ML20203H327
| ML20203H327 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1998 |
| From: | Travers W NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203H317 | List: |
| References | |
| PROC-980205, NUDOCS 9803030197 | |
| Download: ML20203H327 (100) | |
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RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN HILLSTONE STATION l l
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APPROVED BY:
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/A h WILLIAM D. TRAVER, DIRECTOR SPECIAL PROJECTS FFICE Date: February 5,1998 Revision 4 388 R a u 3%88sL 3 0
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MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 HISTORICAL The three Millstone units shut down to formulate responses to a series of 10 CFR 50.54 (f) letters requiring them to affirm their compliance with the conditions of each unit's license and the regulations. During May June,1996, the NRC performed a series of inspections at Units 2 and 3 with a 20-person Special Inspection Team (SIT) to ascertain the extent of their compilance. Currently, the results of those inspections are under assessment by the team and NRC management. The licensee initially focussed on Unit 3 as the lead plant for restart.
However, as a result of a licensee reorganization which occ.urred on October 1, 1996, each Millstone unit was assigned a recovery manager who was an executive en temporary loan from another nuclear utility. Resources originally assigned to Unit 3 from the other units were returned to their respective units. Each unit has been tasked with establishing their own restart plan and whichever unit is ready will apply to restart first. Hence this restart assecament plaa has been expanded to include Manual Chapter (MC)-0350 evaluations (see paragraph 3.0) for all three units.
On June 28,1996, the Executive Director for Operations (EDO) Issued a letter to the licensee that stated the Commission had decided to make the three Millstone units a Category 3 on the Watch List and would vote on the restart of the Millstone units. It is the intent to implement the appropriate aspects of NRC Manual Chapter 0350, " Staff Guidelines for Restart Approval" for the restart of all three units. The NRC will schedule and implement its inspection program after the licensee has indicated that the individual activities necessary for restart are complete and ready for inspection.
The NRC has been dealing with Northeast Utilities on broader performance issues which go beyond the 10 CFR 50.54(f) concerns. These broader concerns are considered contributory causes for the current poor perfortnance, which the 10 CFR 50.54(f) issues are a subset. These issues have been formalized by the licensee in a program titled "improvir.g Station Performance" bSP) and are topics that will be addressed by the licensee and reviewed by the NRC Millstone Restart Assessment Panel. A meeting was conducted on April 30,1996, and disclosed that the licensee was not adequately managing the program or tracking progress.
The salient concerns embodied in the ISP include udership, communications (employee concerns), the corrective action program, procedural adherence and procedure upgrades, work planning end control, and operational enhancements. The NRC Restart Assessment Plan will focus on the broader issues of the ISP and licensee self-assessments and roanagement oversight, recognizing the necessity to ensure adequate closure of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) process. The NRC plan for inspection of the improving Station Performance issues is discussed in more detailin Section 3 of this plan.
On November 3,1096, the agency established the Special Projects Office (SPO) to consolidate NRC efforts under a single Senior Executive Service (SES) manager, who reports to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR). The Revielon 4
2 Director, SPO assumed the authority and responsibilities of the Regional Administrator and the Associate Director of Projects.
1.2 CURRENT STATUS Since the October 1,1996, reorganization of the Millstone Station, several changes in strategy, schedule and organizational function have occurred at the station. The management decided to, again, focus restart resources on br'it 3 and realigned the recovery managers to support Unit 3 restart._ Currently, the Vice President -
Millstone, Unit 3, is easigned primary duties of implementing the safety conscious work environment program, the recovery officer for Unit 1 is assigned responsibility _
for completing physical work on Unit 3 and the recovery officer for Unit 2 is
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completing the configuration management program and overseeing regulatory compliance. The licensee originally announced plans for restart of Unit 3 in the late summer, early fall of 1997. As scheduling constraints emerged and existing work l
was refined, it became apparent restart work would not support the plan. The i
licensee announced a delay of Unit 3 readiness for restart to some time in the first quarter of 1998 and Units 1 and 2 to later in 1998.
The licensee sent a letter to the NRC stating that they should be ready for the IP 40500 inspection on January 5,1998. Subsequently, they requested a delay to February 9,1998, 2.0 10 CFR 50.54ffl Activitima 2.1 HISTORICAL Each Millstone unit has been requested to submit information describing actions taken to ensure that future operations will be conducted in accordance with the terms and conditions of the operating license, the Commission's regulations, and the Final Safety Analysis Report. In a May 21,1996, letter, the NRC requested Northeast Utilitbs (NU) to provide for each unit its plan for completing the licensing bases reviews.
To aid in' NRC understanding of how deficiencies were identified and dispositioned, the NRC's May 21,1996, letter also requested that NU provide for each Millstone unit a comprehensive list of design and configuration deficiencies and information related to how each deficiency was identified and would be dispositioned.
On August 14,1996, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order establishing an Independent Corrective Action Verification Program (ICAVP). The independent effort will verify the adequacy of NU's afforts to establish adequate design bases and design controls, including translation of the design bases into operating procedures and maintenance and testing practices, verification of system performance, and implementation of modifications since issuance'of the initial f acility operating licenses. The NRC oversight of the ICAVP and activities will be in addition to the activities described in this Restart Assessment Plan. The results from this program will be incorporated into this restart plan and considered a significant part of the decision regarding recommended restart.
2.2 CURRENT STATUS Revision 4
3 Slace August,1997, NRC inspection of the licensee's ICAVP process for Unit 3 has been in progress. Two inspections were documented in IR 50 423/97 201, "Sargent & Lundy Independent Corrective Acticn Verification Program" dated December 10,1997, and IR 50-423/97 200, " Independent Corrective Action Verification Program FunctionalInspection" dated December 5,1997. Two additional ICAVP inspections have been completed, and draft inspection reports have been completed. (50 423/97 209, Unit 3 Tier 2/3 Inspection and 50 423/97 210, Unit 3 Tier 1 Inscope Inspection.) For Unit 2, NRC Inspection of Persons Pnwer Group implementation of the ICAVP was completed and documented in IR 50 336/97 211, dated February 9,1998.
3.0 Insoection MADual Chaoter 0350 Process Millstone Unit 1 entered a routine refueling outage on November 3,1995. On December 13,1995, the NRC sent a
- Demand for Information Letter"(10 CFR 50.54(f)) requiring the licensee to certify compliance with the regulatory requirements before restarting the unit. At the January 1996 Senior Management Meeting, the site was placed on the " Watch List" for various reasons, including a concern for regulatory compliance.
Subsequently, Millstone Units 2 and 3 were sent similar letters which required responses before restert.
The NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (MC) 0350, " Staff Guidelines For Restart Approval", provides guidelines and a list of tasks and activities that must be considered before a plant that has been shutdown for cause can restart. Because of NRC concerns relating to the licensee's management effectiveness, the appropriate aspects of MC 0350 will be applied to the restart of Units 1,2, and 3 to ensure applicable requirementa have been tret (Enclosure 4).
The Directr RPO and the Director of NRR, in coordination with the Executive Director for Operations, will make a recommendation regarding restart. NRR and the SPO willinform the Commission of the staff's and licensee's restart activities through Commission papers, or communications to the EDO. The Commission will then vote on the restart of each Millstone unit.
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3,1 BPECIAL PROJECTS OFFICE The SPO was created on November 3,1996, to oversee the restart of the Millstone units. The plan was to consolidate the NRC resources devoted to the restart efforts
. under one SES manager. The office is organized into three primary elements,
- licensing, inspection, and independent corrective action oversight. - The Licensing i
Branch will administer the typical licensing actions performed in NRR; the inspection Branch will implement the inspection programs, normally managed from the region, and the Independent Corrective Action Verification Program Oversight Branch will oversee the licensee's licensing and design bases review process.
Within the SPO, the Restart Assessment Panel (RAPi will meet to assess the licensee's performance and their progress in completing the designated restart I
activities. The RAP is composed of the Director, SPO (chairman); the Deputy Directors of Licensing, inspections, and independent Corrective Actions Verification Program Oversight; the Project Managers for the three Millstone units; the inspection Branch Chief, the Senior Resident inspectors for the three Millstone units, and the appointed Division of Reactor Safety representative. The function of the Millstone RAP is described in MC-0350, 3.2 MllASTONE OPERATIONAL READINESS PLAN 3.2.1 HISTORICAL On July 2,1996, NU submitted the Unit 3 Operational Readiness Plan, which was discussed at the July 24,1996, meeting and updated at the August 19,1996,
. meeting. However, the licensee has replaced all of the senior managers (President, Vice Presidents, and two of the three unit directors) in the recent past.' With these replacements, the submitted plans for Unit 3 and the proposed plans for Units 1 and 2 are being changed substantially. The RAP will review these plans and hold
. periodic meetings with NU, open to the public, to discuss the schedule for implementation and coordination of NRC restart activities.
The deficiency lists associated with the restart plans for each unit, which will be-updated periodically by the licensee, includes restart and deferred items, and will be audited by the NRC to verify the acceptability of the criteria used to defer items from the restart list.
3.2.2 CURRENT STATUS Revision 5 to the Millstone Unit 3 Operation Readiness Plan was submitted to the NRC on February 2,1998. The NRC continues to hold meetings with the licenses which are open to the public to discuss restart activities. The NRC also holds periodic meetings directly with the public to obtain comments concerning the Millstone Restart Plan and to answer questions.
3.3 CORRECTIVE ACTIOAl PROGRAM i
Revlalon 4
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3.3.1 HISTORICAL The NU corrective action program has been weak in ensuring comprehensive and effective corrective actions. There are many instances of narrowly focused corrective actions that failed to embrace all aspects of the underlying problem.
Additionally, the licensee has f ailed to follow up on corrective actions to ensure they viere effective. Consequently, the RAP has determined that any restart effort should examine the current state of the licensees corrective action program.
Because of the large number of Condition Reports (CR) (Note: CRs were previously called Adverse Condition Reports) being identified by the licensee's staff, the resident and regionalinspection staff will concentrate on issues for each unit identified by the CR process and audit the licensees corrective actions for completeness. The staff is periodically select!ng CRs for review, based on the licensee's assigned level of importance, or their risk significance, as perceived by the resident staff. Additionally, other CR's will be examined to provide a spectrum of salety significant and lessor risk issues. These selected CR's will be added to the SIL for each unit, which are Enclosures 1,2, and 3 to this plan. The intent is to primarily assess the corrective action program while dealing with the safety significant technicalissues. Examination of the corrective action program needs to review the Action Requests (AH) from the Action item Tracking and Trending System (AITTS) program, which is an extension of the CR process, and commitments regarding violations end inspection items. Further, a significant input to assessing the licensee's corrective action program is derived from the normal inspection program where valuable insights regarding the effectiveness of corrective actions are routinely collected from the technical safety inspections.
Additionally, the NRC Independent Corrsctive Action Verification Oversight Branch will assess the licensee's corrective actions for degraded and non conforming conditions. Finally, the Operational Safety Team inspection (OSTI) will audit portions of the corrective action process during the course of its activities.
Demonstration of improvements in the process will be judged by the completeness of the licensee's corrective actions for each of the inspected CRs. There must be a high ratio of successfully completed CR's to the total population inspected. There should only be minor comments regarding the processing, evaluation, directed corrective actions and closure of an issue.
3.3.2 CURRENT STATUS The IP 40500 (Corrective Actions) inspcction team began its onsite activities on February 9,1998.
3.4 WORK PLANNING AND. CONTROLS (C.4.F 3.4.1 HISTORICAL 3 Reference to applicable MC-0350 section Revision 4
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Work planning and controls are other areas that the licensee has shown a weakness. The ability to plan, control, and complete work is fundamental to i
achieving adequate corrective actions. Effective work planning and controls are prerequisites for reducing and managing backlogs. Weak work planning and control were evident during the Unit 2 outage, wherein, tagging boundary violations
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resulted in an extensive effort by the licensee to correct. Work control and planning were also lesues at Unit 1, which resulted in a management meeting.
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There will be a complete review of the Automated Work Order (AWO) process by the resident or regional staffs. The automated work order process is an integral part of the work plannir g and control system and is instrumental in establishing the 1
scope of the work, providing the appropriate procedures, and establishing the i
tagging boundaries. Consequently, the linit 1 resident staff has been directed to use the available initle:lve inspection hours to do a comprehensive inspection of the i
AWO process, which is a site-wide process.
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The OSTI will assess the engineering and maintenance backlogs during its operational readiness inspection. The OSTI will determine if there are safety i
significant issues that must be resolved before restart.
3.4.2 CURRENT STATUS An inspection of the AWO process was performed during Inspection 50 245/96 05.
This inspection was limited to Unit 1 and continu'ng weaknesses were observed, l
which resulted in a still open Unresolved item. For Unit 3, SIL ltem 32, which is still open, covers work control and planning. This area will be inspected by the OSTl.
