ML20246E602
| ML20246E602 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/30/1989 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUREG-0420, NUREG-0420-S10, NUREG-420, NUREG-420-S10, NUDOCS 8905110311 | |
| Download: ML20246E602 (72) | |
Text
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NUREG-0420 Supplement No.10 Safety Evaluation Report
- related to the operation of
?Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Units No.1
! Docket No. 50-322
' Long Island Lighting Company L
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-Offico of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
- April 1989 w ussa n 8
- ssm, E
PDR I
_____m_____m_m_m___.m_ _ _.____ - - _ _ _ _.. _ _ _ _. _ _ _.. _. _ _ _,... _.
F AVAILABILITY NOTICE Availability of Reference Materlats Cited in NRC Publications Most documents cited in NRC publications will be available from one of the following sources:
1.
The NRC Public Document Room, 212L L Street, NW, Lower Level, Washington, DC 20555 2.
The Superintendent of Documents U.S. Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 37082 Washington, DC 20013-7082 3.
The National 'rechnical information Service, Springfield, VA 22161 Although the listing that follows represer? the majority of documents cited in NRC publica-tions, it is not intended to be exhaustiv3.
Referenced documents available for inspection and copying for a fee from the NRC Public.
Document Room include NRC correspondence and internal NRC memoranda: NRC: Office of Inspection and Enforcement bulletins, circulars, information notices, inspection and investi-gation notices Licensee Event Reports; vendor reports and correspondence: Commission papers; and applicant and licensee documents and correspondence.
The following documents in the NUREG series are available for purchase from the GPO Sales Program: formal NRC staff and contractor reports, NRC-sponsored conference proceed-
)
ings, and NRC booklets and brochures. Also available are Regulatory Guides, NRC regula-tions in the Code of Federal Regulations, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission issuances.
I Documents available from the National Technical Information Service include NUREG series reports and technical reports prepared by other federal agencies and reports prepared by the Atomic Energy Commission, forerunner agency to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Documents available from public and special technical libraries include all open literature items, such as books, journal and periodical articles, and transactions. Federal Register notices, federal and state legislation, and congressional reports can usually be obtained from these libraries.
Documents such as theses, dissertations, foreign reports and translations, and non-NRC coriference proceedings are agllable for purchase from the organization sponsoring the publication cited.
Single copies of NRC draft re,pc;rts are ovailable fxe, to the extent o' supply, upon written request to rho Office of Information Roaources Management, Distribution Section, U.S.
Nuulear Regdatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.
Copies of industry codes and standards used in a substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are maintained at the NRC Library, 7920 Norfolk Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland, and are available there for r6ference use by the public. Coder and standards are usually copy-righted and may be purchaseo from the originating orgartization cr, if they are American National Standards, from the American National Standards Institute,1430 Broadway.
_ New York, NY 10018.
1 NUREG-0420 Supplement No.10 1
\\
Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation of Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Units No.1 Docket No. 50-322 Long Island Lighting Company U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation April 1989 l
ABSTRACT Supplement 10 (SSER 10) to the Safety Evaluation Report on Long Island Lighting Company's application for a license to operate the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, located in Suffolk County, New York, has been prepared
{
by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory l
Commission. This supplement addresses several items that have been reviewed by the staff since the previous supplement was issued.
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Shoreham SSER 10 iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ABSTRACT.............................................................
111 ABBREVIATIONS.........................................................ix 1
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DISCUSSION.............................
1-1 1.1 Introduction...............................................
1-1 1.7 Outstanding Issues......................................... 1-2 3
DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT AND SYSTEMS......... 3-1 3.10 Dynamic Qualification of Seismic Category I Mechanical and Electrical Equipment.......................................
3-1 3.10.2 Exemption Request................................... 3-1 l
3.11 Environmental Qualification of Electrical and Mechanical Equipment..................................................
3-1 1
4 REACT 0R........................................................ 4-1 4.2 Fuel System Design......................................... 4-1 4.2.3 Design Evaluation.................................. 4-1 4.2.3.14 Control Blade Stress Corrosion Cracking.......... 4-1 5
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND CONNECTED SYSTEMS....................
5-1 5.2 Integrity of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary............. 5-1 5.2.7 ' Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Inservice
. Inspection and Testing.............................. 5-1 6
ENGINEERED S AFETY FEATURES...................................... 6-1 6,2 C on t a i nme n t Sy s tems........................................ 6 -1 6.2.3 Containment Isolation System......................
6-1 8
ELECTRIC P0WER................................................... 8-1 8.3 Onsite Power System........................................ 8-1 8.3.1 Alternating Current Power Systems................... 8-1 8.3.1.2 Discussion........................................ 8-1 8.3.1.2.5 Qualified Load (Procedures and Training)........ 8-1 Shoreham SSER 10 v
f~;
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
Page 9
AUXILIARY SYSTEMS............................................... 9-1 9.5 Fire Protection System.....................................
9-1 13 CONDUCT OF 0PERATIONS........................................... 13-1 13.1 Organizational Structure of Applicant.....................
13-1 13.1.5 Shift Crew Composition.............................
13-1 13.1.5.1 Operating Experience on Shift................. 13-1
- 13. 3 ' Eme rg en cy P l a n n i n g........................................ 13 -1 13.3.1 Onsite Emergency Preparedness Evaluation.........................................
13-2 13.3.2 Offsite Emergency Preparedness Evaluation.........................................
13-3 13.3.3 Conformance With Emergency Planning Rule 10 CFR 50.47(C)(1)............................
13-4 13.3.4 Review Assumptions for Utility--
Prepared Off s i te Emergency Plans................... 13-5 13.3.5 Offsite Emergency Plan Changes Directed by the Licensing Boards...................
13-8 13.3.5.1 Schools and the EPZ Boundaries................
13-9 13.3.5.2 Training................................
...... 13-9 13.5.5.3 Emergen cy Pla nn ing Brochure................... 13-10 13.3.5.4 Evacuation................
................... 13-10 13.3.5.5 Central Suffolk Hospital and j
Reception Centers fer Special l
Care Facilities...............................
13-11
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13.3.5.6 Schools.......................................
13-11 13.3.5.7 Strike by LILCO Employ 6es......
.............. 13-12 13.3.5.8 Thyroid Moni toring Procedures................. 13-12 13.3.6 EPZ Review Requested by the Commission............. 13-13 Shoreham SSER 10 vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)
Page 13.3.7 Director's Findings on Emergency Planning Contentions............................... 13-14 13.3.8 Conclusions........................................ 13-14 13.7 Security..................................................
13-15 13.7.2 Miscellaneous Anendments and Search Req u i reme n t s....................................... 13 -15 13.7.2.1 Background.................................. 13-15 13.7.2.2 Personnel Search............................ 13-15 13.7.2.3 Vi tal Area Acce s s.......................... 13-16 13.7.2.4 Lo c ks a nd Key s.............................. 13 -16 13.7.2.5 Eme rg e n cy A c ce s s............................ 13 -16 13.7.2.6 Protection of Secondary Power Supplies...... 13-16 13.7.2.7 Vital Area Entry / Exit Logging............... 13-17 13.7.2.8 Conclusion..................................
13-17 14 INITIAL TEST PR0 GRAM............................................
14-1 15 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS...............................................
15-1 15.3 AnticipatedTransientWithoutScram(ATWS)................15-1 1
15.3.1 Salem ATWS Event................................... 15-1 4
17 QUALITY ASSURANCE...............................................
17-1 17.7 Independer,t Design Review............
.................... 17-1 17.7.4 Conclusions........................................
17-1 22 TMI-2 REQUIREMENTS..............................................
22-1 I. A.1.1 - S h i f t Te chn i ca l Adv i sor............................... 22-1 i
I.D.1 - Detailed Control Room Design Review..................... 22-1 1
1.D.2 - Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS).................. 22-1 II.B.3 - Postaccident Sanpling Capab ili ty....................... 22-1 Shoreham SSER 10 vii
TABLEOFCONTENTS(continued)
Page 22.6 Regula tory Gu ide 1.97, Rev ision 2......................... 22-2 22.7 Upgrade Emergency Operating Procedures (E0P)............... 22-2 23 CONCLUSIONS.....................................................
23-1 APPENDIX A LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 9, 1988 FROM GRANT D. PETERSON, (FEMA)
TO VICTOR STELLO, JR. (NRC), FORWARDING FEMA'S EVALUATION OF-LILC0'S JUNE 7-9, 1988 EMERGENCY OFFSITE EXERCISE.
1989, FROM DENNIS H. KWIATHOWSKI HEMORANDUM DATED MARCH 17,(NRC),
SUBJECT:
APPENDIX B r
(FEMA) TO FRANK J. CONGEL FEMA SUPPORT FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSING PROCESS FOR THE SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION.
APPENDIX C RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESOURCES FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN NEW YORK STATE AND SUFFOLK COUNTY-PLANS l
Shoreham SSER 10 viii
ABBREVIATIONS ATWS anticipated' transient (s) without scram j
BWR boiling-water reactor l
CFR Code of Federal Regulations DCRDR detailed. control room design review EBS emergency broadcast system ECCS emergency core cooling. system EDG emergency diesel generator E0P emergency operating procedure EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPZ emergency planning zone ETE evaluation time estimate FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report GDC-general design criterion ISI inservice inspection LER0 Local Emergency Response Organization LILCO.
Long Island Lighting Company (licensee)
LOCA loss-of-coolant accident LPCI low-pressure coolant injection NYSWP New York State Warning Point NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OL.
operating license PGP procedures generation package RCIC reactor core isolation cooling RG regulatory guide R0 reactor operator SER Safety Evaluation Report SGER Safeguards Evaluation Report SNPS Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 50P standard operating procedure SPDS safety parameter display system SRV safety relief valve SSER Safety Evaluation Report Supplement STA shift technical advisor USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report L
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Shoreham SSER 10 ix
1 INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL DISCUSSION 1.1 Introduction The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Safety Evaluation Report (SER) (NUREG-0420) on the application by Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO, or licensee) to operate the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station was issued by the Nuclear Regulatory
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Commission staff (NRC staff / staff) on April 10, 1981. Supplement 1 (SSER 1) to l
the Shoreham SER was issued in September 1981; SSER 2 was issued in February 1982;
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SSER 3 was issued in February 1983; SSER 4 was issued in September 1983; SSER 5 l
was issued in April 1984; SSER 6 was issued in July 1984; SSER 7 was issued in September 1984; SSER 8 was issued in December 1984 and SSER 9 was issued in December 1985. On December 7, 1984, The Commission issued a license authorizing fuel loading and cold criticality testing of the reactor. On July 3, 1985, the Commission issued a license authorizing low-power testing at up to 5 percent of rated power.
The section in this SSER 10 is numbered the same as the section of the SER that is being updated. The discussions in this report are supplementary to and not in lieu of the discussions in the SER, except where specifically noted.
Copies of this report are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 2120 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555 and at the Shoreham-Wading River Public Library, Route 25A, Shoreham, New York 11786.
Copies are also available for purchase from the source indicated on the inside l
front cover. The NRC documents and other project-related documents cited in this report are available as described on the inside front cover.
The NRC Project Manager assigned to the operating license (0L) application for Shoreham is Stewart Brown.
He may be contacted by calling (301) 492-7000 or writing to the following address:
Division of Reactor Projects I/II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 This supplement is a product of the NRC staff. The following NRC staff members and consultants participated in its preparation:
NRC Staff R. Hogar - Emergency Preparedness Specialist E. McPeek - Reactor Security Specialist j
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1 Shoreham SSER 10 1-1
i 1.7 Outstanding Issues In Section 1.7 of the SER, the NRC staff identified 61 outstanding issues that were not resolved at the time of issuance of the SER. This report discusses the resolution of the'two remaining of these items previously identified as I
open. The items identified in Section 1.7 of the SER are' listed below, with the status of each item.
If the item is discussed in this supplement, the section where the item is discussed is identified.
