ML20235G351

Facility Changes

ML20235G351
Person / Time
Site:	San Onofre
Issue date:	12/31/1986
From:	Morgan H SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON CO.
To:
References
NUDOCS 8707140214
Download: ML20235G351 (72)

Text

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j, ENCLOSURE 1 SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNITS 1, 2 AND 3 1 1986 FACILITY CHANGES 2!6 h i Index 4 Unit 1

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. Facility' Change No'. Tit 1e "'Pgge s 11-85-3009.01 Switchgear Enclosute Foundation and \

l' Underground Diesel ~ Storage Tank s

1-85-3009.02 Installation of a A re Suppression System i in the Charging Pump Room 2 'j 1-85-3009.03 1 Installation of Portions of the Overa11 %

Y Dedicated Shutdown System (DSD) Emergency \

< Lighting System ,( 3 85-3009.06 Dedicated Safe Shutdown Diesel Generator 4

'l-85-3009.09-Modification and Relocation of Dedicated

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1 Shutdown Panel C-38 7 ( 5 t.I-85-3050.01, Revision 1 Third Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 6 .g 1-85-3060, Revision 1 -

800 MHz Radio System Work Inside  !

Containment 7 i

1-85-3066.46, Revision 1 Dedicated Shutdown System / Appendix R ,

y 1-85-3066.47, Revision 1 Modifications '

8 1 1-85-3066.48, Revision 1 1-85-3008.0, Revision 2 4 Main Control Room (MCR)\ Fire Detection .c PanelReplacementf '6 '

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1-86-3009.05 Dedicated Shutdown System / Appendix R Modifications 10 -l 'l l

1-86-3341.01, Revision 1 Fire Detection and Suppression 12 j 1

j' 1-86-3341.03 Fireproofing/ Fire Barrier System 13

.J z 1 1-}6-3341.15, Revision 1 Post Accident Sampling System (PASS)

A4 Modification 14 ji y,

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8707140214 061231 '

s PDR ADOCK 05000206 R PDR d. 1

1 Index Unit 1 (Continued)

Facility Change No. Title Page 1-86-3341.16 Appendix R Modifications 15 1-86-3400.04 Automatic Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation 17  ;

1-86-3400.13, Revision 1 Uninterruptible Power Supply for Vital Bus No. 4 18 1.m

e Index Unit 2 Facility Change No. Title Page 2-84-6044, Revision 1 HVAC Chillers Automatic Start Interlock 19 2-84-6252, Revision 1 Condenser Vacuum Trip Control Modifications 20 2-85-6193 Secondary Chemistry Alarms 21 2-85-6324, Revision 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Modification 22 2-85-6437, Revision 1 Removal of Internals From 10" Gate Valve 10"-068-C-076 (S2-1219-MU-068) 24 2-85-6574 Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump l Control Modification 25 2-86-6025 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal and Heat Exchanger Flange Gasket Replacement 27

, 2-86-6112.2, Revision 1 Makeup Water Demineralized (MUD) SONGS Units 2 and 3 28 2-86-6143, Revision 1 Modifications to Condensate Storage Tanks T-120 and T-121 29 2-86-6160.02, Revision 1 Addition of Source Range Indicator 30 2-86-6460 Addition of Main Control Room Annunciators for Radiation Monitoring System 31 2-86-6548 Installation of SONGS 2 Cycle 3 CPC/CEAC Revision 06 Software 33 2-86-6571.1 Plant Monitoring System (PMS) Computer Replacement 34 2-86-6573 Name Tag Changes, Villa Park to Serrano 220kV Cutover 35 2-86-6591 Addition of 3-hour Fire Rated Penetration Seals 36 2-86-6621 Modification of the Hydraulic System for the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)

Actuator and Relocation of the Limit Switch Assemblies for MSIV 2HV-8204 and 2HV-8205 37 A

t Index Units 2/3 Facility Change No.- Title Page 2/3-83-808,- Revision 4 Radioactive Process Sample Point

. Modification 38 2/3-84-101,' Revision 1 Relocation of Marotta Valves' 39 2/3-84-6014.3. Respiratory / Service Air System 40 2/3-85-009, Revision 1 Addition of Evacuation Alarm Strobe Lights in Containment to Supplement the Existing Evacuation Sirens and PA System 42' 2/3-85-139- Modification of MSIV-Hydraulic Pump &

Turbine Supervisory Control Interlock Circuits. 43 2/3-85-6161.11 Radiation Monitoring and HVAC upgrading to the Auxiliary Building Elevation 63.5' Addition 44 2/3-85-6581. 800 MHz UHF Repeater Cabinets 45 2/3-86-022 Replacement of Main Steam Drain Line Valves 47 2/3-86-6618 Addition of Radwaste Sump Line to Chemical .

Waste Tank 49

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i Facility Change No. Title Page 3-85-6193 Secondary Chemistry Alarms 50 3-86-6014.4 Respiratory / Service Air System (RSAS)- 51 3-86-6025 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal and Heat Exchanger Flange Gasket Replacement 52

.3-86-6143, Revision 1 Modifications to Condensate Storage Tanks T-120 and T-121 53 3-86-6377 Replacemen't of Main Steam Drain Line Valves 15 4 3-86-6460 Addition of Main Control Room Annunciators for Radiation Monitoring System 56 3-86-6571 Upgrade Computer Room HVAC Recirculation-for New Plant Monitoring System (PMS)

Computer 58 3-86-6571.1 Plant Monitoring System (PMS) Computer Replacement 59 3-86-6591 Addition of 3-hour Fire Rated Penetration Seals 60 3-86-6593.1 Spray Chemical Addition System Replacement with a TSP Passive System 61 3-86-6621 Modification of the Hydraulic System for the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)

Actuator and Relocation of the Limit Switch Assemblies for MSIV 3HV-8204 and 3HV-8205 63 86-6655 Addition of Interlock to Control Room Emergency HVAC System Logic 64 9574u

Facility Change .'l-85-3009.01

-Title Switchgear Enclosure Foundation and Underground Diesel Storage Tank 1

-Description This modification provides for the installation of the following items: ,

A. . Switchgear enclosure foundation, limited to grade beams, drilled

. caissons and subterranean wall.

B. Underground diesel fuel storage tank including transfer pump, leak detection system and other accessories.

C. Underground electrical duct banks and grounding cables.

D. Underground piping from the storage tank.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSA will not be increased as a result of this change. The switchgear foundation is designed for Seismic Category A loadings and is located near the safety related Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB). The structural adequacy of the RAB wall has been verified based on lateral pressures provided by the Geotechnical Consultants. Therefore, all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. The equipment affected by j this change is not governed by Technical Specifications. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

The Fire Hazards Analysis will require revision to reflect the additional fire areas resulting from this modification. The additional fire loading will.not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed, therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis.

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k Facility Change 1-85-3009.02 Title Installation of'a F' ire Suppression System in the Charging Pump Room Description This modification provides for the addition of a Wet Pipe Sprinkler System to the Charging Pump Room. The Sprinkler System is designed and constructed in accordance with NFPA-13 requirements.

Safety-Evaluation The addition of a sprinkler system in the charging pump room will provide fire protection for the charging pump G-8A which is required for dedicated safe shutdown. The failure modes and related effects are identical'to that previously analyzed in the FSA. On the same basis, the results of any potential accident'or malfunction are bounded by existing evaluations in the FSA. There are no changes in the equipment or in one design function of the system, and there are no additional administrative or .;

operational constraints imposed on the affected systems. Therefore, i neither the consequences nor.the probability of occurrence of an accident ';

or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously' evaluated 1 in the FSA will be increased. In addition, this modification will not 1 create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSA.

This modification has no effect on existing Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements governed by the existing Technical

- Speci fications. Therefore, the margin of safety or defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

The Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) will be revised to account for this modification; but the maximum permissible fire loadings are not exceeded.

The Wet Pipe Sprinkler System serves the fire zone 2A. All penetrations ,

for this modification were provided with approved and appropriately rated fire seals. Therefore, the consequences of a design basis fire previously evaluated in the FHA will not be increased by this change.

The system affected by this change is governed by Technical Specification Section 3.14, but the modification does not advarsely affect it. This modification does not modify existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements for the fire protection spray and sprinkler synems; however, Technical Specification change DPR-13-162 has been submitted to incorporate this modification into the pertinent Technical Specification equipment table. Therefore, the

margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change.  ;

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Facility Change 1-85-3009.03 j I \

LTitle Installation of Portions of the Overall Dedicated Shutdown System (DSD)

- Emergency Lighting System 1 Description This modification added one 8-hour emergency lighting unit at the CVI Building. It also added normal lighting fixtures and supports at safe shutdown equipment areas.

Safety Evaluation This modification installed various lighting fixtures and supports to'the Emergency Lighting System, and added one 8-hour emergency light which required electrical cable installation. The. cable was routed in conduit and does not affect the fire loading in that particular fire zone.