The OSTI has been scheduled for March 1998, t
3.5 PROCEDURE UPGRADE PROGRAM (C.3.3.al 3.5.1 $$TORICAL The quality and adherence to procedures has been a chronic problem at the Millstone site. The issue was an element in ' improving Station Performance" and i
was one of the subjects of discussion at the periodic meetings betwwen NU and the NRC. In response to NRC concerns, the licensee developed the Procedure Upgrade Program (PUP) in the early 1990's to improve station procedures, i
The resident inspectors will relate procedural inspection findings back to the
- procedural upgrade program (PUP), identifying whether the procedures reviewed riuring the course of an inspection have been upgraded and characterize the quality of the document. This will provide an input for assessing the effectiveness of the licertsee's PUP. The NRC staff will develop an inspection plan for examining selected portions of each unit's individual efforts.
3.5.2 CURRENT STATUS As of January,1998, the licensee essentially completed the PUP for Units 2 and 3.
Reviolon 4,
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7 The NRC performed a series of inspections of the PUP starting in August,1996, and ending in August,1997. These inspections determined that the licensee essentially met most of it's commitments made to the NRC in a June,1992, letter, particularly in standardizing the format of station procedures and reducing the number of higher tiered procedures.
However, licensee processes such as CRs, LERs, and procedure change requests have continued to identify procedures which are technically deficient. In addition, inadequate procedures were also identified in various NRC inspections; however, in general, these procedures were not directly linked to having been through the PUP.
Inspection 50-423/97 203 identified verlous formal and informal processes, wSch are in placs at Unit 3 to improve the technical adequacy of procedures that have already been through the PUP. Procedure adequacy and implementation will receive continuing oversight through routir.e NRC Inspections, the NRC Inspection of the ICAVP process, and the OSTl.
a6 D.VERSIGHT 1C.1.4,1 3.6.1 HISTORICAL The licensee has identified its oversight function as deficient through self-assessments and external and internal audits and as a contributing factor in the licensee's declining performance. The report of Ammanament of Past ineffectivanaam gLindanandant ovarminht by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC),
examined the failure of Quality Assessment Services, the independent Safety Evaluation Group, and the Nuclear Review Board (NRB) to identify the deficient FSAR control process and the radioactive waste conditions. They found that management did not support these functions adequately, in addition, the Joint Utilities Management Association (JUMA) issued its report on July 17,1996. One conclusion was that the quality assurance (QA) program audits, surveillances, and inspections were not effective in the implementation of their mission and resolution of identified problems. In addition, the JUMA audit found that recommendations for improving QA effectiveness identified in previous OA -
internal and external assessments have not been addressed.
Ti.e NRC assessment of the nuclear oversight function is addressed as part of the
, RAP's review of the ISP program and through insights gained from the normal Inspection program, in addition, the NRC will perform a specialinspection of the oversight function usir,g the services of its Human Factors Assessment group. Late in the restart process for each unit, there will be an inspection to evaluate the effectiveness of the oversight groups and management's utilization of the oversight process. T_here should be positive indications that the oversight function has been made an integral part of the licensee's management team assessment process. The oversight function should result in meaningful findings, have access to line management, and provide assessments of process and program effectiveness through periodic reports. There should be evidence that the reports are forwarded Revision 4
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to the responsible manager and that they have dealt with the contents appropriately.
Oversight should be adequately staffed with qualified and experienced personnel.
The audit and survel'Isnce programs need to be clearly defined, proceduralized, and implemented w'd. e. 'abl;shed schedules.
3.8.2 cu:MNT STAY 13 l
The IP 40500 inspection will assess the nuclest oversight function.
3.7 ENFORCEMENT 3.7.1 HISTORICAL Outstanding enforcement items will be reviewed by the resident inspectors to determine if any issues require closure before plant restart. The Agency is currently-i accumulating escalated enforcement items concerning design bases issues which may require licensee response before recommending restart of each unit. There are also potential enforcement items that will result from the efforts of the Office of
_ investigations, the allegation process review group, the Office of the Inspector L
General, the Special Inspection Team, routine resident and regional inspection efforts, and the 10 CFR 2.026 petition process.
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A Pre decisional Enforcement C,onference was held with the licensee on December 5,1996, to discuss 64 individual apparent viciations. The licensee did not contest any of the violations at the conference, and the staff is in the process of finalizing the enforcement package. Once enforcement actions have been taken, the NRC will evaluate the licensee's corrective action to those enforcement actions 4
1 which are determined to impact restart of each unit.
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9 3.7.2 CURRENT STATUS The enforcement package was issued on December 10,1997. However, since the enforcement conference on December 5,1996, subsequent NRC inspections have identified additional potential escalated enforcement items.
3.8 EMPLOYEE CONCERNS 3.8.1 HISTORICAL The Millstone site has had a chronic problem in dealing effectively with employee concerns. These problems have been documented in severallicensee assessments, audits, and internal task group studies. The NRC continues to receive an inordinate quantity of allegations from the staff at the Millstone site. The current series of 10 CFR 50.54(f) letters were initiated due to NRC concerns regarding design basis issues at Millstone, as well as an allegation, and a subsequent Millstone 10 CFR 2.206 petition, dealing with the Unit 1 spent fuel pool. The NRC has issued two enforcement actions for harassment and intimidation to NU in the past three yests, in a September 1996 report, " Millstone Independent Review Group Regarding Millstone Station and NRC Handling of Employee Concerns and Allegations," the NRC staff determined that, in general, an unhealthy work environment, which did not tolerate dissenting views and did not welcome
";r promote a questioning l
attitude, has existed at the Millstone plants for the,
,t several years. This poor i
environment resulted in repeated instances of discrinunation and ineffective har'dling of employee concerns.
The NRC initiated two task groups to examine the Northeast Utilities handling of employee concerns, and the recent layoffs that affected several previous allegers.
The task group examined NU's handling of employee concerns and identified a number of root causes for the licensee's problems in this area. The task group also concluded that past problems and their root causes still remain. The output from l
these two task groups and the licensee's response to the order will be reviewed for j
restart issues.
I On October 24,1996, the director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR),
issued an Order to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO) requiring specific actions to resolve problems in the process for handling employee safety concerns at the Millstone station. The Order required NNECO to develop, submit for 14RC review, and implement a comprehensive plan for (a) reviewing and dispositioning safety issues raised by its employees, and (b) ensuring that employees who raise safety concerns can do so without fear of retaliation. On January 31,1997 NNECO submitted the plan to the NRC and began implementation of alements of the Plan.
The Order further required NNECO to submit, for NRC approval, a proposed independent, third-party oversight program (ITPOP) organization, to oversee implementation of NNECO's Plan. On December 23,1996, NNECO submitted the proposed third-party organization, Little Harbor Consultants, Inc. (LHC), to the NRC.
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10 On April 7,1997, the NRC approved LHC as the third party organization. The Order i
specified that once approved, the third party organization develops and submits for NRC approval an oversight plan for conduct of their activities. On May 2,1997, i
LHC submitted the third party oversight plan to the NRC for approval. _On July 15, 1997, the NRC reviewed and approved the ITPOP oversight plan. As specified in the Order, independent, third party oversight will continue to be implemented until NNECO. demonstrates, by its performance, that the conditions which led to the requirements of the oversight have veen corrected.
The effectiveness of NNECO programs and program implementation associated with fostering and maintaining a SCWE and for handling employee safety concerns will be assessed by NRC staff relying substantially on the findings of ITPOP's oversight activities. Staff will direct its limited resources to evaluation of a sample of NNECO programs and activities and on review of ITPOP oversight activities. This approach will provide the staff with independent assessment of the effectiveness of NNECO programs as well as establishing confidence in ITPOP's findinge, i
3.8.2 CURRENT STATUS An NRC team evaluation of the employee concerns area was started in December, 1997, and completed in January,1998,
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3.9 SIGNIFICANT ITEMS LIST The technique to be used for the restart will be to reach agreement with the licensee on its restart issues list, have it impose controls on adding or deferring items from the list, have the resident inspectors review the list to ensure it includes l
lasues of interest to the NRC, and have the residents review the deferred list to 4
ensure appropriate rationales for deferral have been documented (see item B,4.3. of MC 0350). As a result of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) activi'. es, the licensee initially determined that, for all three Millstone units, hundreds of items did not meet criteria for inclusion as a restart item. The resident inspectors, augmented by headquarters staff, are reviewing these lists periodically and confirming that the licensee is performing an adequate assessment of the discrepancies. Thl,; process will be used in the restart assessment of each unit. The RAP will determine that licensee's restart issues list includes appropriate restart items from the licensee's programs such as ACR, AR (AITTS), engineering work requests, and commitments.
The enclosed NRC Significant items Lists for all Millstone units (Enclosures 1,2 and
- 3) contain some of the items that are being used to audit and evaluate licensee programs (e.g., the corrective action process) and significant' safety / regulatory technica, issues.
Restart issues on the NRC's Significant items List will meet at least one of the following criteria:
1.
Resolution of the issue is required to ensure safe operation of the facility to include satisf action of the technical specifications or licensing basis.
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Inspection of the issue will provide an insight to an identified programmatic deficiency such as the corrective action system.
3.
Inspection of the issue will provide assessment of management effectiveness or personnel performance.
3.10 POWER ASCENSION INSPECTION l
3.10.1 HISTORICAL Selected portions of NRC MC-93802,
- Operational Safety. Team inspection," will provide the framework for a team inspection of each unit during the restart process.
The procedure scope will be modified to address the pertinent issues at Millstone.
The inspection will cover self assessments by the licensee, the licensee's implementation of its startup plan, control room observations during the approach to criticality and power ascension, selected systems readiness inspection and observation of management oversight.
The resident inspectors will provide close monitoring of each unit during mode changes to ensure compliance with each unit's technical specifications and FSAR design bases.
3.10.2 CURRENT STATUS As a final check before the staff can recommend restart of each individual unit, the staff will conduct an inspection (the OSTI) to verify that plant operations are being conducted safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements. The staff will verify that the organizations that control and support plant operations are functioning effectively to ensure operational safety. Elements of the inspection include operations, maintenance, surveillance, management oversight, technical support, safety review, quality assurance, and corrective action. Additionally, the staff will verify that the licensee has properly prersred its staff and the plant for resumption of power operations after an extended shutdown.
The team leader and members for Unit 3 have been identified and planning has begun. An inspection plan has been developed and requests for inspection material have been sont to the licensee. The onsite inspection for Unit 3 is planned to start in March 1998.
The licensee has established a power ascension procedure and a schedule. This procedure defines management controls and overall guidance for the total program.
Unit 3 anticipates a 25 day heatup period to Modes 3 and 4 to test various balance of plant systems. This 25 day period includes an estimated 8 day contingency shutdown period to correct any identified problems. To the e/ tent possible, the NRC intends to perform the Operational Safety Team Inspection (OSTI) during a mode change to observe operator performance if the heatup occurs during the OSTI, it will be observed by the OSTI.
Revision 4
12 A second heatup will be performed prior to power ascension. Starting at the second heatup, the NRC will provide inspection coverage of significant plant condition changes. There will be an NRC manager on site during power ascension. Routine inspection coverage will be performed for any extended contingency shutdown. The licensee currently estimates that the power ascension program will take 37 days including an estimated 18 day contingency shutdown. There will be four hold points at increasing power levels.
l The NRC has established a draft power ascens!on prograrn inspection plan. The purpose this plan will be to essess the performance of the plant operators durin;,
actual power operation, evaluate plant equipment remdiness for operation, verify compliance with licensee requirements during mode changes and assess licensee management's effectiveness, j
3.11 PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW _
The Restart Assessment Panel performs Plant Performances Reviews (PPRs) semi.
l annually. Two reviews were conducted, on March 19 and November 18,1997.
These PPRs were used to identify issues that need to be inspected at Millstone Station based on licensee performance. These reviews identified severalissues that warrant NRC inspection before plant restart of Unit 3. Unit specific issues as well as station wide issues identified by the March 19 1997, PPR, are contained in the SIL for each Unit as inspection items.
3.12 LICENSING ISSUES I
Each Millstone unit plans to submit or has submitted licensing issues (amendments, unresolved safety questions, relief requests, etc.) which willimpact the restart process. The SPO Licensing Branch will disposition each applicable issue prior to restart. The status of NRR actions concerning each issue is documented in Enclosure (5) of this plan.