Item Status Section (1)
Pool dynamic loads Resolved (2)
Masonry walls Resolved.
(3)
Piping vibration test program - small Resolved bore piping / instrumentation lines (4)
Piping vibration test program -
Resolved safety-related snubbers (5)
LOCA loadings on reactor vessel Resolved supports and internals (6)
Downcomer fatigue analysis Resolved (7)
Piping functional ccpability criteria Resolved (8)
Dynamic qualification Resolved 3.10 (9)
Environmental qualification Pesolved 3.11 (10)
Seismic and LOCA loadings Resolved (11)
Supplemental ECCS calculations with Resolved NUREG-0630 model (12)
ODYN - Generic Letter 81-08 Resolved (13)
NUREG-0619 - feedwater nozzle and Resolved 3
control rod return line cracking -
Generic Letter 81-11 (14)
Jet pump holddown beam Resolved (15)
Inservice testing of pumps and valves Resolved (16)
Leak testing of pressure isolation Resolved valves (17)
SRV surveillance program Resolved (18)
NUREG-0313 Resolved Shoreham SSER 10 1-2
Item Status Section (19)
Preservice inspection Resolved (20)
Appendix G - IV.A.2.a Resolved (21)
Appendix G - IV.A.2.c Resolved
-(22)
Appendix G - IV.A.3 Resolved (23)l Appendix G - IV.B Resolved (24)~
Appendix H - II.C.3 b Resolved (25)
RCIC Resolved (26)
Suppression pool bypass Resolved (27)
Steam condensation downcomer lateral Resolved loads-(28)
Steam condensation oscillation and Resolved-chugging loads (29)
Quencher air clearing load Resolved (30)-
Drywell pressure history Resolved (31)
Impact loads on grating Resolved (32)
Steam condensation submerged drag Resolved loads (33)
Pool temperature limit Resolved (34)
Quencher arm and tiedown loads Resolved (35)
Containment isolation Resolved (36)
Containment purge system Resolved (37)
Secondary containment bypass Resolved leakage (38)
Fracture prevention of contairement Resolved pressure boundsry (39)
Emergency procedures Resolved (40)
LOCA asialyses Resolved a
(41)
LPCI diversion Resolved
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Shoreham SSER 10 1-3 l
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Item Status Section (42)
Flow meter Resolved (43)
Loss of safety function after reset Resolved (44)
Level measurement errors Resolved (45)
Fire protection Resolved (46)
IE Bulletin 79-27 Resolved (47)
Control system failures Resolved (48)
High-energy line breaks Resolved (49)
DC system monitoring Resolved (50)
Low and/or degraded grid Resolved voltage condition (51)
Fracture toughness of steam Resolved and feedwater line materials (52)
Management organization Resolved (53)
Emergency planning (onsite)
Resolved 13.3 (54)
Security Resolved (55)
Q-list Resolved (56)
Financial qualification Resolved (57)
THI-2 requirements:
Shift technical advisor Resolved 22(I.A.I.1)
Shift supervisor administrative Resolved duties Shift manning Resolved 13.1 Upgrade operator training Resolved Training programs - operators Resolved Organization and management Resolved l
Procedures for transients and Resolved accidents Shoreham SSER 10 1-4
L a
L r-Item Status-
-Section:
Shift relief an'd turnover. procedures Resolved Control room access Resolved Dissemination of operating Resolved experiences Verify correct performance of Resolved operating activities Vendor' review of procedures Resolved Emergency procedures Resolved Control room design review Resolved 22(I.D.1)
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- Training during low-power testing Resolved Reactor coolant system vents Resolved Plant shielding Resolved Postaccident sampling Resolved 22(II.B.3)
Degraded core training Resolved Hydrogen control Resolved Relief and safety valves Resolved Valve position indication Resolved Dedicated hydrogen penetrations Resolved Containment isolation dependability Resolved
. Accident-monitoring instrumentation Resolved 22.6 Resolved Resolved Resolved Resolved Resolved j
I Shoreham SSER 10 1-5 4
- Item Status Section Inadequate core cooling Resolved
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IE Bulletins Resolved Item 5 Resolved Item 10 Resolved Item 22 Resolved Item 23 Resolved Bulletins and Order Task Force Resolved Item 3 Resolved Item 13 Resolved l.
Item 16 Resolved Item 17 Resolved Item 18 Resolved Item 21 Resolved.
Item 22-Resolved Item 24 Resolved Item 25 Resolved Item 27 Resolved Item 28 Resolved Item 30 Resolved Item 31 Resolved Item 44 Resolved Item 45 Resolved Item 46 Resolved Emergency preparedness - shcrt term Resolved 13.3 Upgrade emergency support facilities Resolved Emergency preparedness - long term Resolved 13.3 Shoreham SSER 10 1-6 r
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Item Status Section Primary coolant outside containment-Resolved Improved iodine monitoring Resolved Control room habitability Resolved (58)
Reactor vessel materials toughness
' Resolved (59)
Control of. heavy loads -
Resolved Generic Letter 81-07 (60)-
Station blackout -
Resolved Generic Letter 81-04 (61)
Scram system piping Resolved (62)
Remote shutdown system Resolved with license condition (63)
Design verification Resolved (64)
Loose parts monitoring system Resolved (65)
Reactor building flooding Resolved (66)
Deepdraftpumps(IEBulletin79-15)
Resolved (67)
Reactor internal and core Resolved 3.10 support material (68)
GHOSH code Resolved (69)
LPCI annunciator Resolved (70)
Core spray logic Resolved (71)
Nearby industrial transportation Resolved and military facilities (72)
Instrument setpoints Resolved (73)
Physical separation in NSSS panels Resolved (74)
Salem ATWS Item 1 1 -
Resolved Post-trip review (75)
Emergency diesel generators Resolved with license conditions (76)
Solid radwaste treatment Resolved (77)
Physical Security Plan Resolved 13.7 i
Shoreham SSER 10 1-7
3 DESIGN OF STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, EQUIPMENT, AND SYSTEMS 3.10 Dynamic Qualification of Seismic Category I Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 3.10.2 Exemption Request License condition 2.C(14)(a) of the Shoreham low power license requires that prior to exceeding five percent of rated power, the licensee shall complete the qualification, documentation, and installation of:
(1) Radiation Monitoring System Panels (Mark 1D11*PNL-117A and B)
(2) Radiation Monitoring System Pumps (Mark 1D11*P-126. 134).
l LILC0 has completed the qualification, documentation, and installation of this equipment as documented in Inspection Report 50-322/89-01. The staff considers this issue resolved and the requirements of license condition 2.C(14)(a) satisfied.
License condition 2.C(14)(b) of the Shoreham low power license requires that prior to its use as an invessel storage area for irradiated fuel bundles, the l
licensee shall complete qualification and documentation for the invessel rack (F16-E006/1F16*FAK-09).
LILCO in its April 5, 1989 letter committed not to use the invessel storage area for irradiated fuel bundles until invessel rack has been qualified. Since use of this invessel rack prior to completing qualification would result in a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 2.
The staff finds this commitment acceptable and considers license condition 2.C(14)(b) unnecessary.
3.11 Environmental Qualification of Electrical and Mechanical Equipment License condition 2.C(8) of the Shoreham low power license requires that the licensee shall environmentally qualify all electrical equipment according to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.49, prior to November 30, 1985, except that the following equipment shall be environmentally qualified prior to December 31, 1985:
(a) Hydrogen Recombiner Power Panels (IT48*PNLO48 A, B) 1 (b) Hydrogen Recombiner Skids (1T48*RC002 A, B)
(c) Ventilation Damper Actuators (1T46*P00031 A, B, IT46* MOD 036 A, B, C 1T46* MOD 047A,B}
IT46*M00048 A, B LILCO has completed the modification required to bring these components into
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full compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 as documented in Inspection Reports j
50-322/85-43, 50-322/85-42 and 50-322/85-39. The staff considers the i
requirements of license condition 2.C(8) resolved.
Shoreham SSER 10 3-1 j
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4 REACTOR 4.2 Fuel System Design 4.2.3 Design Evaluation 4.2.3.14 Control Blade Stress Corrosion Cracking License condition 2.C(6) of the Shoreham low power license requires that within 30 days after plant startup following the first refueling outage, the licensee shall comply with items 1, 2, and 3 of IE Bulletin No. 79-26, Revision 1, " Boron Loss From BWR Control Blades," and submit a written response on Item 3.
LILCo in its April 10, 1989 letter committed to comply with Items 1, 2, and 3 of IE Bulletin No. 79-26, Revision 1, " Boron Loss From BWR Control Blades,"
and to submit a written response on Item 3 within 30 days after plant startup following the first refueling outage. The staff finds this commitment acceptable and considers license condition 2.C(6) unnecessary.
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Shoreham SSER 10 4-1
5 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM AND CONNECTED SYSTEMS 5.2 Integrity of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 5.2.7 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Inservice Inspection and Testing License condition 2.C(5) a and b of the Shoreham low power license requires the following:
a.
The initial inservice inspection program will be evaluated before the first refueling outage (reference SER Sections 5.2.7, 6.6; SSER 1 Sections 5.2.7, 6.6; SSER 4 Section 6.6).
i k
b.
The develop (ment of the Shoreham ISI program shall incorporate provisions involving 1) the use of Monticello-type techni intergranular stress corrosion cracking and (2) ques for the detection of an inspection program scope consistent with that in Section 5.2.3.2.1.3 of the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report for the Perry plant (Docket 50-440). The licensee shall also notify the NRC staff of any significant or substantive changes in the intended inspection program, and shall continue to evaluate and implement, where practicable, state-of-the-art improvements in scope or methods of implementing the ISI program.
(Section4.5.2,SSER7).
LILC0 submitted its initial inservice inspection (ISI) program by letter dated May(5)b.
17, 1985 in accordance with the requirements of license condition 2.C LILCO's ISI program is currently being reviewed by the staff to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50.559 The staff considers the requirement of license condition 2.C(5)a satisfied since the required ISI program was submitted. Also, since the SNPS ISI program is currently being reviewed by the staff to ensure compliance with 10 CFR 50.55g, the staff considers license condition 2.C(5)b unnecessary.
Shoreham SSER 10 5-1
l 6 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES 6.2 Containment Systems 6.2.3 Containment Isolation System License condition 2.C(11) of the Shoreham low power license requires that the licensee prior to start-up following the first refueling outage shall install two isolation barriers in series in all instrument lines penetrating containment that are not part of the automatic reactor protection system.
Proposals from the licensee on how this shall be accomplished as well as details on the necessary design changes, shall be submitted for NRC staff
)
review and approval.
l LILC0 in its April 5, 1989 letter committed to install the necessary isolation valves on all instrument lines penetrating containment that are not part of the automatic reactor protection system prior to start-up following the first l
refueling outage. LILCO also committed to subinitting the details of these proposed design changes to the NRC for review and approval prior to implementation.
Failure to complete these containment isolation system design modifications prior to start-up following the first refueling outage will result in non-compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 56. The staff finds this commitment acceptable and considers license condition 2.C(4) unnecessary.
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Shoreham SSER 10 6-1 1
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8 ELECTRIC POWER 8.3 Onsite Power System 8.3.1 Alternative Current Power Systems 8.3.1.2. Discussion 8.3.1.2.5 Qualified Load (Procedures and Training)
License Condition 2.C(12) of the Shoreham low power license requires that the i
licensee prior to operation at reactor power levels greater than 5 percent, I
shall complete, in a manner acceptable to NRC staff, the development of I
suitable procedures and training to minimize the likelihood of operator errors that could result in EDG overload.
LILC0 has~ completed the development of suitable procedures and training to minimize the likelihood of operator errors that could result in EDG overload as documented in Inspection Report 50-322/89-01. The staff considers this requirement satisfied.
Shoreham SSER 10 8-1
9 AUXILIARY SYSTEMS 9.5. Fire protection System License condition 2.C(3) of the Shoreham low power license requires that the licensee do the following:
a.