This light is nonsafety related ar.d its power supply is taken from a nonsafety related panel. The new circuit does not affect any safety related system either physically or electrically The Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) will be revised to reflect this modification.

The purpose of the 8-hour emergency lighting unit is to provide illumination in the event.of pressurizer heater transfer switch operation ,

to the DSD mode. In addition, the normal light fixtures and supports installed at safe shutdown equipment areas provide continuous illumination capability in those areas during shutdown operations. Since these lights

.were added in accordance with existing design criteria, neither the

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consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSA will be increased by this modification. In addition, this modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSA.

The Emergency Lighting System is not specifically addressed in the existing Technical Specifications. This modification will not affect the Limiting Conditions for Operation, Surveillance Requirements, or other parameters of the Technical Specifications. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

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' Facility' Change 1-85-3009.06

Title Dedicated Safe Shutdown Diesel Generator Description 7

This modification installs a new 2 megawatt, totally enclosed diesel driven generator set complete with'all instrumentation and controls, a fuel day tank, lube oil system, and cooling ' system to comply With Appendix R.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides for the addition of a dedicated diesel generator which will provide power to Dedicated Safe Shutdown equipment to meet 10CFR50, Appendix R requirements. The change has no impact on the original' design basis or function of any plant system. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this modification does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to

. safety previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis (FSA), nor_ does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FHA.

This change has no effect on the existing Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements governed by the existing Technical Specifications. The margin of safety as defined in the basis- for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this modification.

The Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) will require revision to incluc'e these Dedicated Safe Shutdown System components. The addition of these components-will not adversely affect the FHA.

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Facility Change 1-85-3009.09 Title Modification and Relocation of Dedicated Shutdown Panel C-38 Description This modification provides redesign and relocation of Dedicated Shutdown Panel C-38. Additionally, solenoid valve SV-175 is relocated and installed within a three-hour fire protective enclosure. The n. modification is made solely to provide the interconnecting cabling and terminations for i

the Dedicated Shutdown System.

Safety Evaluation The change has no impact on the original design basis or function of any plant system. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this modification does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis (FSA), nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FHA.

This margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this modification. This modification has no effect on any Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance requirements of the existing Technical Specifications, 3.0.2, 3.4.1, or 4.1.6, respectively.

The Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect the relocation of the C-38 Auxiliary Control Panel components from this modification. This alteration neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

Facility Change 1-85-3050.01, Revision 1 Title Third Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Description This modification involves installation of a manually operated Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and motor along with associated piping, supports, valves ,

and instrumentation as part of the Dedicated Safe Shutdown System.

Safety Evaluation l

This modification involves installation of a third Auxiliary Fee'

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Pump which will enhance the plant dedicated safe shutdown position required by 10CFR50, Appendix R. The modification has no adverse impact ,

on the original design basis or function of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. All accident probabilities, consequences and scenarios remain bounded by the existing Final Safety Analysis (FSA) analyses. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of '

occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSA, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSA.

The Auxiliary Feedwater System is governed by Technical Specifications 3.4.1 and 4.1.9. This modification does not impact any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

This modification will require the revision of the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) to account for the additional fire loads, in the new Fire Zone associated with the Dedicated Shutdown System equipment. The additional fire loading due to this modification does not result in exceeding the maximum permissible fire loading. This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

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Facility Change 1-85-3060, Revision 1 1

Title 1 800 MHz Radio System Work.Inside Containment l

Description i This change.provid'es containment access for a radiax coaxial cable'and radio communication between the areas inside containment and outside containment. This change is part of the 800 MHz Radio System with the

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installation of: 7/8" Radiax Coaxial Cable from the Ventilation Equipment Room to a new Penetration WI-7 to be installed under theLEnvironmental '

Qualification Upgrade Project; 7/8" Radiax Coaxial Cable'from Penetration WI-7 to the secondary shield area in the containment sphere; and one Discone Antenna to be located in the secondary shield area inside containment.

This new radio coverage system inside containment is an essential part of site commitments to improve operations, maintenance and safety, and provides communication aid to Health Physics, Emergency Preparedness, Fire Department, Security and/or Contractors with their corresponding mobile '

units and control units outside containment.

The Radiax Slotted Coaxial Cable is designed to function as a continuous antenna. The slots in the corrugated copper cable allow RF signal to be transmitted near the cable.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSA will not be increased as a result of this change. This change provides communication link from inside containment to outside containment as part of the 800 MHz Radio System. This change does not adversely affect the process parameters, pressure boundary, seismic integrity or other design function of any safety or non-safety related system. As such, all accident scenarios, consequences, and probabilities remain bounded by the existing analysis.

This change does not increase the consequences or probability of 3 occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type that any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. The equipment affected by  :

this change is not governed by.any Technical Specifications. This change l does not affect any other existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements. As such, no Technical Specification bases or associated margin of safety is adversely affected.

This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA).

i Facility Change 1-85-3066.46, Revision 1 '

1-85-3066.47, Revision 1 1-85-3066.48, Revision 1 Title Dedicated Shutdown System / Appendix R Modifications Description These modifications involve installation of additional electrical penetrations for the Dedicated Safe Shutdown System (DSD) and 10CFR50 Appendix R additions.

Safety Evaluation These modifications involve installation of new containment electrical penetration assemblies to provide containment pressure integrity and to assure electrical continuity for DSD circuits penetrating containment.

These modifications do not have any other safety related functions and does not affect process parameters, seismic integrity or other design functions of any other safety related systems. Therefore, all potential accidents, probabilities and consequences remain bounded by existing analyses.

In addition, these changes do not increase the consequences or probability I of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis (FSA), nor do they create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSA.

Technical Specifications 3.6.1 and 4.3.1 govern the containment sphere.

However, these modifications do not impact any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements. As such, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect the additional fire leading resulting from these modifications. The additional fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed, therefore, these modifications neither adversely impact the Fire Protection System / Program nor violate the FHA.

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Facility Change 1-85-3068.0, Revision 2 Title Main Control Room (MCR) Fire Detection Panel Replacement Description This modification deletes the Unit 1 Firo Detection alarm panel in the l Main Control Room, which is currently operating as the " Central Supervisory Station", and replaces this with new alarm modules. This is one of a group of Facility Changes which will consolidate the operational responsibility for the fire detection system in the Emergency Service Office (ES0) and upgrade components to comply with NFPA 72D-1975.

Fire Detection Alarm panels F-51 and C-43 are removed and replaced by new UL listed modules in the new C100 extension of the MCR vertical boards.

All fire detection and suppression signals are transmitted through new data gathering units to the SONGS Units 2&3 Fire Detection Computer (FDC). The FDC then processes these signals to the Unit 1 MCR Fire Detection Alarm Modules. This modification includes new drawings and drawing changes which reflect the "as built" condition of the control circuits associated with the relocation of the C43 panel. The K03A control room annunciation alarn inputs are now included in the inputs to the new data gathering units, thereby, leaving the K03A annunciator points, i.e., windows, as spares.

Safety Evaluation This modification replaces the Main Control Room Fire Detection Alarm Panels with new UL listed panels which meet NFPA 72D-1975 requirements and upgrades the Fire Detection System. No safety related system capabilities are affected. All anlayzed accident scenarios, consequences and probabilities remain unchanged and founded by the existing analyses. As such, this modification does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSA, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSA.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. Technical Specifications 3.14 and 4.15 govern the Fire Detection System, and this change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) or Surveillance Requirements.

A revision is required to the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) to delete or modify the exceptions taken to NFPA 72D compliance. Also, the FHA combustible material and fire loading data for the Control Room Complex requires revisions.

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Facility Change 86-3009.05 Title Dedicated Shutdown System / Appendix R Modifications Description These modifications are a part of the Dedicated Shutdown System that will provide the_ capability to achieve safe shutdown for any' postulated fire in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R.

-All modifications involve work outside containment only. These modifications include the installation of the following components:

1. 4160 V Switchgear Bus A4

2. 480 V Motor Control Center B30

3. 250 kVA Power Transformer X55

4. 4160 V Transfer Switch A451 ,

5. 480 V Transfer Switches B31 and 832

6. 125 Vdc Batte y Charger D26

7. 480 V Breaker Panelboard B41

8. 125 Vdc Distribution Panel Bus D28

9. UPS inverter YV30 and 120 Vac inverter distribution panel Y-49 i

10. 30 kVA Lighting Distribution Transformer X56 '

11. 120 Vac Lighting Panel Bus LDSD

12. 120 Vac OSD Distribution Panel Enclosure C106

13. Size 4, Combination starter / breaker in MCC-2A position 8-12A80

14. 350 AH, 125 Vde, Battery D25 and battery rack

15. Complete lighting fixtures in the switchgear enclosure

16. Dedicated Shutdown Panel C-38 (relocated)

17. Leak Detector Panel C-104 and Probes (AE-5023 and AE-5024)

18. Diesel Oil Transfer Pump Control Panel C-105

19. UV Detectors in Diesel Generator Enclosure and Smoke Detectors in Switchgear Enclosure

20. UV Detector Panel F-83

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o Facility Change 1-86-3009.05-(Continued)

Description-(Continued)

21. -. Two 480 V Motor Starters, Size NEMA 1 for EF-1 and EF-2

22. Five (5) emergency lighting fixtures, three (3) outside and two (2) inside the switchgear enclosure building.

23. Miscellaneous power and control (including one-hour fire rated) cables.

24. Miscellaneous raceways and supports.

Safety Evaluation These modifications will be included in a revision to the Final Safety Analysis (FSA) which will inc'orporate the Dedicated Shutdown System. The Dedicated Shutdown System will provide the capability to achieve safe shutdown for any postulated fire in.accordance with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R. Any potential accident scenarios and consequences remain bounded by existing analyses.