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Enclosures:
(1)
Significant items List. Millstone !Init 1-(2)
Significant items List Mitistone Unit 2 1
(3)
Significant items List Millstone Unit 3 (4)
MC 0350 Restart Approval Checklist All Millstone Units (5)
Licensing Amendment Requests 9
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o ENCLOSURE 1 SIGNIFICANT ITEMS LIST - MILLSTONE UNIT 1 Revision 4
MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN ENCLOSURE (1)
Millstone Unit 1 Significant items List REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 1
ACR:01148 FSAR Update SPO (L) 2 ACR;01535 While de. watering spent resin, the waste temperature DRS CLOSED in the liner raised from 90 to 310'F 97 203 3
ORDER Licensee Handling of concerns raised by employees SPO H "" ' "
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- Employee Concerns Program improvemer.ts (L)
C 9-0921
MC 0350 Review enforcement and unresolved items for restart SPO (I)
C.B.e issues 5
MC 0350 C.S.t Review allegations for restart issues SPO(l)
SPO(L) 6 Review all operability determinations and by pass SPO (l) jumpers before restart 7
LER: 96 22 Fatigue cycle open items DRS URI: 92 30 2 e
MC 350 Security issues Corrective Action DRS l
C.3.1.1 f
eel: 96 0515, 97 03 01 (02H03h VIO: 96 09 20 9
Review licensee event reportsgrestart issues SPO (l) to ACR:05373 Material, Equipment and Parts SPO(L)
M197 0358 List (McPL) Program DRS 11 ACR: 961068 RPS System SPO (l) 7245 eScram solenold pilot valve replacement 12 LER: 96 48 Overlap testing of RPS/ESF DRS GL 96 01 ACR: M197-045 Revised: 02/05/98
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j REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS is 112s15/109 Motor Operated Valves (GL 8910)
DRS URI:94 006 02,94 00s.
t 04,96 001 01.96 006 06
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LIR:96 52 ACR: 03689, M197 0397, 03 4,s90s 14 ACR:M t.9s.
Surveillances Program Review SPO (l)
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LER: 9618 V10:05 007 02 i
LER: 96 42 18 ACRl1780 Control /Use of Vendor Information DRS U3 16 ACR:M196*
Radweste recovery / configuration.
DRS 0916,M1 97 1
0240,0241 Eti:9s 003 01 einsufficient management support for maintenance of LER: 97 001 radWalk Mc 0360
- RW effluent isolation valve QA classification C.2.2.c 17 Eti: 96 09 05, Corrective Action Program Effectiveness SPO (1)
UPDATE 97 02 01:
IR:9742
$.I'3h'if0#3 eReview licensee correcue action programs for SPO IR:97 IR: 96 04 effectiveness to include ACR's.
(O).
203 A cR: M 1 96-
- Corrective actions have been ineffective in resolving IR:97-sy,' 7007' problems 207 M1 96-0823,
- M1961035, M197 0342, i
0343 MC 0360 4
C.1.1, C.1.1, C.1.4.d, C.2.1.h, j
C.3.1.d 19-Review 0737 oction items for completion and SPO (l) adequeny 19 Review engineering back'ogs SPO (l) for restart issues 20 ORDER Implementation of CMP /lCAVP corrective actions.
SPO Mc0350 C.s.d (o) 2 Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 21 ACR: 03117 eSingle f ailure can disable both trains of emergency DRS
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power source LNP lockout relay
'81*08 A cR: M 1.s7
- Review LNP integrated procedure and results 0323,0417,
- LNP post testing does not meet RG 1.41 LtR: 94 20-01 Requirements 22 URLs4 014 o1 SRV's DFtS y'['o4Q7 e setpoint drift resolution M196 e accelerated testing 0622,1120 e electric lift modification adequacy l
e electric lift setpoints not fully evaluated 23 AcR: 6264, Configuration Management / Design Control Process SPO N oe'$s 1
(l)/SPO e6 os36, Mt.
(part of ICAVP Phase 1)
(0) 96 0345, M1-90 100s;
- Review 50.54 issues for restart issues
'73o3,o3 eUnit 1 design det..:lencies and issues trends
'0 l
Ettss 04 os
- Review open DBDP ltems for startup issues 1
Mc 0350 eReview station blackout self assessment items for c.2.1.o.t atartup issues
$'vio,,7, eSignificant differences between design bases and as-02 07 built eFleid changes to plant modifications not reviewed for cause 24 Review FME SPO (1)
$s.'o# ,
e FME deficiencies trend for SFP and RX cavity 2so M196 0728, e Debris identified in spent fuel pool y,y.
- Adverse trend identified in Unit 1 FME program o Fuel Pool foreign material and storage controls
- LP 24D stuck open due to foreign material 25 AcR: 0747s, inadequate design modifications DRS O$4' tR-5 24 e installed wrong material (pressure rating) for LLRT connections 26 AcR: oss22 Current CWDs do not show modifications to equipment SPO (1) 3 Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILL 8 TONE UNIT 1 IN8FECTION ITEM RESP STATt ;
27 ACR: 06483 Fuse contro; program inadequate DRS LER:96 31,96 17 URh96 004 06 2s ACR: 12663 LOCA analysis does not account for instrument DRS uncertainty during surveillance testing 29 PPR E.1 Operator acceptance of degraded conditions, lack of SPO (l) y,j,0380 ownership, O.D.'s accept degraded conditions, temporary mods, etc.
30 ACR:M196-Work Planning and Control SPO (1)
UPDATE 0343,M196 IR 97 02
$3 eAudit the AWO process IR 97 PPR E.2 eSignificant long standing work management 203, IR ELL 96 06 01 weaknesses C
5 97 207
.2.
- Failure to completely implement and document recommendations of AWO task force report of 1/1905 eTroubleshooting 31 PPR E 2 Post maintenance testing / maintenance F/U inspection SPO vio 96 001*
02,94 031 01; (1)/DRS MC 0350 C.4.h 32 URh96-005 o4 Rework SPO (I) 33 LER:96 40,96-Seismic issues DRS UPDATE 49,96 51
'7[,8 $,n3 eSeismic review selsmic modifications (FWCl, A 46, 01 06 gg. g7, g
URl:96 06 04, 79 02/79 14, NUSOER) 96 06 05.97 eSeismic ll/l 01*yn7,54, eVerify resolution of A 46 outilers og M t.96-0696, oCRD operability M197 0345.
- SEP Topic lil 6 Close out 0412.M1 96-os43 4
Revised: 02/05/98
.- -- --. =.
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 34 in: es s2 Spent Fuel Pool DRS OFl:96 004-02 LtR: 96 013 Acm:M1.es.
eSFP Cleanup 646,M1 97
- Review resolution of Spent Fuel Pool issues g{1g ssess and disposition r nmerous open items in IR95-o0 2,0035, eUnanalyzed condition due to indeterminate boraflex M197 03:6, degradation Oye,04
- Load drop onelysis (Fuel)
,p 7,
o1 01 38 Review Reg Guide 1.97 modifications DRS 36 AcR:M1.os.
NRC Information Notices LENS have incomplete or SPO (I) 0108 inaccurate responses 37 ACR;M196*
Control rod blades in spent fuel pool lifted inadvertently SPO (1)
UPDATE w
.nue Mer MM2 UR :96 006 02 as AcR:M1.es.
Ineffective program to monitor and control fasteners DRS o545 LER: 96 27 eel:96 04 o6 as AcR:M1.ss-Adverse trend identified in the control of contracted DRS 05
services 40 ACR:M1.ss-M&TE program is ineffective SPO (l)
UPDATE os14 IR:97 01 41 ACR.M1 96-Process for controlling distribution and use of SPO (l) yM17*
documents (procedures) is ineffective 42 AcR;M1.so-Potential deviation from toch specs when changes SPO (1) 0810 made to Unit 1 organizational structure 43 A cR:M 1 se.
Emergency Preparedness Program DRS 0448,M1 9).
fu#dne, (including Organization / Staffing / Dose Assessment e18195.
Capability) 2/10/97 MC 0360 C 3.1.m C.2.2.s C.2.2.h 44 AcR:M196-Equipment Environmental Qualification (EEO) Program DRS o876 8
Revised: 02/06/98 w--,m,m-w..w..--
.e.--e
-w-
..w-~,-.
,-e r
, m3
,,m n.
r er r
-m--en,*,.--
ne,---.-
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 IN8:'ECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 46 AcR:M196 Components in control rod drive system (suction filters DRS 0838 and associated olping, volves and fittings) may not meet the original design requirements 46 Acm M1o 6-insufficient personnel for key leadership programs SPO (1) 0 24 47 Acm;M1 96-PM tasks on plant equipment not performed SPO (1) 0926 MC o36o c.4.1 4e Acm M196-Management direction insufficient for system DRS jc'36o I
'"9 ""'I"9 C.2.1.s 49 ACR:M106-System and destga engineering work management SPO O82 weaknesses yg 360 (0)
C.2.1 60 ACR:M t.96-Training for engineering personnel not effectively SPO jc 360 implemented C.3.1.e 61 Acm.M196-Improvements needed in TLD process and program DRS os33 62 ACR:M196-Chemistry issues DRS y,M196-
- Adverse chemistry conditions increase potential for Wl:96 oo416 corrosion eWeaknesses in chemistry monitoring, trending and evaluation 63 URh 9612 01 Procedure Adequacy / Procedure Upgrade Program SPO (1) yg[gf,8,,
e Operating procedure deficiencies hinder operators R l ogio e Deviation from operations procedures during Mc 0360:
simulator transients C.3.1.k.
e ver;fy off. normal and general operating procedures Cj',3],'
revisions / adequacy C.2.2.d.
- EOP's C.2.1.b URl:97.ot o2 64 ACR:Mi 96-Component and system degradation during plant SPO (l) 0811 shutdown 66 ACR M196-Degraded instrument air system quality SPO (1) os12 8
Revised: 02/05/98
..ciFRENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS j Vio:96 oo7 o4 Appendix J resolution DRS UPDATE 46 8E f,'j,7 02*
einadequate testing IFt97 02 ACR:9636, almplementation of Appendix J modifications l
M196
- Verify the basis for not Appendix "J" testing the 0166,M197 ECCS suction valves s';N7*
eAdequacy of the basis for the shutdown cooling 46 system classification as a closed loop system 67 LER: 96 026, LLRT Program Review DRS UPDATE d4f,2 as eFeedwater system configuration not allow complete IR: 97-p 3,
96 1104:
drain, accspt LLRT 02 UNl:97 01-
- Containment isolation check valve falls inform LLRT 06; eel:97 02-eHistorica! LLRT results/ repeat failures of MSIVs, MSIV drains, FWlVs 6e eReview ILRT (required due to the replacement of DRS inboard containment isolation valves LP 14A & LP 14B) 69 ACR:M1 96-SBGT issues resolution DRS 0996,97-OM' '7' elmplementation of a low flow isolation modification DEv:94-023 eResolution of all outstanding lasues that could affect 05 operability (ACR 03735,08248,03403, 03402)
$'5 g 7,n2I 31'0eTechnical Specification restriction to prevent the use vio:96-44 02 of both standby gas trains when venting the drywell Etl.96 08 02, eUse of a dedicated operator while venting the drywell 96 82 03 via SGTS E "; ' ' " * * '
62 eDraw down time criteria / testing during a LNP 6o URl:96 3101 Verify resolution of ATWS issues, lack of LCO and SPO (1)
^Cn 70o1, 7,
turning off the ATWS system to perform battery voltage adjustments 61 LER: 96 68 Verify resolution of IPEEE walkdown issues DRS/S eDetermine the need for the licansee to complete the PO(L)
IPEEE 62 ACR:M197-Verify implementation of setpoint changes identified by DRS
]'M1 *87*
the setpoint verification program eincorrect RPS setpoints
- Yarways 7" Error Low Low Water Level Calculation Sh Verify HELB program completion ORS 7
Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS
- 4 Venfy drywell temperature profile,.
DRS PDCR completion and closeout necessary to update the plant design basis es untes 24 o*
Fire Protection / Appendix R Programs DRS
'h "* 8 eReview fire detection and suppression system code compliance issues resolutbn
- Appendix R equipment, test, maintenance program, and surveillance program se -
Review commitment modification proCram for startup SPO (1) issues e7 AcR:M1 De-Core reload DRS-y' '7'
- Error in LOCA modelinput data for GE11 fuel eS!L 581 eThe LOCA resulta are expected to reduce the operating margin for MAPLHGR bCow the normal value (10%)
e3D monicore heat balance error correction eReview reload 15/ core design for cycle 16 including the PDCR, safety evaluation and reload report, sa Core spray suction valves receives a seal in accident
- SPO (l) signal and can not be shut for leak isolation during an accident es SD valves (1, 2A, 2B) may not close under HELB SPO (Il conditions if open with greater than 300 degrees Rx water temperature
=7o Review relief valve reliability Dl%S
- ACR trend 71 10 CFR 50.59 Process SPO Modifications installed prior to NRC approval and (L) sometimes before the TSAR submitted. (shutdown cooling, SRVs) 72 AcR: s2v.
