Letter Sequence Approval |
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MONTHYEAR05000346/LER-1986-028, :on 860710,review of B&W Small Break LOCA Licensing Analyses Identified Potentially Nonconservative Input Assumptions.Caused by Lack of Util Involvement in B&W Analyses Performed in 1972 & 19731986-08-10010 August 1986
- on 860710,review of B&W Small Break LOCA Licensing Analyses Identified Potentially Nonconservative Input Assumptions.Caused by Lack of Util Involvement in B&W Analyses Performed in 1972 & 1973
Project stage: Other ML20214T7501986-09-11011 September 1986 DB Small-Break LOCA Analysis Assumptions Evaluation Project stage: Other ML20214T7231986-11-25025 November 1986 Informs of Major Discrepancies Between B&W Topical Rept BAW-10075A,Rev 1, Multinode Analysis of Small Breaks for B&W 177-Fuel Assembly...Plants W/Raised Loop Arrangements & Internal Vent Valves, & as-built Configuration of Plant Project stage: Other 05000346/LER-1986-028, :on 860710,review of B&W LOCA Licensing Analyses Performed for Util Identified Potentially Nonconservative Input Assumptions.Caused by Lack of Communication Between B&W & Util1986-12-10010 December 1986
- on 860710,review of B&W LOCA Licensing Analyses Performed for Util Identified Potentially Nonconservative Input Assumptions.Caused by Lack of Communication Between B&W & Util
Project stage: Other ML20236U6531987-11-27027 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Effects of Errors in Util Analysis of Small Break Loca.Use of Incorrect Values in Analysis Results in Incomplete Compliance w/10CFR50,App K.Plant Poses No Risk to Public Health Due to Meeting 10CFR50.46 Requirements Project stage: Approval ML20236U6471987-11-27027 November 1987 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re Assessment of Errors in Util Analysis for Small Break Loca,Per 860718 Request.Incorrect Values Used in Analysis Result in Incomplete Compliance W/ 10CFR50,App K.Performance Requirements of 10CFR50.46 Met Project stage: Approval 1986-08-10
[Table View] |
Safety Evaluation Re Effects of Errors in Util Analysis of Small Break Loca.Use of Incorrect Values in Analysis Results in Incomplete Compliance w/10CFR50,App K.Plant Poses No Risk to Public Health Due to Meeting 10CFR50.46 RequirementsML20236U653 |
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ML20236U649 |
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TAC-62086, NUDOCS 8712030260 |
Download: ML20236U653 (9) |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20211B0271999-08-13013 August 1999 SER Accepting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief RR-A16,RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant, Unit 1 ML20212H9961999-06-22022 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 233 to License NPF-3 ML20195K2871999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20207G6661999-06-0808 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 232 to License NPF-3 ML20206U7371999-05-19019 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 231 to License NPF-3 ML20206U2441999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 229 to License NPF-3 ML20199H5931999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Thermo-Lag Re Ampacity Derating Issues for Plant ML20198K7671998-12-21021 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 228 to License NPF-3 ML20155B6781998-10-28028 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Reduction in Commitment Changes in QA Program Matl Receipt Insp Process ML20236R1441998-07-15015 July 1998 SER Related to Quality Assurance Program Description Changes for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236M9411998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 225 to License NPF-3 ML20236K4321998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 224 to License NPF-03 ML20236K3981998-06-30030 June 1998 SER Accepting in Part & Denying in Part Relief Requests from Some of ASME Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K5131998-06-29029 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternate Emergency Operations Facility Location for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20249A7551998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 223 to License NPF-3 ML20249A7661998-06-11011 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 222 to License NPF-3 ML20216B9401998-04-15015 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 221 to License NPF-3 ML20216B8381998-04-14014 April 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 220 to License NPF-3 ML20202C6131998-02-0303 February 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 219 to License NPF-3 ML20199J9511998-01-30030 January 1998 SER Related to Exemption from Section Iii.O of App R,To 10CFR50,for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20198R4771998-01-13013 January 1998 SER Approving Second 10-year Interval Inservice Inspection Program Plan Requests for Relief for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20203B2141997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 