ML20245H337

Safety Evaluation Re Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.1 (Part 2) About Vendor Interface Program

ML20245H337
Person / Time
Site:	Browns Ferry
Issue date:	05/01/1989
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML20245H307	List: ML20245H303 ML20245H337
References
GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8905030373
Download: ML20245H337 (3)

Text

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>R Maug y  %, UNITED STATES

f. * *y g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION rn . !j WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 o,, ,e

.,n e ENCLOSURE SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.1 (PART 2)

BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-259, 50-260 AND 50-296

1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND

SUMMARY

On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open on an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.

Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for Operations (ED0), directed the staff to investigate and report on the-generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000, " Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Commission (NRC) requested by Generic Letter (GL) 83-28 dated July 8,1983 (Reference 1) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.

This report is an evaluation of the response submitted by Tennessee Valley Authority, the licensee for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Station, Units 1, 2 and 3, for Item 2.1 (Part 2) of GL 83-28. The actual documents reviewed as part of this evaluation are listed in the references at the end of the report.

Item 2.1 (Part 2) requires the licensee to confirm the establishment and maintenance of a program to ensure that vendor information for components of the Reactor Trip System (RTS) are complete as indicated in the following ,

statements: 1

1. For all components whose functioning is required to trip the reactor, the licensee shall establish, implement and maintain a continuing program to ensure that vendor information is complete, current and controlled throughout the life of the plant, no#28suSs8 bag

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2. The vendor interface program shall include periodic communication j with vendors to assure that all applicable information has been )

received.

3. The program should use a system of positive feedback with vendors for mailings.containing technical infonnation.

4. The program shall also define the interface and division of responsibilities among the licensees and the nuclear and non-nuclear divisions of their vendors that provide service on reactor trip system components to assure that requisite control of and applicable-instructions for maintenance work are provided.

I 2.0 LICENSEE RESPONSE TVA's original responses in November 1983, to GL 83-28, Item 2.1 (Part 2) gave a description of the TVA Operating Experience Review (0ER) Program. That  ;

program has been recently updated and renamed to be the Nuclear Experience i Review (NER) Program. The major elements of_the experience review program ]

described in TVA's initial responses remain valid. Specifically, the corporate i manager of NER still distributes the information to the appropriate organization within TVA to determine applicability and safety significance. The NER program still requires that this information is tracked and that working files are maintained of the disposition of each technical bulletin and Service InformationLetter(SIL).

The TVA NER program is described in TVA Office of Nuclear Power Program Manual Procedure (PMP) 0601.01, " Nuclear Experience Review."~ This program ensures that there will be an ongoing interface with the NSSS suppliers for Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (General Electric), Se and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (Westinghouse)quoyah throughout eachNuclear Plant plant's life.(Westinghouse)

The program is comitted to ensuring that technical information from these vendors is reviewed and, if applicable, incorporated or referenced in each plant design and/or procedures. Westinghouse transmits important NSSS information to TVA by way of technical bulletins. General Electric provides such NSSS information by way of SILs. These are received at TVA and processed by the manager of NER.

TVA acknowledges receipt of these documents by returning a receipt acknowledgement to the appropriate NSSS vendor. In addition to the fact that technical bulletins and SILs are numbered sequentially, Westinghouse i periodically sends current lists of documents which have been recently l transmitted and General Electric sends 'SIL status reports twice yearly. If technical information is received with document numbers out of sequence, the manager of NEP, explores the reasons and takes appropriate steps to obtain any relevent missing information.

3.0 EVALUATION The licensee for Browns the requirements Ferry of item 2.1 Part(Nuclear

2) with aPlant, Unitsdated submittal 1, 2 November ano 3 responded 7, 1983to

3 (Reference 2) and April 1,1987 (Reference 3). The licensee stated in those submittals that General Electric is the NSSS for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2 and 3 and that the RTS is included as part of the General Electric interface program for this plant. The responses also confirm that this interface program includes both periodic communication between General Electric and the licensee and positive feedback from the licensee in the form of signed receipts for technical information transmitted by General Electric.

4.0 CONCLUSION

Based on our review of these responses the NRC staff finds the licensee's statements confirm that a vendor interface program exists with the NSSS vendor for components that are required for performance of the reactor trip function.

This program meets the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 2) of the GL 83-28, and is therefore acceptable.

5.0 REFERENCES

1. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to All Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License and Holders of Construction Permits,

" Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (GL 83-28)," July 8, 1983.

2. Letter, L. M. Mills, Tennessee Valley Authority to Harold R. Denton, NRC, November 7, 1987. I a

3. Letter, R. L. Gridley, Tennessee Valley Authority, to U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, April 1, 1987.

Principal Contributor: T. Daniels  !

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