Isolation condenser thermal she<:k operability / service DRS life issue -
73 Leaker fuel bundle root cause SPO (l) 74 M: 96 07 CRD scram solenoid pilot valve elastomer degradation SPO (I) 8 Revised: 02/05/98
I REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 75 eel:96-09 os, Service water inspection (GL8913)
DRS UPDATE f,0"y,74
- Arcor issue resolution IR:97-02 ACR:M1 96
- SW and ESW system operability 09:1,
- LPCI system operability 02372,M1 96-
- 1o5e, 76 ACR 8260,M1-Electrical separation DRS/S
'7 [,881
- Rx high level trip powered from the same :,ource PO (L)
,,14-02 LER: 96 25
- Cable Separation in f (chgear NR:95 048 ACR:M 1 96-0859,M1 97-0144 LER: 96-3o 77 ACR:M1 96-Seismic concern with 4KV breaker racked out SPO (1) 0845 LER: 96 57 78 ACR:07454 1GSCC Program weaknesses DRS LER: 9614,95-29,96-35 EEh 96 09 o6 URl:96 oo5-03,96 005 o2 79 ACR:7304, Review failure to meet technical specifications root SPO (l) 7402
,, 9,,3 3 cauce and corrective actions Numerous LERs 80 ACR:M1 96-Review TRM for technical specification interpretations SPO (1) 1011 eMethod to track conditional LCO's at uni:90-oot 02 Seismic qualification of FWCl valve air supply SPO (1) s2 unt:90 oot 03 FWCl test results SPO (1) as URi:91 ost 04 Availability of short circult/ voltage drop celes DRS s4 vio:95-oo7-01 Control room habitability 3fD eUse of SCBAs (ll/SPO (L) es unt:95-028-02 Refueling evolutions contrary to design basis SPO (1) se vio:95 03102 Cross connecting 480V safety related buses SPO (1) 9 Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 IU3PECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 87 URl:96-006 01 Drywell fire / Technical Specifications violation SPO (1)
LER: 96-041, 96-n43
]
88 LER: 96 008 Nonconservative ATWS low low water level setpoint SPO (1) 89 LER. 98 015 Recirc pump flow mismatch surveillance not performed SPO (1) in accordance with TS 90 LER: 96-024 Temporary Modification to the scram air header SPO (1) pressure switch instrument not removed 91 LER: 96 032 Unqualified components in drywell preclude long term SPO (1) operability 92 LER: 96 036 Potential to bypass turbine stop valvt when required to SPO (l) be operabia 93 LER: 96 037 Automatic depressurization system may not be single SPO (l) f ailure proof 94 LER: 96 029, inservice inspection / Inservice Testing Programs DRF 96-039 ACR: M1 97-0276.0400 k
95 LER: 96 045 LPCI sys inop due to stuck open injection check valve SPO (1)
ACR: M196-0088.0087 96 LER: 96-061, LOCA concurrent with LNP loss DC power p avents SPO (l) 88' $ '97 04
,cR:
1_9 g, closure of LPCI torus cooling valve 0941, M1 96
- RWCU Valves 0550 97 URl:95-81-01 NCR Program ineffective SPO (I) eel:96-006-04 ACR:M1 96-SPO 0454 (0) 98 IR:96-12 Operator Licensing and Training DRS URI:96 $'CR:
- LOIT/ LOUT program requirement discrepancies 95 1024.1025 M197-0117.0148, 0168,0223, 0259,0398, 0437 MC 0350 C.3.1.e C.3.3.c 10 Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 1 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 99 eel:96-0101 Inoperable Gas Turbine Fuel Pump SPO (I)
LER:9610 100 IFt:96-Os 21 Material Condition Program SPO (1)
MC 0350 C.4.1 101 LER: 96 53, 9adiation Effluents Monitoring Program Review DRS 96-54,96 65; 97 05 ACR: M1 96-1042,1060, 1059,M1 97-0242,0424 102 ACR:M1 97-EDG Air Start System Review SPO (I) 0424 eel: 96-09 07 LER: 96 55, 96 56, 96-60 l
103 ACR: M197 Use of "Non-Q" parts in "Q" applications SPO (1) 0292,0207, 0026; ACR:
M1961097 104 ACR: M197 GT Air Start System Review SPO (1) 0260 105 ACR: M1 97-Single failure vulnerability of FWCl/APR historical SPO (1) 0277.0794 failure to meet ECCS acceptance criteria 106 ACR: M1 97*
Containment isolation valves exceed allowable stroke SPO (1) 0200 time 107 Review deferred restart items list (50.54 (f) Response)
SPO (1) 106 Quality Assurance and Oversight Program SPO (1)
UPDATE NRet 97-202 IR 97-203 I
Revised: 02/05/98
d i
ENCLOSURE 2 SIGNIFICANT ITEMS LIST - MILLSTONE UNIT 2 l
I x <
MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN ENCLOEURE (2)
Millstone Unit 2 Sionificant Itama List The fOllOwing is a list Of the Millstone issues that, sa a minimum, require an NRC inspection and evaluatlOn prlOr to restart.
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 1
MC 0350 SECTION C.1.3, MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND EFFFCTIVENESS; SPO(l)
C.2.1, C.2.2.e,d.e, LICENSEE STAFF SAFETY CULTURE C.3.1,s,b,c,d
_n. -
2 MC 0350 SECisON C.I.1, 50.54(fi/1CAVP (PHASE I and lli SPO C.1.3, C.1.4.g. C.3.2 C.4.f; FSAR UPDATE (Oll/L)
CONFIRMATORY ORDER -
10 CFR 50.59 PRGCESS DATED 08/14/96 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT / DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS (PART OF ICAVP PHASE il 3
MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1 AND DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS CHANGES TO ADDRESS SPO(O)
C.1.3; C.2.2.d:
UNIT 1 ACR 7007 UNIT 1 ACR 7007; UNIT 2 ACR 8761 NUMEROUS EXAMPLES OF DRAWINGS NOT REFLECTING ACTUAL PLANT CONFIGURATION 4
MC 0350 ITEM C.1.4.e.
LICENSEE HANDLING OF CONCERNS RAISED BY SPO(LI C.2.2.b,e; EMPLOYEE CCNFIRMATORY ORDER
- EMPLOYEE CONCERNS PROGRAM IMPROVEMENTJ DATED OCTOBER 24,1996
- SCWE IMPROVEMENTS 5
MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1, CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS SPO(l)
C.1.3, C.).4.d-l, C.2.1, C.2.2.c.e, C.3.1.d.m; C 4.f; SELF ASSES 3 MENT PROGRAM IMPLEMENTAT*0N AND IR 96-04 & 08 EFFECTIVENESS; eel 336/96-20130 COMMITMENT TRACKING 1
1 Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 6
MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.d, WORK PLANNING AND CONTROL:
DRS UPDATEIR C.4.e,1,h,l.)
(OL) 97 207 PLANT MAINTENANCE PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS; SIGNIFICANT HARDWARE ISSUES RESOLVED; MAINTENANCf BACKLOG MANAGED AND IMPACT ON OPERATION ASSESSED; SURVEILLANCE TESTING:
PLANT HOUSEKEEPING 7
MC 035011 EMS C.1.3.f, BYPASS JUMPERS, OPERATOR WORK-AROUNDS &
SPO(ll, C.2.1.e, C.3.2.e, C.4.f,1; CONTROL BOAQ DEFICIENCIES OSTI 8
MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.1.b, PROCEDURE ADEQUACY / PROCEDURE UPGRADE SPO(l)
UPDATE C.2.2.d, C.3.1.k. C.3.3.e,1; PROGRAM OSTI 1R 97 202 IR 97 203 IFl 336/95 20103; PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION GENERAL USE VERSUS IR97 207 CONT!NUOUS USE URI 336/96-0104; LOSS OF DC BUS EVENT. ESTABLISH PROCEDUREE' REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 6.8.1 URI 336/96 06 08 SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM WATER HAMMER; NU LETTER B16257 REVIEW OPERATING PROCEDJRES TO PRECLUDE WATER HAMMER EVENTS eel 97 0212 SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE ADEQUACY SPO(O) l 9
MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.4.g, OPERATING PROCEDURES CONSISTENT WITH FSAR SPO(0),
UPDATE C.2.2.g. C.3.3.e,f; DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM OPERATION SPO(l) lR 97 02 1
eel 336/96 08-13, eel 336/96-06-05, ADEQUACY OF PROCEDURE CHANGE PROCESS TO EEI 336/96-08-06, ENSURE OPERATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH LICENSE LER 336/97 02; ACR 11104 10 MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.1.g.
PROGRESS OF EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE DRS UPDATE C.3.3.e.f; UPGRADES; (OL)
IR 97 203
'IR 336/95 21 ACCEPTABILITY OF DEFER. RING ABNORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURE UPGRADES i
11 MC 0350 ITEMS C.1.4.a,b,c, QUAUTY ASSURANCE AND OVERSIGHT PROGRAM SPO(l)
C.2.1.c NRR 12 MC 0350 SECTION C.1.1 LICENSEE RESTART PUNCH LIST REVIEW OF ITEMS SPO(l)
UPDATE C.1.3, C.1.4.e, C.2.1.f-g, DEFERRED UNTIL AFTER RESTART IR97 207 C.4.f,i 2
Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 13 MC 0350 ITEMS C.3.1.g,h,l.),1, LICENSED OPERATOR STAFFING; CONTROL ROOM SPO(!)
C.3.3.a,b,d,g FORMALITY; ATTENTIVENESS TO DUTY; ATTENTION TO OSTI
]-
DETAIL: OFF HOUR PLANT STAFFING OVERTIME USAGE; AWARENESS TO PLANT SECURITY; AWARENESS OF EQUIPMENT STATUS; LOG KEEPING PRACTICES; 14 MC 0350 ITEMS C 3.1.e, OPERATOR LICENSING AND TRAINING DRS C.3.3.c; CONFIRMATORY ACTION (OL)
LETTER DATED MARCH 7, 1997; URI 336/97 0103 15 MC 0350 ITEMS AUGMENTED INSPECTION COVERAGE DURING RESTART SI;O(l)
NOTE 2 C.4.a,b,c,d,e,g INSPECTION: OPERABILITY OF TECHNICAL OSTt SPECIFICATION SYSTEMS: OPERABILITY OF SECONDARY AND SUPPORT SYSTEMS; SYSTEM LINEUPS; RESULTS OF PRE STARTUP TESTING: POWER ASCENSION TESTING 16 MC 0350 ITEMS C.2.2.g-h, EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM (INCLUDING DRS(EP)
UPDATE C.3.1.m. C 3.2.h; ORGANIZATION / STAFFING / DOSE ASSESSMENT 1R 96 06 NU LETTER (B16195) DATED CAPABILITY)
FEBRUARY 10,1997 lR 97 202 17 MC 0350 SECTION C.5 AND DISPOSITION OF REGULATORY ISSUES: LICENSE
- NRR, C6 AMENDMENTS; EXEMPTIONS; RELIEFS; ORDERS; SPO(L),
SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ISSUES; ALLEGATIONS:
OE, 01, AND 10 CFR 2.206 PETITIONS COORDINATION WITH
- DRS, INTERESTED AGENCIES AND PARTIES.