The licensee shall maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Fire Hazards Analysis Report and the Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Revision 33 and as approved in the SER through Supplement 3, subject to provisions b and c below.
b.
The licensee may make no change to features of the approved fire protection program which would decrease to the level of fire protection in the plant without prior approval of the Commission. To make such a change the licensee must submit an application for license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90.
c.
The licensee may make changes to features of the approved fire protection prog!am which do not decrease the level of fire protection without prior' Commission approval, provided:
(i) such changes do not otherwise involve a change in a license condition or technical specification or result in an unreviewed safety question (see 10 CFR 50.59)
(ii) such changes do not result in failure to complete the fire protection pregram approved by the Commission prior to license issuance.
The licensee shall naintain, in an auditable form, a current record of all such changes inc'uding an analysis of the effects of the change on the fire protection pogram and shall make such records available to NRC inspectors upon reque..t. All changes to th_e approved program made without prior Commission approval shall be reported annually to the Director of the Office of Nuclear Regulation together with supporting analyses.
The staff has determined tnat the requirements of this license condition should be reviewed to reflect current licensing criteria as specified in Generic Letter 86-10, " Implementation of Fire protection Requirements."
Shoreham SSER 10 9-1 J
l 13 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 13.1 Organizational Structure of Applicant 13.1.5 Shift Crew composition 13.1.5.1 Operating Experience on Shift License condition 2.C(15) of the Shoreham low power license requires that the licensee shall have a licensed senior operator on each shift who has had at least six months of hot operating experience on a same type plant, including at least six weeks at power levels greater than 20 percent of full power, and who has had start-up and shutdown experience. For those shifts where such an individual is not available on the plant staff, an advisor shall be provided who has had at least four years of power plant experience, including two years of nuclear plant experience, and who has had at least one year of experience on shift as a licensed senior operator at a similar type facility. Use of advisors who were licensed only at the R0 level will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Advisors shall be trained on plant procedures, technical specifications and plant systems, and shall be examined on these topics at a level sufficient to assure familiarity with the plant. For each shift, the remainder of the shift crew shall be trained in the role of the advisors. The training of the advisors and remainder of the shift crew, and the assignment of an advisor to each shift, shall be completed at least one week prior to exceeding five percent of rated power. The licensee shall at that time certify to the NRC staff the names of the advisors who have been exaniined and have been determined to be competent to provide advice to the operating shifts.
These advisors shall be retained until the experience levels identified in the first sentence above have been achieved. The NRC staff shall be notified at least 30 days prior to the date the licensee proposes to release the advisors from further services.
LILCO in its April 5, 1989 letter provided a commitment to ensure adequate operating staff experience. This commitment fully encompassed the requirements cf license condition 2.C(15). The staff finds this corrnitment acceptable and considers license condition 2.C(15) and Attachment 2 unnecessary.
13.3 Emergency Planning The Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) filed its most recent revision,(the Revision 9, of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS) Emergency Plan onsite phn) with the NRC on February 2,1989.
Previously, the staff reviewed and commented on earlier revisions of the onsite emergency plan. The staff's evaluation of onsite emergency planning and preparedness for Shoreham is discussed in Section 13.3.1.
Suffolk County and New York State have resolved not to participate in offsite emergency planning.
In the absence of State and local plans, the licensee has developed an offsite emergency plan for Shoreham, the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan (the LER0 plan).
The plan is to be implemented by the Local Emergency Response Organization l
(LERO) consisting of utility and contractor personnel with support from l
orgeizations such as the U.S Department of Energy, the U.S. Coast Guard, local hospitals, and various private bus, ambulance and service companies.
Shoreham SSER 10 13-1 A
I The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reviewed the LERO nlan through Revision 10, including an evaluation of the full-participation exercise conducted at Shoreham on June 7-9, 1988. Subsequently, FEMA reviewed the licensee's responses to the FEMA plan review and exercise assessment. The FEMA findings are presented in Section 13.3.2 of this report.
The Licensing Board had determined that there was nothing unique about the demography, topography, access routes, or jurisdictional boundaries in the area in which Shoreham is located, and that the record failed to reveal any basis to conclude that it would be impossible to fashion and implement an effective offsite emergency plan for the Shoreham plant. LBP-85-31, 22 NRC 410,427(1985). On September 23, 1988, the Licensing Board, in imposing the sanction of dismissal on the Interveners, reaffirmed its earlier determination LBP-88-24, 28 NRC 311, 369 (plan for Suffolk County could be implemented.
that an effective emergency 1988).
On March 3, 1989, the Commission, in CLI-89-02, dismissed the Interveners and terminated all proceedings in the Shoreham case. The Commission directed the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to evaluate each contention which remained outstanding as a result of the Commission decision and to report to the Commission on how each of these issues has been resolved.
In a report titled, " Director's Findings on Shoreham Emergency Planning Contentions," dated April 7, 1989, the Director concluded that each of the outstanding Shoreham emergency planning issues has been satisfactorily resolved. The staff's overall finding regarding the adequacy of onsite and offsite emergency planning and preparedness for Shoreham is provided in Section 13.3.8 of this report.
13.3.1 Onsite Emergency Preparedness Evaluation The Shoreham onsite emergency plan applies to the licensee's onsite emergency response organization and is supported by emergency plan implementing procedures.
The acceptance criteria used as the basis for the staff's review of the Shoreham onsite emergency plan are specified in Standard Review Plan, Section 13.3,
" Emergency Planning" (NUREG-0800) and include the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b), the requirements of Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50, and the specific guidance criteria of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," dated November 1980.
The licensee's onsite emergency plan was evaluated in SSER 1 (September 1981).
SSER 1 identified deficiencies requiring revisions or additional information, and the licensee responded by providing the required information. The staff reviewed the information and published its findings in SSER 3 (February 1983),
which identified open and confirmatory items not yet resolved. On the basis of a review of additional information provided by the licensee and the results of en NRC onsite emergency plan implementation appraisal, the staff concluded in SSER 7 (September 1984) that the state of onsite emergency preparedness provided reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency during fuel loading and low-power operations (up to 5 percent of rated power).
Shoreham SSER 10 13-2
The staff has reviewed onsite plan revisions through Revision 9, submitted since SSER 7 was issued, against the same requirements and guidance criteria identified in SSER 7.
Based on the staff's review of the changes to the onsite emergency plan through Revision 9, the stat f has determined that the changes are consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and do not decrease the effectiveness of the emergency plan.
In addition, the staff has observed onsite drills and exercises at Shoreham and conducted inspections of the licensee's emergency preparedness program. The staff concludes that the onsite emergency plan remains adequate and that there is reasonable assurance that it can and will be implemented in the event of an emergency at Shoreham.
13.3.2 Offsite Emergency Preparedness Evaluttion The licensee initially submitted its own utilit plan for radiological emergencies at Shoreham (y-prepared offsite emergencythe LER May 1983. The NRC forwarded the plan to FEMA with a request for FEMA to review the plan and provide findings and determinations in accordance with the NRC/ FEMA Memorandum of Understanding. The licensee subsequently submitted revisions to its plan, the latest being Revision 10 which was submitted on May 24, 1988. The NRC requested that FEMA review the plan revisions using the criteria and assumptions in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1 and, later, 1
Supplement 1* to that document. The NRC also requested that FEMA conduct a l
full-participation exercise of the LERO plan.
FEMA reviewed the LERO plan (through Revision 10) including an evaluation of the June 7-9, 1988 full-participation exercise conducted at Shoreham.
In a letter to the NRC dated September 9, 1988 (Appendix A), forwarding the FEMA review of Revision 10 of the LERO plan and the FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment report, FEMA concluded that although seven plan elements (out of 101 plan elements) were inadequately addressed in the plan, the exercise held on i
June 7-9, 1988, demonstrated adequate overall preparedness on the part of LERO personnel. Therefore, based on the evaluation of the plan and exercise, FEMA reached an overall firding of reasonable assurance for Shoreham offsite emergency preparedness.
FEMA's September 9, 1988 letter stated that its plan review and exercise evaluation were based on the assumptions embodied in the Commission's regulations that in ao actual radiological emergency, State and local officials who have declined to participate in emergency planning will exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public, and will cooperate with the utility and follow the utility emergency plan. The FEMA finding was also based on the assumption that State and local governments have sufficient resources to impicment those portions of the utility plan where State and local response is necessary. This latter assumption was developed by the NRC to assist FEMA in its review of utility-prepared offsite plans. The assumptions upon which FEMA's review was based are discussed further in Section 13.3.4.
On November 21, 1988, the licensee provided proposed corrections in response to the plan inadequacies and areas requiring corrective action identified in the FEMA review of Revision 10 of the offsite emergency plan and the FEMA
- Supplement 1 to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, issued in September 1988, developed in response to the NRC's amended " realism" rule 10 CFR 50.47(plans contains criteria for the review of utility-prepared offsite emergency c)(1) effective December, 3 1987.
Shoreham SSER 10 13-3
Post-Exercise Assessment. FEMA has reviewed the proposed changes and in a memorandum to the NRC dated March 17, 1989 (Appendix B), FEMA indicated that most of the responses (including the responses to five of the seven plan inadequacies) appear adequate subject to confirmation of their incorporation into the next plan revision. Some additional changes and information were requested by FEMA for the remaining plan and exercise issues. FEMA reaffirmed its continued support of its overall finding of reasonable assurance transmitted to the NRC on September 9, 1988.
13.3.3 Conformance With Emergency Planning Rule 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1)
The emergency planning regulations were amended (52 FR 42078, November 3, 1987) to provide criteria for the evaluation, at the operating license review stage, of utility-prepared emergency plans in situations in which State and/or local governments decline to participate in emergency planning.
10 CFR 50.47(c)(1) states, in part:
"Where an applicant for an operating license asserts that its inability to demonstrate compliance with...[NRC emergency planning] requirements...results wholly or substantially from the decision of state and/or local governments not to participate further in emergency planning, an operating license may be issued if the applicant demonstrates to the Commission's satisfaction that:
i The applicant's inability to comply with...[NRC emergency planning]
requirements...is w b 1ly or substantially the result of the non-participation of state and/or local governments, 11 The applicant has made a sustained, good faith effort to secure and retain the participation of the pertinent state and/or local governmental authorities, including the furnishing of copies of its emergency plan.
iii The applicant's emergency plan provides reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered by operation of the facility concerned. To make that finding, the applicant must demonstrate that, as outlined below, adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency. A utility plan will be evaluated against the same planning standards applicable to a state or local plan...with due allowance made both for--
(A) Those elements for which state and/or local non-participation makes compliance infeasible and (B) The utility's measures designed to compensate for any deficiencies resulting from state and/or local non-participation.
In making its determination on the adequacy of a utility plan, the NRC will recognize the reality that in an actual emergency, state and local government officials will exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public. The NRC will determine the adequacy of that expected response, in combination with the utility's compensating measures, on a case-by-case basis, subject to the following guidance.
In addressing the circumstance where applicant's inability to comply with the requirements...is wholly or sub-stantially the result of non-participation of state and/or local governments, l
i Shoreham SSER 10 13-4
1 it may be presumed that in the event of an actual radiological emergency state i
and local officials would generally follow the utility plan. However, this presumption may be rebutted by, for example, a good faith and timely proffer of an adequate and feasible state and/or local radiological emergency plan that would in fact be relied upon in a radiological emergency." (emphasis added)
On December 18,1987, LILC0 filed motions for summary disposition of the legal authority contentions, including a motion for the Licensing Board to find LILC0 to be in compliance with 950.47(c)(1)(i) and (ii) of the Commission's emergency planning rule insofar as the legal authority contentions are concerned. LILC0 l
asserted that it complies with paragraph (i) based on the overall factual record in this case and the Concluding Partial Initial Decision of the Board which found fatal flaws in LILC0's plan based on non-participation of the Governments.