218 to License NPF-3 ML20203C1401997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 217 to License NPF-3 ML20203C2701997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 216 to License NPF-3 ML20137G5721997-03-24024 March 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 215 to License NPF-3 ML20138L0491997-02-11011 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 214 to License NPF-3 ML20138L0661997-02-10010 February 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 213 to License NPF-3 ML20134J7781996-11-0808 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 212 to License NPF-3 ML20128L3001996-10-0202 October 1996 SER Supporting Dbnp IPE Process of Identifying Most Likely Severe Accidents & Severe Accident Vulnerabilities ML20107K3131996-04-23023 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 211 to License NPF-7 ML20107J6371996-04-19019 April 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 201 to License NPF-3 ML20101Q5951996-03-29029 March 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 209 to License NPF-3 ML20100L0561996-02-27027 February 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 207 to License NPF-3 ML20095E3571995-12-0808 December 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 204 to License NPF-3 ML20095E3271995-12-0808 December 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 203 to License NPF-3 ML20094M4031995-11-17017 November 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 202 to License NPF-3 ML20094L4821995-11-14014 November 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 201 to License NPF-3 ML20092A1721995-09-0505 September 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 200 to License NPF-3 ML20086M1321995-07-20020 July 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 199 to License NPF-3 ML20083K5641995-05-0303 May 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 198 to License NPF-3 ML20081J2341995-03-22022 March 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 197 to License NPF-3 ML20081H1031995-03-21021 March 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 196 to License NPF-3 ML20080L9501995-02-27027 February 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 195 to License NPF-3 ML20078C1531995-01-17017 January 1995 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 194 to License NPF-3 ML20076J3031994-10-18018 October 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 193 to License NPF-3 ML20076G9421994-10-0707 October 1994 SER Supporting Amend 192 to License NPF-3 ML20071N4211994-07-27027 July 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 190 to License NPF-3 ML20070K9001994-07-22022 July 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 189 to License NPF-3 ML20070C7971994-06-28028 June 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 188 to License NPF-3 Unit 1 ML20065C7791994-03-28028 March 1994 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 185 to License NPF-3 1999-08-13
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217K1231999-10-14014 October 1999 Revised Positions for DBNPS & PNPP QA Program ML20217D5441999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.With 05000346/LER-1998-011, :on 981014,manual Reactor Trip Occurred.Caused by Component Cooling Water Sys Leak.Breaker Being Installed Into D1 Bus cubicle.AACD1 Was Removed from Cubicle1999-09-0303 September 1999
- on 981014,manual Reactor Trip Occurred.Caused by Component Cooling Water Sys Leak.Breaker Being Installed Into D1 Bus cubicle.AACD1 Was Removed from Cubicle
ML20211R0811999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1999-003, :on 990727,failure to Perform Engineering Evaluation for Pressurizer Cooldown Rate Exceeding TS Limit Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Provided Required Reading for Operators.With1999-08-26026 August 1999
- on 990727,failure to Perform Engineering Evaluation for Pressurizer Cooldown Rate Exceeding TS Limit Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Provided Required Reading for Operators.With
ML20211B0271999-08-13013 August 1999 SER Accepting Second 10-year Interval Inservice Insp Requests for Relief RR-A16,RR-A17 & RR-B9 for Plant, Unit 1 ML20210Q8541999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20209E6231999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1998-013, :on 981105,safety Valve Rupture Disks May Induce Excessive Eccentric Loading of Pressurizer Vessel Nozzles.Caused by Failure of RCS Pressure Boundary.Plant Mod Was Implemented in May of 1999.With1999-06-24024 June 1999
- on 981105,safety Valve Rupture Disks May Induce Excessive Eccentric Loading of Pressurizer Vessel Nozzles.Caused by Failure of RCS Pressure Boundary.Plant Mod Was Implemented in May of 1999.With
