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[, # %,1 0NITED STATES 9
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
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- WASHINGTON, D.C.
20545 gLQ3J RECEIVED
<, Ums 01 e Docket No. 50-220 JUN s 1ggj968 JUN 21 PM.3 03 i
ll2. ATOM;C ENERGY COMM*
Wiagara Mohauk Power Corporat?.on OFK8Y COMMITTEE ON 300 Erie Boulevard West
- ^ 'w aAFEGUAROS Syracuse, New York 13202 i
d, ;1lVI Attention: Mr. Minot H. Pratt j
i Vice President and b
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Executive Engineer y
Gentlemen:
This refers to Amendment No. 2, de ted June 1,1967, to your appli_
cation for a construction permit and operating licence for the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station located in the town of Scribs, !!cv York.
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During meetings held on April 10 and 11,1963, we discussed several technical aspects of the facility design with your representatives I
and indicated tnat additional information would be necessory to con'i'nue our review. This information concerns seismic desicn, 1
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transient analysis and accident design considerations. A list of l
specific comments illustrating the kind of infcreation needed is 1
enclosed.
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We vill continue our review of the foregoing matters upon receipt of the additional information. We vill be available to discuss and i
clarify any of the specific comments.
AC'IS Committee Members SHB I __
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Peter A. Mc,rris, Director HSI__/__
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Request for Additional Information
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ce; Mr. Arvin E. Upton, Esquire LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae 8904210363 890413 PDR FOIA WETTERHB9-101 PDR__
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IEQUIRED RECEIVED NIIE MILE POINT STATION 2
3 03 NIAGARA Mou.AWK POWER CORPORATION DOCET No. 50-220 (M. ATOM!C ENCEGY COMM*
f M'!SCRT COMMllTEE ON kMW. 5 AFEGU),Ros I,
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Your appliettien defines Class I, Class Il and Class III structures.
.i cnd ccmponents as follows:
Cic s, I Structures an6 Comoonents -
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- 1 Structures and components whose failure could cause i
- i significant release of radioactivity or which are vital 4
i to safe shutdown and isolation of the reacter.
k-5 Class II Structures and Components -
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Structures and components which are important to reactor t-i; operation but are not essential to safe shutdown or isolation, and could not result in substantial release of f'
radioactive materials.
L Cicss IEI Structcres and Components -
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Structures and components that are not esser.tial for safe V
' j shutdown and isolation of the reactor and vtose failure vill b
y not result in significant release of radioactive materials.
7 Define and describe the bases for the limits of the " release of l
fi radioactive materials" associated with each of these definitions, i
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Provide complete lists of Class I and Class II structures and systems, of structures constructed of elements of more than one J.j class, end of Class I equipment housed in, adjacent. to, or supp,orted by a C142ss II or Class III structure. Describe the' design techni, ques 1
y used for Class I and Class II structures.
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3 For Class II structures and for structures consisting in whole or in L
f art of Class I elements, state the criteria used to determine the p
design basis load combinations to be considered and the allowable Lc stresses or the.allovable deformations for each design basis load L r
'fF combination.
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. k.. State the design basis load combinations, allowable etresses and/or i
allowable deformations, and calculated deformations for each e
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strneture, system or component consisting in whole or in part of
- - j ulass I elements.
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'5 Discuss the seismic exposure assumptions and the criteria relating to spectra, amplification, damping end other appropriate factors used in the design of the Class II structures and for structures f
consisting in whole or in part of Class I elenents. Provide,justifica-r tion for the damping levels assumed for the stack.
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':'he Prel1=inary Hazards Summary Report stated that Class II structures will be det,igned for a Ground motion of the O.llg design earthquake.
It.is not clear that this criterion was followed rigorously; please clarify.
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7 Describe the present capability of the plant to withstand a tornedo.
8.
Discuss the basis fbr the development of the acceleration response spectra shown in Plate C-22 of the First Supplement to the i
Preliminary Hazards Summary Report. Were these spectra used in i
f all dynamic analyses? What is the basis for the large "saw tooth"
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vcriation in the range of 0.1 to 0 3 seconds for o percent critical damping? What is the bcsis for the sharp ettnge in acceleration at a period of about 0.12 seconds in all the spectra?
9 For all systems, components, or structures snalysed, were the allowable values for stresses resulting from the combination of operating loads and earthquakes increased by 331/3 percent in accordance with code practices?
k 10.
Describe the method used to combine seismic stresses with the stresses 1
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l caused by operating and other loads.
1 11.
Was the ratio of vertical to horisontal excitation equal to one-half throughout the analyses in all cases?
I 12.
For those cases analyzed using the reserve energy technique, what vos the r:ximum level of deformation that vss permitted in the analysis?
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13 Discuss tne design criteria used to cssure that the function of any L,
structure vill not be lost because sdjacent structures strike each other under scismic excitation. Provide cstimates (with bsses) of the magnitude
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of relctive motions of adjacent structures and a discussion of the f
provisions made to ensure the continued integrity of connections I
(e.g., piping) between buildings. In view of the shaly lacinations et the site, discuss the permanent relative displacements that can
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occur and the design features that ensure required performance under these conditions.
