ML20236D005

Insp Rept 50-395/87-24 on 870801-0930.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Action on Previous Insp Findings, Onsite Followup of Events & Subsequent Written Repts,Monthly Maint Observation & ESF Sys Walkdown

ML20236D005
Person / Time
Site:	Summer
Issue date:	10/14/1987
From:	Dance H, Hopkins P, Prevatte R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236C935	List: ML20236C932 ML20236C962 ML20236D005
References
RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737, TASK-1.C.6, TASK-TM 50-395-87-24, NUDOCS 8710270441
Download: ML20236D005 (10)

See also: IR 05000395/1987024

Text

UNITED STATES

[gnRico

,

'

o

'

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION 11

["-'

<

n

0 101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

' Ia f ATLANTA, GEORGI A 30323

%,.....

~ Report _No.: 50-395/87-24

Licensee: South Carolina Electric and Gas Company

Columbia, SC 29218

Docket No.: 50-395 License No.: !;PF-12

Facility Name: V. C. Summer

Inspection Conducted: August 1 - September 30, 1987

Inspect rs: l / cwo-7 /0 !/1 7

<3 Rich rd L. Prevatte Date Signed

i f MLn

Perry C. Hopkins

u/,de,

Date igned

Approved by: b (' N /0 / 77

Hugh E. Dance, Section Chief Da.te Sfgned

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

Scope: This routine, announced inspection was conducted by the resident

inspectors onsite, in the areas of licensee action on previous inspection

findings, onsite followup of events and subsequent written reports, monthly

surveillance observations, engineered safety features system walkdown, monthly

maintenance observation, operational safety verification and offsite review

committee.

Results: Two violations were identified, inadequate action for degraded fire

detection equipment and failure to follow precedures.

MO Sobk

G

- _ _ ___ - _ - _ - _______ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ . _ _

.

l

REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

l Licensee Employees

'

D. Nauman, Vice President, Nuclear Operations

0. Bradham, Director, Nuclear Plant Operations

• D. Moore, Director, Quality and Procurement Services

• J. Skolds, Deputy Director, Operations and Maintenance

• G. Soult, Manager, Operations

• M. Browne, Group Manager, Technical and Support Services

M. Quinton, Manager, Maintenance. Services

A. Koon, Manager, Technical Support

G. Putt, Manager, Scheduling and Materials Management

K. Woodward, Manager, Nuclear Education and Training

L. Blue, Manager, Support Services

S. Hunt, Manager, Quality Assurance Surveillance Systems

K. Beale, Manager Nuclear Protection Services

• A. Paglia, Manager Licensing

W. Higgins, Associate Manager, Regulatory Compliance

B. Williams, Supervisor, Operations

NRC Resident Inspectors

• R. Prevatte, Senior Resident Inspector

P. Hopkins, Resident Inspector

Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians,

operators, mechanics, security force members, and office personnel.

• Attended Exit Interview

2. Exit Interview (30702,30703)

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on September 30, 1987,

with those persons indicated in paragraph 1 above. The inspectors

described the areas inspected and discussed the inspection findings. The

licensee acknowledged the violations described in paragraph 6. The

licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials provided to

or reviewed by the inspectors during the inspection.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)

(Closed) Violation 87-14-02, Inadequate system operating procedure for

the service water system. The licensee provided a written response to

this violation in a letter to Region II, dated July 14, 1987. The

inspectors reviewed the licensee's response and corrective actions taken

to prevent recurrence. The service water booster pump low suction trip

switches, which caused this problem, were removed for the start and stop

_ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _

_

i

!

'

.

2

.

'

circuits of these pumps under modifications 21234 and 21234B. Since these

trip circuits no longer exist, procedural changes are not required. This *

item is closed.

(0 pen) Inspector Followup Item 85-23-01, Determination of inspection l

requirements for seismically designed steel platforms. The inspectors

reviewed the licensee's progress to date on this item. The licensee and

its Architect Engineer (AE) have made a determination of the platforms

that must meet anti-fall down requirements. Quality Control (QC), has  !

inspected and developed as-built drawings of these platforms. It is ,

j

anticipated that the AE will complete their evaluation of the as-built

drawings in September 1987. This item will be reviewed by regional

'

specialists upon completion of the evaluation and implementation of

inspection requirements.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 87-19-01, Inadequate fire patrol. This item is

escalated to a violation and is further discussed under paragraph 6, ,

Operational Safety Verification.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 85-07-05, Retraining requirements for I

non-licensed managers in mitigating core damage. This item was identified l

during a review of the requirements to provide training for non-licensed I

managers in area of mitigating core damage. The licensee had conducted l

the initial training in this area but had not committed to provide this j

training on a regular basis. During a subsequent inspection in this area,  !