OPA 18 ACRs 02621, M2 96-0239 MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT AND PARTS LIST (MEPL)
- NRR, UPDATE eel 336/96-201-42 & 43 PROGRAM DRS IR 97 202 (SEB) lR 97 203 19 ACRs M2 96-0515 & 07958; EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION (EEO)
DRS UPDATE eel 336/96-06-12, PROGRAM eel 336/96-201 20, (EEB)
IR 97 203 URI 336/93-19 02 HIGH ENERGY LINE BREAK PROGRAM LER 336/97 31 g
3 Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECYlON ITEM RESP STATUS 20 IFl 336/95 0101 MOTOR OPERATED VALVES (GL 89-10)
IR 97 203 eel 336/96-0511 INACCURATE INFORMATION PROVIOED TO THE NRC REGARDING GENERIC LETTER 8910; eel 336/96-05 09 DYNAMIC TESTING OF AFW TERRY TURBINE STEAM ADMISSION MOV; eel 336/95 06 01,03 & 04 PRESSURE LOCKING OF CONTAINMENT SUMP LER 336/97 34 RECIRCULATION VALVES 21 MC 0350 ITEM C.3.3.o; FIRE PROTECTION / APPENDIX R PROGRAMS DRS IR 336/96-06; lEEB)
UCENSEE SELF ASSE8SMENTS APPENDIX R RELATED ABNORMAL OPERATING AND QA AUDITS; PROCEDURES; ACR M2 96-0460 APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE ASSOCIATED WITH THERMO-LAG l
22 ACRs M2 96 0513; CONTAINMENT SUMP SCREEN MESH SIZE & ECCS DRS CLOSED eel 336/96-0611 PUMP THROTTLE VALVE CLOGGING (SEB)
IR 97 203 URI 336/96-0610 (NOTE 1) 23 ACRs 01991, M2 96-0449, HYDROGEN MONITORS AND POST ACCIDENT SAMPLING SPO(l) 0467, 0654, 0655, & 0656; SYSTEM INOPERABLE AND FAILURE TO MEET DESIGN eel 336/96 06-11,12 & 13, BASIS AND LICENSING BASIS eel 336/96-201-03 & 41, URI 336/96-0105 24 ACRs 06174,04047,06372 &
EXCESSIVE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM HEATUP AND SPO(1) 09739; COOLDOWN RATES; EVALUATION OF SIMULTANEOUS URI 336/95-42 03 REACTOR COOLANT PUMP AND SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM OPERATION 25 NUMEROUS ACRs; ECCS PUMPS SUCTION LINE FROM RWST HAS DRS L'*0 ATE URI 336/96-06-06 NUMEROUS DEGRADED OR INOPERABLE PIPE (CMME)
IR.7 203 SUPPORTS, MANY CAUSED BY WATER HAMMER 26 ACR 11252;
- B' EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FAILURE -
SPO(l)
CLOSED eel 336/96-09-10 INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS IR 97-02 IR 97 203 (NOTE 1) 27 eel 336/96-201-09 INADEQtIATE DESIGN CONTROL MEASURES FOR SPO(O)
VERIFYING ACCURACY OF INFORMATION CONTAINED IN DESiCN BAS'S DOCUMENT PACKAGES 4
Revised: 02/05/98
l REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 26 eel 336/96 201 11, FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY CONTROL INSTALLATION OF SPO(1)
UPDATE eel 336/96 20131 TEMPORARY MODIFICATION TO THE RFCCW SURGE IR 97 203 TANK 29 eel 336/96 201 12 SEPARATION AND SINGLE FAILURE CONCERNS FOR SPO(l)
CLOSED WIDE RANGE NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTS 1R 97 203 (NOTE 1) 30 eel 336/96 20125 FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS SPO(l)
UPDATE CONCERNING ' DUAL FUNCTION" ISOLATION VALVES IR 97 202 31 eel 336/96-20128 FAILURE TO ADDRESS STATION BLACKOUT fSSUES SPO(l)
UPDATE IDENTIFIED IN THE VECTRA ASSESSMENT IR 97 203 32 eel 336/96 20129 FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SPO(l)
CLOSED AUDIT ISSUES INVOLVING TRENDING AND IR 97 02 PRIORITIZATION OF NON-CONFORMANCE REPORTS IR 97 207 L
33 eel 336/96-20136 INADEOUATE CORRECTIVE ACTION CONCERNING A DRS CLOSED SEISMIC DESIGN DEFICIENCY OF A VITAL SWITCHGEAR (CMME) lR 97 202 ROOM COOLER 1R 97 203 (NOTE 1) 34 eel 336/96-06-06 IMPLEMENTATION OF CORRECTIVE ACTION OF SPO(l)
CLOSED CHANGING OPERATING PROCEDURE TO LOCK OPEN IR 97 02 REFUELING POOL DRAIN VALVES, AS SPECIFIED IN THE IR 97 203 FSAR, WAS INADEQUATE (NOTE 1) 35 LII 336/96 06 06 INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTION IN LER 33C/96 24 SPO(l)
CLOSED IR 97 203 (NOTE 1) 36 eel 336/96 0610 INADEQUATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO ADDRESS UNIT SPO(l)
CLOSED 1 HEAVY LOADS LIFTED OVER THE UNIT 2 VITAL IR 97 02 SWITCHGEAR ROOM IR 97 203 (NOTE 1) 37 eel 336/95 44-06 ICE BLOCKAGE OF SERVICE WATER STRAINER SPO(l)
SACKWASH LINE 36 URI 336/96-0511 (IFS NO. URI SPENT FUEL POOL FSAR UPDATES SPO(l)
CLOSED 336/96-05-17)
IR 97 02 5
Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 39 eel 336/96-0410 ERRONEOUS RBCCW FLOW VALUES IN CONTAINMENT DRS TEMPERATURE PROFILE ANALYSIS (SEB)
URI 336/96 20138 FAILURE TO CONSIDER POST ACCIDENT FLUID TEMPERATURE IN HPSI FLOW EVALUATION 40 LER 336/90-31 POTENTIAL STEAM GENERATOR OVERPRESSURE DUE DRS TO RESTRICTIVE MAIN STEAM SAFETY PIPING (SEB) 41 ALrt M2 97-0023 SEIMANS COMPUTER MODEL OF REACTOR CORE LARGE NRR CLOSED AhO SMALL BREAK wSS OF CODLANT ACCIDENTS NRC LETTER DATED 07/23/97 42 IR 336/94 201 (IFS NO. IFl EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR FUEL DAY TANK DOES SPO(L) 336/94 201-90)
NOT SATISFY 7 DAY DESIGN BASIS CAPACITY 43 URI 336/96 0814 INAPPROPRIATE REMOVAL OF STARTUP RATE TRIP SPoll)
CLOSED LER 336/96-29 1R 96-08 IR 97 207 44 ACR 02797, ACR 09663, POTENTIAL TO EXCEED CONTAINMENT DESIGN SPO(l)
ACR M2 96-0153; PRESSURE FOLLOWING A MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK LER 336/97 06 45 ACR M2 96-0296 FAILURE OF MAIN STEAM CHECK VALVE FOLLOWING ASPO(l)
CLCSED MAIN STEAM LINE BREAK (MSLB) COULD CAUSE BOTH IR 97-202 STEAM GENERATORS TO BLOW DOWN RESULTING IN EXCEEDING CONTAINMENT DESIGN PRESFURE. THE LICENSEE'S M;PL PROGRAM DESIGNATES THE MS CHECK VALVEE AS NON-QA WHICH THE LICfNSEE HAS EVALUATED AS ACCEPTABLE.
46 LER 336/97 02 CONTROL ROOM AIR CONDITIONING COMMON INLET SPO(l)
DAMPER COULD BECOME STUCK CLOSED, DISABLING BOTH FACILITIES. DAMPER HAS NO MANUAL OPERATOR AS STATED IN FSAR.
47 URI 336/96 08-09, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND ENGINEERED SPO(l)
LER 336/96 24 SAFETY FEATURE RESPONSE TIME TESTING 48 ACR M2 96 0542 TECHNICAL S"2ECIFICATION LIMITS FOR INOPERABLE SPO(l)
MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES NON-CONSERVATIVE 6
Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 2 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 49 LER 336/96 30, LER 336/97 05 INSERVICE INSPECTION / INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAMS DRS UPDATE CR M2 07 0491 & 1229 l
(SEB)
IR 96-08 I
1R 96-06 50 CONTROL /USE OF VENDOR INFORMATION SPO(l)
UPDATE 97 203 51 IR 336/95 29 SERVICE WATER SYSTEM OPERATIONAL PERF99MANCE DRS INSPECTION (SWSOPI) FOLLOWUP (SEB) 52 LER 336/97 33 ENGINEEREC, SAFEGUARDS ACTUATION SYSTEM SPO(l)
INOPERABLE DUE TO IMPROPERLY SIZED POWER SUPPLY FUTES
~m Note 1: The NRC has inspected the technical concerns associated with this Sllitem and determined that these concerns have been adequately dispositioned by the licensee. Based on this, the SIL item is considered " closed" even though the referenced Eels remain open pending NRC considerations of potential escalated enforcement action. No additional NRC inspection of this Sllitem is necessary prior to restart (although the NRC reserves this l
option.)
Note 2: Since this inspection will occur following restart approval, the closure of this item will not be reflected on this list.
7 Revised: 02/05/98
I REPSRENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPSCTION ITSM RESP STATUS 71 MC 0360 -
REVIEW LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS FOR RESTART ISSUES SPO(1)
C,1.4.4 72 REVIEW ENFORCEMENT AND UNRESOLVED ITEMS FOR ITEMS SPO(l) -
FOR RESTART ISSUES 73 NOV: 96 06-QUALITY ASSURANCE AND OVERSIGHT PROGRAM OSTI UPDATE 12; IFl: 96-40600 IR:97 202 06-17 MC 0360 C.1.4.a,b,c, 1R97 203 C.2.1.c 74 URl: 96 INSERVICE INSPECTION / INSERVICE TESTING PROGRAMS DRS UPDATE 18; LER: 96-21; CR 97-iR:97-901 02,97-202,97-203 75 IFl: 96 0815 TIA ISSUES (EDG EXHAUST & REQUIRCD # OF SW PUMPS)
NMR 96-09 17 SPO (L) 76 IFl: 96-0817 CRACKING OF FUSE FERRULES DRS CLOSED-IR:97 202 77 IFl: 95-44 06 -
POTENTIAL FREEZING OF SW SACKWASH LINES SPO(l)
UPDATE IR:96-09 CLOSED-IR 97 207 78 URl: 93 07-10 CFR 50.59 PROCESS SPO(L)
UPDATE
. 07, eel: 96 201-IR:97-02,06,07, 203, IR 08 97 207 79-EFl: 96 201 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT / DESIGN CONTROL PROCESS SPO(l)
UPDATE 09,36,37.
SPO(O)
IR: 97 02 39 (PART OF ICAVP PHASE 1)
MC 0360 97 203, C.3.2.f 97 206, 97 207 SO ACR: 97 348 MOCEDURE ADEQUACY / PROCEDURE UPGRADE PROGRAM SPO(l)
UPDATE MC 0350 OSTI 1R97-01, C.2.1.b.
C.2.2.d, 97 203, 97 206 C.3.1.k.
C.3.3.e,f 81 eel: 96 201-TESTING OF SAFETY SYSTEMS DRS UPDATE 32, 34; LER:
IR:97-02 06-32 8
Revised: 02/05/98
-e
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a i
2 ENCLOSURE 3 SIGNIFICANT ITEMS LIST - MILLSTONE UNIT 3 e
t O
f 1
I; P
b i
f_
MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN ENCLOSURE (3)
Milletona Unit 3 Slanificant items List 1
i
- flEPERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM RESP:
STATUS 1.
ACR: 10773 RSS AND OSS PIPING TEMPERATURE NMR UPDATE eel: 96-0613 MAYBE HIGHER THAN ANALYZED (NRM REVIEW ENG.
DRS' IR96-06 LER: 96 007-ANALYSIS, DRS INSPECT INSTALLATION)
SPO (0) 1R97 202 01& 02 lR97 203 2
eel: 96 201-FSAR UPDATE 01 SPOIL)
UPDATE IR 97-207 3
ACR: 06715
' REACTOR POWER INCREASE WHEN UN80 RATED CATION DRP CLOSED DEMIN PLACED INTO SERVICE 3CHS-DEMIN2 IR96-08 4
ACR: 01895 EDG SEQUENCER CDA SIGNAL OUTPUT 'A' TRAIN DRS CLOSED-COMPONENTS STARTED 1R96-09 5-ACR: 01844 FAILURE TO ENTER AN ACTION STATEMENT WHEN MSIVS SPO(l)
UPDATE VIO: 94 24 WERE CLOSED. (TECH SPEC AMEND) 01: LER:97-IR 97 02 08 CLOSED IR 97 207 6
. ACRi 04199 RCP SEAL INJECTION FILTER *B" GASKET FAILED RESULTING IN -
DRP.
CLOSED SPILL OF COOLANT TO FLOOR DRAINS 1R96-08
-7 ACR: 06092 RCS CHECK VALVE BODY TO BONNET LEAK: 3 RCS*V146 DRP CLOSED IR96-06 8
ACR: 01535 WHILE DEWATERlNC SPENT RESIN, THE WASTE TEMPERATURE DRP CLOSED' IN THE LINER RAISED FROM 90 TO 310'F 1R96-06
~9 ACR:10643 NEED FOR ADDITIONAL REVIEW OF RESPONSE TIME TESTING FOR PROCEDURES SPO(l) 10 ACR: 11322 CLOSURE OF PlR WITHOUT ADDRESSING DESIGN FEATURE OFDRP CLOSED-AFFECTED COMPONENTS 1R96-09 11 NU LTR TURBINE DRIVEN AUX FEEDWATER DESIGN CONCERNS. (TECH 1815397)
SPEC AMEPO.)
