ML20237L230
Text
- - - - - - - - _ - _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ -
DRAFT
'i t
i DIABLO CANYON 1 Concern Items on IDVP Evaluation of L/B and S/B Piping and Pipe Support Design Prepared By:
Isa T. Yin l
April 25, 1984 B708200128 870014 PDR okh1 NEB 7-743 Recenyt+
e-CONTENT P_ age Concern Items - ITR's 30 and 61, "S/B Piping" 3
Concern Items - ITR 59, "L/B Piping" 11 Concern Items - ITR 60, "L/B & S/B Pipe Supports" 17 Table 1 NRC Review of DCP S/B Piping Analysis and Support 5
Calculations - ITR 30 and 61 Table 2 S/B Piping Stress Analysis - ITR 61 6
Table 3 Review of Computer Analyzed Piping - ITR 61 7
Table 4 Completion Review of Computer Analyzed Piping - ITR 61 8
Table 5 Review of Span Rule (M-40) Applications - ITR 61 9
Table 6 Completion Review of Span Rule (M-40) Applications -
10 ITR 61 Table 7 L/B Piping Stress Analysis - ITR 59 13 i
Table 8.L/B Piping Local Stress Analysis - ITR 59 14 Table 9 Overall Reviews of DCP Piping Analysis - ITR 59 15 Table 10 Specific Reviews of DCP Piping Analysis - ITR 59 16 Table 11 L/B Support Calculation - ITR 60 18 Table 12 Review of L/B Pipe Support Analyses Performed 19 by DCP0 - ITR 60 Table 13 Review of L/B Pipe Support Analyses Performed 20 by Cygna and Imprell - 60 Table 14 L/B Support Calculations Completion Review - ITR 60 21 Table 15 S/B Support Calculation - ITR 60 22 23 26 28 2
y
I;
. DRAFT Concern Items - ITR 30 and 61, "S/B Piping"
(
i
]
l J
1.
In reference to Table 1, the justification for. accepting 15,000' of 5/B' f
pipe and the associated 1,500 safety-related supports, without further evaluation, is based on a review of a sample of piping analyses for 5,000' of pipe using the ME-101 computer program.
Analysis Methods Included in the 5,000' of Pipe i
1,000' Hot Pipe 4,000' Cold Pipe
. Thermal - MEL 40 600' - PIPSD p
Seismic -'PIPSD 3,400' - File 44 f
19 ME-101 Analyses were Performed on'the 5000' of Pipe f
10 ME-101 Included:
9 ME-101 Included:
4 active valves How many feet of 4 Code Breaks Pure File 44?
5 SAM / TAMS 2.
In reference to Table 1, are all 15,000' S/B piping that were without additional review, 2" and below?
4 I
3 I
DRAFT 3.-
In conjuction with Item 2 above,'are they all located below F1. El. 140' in containment and auxiliary buildings?
(p. 15) 1 4.
The old span rules contained in PG&E Drawing 049243 for field run of 4" to 2" S/B and Drawing 049239 for field run of 2 " to 4" S/B do not address all piping configurations (p. 6).
The application of these drawings was largely based on undocumented engineering judgements (p. 6).
In view of the situation, the staff would like to know the basis of IDVP acceptance of the 15,000' S/B that were designed by non-uniformly applied S/B span l
l rule criteria, and were without design documentation.
1-5.
With the large amount of identified deficiencies (Tables 2 to 6), why were S/B computer and span rule (M-40) piping analyses considered to be acceptable without expanding sample size of the IDVP review?
i 1
l l
t 4
1 TABLE 1 - ITRs 30 and 61
(-
NRC Review of OCP S/B Piping Analysis and Support Calculations I
I Piping Analysis l
Support Calculation l
Hardware Change i
4 d
- 1. - Total footage of pipe 1.
Total estimated number-l based on summation ofl of supports I
average measurement l l
i on piping isometrics l l
l l
J 43,000 l
3,715 l
l l
l
)
2.