the licensee committed to provide this training on a regular basis. The

inspactor reviewed a letter CGSS-13-1244-N0 File No. 950.49 dated ,

October 1, 1985 from M. B. Williams to H. T. Babb in which it was agreed )

that periodic retraining should be given in the area of mitigating core ))

damage. This training was initially conducted in March 1985. Addition-

ally the inspector reviewed Nuclear Operations Education & Training l

Letters dated May 29 and August 5, 1987 which rescheduled the training for

non-licensed managers for the two year interval. Based on the licensee's t

implementation of two year requalification training in mitigating core j

damage for non-licensed managers, this item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 85-24-01, Disposition of spare and

replacement parts under nonconformance (NCN) 1390, hold on Colt Industries

diesel generator parts. The inspector reviewed disposition number 42 of

NCN 1390 to assess the corrective action adequacy for spare and replace-

ment diesel generator parts. The inspector also reviewed approximately 25 )

spare and replacement parts, safety classifications and their associated (

engineering justifications. Based on this review, the licensee has I

completed correction actions required by NCN 1390. This item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item 83-28-01, Independent verification. The

inspector and regional office reviewed the plant's system of independent

verification as implemented by administrative and operating procedures.

The review included a plant memo on the subject dated September 19, 1986, j

SCEG letter to NRC dated December 11, 1980, and several safety system

-

l

l

J

_ _

'

.

3

l

drawings and procedures. -Collectively, the established system meets the  ;

intent of NUREG 0737 Item 1.C.6.

4. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)

1

The inspectors observed surveillance activities of. safety related systems

and components- to ascertain that these- activities were conducted in

accordance with license requirements. The inspectors observed portions of

selected surveillance tests including all aspects of one major surveill-

ance test involving safety related systems. The inspectors also verified

that the required administrative approvals were obtained prior to initi-

ating the test, that the testing was accomplished by qualified personnel,

that. required test instrumentation was properly calibrated, that data met

Technical Specification (TS) requirements, that test discrepancies were

rectified, and that the systems were properly returned to service. The

following specific surveillance activities were observed:

STP 102.001 Source Range Analog Channel Operation Test (N-31,N-32)

STP 105.002 Chemical and Volume Control System Valve Operability Test

STP 106.001 Moveable Rod Insertion Test

STP 114.001 Operational Leakage to Reactor Coolant Pump Seals

STP 108.001 Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio

STP 133.001 Axial Flux Difference Calculation  !

STP 102.002 Nuclear Instrumentation System Power Range Heat Balance

STP 114.002 Operational Leakage Test ,

!

STP 126.002 Spent Fuel Pool Ventilation Operability Test .j

i

STP 127.001 Pressurizer Block Valve Operability Test l

STP 124.001 Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System Operability Test l

STP 125.001 Electric Power System Weekly Test  ;

STP 128.004 Diesel Fire Pump Weekly Test j

i

STP 120.004 Emergency Feedwater Valve Operability Test l

STP 113.001 Remote Shutdown Instruments Channel Check

STP 122.002 Component Cooling Pump Test

STP 301.002 Containment Hydrogen Monitor (1C1-8257 & ICI-8358) Opera-

tional Test ,

l

1

!

j

-_ . _ - - _ _ - _

' '

. ,

'

'

4

.!

b .STP 303.005 Steam . Generator "A" Steam Pressure - Instrument (PT-474)!

Operational Test

STP 345.037' Solid State Protection System Actuation Logic and Master,

Relay Test for Train "A"

STP 345.075 Solid State Protection System' Actuation of Train "A" Rx

Trip Breakers

STP 506.001' Pressurizer Heater Capacity Test

STP 506.002 Reactor Coolant Pump Undervoltage Unit Trip Actuating

Device Operational Test

STP 506.003 Reactor Coolant Pump Underfrequency Unit Trip Actuating

Device Operational. Test

ICP 360.002; Radiation Monitors Calibration,.RMA-3

'

STP 302.022 Steam ; Generator "A" . Narrow Range Level II Instrument

'