LILC0 also claimed that it has made a sustained good faith effort to retain the cooperation of Suffolk County and to persuade the State to participate in emergency planning. Suffolk County, the State of New York and the Town of Southampton (" Interveners") opposed LILC0's motion claiming that LILC0's conduct was neither sustained nor in good faith and it was not designed to secure the Governments participation in emergency planning. The Board, after consideration of the views of LILC0 and Interveners, concluded (Order, March 3, 1988) that there are no material facts in dispute regarding whether LILC0 has net the tests specified in $50.47(c)(1)(1) and (ii) and granted summary disposition on those issues.
Regarding conformance with $50.47 (c)(1)(iii), the Licensing Board in its Concluding Initial Decision, LBP-88-24 (28 NRC 311, 385) September 23, 1988, found that LILC0's offsite emergency plan "provides adequate protective measures that can and will be taken in the event of an emergency and that any deficiencies in the plans resulting from New York State and Suffolk County lack of participation therein are not significant." The Board found that "the Utility's emergency plan supplemented by the best efforts responses of the State and County provide reasonable assurance that public health and safety is not endangered by the operation of the Shoreham facility." Further, the Board found that the LILC0 energency plan provisions for the legal authority contentions "are adequate in meeting the NRC's regulatory requirements, standards, and criteria as found in 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b) and (c)(1)(iii),
Appendix E, NUREG-0654 and Supp. 1."
13.3.4 Review Assumptions for Utility-Prepared Offsite Emergency Plans FEMA's evaluations of the 1988 exercise and Revisions 9 and 10 of the LERO plan were based upon three assumptions provided by NRC. These assumptions are that in an actual radiological emergency, State and local officials that j
have declined to participate in emergency planning will:
1 1)
Exercise their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public, 2)
Cooperate with the utility and follow the utility plan, and 3)
Have the resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility off site plan where State and local response is necessary.
The first two assumptions derive from 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1)(iii)(B) as shown above.
Regarding the first assumption, the NRC accepts, as an absolute given, the reality that in an actual energency, State and local governments will I
Shoreham SSER 10 13-5 i
)
exercise their "best efforts" to protect the health and safety of the public.
The secon: assumption concerning the rebuttable presumption that State and local officials in an actual emergency will generally follow the utility plan has not been successfully rebutted in the Shoreham case by a showing of any other way State and local officials will use their "best efforts" to protect the health and safety of the public.
The third assumption, concerning the sufficiency of resources, was provided to FEMA by the NRC to facilitate their review of utility-prepared offsite emergency plans. The following discussion supports the conclusion that, at Shoreham, the State and local governments have resources sufficient to implement those portions of the utility offsite plan where State and local response is necessary.
The Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan (the LERO plan) lists the State and County resources that might be used in an emergency. Because the LERO plan is basically a " stand-alone" plan, few State and local resources are identified and some of these are listed as optional, i.e., not required to implement the plan.
All of the State resources and capabilities referenced in the LERO plan are identified as optional except those associated with functions normally carried out on State roads (e.g., snow removal). The following are characterized in the LERO plan as " services that the State might provide": command and control, communications, evacuation, social services, public health and fire and rescue.
LERO would provide assistance to incorporate State resources into the LERO emergency response. LILC0 expects that New York State personnel will continue i
to perform normal functions, such as snow removal, on State roads within the i
EPZ, purnuant to New York Highway Law.
l 1
Under the County response, the LERO plan calls for active participation of the County Executive, the Commissioner of the Department of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services, the Commissioner of the Department of Health Services, and the Commissioner of Police consistent with their obligation under New York Executive Law. LILCO expects that Suffolk County personnel will continue to perform their normal response functions during an emergency in the areas of snow removal, fire safety, and police actions. LILC0 also expects that Nassau County will provide the Nassau County Veterans Memorial Coliseum and the Nassau Community College as relocation centers for school children, and the Nassau County Medical Center as a backup hospital for the treatment of contaminated injured evacuees. Nassau County police are expected to perform their normal funct'm i including directing traffic around the relocation centers.
The NRC staff reviewed the State and County (LILCO Discovery Exhibit 10)g the plans made available durin Shoreham OL-3 Licensing Board proceedings to determine whether there would be sufficient State and County resources to supplement the LER0 resources where they are relied upon in the LERO plan.
The following analysis details components of "The Emergency Operations Plan of the State of New York, County of Suffolk" (Suffolk plan) which are rele-vant to radiological emergency planning. The resources identified and the details of implementation demonstrate the breadth and depth of the County's planning for radiological and other emergencies.
Shoreham SSER 10 13-6
I i
The Suffolk plan represents an integration of their natural disaster and peacetime emergency response functions with their civil defense program.
It is part of the "New York Emergency Operations Plan." Heading the list of man-made disasters in the Suffolk plan are nuclear facility accidents.
Suffolk Plan The Suffolk plan states that ultimate responsibility for relief and recovery from disasters occurring in New York State rests with the Governor and, similarly responsibility for relief and recovery from disasters occurring within a political subdivision of the State rests with the chief executive or administrative head of that political subdivision. The Suffolk plan states that County and City Emergency Operating Centers have been or will be established by the appropriate chief executive. The Suffolk plan lists the lines of succession including addresses and phone numbers for the County Executive, Division of Emergency Preparedness, County Police, County Sheriff, Department of Public Works, Department of Health Services, Department of Social Services, Department of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services, Department of Law, County Clerk, Department of Labor, Planning Department, Departments of Probation, Agriculture, Parks and Recreation, and Elections, County Office for the Aging, Suffolk County Water Authority, Civil Air Patrol, Department of Audit and Control and ten townships. The Suffolk plan shows the interfaces between the County and Federal, State and volunteer agencies and among the County agencies. The County Charter, among other things, tasks the Division of Emergency Preparedness with locating and integrating with emergency service teams, all privately owned construction and health service equipment, all trained construction, radiological, health service and sanitation personnel and all public utility installation and maintenance personnel.
The Suffolk plan includes a Standard Operating Procedure for the Office of the County Executive (S0P) for use in the event of natural disasters, man-made disasters and nuclear attack. As in the overall plan, nuclear facility accidents head the list of man-made disasters in the S0P. The 50P lists responsibilities of key County individuals who would respond to an emergency.
In addition, the Suffolk plan contains a " Local Law To Amend County Charter,"
dated August 15, 1983, abolishing the Departments of Emergency Preparedness and Fire Safety and transferring their functions and the functions of the vocational education and extension board to a new Department of Fire, Rescue and Emergency Services. The department duties include, among other things:
(1) maintaining and operating the County Emergency Operations Center; l
(2) maintaining, operating and coordinating the use of the County Civil defense emergency communications network; (3) maintaining and conducting a daily j
operational check of the Suffolk County school alert warning system; (4) i maintaining operational liaison with the Salvation Arnty, Red Cross, private industry, Brookhaven National Laboratory, utility companies, National Guard Units, Civil Air Patrol, etc.; (5) securing and maintaining radiological monitoring equipment, and providing for the radiological training of sufficient volunteers to adequately cover the major radiological stations, when needed, in l
Suffolk County; (6) dispatching firefighters and fire fighting and emergency vehicles of the fire rescue service in the County on any call for assistance in the event of fire or other emergency and in the case of natural disasters as defined by law, and for any drills as training for such services; (7) keeping a Shoreham SSER 10 13-7 l
l
complete and current roster of all officers of all fire departments and fire districts, within the County; and (8) training the personnel of hospitals, nursing homes, schools, armed forces, civic groups, industry and County facilities in the areas of fire prevention, evacuation and other needed areas.
Resources Manual The "Suffolk County Resources" Manual supports the Suffolk plan with letters of agreement and the identification of specific resources, for example:
NYS Department of Transportation Equipment Inventory for Towns of Babylon, Brookhaven, East Hampton, Huntington, Islip, Riverhead, Smithtown, Shelter Island, Yaphank, Hauppauge, the Department of Parks and Recreation, Department of Public Works, including cars, trucks, snow plows, front-end loaders, chain saws, tractors, etc.
" Emergency Broadcast System (EBS) Procedures For The Nassau and Suffolk Counties New York EBS Operational Area" which includes the following statement in the introduction.
...This local EBS plan may be activated in response to such emergencies as nuclear generating plant accident or other occurrences which pose a widespread danger to life or property."
Iemphasis in original).
New York State Department of Transportation Region 10 Snow and Ice Control Manual (Nassau and Suffolk Counties)
" Commercial Snow Removal Services" listing including telephone numbers and locations and the addresses and members of contractors for snow equipment.
The plans for New York State and Suffolk County identify additional resources that could be used in response to an emergency, but that are not relied upon in the LERO plan. Details of these resources and the emergency responsibilities of County officials are contained in Appendix C.
The NRC staff concludes, based on a review of this information, that there are sufficient resources available to New York State and Suffolk County to implement those portions of the LERO plan that require State and County resources.
13.3.5 Offsite Emergency Plan Changes Directed by the Licensing Boards In its Partial Initial Decision on Offsite Emergency Planning issued April 17, 1985 (LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board decided all the matters before it except one (reception centers) and reserved making an overall finding until the record on the open issue was closed.
However, in its decision the Board directed that changes be made to certain details of the LERO plan. Sections 13.3.5.1 to 13.3.5.7 below discuss those changes and NRC staff verification that the required changes have been made.
In addition, in its Concluding Partial Initial Decision on Offsite Emergency Planning issued August 26, 1985 (LBP-85-31, 22 NRC 410), the Licensing Board directed an additional change to the LER0 plan. Section 13.3.5.8 discusses the staff verification of that change.
Shoreham SSER 10 13-8
13.3.5.1 Schools and the EPZ Boundaries Terryville l
The Board,:f rected that the 10-mile plume EPZ boundary be relocated to l
Terryville Road, a short distance west of Jayne Boulevard, the previous EPZ l
boundary, in order to include Comsewogue Senior High School and Terryville Elementary School both of which are located a few hundred yards outside the EPZ. LBP-85-12, 21 NRC at 704.
The NRC staff has verified that the licensee relocated the 10-mile plume EPZ boundary to Terryville Road and developed provisions for protective actions for the two schools that were incorporated into the offsite emergency plan and implementing procedures. Subsequent to the Board's decision, the Terryville Elementary School was closed and the plan is being revised to reflect this change.
Riverhead and Port Jefferson The Board found that the exclusion, from the 10-mile plume EPZ, of Pulaski Street Elementary School, Riverhead Junior High School, and Riverhead High School in Riverhead and Earl L. Vandermeulen High School in Part Jefferson constituted a failure to consider demographic conditions in determining the shape of the plume exposure EPZ and ordered that the schools be included in the EPZ. 21 NRC 705, 706.
The NRC staff has verified that the plan and procedures have been revised to include these schools in the EPZ, and to provide for protective action for these schools in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham.
13.3.5.2 Training The Licensing Board found that the LER0 plan training program meets the regulatory standards sub,iect to confirmation by a FEMA finding after a graded exercise that the plan can be satisfactorily implemented with the training program and that LILC0 possesses an adequate number of trained LERO workers.
21 NRC 756.
In its September 9, 1988 letter to the NRC transmitting the exercise assessment, FEMA stated that the exercise demonstrated adequate overall preparedness on the part of LERO personnel, and therefore, based on the evaluation of the plan and exercise, FEMA reached a finding of reasonable assurance th.at the plan can protect the health and safety of the public.
FEMA prefiled testimony for the now terminated 1988 exercise proceeding indicated that most participants are adequately trained to carry out their emergency roles and that the results of the 1988 exercise indicated that there has been substantial improvement in the training of LERO workers since the 1986 exercise. FEMA further concluded that any issues identified in the 1988 exercise related to LER0 worker training are the result of individual participant errors on the day of the exercise rather than the result of a defective training program.
FEMA Testimony at 70-71.
Shoreham SSER 10 13-9
With regard to the number of trained LERO workers, FEMA evaluated the ability to maintain staffing on a continuous, 24-hour basis by an actual shift change (Objective 34) at the LER0 Emergency Operations Center, the Emergency Operations Facility, the Emergency News Center, the Staging Areas, and the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility. At each facility, FEMA determined that the objective was met, that there were sufficient LERO workers for both a first and a second shift and that personnel were knowledgeable in their duties. PEA at 48, 58, 70, 73, 80, 86.