Therefore, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously i evaluated in the'FSA will be increased. In addition, these modifications will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a-different type than any previously evaluated in the FSA.

These modifications have no effect on the existing' Limiting Condition for Operation or Surveillance Requirements governed by the existing Technical Specifications. -The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by these modifications.

These modifications require a revision of the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) to incorporate a new Fire Zone to address the Dedicated Shutdown System equipment. Fire loading in the new Fire Zone does not exceed the maximum permissible loading. These modifications enhance the Fire Protection System / Program and do not violate the FHA.

1 Facility Change 1-86-3341.01, Revision 1 Title Fire Detection and Suppression Description This modification provides for fire detection and suppression in the following areas in order to satisfy the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R:

1. Fire detection and suppression for Station Service Transformer No.1.

2. Fire detection and suppression for dedicated safe shutdown area cable trays in Fire Zone 1-AB-14-2J (proposed Fire Zone 1-YD-14-4D).

3. Fire detection for the Dog House (proposed Fire Zone 1-AB-14-4C).  ;

4. Secondary firewater supply connection to the containment fire suppression system, Fire Zone 1-C0-(-10)-1.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides for installation of fire detection and suppression in the areas described above which enhances the plant fire protection capability and meets the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R.

The change has no impact on the original design basis or function of the fire protection system. Therefore, all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment previously important to safety evaluated in the FSAR will be increased. In addition this modification will not create the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The Fire Protection system is addressed by Technical Specification Section 3.14, and the containment structure is addressed by Section 3.6. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification. This change has no effect on any of the Limiting Ccnditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specification. As such, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will be revised to account for this modification, however, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

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Facility Change .1-86-3341.03

!. Title-Fireproofing/ Fire Barrier System Description This modification provides for the installation of fireproofing for penetrations, conduits, cable trays, cables, supports and associated components important to safe shutdown. The fireproofing is designed for the isolation and protection of these components to meet the requirements of 10 CFR'50, Appendix'R.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides for the installation of fireproofing material.

which enhances the fire protection system at SONGS 1 and brings the plant into compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R. .The firefproofing material shall have a tested configuration in accordance with ASTM E-119 and be approved for installation in nuclear power plants. The barrier shall be capable of withstanding a minimum three horn fire.

This modification has no impact on the original design basis or function of any system or component. All-potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such,'this change does not increase the consequences or' probability of occurrence of an accident.or malfunction of any equ.ipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSA, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSA.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced' by this. change. This change has no effect on any of'the Limiting Conditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specification.

The fireproofing constitutes an exposure fire barrier as part of a possible fire protection system. The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will l require revision to reflect the additional fireproofing. This 4 modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA. j

i Facility Change 1-86-3341.15, Revision 1 Title Post Accident Sampling System (PASS) Modification Description This modification provides Reacter Coolant System (RCS) boron measurement capability following an Appendix R type fire. This change provides power to Motor Control Center (MCC) 3A for post-fire PASS operation supplied by the Dedicatea Safe Shutdown (DSD) diesel generator, through a transfer switch. The pneumatic control circuit for RCS Loop C inside containment sample isolation is modified and a manual valve is installed as a basis for RCS outside containment sample isolation. Local leak rate testing capability is provided to detect any leakage through containment isolation valves RSS-018 and RSS-344.

Additionally, existing ninety (90) minute emergency lights in the PASS pit are replaced by two eight-hour lights and an additional eight-hour light is provided for operation of the manual valves.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides the capability to verify RCS boron concentration following potential fires when the normal and emergency diesel power and instrument air are unavailable in order to assure that the reactor is subcritical by the required margin for cold shutdown.

Separation and isolation of safety-related circuits from nonsafety-related circuits is maintained in this change. This change also assures that the integrity of containment pressure boundary is met and precludes any potential for an undesirable dilution of borated water in the Volume Control Tank (VCT) in the event of an inadvertent operation (opening) of the sample return line. Therefore, no safety-related system capabilities are affected and all potential accidents and consequences remain bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Final Safety Analysis (FSA), nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSA.

The equipment affected by this change is governed by the Technical Specifications, but the change does not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirement. Therefore, the margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification, will not be reduced.

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will be revised to reflect this modification. The change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA. The FHA revision will incorporate the boron measurement system and the added emergency lights.

I l- Facility Change 1-86-3341.16 -)

Title

' Appendix'R Modifica'tions  !

Description I Under a 10CFR50. Appendix R scenario, a postulated fire in the yard area

'(Fire Area / Zone 1-YD-14-40) could result in the loss of auxiliary feedwater system function. To mitigate the effects of a yard area fire, this' change will install a new power cable for the motor-driven-auxiliary feedwater pump G-10S . routed through the turbine area (Fire Area / Zone 1-TB-8-9A).

Safety Evaluation This modification involves installation of new cable, raceways, associated supports and fire seals'around wall penetrations. The design is in accordance with.the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R and Safety Related, Seismic Category A criteria. The components will be installed such that

-they will not impact other safety related equipment, structures and systems from performing their intended functions, nor will they adversely affect the process parameters, seismic integrity, or design function of any non-safety related. system. Routing the G-10S power cables through the turbine' area. involves additional exposure of this circuit to potential high energy line breaks (HELBs), including ruptures of the main feedwater system. Specific break locations and protection features (such as

. impingement. barriers or whip restraints) have not yet been defined, since resolution of SEP Topic III.5.b has not been' completed. However, based on the low. probability of a line~ break during Cycle X, and the availability of alternative means of removing decay heat for post-HELB safe shutdown (including use of new auxiliary feedwater pump G-10W to support steaming, or the charging pumps and PORVs for feed and bleed) should a line break occur, the proposed routing is considered acceptable pending completion of l modifications identified in the SEP-Topic III.5.b evaluation. As such, all accident scenarios, consequences and probabilities remain bounded by existing analyses.

Therefore, as described above, this modification will not increase the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSA. Additionally, the consequences of an accident or malfunction of any equipment previously evaluated in the FSA will not ue increased nor will the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSA be created.

The margin of safety.as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. Technical Specification Sections 3.4.3 and 4.1.9 govern the Auxiliary Feedwater System pumps. This modification has  ;

no impact on existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for  !

Operation, or Surveillance Requirements.

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i Facility Change 1-86-3341.16 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued) i The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect the l addition of a new power cable and reroutings of existing cables. The l change in fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously i analyzed. Therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

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Facility Change 1-86-3400.04 Title Automatic Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Description This modification provides for installation of automatic steam generator '

blowdown termination during Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFWS) operation.

Remote position indication and operation capability for blowdown valves CV-100 and CV-1008 is added in the Main Control Room (MCR).

Safety Evaluation This modification provides automatic blowdown termination during AFWS operation to ensure that the AFWS can cool down the RCS to less than 350 F for normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of offsite power as required per Technical Specification 3.4.3. By providing remote manual operation of the blowdown system, this modification will eliminate automatic blowdown initiation. However, it will not impede the Blowdown System from performing its function and Radiation Channel R-1216 from monitoring and controlling the releases of radioactive materials in the steam generator blowdown effluent line as required by Technical Specification 3.5.8. Additionally, this modification will not prevent the blowdown valves from providing containment isolation as required by Final Safety Analysis (FSA) Section 4.3.

This modification will not adversely impact the design basis of the Blowdown or AFW Systems as described in the FSA. However, a revision to FSA Section 4.3 is required to add the new actuation signal and manual control to valves CV100 and CV100B. As described, all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSA, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSA and Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA).