-(LT-475) Operational Test

REP 109.001- Estimatect Critical Conditions

STP .,105. 001 - ' Charging Safety Injection. Pump Test

STP.134.001 Shutdown Margin Calculation

STP 137.002: Radiation Monitor Monthly Source Check

STP 123.003 Service Water Valve Operability Test

STP 130.003 Valve Operability Testing (Mode 1, 2, and 3)

STP 148.001 Feedwater Valve Operability Test

STP 128.001 Electric Fire Pump Weekly Test

STP 345.076- Solid State Protection System Actuation of Train "B" Rx

Trip Breakers

STP 302.001 Delta T - Tavg Protection loop 1 Operational Test

STP 106.002 . Rod Position Indication Operational Test

STP 134.001 Shutdown Margin Calculation

STP 345.039 Reactor Trip P-4 Trip Actuating Device Operational Test

E0P 1.1 Reactor Trip Recovery Evaluation

.No violations or deviations were identified. i

!

_ _ _ _ - _ - - _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ - - _ _ - -

- -- .

,

i

g:

5 1

5. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703) <

The inspectors observed maintenance activities of safety related systems

and components 'to ascertain that these activities were conducted in.

-

accordance with approved l procedures, TS and appropriate industry codes and

standards. The inspectors also. determined.that the procedures used were- .j

adequate to control the activity, and that these activities were accom-

plished; by qualified personnel. . The inspectors independently verified

that equipment was properly tested before being returned to service.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed several- outstanding job orders to

determine that the licensee was giving priority to safety related mainten-

ance and a backlog which might affect its performance was not developing

on a given system. - The following specific maintenance activities were ,

observed:

MWR 8710489 Retorquing of U-bolts on the-air supply solenoid bracket

- MWR 8701548 Replace filters on the air handling unit for relay room

cooling unit "A"

- MWR 87M0380 , Replace thermal link on the air handling unit in compliance .

with NCN (2227) disposition -l

'

.i

MWR 87G0053 Replace charcoal and filters in the fuel handling building  !

Plemium "B"

'

j

MWR 86T0090 Replace' unqualified fire damper on air handling unit

XFD0025A

MWR 86T0151 Replace butterfly lock on air handling unit XFD0265 ,

MWR 86T0140 Evaluation of the performance of the control room emergency

air cleanup system, for 1EN86-76 y

'l

MWR 107470002 Drain valve, add oil and lubricate and change oil to

chiller XHX0001A, XHX0001B and XHX00010 i

MWR 86T0203 Pull canister, test and replace carbon as needed on air i

handling unit XHA0021C (

MWR 317450010 Remove and reinstall motor and pump for component cooling

MPP0001A 'l

MWR 87E0205 Manufacture and install balancing weights on motor pump '

coupling MPP0043A ,

!

'

PMTS P0094938 Test molded case circuit breaker XME 1DAZY-16KM

MWR 212270002 - Restore sequencer wiring to original drawing design and

perform post-mod, testing per MRF 21227 and MSI 21227-2 for i

the "C" chiller i

!

l

,

g .. ..

..

-

.- -

r . ,,

.q

-

q

,

'*

_ 4 i

6- -

q

MWR 87IOS201 . Inspect and correct wiring.in' rod control room cabinets .j

No violations or deviations were identified. I

6. Operational Safety Verification (71707)-

a.: LThe in'spectors toured the control room, reviewed plant. logs, records

and held discussions with plant staff personnelito -verify that the

plant- was- being operated safely and in conformance 'with applicable '

requirements. Specific items inspected in the contro1~ room included: ,j

.

adequacy of. staffing;and attentiveness of control room personnel, TS! l"

andi procedural.' adherence, operability of equipment and. indicated

control room status, control room logs, tagout books, operating .

..

'.  ;

N ' orders, jumper / bypass controls, computer printouts and. annunciators.

-

.l

'

Tours of.other plant areas were conducted to verify. equipment oper-- ,

ability, control of ignition sources and combustible materials, .the_

-l

' condition of fire detection and extinguishing equipment,.the control- l

of maintenance and' surveillance; activities in. progress, the imple- 1

mentation of radiation protective controls and the physical: security.

plan. . Tours were. conducted during normal and ' random off hour . 1

periods.

'I

<

_b. On July 29,1987, at approximately 7:10 p.m. with the . plant in .

Mode 3, a lightning storm rendered. the Integrated Fire and Security:

.