13.3.5.3 Emergency Planning Brochure The Licensing Board ordered that the radiation information section of the public information brochure be changed to include "information that radiation can cause injury or death." The Board also recommended "that information be included to the effect that a few hundreds of rem can cause acute illness or death and a few tens of rem can increase the risk of cancer or genetic change."
21 NRC at 769-770.
The NRC staff has reviewed the 1988 version of the Public Information Brochure and determined that the information described by the Board has been included and is both clear and succinct. The brochure specifically states that
" radiation at high levels can cause injury or death" and includes the biological effects that may occur after exposure to 0-10,000 millirem, 10,000-75,000 millirem, 75,000-200,000 millirem, 200,000-450,000 millirem and 450,000-1,000,000 millirem.
13.3.5.4 Evacuation RegardingShorehamevacuationtimeestimates(ETEs),theBoardfoundthat "LILCO should incorporate a reasonable summary of the results of its sensitivity analyses contained in KLD Tm-140 into Appendix A of the plan.
The results should be accompanied by brief text that alerts decisionmakers to the fact of uncertainty and the bounds of uncertainty in time estimates for a range of realistic accident scenarios." 21 NRC 794-95.
Procedure OPIP 3.6.1, Plume Exposure Pathway Protective Action Recommendations, contains a brief discussion on the uncertainty associated with evacuation time estimates and the fact that the estimates are sensitive to such factors as evacuee compliance with recommended routes and shadow evacuation traffic beyond the EPZ. A summary titled, " Evacuation Time Estimate Sensitivity Study," is included as an attachment to the procedure. The attachment lists times for a range of evacuation conditions and is a reasonable summary of the I
sensitivity of evacuation time estimates.
The Suffolk County Police panel identified a group of traffic posts where Appendix A did not properly describe the needed traffic control strategy.
j LILC0 agreed to correct all of the inaccurate descriptions. The Board relegated the review of LILCO's corrections to the staff. 21 NRC at 809.
The NRC staff has verified that the changes have been incorporated into the plan.
l l
l Shoreham SSER 10 13-10
13.3.5.5 Central Suffolk Hospital and Reception Centers for Special Care Facilities The Board found that Central Suffolk Hospital is a support organization having an emergency response role and that LILC0 must obtain a letter of agreement describing the role of the hospital in the event of an emergency. 21 HRC at 834-35. The Board further required that LILC0 " identify reception centers for special facilities that could be evacuated" and that letters of agreement be obtained to support this identification. 21 NRC at 840.
The licensee has obtained an agreement letter from Central Suffolk Hospital that describes the support to be provided in the event of an emergency. OPIP 3.6.5, Protective Actions for Special Populations, designates a reception center for each special facility within the 10-mile plume EPZ.
Letters were also obtained by the licensee describing the arrangements for use of the identified reception centers in the event of an evacuation. The staff has determined that the letters are adequate.
13.3.5.6 Schools The Board directed that LILC0 revise the LER0 plan to allow for alteration of early dismissal procedures in case a protective action is recomended for j
the general public. The plan should allow schools to implement the same protective action recommended to the public. LBP-85-12, 21 NRC at 863; l
LBP-85-31, 22 NRC at 430.
The licensee has revised its procedures to direct LER0 school coordinators to notify the schools of protective actions recomended for the general public and determine what protective actions the schools intend to take. The procedures direct LERO to update the information to the schools during the course of an event. Protective actions which have been implemented by the schools will be included in EBS messages. The staff believes that the changes include sufficient details to implement a change in the protective action for school children in case a protective action for the general public differs from the protective actions that have been implemented for school children.
The Board delegated to the staff the responsibility for ensuring that "LILC0 has received comitments for release of buses from schools outside the EPZ and allow for their use inside the EPZ in the event of an emergency." 21 NRC at i
864.
In addition, the Appeal Board in ALAB-911, 29 NRC (March 13,1989),
l advised that LILCO should be required to provide a 50% backup for the regular j
school bus drivers to ensure a pool of 150% of these drivers.
)
i The licensee has signed contracts with bus companies that provide prompt j
availability of school buses in the event of an emergency. The staff has j
reviewed these contracts and verified that:
- 1) there are sufficient buses j
available to evacuate all school children in a single-wave evacuation; 2) there are centracts for over 200 buses that are available immediately, i.e., with no prior comitment; and 3) these uncomitted buses are sufficient to supplement l
the school buses that are currently under contract to the school districts in l
the EPZ. The licensee, by letter dated March 27, 1989, confirmed its comitment to provide a 50 percent reserve of backup school bus drivers for the regular bus drivers.
Shoreham SSER 10 13-11
The Board found that, "[I]t is not possible to calculate how long an evacuation might take without knowing the location of the reception centers" and that "the lack of a reasonable estimate of the time to evacuate [ school children] is a defect in the LILC0 Plan." 21 NRC at 872.
The licensee has designated two reception centers for schools, assigned each school to a specific center and developed evacuation routes for each school.
The MRC staff has reviewed the evacuation time estinate study, Appendix A of the LERO plan, and determined that evacuation time estimates for each school have been included in Table XIIIC. The estimates indicate that evacuation of school children could be accomplished within approximately the same time as a general public evacuation.
13.3.5.7 Strike by LILC0 Employees The Licensing Board imposed a license condition related to a strike by LILC0 employees some of whom are part of the offsite emergency response organization (LER0). The Board directed the language of the condition to read:
"Since LILC0 relies on an offsite emergency response organization consisting entirely or primarily of LILC0 employees, in anticipation of the commencement of any strike b Station (SNPS) y such employees, LILCO shall bring the Shoreham Nuclear Power to cold shutdown condition using normal operating procedures.
LILC0 shall commence bringing SNPS to cold shutdown condition 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the commencement of such strike, or immediately upon receipt of less than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />' notice of the impending commencement of a strike, with the goal of having the p b t in cold shutdown condition by the time the strike commences.
LILCO shall maintain SNPS in a cold shutdown condition until the strike is over and review by FEMA and the NRC Staff has given assurance that LERO capability is fully restored.
During a. strike-occasioned shutdown, with the prior approval of the NRC Staff upon review of written application by LILC0, f
LILC0 shall be permitted to take the reactor to a refueling mode to conduct refueling cr other operations requiring access to the reactor core if it is shown that such operations cannot result in the occurrence of any events I
requiring offsite emergency response capability. This condition shall be terminated only in accordance with the regulatory procedures for amendment of an operating license." 21 NRC at 894-95.
The license condition has been included in the draft full-power license.
13.3.5.8 Thyroid Monitoring Procedures The Board ordered the staff to verify the licensee's commitment to revise the plan, "1) to reflect that both background radiation and thyroid contamina-tion readings are to be conducted with a closed shield..., 2) to indicate that the RM-14 meter with HP-270 probe is to be set on a fast response time; and 3) to include special provision for monitoring children with an HP-210 probe." LILCO was ordered not to change the permissible background levels for thyroid monitoring. LBP-85-31, 22 NRC at 425-426.
l The licensee has revised OPIP 3.9.2, Radiological Monitoring / Decontamination of l
Emergency Workers and Evacuees, to include the required changes. The current i
procedure retains the permissible background radiation level of 50 cpm as specified by the Board.
The staff finds that the changes to the thyroid monitoring procedures are adequate.
Shoreham SSER 10 13-12
'13.3.6 EPZ Review Requested by.the Commission In CLI-87-12, dated November 5, 1987 (26 NRC 383), the Commission ruled on an issue related to the expansion of the Shoreham plume exposure pathway EPZ.
The Commission reversed an Appeal Board decision allowing the admission of two contentions for evidentiary hearing on whether the EPZ should be expanded by a few miles. However, the Commission directed the staff "to advise...[the Commission] prior to issuance of any license for operation above 5% power whether there are special circumstances at Shoreham that were not envisioned in the emergency planning rulemaking, and that would make it inappropriate to apply to Shoreham the generic decision that an EPZ of about ten miles is adequate for emergency planning purposes."
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2), the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall generally consist of an area "about 10 miles" in radius.
In j
addition, the exact size of the EPZ for a particular plant must be determined "in relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries."
The EPZ concept in the NRC's emergency planning regulations derives from the report of an NRC/ EPA Task Force on emergency planning, NUREG-0396, " Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," December 1978.
The Task Force's conclusions on EPZ size were based on the analysis of both design basis accidents and severe low probability accidents including those involving core damage and containment failure. After reviewing the potential consequences associated with these types of accidents, it was the consensus of the Task Force that emergency plans could be based upon a generic distance out to which predetermined actions would provide dose savings for any such acci-dents.
It was the judgment of the Task Force that an EPZ of about 10 miles in radius as a generic planning basis would provide an adequate response base.
Beyond this generic distance the Task Force concluded that actions could be taken on an ad hoc basis in the event that it would be necessary to expand the response effort. The Task Force further stated that although the radius for the EPZ implies a circular area, the actual shape would depend upon the characteristics of a particular site. The Task Force stated that " judgment...
will be used in determining the precise size and shape of the EPZs considering local conditions such as demography, topography and land use characteristics, access routes, local jurisdictional boundaries, and arrangements with the nuclear facility operator for notification and response assistance." The NRC l
i regulations concerning the determination of the size of an EPZ, as indicated above, as well as the guidance in NUREG-0654 reflect the considerations developed in NUREG-0396 by the NRC/ EPA Task Force.
The Shoreham plume exposure EPZ is described in the onsite and offsite plans.
Detailed information on the EPZ is presented in Appendix A to the LERO (offsite) plan which contains the Shoreham evacuation time estimate study. The Shoreham EPZ is approximately 10 miles in radius and has been subdivided into distinct planning areas. The boundaries of each planning area are based on easily identifiable roadways or political boundaries. The development of the l
EPZ included consideration of factors such as demography, transportation I
network, meteorological influences, land use, and special facilities such as j
schools, daycare centers, hospitals and nursing homes.
Shoreham SSER 10 13-13
The NRC staff has reviewed the information on the Shoreham EPZ in the onsite and offsite plans, has been cognizant of the issues raised during the course of the proceedings, and has visited the site and toured the plume exposure pathway EPZ on numerous occasions. The staff has also relied upon its collective experience acquired through the review of emergency planning for other nuclear power plant sites across the country. For example, the Shoreham EPZ is located on a flat coastal plain, without complex terrain to consider in predicting plume trajectory. The road system around Shoreham compares favorably with other coastal sites and the population density in the Shoreham EPZ is less than that for several other nuclear power plants.
In summary, the staff is not aware of any special circumstances or unique features involving the Shoreham EPZ that were not envisioned in the development of the 10-mile EPZ. The staff concludes that it is appropriate to apply to Shoreham the generic decision that an EPZ of about 10 miles is adequate for emergency planning purposes.
13.3.7 Director's Findings on Emergency Planning Contentions In a Decision (CLI-89-02) issued on March 3, 1989, the Commission dismissed the Interveners, i.e., Suffolk County, the State of New York and the Town of Southampton, and terminated the Shoreham proceedings. The Commission directed the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to evaluate each contention which remained outstanding as a result of the Decision and to report to the Commission on how each has been resolved. The results of this evaluation are presented in the document, " Director's Findings on Emergency Planning Contentions," dated April 7, 1989. The evaluation addresses contentions in five distinct areas: issues that were pending before the Appeal Board when the groceedingswereterminated,issuesthatwereremandedtotheLicensingBoard, realism" issues, admitted exercise contentions for the June 1988 exercise, and exercise contentions not admitted by the Board which were appealed by the Interveners. The Director concluded, based on an NRC staff examination of the issues and FEMA findings, that all of the emergency planning contentions have been satisfactorily resolved and thus do not present an impediment to issuance of an operating license for the Shoreham facility.
