not trigger any significant design issues, these reviews should be completed within the 24 to 36 months from receipt of the application.
l
' No away-from-reactor private independent spent fuel dry storage installation has been licensed.
l The staff estimates that the current review of the application from Private Fuel Storage, LLC, l . (for a proposed facility on the Reservation of the Skull Valley Band of Goshute Indiens in Tooele County, Utah) may take approximately 36 months (from receipt), exclusive of adjudication.
Finally, the staff has not licensed a Department of Energy (DOE) Central Interim Storage
! Facility, although the staff is reviewing a non-site-specific Central Interim Storage Facility Topical
! Report from DOE. The staff estimates that the current review of the topical report will be completed within the next 8 to 12 months. This topical report, if referenced in a site-specific license application should reduce the anticipated review time by 6 te a However, a lack of information on the exact design configuration or location < = . T- imits the staffs
. ability to predict the schedule.
QUESTION 3. (E) Does the Commission have any guidelines or regulations establishing time limits for NRC action on individual applications?
ANSWER.
i The NRC does not have any specific guidelines establishing time limits for NRC action on individual applications. However, as noted in response to question 3 (D), the staff ideally anticipates that the review of each new application may take 18 to 24 months, in the case of optimum quality and performance by the applicant.
The Commission is looking at ways to accelerate this review time. The Commission is focusing its attention at both process improvements and resource reallocation.
,, QUESTION 3 (F) What are the current procedures for prioritizing and separating workloads throughout the SFPO? Does the prioritization process result in slowing down the review process for individual applications?
ANSWER SFPO has developed a strategy for prioritizing work. Work on spent fuel storage and transportation systems are prioritized based on: (1) safety issues of operating independent spent fuel storage installations; (2) storage needs of operating nuclear power plants that will lose full core off-load capability; (3) storage needs of nuclear power plants undergoing decommissioning; and (4) other work. However, as noted previously, based on recent experience, a new application review may take 24 to 36 months or longer depending upon many factors that are specifically related to the application, such as: poor quality of the applications;
. proposed new design features under consideration; proposed reduction in heretofore established design safety margins; and tardy and insuffidieint responses by the applicant to staff requests for additional information. Also, while routine staff activities are planned, emergent activities (e.g., event response, emergency amendment requests, and unanticipated applications related to the Department of Energy) have delayed planned review considerations. It is more likely that these reasons, rather than a question of priorities, will delay completion of the review process for individual applications.
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l QUESTION 3 (G) What actions have you already taken to ensure that there will be a&xluate resources to meet anticipated demands at the SFPO?
What additional actions, if any, are necessary to ensure that appi! cations are dealt with in a timely manner?
ANSWER.
NRC staff in the Spent Fuel Project Office (SFPO) routinely contact licensees and industry members to obtain current and realistic forecasts of planned workload, and use this information as an important factor in developing resource requests. The NRC staff in the SFPO has undertaken a number of initiatives to facilitate the review of license applications.
The NRC has prepared standard review plans (SRPs) on (1) Dry Cask Storage Systems, (2) Spent Fuel Dry Storage Facilities, (3) Transportation Packages for Spent Nuclear Fuel, and (4) Transportation Packages for Radioactive Material (Other than Spent Nuclear Fuel). The SRPs summarize the regulatory requirements for cask approval, describe the procedures ty which the SFPO staff determines that these requirements have been satisfied, and document the practices developed by the staff in previous reviews of applications.
. NRC has taken actions to improve project management practices to ensure proper resource allocation. In addition, the NRC has taken steps to improve the quality of the applicants' submittals by issuing SRPs, rejecting poor quality applications, and delaying the review of apphcations that were not complete.
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QUESTION 3 (G) (Continued) 2 Although the NRC SFPO staff are experienced personnel, the NRC staff relies on contractors to supplement key technicci reviews and analyses. Contractors from the Southwest Research E institute's Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses, Science Applications Intemational Corporation, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory augment staff technical review functions. The NRC SFPO staff also uses Oak Ridge National Laboratory for computer code support to perform complex technical analyses.
I believe that the actions outlined above facilitate the timely review of applications. However, it should be noted that the NRC staff has encountered specific problems with individual applications (e.g., poor quality of the applications; proposed new design features under consideration; proposed reduction in heretofore established design safety margins; and tardy - l and insufficient responses by the applicant to staff requests for additional information) which have delayed the various technical reviews. Additionally, emergent activities, such as event response, emergency amendment requests and unanticipated applications related to the Department of Energy, have also impacted technical review schedules. As a result, the NRC is considering staff increases during the remainder of FY 1998 and FY 1999 to accelerate the technical review process.
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1 QUESTION 3. (H) Does the Commission's FY 1999 budget request for Nuclear Waste Safety reflect the anticipated workload increases at the Spent Fuel Project Omce?