(IF&S) computer ' inoperable. Compensatory action - was taken to-

establish fire' and security patrols at.that time. y

i

"

Ilhen the Control- Room Supervisor was notified of the IF&S' computer

- failure, he failed to document this in the Restoration and Removal-

(R&R) Log. Since the IF&S computer was not, logged as inoperable, the

containment. air temperature. was . not ' monitored hourly between the

hours of 7:10 p.m. on July 29, 1987-to 2:00 a.m. on July 30, 1987, as

required by TS 3.3.3.7 when the normal instrumentation was inoper-  ;

'

'able.

a The IF&S computer was restored with the exception of the instru-

mentation for fire zones ZZZ, WWW, LLL and-Q at 2:00 a.m. on July 30.

At this time the compensatory fire watches that had been established

j

were discontinued. The failure to. maintain the fire watch in the

above fire' zones was not discovered until 12:30 P.M. on July 30, a

period of approximately 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. This is contrary to the require-

ments of TS 3.3.3.7, which required that an hourly fire watch be

established on the above fire zones while the required instruments-

tion was inoperable.

U This item was previously identified as an unresolved item in report

87-19. This item is upgraded to a violation, " Inadequate action for

,

degraded fire detection equipment", 87-24-01.

!

s

I

-- _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

.

L

7-

c. On September 3, 1987, with the plant in Mode 3, the licensee removed

ESF transformer XTF-4-ES from service for preventative maintenance.

This was tagged out and logged in the R&R log at 5:00 a.m. At

l

8

15 a.m. the 115 kV offsite power source was declared inoperable and

'

the licensee entered the applicable action statement for TS 3.8.1.1.

The remaining _offsite power sources and diesel generators were tested

'

satisfactory at that time. The maintenance was completed and the

transformer was returned to service at 12:00 a.m. on Sept 'ber 3,

1987.

identified by the

A review revealed

licensee, of the abovethe Systemincident, which was

Operating initially (S0P-304), 7.2.kV

Procedure

switchgear precautions specifically state that XTF-4-ES and XTF-5-ES

must be operated in parallel. This is also reiterated in the FSAR

sections 8.2.1 and 8.3.1.1.1. FSAR Appendix 8D, analysis of accep-

table voltage range to be applied to the ESF system, Tables 80-1 and

8D-3 also specified that these two transformers should be operated in

parallel to achieve acceptable voltage to ESF equipment under worst

case accident conditions.

The licensec failed to adhere to the procedural precaution of the S0P

and failed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for operating the 115

kV offsite power source using one transformer instead of the previ-

ously evaluated two transformers in parallel. The licensee also

failed to declare the 115 kV offsite power source inoperable at

5:00 a.m.on September 3, 1987, when XTF-4-ES was removed from

service. This would have required demonstrating the operability of

the remaining A.C. sources by performing the surveillance require-

ments of TS 4.8.1.1.1. A and 4.8.1.1.2. A.3 within one hour versus

three hours and fifteen minutes. This is a violation, " Failure to

follow procedures and evaluate an operation per 50.59", 87-24-03.

The licensee's architectural engineer, Gilbert Commonwealth, on

September 18, 1987, performed an evaluation of this event. This

evaluation indicates that even though equipment voltage would be

lower than previously analyzed, the 7.2 kV and 480 volt safety

related equipment would operate satisfactory,

d. On September 24, 1987 at 10:10 p.m., with the plant in Mode 1 at 100

percent power, a reactor trip occurred. This trip was the result of

a negative rate. Investigation revealed that an instrumentation and

control technician, while performing maintenance activities to

replace a power supply module inside rod control power cabinet 1 BD,

disconnected the module for replacement. When this module was

disconnected, it resulted in deenergizing the control rods in that

group. Inserting the control rods in this group resulted in a

negative rate trip. The applicable vendor wiring diagram indicated

that this module could be replaced at power since it was backed up by

a redundant unit connected in parallel. Further investigation by the

licensee revealed that the neutral connection on the redundant power

supply was terminated in a manner such that when the leads were

lifted the redundant power supply was deenergized.

. _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ - _

'

' '

d'; i ]

. a

.

'

8

' .j

1

'~

q

.The above problem was ' corrected ~on this and the . remaining power- -1

supplies. The unit was restarted on September 25,1987. The

.

licensee is currently preparing an LER-on this event.