13.3.8 Conclusions Based on a review of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Emergency Preparedness Plan for conformance with the guidance criteria in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, the staff concludes that the Shoreham onsite emergency plan provides an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency preparedness and meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and Appendix E thereto. FEMA has provided its findings and determinations on the adequacy of offsite emergency planning and preparedness. Since the State and the local governments have refused to participate in emergency planning, the licensee has developed its own utility-prepared offsite emergency (LER0) plan. The licensee has filed documents attesting to its conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1) regarding legal authority issues. The licensee has asserted that they have made a sustained, good faith effort to secure the participation of the New York State and Suffolk County governmental authorities. The Licensing Board considered the LILCO filings and concluded that LILC0 has met the I
requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1).
In making its overall determination on the Shoreham SSER 10 13-14 l
adequacy (of the LERO plan, the NRC, in accordance with 10 CFR50.47(c) 1)(iii) i i
their best efforts to protect the health and safety of the public and would generally follow the utility plan in the event of an actual emergency.
Based on a review of the FEMA findings on the adequacy of the offsite LERO plan and preparedness, the_ staff's assessment of the adequacy of the utility's i
onsite emergency plans and preparedness, the conclusion in the Director's i
Findings that all outstanding emergency planning contentions have been satisfactorily resolved, and on the licensee's conformance with the requirements i
of 10 CFR 50.47(c)(1), the staff concludes that the overall state of onsite and offsite emergency preparedness provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
13.7 Security 13.7.2 Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements 13.7.2.1 Background The Long Island Light Company (LILC0) has filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission revisions to their Physical Security Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.
This Safeguards Evaluation Report (SGER) summarizes how the licensee proposes to meet the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions of 10 CFR Part 73.55.
Based on a review of the Physical Security Plan, the staff has concluded that the proposed changes satisfy Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 (51 FR 27817 and 27822) and accompanying 10 CFR 73.70 record keeping requirements. Accordingly, the protection provided will ensure that the public health and safety will not be endangered.
13.7.2.2 Personnel Search The licensee has provided commitments in the Physical Security Plan to provide a search of all individuals entering the protected area except bona fide Federal, State and local law enforcement personnel on official duty, through the use of equipment designed for the detection of firearms, explosives, and i
incendiary devices.
In addition, the licensee has provided commitments to conduct a physical pat-down search of an individual whenever the licensee has cause to suspect that the individual is attempting to introduce firearms, explosives, or incendiary devices into the protected areas; or whenever firearms or explosives detection equipment is out of service or not operating satisfactorily.
13.7.2.3 Vital Area Access LILC0 has modified their Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Physical Security Plan to limit unescorted access to vital areas during non-emergency conditions to individuals who require access in order to perform their duties. They have established current authorization access lists for each vital area which are i
updated and approved by the cognizant manager or supervisor at least once I
Shoreham SSER 10 13-15 i
l j
I every 31 days. LILC0 has ensured that only individuals whose specific duties i
require access to vital areas during nonemergency conditions are included on their site access list. LILCO has provided further assurance by revoking access and retrieving badges and other entry devices prior to or j
simultaneously with notification of termination of an individuals unescorted facility access.
Based upon commitments made by the. licensee in revisions to their Physical Security Plan, the staff has concluded that LILC0 meets the vital area access requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(i)(A)(B) and (C).
13.7.2.4 Locks and Keys The licensee has comitted to providing methods to reduce the probability of compromise of keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices used to control access to their protected areas and vital areas. These methods include the rotation of keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices every 12 months or the changing of these devices whenever there is evidence or suspicion that any key, lock, combination or related access control device may have been compromised or when an individual who has had access to any of these devices has had their access terminated due to a lack of trustworthiness, reliability or inadequate work performance. Only persons granted unescorted facility access are issued such entry devices.
Based upon comitments made by the licensee in revisions to their Physical Security Plan,)the staff has concluded that LILCO meets the requirements of 10 CFR73.55(d)(9 to reduce the probability of compromise of keys, locks, combinations, and related access control devices.
13.7.2.5 Emergency Access The licensee has provided commitments to provide for the rapid ingress and egress of individuals during emergency conditions or situations that could lead to emergency conditions by assuring prompt access to vital equipment. An annual review of their physical security plans and contingency plans and procedures will be conducted to evaluate their potential impact on plant and personnel safety. Emergency access is granted by a licensed senior operator.
Based upon commitments made by the licensee in revisions to their Physical Security Plan, the staff has concluded that LILC0 meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(d)(7)(ii)(B) to ensure access to vital equipment during emergencies or to situations that may lead to an emergency.
13.7.2.6 Protection of Secondary Power Supplies The iicensee has provided comitments to protect the on-site secondary power supply system for alarm annunicator equipment and non-portable communications equipment by including such equipment within a vital area boundary.
Based upon commitments made by the licensee in revisions to their Physical Security Plan, the staff has concluded that LILC0 meets the requirements of 10 j
CFR 73.55(e) in protecting the secondary power supplies of alarm annunicator equipment and non-portable communications equipment.
Shorehams SSER 10 13-16
\\
13.7.2.7 Vital Area Entry / Exit Logging i
The licensee has committed to maintaining a log indicating name, badge number, time of entry, and time of exit of all individuals granted access to a vital area except those individuals entering or exiting the reactor control room.
Based upon commitments made by the licensee in revisions to their Physical Security Plan, the staff has concluded that LILC0 meets the requirements of 10 CFR 73.70(d) by maintaining entry / exit log of individuals accessing vital areas (except the reactor control room).
I 13.7.2.8 Conclusion Based upon the above evaluation, we find that the licensee has met the requirements of the Miscellaneous Amendments and Search Requirements revision to 10 CFR Part 73.55 and the recordkeeping requirements of 10 CFR Part 73.70 and that license condition 2.E should be modified to reflect this finding.
Shoreham SSER 10 13-17 l
1
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- 14. INITIAL TEST PROGRAM License condition 2.C(4) of the Shoreham low power license requires that if the licensee makes any changes to the Initial Test Program described in Section 14 of the FSAR made in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 it shall be reported in accordance with 50.59(b) within one month of such change.
LILCO in its April 5, 1989 letter committed to report any changes to its Initial Test Program described in Section 14 of the USAR in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59 within one month of such change. The staff finds this commitment acceptable and considers license condition 2.C(4) unnecessary.
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l Shoreham SSER 10 14-1 l
15 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS 15.3 Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) l 15.3.1 Salem ATWS Event l
License condition 2.C(17) of the Shoreham low power license requires that the licensee shall implement its response to the requirements of Generic Letter 83-28 on a schedule which is consistent with that stated in its letters of March 9, 1984 (SNRC-1013) and December 4, 1984 (SNRC-1116).
i Since July 3, 1985 most of the ATWS issues have been resolved and staff findings issued. Only two of those issues remain under staff review. With the exception of LILC0 providing a technical specification change to test the backup scram valves by the first refueling outage as required in the staff's September 19, 1988 letter, the remaining issues are considered resolved.
Since all of the more significant ATWS issues have been resolved, the staff considers license condition 2.C(17) to be no longer necessary.
1 1
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l Shoreham SSER 10 15-1 J
l 17 QUALITY ASSURANCE l
17.7 Independent Design Review 17.7.4 Conclusions License condition 2.C(13) of the Shoreham low power license requires that the licensee prior to exceeding five percent of rated power, shall incorporate the studies and evaluations performed by the licensee or its contractors as a result of the IDR, into the existing plant calculation and documentation packages, in order to provide a complete set of records to be used for maintenance, replacement, repair, and modification of equipment.
LILC0 in its April 5, 1989 letter submitted SNPS-Project Procedure No. 54 (J.0. No.11600.02), " Incorporation of Independent Design Review Evaluation and Studies into Appropriate Calculations." This procedure was developed by the Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation for LILCO, to incorporate these IDR results and other future findings, if necessary, into plant calculations and documentation.
The staff has determined, based on its review of this procedure, that the requirements of license condition 2.C(13) have been satisfied.
l Shoreham SSER 10 17-1
22 TMI-2 REQUIREMENTS I.A.1.1 Shift Technical Advisor License condition 2.C(7)(a) of the Shoreham low power license required the licensee shall submit the qualifications each backup shift technical advisor (STA) is expected to have at the completion of their training program, for review and approval by the NRC staff prior to assigning them to STA duty. This license condition shall terminate upon the completion of NRC staff approval of the first group of seven backup STAS.
LILCO, by letter dated July 11, 1986 (SNRC-1272) provided the professional qualifications of the seventh backup STA of the first group of STAS. That submittal satisfied the requirement of license condition 2.C(7)(a) as noted in the staff's December 9,1986 letter.
I.D.1 Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)
License condition 2.C(7)(b) of the Shoreham low power license requires that prior to completion of the startup test program, appropriate control room meters and recorders shall be marked to indicate normal operating limits, trip valves and alarm points.
LILC0 in its April 5,1989 letter comitted to mark the appropriate control room meters and recorders to indicate normal operating limits, trip valves and alarm points prior to completion of the startup test program. The staff finds this comitment acceptable and considers license condition 2.C(7)(b) unnecessary.
License condition 2.C(7)(d) Attachment 1, Item 2 of the Shoreham low power license requires that the licensee submit a Sumary Report to the NRC including a proposed schedule for implementation prior to startup following the first refueling outage.
LILC0 in its April 5,1989 letter committed to submit a Sumary DCRDR Report including a proposed schedule for implementation modifications prior to startup following the first refueling outage. The staff is currently reviewing LILCO's DCRDR program plan submitted December 8, 1986. The staff finds this comitment acceptable and considers license condition 2.C(7)(d),, Item 2 unnecessary.
I I.D.2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)
License condition 2.C(7)(d), Attachment 1, Item 1 requires that the final SPDS be fully operational and operators trained prior to startup after the first refueling outage. The interim SPDS is installed and fully operational.
LILCO in its April 5,1989 letter comitted to complete installation of the SPDS prior to startup after the first refueling outage. The staff finds this commitment acceptable and considers license condition 2.C(7)(d), Attachment 1, Item 1 unnecessary.
l Shoreham SSER 10 22-1 i
.II.B.3 Post Accident Sampling Capability License Condition 2.C(7)(c) of the Shoreham low power license required that prior to startup following the first refueling outage, the licensee shall submit to the NRC staff'a modified core damage procedure that includes an estimation of cladding failure due to fuel overheating, as well as cladding failure and core melt for review and approval. This procedure shall incorporate the use of other plant parameters as indicators of core damage.
LILCO in its April _5, 1989 letter committed to submit a modified core damage procedure that encompasses the requirement detailed in this license condition.
The staff finds this commitment acceptable and considers license condition 2.C(7)(c) unnecessary.
22.6 Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2 License condition 2.C(7)d, Attachment 1, Item 3 of the Shoreham low power license requires that the licensee implement'the requirements of RG 1.97 or provide justification for deviations.
LILC0 by letters dated April 14, 1983, October 23, 1985 and February 27, 1986 provided information demonstrating compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 2.
The staff's September 14, 1987 letter provided the results of its review of this information. The staff considers this issue resolved with the exception of SNPS flux monitoring instrumentation. The staff will require the SNPS flux monitoring instrumentation to be upgraded to meet the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.97 Revision 2 prior to startup following the first refueling outage.
22.7 Upgrade Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP)
License condition 2.C(7)d, Attachment 1, Item 4a of the Shoreham low power license requires the licensee to submit a Procedures Generation Package to the NRC prior to the start of the first refueling outage.
LILCO, by letter dated March 12, 1987, submitted the required Procedures GenerationPackage(PGP). LILCO, on July 15, 1988, revised this PGP at the request of the staff. The latest submittal is currently being reviewed by the staff. The requirement of the license condition 2.C(7)d, Attachment 1, Item 4a has been satisfied.
License condition 2.C(7)d, Attachment 1, Item 4b of the Shoreham low power license required the licensee to implement the upgraded E0P's prior to startup after the first refueling outage.