Total ME-101 computerl 2 & 3.
Total pipe supports l 2 & 3.
Total support I
analysis l
evaluated I
modifications l
l including addi-25,000' l
a.
Detailed l
tions, deletions, 1
l analysis 1,800l and component l
l upgrading 1380,
{
l l
- or.1380/2215 =
l l
62.3%
D.
Total M-40 hand l-b.
Prequali fied I
calculations-l s,tandard l
l supports 415l 1
l I
j 3,000' l
2,215l 1
l l
1 4.
Total number of cook-l 4.
Total pipe supports l 4.
None book type analysis l
that have not been l
.]
that were without-l reanalyzed l
J design documentation l l
l and were not verifiedi 1,500 l
1 i
by PG&E l
or 40.4% of total S/B l l
supports l
15,000' l
I or 34.9% of total l
l S/B piping l
l n
i 1
5
i TABLE ?
S/B Piping Stress Analysis - ITR 61 Review l
l l No. of Analyses l No. of Completion l l Analysis l Total No. :l Reviewed l
Review l
l' Method of Analyses ~
(w/ deficiencies)
(w/ deficiencies) l l.
I
- l Computer l l.2.q-l 8 (8) l 3 (2) l l..
1 I
I I
l Span Rule l
(( O l
4 (4) l 4 (4)-
l l
(M-40) l-l l
. l 450 feet of S/B piping were evaluated in ITR 61.
d A.L.J J
s' d S 0
(~ YG>
[s" A-ya y
$;fg rh ca i %.a I'
a h
t l
I~
6 l
i j
,. ~.......
__ _ _ __a
-, 1 d
.(.
TABLE 3 Review of Computer' Analyzed Fiping - ITR 61 l
l l Incorrect Thermall l
l l
l l
l Modes; Valve l
l Incorrect l Piping l
l Analysis l l Weight; Support l Incorrect] Piping l Interference l
l No.
Pipe Size (in.) Modeling; SAM / TAM SIF l Geometry Not Considered]
l l
l l
7-301 l 3/4, 1, 2 l
X l
X l
X l
l l
8-305 l 2
l l
l l
X l
l l
8-306 l 3/4, 2 l
X l
l X
l l
l l
8-310 l 3/4, 2 l
X l
l
.X l
X l
l 8-311 l 3/4, 2 l
X l
l X
l l
l 9-304 1 3/4 l
X l
l l
l l
9-307 l 3/4, 1, 2 l
X l
l l
l l 10-301.,l 1/2, 3/4, 2 l
X
~l X
l l
l-l l
l l
l 1
l 7
4 TABLE 4 Completion Review of Computer Analyzed Pipina - ITR 61
'l Analysis No.
Pipe Size (in.) !
Review Results-1 I
l l
S-118-l 3/4, 1 l No deficiencies identified.
l l
l 1
l l
7-300 1
1 1 Incorrect SIF.
- l I
l l
l l
9-308 1
3/4 l Incorrect comparison of valve i 1
I 1 accelerations to allowables.
l I
l l
1 9
9 8
I
TABLE 5
(
Review of Span Rule (M-40) Applications - ITR 61 1
I 1
l Analysis No.
I 3-303H 6-301H 9-327H 19-307H l
l l
l l
l Pipe Size (in.)
l 3/4 2
1 2
l I
l l
I I
I Incorrect Pipe and Component l
l l
l Flexibility Evaluatio,, Valve l
X X
X l
l I
Weight; Span Weight; Design l
l l
Temperature l
l l
l l
l l
Auxiliary Building Flexible l
l l
Slabs Not Considered I
X l
l l
l l
1 I
I Seismic Stress Acceptability l
l l
Not Documented l
X l
\\
l l
l l SAM / TAM Support Loads Not Shown l
l l
on Review Sheet l
X X
l I
l l
I I
l Anchor Movement Not Considered I
(X) l l
1 1
I I
I l
Underestimate Support Loadings l
X l
l l
1 I
I I
l Active Valve Qualification Not l
l l
Documented I
X l
l l
I (X) An E0I was issued.
l 1
9 I
TABLE 6
-(
Completion Review of Span Rule (M-40) Applications - ITR 61 l Analysis No. l Pipe Size (in.) l Review Results l
l l
l l
3-313H l
1 1 Incorrect spectral acceleration factors l l
l l for support loads.
l l
l l
1 l
8-324H l
1/2, 1 1 Incorrect support design loads.