SPO(l)
UPDATE 11/1/96, 1R 97 202 ACR: 10774 IR 97-207
& 10780 eel: 96-201 04 URl: 96-201 40 Revised: 02/05/98
I j
REPERENCE MILLSTONE UNil 3 INSPECTION ITSM FIESP STATUS 12 ACR;37 0317 CONTAINMENT FOUNDATION ERO$lON NRR UPDATE 6323 URI: 96 SPO (L)
IR 97 203 TIA 13, 96-04 14, 96-04 15 IFl: 941109 IN: 9711 13 ACR: 96-CCP SYSTEM OPERATION A90VE DESIGN TL;APERATURE; 3 SPO(l)
UPDATE
0897 97 203 URl: 96 20;lR: 96-201 LER: 96 28 &
96-40 14 ACR:7745 SGCS OPERATIONAL CONFIGURATION CONTROL (TECH SPEC SPO(l)
UPDATE 191: 96 01-AMEND.)
?
lR 97 02 15
,mn; 96 LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER LEAKAGE AND DESIGN SPO(l)
UPDATE 0159-O!SCREPANCIES EEt: 96 0615 1R96,06, 97 202 CLOSED 8 IR97 203 16 Unit 2 DUAL FUNCTION VALVE CONTROL AND TESTING SPO (1)
UPDATE l
ACR: 01935 1R 97 02
' CLOSED IR 97 202 17 ACR: 7266.
RCP SEAL HOUSING LEAKAGE AND SOLT CORROSION DRS 18 ACR: 10562, CONTROL /USE OF VENDOR INFORMATION DRS UPDATE PPR G.2 SPollt IR 97-eel: 96 201-15, 96-201-02,97 203 18,96-201 19 U
__ RI: 96 201-17 19 URI: 96 201-RESOLUTION OF AFW VALVES HELE CONCERN SPO(l)
CLOSED 16 IR97 203 rSIL Item is CLOSED eel remains open pending completion of enforcement action.
2 Revised: 02/05/98
~
REPERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS w
20 VIO: 96 LICENSEE HANDLING OF LONCERNS RAISED SY EMPLOYEE SPO(L) 13
C.2.2.6 21 FATICUE CYCLE OPEN ITEMS IP 37750 DRS CLOSED (UNIT 2 ISSUE)
IR96-01 22 PART 70 STORAGE AND INVENTORY IP 84750 (UNIT 1 ISSUE)
DRS CLOSED IR96-05 23 FORMALITY OF NON-ROUTINE SECURITY ACTIVITIES AND NEW DRS CLOSED FUEL SECURITY IP 81064 1R96-05 24 URI: 96 OVERLAP TESTING OF RPS/ESF SPO(1)
UPDATE 08 LER: 9717 IR97 01 25 ACR: 912 MATERIAL, EQUlPMENT AND PARTS LIST (MEPL) PROGRAM DRS UPDATE URL: 95-07 SPO(l) lR96 201, 10 eel: 96 201-97 202, 43 97 203 28 ACR: 96-MOTOR OPERATED VALVES (GL 8910)
DRS UPDATE 277,0278, 627,12862 IR97 203 LER: 96-19,20, 96-35; URl: 9517-09 IFl: 95 0101, 95-17 01, 02,03,04, 05;IN: 97 07 27 PPR G.1.C.
MISSED SURVEILLANCES/ TEST CONTROL VIO 95 38 01 SPO(l)
CLOSED G.2 MC 0350 ITEMS C.4.e IR96-08 28 PPR G.1.C DILUTION EVENTS ACR 05715, SIL NO. 3 SPO(l)
CLOSED IR96-08 29 PPR G.I.C FEEDWATER HAMMER DRS CLOSED IR96-01 3
Revised: 02/05/98
REPSMENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM RESP-STATUS-30
'IR: 96 31, NU AFW CHECK VALVE LEAKAGE
.LTR-SPott)
CLOSED (516397) lR:97 02 11/1/96 PPR G.I.d, ACR 96-0066 31 PPM G.1.C, WORK AROUNDS AND ABUSE OF USE-AS-IS DEFICIENCIES SPO(l)
G.2 MC 0360 ITEMS C,1.3.f, C.2.1.e C 3.2.e, C.4.f.& 1 32 NOV: 9416-WORK PLANNING AND CONTROL OSTI i
06 PPR G.2 l
MC 0360 l
ITEMS C.2.2.e C4fhi 33 1R: 90-201, SEISMIC 11/1 DRS UPDATE IFl 97 01-07 PPR G.2, -
1R97 202, LER: 96 003; 97 203 ACR: 96-0663; CR:
97 0960 34-IP:84760; EFFLUENT / ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING AND ANALYTICAL DRS UPDATE VIO: 96 05-PROFICIENCY 10;lFl:9613-1R96-09, 01 96 13
-CLOSED 1R97 203 36 IP:86760 RADWASTE SYSTEMS / CONTROLS DRS UPDATE IR96-08 CLOSED IR 97-207 36 ACR:M3 97 HEAT EXCHANGEh PERFORMANCE (GL 63-13)
DRS UPDATE O216-IR 97 207 4
Revised: 02/05/98 I
REPSRENCS MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM RESP-
-STATUS 37 IR: 96 COMMECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS (TECH SPEC SPO(l)
UPDATE eel: 96 201 AMEND.)
40500 IR:97 13,21,22, 24,26,27.
02,97 28,29 MC 202,97 0350 ITEMS 203,97-C. I.1, C. I.3, 207 C.1.4.d.e,g, -
C.2.1, C.2.2.c.e, C.3.1.d, C 4.f 38 REVIEW 0737 ACTION ITEMS FOR COMPLETION SPO(1)
UPDATE IR 97 307 39 MC 0350 REVIEW ENGINEERING SACKLOGS DRS ITEMS OSTI C.3.2.a.c 40 MC 0350 REVIEW 50.54F ISSUES FOR RESTART / REVIEW DEFFERED SPO (L)
UPDATE ITEMS C.1.1, RESTART ITFMS LIST C.1.3,
- SPO (1)
IR96-06, C.1.f,& g, IR97 202, C.4.f,I IR97 207 41 ACR:7007 REVIEW SELF ASSESSMENT ROOT CAUSES AND VERIFY SPoll)
UPDATF
.URl: 95 81-CORRECTI'/E ACTIONS (IP40500) 40500 IR 97 02 01 VIO: 96 09-IR 97 203 04 MC 0350 C.1.4.1 42 IR: 96-08 FIRE PRLsTECTION/ APPENDIX R PROGRAMS IP64704 DRS UPDATE CR97 3226 IR:97 202 i
IR: 97 207 43 ORDER 50.54(f)/ICAVP (PHASE I and 11)
SPO(O)
IR97 206 44 ACR:12116, CYCLE 6 SORON DILUTION ANALYSIS POTENTIALLY NON-ORS CLOSED 96-0325 CONSERVATIVE AND PGS FLOW RATE TO CHARGING PUMPS IR 97 207 LER: 96 26 MAY BE IN ERROR 45 ACR: SS-INITIAL SETTINf% FOR ECCS THROTTLE VALVES INADEQUATE SPO(l)
UPDATE 0524,08997 AND POTEriTIAL CLOGGING. (TECH SPEC AMEND.)
URI 96-06-14 IR96-06 LER 96-29 &
CLOSED 96-39 IR97 203 46-ACR: 96-LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION PENETRATIONS SPO(l)
CLOSED 0183 1R 97-207 5
Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 47 ACR: 96-RHR HEAT EXCHANGER BOLTING SUSCEPTIBLE TO BORlC ACID DRS CLOSED 0391 IR:97 202 48 ACR: 10397 LLRT *AS FOUND* TOTAL LEAKAGE EXCEEDED MAX SPO (I)
CLOSED ALLOWABLE 1R96 08 49 ACR: 96-FUEL TRANSFER TUBE BELLOWS SEAL CONNECTION NOT SPO (I)
CLOSED 0324 TESTED IR96 08 50 ACR: 96-DOCUMENTATION OF CONTAINMEN1 'YSTEMS DRS 0446 DISCREPANCIES 51 ACR: 96-WALWORTH VALVE YOKE GENERIC ISSUE DRS 0339,96 0389 52 ACR: 10795 SWP TEMPERATURE SWITCHES DEFEATED BY BYPASS JUMPER SPO(t) eel: 96-201 FOR SWP'P3A1B (BOOSTER PUMPS) 03 LER: 96-005-01 53 ACR: 96-PIECES OF ARCOR FOUND IN 3RSS'EI A AND 3RCC'EIC SPO (1)
UPDATE 0449;CR:97-SPO (0) lR:96-09, 1007,97-97 202 1729,97-0727; URl:
96 09 11:
LER: 96 25 54
( CR: 96 NUMEROUS BOLTS ON BACK DOOR ON 4160V SWITCHGEAR DRP CLOSED 0181 MISSING IR96-06 55 ACR: 96-FAST TRANSFER TEST FAILURES DRS CLOSED 0467 IR96-09 56 ACR:12495 SHUTDOWN MARGIN MONITOR ALARM SETPOINT DRS CLOSED IR96-05 57 ACR: 96-POTENTIAL ELECTRICAL SEPARATION VIOLATIONS DRS UPDATE 0080,96-SPO (1) lR:97-0081 202, 97-LER 96-15, 203 45,49 CLOSED IR 97 207 58 ACR: 96-THERMAL RELIEF VALVE SETPOINTS SPO(l)
UPDATE 0557, 96-IR 97-02, 0685 IR 97 207 eel 96-201 33 6
Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 59 ACR: 96 USE OF BORAFLEX IN SFP RACKS (TECH SPEC AMEND.)
SPO(l) 0775,9124, NRM 0846 LER 96 33 60 ACR:96-ANALYSIS OF SOV FAILURE MODES DUE TO MOPD JII)
UPDATE 0718,0821 eel:96-09-16 IM96-03, 1R 97 207 61 UNIT 2 EQUIPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION (EEO) PROGRAM DRS CLOSED ACR: 7923 IR97 203 62 ACR: 13788 TSP BASKET SAFETY EVALUATION POSSISLY NOT VAUD SPO(l)
CLOSED IR: 97 02 63 ACR:96-0396 3MS$'MOV17D MISSED IST SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT DRP CLOSED 1R96-08 64 ACR: 08614 REACTOR PROTECTION LEAD LAG CIRCUITS MAY SE SET DRS CLOSED NONCONSERVATIVELY IR96 05 66 ACR: 96 SIL/SlH VALVES POWERED FROM NONSAFETY TRAIN SPO 0745, CA:97-NRR 742 LER: 96-36 66 ACR: 96-CCP AND CCE NON O COMPONENTS CAUSE O COMPONENTS SPO(l) 0483 NOT TO FAIL SAFE 67 ACR: 96-880 POSSISLE OVERLOAD IN EVENT OF AN SIS ACTUATION &
SPO(l)
UPDATE 0621 DESIGN ISSUES NRR 1R 97 01 TAC No, M96064 URI: 96-201 14; IN 97 21 68 REVIEW ALLEGATIONS FOR RESTART ISSUES SPO (L)
SPO (1) 69 REVIEW ALL OPERABILITY DETERMINATIONS AND BY PASS SPO (1)
JUMPERS BEFORE RESTART 70 URI: 96 REVIEW TRM FOR TECH SPEC. INTERPRETATIONS: EVALUATE DRS-UPDATE 16 TS AND OPER. LICENSE ISSUES. REVIEW MODIFICATIONS FOR IR:97-02, LER: 96 002-OPERATOR ACTIONS AND USO. (REF. SIL 86)
IR:97 202 01, 96-37, 6R:97-96-38, 96-
- 203, 42, 96-43, IR 97-207 96-48, 96-51,97-04,97-07,97 18,97 19 and eel 96-201-05 7
Revised: 02/05/98
REFERENCE MILLSTONE UNIT 3 INSPECTION ITEM RESP STATUS 42 EEi; 96 201-QUALITY ASSURANCE RECORDS 10 SPO(1) 83 NU LETTER EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM DRS UPDATE (B161951, IR;96 09, 2/10/97 (INCLUDING ORGANIZATION / STAFFING / DOSE ASSESSMENT 1R 97 81, MC 0350 CAPABILITY)
ITEMS 97 202 C.2.2.g, h, C.3.1.m.