1

e. On September 11,1987. at 7:42 a.m. 'with the plant in . Mode 3, an -

Engineered. Safety Features - (ESF) actuation of the motor driven

emergency feedwater pump'(MDEFP) occurred. The above was the result

.of the following; the licensee's procedures permit securing one of

-the two installed MDEFWP's when feedwater demand is insufficient to .

'

. require operation of both pumps. To prevent possible overheating.of. 1

the pumps with minimum flow, one pump is routinely secured. -To

' insure that the secured pump will automatically start on a lo-lo

steam generator level, a - safety injection signal or blackout, the 3

secured MDEFP can not be placed in pull-to-lock position. The steps _ l

taken by the~ licensee. to insure the secured pump would automatically  ;

restart, was to reset 'one-of the secured main feedwater pumps. This

signal, trip of all main feedwater water pumps, is also an' automatic i

start signal for the' MDEFWP's. While operating in hot standby, with-  ;

one MDEFWP operating, the licensee drained portions of the feedwater- '

systems to perform maintenance. - These. actions resulted in tripping

the reset' main feedwater pump. This trip signal resulted in the ESF

actuation of the secured MDEFWP. The licensee is currently preparing _ i

an LER on this event.

f. On' September 22 and 23, 1987, spikes in radiation monitor RMA-l' gas a

channel, resulted in an ESF actuation and isolation of control room

,

-l

ventilation. Air samples indicated negligible activity on both 1

' occasions. The licensee tracked the source of the problem 'to a y

faulty connector. Repairs were- accomplished and the radiation

monitor was' restored to an operable status on September 29, 1987. l

Two viol,ations were identified as discussed in paragraphs b. and c. above, j

l

7. ESF System Walkdown (71710) l

I

The inspectors verified the operability of an engineered safety features

(ESF) system by performing a walkdown of the accessible portions of the i

'

Control Room Ventilation System. The inspectors confirmed that the

licensee's system lineup procedures matched plant drawings and the I

-

as-built configuration. The inspectors looked for equipment conditions

and items that might degrade performance (hangers and supports were

operable, housekeeping, etc.) and inspected the interiors of electrical i

and instrumentation cabinets for debris, loose material, ' jumpers, evidence ,

of rodents, etc. The inspectors verified that valves, including instru-

mentation isolation. valves, were in proper position, power was available, l

and valves were locked as appropriate. The inspectors compared both local -

and remote position indications, i

No violations or deviations were identified.

!

!.

L

L

l;

C____-_____ --- _

,

__- .

.

"

,.

9

Onsite Followup of Events and Subsequent Written Reports (92700, 93713,

'

8.

93702)

The inspectors reviewed the following Licensee Event Reports (LER's) and

Special Procedures Reports (SPR's) to ascertain whether the licensee's

review, corrective action and report of the identified event or deficiency

was in conformance with regulatory requirements, technical specifications,

license conditions, and licensee procedures and controls. Based upon this

review the following items are closed:

LER 87-09 Service water booster pumps tripped on low suction

LER 87-13 Reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage

SPR 86-14 Diesel generator lube oil duplex filter leak

SPR 87-01 Seismically unqualified fire damper installed

LER 87-08 Blocked open fire damper

LER 87-12 Failure of two feedwater isolation valves due to decrease

in local area temperature and defective pressure transducer j

LER 87-14 Failure to perform technical specification surveillance

SPR 87-08 Inoperable fire door assembly

SPR 87-14 Main steam line process radiation monitor inoperable j

LER 84-29 Defective Brown Boveri speed and transfer switches

No violations or deviations were identified. ]

!

9. Offsite Review Committee (40701) {

i

'

The inspectors reviewed certain activities of the nuclear safety review

committee (NSRC) to ascertain whether the offsite review functions were '

conducted in accordance with TS and other regulatory requirements. The

inspectors (1) attended the regular monthly NSRC meeting held on

September 15, 1987 and observed the conduct of the meeting, (2) ascer- l

tained that provisions of the TS dealing with membership, review process, i

frequency, qualifications, etc., were satisfied, and (3) reviewed meeting i

minutes to confirm that decisions and recommendations were accurately 4

reflected in the minutes, and (4) followed up on previously identified l

NSRC activities to independently confirm that recommended corrective

,

l

actions were progressing satisfactorily. Proposals for TS changes I

regarding fire protection, post maintenance tests, procedures changes, l

plant modifications and craft training responses were reviewed.  ;

No violations or deviations were identified.

I  !

.

!