I I
I I
I l
25-300H l
1 1/2, 2 l Did not use envelope of spectral l
l l
l acceleration factors of the elevations l
j l
l in the building for determining support l l
l l loads.
l l
I I
l l
26-302H l
1 l Same as 25-300H.
l l
1 I
l 10
DRAFT Concern Items - ITR 59, "L/B Piping" 11.
Did IDVP evaluate any L/B Quick Fix disposit' ions that were performed in DCP, SF office before and after June 30, 19837 (p. 3-1) 2.
.Dne of the factors in selecting sample weld attachment for evaluation is the group that performs the analysis.
Why was Imprell work not evaluated?
(p. 3-2) 3.
Was IEB 79-14 requirements adequately implemented?.(p. 3-3) 4.
Since Cloud reviewed mostly preliminary analyses, was there any measures l
taken to check whether or not the " final" package has changed the Cloud review findings and resolutions? (p. 3-4) 5.
Cloud field verification identified several piping interferences. What were the DCP's generic corrective measures?
(p. 9-1) 6.
Need to know the basis for determining the L/8 piping analysis review sample sizes that are disproportional to the work performed by the responsible organizations.
(Table 7) 7.
With the large amount of identified deficiencies (Tables 7 to 10), why were the L/B piping analyses reviewed considered to be acceptable without expanding review sample size ?
11
DRAFT j
8.
Evaluation of W L/B piping analysis appears to be warranted.
(Tables 1
)
tc 2; Attachments 1 to 3)
\\
l 9
J 5
\\
E 12
TABLE 7
(
L/B Piping Stress Analysis - ITR 59 Review l
l l No. of Completion l
1 1
Review Among i
i No. of Piping l
the Selected Design l
Total No.
l Analyses Reviewed l
Piping Analyses Organization of Analyses (w/ deficiencies)
(w/ deficiencies)
DCP0 l
78 l
0 11' ('11) l l
l S
6-(6) l l
l 17 (17) 1 5 (2) i I
l Cygna 1
33 1
0 1.
(1) l l
l S
1 (1) l l
l 2
(2) i 1 (1)
I I
l-Imprell i
136 1
0 1
(1)'
l l
l 5
1 (1) l l
l 2
(2) l 1 (0) l I
l W
l 14 l
0 1
0 l
l l
l l
l I
I I
I I
I I
l 1
NRC Requested l 8-102 l
l l
l l
DCP0 Analyses l 8-111 l
l 0 - Overall Review 5 - Specific Review 1
13
lp 4
' ?