The equipment affected by this change is governed by Technical Specification Sections 3.4.3 and 3.5.8. This change will not modify or affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for )

Operation or Surveillance Requirements. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

Facility Ctange 1-86-3400,13, Revision 1

-Title Uninterruptible Power Supply for Vital Bus No. 4 Description-This modification will provide for a continuous 120_VAC power-supply to Vital Bus No. 4 by installation of an inverter (No. 4A) in the powcr feeder between the 7.5 kVA transformer and Vital Bus No. 4. This modification is the result of corrective actions identified in the NRC-IIT report of the Water Hammer Incident of November 1985. .During that  ;

incident, Vital Bus No. 4 became deenergized upon a loss of offsite power i

-and initiation'of auxiliary feedwater was. delayed until emergency power was aligned.to Vital Bus No. 4.

i Vital Bus No. 4 is currently powered from a 7.5 kVA transformer. In the event of a power supply failure, Automatic Transfer Switch No. 4 will  !

transfer the Vital Bus No. 4 power' source to the 37.5 kVA utility bus transformers. Both transformers receive power from either MCC 1 or MCC 2 '

via Manual Transfer Switch No. 7, depending on the switch alignment. This change will provide an inverter (No. 4A) that will be inserted in the power _ feeder between the 7.5 kVA transformer and Vital Bus No. 4. The' inverter will recieve its normal power supply from the plant DC Bus No. 1. In the event of DC power failure or inverter failure, an automatic transfer switch within the inverter will-transfer back to the 7.5 kVA transformer as an alternate power source. An alarm point will be provided-on the electrical annunciator panel in the main control room to indicate inverter trouble. Inverter 4A will be located in the 4 kV room adjacent to the cabinet that houses both the 7.5 kVA and the 37.5 kVA transformer  !

and the Manual Transfer Switch No. 7.  !

Safety Evaluation  :

This modification does require a revision to the Final Safety Analysis (FSA) to incorporate the addition of the inverter, but it will not affect the design basis of any safety related systems. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. _ As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident evaluated in the FSA, nor does it create the possibility of an _

accident or malfunction of a different type then any previously evaluated  !

in the FSA.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. The change has no impact on the existing  ;

Technical Specifications, Limiting Conditions of Operation or Surveillance Requirements. Therefore, no technical basis on associated margins of safety are'affected as a result of this change.

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect the addition of new equipment and cable in the 4kV room and the battery room.

The additional fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed. Therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

Facility Change 2-84-6044,- Revision 1 Title HVAC Chillers' Automatic Start Interlock Description This modification documents the partial implementation of a design change that was later cancelled, with pulled cables abandoned-in place. No connections to any installed circuitry was made and the change consequently involves only a revision to FHA fire loadings in affected areas.

r Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malf' unction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased as a result of this chrnge. This change provides documentation of the cables abandoned in place when the work was cancelled. The nature of the. modifications does not impact-the capability of the Component Cooling Water System to perform its intended function in accordance with the safety design basis, as defined in FSAR Section 9.4.2,2.

Therefore, all. potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change,does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of ,

any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor '

does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical ~

Specification is not reduced by this change. The equipment affected by this change is not governed by Technical Specifications. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

The Fire Hazards Analysis will require revision to reflect the additional cable routing resulting from this modification. The additional fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed, therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis.

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Facility Change 2-84-6252., Revision 1 Title Condenser Vacuum Trip Control Modifications Description This change will implement a manual set point selection scheme for the  !

circulating water system heat treatment. A key lock selector switch mounted on the main control panel with mode selection capability of

" Normal" or " Heat Treat" will be provided. The condenser vacuum set point i which trips the turbine will be 4-1/2" Hg during normal and 6-1/2" Hg during heat treat. An interlock will be provided to prevent return to normal frcm heat treat unless condenser vacuum is below the 4-1/2" Hg set

- point. Status lights will be provided to indicate 4-1/2" and 6-1/2" relay pick up and " Normal" and " Heat Treat" mode. A test switch will be provided to test the lights.

j Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important tc safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased as a result of this change.

The circulating water system is discussed in Section 10.4.5 of the FSAR.

The circulating water system has no safety design basis, however, parts of the system are necessary for operation of the ultimate heat sink.

Therefore, all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. The equipment affected by this change is not governed by Technical Specifications. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

The Fire Hazards Analysis will require revision to reflect the additional cable routing resulting from this modification. The additional fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed, therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis.

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Facility Change 2-85-6193.

F Title Secondary Chemistry Alarms Description This modification deletes three alarms from the control room, moves sixteen alarms from the control room to the secondary chemistry laboratory,- rearranges one control room alarm, duplicates six control room alarms in the secondary chemistry laboratory, and revises some chemistry alarm setpoints. These modifications are being made to reduce the number of alarms in the control roon which do not require operator action, and to better utilize the chemistry laboratory staff. No alarms associated with an effluent function or operator action are removed from the control room.

Safety Evaluation c

Process sampling as described in Section 9.3.2 of the FSAR will not be affected by this modification, nor will any functional design basis.

'Thus, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will be affected, nor will the possibility of an

accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the' FSAR be created.

i The equipment modified by this change is not governed by the Technical Specifications and no existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements are affected. As such, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is impacted.

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect the additional cable routing in six fire zones resulting from the modification of both the Unit 2 and Unit 3 control rooms and the common chemistry laborato ry. However, permissible fire loading limits previously analyzed will not be exceeded, and thus this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

Facility Change 2-85-6324, Revision 1 Title Emergency Diesel Generator Modification Description This modification will provide the capability of a reduction in cold fast starts, as recommended in Generic Letter 84-15. This change will modify the capability of Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 2G002 and 2G003 to run at idle speed, provide an overload alarm, and remove a jumper to utilize the governor reverse acting features.

This design change will effectively remove the Diesel Generator excitation system f rom service any time the Diesel Generator is run at idle speed.

This change is intended to reduce the possibility of damage through overexcitation of the generator stator. The removal of excitation system during idle running of the diesel generator is accomplished by cutting off the excitation system power source to the static voltage regulator and by holding out the permissive / timer that applies (field flashing) station battery power to the exciter field. The exciter system is returned to its normal configuration after the idle speed control function is overridden. i The station battery field flashing voltage is applied to the exciter field 1.5 seconds after idle control function is removed.

The idle start /stop feature will allow the Diesel Generators to be gradually warmed up prior to loading, and gradually cooled before shutdown, which will reduce long term engine degradation. The idle feature is designed to be automatically bypassed in the event of a SIAS/LOV signal which requires a fast cold start and loading within 10 seconds. It is also automatically bypassed when Diesel Generator control is transferred to the Control Room.

The overload alarm will be set at 5250 kW to alert Operations pers ,nnel of an EDG overload condition.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equinment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased as a result of this change. This change only removes external jumpers from the existing governor to enable the governor to be reverse acting. It also adds prefabricated alarm module panel 2L-621 to provide an overload alarm at 5250 kW. Both changes provide added reliability and extended life to the class IE Emergency Diesel Generator.

This change will not prohibit testing in accordance with current FSAR criteria but rather facilitates a future FSAR change to reduce the number of fast cold starts utilizing the idle feature, thereby minimizing EDG degradation.

Facility Change 2-85-6324, Revision 1 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

This change does not adversely affect any safety function as previously reviewed in FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.4. Therefore no design bases have been changed, and any potential accident scenarios, consequences and probabilities remain bounded by existing analyses.

This change does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. The Onsite Power System, of which the Emergency Diesel Generator is part, is governed by Technical Specification 3/4.8.1.1. The proposed change does not impact any existing Technical Specification, Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements. As such, no Technical Specification bases or associated margin of safety can be affected. However, the number of cold fast starts required to verify operation in accordance with the Technical Specification has been reduced per Technical Specification Amendment 54.

This alteration neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA).

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L Facility Change 2-85-6437, Revision 1 Title Removal of Internals From 10" Gate Valve 10"-068-C-076 (S2-1219-MU-068)

Description This modification removes the internals from valve MU-068 and adds a blind flange to the valve bonnet, to effectively ensure the miniflow path between safety injection pumps and the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST)

, is always open, and to eliminate the need for surveillance verification I

that valve S2-1219-MU-068 is in the locked open position.

Safety Evaluation This modification removes the internals of manual valve 10"-068. At the present time this manual valve is locked open. Removing the valve internals and replacing the valve bonnet will not adversely affect the (open) flow path or existing seismic qualification of the piping or valve body. Miniflow isolation can be accomplished by existing individual pump isolation valves and upstream MOV's for all related safe shutdown and accident mitigation functions. Therefore, although this modification requires a revision to FSAR Section 6.3.3.5 (eliminating reference to valve S2-1219-MU-068), the functional design bases described in this section are not affected. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

Manual valve 10"-068 is governed by Technical Specification 3/4.5.2 and is required to be locked open. Removal of valve 10"-068 internals will ensure the flow path to the refueling water storage tank remains open without reliance on administrative controls. The quality class and seismic category of the valve (body, bonnet, etc.) and piping are unaffected by this change. Existing individual pump valves provide the capability for miniflow isolation for all safety related functions which require its isolation. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

This modification eliminates the surveillance requirement for verifying the valve is locked open every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, per Technical Specification 3/4.5.2. Technical Specification Amendment 53 incorporates this change.

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l Facility Change 2-85-6574 Title Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump Control Modification Description The emergency diesel generators are designed to provide power needed to shutdown and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a loss of offsite power. However, the control circuitry for the two fuel oil transfer pumps associated with each diesel generator train are located in the main control room. In the event of a fire requiring control room evacuation, concurrent with the loss of offsite power, provisions for the operation of the fuel oil transfer pumps must be available locally.