ML20212H9961999-06-22022 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 233 to License NPF-3 ML20195K2871999-06-16016 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Licensee Response to GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves ML20207G6661999-06-0808 June 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 232 to License NPF-3 ML20195F4871999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20207E8011999-05-19019 May 1999 Non-proprietary Rev 2 to HI-981933, Design & Licensing Rept DBNPS Unit 1 Cask Pit Rack Installation Project ML20206U7371999-05-19019 May 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 231 to License NPF-3 ML20207F4351999-05-0404 May 1999 Rev 1 to DBNPS Emergency Preparedness Evaluated Exercise Manual 990504 ML20206M6341999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Station,Unit 1.With ML20205M2931999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.With 05000346/LER-1999-002, :on 990208,both Trains of Emergency Ventilation Sys Were Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Unattended Open Door. Door Was Immediately Closed Upon Discovery.With1999-03-0505 March 1999
- on 990208,both Trains of Emergency Ventilation Sys Were Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Unattended Open Door. Door Was Immediately Closed Upon Discovery.With
ML20207J1461999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20206U2441999-02-0909 February 1999 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 229 to License NPF-3 ML20199H5931999-01-20020 January 1999 Safety Evaluation Accepting Thermo-Lag Re Ampacity Derating Issues for Plant ML20199E2501998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20204J6751998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Dbnps,Unit 1,PNPP,Unit 1 & BVPS Units 1 & 2 ML20206B0101998-12-31031 December 1998 1998 Annual Rept for Firstenergy Corp, for Perry Nuclear Power Plant & Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station.Form 10-K Annual Rept to Us Securities & Exchange Commission for Fiscal Yr Ending 981231,encl ML20205K5781998-12-31031 December 1998 Waterhammer Phenomena in Containment Air Cooler Swss ML20198K7671998-12-21021 December 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 228 to License NPF-3 ML20197J3441998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1998-012, :on 981018,reactor Trip Occurred from Approx 4% Power Due to ARTS Signal.Caused by Inadequate Design Drawing Resulting in Inadequate Procedure.Procedure Revised to Correct Deficiency.With1998-11-17017 November 1998
- on 981018,reactor Trip Occurred from Approx 4% Power Due to ARTS Signal.Caused by Inadequate Design Drawing Resulting in Inadequate Procedure.Procedure Revised to Correct Deficiency.With
05000346/LER-1998-011, :on 981014,manual RT Due to Ccws Leak Was Noted.Caused by Failure of One Letdown Cooler Rupture Disk. All Letdown Cooler Rupture Disks Were Replaced Prior to Plant Restart.With1998-11-13013 November 1998
- on 981014,manual RT Due to Ccws Leak Was Noted.Caused by Failure of One Letdown Cooler Rupture Disk. All Letdown Cooler Rupture Disks Were Replaced Prior to Plant Restart.With
05000346/LER-1998-009, :on 980909,RCS Pressurizer Spray Valve Was Not Functional with Two of Eight Body to Bonnet Nuts Missing. Caused by Less than Adequate Matl Separation Work Practices. Bonnet Nuts Replaced.With1998-11-13013 November 1998
- on 980909,RCS Pressurizer Spray Valve Was Not Functional with Two of Eight Body to Bonnet Nuts Missing. Caused by Less than Adequate Matl Separation Work Practices. Bonnet Nuts Replaced.With
ML20195D0001998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With ML20155B6781998-10-28028 October 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Reduction in Commitment Changes in QA Program Matl Receipt Insp Process 05000346/LER-1998-010, :on 980924,manual Reactor Trip Was Noted.Caused by Misdiagnosed Failure of Main FW Control Valve Solenoid Valve.Faulty Solenoid valve,SVSP6B1,was Replaced & Tested. with1998-10-26026 October 1998
- on 980924,manual Reactor Trip Was Noted.Caused by Misdiagnosed Failure of Main FW Control Valve Solenoid Valve.Faulty Solenoid valve,SVSP6B1,was Replaced & Tested. with
05000346/LER-1998-008, :on 981001,documented Proceduralized Guidance for Initiation of Post LOCA B Dilution Flow Path.Caused by Design Analysis Oversight.Revised Procedures to Provide Active B Dilution Flow Path Guidance.With1998-10-0101 October 1998
- on 981001,documented Proceduralized Guidance for Initiation of Post LOCA B Dilution Flow Path.Caused by Design Analysis Oversight.Revised Procedures to Provide Active B Dilution Flow Path Guidance.With
ML20154H5801998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1.With 05000346/LER-1998-007, :on 980824,CR Humidifier Ductwork Failure Caused Excessive Opening in Positive Pressure Boundary. Caused by Less than Adequate Fabrication.Evaluation of CR Humidifiers Conducted.With1998-09-22022 September 1998
- on 980824,CR Humidifier Ductwork Failure Caused Excessive Opening in Positive Pressure Boundary. Caused by Less than Adequate Fabrication.Evaluation of CR Humidifiers Conducted.With
ML20151W1611998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1998 for Dbnps.With 05000346/LER-1998-006, :on 980624,loss of Offsite Power Was Noted. Caused by Tornado Damage to Switchyard.Tested & Repaired Affected Electrical & Mechanical Equipment Necessary to Restore Two Offsite Power Sources1998-08-21021 August 1998