C.3.2.h: IFl:
95 36-01 84 MC 0350 SECURITY ISSUES CORRECTIVE ACTION DRS UPDATE ITEM C.3.1.1 eel: 96 1R:97 203 15, 97 01, 97 03-02, 97 03-03; U1 VIO:
96-09 20 85 ACR: 96-OTHER RSS AND RELATED DESIGN BASIS CONOERNS SPO (O)
UPDATE 496.497 l
NRR 1R:97-l 620,1078, 97 039,128, 202,97-409 203 LER: 97 03, 97 15,97-21: CR:97 1029; eel 97-202 09 86 CAL:1 97-OPERATOR LICENSING AND TRAINING (REF. SIL 70)
SPO(l)
UPDATE 010: CR:97-DRS IR: 97-0927 202,97-04 Revised: 02/05/98
l ENCLOSURE 4 MC-0350 - RESTART APPROVAL CHECKLIST ALL MILLSTONE UNITS b
MILLSTONE RESTART ASSESSMENT PLAN ENCLOSURE (4)
MILLSTONE UNIT ALL UNITS RESTART APPROVAL (MC0350)
The following items are considered applicable to the restart of all Millstone Units:
RESPONSlR!LITIES AND AUTHORITIES w
l lNEED l STATUS l RESP 4.01 Director. Snacial Prolacts Offica (SPol. Notifies the X
C
_ NRM Executive Director for Operations (EDO) and the Commission, as appropriate, of the NRC actions taken concerning shutdown plants and the proposed followup plan.
4.02 Director. Snacial Prole, cts Offica X
C DSPD a.
Discusses with the Deputy Executive Director for Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Regional Operations and Research, the Office of Enforcemerit (OE), and l
NRR, as appropriate,- the need for an order or confirmatory action letter (CAL) specifying the actions required of the licensee to receive NRC approval to restart the plant and the proposed followup plan, b.
Decides, in consultation with the NRR Associate X
C DSPO Director for Projects, whether this manual chapter applies to a specific reactor restart.
c.
In coordination with the NRR Associate Director for X
C DSPO Projects, decides whether to establish a Restart Panel.
d.
Develops a written Restart Assessment Plan, X
C RAP including a case-specific checklist, to assign responsibilities and schedules for restart actions and interactions with the licensee and outside organizations.
Revised: 02/05/98 c-
NEED STATUS RESP e.
Coordinates and implements those actions X
RAP prescribed in the Restart Assessment Plan that have t~en determined to be the Office of Special Project's responsibility. These include, when appropriate, interactions with State and local agencies and with regional offices of Federal
- agencies, f.
In conjunction with NRR, reviews and determines X
RAP the acceptability of licensee's action program.
Approves restart of the shutdown plant, following X
DSPO consultation with the EDO and the Director of NRR, and approval / vote by the Ccmmission.
4.03 Director SPO a.
Acts as the focal point for discussions within NRR X
DSPO to establish the appropriate followup actions for a plant that has been shut down.
4.04 Deputy Director, Licensing a.
Coordinates participation in followup conference X
calls and management discussions to ensure that the Director SPO is riirectly involved, when appropriate, in followup action.
b.
Coordinates and implements actions prescribed in X
DSPOL the Restart Assessment Plan that have been determined to be Licensing's responsibility. These include, where applicable, appropriate NRC Office or NRR Division interaction with other Federal agencies (e.g., Federal Emergency Management Ager.cy (FEMA), Department of Justice (DOJ))
pursuant to any applicable Memoranda of Understanding.
2 Revised: 02/05/98
l
.l l STATUS l RESP NEED B.1-INITIAL NRC RESPONSE NA The facts, the causes, and their apparent impacts should be established early in the process. This information will assist the NRC in characterizing the problems, the safety significance, and the regulatory issues. Early management appraisal of the situation is also important to ensure the proper immediate actions are taken. The following items should have been completed or should be incorporated into the CSC as appropriate. Refer to Section 5.02 of this manual chapter for additional information, s.
Initial notification and NRC management discussion NA of known facts and issues b.
Identify /impisment additionalinspections (i.e. AIT, NA IIT, or Special) (Region).
c.
Determine need for formal regulatory response (i.e.
NA order or CAU.
d.
Identify other parties involved (i.e., NRC NA Organizations, other Federal agencies, industry organizations).
3 Revised: 02/05/98
l l NEED l STATUS l RESP B.2 NOTIFICATIONS NA initiril notification of the event quickly communicates NRC's understanding of the event and its immediate response to the parties having an interest in the event.
Notification to regional and headquarters offices of cognizant Federal agencies may be appropriate. As the review process continues, additional and continuing notifications may be required.
a.
Issue Daily and Directors Highlight (NRR).
.NA-b.
Issue preliminary notification (Region).
NA Conduct Commissioner assistants' briefing.
NA c.
d.
Issue Commission paper (NRR).
NA Cognizant Federal agencies notified (i.e., FEMA, -
NA e.
f.
State and local officials notified (Region).
NA g.
Congressional notification (NRR)
NA B.3 ESIABLISH AND ORGANI2E THE NRC REVIEW PROCESS C.
RAP s.
Establish the Restart Panel.
-X b.
Assess available information (i.e. inspection X
C RAP-results, licensee self assessments, industry reviews).
c.
Obtain input from involved parties both X
RAP within NRC and other Federal agencies such as FEMA, EPA, DOJ.
j d.
Conduct Director SPO briefing.
X C
RAP Conduct NRR Executive Team briefing X
C RAP e.
(NRR).
f.
Develop the casa-specific checklist (CSCs.
X C
RAP g.
Develop the Restart Assessment Plan.
X-C RAP h.
Director SPO approves Restart Assessment X
C osPo Plan.
4 Revised: 02/05/98
NEED STATUS RESP l.
NRR Director approves Restart Assessment X
C DNRR Plan.
J.
Implement Restart Assessment Plan.
X RAP k.
. Modify order as necessary X
NMR B.4 l REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION l
l l
B.4.1 Root Caunan and Corrective Actions OSTI a.
Evaluate findings of the special team X
inspection.
b.
Licensrs performs root cause analysis and X
NU develops corrective action plan for root OSTI causes.
c.
NRC evaluates licensee's root cause X
RAP determination and corrective action plan.
oSTI B.4.2 B.4.2 Annmanment of Emulomant Damana NA For events where equipment damage occurs, a thorough assessment of the extent of damage is necessary. A root cause determination will be necessary if the damage was the result of an internal event. The need for independent NRC assessment should be considered. The licensee will need to determine corrective actions to repair, test, inspect, and/or analyze affected systems and equipment.-
These actions are required to restore or verify that the equipment will perform to design requirements. Equipment modifications may also be required to ensure performance to design requirements.
Potential offsite emergency response impact for external events such as natural disasters, explosions, or riots should be considered. NRR should obtain information from FEMA headquarters reaffirming the adequacy of State and local offsite emergency plans and preparedness if an event raises reasonable doubts ebout emergency response capability.
5 Revised: 02/05/98
N*.ED STATUS RESP a.
Licenses assesses damage to systems and NA components, b.
NRC evaluates licensee damage assessment.
NA c.
Licensee determines corrective actions.
NA i
d.
NRC evaluates corrective actions.
NA I
B.4.3 Determine Restart issues and ResolutinD X
RAP The establishment of the restart issues that require resolution before restart demands a clear understanding of the issues and the actions required to address those issues by both the NRC and the licensee. This section outlines steps to determine the restart issues and NRC's avaluation of their resolution, Review / evaluate licensee generated restart issues.
X RAP s.
b.
_ independent NRC identifi:ation of restart issues X
C RAP c.
NRC/ licensee agreement on restart issues.
X C
RAP d.
Evaluate licensee's restart issues implementation X
C RAP
- process, e.
Evaluate licensee's implementation verification X
SRI process.
B,4.4 Qhia]p Comrnania Since some shutdowns involve a broad number of issues, solicitation of comments from divers", sources may be appropriate. The deelslon to solicit comments from a l group and the level of participation should be made on a case by esse basis, input from these groups should be factored into the restart process when they contribute positively to the review. Note: If needed, comments concerning the adequacy of state and local emergency planning and preparedness must be obtained from FEMA headquarters through NRR.
a.
Obtain public comments.
gap l
X j
C 6
Revised: 02/05/98
,s
NEED STATUS RESP b.
Obteln comments from State and Local X
C Realonel Officials (Region).
)
c.
Obtain comments from applicable Federal X
C RAP agencies.
B.4.6 Clomeout Ach When the actions to resolve the restart issues and significant concerns are substantially complete, closeout actions are needed to vtstity that planned inspections and verifications are complete. The licensee should certify that corrective actions required before restart are complete and that the plant is physically ready for restart. This sectiori provides actions associated with comoletion of significant NRC reviews and preparations for restart.
gap osTi a.
Evaluate licensee's restart readiness self assessment.
X b.
NRC evaluation of applicable items from Section C X
RAP "lSSUES" complete, c.
Restart issues closed.
X RAP f
^STI d.
Conduct NRC restart readiness team inspection.
X
.1 issue augmented restart coverage inspection plan.
X ll e,
f.
Corr.monts from ottier parties considered.
X RAP g.
Determine that all conditions of the Order / CAL are X
RAP /DRS satisfied, h.
Re review of Graeric Restart Checklist complete.
X RAP sri 7
Revised: 02/C5/98
I NEED STATUS RESP 8.5 RESTART AUTHOR 17ATION 1R.51 When the restart review process has reached the point that the issues have been identifisd, corrected, and rev)ewed, a restert authorization process is begun. At this point the Restert Panel should think broadly and ask: "Are i
all actions subster.tlally complete? Have we overlooked l
any items?"
a.
Prop.
iestart recommendation document and basis for restart.
X RAP b.
NRC Restart Panel recommends restart X
.e c.
No restart objections from other applicable HQ X
Dspot offices.
d.
No restart objections from appl; cable Federal X
- agencies, e.
DSPO concurs in restart recommendation X
DSP0 f.
NRR Director concurs in restart recommendation.
X DSPOL g.
EDO concurs in restart recommendation when X
- required, h.
Conduct ACRS briefing when requested (NRR).
X sPo I.
Conduct Commission briefing when requested.
X DSPO j.
Commission approves restart.
X COMM k.
DSPO authorizes restart.
X Dseo B.6 RESTART AUTHORIZATION NOTIFICATION (R.8)
Notify the applicable parties of the restart authorization.
Notifications should generally be made using a memorandum or other format consistent with the level of formality required. Communication of planned actiens is important at this at see to ensure that NRC intentions are a:learly understood, s.
Commission (if the Commission did not concur in the Restart Authorization or as requested) (NRR).
NA RAP b.
EDO (if the EDO did not concur in the restart NA EDO recommendation or as requested) (NRR).
c.
Congressional Affairs (RAP).
X ocA 8
Revised: 02/05/98
NEED STATUS REOP d.
ACRS ta briefing may be substituted for the written X
SPo i
notification if the ACRS requests a briefing) (NRR).
e.
Applicable Federal agencies.
X RAP f.
Public Atfairs.
X oPA g.
State and local of ficials.
X sto h.
Citizens or groups that expressed interest during X
RAP the restart approval process.
l.
Issue staff concerns memorandum.
X RAP C.1.1 Root Cause Annanament Conditions requiring the shutdown are clearly X
C RAP a.
understood, b.
Root causes of the conditions requiring the X
C RAP shutdown are clearly understood, c.
Root causes of other significant problems are X
C RAP clearly understood, d.
Effectiveness of the root cause analysis program.
X 40500 RAP
_C.1.2 Damage Assessment a.
Damage asseo, ment was thorough and NA comprehensive, b.
Corrective actions clearly restored systems and NA equipment or verified they can perform as designed.
C.1.3 Corrective Actions Thoroughness of the corrective action plan X
RAP a.
b.
Completeness of corrective action programs for X
SRI specific root ceuses.
Control of correcti're action item tracking.
X SRI c.
osTI d.
Effective corrective actions for the conditions X
SRI requiring the shutdown have been implemented.
osTI Effective corrective actions for other significant X
SRI e.
problems have been implemented.
Osi c p 9
Revised: 02/05/98
NEED status RESP f.
Con 'l of long term corrective actions.
X SRI OSil 40600 p.
Effectiveness of the corrective action verification X
sR process.
OsTl 40600 C.1.4 Self Annanament Canability The occurrence of an event may be Indicative of potential weaknesses in the licensee's self assessment capabilitv. A strong self assessment capability creates an environment where problems are readily identified, prioritized, and trackect. Effective corrective actions require problem root cause identification, solutions to correct the cause, and verification methods that ensure the issue is resolved.
Senior licensee management effectiveness in ensuring effective self assessment is treated separately.
a.
Effe<:tiveness of Quality Assurance Program.
X RAP 40500 b.
Effectiveness of Industry Experience Review X
osTi Program.
40600 c.
Effectiveness of licensee'a 8-dependent Review X
SRI Groups.
osT og d.
Effectiveness of deficiency reporting system.
X SRI OsTi 40n0 e.
Staff willingness to raise concerns.
X SPO(L)
RAP f.
Effectiveness of PRA usage.
X osTi g.
Effectiveness of commitment track'ng program.
X sri RAP h.
Review applicable external audits X
osTi 1.
Quality of 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73 reports.
X SRI C.2.1 Mank amant Oversloht and Effectivanaan a.
Goals / expectations communicated to the staff.
X osTi 40500 b.