TABLE 8 C
L/B Pipina' Local Stress Analysis - ITR 59 Review l
l No. of Analysis Reviewed Design Organization l Total No. of Analyses I
(w/ deficiencies)
I l
DCP0 l
699 l
15 (4) l l
Cygna l
162 l
8-(4) l I
Imprell l
89 l
0 1
I W
(
Unknown l
0 1
f 14
31 P
C X
A D
4 1
0 P
1 C
X X
X D
6 l
0 l
2 e
)
1 r
X p
(
2 m
I 5
0 P
1 C
X X
D 2
3 a
1 n
1 g
X X
X X
y 4
C s
6 i
0 P
s 1
C X
X y
D l
8 an A
0 0
g 1
P n
C X
X X
X A
D 9
i 5
p 4
i R
P T
2 I
P 0
P C
1 C
X D
D 4
9 fo E
0 L
s 1
P B
w 1
C X
X A
e D
T i
9 ve R
11 P
l 1
C X
X l
D X
a 2
rev 9
O 1
P 1
C X
D 1
8
)
0 P
1 C
X X
(
D 9
0 0
P 1
C X
X X
D 4
I I I I I l I i I I I Il I Il iI I i I lI i I I l lil Ilii d
d e
g
.o n
- sne t
r n
N at nreos gr e
i h
gesi n no F
- d l
s y
eg i pat o i p I
ri e
i B
vi smC ap pp S
es dt i un f n or s
l e ee ns m y
d aW DTdi eu PS o t
ro Mo l
e V
adR r i
c eC p
a m
t t ;or t
t ;t e
t t p n
r t n ceL od c cya r
nt cu A
o ce er one erc r
I o eS f
en r u ;C ap rt o o
N r
g r
ro rse S
reL c
g rf om n
ns oo n
e rp osrd i
P om ceuaM co I
i e c
p co nrt oA ne pc n
i n I
i nC IP aLS IG P e P
I lI 1I ll I Il I I I ll I l I I I I l l I I l i l I l l Il1 I
,!l
. TABLE 10 - ITR 59 Specific Reviews of DCP Piping Analysis
<l l-l l Piping Analysis No.I 4-101 '2-114 7-103 _8-116L 8-117 4A-111 8-102 12-101l l
I 1
l l
Performed By l
DCP Cygna DCP DCP DCP DCP DCP Impre11l l
1 l
l l
Incorrect Valve-l l
l Weight l.
(X)
X (X)
X l'
I I
I I
l Incorrect Design l l
l Pressure;-Response l X
X X
l l
Spectrum l-l l.
l l
~1 l
l Incorrect Support l l_
l Location.
l X
l l
l l
1 i
Incorrect SIF l'
X X
X X
X X
X X
l i
l l
l (X) An E01 was issued.
i I
16
DRAFT
.1 1
Concern Items - ITR'60, "L/B & S/B Pipe Supports"
~
. (
j 4.
A.
L/B Supports 1.
Need to know the basis for determining the L/B support calculation review sample sizes that are disproportional to the work performed by the responsible organizations.
(Table 11) l i
2.
With the large. amount of identified deficiencies, why was the.L/B q
support work done considered to be acceptable without expanding q
review sample size?
(Tables 11 to 14) l t
3.
Evaluation of W L/B piping support calculation appears to be warranted.
(Attachments 1 to 3)
B.
S/B Supports 1.
In reference to Table 10 with less than 1% S/B support calculations evaluated, could it possibly represent all plant' areas, original hardware conditions, support types, etc.? Concern was addressed i
with 100% re-evaluation of computer calculated S/B supports.
1 2.
62.3% S/B support hardware modification was made as'a result of re-evaluation of 2,215 supports.
Shouldn't the remaining 1,500 supports be looked at?
(Table 1)
/
-3 17
e i
i.
i TABLE 11 l
-('
a L/B Support Calculation - ITR 60 Review l
l l No. of Completion l
l l.
Review Among-l l No. of Calculations l the Selected Design i
Total No.
l Reviewed l
Pipe Suppports Organization-of Calculat'lons I
(w/ deficiencies)
(w/ deficiencies)
{
l i
DCP0 l
2089 l
17- (13) l 1 (1) l l
l l
Cygna l
516 l
3 (3) l
-2 (2) l l
l Imprell 1
894 l
2
'(1) l' 1 (0) d 1
I l
W l
505 l
0 l
0-
.I I
-)
a 1
1 i
o j
1 l
18 I
e 4
TABLE 12 - ITR 60 t
Review of L/B Pipe Support Analyses Performed by DCP0 l
l Incorrect orl Incorrect orl l
l l
j-l Lacking of l Lacking of-l Lack of I
l l
l l Steel or IStructural l Reflection l Lack of I
l j
l Support fn land Piping lof As-Built lCalculationlNo Deficiencies l l Support No. calculation l Calculation l Conditions I on Welds Identified l
- 1 1
I I
I I
l 10/70 SL l (X) l X
l X
l l
l l 10/104 SL l l.