LILC0 has implemented the required upgraded E0Ps based on the BWR owner's group Emergency Procedures Guidelines, Revision 4, documented in inspection report 50-322/88-11. The requirement of license condition 2.C(7)d, Attachment 1, Item 4b has, therefore, been satisfied.
l Shoreham SSER 10 22-2
23 CONCLUSIONS We have determined that the application for a license authorizing operation up to 100 percent of full rated power for Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, meets the requirements for issuance of an operating license as set forth in 10 CFR 50.57.
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Shoreham SSER 10 23-1 I
r APPENDIX A g
y D Federal Ernergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 4;
l SEP - 91988 l
Mr. Victor Stello, Jr.
Executive Director for Operations Nuclear Pegulatory Ccrnmission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Stello:
On January 27, 1988, the Nuclear Pegulatory Ccrnmission (NRC) requested that the Federal Dnergency Management Agency (FDiA) review Revision 9 of Iong Island Lighting Ccznpany's (LIIf0) offsite preparedness plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS), under the provisions of the April 1985 FD4A/NRC Hemorandum of Understanding and the criteria aM assumptions of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supplement 1.
FDiA was also requested to provide a fiMing, i.e., iMicate whether in the framework of those criteria and assumptions, FDiA had reasonable assurance that the plans can protect the health and safety of the oublic living in the vicinity of the plant.
That finding was delivered tc, the NRC on May 31, 1988.
On February 8,1988, NRC requested that FDdA evaluate a full-participation exercise of LIIf0's offsite preparedness plan for Shoreham. On May 20, 1988, aM May 26,1988, NRC staff agreed that the proposed objectives submitted by FDiA on May 13, 1988, were sufficient to demmstrate the capabilities of LIICO's local Dnergency Res;x>nsa Organization in a full-participation exercise.
'Ibey also stated their position that the objectives were sufficient to constitute a " qualifying " exercise under 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.1 in that it should test as much of the emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation.
On May 23, 1988, NRC requested that FD4A conduct a review of Revision 10 of the LIICO offsite plan against the criteria of NURD3-0654/FDiA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supplement I aM the three asstrnptions stated below. NRC also requested that Revision 10 changes be incorporated into the exercise play of the upcczning Shoreham exercise. Since a full Begional Assistance Ccmnittee (RAC) review could not be conducted in the short time frame remaining before the exercise, FD4A Region II agreed to review the changes, coordinate with the RAC where necessary, and incorporate then into the evaluation of the exercise. The j
asstrnptions upon which the plan review and the exercise were based are that j
in an actual radiological energency, State and local officials that have declined to participate in anergency planning will:
- 1) Exercise their best efforts to protect the health aM safety of the public;
- 2) Cooperate with the utility aM follow the utility plan, aM
- 3) Have the resources sufficient to implement those porticns of the utility offsite plan where State aM local response is necessary.
Shoreham SSER 10 A-1
_ - - _ It is further understood that in any subsequent hearings or litigation related to the plan review or exercise, NRC will defend the above assumptions.
On August 31, 1988, you-also requested that FD!A review certain updated letters of agreement in conjunction $41th FDiA's ongoing review of Revision 10.
Enclosed is a report on the results of a full review of Revision 10 of the LIIf0 plan aM the abovementioned letters of agreenent, conducted by FDiA 1
Region II and the RAC. The Shoreham exercise was conducted on June 7-9, 1988.
Enclosed is a copy of the Post-Exercise Assessment, dated September 2,1988, containing the results of FDiA's evaluation.
It was prepared by FDiA Region II.
'Ihere were no deficiencies identified in the exercise. However, there are sane areas requiring corrective action. FDiA is requesting LIIf0 to submit a schedule of actions that they have taken or intend to take to correct both plan-related and exercise-related inadequacies.
As indicated in the plan review, Revision 10 contains 94 plan elements rated adequate and 7 plan elements rated inadequate. Same of the inadequacies were revealed as shortcomings in the exercise requiring further implementing detail in the plan. However, the exercise demonstrated adequate overall preparedness on the part of LERO personnel, and therefore, based on the evaluation of the plan and the exercise, and the recommendation of FDiA Region II, FDiA has reached a finding of reasonable assurance.
By way of clarification, we would like to note for the record that the enclosed plan review did not reevaluate Elements C.2.b, C.2.c, E.3 and E.4 a-n, since they are to be removed fran the final version of NURE-0654/FDiA-REP-1, Rev.1, Stcpplement 1.
'Ihe review also does not take into consideration any possible rainifications of ongoing litigation in the State of New York concerning LIIf0's reception center at Bellmore. Although the Suprume Court of the State of New York, Nassau County, has ruled on that issue, it is our understanding that LIICO is appealing that ruling. Finally, the review also did not consider the swalled ministerial changes listed as part of Revision 11 of the LIILO plan, although incorporated in Revision 1 of the SNPS Prompt Notification aM Design Report. You requested that FDLA review that revision to the design tvport on August 16, 1988. Our consolidated report on the SNPS alert and notification system will contain our evaluation of those changes, unless a full RAC review of any potential Revision 11 of the entire plan is produced first.
We hope that the above infonnation is useful. If you have any questions, please feel free to call me at 646-3692.
Sin t C.
terson Associate Director SW and Iocal Prograns and Support i
Enclosures As Stated Shoreham SSER 10 A-2
APPENDIX B
($ Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 March 17, 1989 l
MEMORANDUM FOR: Frank J. Congel Director, Division of Radiation Protection and Emergency Preparedness ffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation lat ry Commis ion /
4uclear R y /e FROM:
Dennis H. Kwi kowski Assistant Ass ciate Director Office of Natural and Technological Hazards
SUBJECT:
FEMA Support for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Licensing Process for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station This is in response to your memoranda of November 7,1988, and December 5, 1988, to Richard W. Krimm, requesting that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) review the following documents and provide coments. The documents are:
- The Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO) draft proposed brochure for f armers, food processors and food distributors for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station;
- LILCO's schedule for correcting Areas Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA) identified in FEMA's Post-Exercise Assessment for the June 7 - 9, 1988, Shoreham exercise; and
- LILCO's responses to FEMA's Review of Revision 10 of the LILCO Offsite Emergency Response Plan for Shoreham and LILCO's proposed changes to be incorporated in the next revision of that plan.
The reviews have been prepared by FEMA Region II and include input from the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC). We realize that LILCO's responses to the FEMA September 9,1988, Review of Revision 10 do not constitute actual plan revisions. Thus, although in most cases, the responses appear adequate, we must await the submittal of the next plan revision to evaluate the actual changes as they are executed in the plan. The same is true where plan changes constitute part or all of the proposed corrective l
action for an exercise issue.
In addition, we have reiterated, as a reminder, several items listed in the FEMA review of Revision 10 that LILCO did not specifically address.
Finally, as promised on page 6 of the review of Revision 10, we have provided an update of the FEMA review of the LILCO general public information brochure to be distributed in the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone.
Shoreham SSER 10 B-1
_ FEMA continues to support its overall finding of reasonable assurance transmitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on September 9, 1988.
Although not specifically addressed in the above mentioned documents, LILC0 should take note of the requirement for an Annual Letter of Certification prescribed by FEMA Guidance Memorandum (GM) PR-1, in order to facilitate the monitoring of radiological emergency preparedness (REP) planning and preparedness requirements under NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. Supp. 1.
The Annual Letter of Certification should be submitted to FEMA through the NRC.
It is nomally due by January 31 of each year and should address compliance with periodic requirements for the preceding year. However, given the impact that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB) proceedings have had on the submittal of,information from LILCO, it would be acceptable if the first Annual Letter of Certification were submitted with their next plan revision. Specific items to be addressed are indicated in GM PR-1.
That list has been modified as shown on the attached FEMA Region 11 memorandum to include requirements relating to non-participating organizations, as defined in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, Supp. 1.
As you will recall, on December 20, 1988, Richard W. Krimm transmitted to you FEMA's preliminary technical review of the Shoreham alert and notification system (ANS) design.
I have included a copy of the transmittal memorandum for your infomation. As stated in that report, the preliminary technical analysis indicates that the Shoreham ANS is adequate to allow its activation for the telephone survey. The report is now under review l
in FEMA Region 11. We have received approval from the Office of Management I
and Budget to conduct the remaining four telephone surveys, one of which is for Shoreham. We are now in a position to schedule a date for the survey. However, we understand that LILC0 intends to distribute the general public information brochure before the survey takes place. The issuance of that brochure is affected by the following discussion.
Further, it is FEMA'S position that while the use, and the representation of this use in the public infomation materials, of LILCO's Bellmore facility as a reception center has been prohibited without the prior approval of the Town of Hempstead, the use of the facility and the representation of l
use may be permissible under the assumptions and provisions of NUREG-0654/
I FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1. Supp.1. However, the FEMA Office of General Counsel has identified both matters as a legal issue. FEMA defers to the NRC on whether LILC0 has adequately accommodated the concerns expressed by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board in ALAB-905 on this matter. We note that the most current version of draf t reception center maps for the brochure for each of the 19 emergency response planning areas (ERPA) contains the following language directly below the map title, "A New York State court has ruled that, because of local zoning laws, this Reception Center may not be used without prior approval of the Town of Hempstead.
If this Reception Center is needed during an emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, LERO will request the permission of the appropriate official (s) of the Town of Hempstead, Nassau County, or New York State Shoreham SSER 10 B-2 I
_ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ before it is used." On advice of counsel, FEMA continues to believe that the language of the brochure gives adequate advice to the public, and reflects the correct analysis of the New York Supreme Court decision as applied in the emergency planning context. FEMA's Office of General Counsel bases its advice on continuous tracking of emergency response-related court decisions. FEMA knows of no actual case where zoninq restrictions prevented or delayed an emergency response, even by authorized private entities.
As a tangential issue, the above quotation now appears even on reception center maps for ERPA'r, whose population would be directed to the Roslyn and Hicksville facilities. This was probably a printing error, since the language addresses only zoning restrictions for the Bellmore facility.
However, as indicated in the attached review of the brochure, if the language is acceptable to permit Bellmore to be mentioned as a reception center, it should be retained only on maps for Bellmore and deleted from the maps for the other two facilities.
We have also included an attachment listing clarifications / corrections to the FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment on the June 1988 Shoreham exercise.
These were compiled in the process of doing preparatory work for the now cancelled OL-5R hearing on the exercise.
We hope that the above information is helpful. If we can be of further assistance, please feel free to contact me at 646-2871.
Attachments As Stated Shoreham SSER 10 B-3
l,
APPENDIX C RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESOURCES FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN NEW YORK STATE AND SUFFOLK COUNTY PLANS Suffolk Plan 1.
Responsibilities of County Personnel I
" Responsibilities of the County Executive. The County Executive is responsible for:
a.
Conducting natural and man-made and nuclear attack emergency operations.
b.
Utilizing, when necessary, the assistance of County civil defense forces as provided in New York State Executive Law, 2-B, Section 29-b.
Obtaining, when necessary, assistance from the State of New York c.
and other political subdivisions.
Disaster Emergency Functions. The following County officers, under the
. direction of the County Executive, and with the guidance of the County I
I Director of Emergency Preparedness, will direct and coordinate performance of specific emergency civil defense functions to include but not be limited to the following:
a.
Director of Emergency Preparedness:
(1)
Issue appropriate warnings.
(2) Staff, administer, and oversee the operation of the County Emergency Operating Center (Alternata Sect of Government).
(3) Coordinate the overall functioning of all officials and agencies with emergency responsibilities.
(4) Disseminate information to the populace.
(5) s pervise special defense functions, such as radiological monitoring and reporting, public shelter activities, and provide volunteer services as required.
b.
Clerk of the Legislature and Legislative Aides: Act for and on behalf of the Legislature in implementing whatever emergency legis-lation may be required in accordance with any such authorization that may have been delegated to them by the County Legislature.
c.