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II.
STRUCTURES 1.
Describe the basis for the selection of the acceleration factor of 0.20g horizontal and 0.10g vertical for the control room i
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components, Vere these factors also used for essentici instrumentation, controls protection cystem and electrical i
p system components in the control room? What accelera' tion facters f
vere used for these components at other locaci~ons?
2.
Describe the portion of the intake structure designed as a Class I structure.
3 Evaluate the effect of vind speed and the shape of the reactor building on the validity of estimated leakage from the reactor building and on the validity of the reactor building leakage
.I tests.
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h.
Evaluate the consequences of a stack failure in which portions of the stack strike the plant.
III. REACTOR i
l 1.
Describe the assumptiom, method of calculation and uncertainty in the prediction of the beginning of life and end of life power Fi coefficients.
f-2.
Describe the model and assumptions used to account for reactivity changes due to void changes caused by rcpid isolation of reactor coolant system (e.G., turbine trip without bypass),
I-i 3
Describe the spacer pellet adjacent to the fuel rod spacers 1n the center fuel pin of each fuel bundle.
4.
What is the expected life of the control rod if water leaks into the B C; what effect would it have on dimensions of the control rod?
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5 Specify the reactor components which cust maintain their functional capabilities to assure safe shutdown of the reactor. For each such component describe:
(a) the design basis load combinations (b) the expected stress and deformation (c) the stress and deformations at which the component l.
is unable to function (d) the margin of safety (e) the effects of irradiation on material properties and deformation limits.
6.
Confirm that the integrity analysis for the res: tor vessel internals is identical to Amendment 12 to Docket Ko. 50-219, Cyster Creek Nuclear Paaer Plant, Unit No.1, Jersey Central Power and Light Company.
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7 Discuss the effects of vibration during normal operation on the components inside the reactor vessel. Describe design features to t
urevent or limit vibration. Describe tests and instrumentation to 4
g c;termine if unexpected vibraticn is present.
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1.
Z3tablish the compatibility of dynamic deformations (for the earthquake 1
l cnd the ecsbined accident plus earthquake conditionc) occurring in the 1
d y ell, theterus and the connecting vents, includins exp:nsion joints a
_i Uo positive enchorage system appears to be provided between the interior concrete structure supportin; the reactor, the lower part of the drywell ehell,an the concrete foundation under the dry well. The dynamic 1
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characteristics of these three structures are very different and their '
l responce to a seismic disturbance will be dissimilar.
In view of this L
provide a discussion of the following:
The validityfbr the assumption tF_t the three structures are c.
rigidly connected at the foundation level. It may be
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that differential sliding of the structures, which =sy rotate about the com.on center of rotation (center of the I
sp _ical part of the dry well) will occur and rupture the bond between the steel and the concrete.
b.
If such sliding occurs, what are the consequences fro' m the 3
e point of view of dyratic stresses and strains for the three
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structures?
If the bond between the steel and the concrete is brokca ccr.
c.
corrosion of the steel shell occur? Consider, in this discus-
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sion the effect of the tc:perature gradient, and of the resulting thercal wpansion of the shell, on the bond betucen steel and concrete.
d.
Provide diagrams for each of the three structures indicating l
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the earthquake accelerations at different levels, the over-a.
turning, or bending eccents cnd the shears, and the rel:.tive i
displacements.
i e.
If the three structures conticted above are interconnected ct h
the bottom, provid.e a discuss, ion of the design of the installed anchors.
If 2.
Provide a detailed diseassion of the design bcs:s for the gap 1
1-between the primary containment and the concrete shielding.
j Discuss the construction technique used. to establish the gap and the caterials involved in the procedure. How is the gap to be
.i ventilated and drained?
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Evaluate the effect of debris in the air Cap between the dryvell and the chielding on the integrity of the containment under 1
accident conditions, i
I 4.
What portion of the drywell air cap can be inspected?
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3 5
Provide snalyses of the deformation of the dry voll vall due to i~
jet forces acting on the vall or on elements connected to the rail i
which show that auch forces vill not result in brecching of the containment. This analysis should include en evalustion of the effect of jets or missiles impinging on the contcinsent at i
i-locations opposite steel flanges at the for: joints that are close to the surfcce of the concreto. Uhat are the applicable g
stress and strain criteria? Is there any possibility of jetc hitting the vall of the toruc of the pressure, suppression chamber?
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We understand that Chicago 3 ridge and Iron Company conducted tects 1
ciculcting the effect of the jet forces on the dryucll cteel shell.
s Discuss the reliability of the results of thece tects ao a;glied j
to the actual conditions exicting during an incident, considering f
that the dynamic effect or the jet cnd the thermal effect of the hot fluid on the steel plctes hcVe beca neglected.
6.