Demonstrated expectation of adherence to X
SRI procedures.
OsTI 10 Revised: 02/05/98
NEED STATUS RESP c.
Management involvement in self assessment X
RAP and independent self assessment capability 40500 d.
Effectiveness of management review committees.
X SRI oSil 4050o l
e.
Mana;;ement's demonstrated awareness of X
SRI day tn day vperational concerns.
osTI f.
Management's ability to identify and prioritize X
SRI significant issues, osT g$ 9 g.
Management's ability to coordinate resolution of X
SRt significant issues.
osTi 4o5o0
)
h.
Management's ability to implement effective X
SRI corrective actions.
08T8 40500 C.2.2 Manmoement Suonort a.
impact of sny management reorganization.
X RAP 4050o b.
Effective and timely resolution of employee X
RAP Concerns.
c.
Adequate engineering support as demonstrated by X
DRS timely resolution of issues, osTI d.
Adequate plant administrative procedures.
X SRI 40500 oSTI e.
Effective Information exchange with other utilities.
X SRI OSTI f.
Participation in industry groups.
NA 40500 g.
Effectiveness of Emergency Response X
DRs Organization.
h.
Coordination with offsite emergency X
DRS planning officials.
e--
C.3.1 Assessment of Staff RAP a.
Demonstrated commitment to achieving X
SRl y
improved performance.
b.
Demonstrated safety conselousness.
X osTI SRI c.
Understanding of management's expectations and X
osTI goals.
40500 11 Revised: 02/05/98
' NEED STATUS l RESP d.
Understanding of plant issues and corrective X
osil i
actions.
'9500 e.
Qualifications and training of the staff.
X osTI 41600 f.
Staff's fitness for duty.
NA g.
Attentiveness to duty.
X OsTI h.
Level of attention to detall.
X osTI l.
Off hour plant staffing.
X SRI J.
Staff overtime usage.
X SRI k.
Procedure usage / adherence.
X SRI l
OSTI 1.
Awareness of plant security.
X DRs Understanding of offsite emergency planning X
ons m.
issues.
C.3.2 Assessment of Cornorate Sunnott and Site Enoineering Suoport X
OSTI Corporate staff understanding of plant issues, a.
b.
Corporate staff site specific knowledge.
X osTI c.
Effectiveness of the corporate / plant interface X
OSTI meetings.
d.
Corporate involvement with plant activities.
X OSTI Effi.ctiveness of site engineering support.
X DRS e.
OSTI f.
Effectiveness of the site design modification X
ICAVP process.
OSTI g.
- Effectiveness of licensing support.
X RAP h.
Coordination with offsite emergency planning X
RAP officials.
C.3.3 Oneistor lamuan Licensed operator staffing meets requirements and a.
licensee goals.
X OSTI b.
Level of formality in the control room.
X osTI-SRI Effectiveness of control room simulator training.
X DRs c.
12 Revised: 02/05/g8 m
NEED STATUS RESP d.
Control room / plant operator awareness of X
osTI equipment status.
SRI e.
Adequacy of plant operating procedures.
Procedure usage / adherence.
X SRI osTl g.
Log keeping practices.
X osti C4 ASSESSMENT OF PHYSICAL READINESS OF THE PLANT a.
Operability of technical specification systems.
X osit b.
Operability of required secondary and support X
osTI systems.
c.
Results of pre startup testing.
X sPo osTl d.
Adequacy of system lineups.
X osTI e.
Adequacy of surveillance tests / test program.
X osTI f.
Significant hardware issues resolved (i.e. damaged X
osTi equipment, equipment ageing, modifications).
g.
Adequacy of the power ascension testing program.
X osTI SRI h.
Effectivnness of the plant maintenance program.
X osTi DRs 1.
Maintenance backlog managed and impact X
osT on operation assessed.
J.
Adequacy of plant housekeeping and equipment X
oSTI storage.
C5 ASSESSMENT OF COMPLlANCE WITH REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS a.
Applicable license amendments have been issued.
X RAP b.
Appliceble exemptions have been granted.
X RAP c.
Applicable reliefs have been granted.
X RAP d.
Imposed Orders have been modified or rescinded.
X RAP e.
Significant enforcement issues have been resolved.
Allegations have been appropriately addressM.
X gP PE 13 Revised: 02/05/98
NEED STATUS RESP g.
10 CFR 2.206 Petitions have been appropriately X
NRR addressed.
b.
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board hearings have NA been completed.
C.6 COORDINATION WITH INTERESTED AGENCIESM PARTIES a.
Federal Emergency Management Agency X
DRS b.
Environmental Protection Agency X
RAP c.
Department of Justice X
OE l
01 DSPO d.
Department of Labor X
OE e.
Appropriate State and local officials X
SLO f.
Appropriate public interest gre'aps X
RAP g.
Local news media X
OPA 14 Revised: 02/05/98
I 1
l l
ENCLOSURE 5 LICENSING AMENDMENT REQUESTS m.
LICENSING ISSUES REQUIRED FOR RESTART MILLSTONE UNIT 1 No.
TAC No.
Issue i
status 1
M94258 standby Gas T:eatment system Waiting for RAI response.
Licensee may revise significantL 2
M96062 Safety / Relief Valve Electrical Design Waiting for RAI response.
Modification 3
M97934 Response Time Testing Licensee Amendment issued Clarification / Modification 10/22/97 4
M98833 Neutron Monitoring Licensee Amendment issued 10/27/97 Note: The licensee indicated that at leas'. one additional licensing action will be needed prior to restart.
Revised: 02/05/98
LICENSING ISSUES REQUIRED FOR RESTART MILLSTONE UNIT 2 No TAC No.
Issue Status 4
1 M97746 Meteorological Tower instrumentation (TS)
Withdrawn 11/25/97 Mode N/A 12/16/97CA (Completed Action)
?
M98277 Ultimate Heat Sink Temperature (TS)
Under Review PM Mode 4 3
M98347 Enclosure Building (TS) 09/30/97CA Mode 4 4
M94623 Containment isolation Valves List - Removal 11/19/97CA Mode 4 from TSs and surveillance requirements (TS)
I 5
M92879 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System UnderReview; RAI Mode 4 (TS) issued 11/25/97 6
M97680 EDG Fuel Oil Supply Adequacy (USQ)
UnderReview TS Mode 4 (License Amendment) 7*
ESFAS - Harsh Environment (TS)
Submit 02/01/98T-Mode 4 Need Vendor analysis 8
UnderReview TS Mode 4 9
M99503 Max. Containment Pressure Limit (TSs) 10/27/97CA Mode 4 10 M99504 Technical Specification - Verbatim Under Review - PM Mode 4 Compliance (TS) i 11 M94105 Steam Generator Blowdown Monitors (TS) 08/26/97CA Mode 4 12 M99609 Rx Trip Setpoints - SG Safety Valves (TS) 11/19/97CA Modes 1-3
- 3 Technical Specification - Safety Limit Curves Withdrawn Mode 2 (TS) 12/09/97CA (NRC Acknowledged 1/13/98 14 M97680 Siemans LOCA Analysis Eva uation (non TS) 07/23/97CA 15 M99268 S artup Rate Trip (non TS) 08/19/97CA 18 l M99296 Hydrogen Monitors - NUREG-0737 (non TS) 10/2S<97CA 2
Revised: 02/05/98
_---- J
17 M99613 RG 1.97 Core Exit Thermocouples (CETs)
UnderR3 view TS Power Supply Modifications (non TS) l 18 Exemption request Appendix R 02/02/95T-TS (20 foot separation requirement) 19 MA0251 Compliance for CEA Rod Drop Testing &
Under Review-PM Mode 2 Design Section Updates (TS) 20 M99614 ATWS Commitment Withdrawal (non TS)
UnderReview TS
, 21 Condensate Storage Tank Volume (TS) b22 Triandium Phnenhmte (TRP) Valuma (TR)
- This item is awaiting vendor analysis l
16 Amendment Requests (7 complete,6 under review, and 3 to be submitted).
6 Licensing Activities (4 complete #14/15/16/17; 1 under review #20; ito be submitted #18).
22 TotalLicensinglasues Revised: 02/05/98
LICENSING ISSUES REQUIRED FOR RESTART MILLSTONE UNIT 3 No.
TAC No.
Issue ttatus l
1 M92798 Modified MSIV surveillance and action Amendment No.136 statements (TS).
Issued 4/10/9' 2
M95469 Modified the description of the time constants Amendment No.134 associated with the OT and OP Delta T losued 3/10/97 calculations (TS).
3 M96054 SSO possible overload in event of ar. 18 Under staff review, actuation and design issues (SIL #67).
4 M96402 TIA issue involving the containment foundation Under staff review.
erosion (SIL #12).
5 M96773 TIA issue involving the number of required SW Under staff review.
pumps (SIL #75).
6 M97508 TIA issue involving the EDG exhaust stack Under staff review.
(SIL#i5).
7 M98288 Chan9ed AFW motor and tuMne-driven pump Amendment No.139 surveillances (TS).
Issued 5/29/97 8
M98289 Separated the required teethe of MOV thermal Amendment No.140 overload protection into 2 new surveillances issued 5/29/97 (TS).
9 M98415 Changed the RHR suction relief valve setpoint Amendment No.143 (TS).
Issued 7/10/97 10 M98455 Clarified the actions to be taken when an area Amendment No.141 temperature exceeds the limit (TS).
Issued 6/24/97 11 M98456 Changed the surveillance requirements for the Amendment No.142 hydrogen monitors (TS).
Issued 6/24/97 12 M98525 Requested changes to the charging and Si Withdrawn by licensee -
pump surveillances (TS).
10/15/97 13 M98630 Added valves that must be closed to provide Amendment No.144 flood protection (TS).
Issued 7/28/97 14 M98078 Overcurrent protection dev'ses. Relocated the Amendment No.153 300% and 150% circuit breaker test currents to issued 11/14/97
~
the Bases (TS).
15 M98679-Issue clarified the number of battery banks Amendment No.146 e required in Modes 5 & 6 (TS).
Issued 8/21/97 4
Revised: 02/05/98
16 M98680 lasue addressed selsmic qualification of the Withdrawn by licensee -
spent fuel racks (TS).
11/11/97 17 M98681 lesue corrected the wording associated with Amendment No.147 venting [he charging pumps (TS).
Issued 8/28'97 18 M98699 Will allow the SMM to be operable at a lower Under staff review, count rate (TS).
19 M98724 Revised the battery changer test requirements Amendment No.149 to equal to or Dreater than 132V (TS).
Issued 9/5/97 20 M98860 SlUSlH valves powered from nonsafety train Under sta# review.
(SIL #65).
21 M98866 lasue addressed the testing of the RSS pumps Withdrawn by licensee -
(TS).
10/15/97 22 M99016 Crohted a surveillance for the situation when Amendment No.145 the reactor trip breakers are closed (TS).
lasued 6/5/97 23 M99041 Table 2.2-1 Notes. Defined the terms (TS).
Amendment No.152 lssued 10/22/97 24 M99042 Revised the required volume in the DWST and Amendment No.150 CST (TS).
Issued 9/11/97 25 M99131 lasue involved the partial and full-stroking of Amendment No.148 MSIVs (TS).
Issued 9/3/97 26 M99132 issue involved manual CIVs that require Withdrawn by licensee -
intermittent operation in Modes 1-4 (TS).
10/3/97 27 M99261 lasue involved addMg a new TS and Bases for Amendment No.151 the SGARBVs (TS).
Issued 10/2/97 28 M99502 Proposes new pressure / temperature curves Under staff review.
(TS).
29 M99747 lasue involves manual CIVs that require Amendment No.154 Intermittent operation in Modes 1-4 (TS).
Issued 12/18/97 30 M99796 Change will affect rominal trip setpc!nts and Under staff review, allowable w 9 nr RTS and ESFAS Instrumentation Trip Setpoints (TS).
31 M99797 Changes the TS and bases description for Under staff review, pressurizerlevel(TS).
32 M99798 Changes ECCS pump surveillances to Under staff review.
reference the IST program (TS).
33 MA0070 lasue addresses seismic quaiification of the Under staff reviaw.
spent fuel racks (TS).
1 5
Revised: 02/05/98
I 34 MA0104 lesue ac' dresses the RHR interlock at 390 pela Under staff review.
(TS).
35 MA0273 TIA issue involving RSS and related design Under staff review basis conoems (SIL #14 85)
Totalissues: 35 Total Issues closed: 22 (18 amendments issued,4 mmendments whhdrawn)
Totalissues Open: 13 (7 amendments,6 SIL Nems) 4 Note: The licensee has indicated that N plans to submr 1 additional license amendment (Arcor) which Will be needed prior to restart.
a t
f 4
i 1
e 8
Revised: 02/05/98
.