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ANSWER 1
Yes, the Commission's FY 1999 budget request for Nuclear Waste Safety includes resources to complete the review of the majority of the forecasted receipts. During 1997 and 1998, SFPO staff has been diverted from the review of license and certificate of compliance applications by the need to respond to and oversee resolution of events, and to respond to various administrative, managerial, and technical issues associated with poor licensee and veredor performance.
During the first half of FY 1998, the staff was still involved with the aftermath of the May 28,1996, VSC-24 hydrogen gas ignition event at Point Beach. Moreover, emergentwelding problens were encounteredwith the VSC-24 cask. Additionally, in 1997, one design vendor, VECTRA, Inc., did
! not adequately control the design processes which led to fabrication problems.
Thus, while routine staff activities areplanned, emergent activities (e.g., event response, emergeny amendment requests, and unanticipated applications related to the Department of Energy) have delayed planned review considerations. Additionally, the staff has encountered specific problems with individual applications (e.g., poor quality of the application.s; proposed new design features under consideration; proposed reduction in heretofore established design safetymargins; and tardy and insufficient responses by the applicant to staff requests for additional information) which have
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QUESTION 3.(H) (Continued) 2 l delayed the various technical reviews. As a result, the NRC is considering staff increases during the remainder of FY 1998 and FY 1999 to accelerate the technical review process.
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QUESTION 3. (l) What has the SFPO done to improve project management practices in review procedures to improve dedication and focos of resources?
ANSWER SFPO has implemented several initiatives (developed through business process re-engineering) to better manage its workload and resources. To allow for better planning, SFPO has initiated two workload management tools to plan and track casework, and has developed a strategy for priornJ'ig work. Work on spent fuel storage and transportation systems are prioritized based on: (1) safety issues of operating independent spent fuel storage installations; (2) storage needs of operating nuclear power plants that will lose full core off-load capability; (3) storage needs of nuclear power plants undergoing decommissioning; and (4) other work. Additionally, management routinely issues a priority list of all casework. It is anticipated that better planning w will better manage SFPO resources.
In addition, the SFPO staff has indicated very strongly to industry that improved performance on their part, in relation to the quality of submittals, is required for staff review. It is anticipated that better quality submittals will reduce the need for excessive staff review and requests for additionalinformation.
To ensure an expedited processing of incoming licensing actions, NMSS Policy and Procedures Letter 1-51, " Policy and Criteria for initial Processing of incoming Licensing Actions," provides for a general acceptance review within 30 days of receipt. While primarily an administrative review, this general acceptance review includes, but is not limited to, the following: (1) legibility of
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QUESTION 3 m. (Continued) 2 l
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drawings; (2) general adequacy of information; (3) proprietary information; and (4) obvious technical inadequacies. The objective of the acceptance review is to verify that the application contains sufficient information before the staff begins an in-depth technical review using the recently developed standard review plans.
Standard review plans (SRP) have been developed to provide guidance to SFPO staff reviewers,'and they indirectly provide guidance to applicants on the content of their applications.
The objectives of the SRPs are to: (1) summarize the regulatory requirements for cask approval; (2) describe the procedures by which the SFPO staff determines that these requirements have been satisfied; and (3) document the practices developed by the staff in previous reviews of applications. The SRPs assist in ensuring the quality and consistency of I
staff reviews and in establishing well-defined bases from which to evaluate proposed changes in the scope of the reviews. SRPs for dry cask storage systems (NUREG-1536, final document),
spent fuel dry storage facilities (NUREG-1567, draft document for public comment), and transportation packages for spent nuclear fuel (NUREG-1617, draft document for public comment) have been published.
If the staff's review requires additional applicant information, requests for additional information L (RAI) are issued in a standard format. This RAI format includes a description of the information l
- j. needed, the regulatory basis of the RAI, and the technical or safety basis of the RAl. The objective of using an RAI standard format is to ensure that each RAI item is unambiguous and focused on a regulatory or safety issue.
QUESTION 3 (1). (Continued) 3 it should be noted that the specific problems the staff has encountered with individual applications (e.g., poor quality of the applications; proposed new design features under consideration; proposed reduction in heretofore established design safety margins; and tardy and insufficient responses by the applicant to staff requests for additional information) have delayed the various technical reviews. Additionally, emergent activities, such as event response, emergency amendment requests and unanticipated applications related to the Department of Energy, have also impacted technical review schedules. As a result, the NRC is considering staffincreases during the remainder of FY 1998 and FY 1999 to accelerate the technical review process. Part of the increased emphasis in this area will include direct support to the SFPO by the NRR project managers for specific reactors which may experience spent fuel storage shortages in the near future as well as increased interaction with NEl to enhance i
industry awareness and support for resolution of the issues raised in the technical reviews.
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