County Attorney:
l' (1) Render advice and opinions to the County Executive with regard to:
Shoreham SSER 10 C-1 1
.m.
f (a) Continuity of government (b)
Interpretation, application and implementation of the.
New York State Defense Emergency Act, as amended, related Defense Emergency laws, New York State Executive Law, Article 2-B, other relevant laws and regulations, and orders of the State Office of Disaster Preparedness.
(2) Draft executive orders'and regulations in coordination with the County Executive and the Director of Emergency Preparedness.
d.
County Clerk:
(1))
Preserve County records.
(2 Administer oaths of office to duly appointed County officials and their successors.
(3). Carry out other essential duties of his office.
e.
Commissioner of Police:
(1) Utilize regular and auxiliary police for maintenance of law and order, including protection of life, property and essential commodities.
(2) Regulate and control traffic.
(3) Direct the populace to shelter or other appropriate installations.
(4) Direct the injured and sick to medical installations, and the homeless to American National Red Cross and other mass-care installations.
f.
Sheriff:
(1) Regulate and control traffic.
(2) Direct-the populace to shelter or other appropriate installations.
(3) Direct the injured and sick to medical installations, and the homeless to American National Red Cross and other mass-care installations.
(4) Operate the County jail and provide for safe custody, treatment, care and control of all prisoners within the County, g.
Commissioner of Public Works:
(1) Clear debris.
(2) Perform temporary repair and restoration of roads, bridges and transportation facilities.
(3) Perform related engineering and construction work.
(4) Provide for the maintenance, temporary modification and repair of the County Emergency Operating Center.
(5) Provide necessary maintenance and repairs to other essential County facilities.
Shoreham SSER 10 C-2
(6) Distribute emergency potable water supplies in coordination with the Commissioner of Health Services, h.
Commissioner of Social Services:
(1) Provide emergency feeding, clothing, lodging and financial assistance.
- 2) Provide information concerning missing relatives.
- 3) Provide authorized assistance to those in need in accordance with the provisions of the Social Welfare Law.
i.
Commissioner of Health Services:
(1) Coordinate the provision of health and medical services to the population, including safeguarding the health of the people, the care and treatment of the ill and injured, and the identification of the dead.
(2) Coordinate the emergency operations of all hospitals.
(3) Perform decontamination duties as required.
(4) Provide coordination of on-site emergency medical services to include transportation of patients to stationary medical facilities.
(5) Coordinate the distribution of emergency potable water supplies with the cooperation of the Commissioner of Public Works.
j.
Commissioner of Fire Rescue and Emergency Services (FRES):
(1) Activate the Civil Defense warning system.
(2) Cocrdinate the County-wide deployment of equipment for the containing and extinguishing of fires and the removal of trapped and injured persons from damaged buildings.
(3) Perform decontamination duties as required.
(4) Previde coordination of on-site emergency medical services to include transportation of patients to stationary medical care facilities.
k.
County Comptroller: Carry out, with the advice of other appropriate governmental officers and representatives of the private sector, measures necessary to:
(1) Stabilize wages; salaries and rents.
(2) Support indirect monetary, tax and credit measures adopted by the Federal government.
1.
Chief Purchasino Agent: Direct the purchasing of and contrar. ting for all supplies, materials and equipment of every kind and nature for all county agencies, l
I m.
Commissioners of Election: Carry out measures to register the populace for the rationing of essential supplies, commodities and equipment.
1 4
Shoreham SSER 10 C-3
Natural Disaster Operational Assignments. The following agency heads will have field operational responsibility in the types of disaster hereinafter designated:
a.
Commissioner of Public Works: flood, tidal wavo, earthquake, hurricane.
tornado, windstorm, landslide, drought, snow and ice storm, and blizzard operations; and failure of water supply, in coordination with the Commissioner of Health Services.
b.
Commissioner of FRES:
fire, including forest fire operations, c.
Co'nmissioner of Health Services: epidemic operations, radiation accidents, and certification of water supplies.
d.
Sheriff and Commissioner of Police: actual or threatened disaster conditions, including civil disturbances, which are in the scope of law enforcement agencies.
2.
An Emergency Directory containing the address, home and business telephone numbers of approximately 240 persons and entities including County depart-ment, County services, police, fire etc.; Town department services, police, fire etc.; Federal resources, State resources, utilities, American Red Cross, Salvation Army; airports; and hospitals.
3.
A County of Suffolk Disaster Preparedness Plan, containing among other things, provisions for public information, press releases, rumor control, evacuation, keeping evacuation routes clear, traffic control waiver of restricting laws on roadway usage, evacuation of special populations, receiving, registry, lod congregate care centers)ging, feeding and clothing evacuees (reception /
, monitoring potable water supplies, board police and fire functions including establishing ingress and egress control, j
maintaining traffic and crowd control, closing highways, securing evacu-l ated areas, and search and rescue.
4.
A Standard Operating Plan (50P) for winter storms and hurricanes which includes coordination of public and private resources.
5.
A letter of agreement with the Civil Air Patrol to provide the County with trained Air Crew Personnel to perform Aerial Radiological Monitoring Missions with the county providing the training and equipment. The CAP
'and the County executed an additional " Peacetime Radiological Agreement" for a radiological incident at a r,uclear power plant wherein the CAP would provide aerial and ground monitoring, medical aid and traffic control.
6.
A sophisticated communications plan combining commercial and designated telephones and radios.
7.
Four plots of outdoor warning coverage consisting of " sirens, horns, or claxons of the electro mechanical or electronic variety located in each i
fire district so that the sound of the device can be heard throughout the j
district". The plots, show about 300 warning devices.
Shoreham SSER 10 C-4
8.-
213 ambulances listed by town, 2557 full time police, 397 auxiliary forces,
-704 cars, 20 motorcycles, 7 busses, 65 vans, 8 wreckers, 22 4-wheel drives, 5 helicopters,17 boats, 270 mobile public address systems, 25 bull horns,'400 portable radios, and 60 mobile radios.
(The Suffolk Plan includes a plan for the Sheriff's Office but does not include resources.)'
9.
Provision for coordination with the American Red Cross through the Suffolk County Department of Social Services.
Resources Manual 1.
Aircraft and helicopters from the NY Air National Guard capable of carrying 25 stretcher cases and 140 seated patients; l-2.
5 major and 12 minor airfields; 3.
Location and telephone numbers of ambulances; 4.
50 aircraft from the NY Arrqy National Guard; 5.
Members and contact numbers for.the Civil Air Patrol; 6.
Non-public school listings addresses and phone numbers; 7.
Coast Guard resources and phone numbers; 8.
The State Emergency Equipment Stockpile inventory.
9.
A procedure titled " Emergency Employment of Army and other Rescurces (Use of Troops, Equipment and Facilities, New York State Military Forces)."
10 State Emergency Management Office Emergency Operations Telephone Directory containing key State, Nassau and Suffolk County, and Federal contacts and telephone numbers.
- 11. 49 ferries their capacities and daytime and nighttime numbers; telephone l
. numbers for about 150 boating facilities, marina and yacht clubs; telephone numbers for 35 charter boats.
12 Generator and portable pump capabilities for each of 118 fire departments.
- 13. Town Contacts for Handicapped Affairs, names, addresses u d telephone numbers; Issuing Offices for Handicapped Parking Permits, names, addresses and telephone numbers.
- 14. Hazardous materials ar.d related information resources (including nuclear).
15.
Information for contacting Senior Citizens including contacts for the Home Energy Assistance Program and Senior Nutrition Centers and nursing homes.
- 16. Health Services Department emergency telephone numbers.
Shoreham SSER 10 C-5
i l
- 17. Names, addresses and telephone numbers for contractors for: heavy equipment, materials and equipment supplies, wrecking contractors, rigging contractors, truck hires, tankers, engineering services, bulldozers, wreckers, amphibians, loading barges, barge mounted cranes and divers.
- 18. Listing for hospitals indicating normal bed capacity, emergency bed capacity and refrigerator morgues; Listings for medical supply companies and drug companies; Listings for local newspapers and community publica-tions.
- 19. Distribution of County owned busses, school busses and trucks including capacities, location and telephone numbers.
- 20. Listings of designated severe weather shelters by town.
Annex K to the New York State Plan Annex X to the Emergency Operations Plan of New York State titled " Radiological Intelligence" is also Annex K to the county plan and it identifies the mission of the Radiological Intelligence Section as:
...to direct and coordinate activitics in detecting, measuring, evaluating and reporting weapon effects, the extent and magnitude of fallout radiation, and chemical and biological hazards; to advise the Director on remedial Radiological Defense (RADEF) actions to be taken such as shelter, relocation, etc., to protect the population from these hazards; to supervise radiological monitocing and decontamination procedures at the E0C; to coordinate Civil Air Patrol (CAP) emergency services; to provide support assistance during natural disasters, and to assist State and local health officials in detecting and monitoring radiation hazards resulting from accidents or disasters involving radioactive materials."
(emphasis added)
Although primarily a civil defense plan, the State plan includes guidelines intended to provide first-on-the scene emergency response personnel with guidance on handling accidents involving either chemical and/or radioactive materials. The plan includes the location and inventory of radiological monitoring equipment throughout the State and procedures for reporting and plotting readings. According to the plan, Suffolk County has:
96 Fixed Monitoring Kits, 13 Mobile Monitoring Kits, 431 Shelter Kits, 2 Remote Monitors, 1 Aerial Survey Instrument, Instrument Training Set, 58 School Kits, 6,000 Dosimeters and 180 Chargers. Nassau County has: 6 Fixed Monitoring Kits, 86 Mobile Monitoring Kits, 485 Shelter Kits, 1 Remote Monitor, 2 Aerial Survey Instruments, 1 Training Set, O School Kits, 9,000 Dosimeters and 290 Chargers.
The locations of the equipment and established and equipped monitoring stations are identified. The plan also includes the standard operating procedure and for the Radiological Intelligence Section and their interface with other organizations in assisting health officials in detecting and monitoring radia-i tion hazards resulting from peacetime accidents. This involves the coordina-tion of measurements from fixed, mobile and aerial based detection systems.
Finally, the plan includes information on ingestion pathway protective measures i
and a contact for the New York State Warning Point (NAWAS).
i i
Shoreham SSER 10 C-6 L_____-_____-____--___-___
u 5. NuCLuR REovLAf oRv Co M,uioN i R E POR T huu.E R, A..
e,., r,oc. a., vo, No.., e,,
7 geoRMm NUREG-0420 Ofi d'7 BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET Supplement No. 10 5EE (N$TRUCTIONS ON TME REVERSE 3 LE AVE BLANE
- 2. TITLE AND SU81aTLE Safety Evaluation Report related to the operation -of Shoreham Nuclear. Power Station, Unit No.1 4 DATE REPORT COMPLETED MON 1M vEAR APRIL 1989 a AuTRORi5, 6 DATE REPORT ISSUED MONTH YEAR APRIL 1989 7 8 ERFORMING ORGANtlAflON NAME AND MAILING ADORESS flaciudele Lodri 6 PROJECTei A5R %ORK UNil NUMSER Division'of Reactor Projects I/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 5,N OR oa A~i ~UM.E R U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,_0.C. 20555 10 SPONSORING ORGANil AT,ON N AME AND M AILING ADDRESS (f.ectusele Coael Ila T VPE OF REPORT Same as 7. above.
D PERIOD COVERED (Japctus.ve rea) 12 SUPPLEMENT AR Y NOTES Pertains to Docket No. 50-322.
13 ABSTRACT (200 words or tenf.
Supplement 10 (SSER 10) to the Safety Evaluation Report on Long Island Lighting Company's application for a license to operate the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, located in Suffolk County, New York, has been prepared by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
This supplement' addresses several items that have been reviewed by the staff since the previous supplement was issued.
14 DOCUMENT ANALv5f 5 - e a E vWORD5'DESCRtPTOR5 lb AvasLAB+ LIT Y STATEMENT Shoreham, Unit 1 Safety Evaluation Report Unlimited to SECURITv CL A55sFICAflCN a,,,,ea.,
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