This change consists of the following:

1. Provide a local control panel for each emergency diesel generator with local control handswitches for each of the two fuel oil transfer pumps associated with each diesel generator.

2. Provide isolation switches on the local panel to simultaneously disconnect all circuits to the main control board.

3. Provide conduit and cable to connect the local panel to the existing motor control center for each diesel generator.

4. Provide an alarm at the main plant annunciator if the local isolation switches are placed in the " local position".

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased as a result of this change.

This change does not affect functional operation of the Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil System as described in the FSAR. This change assures that the original design objectives and system functions in FSAR Section 9.5.4 are met. Therefore, all accident scenarios and consequences remain bounded by existing analysis in the FSAR.

This change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

Facility Change 2-85-6574 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

The margin of safety ac defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This change has no impact on the original design objectives and system functions. Thus, this change has no impact on any Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specifications. Hence, no Technical Specification bases or associated margin of safety is affected.

This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA).

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Facility Change 2-86-6025 Title Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal and Heat Exchanger Flange Gasket Replacement Description This modification replaces the Byron Jackson RCP shaft seals with Bingham-Willamette shaft seals and replaces the original stainless steel and asbestos RCP seal heat exchanger flange gaskets with inconel and carbon gaskets. These changes were made to increase the reliability of the shaft seals and minimize the leakage from the original flange gaskets. The replacement shaft seals and gaskets have the same general configuration as the original parts include design refinements to improve the reliability of the systems.

These modifications are expected to decrease the frequency of shaft seal l replacement and eliminate RCP flange damage caused by leaking borated i water, ultimately resulting in an improvement in plant reliability and a '

reduction in worker radiation exposure.

Safety Evaluation Although Section 5.4.1 of the FSAR, " Reactor Coolant Pumps," will be changed to reflect the parameters and certification of the new shaft seals, no functional design bases in this or other sections will be affected. This has been assured because equivalency has been demonstrated for testing and analysis of the new and original shaft seals. Thus, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will be increased, nor will the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR be created.

Operability of RCP shaft seals and heat exchanger flange gaskets are not governed by any Technical Specification. However, seal integrity and pressure retaining capability are indirectly related to Technical Specification 4.0.5 and 3/4.5.2 (minimum capacity for operability of charging pumps), and 3/4.4.5.2 (total RCS leakage). Since testing and analyses have demonstrated that the new shaft seals perform within the bounds of the existing safety analyses, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety will be adversely affected.

This modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazard Analysis.

Facility Change 2-86-6112.2, Revision 1 Title Makeup Water Demineralized (MUD) SONGS Units 2 and 3 Description This modification provides for installation of foundations for the MUD equipment, tanks, control building, electrical manholes and conduits, waste sump and pipe supports located outside the protected area south of SONGS Units 2 and 3 Demineralized Water Storage Tanks. The MUD will be a facility common to SONGS Units 2 and 3.

Safety Evaluation This modification provides for installation of portions of the MUD system located both inside and outside the Protected Area of SONGS Units 2 and 3. The subject portion of the MUD system is designed per Quality Class (QC) IV and Seismic Category (SC) III requirements and is not in the immediate vicinity of any equipment important to plant safety. As such, this change does not affect the function or operation of any equipment or systems except the drilling for and the installation of concrete expansion anchors in the Circulating Water System (CWS) vent and discharge structure. The modifications done to the CWS vent hoods is designed for QC II, SC I and does not affect the structural integrity of the vent shaft wall. Therefore, all potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of oce:urrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluatec in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

This change does not affect any Limiting Condition of Operation or Surveillance Requirements of any existing Technical Specifications.

Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change.

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect the addition of a new hydrant, post indicator valve and a hose cabinet next to the MUD Control building. A connection for the new hydrant will be made to the existing Unit 1 fire water main. However, this alteration neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

Facility Change 2-86-6143, Revision 1 ,

Title Modifications to Condensate Storage Tanks T-120 and T-121 Description This modification will consist of the following changes:

1. A nitrogen blanket to Condensate Storage Tank T-120 will be added to reduce the dissolved oxygen in the condensate. Provisions to add a i nitrogen blanket to Condensate Storage Tank T-121 will be made.

2. Install a seal vent to each tank to protect them against overpressurization or vacuum inside of the tank.

3. Install tornado relief valves to protect the T-120 tank from sudden pressure changes outside the tank. A flow limiting orifice in the makeup line will limit the makeup flow to the capacity of the overflow pipes. This will reduce the possibility of lifting the relief valve during a tornado.

4. Install instrument root valves that will be utilized for l instrumentation changes covered by DCP 2-6428.0J.

Safety Evaluation i

Although this modification requires a revision to FSAR Section 9.2.6, the design bases for Condensate Storage and Transfer System will not be affected by this change. The condensate storage tanks are protected by seal vents for overpressurization or vacuum created during makeup and overflow of condensate. The seal vents are structurally designed to withstand missiles and tornados. Tornado valves are provided on Tank 120 to protect the tank from collapsing due to pressure differential during a tornado. The system function remains as originally intended and design bases are unaffected. Therefore, neither the :.ansequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will be increased.

In addition, this modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR and Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA).

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. The equipment affected by this change is not governed by Technical Specifications. This change will i not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for 4 Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

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Facility Change 2-86-6160.02, Revision 1 Title Addition of Source Range Indicator '

Description This change resulted from a licensing commitment to comply with 10CFR50, Appendix R, which requires that systems associated with achieving and  ;

maintaining safe shutdown, shall be designed and located to minimize the probability and effects of fire and explosions. This change provides for the addition of a new source range indicator, receiving an input from Neutron Flux Level Startup Channel 2, to Remote Shutdown Panel 2L-042.

Safety Evaluation This change adds a remote source range indicator to the Remote Shutdown Panel utilizing an existing signal from Ex-Core Neutron Monitor Startup Channel 2, in order to eliminate a deviation from 10CFR50, Appendix R.

This change does not adversely affect any safety function described in FSAR Sections 7.5.1.5 or 7.7.1.8, therefore, any potential accident scenarios, consequences, and probabilities, remain bounded by existing analyses. FSAR Table 7.5.-1 and Figure 7.4-3 are to be revised to show the addition of the new Source Range Indicator 2JI-0005C2. ,

Neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will be increased as a result of this change. In addition, this change will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction '

of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. The source range indicator added by this change is safety related and does not alter any existing instrumentation I used for monitoring Start Up Channel 2.

The proposed change will not modify or affect any existing Technical Specification, Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements. As such, no Technical Specification bases or associated margin of safety will be affected.

This change will not adversely impact the Fire Protection System / Program or violate the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA). However, a FHA change is required to document this modification.

Facility Change 2-86-6460 Title Addition of Main Control Room Annunciators for Radiation Monitoring System Description These modifications will allow the control room operator to ascertain monitor failure or high radiation, without leaving the Control Room. This change adds new annunciator subpanels in close proximity to the corresponding main annunciators with Hi Radiation and fail alarms for each radiation monitor. Fail alarms will include, as appropriate, signals for channel failure, low process flow and alarm disable (NORAD). Each l' subpanel annunciator is connected to a main annunciator window, and each subpanel alarms only after a main window alarm. Reflash is also incorporated in the design. The subpanel windows are colored to match their main window counterpart priority codes. A new control room cabinet, 2L60, contains the subpanel annunciator logic cards.

A number of the main annunciator windows are modified and regrouped to correlate with the subpanel annunciators which have nameplates that identify their associated main windows. The main control board annunciator switch station, with individual switches, controls both the main and subpanel annunciator windows.

To connect the new subpanels and the new panel 2L-60 with the main annunciators, cable will be routed in cable trays and through new conduits supported by hangers.

Safety Evaluation Although a FSAR change is required by this modification, the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased as a result of this change. The installation of this equipment does not affect adversely any safety related equipment or any equipment important to safety. Existing relay contacts in the radiation monitors are used and in some cases new relays are added. The new connections and associated equipment and the new relays are the same Quality Class and Seismic Category as the equipment affected. All accident scenarios, probabilities and consequences remain bounded by the existing FSAR analysis, after considering the implementation of this modification.

This change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR. These changes will enhance plant operation and will aid the operators in assessing the radiation monitor status by noting the alarm status on the main annunciator panel and determining any individual monitor by checking the nearby annunciator subpanel. The new connections and associated equipment are the same quality class and seismic category as the existing annunciators, circuits and cabinets affected.

Facility Change 2-86-6460 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

This modification has no effect on any Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements or Limiting Conditions for Operation.

Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not altered.