l l
l X
l
- l 13/23 SL l X
l l
X l
X l
l l 41/15A l
X l
X l
l X
l l
l 51/4V l
l l
l l
X l
l 51/10R l
l l
l X
l l
l 51/13R, l
l l
l l
X l
l SSA/41A-l l
X l
l X
l l
l 56N/35A l
X l
X l
l X
l l
l 565/6A l
X l
l l
l l
l 57N/90V l
l X
l l
X l
l l 58S/16V l
l l
X l
X l'
l l 585/39V l
l l
l X
1 l
l 58S/44V l
l X
l l
l l
l 63/26V 1
l X
l l
(X) l l
l 85N/34R l
l l
l l
X l
l 98/134R l
X l
X l
l X
l l
l l
1 1
I I
I i
(X) An E01 was. issued.
19 e
TABLE 13 - ITR 60 1
Review of L/B Pipe Support Analyses Performed by Cygna and Imprell l
l l
l Support No.
l 56S/3A 85N/31R 92/11R 58S/37A 58S/69R I
l l
l 1
I l
Performed By l
Cygna Cygna Cygna Imprell Imprell l
l 1
l 1
I I
1 Incorrect or Lacking l
l j
l of Steel or Support i
X X
X 1
j l
fn Calculation l
l t
i l
I I
l Incorrect or Lacking l
l l
l of Structural and I
X X
X l
l Piping Calculation l
l
]
l l
j i
l i
l Lack of Reflection of l
l l
l As-Built Conditions l'
X X
X l
1 1
._.I l
l l
Incorrect or Lacking l
l
)
l of Calculation on l
(X)
X X
l l
Welds l
l l
1 1
I I
Incorrect Base Plate l
I l
Analysis l
X l
l l
1 1
I I
l No Deficiencies l
l l
Identified l
X l
l I
I (X) An E0I was issued, i
I i
20
.l7
.)
- (-'
TABLE 14 - ITR 60 L/B Support Calculations Completion Review l Support No. !
Performed By Review Results l
l l
l-l' DCP0 l Load sheets not included.
I
{
l 41-39A l
I
{
'l l
I l
56N-92R I
Cygna l Incomplete references for loads.
I i
1 l
l l
I l.
57N-34R-l Cygna l Stresses compared to incorrect allowables, l.
l l
l l
I i
i 1
384-181R l
Imprell l No deficiencies identified.
l l
I I
l l
l 21
r I
TABLE 15
(
S/B Support Calculation - ITR 60 Review l
l No. of. Calculations l No. of Completion Design 1-Total No.
l Reviewed l
Review Organization of Calculations (w/ deficiencies)
(w/ deficiencies)
DCP0 - OPEG
'l 1,800*
I 8 (6) l 11 (3)
Estimated Numbers:
w/ Detailed. Calculations 1,800 Standard Supports 415 Old Supports w/o Analyses 1,500 3,715 Total l
e 22
MWM
(
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGION III Reports No. 50-266/81-09; 50-301/81-10 Docket Nos. 50-266; 50-301 Licenses No. DPR-24; CPR-27 Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Company 231 West Michigan Milwaukee, WI 53201 Facility Name:
Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At: Bechtel Power Corporation, San Francisco, CA Inspection Conducted: May
-8, 1981 Inspector:
in
/8
/
Approved By:
ielson, Chief
// /
Materials and Processes Section Inspection Summary Inspection on May 7-8, 1981 (Reports No. 50-266/81-09; 50-301/81-10)
Areas Inspected:
Licensee actions relative to IE Bulletin 79-14, including general discussion on NRC requirements, work procedure review, and review of analysis and calculations. The inspection involved 12 inspector-hours at the A-E's office by one NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
~
23 a
t i
j J
-j i
l I
1.
Westinghouse Work Most parts of the Westinghouse (W) stress calculations, such as computer configuration models and output details were considered to be proprietary information.