- on 980624,loss of Offsite Power Was Noted. Caused by Tornado Damage to Switchyard.Tested & Repaired Affected Electrical & Mechanical Equipment Necessary to Restore Two Offsite Power Sources
ML20237E3171998-08-21021 August 1998 ISI Summary Rept of Eleventh Refueling Outage Activities for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station ML20237B1681998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236U5011998-07-23023 July 1998 Special Rept:On 980624,Unit 1 Site Damaged by Tornado & High Winds.Alert Declared by DBNPS Staff,Dbnps Emergency Response Facilities Activiated & Special Insp Team Deployed to Site by Nrc,As Result of Event ML20236R1441998-07-15015 July 1998 SER Related to Quality Assurance Program Description Changes for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 05000346/LER-1998-004, :on 980601,ductwork for Number 2 Control Room Humidifier Found Disconnected from Humidifier.Caused by Less than Adequate Connection at Humidifier Blower Housing. Ductwork Repaired1998-07-13013 July 1998
- on 980601,ductwork for Number 2 Control Room Humidifier Found Disconnected from Humidifier.Caused by Less than Adequate Connection at Humidifier Blower Housing. Ductwork Repaired
05000346/LER-1998-005, :on 980601,both Low Pressure Injection/Dhr Pumps Were Rendered Inoperable During Testing.Caused by Inadequate Self Checking,Communication & Procedure Usage Work Practices.Operations Mgt Reviewed Expectations1998-07-11011 July 1998
- on 980601,both Low Pressure Injection/Dhr Pumps Were Rendered Inoperable During Testing.Caused by Inadequate Self Checking,Communication & Procedure Usage Work Practices.Operations Mgt Reviewed Expectations
ML20236M9411998-07-0707 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 225 to License NPF-3 ML20236K3981998-06-30030 June 1998 SER Accepting in Part & Denying in Part Relief Requests from Some of ASME Section XI Requirements as Endorsed by 10CFR50.55a for Containment Insp for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K4321998-06-30030 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 224 to License NPF-03 ML20236N7451998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1998 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 ML20236K5131998-06-29029 June 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Proposed Alternate Emergency Operations Facility Location for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station,Unit 1 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
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UNITED STATES l"
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o
g j
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 o
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1 I
REVIEW OF NON-CONSERVATIVE ASSUMPTIONS USED IN SMALL BREAK LOSS-0F-COOLANT-ACCIDENT ANALYSES l
DAVIS-BESSE i
1.0 INTRODUCTION
q By a telephone call on July 10, 1986 and a subsequent follow-up letter j
dated December 10, 1986 (Ref. 1), Toledo Edison Company reported to Region III that non-conservative assumptions were found in the small break loss-of-coolant-accident (SBLOCA) analyses performed by the Babcock and Wilcox Company (B&W) for Davis-Besse (Ref. 8). The non-conservative assumptions used in the SBLOCA analyses were identified as follows: (1)a reactor coolant system (RCS) low pressure trip setpoint of 2065 psia instead of 1900 psia was used, (2) a main feedwater (MFW) coastdown time of 43.5 seconds instead of 7 seconds was assumed, (3) steam generator water was controlled at 32 feet instead of 10 feet by the auxiliary feed-water (AFW) system,and(4)theAFWsystemprovidedwatertobothsteam generators (SG's)insteadofonlyonesteamgeneratorfortheworstcase l
single failure assumption. Region III requested (Ref. 2) NRR's assistance in evaluating the significance of these non-conservative assumptions on the SBLOCA licensing analyses documented in B&W Topical Report BAW-10075A, Revisions 1 (Ref. 8).
The Reactor Systems Branch (RSB) of NRR has reviewed the licensee's assess-ment (Ref. 4) of the effect of these non-conservative assumptions on the l
SBLOCA licensing analyses for Davis-Besse and has prepared the following evaluation.
8712030260 871127 ADOCK0500g6 DR
4
- 2 ;,
2.0 EVALUATION The licensee had B&W perform a qualitative evaluation to determine the impact of the non-conservative assumptions on their SBLOCA analytical results. The results of this evaluation are documented in Reference 4.
The licensee submitted, et the staff's request, Reference 4 for review.
The B&W evaluation in Reference 4 was primarily based on the following B&W analyses:
1)BAW-10075A, Revision 1(Ref.8),2)BAW-10154A(Ref.6),
- 3) calculational results of the high pressure injection line break, core
~
flood tank break and 0.5 ft break, and 4) the auxiliary feedwater system-analysis and other related analyses. The effects of the assumptions on-the SBLOCA analysis are evaluated and summarized below.