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect the additional cable routing for the annunciator subpanel. However, permissible fire loading limits previously analyzed will not be exceeded, and thus this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

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Facility Change 2-86-6548 Title Installation of SONGS 2 Cycle 3 CPC/CEAC Revision 06 Software Description This change implements the use of CPC/CEAC Revision 06 software in the Unit 2 Core Protection Calculators (CPCs) and Control Element Assembly Calculator (CEACs) which is necessary to reduce the number of unnecessary reactor trips due to single component failures as experienced in previous plant operations. These changes will increase plant availability and reduce transient-related stress on plant systems. This software revision will also simplify future core cycle reload analysis, and was designed, coded, and tested by Combustion Engineering (CE) and approved by the NRC.

Safety Evaluation This modification requires a Technical Specification Change associated with the CPC software which have been approved and implemented as Amendment No. 47 to NPF-10 which is editorial in nature deleting Section 2.2.2 list of addressable constants. Changes to Plant Operating Procedure are required to reflect a change in CPC point identification assignments which provide information to the Control Room operators. The Design Basis for Accident Analysis in Chapter 15 of the FSAR remains unaffected by the Software Change, since the change was specifically designed to stay within the analysis made in the FSAR.

The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment previously evaluated in the UFSAR will not be increased as a result of this change. The CPC basic trip function on LPD and DNBR remain unchanged. The modifications have been designed to be within the design criteria of the Plant Protection System as described in the FSAR, Section 7.2. As such, existing analyses in the FSAR are unaffected by this modification, and all accident scenarios, probabilities, and consequences remain bounded by the existing analyses. This change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. Technical Specification Section 2.0 discusses safety limit settings including LPD and DNBR trip setpoints.

These trip setpoints are incorporated in the CPC Revision 06 software and the associated trip variables LPD and DNBR are calculated by the CPCs.

The margin of safety assumed in the safety analysis is maintained by allowances as defined in the CPC Functional Design documents referenced in Technical Specification Basis Section 2.2.1. Although these documents have been revised to show the design of the Revision 06 software, the original design basis remains unchanged. This change does not decrease the effectiveness of the Security Plan or the Emergency Plan, and does not affect the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA).

Facility Change 2-86-6571.1 Title Plant Monitoring System (PMS) Computer Replacement Description j This is one of four change packages that will be implemented to replace the PMS computer. This package modifies the operator console in the  !

control room by replacing three CRT's, three display generators, one I keyboard, two Data Acquisition Unit chassis, and one power supply. The replacement units are physically and functionally similar to the original units but are compatible with the new PMS software. Also, a new conduit and power cable will be routed to the control room to provide alternate power for the operator console.

The PMS is being replaced because it is difficult to maintain and obsolete.

Safety Evaluation The PMS equipment modified by this change is all non-safety-related and, as such, is not part of the accident analysis of the plant. The new equipment is functionally similar to the original equipment and does not interact with safety-related systems, therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been created.

The equipment modified by this change is not covered by any Technical Specification. This change has no effect on any Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance requirement of any existing Technical Specification. Therefore, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect the additional cable routing for the alternate power supply. However, permissible fire loading limits previously analyzed will not be exceeded, and thus this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

l Facility Change 2-86-6573 Title Name Tag Changes, Villa Park to Serrano 220kV Cutover Description This modification documents the "as-built" name tag changes for affected annunciator windows, metering, breaker / disconnect, and the mimic bus to show that the SONGS - Villa Park 220kV line was reconfigure to feed the new Serrano Substation. Additionally, this change will modify respective drawings to change all references from " Villa Park" to "Serrano".

Safety Evaluation This modification documents "as-built" non-safety related name tag changes only and defines associated drawing changes. This change will not affect any other equipment, structures, or systems. Although this modification requires a revision to FSAR Section 8.2, no construction work is involved. Therefore, no design bases have been changed. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA).

This modification does not affect existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements; therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced.

Facility Change 2-86-6591  !

1 Title

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i Addition of 3-hour Fire Rated Penetration Seals i Description This design change provides for the installation of approximately 144 3-hour fire rated penetration seals in unsealed or non-fire rated sealed .

penetrations which are located on heavy concrete (HC) walls at the Safety -

Equipment Building elevations (-) 15'-6", (-) 5'-6", and 8'-0". It also )

provides for the installation of one (1) 3-hour fire rated damper at  !

elevation 8'-0" between Room 017 and Room 022 (Fire Area / Zones {

2-SE-(-15)-136 and 2-SE-(-5)-135A.) {;

This change ensures adequate separation between redundant trains to safe shutdown equipment and provides 3-hour fire barrier integrity..

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR Section IIIA will not be increased as a result of this change. This change will not affect the design bases of any safety related systems and does not require modification to safety related structures, components or systems.

As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) or Surveillance Requirements. This change however, will affect the Fire Protection System, and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect the addition of penetration seals and fire dampers to the heavy concrete walls. Also, the Fire Barrier Surveillance Procedures have to be modified and the FHA wall rating will require a change from HC to 3-hour rated. The additional fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed; therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis.

l Facility Change 2-86-6621 l

Title Modification of the Hydraulic System for the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Actuator and Relocation of the Limit Switch Assemblies for MSIV 2HV-8204 and 2HV-8205 Description

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l This modification will modify the hydraulic system of the MSIV (Main Steam l Isolation Valve) actuator by replacing the Marotta hydraulic dump valves with Paul Munroe hydraulic dump valves and removing the restricting orifice provided with the Marotta valves.

In addition, this modification will relocate the MSIV (2HV-8204 and 2HV-8205) limit switch assemblies from inside the yoke to outside the yoke I with new redesign limit switch assemblies by WKM to provide better access for maintenance and adjustment.

The above modifications are required to provide reliable operation of the MSIVs and to minimize spurious MSIV closures.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, Sections 5.4.5 and 10.3 will not be increased as a result of this change.

These modifications will not affect the design basis of the main steam system, or any other safety related system. In the case of a hydraulic line break and resultant fluid loss, the MISV will close. A break in the hydraulic line will not create an unsafe plant condition and the new equipment will not create any internal missile effect.

All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analyses and no new High Energy Line Break Analysis (HELBA} is required. As such this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification is not reduced. The equipment affected by this change is governed by, but does not modify, Technical Specifications 3/4.3.1, 3/4.6.3 and 3/4.7.1.5. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) or Surveillance Requirements.

Facility Change 2/3-83-808, Revision 4 Title Radioactive Process Sample Point Modification Description This change resulted from a review performed to identify those design changes being proposed that would lead to increased local radiation levels and, therefore, potentially increased occupational radiation exposure. A case-by-case evaluation of each radioactive sampling location was made in an effort to reduce installation cost and complexity without violating sound radiation protection practices. The results of the evaluation include:

Relocating Sampling Points 2AP-7179, 7340, 7343, 7298, 7442 and 7544 to an accessible area; providing electric heat tracing to four highly-concentrated Boric Acid Sample Stations 2AP-7179, 7340, 7343 and 7298; providing Sample Point 2AP-7298 with a 3/4" pipe sample line, nuclear service water and a boric acid dilution tank; and, adding a new sample point 2AP-9158 to provide a concentrated boric acid sample in an accessible location. The new sample point includes sample receiver and drain line.

Safety Evaluation The probability or occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased as a result of this change. FSAR Section 9.3.2 discusses the bases of the Process Sampling System. This modification ensures operation within the design by improving the efficient and safe handling of the sampling system. The probability of an accident or malfunction addressed by existing analyses remain unchanged.

This change will not affect the design basis of the Radioactive Process System Sampling or any other safety related system. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident ce malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced as a result of this change. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements. As such, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected. This change will add to the safety of plant operation, and will make the system more responsive to meet the requirements of the Technical Specifications.

Facility Change 2/3-84-101, Revision 1 Title Relocation of Marotta Valves Description This modification relocates the Marotta Dump Valves to outside the yokes of Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV), Feedwater Isolation Valves (FWIV) and Feedwater Block Valve (FW3V). Hydraulic supply line thermal relief valve' discharge lines for these valves are connected downstream of Marotta dump valves.

"Tell-tale" valves and vent lines are being provided with the Marotta Valves; flex hose sections, except at the inlet to the hydraulic control skid module, are removed.

This revision affects the MSIV's, FWIV's and FWBV's. It still relocates the main valve dump valves (by Marotta) to a position outside the yoke of the main valves but installs the MSIV (Marottas) in the vertical orientation and in a piping configuration arranged to reduce external loads on the valve.

Safety Evaluation:

The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment previously evaluated in the FSAR, Sections 5.4.5, 10.3 and 10.4.7 will not be increased as result of this change.

All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. The equipment affected by this change is not governed by Technical Specifications. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for >

Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

The Fire Hazards Analysis will require revision to reflect the additional hydraulic fluid resulting from this modification. The additional fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed, therefore-, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection Syste:n/ Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis.

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i Facility Change 2/3-84-6014.3 i

Title Respiratory / Service Air. System Description This change covers mechanical and civil portions of design work outside of Units 2 and 3 containments and in the common areas. It provides a new  !