To verify the adequacy of W evaluations Bechtel re-ran two of the stress calculations on their ME-101 computer program. W Calculation, No. P-136, "SI From Penetration P-22 to RPV (SI-601R-2, SI-2501R, RC-2501R-5):
dated January 3, 1980 was compared in the areas of system modes / frequencies, stresses, forces, moments, and defections, on January 14, 1981 and was determined to be acceptable by the Bechtel engineers. The second W Calcula-tion, No. P-120, "SI from P27 to RCS", dated November 21, 1979 was deter-mined to be unacceptable, and the W calculation was subsequently superseded.
The inspector reviewed the W 1etter, WEP-81-10, to Bechtel Power Corporation,
' dated March 17, 1981, which stated that W performed a thorough' comparison between its internal analysis packages and the data previously provided.by Bechtel, and had found no differences, except P-120. The second W submittal of P-120 calculation was evaluated by Bechtel engineers on January 13, 1980, and was considered to be acceptable.
In review of the W and Bechtel calculation packages, including the com-parison data and in discussions held with the licensee and Bechtel j
representatives, the inspector considers the licensee measures taken to resolve the subject concern to be adequate. Such consideration was based on:
Since the original 38 W calculations were made, there were some system a.
modifications that invalidated the W analysis. The affected systems were re-calculated by Bechtel. As of the date of the inspection, there were 23 W packages in final scatus.
f'i
- Y
- /-
27
~
(
b.
A licensee audit of y was performed at the y Design Engineering office on September 16, 1980. No problem areas were observed by the licensee. The licensee a'udit included three stress calculations pertaining to piping isometric drawings P-143 and P-128.
The load combination methods utilized by y, i.e., the absolute value c.
summation, was considered more conservative than Bechtel's method of using the square root of the sum of the squares, d.
For some of the stress values where Bechtel exceeded the y computation, the explanation was that frequencies calculated for y and Bechtel were slightly different in the first five vibration modes. The differences in stress and deflection magnitudes evaluated were not considered to be significant. The inspector concurred with Bechtel's determination.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified as a result of the record review.
j e
1 l
l 1
i l
i e
~
27
C C
A& lgs 2.
.1 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 1
l Report No. 50-454/83-06(DE); 50-455/83-05(DE) l Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. CPPR-130; CPPR-131 Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 l
l Facility Name:
Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Byron Site, Byron, Illinois Sargent & Lundy Engineers (S&L), Chicago, Illinois Commonwealth Edison Company (Ceco), Chicago, Illinois Inspection Conducted:
December 27-29, 1982, and January 27-28, 1983 at site January 11-13, and 17, 1983 at S&L January 19, 1983 at Commonwealth Edison Company l ? 1 8 c. u U C m Inspector:
T. Yin 5 2'/#.5 xmi 6N~~
Approved By:
D. H. Danielson, Chief Y3r[i3 Materials & Processes Section Inspection Summary Inspection on December'27-29, 1982 and January 11-13, 17, 19 and 27-28, 1983 (Reports No. 50-454/83-06(DE); 50-455/83-05(DE))
Areas Inspected:
Inspection of piping suspension system installation and inspection program including site hanger design control, and S&L design pro-visions for the pipe whip restraints. The inspection involved a total.of 38 inspector-hours on site, at the A-E's office, and at Ceco office by one NRC inspector.
Results:
Within the areas inspected, four apparent violations were identified (department memorandum were used to document friction anchor desig
- Paragraph 2; lack of site hanger nonconformance control - Paragr,n procedure aph 3; lack of licensee corrective action to prevent snubber damage during installation -
Paragraph 4; lack of S&L pipe whip restraint design control - Paragraph 6).
deus *
-(
1 l
l 2.
W Design of Friction Anchors I
The inspector reviewed the y Disposition of Hunter Field Problem No. FC 05119A, Revision A, dated November 29, 1982 and W calculation
" Unit 1 Auxiliar! Building Drawing No. 1FC05119A, Line No. 1FC22A-2" i
Area 6, Intestace with Hanger IFC501011," dated December 17, 1982.