Provide a more detailed deceription of, and the design basis for, i
the containment penetrations, particularly those for high temperature lines. Include (a) the cethods of stress analycis employed for the penetrations, both large and small, to assure their continued 5
integrity under cc:bined normal, seismic and accident loads, (b) the leak test capability for the penetration:, and (c) fatigue desi n 5
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of the penetrations. Include material specifications, NDTT I
considerations, and applicable codes.
7 Describe the effect of jet and reaction loads on the integrity
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of containment, penetrations.
8.
Describe the effect of the loads on containment check valves gj*
on the integrity of the containment -for loads produced from I
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line brecks that occur outside of the containment.
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State the design criteria for the containment valves applicable to insuring their operation during and following an earthquake.
Y 10.
Liscuss the extent to which post-accident containment floodina nas.
been considered in the structural design of the containment vessel, u
h If venting systems have been incorporated into the design, provide j
an evaluation of the selected concept. Indicate the design criteria I
that apply to seismic forces in combination with a flooded containment and the corresponding limiting stress levels and deformations in the r
3 dryvell, in the vents, and in the torus (and its supports).
a Discuss j
the water temperature and the required UDTT.
11.
For each load combination on the containment, discuss how the loads tre shared in the containment supports.
12.
The foundation of the containment rests on bedrock described as i
Substantial Oswego Sandstone. Discuss:
The construction procedure used to avoid damage to a.
rock during the time interval between excavating and installing of foundations.
b.
The shape of the excavation under the containment.
Has
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the rock directly under the dry well foundation been excavated to the same level as the rock under the pressure
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suppression chamber or not?
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The behavior of shaly laminations from the point of view of c.
accelerated weathering during construction.
d.
Supporting evidence for the statement that the behavior of k
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Osweco sandstone under dynamic loading is similar to that t
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of sound rock, despite the lenticular nature of the rock and i
the presence of cross-bedding and shaly laminations. How has 1
j this condition been taken care of in dyncmic analysis of the 1
l structure? What value of dcmping has been used?
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- 13.. Provide a detailed discussion of the primary containment pneumatic testing including the extent to which the acceptance test pressure stress loadings simulctes design basis accident loadings and
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combinations of accident and earthqucke icadings.
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14 Provide a detailed discussion of the primary containment leakage 8
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tests. Describe the supporting baces for the tests cnd include i
a detailed description of test precedures and test results.
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respect to the strength and leak rate test of the drywell and I
pressure suppression system, discucs the following:
l How was the dryvell and the torus supported during these a.
it-tests? If on temporary supports, describe the type i
used and provisions made for removal of the temporary supports
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after the tests. Hcs local overstreccing of the steel plates i
been avoided?
f b.
The lower part of the dryvell shell is sandwiched between
, i the concrete foundation under it and the slab supporting the interior concrete structure; it vill therefore be impossible to inspect this part of the steel shell after the construction is completed. Has the soap bubble test been
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' extended at this location to the full area of the steel plates
- or only to the velded-seems?
15 Provide information to support the claim that the proposed test e
.O methods can demonstrate. the secondary containment building's
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l-c:.pebility to maintain's negative pressure under various environ-
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8 mental conditions.
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- 5. ACTOR AUXILIARY AHD EMERGENCY SYSTEMS
'.1.
Discuss the release of radioactive caterial from the ccaponents stored in the fuel storage pool that can result from heavy objects (e.g., fuel l.
shipping cask) falling upon fuel stored in the pool. Describe the
.f operating restraints or design features which reduce the probability
.i of this type of accident.
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Discuss the. release-of radioactive material that may result if the fully
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loaded fuel shipping cask were to drop from the maximum height (80')
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to which it is raised during fuel transfer operations.
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-3 Discuss the consequences to the valve operations that cecur if-the j
nstrument air supply fails, f
L.
Discuss how the release of radioactive material during refueling or l,
. fuel shipping accidents is detected. How is safety action initiated
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for these releases?
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a??2ZDIX D - SAFSTY ANALYSIS f
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1.
Section 3 7 valve operation i
j.
- a.. Describe the interaction of reactivity effects that determine 1
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the neutron flux vs time characteristic.
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b.
Idcntify the parameters that determine the magnitudes of the l
neutron flux peaks,the number of neutron flux peaks and the
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decay of the neutron flux indicated for this transient.
'A c.
Describe the distribution throu6hout the core of the f
energy released during this transient.
2.
Section 3 11 Turbine Trip with Fcilure of Bypass System a.
Provide curves of reactivity changes vs time for the four (h) seconds following the initiation of the transient.
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6-Provide separate curves for reactivity changes due td each of the following: void changes,. control rod insertion, and Doppler effect.
I J b.
Describe the changes in power density at'the location of void
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collapse, the hot spot factors and MCHFR throughout the core
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c.
What is the tota}. energy stored in the core while the neutron flux is greater than its initial value prior to occurrence
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of the transient.
d.
What is the maximum UO temperature during this transient?
2 e.
Describe the effects on items a thru d above for this transient occurring at the end of c fuel cycle. What is the gap between the Zr clad and UO pell t prior to the transient and at the 2
time of maximum UO temperature after initiation of the trancient?
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