Respiratory / Service Air System consisting of the following: three 1200 SCFM air compressors, complete ^with air receivers and instrumentation; an inlet air duct manifold for the air compressors, including a louver / filter i unit, duct supports, and a service platform to the louver / filter unit; a discharge air piping manifold to be connected to the existing service air header inside the Unit 3 Turbine Building; moisture traps and drain piping to the Respiratory / Service Air Piping System; equipment drain piping to the nearest floor drains and cover steps over the drain piping to prevent a tripping hazard; modification of all hose stations in the radioactively contaminated areas outside of the containment to provide respiratory /

service air connections at each existing service air hose station; nineteen (19) additional respiratory / service air hose stations; check valves (zero leakage type) in the branch air piping to prevent radioactive contamination of Respiratory / Service Air System (RSAS); and, a removable pipe spool between the Instrument Air System and the Respiratory /Strvice Air System (to be connected under the authorization from Health Physics during emergency conditions). Also, a breakout pipe spool in Unit 3 Turbine Building is provided for flushing and cleaning'the header; and, concrete foundations for compressors and air receivers.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accider.t or malfunction of any equipment previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. FSAR Section 9.3.1.1 discusses the design bases of the Compressed Air System which currently is combined with the Instrument Air System. This change ,

will separate the Service Air System from the Instrument Air System and integrates the Service Air System into the new Respiratory / Service Air System. This change to original Compressed Air System which is a non-safety related system will improve the system capability in relation  :

to respiratory use, and enhance the Instrument Air System by making it independent from the Service Air System.

The existing Compressed Air System in the Station Manual and the FSAR will  ;

require a change to add this air system.

This change does not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of any equipment evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possib,ility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

Facility Change 2/3-84-6014.3 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation' (Continued)

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced by this change. The change will not affect any Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operations or Surveillance Requirements. Therefore, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

In addition the change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA).

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t Facility Change 2/3-85-009, Revision 1

-Title-Addition of Evacuation Alarm Strobe Lights in Containment to Supplement ,

the Existing-Evacuation Sirens and PA System l Description  !

This modification installs 19 visual alarms (red flashing strobe lights) in areas of the containment where audio evacuation alarms are ineffective  !

due to high background noise, to ensure personnel in all areas of l containment are properly notified.of emergency-evacuation conditions.

Safety Evaluation This modification is being made to add visual evacuation alarms to l supplement the existing audio evacuation alarms in high noise areas of  !

containment and will have no adverse effects on tsy other system.

Therefore, although this modification requires a revision to the'FSAR system description (paragraph 9.5.2.2.1.3) and Table 7.3-2 in order to reflect the revised system design concept, it does not adversely effect the design bases. Neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will be increased. In addition, this modification will not create the possibility of an~ accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. The equipment affected by this change is not governed by Technical Specifications. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for H Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect a very insignificant increase in combustibles for the electrical penetration area. The materials present in each of the strobe lights are steel and small quantities of plastic, glass and wiring and therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

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' Facility Change 2/3-85-139 Title Modification of MSIV-Hydraulic Pump & Turbine Supervisory Control l Interlock Circuits l Description This modification removes the jumper wire from the valve position interlock contacts in the hydraulic skid pumps for the Units 2 and 3 MSIVs and replaces valve position switch interlock contacts in the hydraulic skid pumps for the MSIVs and turbine. supervisory control circuits with relay contacts to be used in conjunction with a hand switch.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment'impc,rtant to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR Section 7.3.1.1.6 will not be increased as a result of this change. This modification only replaces defective switch interlock contacts on the Units 2 and 3 hydraulic skid pumps for MSIVs as wel_1 as those in the turbine supervisory. control circuits. All potential accidents'and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of. occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in.the FSAR, ncr does it create the possibility of an' accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. The equipment affected by this cha'nge is not governed by Technical Specifications. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

This modification will require a revision to the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) to account for the additional fire loading. . Cables are added to cable' trays with greater than 30% fill; however, the additional fire loading is within the limits of FHA design base fire load for that zone, and will not adversely affect the FHA.

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Facility Change 2/3-85-6161.11 Title Radiation Monitoring and HVAC upgrading to the Auxiliary Building Elevation 63.5' Addition Description i This modification will provide a radiation monitoring system in the Contaminated Equipment Storage Room of the Elevation 63.5' Addition over the Radwaste Storage Tank Area. This Radiation Monitor, RE-7899, is i needed to alarm whenever the radiation levels in the Elevation 63.5' Addition reach unacceptable levels due to rad 8ation sources in the Radwaste Building below this addition. The radiation monitor will alarm locally and in radiation alarm panel 2/3L-643A. Panel 2/3L-643 will house the readout module for the radiation monitor ano the radiation levels can be read through a window on the side of the cabir,et. '

This modification will also modify the isokinetic probes in the common duct for the two plant vent stacks to account for the increased flow due to the Elevation 63.5' Addition. The modification will be to replace the existing Kurz velocity nozzles with larger nozzles and replace the signal processing assemblies with new assemblies calibrated for the new velocity nozzles.

This modification will also provide capability to monitor the exhaust fans A506 and A507 of the Elevation 63.5' Addition from control sanel 3L-154 located at Elevation 30' of the Control Building. Panel 3L-154 will indicate the status of the fans and it will have switches to control their operation.

Safety Evaluation Although this modification requires a revision to FSAR, the design basis is not affected. This modification will not affect adversely the structural integrity d the Auxiliary Building or any safety-related systems. The effectiveness of the Plant Security Plan will not be decreased nor will this modification become a fire hazard. All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analysis. As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. This modification is not specifically addressed in the Technical Specifications. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect the additional fire loading resulting from this modification. However, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

Facility Change 2/3-85-6581 Title 800 MHz UHF Repeater Cabinets Description To meet the linearity requirements of the previously installed 800 MHz distribution amplifier, this change will install five narrow band amplifiers at each of the seven UHF repeater locations; however, since the five amplifiers will not fit in the existing 450 MHz distribution amplifier cabinets, seven new 800 MHz amplifier cabinets will be provided at the following locations:

New cabinets 2L and 3L-428A will be installed next to the existing 450 MHz distribution amplifier cabinets 2L and 3L-428 for the i Turbine Building of Elev. 7'; new cabinets 2L and 3L-427A will be installed next to the existing 450 MHz distribution amplifier cabinets 2L and 3L-427, for the Cable Riser Gallery at Elev. 50';

new cabinets 2L and 3L-426A will be installed next to the existing 450 MHz distribution amplifier cabinets 2L and 3L-426 for the Penetration Area Elev. 63'; and, new cabinet 3L-429A will be installed next to the existing 450 MHz distribution amplifier cabinet 3L-429 for the Unit 3 Switchgear Room Elev. 85'.

115 VAC power feed (in conduit) jumper cables will be installed between new and existing cabinets and terminated to power strips inside the cabinets. Also, a coaxial connector will be installed in each new cabinet to connect to input / output coaxial cables (jumpers) from adjacent cabinets. Additionally, water drip shields will be installed.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased as a result of this change. All changes covered by this pFC are related to data communications equipment only. All affected equipment, devices and wiring are Quality Class IV. Addition of this equipment will not impact safe shutdown or other safety related equipment; therefore, all accident probabilities, consequences, and scenarios remain bounded by existing analyses. This modification does not increase the consequences or probability of occurance of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

Facility Change 2/3-85-6581 (Continued)  ;

Safety Evaluation (Continued)  !

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced. This modification will not affect any Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements. Therefore, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

This modification does involve a change to the FHA. Input / output coaxial cables (jumpers) from adjacent cabinets will be installed per

" Communication System Practices Manual". Therefore, a FHA change has been issued to show the added combustible material. The additional fire loading however, will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed. Therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection. System / Program nor violates the' Fire Hazards Analysis.

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Facility Change 2/3-86-022 Title Replacement of Main Steam Drain Line Valves I Description This modification replaces Solenoid Valves 2HV-8248 and 2HV-8249 with Manual (non-isolating) Valves 2MU-1257 und 2MU-1258 respectively, with related cables being de-terminated and abandoned in place. All lifted wires shall be tagged and the control switches for the solenoid valves on Control Panel 2CR-52 and the valve position indicating lights in Control Panel 2CR-57 will be removed and replaced with blank cover plates. The Critical Functions Monitoring System (CFMS) Computer inputs will be deleted and the I/O List and software modified to reflect this deletion.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification involves two (2) separate plant functions: the Main Steam Drains and Containment Isolation.

FSAR Sections 10.3 and 10.4.9.2.2.2 discuss the design basis for the Main Steam Drains and Main Steam Supply to the Aux. Feedwater Turbine respectively. This change does not adversely affect operation of these Main Steam (MS) System functions. These system functions remain as originally intended and the design bases are unaffected. No changes are required to these portions of the FSAR.