)
In checking the design methods for the friction anchor, the inspector observeJ that the procedure was documented in a Structural Design Engineering Department Memorandum to G. J. O' Hare and J. Shulm' ann, "ELCE', Friction Anchor Capacities", dated December 13, 1982.
This memorandum was not included in the BPSS Group" SAMUI Approved Structural Reference List", Revision 0, dated November 5, 1982.
The use of inter-department memorandum to document design procedures bypasses the site document control system.
This is a violation (454/83-06-02; 455/83-05-02).
27 l
u
$f &f i
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
(
REGION III Report No. 50-454/83-20(DE); 50-455/83-17(DE)
Docket Nos. 50-454; 50-455 Licenses No. CPPR-130; CPPR-131 l
Licensee:
Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690 Facility Name:
Byron Station, Units 1 and 2 Inspection At:
Byron Site, Byron, IL Sargent & Lundy Engineers (S&L), Chicago, IL Inspection Conducted: May 3-4, 9-10, 1983 at site May 12, 1983 at S&L
- bydb.-.
. Inspector nI. T. Yin 0
PJ D.H.9Vb-YC%
dl/
Danielson, Chief 0
N Approved By:
Materials & Processes Section Inspection Summary Inspection on May 3-4, 9-10, and 12, 1983 (Report No. 50-454/83-20(DE);
50-455/83-17(DE))
Areas Inspected:
Inspe'ction of pipe whip restraint (WR) installation and QC inspection program; steam generator snubber specification, testing, and installation; Westinghouse (W) snubber system design.
The inspection involved a total of 36 inspector-hours on site and at the AE's office by one NRC inspector.
Results: Within the areas inspected, four apparent violations were identified (inadequate QC for WR installation-Paragraph 2.a; inadequate CECO audit of site VR activities-Paragraph 2.a.(3); nonconforming steam generator snubber
}
conditions were not identified, controlled, and corrected in a timely manner-
)
Paragraph 2.b; lack of adequate measures to prevent steam generator snubber damage after installation-Paragraph 2.b).
J i
28
1
~
t
(
r O,
c.
Inspection of Westinghouse (W) Snubber Design During inspection of steam generator snubbers in Byron Unit 1, the inspector also checked piping snubber installations on the four main feedwater lines that connect to the four steam generators.
No-abnormalities were identified except with snubber M-1FWO9001S, a PSA 35 snubber with a faulted condition loading of 35,240 lbf.
The i
snubber was installed on the other end of the 6" pipe 1FW87CD-6" elbow that was welded directly to the SG nozzle. The inspector dis-cussed the following concerns with the W site management, including:
9 (1) if there is a difference between the steam generator snubber or pipe snubber lock-up rates, the SG nozzle could experience excessive " lock-in" stresses (2) if the piping stress analysis modeled the nozzle as a pipe anchor, as is normal industrial practice, the small amount of dynamic / seismic movements may not be sufficient to cause the snubber to lock-up and perform its intended function.
The V engineers reviewed the piping stress analysis and concluded that'the steam generator snubber will lock up ahead of the PS.A snubber, however, piping seismic motions (anchor movement of 0.079", SSE of 0.026" and OBE of 0.008") were insufficient to ensure snubber functionability,.and as a result j!
the snubber was deleted in ECN No. 48436, dated May 9, 1983.
l The W engineers further stated, that with the removal of the snubber, the pipe str' esses were still within code allowable at both the OBE and SSE conditions.
In review of a W internal letter from the Manager, Commonwealth I
Edison Projects to Projects Engineering Manager, Byron and Braidwood Projects, " Byron Station Unit 1, Review for Snubber Close to Equipment", dated May 10, 1983, the inspector concurred
)
with the W proposed sample review plan to be completed by l
June 10, 1983 for reviewing similar problems. Followup inspec-tions are planned.
This is an unresolved item (454/83-20-08; 455/83-17-08).
j t
(
q i
l b
N