2.1 Low Pressure Reactor Trip Setpoint A low pressure reactor trip setpoint of 2065 psia instead of 1900 psia (the Technical Specification value less uncertainty) was used for the SBLOCA licensing analyses. For the licensing analyses, it is assumed that the loss of offsite power occurred when the reactor tripped. Before the reactor trip, the reactor coolant pumps and main feedwater pumps are assumed operational. During this pre-trip period, the SG's maintain full heat removal capacity and thus maintain a balance between the reactor heat generation and SG heat removal. Furthermore, the results of recent analyses (Ref 5) performed by B&W indicated that the use of a 2065 psia, instead of 1900 psia, 1cw pressure reactor trip setpoint only delays the l
.. trip tiine and has an insignificant effect on the SBLOCA analysis results because of the maintainance of full SG heat transfer capacity prior to reacter trip.
I Based upon the licensee's evaluation, the recent analytical results and the staff's assessment of the licenstrg assumptions, the staff concludes thtt this assumption has minimal inptet on the SBLOCA analysis results for Davis-Besse.
2.2 Steam Generator Models The steam generator heat transfer models are affected by the following assumptions:
(1)thenumberofSG'savailable;(2)theSGlevel l
control setpoint; and (3) MFW coastdown time. The current Davis-Besse SSLOCA analyscs assumed that both SG's received flow from the AFW system. However, the worst single failure event assumed for the SBLOCA licensing analyses is loss of one diesel generator. For Davis Besse, this failure results in the AFW system providing flow to only one SG.
The AFW system is actuated in the SBLOCA analyses based upon the loss of offsite power assumed at the time of reactor trip. After accounting for the startup of the AFW system, the analysis assures full AFW flow until the SB level reaches its level control setpoint. Within the Davis-Besse SLLOCA analyses, the SG level control setpoint was assumed
4_
to be 32 feet. However, the actual SG 1evel contori setpoint is only 10 feet at Davis-Besse.
Following the reactor trip and loss of offsite power, the MFW pumps trip and coast down. Water is added to the SG during the MFW coast-down period. This coastdown period was assumed to be 43.5 seconds in the Davis-Besse SBLOCA analyses. The licensee repurted that a i
l 7 second coastdown period is more appropriate for the plant.
l To evaluate the impact of these non-conservative assumptions related to SG modeling for the Duis-Besse SBLOCA analyses, B&W examined previous SBLOCA results. These previous Bt.W analyses show that the effect of the SG modeling on the SBLOCA results are functions of break size. For a SBLOCA with a break size larger than 0.02 f t, the blowdown from RCS through the break was sufficient for heat removal and ultimately resulted in a negative tetuperature gradient between the primary and secondary sides of the steam generator. This l
negative temperature gradient resulted in a reverse SG beat transfer (i.e.,theSGservesasaheatsource). These analyses further showed that the reverse SG heat transfer had a negligible effect on the consequences of the SBLOCA. Thus, it was concluded that the non-conservative assumptions for the SG modeling would not have a significant impact on brea'k sizes greater than 0.02 fte.
For smaller size SBLOCA's, B&W stated that SG heat transfer affects the transient and is needed to assure the ECCS performance. However, B&W indicated that their plants were designed to assure that, before any ccre uncovering occurs, the RCS water level decrease would result f
. in steam in the primary side of the SG tube region with adequate heat removal occurring via condensation. Condensation will occur if AFW injection occurs through the AFW nozzles or if the SG secondary side level exceeds the water level in the primary side of the SG tube. As a result of this condensation, the RCS pressure would decrease to a value near that of the secondary side (1000 psia) and would result in l
l sufficient ECCS injection to assure adequate long term cooling for these smaller sized SBLOCAs. Minimum AFW flow and SG pool levels have been determined by B&W which assure an adequate condensing surface.
For the Davis-Besse plant, these calculations show that a 3 foot level in both SG's (equivalent to 6 foot level in one SG) will result in sufficient heat transfer area for those SBLOCA's (such as a 0.01 ft break) where SG heat removal is necessary. Therefore, B&W concluded l
that the 10 foot SG 1evel control setpoint for the AFW system will assure an adequate condensing surface and thereby adequate decay heat removal.
B&W also indicated that the existing analyses showed that sufficient SG heat transfer is available to assure an acceptable ECCS performance for the AFW system controlled at 10 foot level, with or without MFW.
Therefore, B&W concluded that the use of MFW coast down time of 43.5 seconds instead of 7 seconds does not significantly affect the previous SBLOCA analysis results.
i l
1 l
1
.. Based upon the licensee's evaluation and the staff's assessment of the licensing assumptions, the staff concludes that the non-conservative assumptions for the SG modeling have minimal impact on the results of the Davis-Besse SBLOCA analyses results.
2.3 SBLOCA Analysis - 0.04 ft. Break In accordance with the requirements of TMI Action Item II.K.3.31 of NUREG-0737, the licensee recently submitted new SBLOCA analytical results(Ref.5)forreview. A SBLOCA break size of 0.04 ft.' was i
analyzed using a modified version of the 1985 B&W ECCS model (Refs. 6 e
and 7), which satisfied the requirements of TMI Action Item II.K.3.30 and was approved by NRC. The assumptions for the SG availability.
AFW actuation setpoint, MFW coastdown time and low RCS pressure trip l
setpoint used for this analysis are consistent with the Davis-Besse plant configuration and Technical Specification values. Thus, this analysis foms a basis for direct comparison between the results obtained using the appropriate plant data and new computer model versus the previous plant SBLOCA analyses with the non-conservative assumptions and present models. The results of this recent analysis showed that while there were some differences in system response, the performance requirements of 10 CFR 50.46, e.g., peak cladding temperature shall be less than 2200 F, were satisfied. Therefore, the licensee concluded that the non-conservative assumptions had only a small effect on the previous SELOCA analytical results for Davis-Besse.
l
l
, i The analyses of Reference 5 are currently being evaluated by the staff and the review is expected to be completed by December 31, 1987.
Based on the staff's limited examination of these analyses, we find j
that the results further support the licensee's assessment that the noncunservative assumptions discussed in this evaluation have only a'small effect on the SBLOCA licensing analyses.
l l
3.0 _CCNCLOSIONS j
The staff has evaluated the effect of the nonconservative assumptions
]
used in the Davis-Besse SBLOCA analyses. Based on its review of the assessment report (Ref. 4) provided by the licensee, the staff concludes that some of the plant data used in the existing SBLOCA licensing analysis are incorrect, and thus the analyses are not in complete compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.
However, the staff has also concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the Davis-Besse ECCS satisfies the performance requirements of 10 CFR 50.46. Therefore, continued operation of the plant poses no undue risk to the public health and safety.
Revised SBLOCA analyses (Ref. 5) have been submitted by the licensee in order to satisfy the requirements of TMI Action Item II.K.3.31. The' staff is scheduled to complete its review by December.31, 1987. Assuming that the staff finds the licensee's submittal to be acceptable, the staff 1
will then be able to conclude that Devis-Besse is in full compliance with 10 CFR 50 Appendix K and 10 CFR 50.46.
)
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4.0 REFERENCES
1.
Letter with an attachn'ent from 1.. Storz (Toledo Edison) tc NRC, dated December 10, 1986.
2.
Letter from C. Norelius (Region III/NRC) to G. Holaban (NRC), Request l
for Technical Assistance - Potential Non-conservathe Assumptions 1
Used in Davis-Besr,e Small Break LOCA Analysis, dated July 18, 1986.
j h
1 3.
Letter from J. Williarc, Jr. (Toledo Edison) to J.. Stolz (NRC), dated November 6, 1986.
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4.
Lett,er with Attacnment from J. Williams, Jr. (Toledo Edison) to
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J. Stolz (NRC), dated November 25, 1986.
9 5.
Attachment to Reference 3, BAW-1981,-Small Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident Analysis for the B&W 177-FA Raised-Lorp Plant in Response to HUREG-0737, Item II.K.3.31, dated October 1986.
)
6.
BAW-10154A, N. Savani, et al., B&W's Small Break LOCA ECCS Evaluation Model, dated July 1985.
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.i
.; 1 7.
BAW-10092A, Rev. 3, J. Cudlin, et al., CRAFT 2 Fortram Program for j
Digital Simulation of a Multinode Reactor During Loss of Coolant, dated July 1985.
q 8.
BAW-10075A, Rev. 1 Multinode Analysis of Small Breaks for BlW's l
177-Fuel-Assembly Nuclear Plants with Raised Loop Arrangement and Intervals Vent Valves, dated March 1976.
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