FSAR Section 6.2.4 discusses the design basis for the Containment ,

Isolation System (CIS) and Section 7.3 discusses the Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS). This change does affect the description of the CIS and modification of both these FSAR sections is required. In both cases, ,

references to isolation of the drain lines upon MSIS must be deleted.

FSAR Table 15.6-9, which addresses radiological consequences of a postulated steam generator tube rupture, will also be revised.

Facility Change 2/3-86-022 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation: (Continued)

As a result of the changes made to the Containment Isolation System, specifically to the MSIS, a review of accident scenarios involving MSIS was performed. The scenarios involved are the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) and the Steam Generator (S/G) tube rupture. The effects on the MSLB scenario are negligible; however, the offsite dose limits associated with the S/G tube rupture incident are increased. Therefore, this change required prior NRC approval in accordance with 10CFR 50.59 (c) which has been received per Licensee Amendment No. 35 dated May 16, 1986; as such this change can be implemented and the following is maintained:

1. The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will l not be increased. The design accidents applicable to this system are the MSLB and S/G tube rupture. Changes made in accordance with this PFC do not affect any components or systems which could affect I the integrity of the steam lines or the S/G tubes.

2. The consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipmer.t important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will be increased. There is an increase in offsite doses associated with l the S/G tube rupture incident. The proposed change would increase the doses approximately 2.5 times the estimated Cycle I rates referenced in the existing FSAR evaluation. While this increase is significant it is still only 25*4 of the 10CFR100 limits and considerably less than the offsite dose consequences for the limiting large break loss of coolant accident.

3. This modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment different than any type previously evaluated in the FSAR. There are no changes in design function of the Main Steam System and there are no additional administrative or operational constraints imposed on the Main Steam System. There are no significant changes in the design function the Containment Isolation System and there are no additional administrative or

! operational constraints imposed on the CIS.

l 4. The margin of safety ac defined in the revised Technical Specification is not significantly reduced by this change. The change has no ;ignificant effect on existing Limiting Conditions of Operation. Surveillance requirements governed by the revised Technical Specification arn reduced as a result of the deletion of the subject Containment Isolation valves. Technical Specification 3/4.3, 3/4.6 and 3/4.7 have been revised to reflect the described changes.

This modification does not impact the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA).

Facility Change 2/3-86-6618 Title Addition of Radwaste Sump Line to Chemical Waste Tank Description The volume of miscellaneous liquid waste generated on a routine basis is greater than the normal system capacity. Thus, processing of miscellaneous waste requires diligent operator attention and sometimes interferes with other ongoing plact activities. The most limiting component in the miscellaneous waste system is the miscellaneous waste tank, SA1901MT063. This tank's capacity is only 6000 gallons. However, the chemical waste tank volume is approximately 25,000 gallons. Because the activity of water in the cheoical waste tank is generally high and the chemical content is low, the chemical waste tank is processed in the same manner as the miscellaneous waste tank. Addition of piping and valves to allow the radwaste sump to be pumped either to the chemical waste tank or the miscellaneous waste tank will provide more operating flexibility and allow a reduction of total curies released to the environment via the liquid pathway.

This change provides piping and the necessary isolation valves to permit the chemical waste tank, SA1901MT064, to receive the discharge of the Units 2/3 radwaste sump pumps, SA2426MP208 and SA24E6MP209. This change will reduce the volume of waste going directly to the miscellaneous waste tank by installing piping and isolation valves in the radwaste sump room and provide pipe routing from the radwaste sump pump discharge to the inlet of the chemical waste tank.

This change neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA).

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased as a result of this change. The addition of piping from the radwaste sump to the chemical waste tank provides for increased storage capacity for radwaste processing and does not change the final processing of radwaste. As such, all accident probabilities, consequences and scenarios remain bounded by the existing FSAR analyses.

This change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basi +, for any Technical Specification is not reduced. This change does not affect any Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements. As such, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

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Facility Change 85-6193 Title Secondary Chemistry Alarms I Description This modification deletes three alarms from the control room, moves sixteen alarms from the control room to the secondary chemistry laboratory, rearranges one control room alarm, duplicates six control room alarms in the secondary chemistry laboratory, and' revises some chemistry 1

alarm setpoints. These modifications are being made to reduce the number

• of alarms in the control room which do not require operator action, and to better utilize the chemistry laboratory staff. No alarms associated with f an effluent function or operator action are removed from the control room.

Safety Evaluation Process sampling as described in Section 9.3.2 of the FSAR will not be affected by this modification, nor will any functional design basis.

Thus, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will be affected, nor will the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR be created.

l The equipment modified by this change is not governed by the Technical

} Specifications and no existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements are affected. As such, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is impacted.

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect the additional cable routing in six fire zones resulting from the modification of both the Unit 2 and Unit 3 control rooms and the common chemistry laboratory. However, permissible fire loading limits previously analyzed will not be exceeded, and thus this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

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Facility Change 2-86-6014.4 Title l

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Respiratory / Service Air System (RSAS)

Description l This modification consists of installing three new RSAS compressors which are designed to provide compressed air for respiratory and service requirements for Units 2 and 3. This modification is necessary because the existing instrument air system does not provide air for breathing purposes in acconiance with the requirements of NRC IE Information Notice 79-08 and NUREG-0L41, Section 9.8. This facility change will result in RSAS systems from the instrument air.

Safety Evaluation Although this modification will require a change to FSAR Section 9.3.1 to describe the addition of the RSAS, no functional design bases in this or other sections will be affected. Therefore, neither the consequences nor the probability of occuarence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will be affected, nor will the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR be created.

The equipment added and modified by this change is not governed by the Technical Specifications, nar will this change impact any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements. Therefore, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

The Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will be revised to reflect the routing of additional cable in three fire zones. However, the additional fire loading will not exceed the perr.issible limits previously analyzed, and therefore, this modification ne'ther adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the FHA.

Facility Change 3-86-6025 Title Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal and Heat Exchanger Flange Gasket Replacement Description This modification replaces the Byron Jackson RCP shaft seals with Bingham-Willamette shaft seals and replaces the original stainless steel and asbestos RCP seal heat exchanger flange gaskets with inconel and carbon gaskets. These changes were made to increase the reliability of the shaft seals and minimize the leakage from the original flange gaskets. The replacement shaft seals and gaskets have the same general configuration as the original parts but include design refinements to improve the reliability of tne systems.

These modifications are expected to decrease the frequency of shaft seal replacement and eliminate RCP flange damage caused by leaking borated water, ultimately resulting in an improvement in plant reliability and a reduction in worker radiation exposure.

Safety Evaluation Although Section 5.4.1 of the FSAR, " Reactor Coolant Pumps," will be changed to reflect the parameters and certification of the new shaft seals, no functional design bases in this or other sections will be affected. This has been determined because equivalency has been demonstrated for testing and analysis of the new and original shaft seals. Thus, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will be increased, nor will the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR be created.

Operability of RCP shaft seals and heat exchanger flange gaskets are not governed by any Technical Specification. However, seal integrity and pressure retaining capability are indirectly related to Technical Specification 4.0.5 and 3/4.5.2 (minimum capacity for operability of charging pumps), and 3/4.4.5.2 (total RCS leakage). Since testing and analyses have demonstrated that the new shaft seals perform within the bounds of the existing safety analyses, neither the Technical Specification basis nor the associated margin of safety will be adversely affected.

This modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis.

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Facility Change 3-86-6143, Revision 1 Title l Modifications to Condensate Storage Tanks T-120 and T-121 'I

' Description This modification will consist of the following changes:

1. A nitrogen blanket to Condensate Storage Tank T-120 will be added to reduce the dissolved oxygen in the condensate. Provisions to add a nitrogen blanket to Condensate Storage Tank T-121 will be made.

2. Install a seal vent to each tank to protect them egainst overpressurization or vacuum inside of the tank.

3. ' Install tornado relief valves to protect the T-120 tank from sudden pressure changes outside the tank. A flow limiting orifice in the makeup line will limit the makeup flow to the capacity uf the overflow pipes. This will reduce the possibility of lifting the relief valve during a tornado.

4. Install instrument root valves that will be utilized for instrumentation changes covered by DCP 2-6428.0J.

Safety Evaluation Although this modification requires a revision to FSAR Section 9.2.6, the design bases for Condensate Storage and Transfer System wil' not be affected by this change. The condensate storage tanks are protected by seal vents for overpressurization or vacuum created during makeup and overflow of condensate. The seal vents are structurally designed to withstand missiles and tornados. Tornado valves are provided on Tank 120 to protect the tank from collapsing due to pressure differential during tornado. The system function remains as originally intended and design bases are unaffected. Therefore, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will be increased.

In addition, this modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR and Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA).

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical i Specification is not reduced by this change. The equipment affected by this change is not geverned by Technical Specifications. This change will '

not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

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Facility Change 3-86-6377 Title  ;

L Replacement of Main Steam Drain Line Valves l

l Description This modification consists of replacing Solenoid Valves 3HV-8248 and

3HV-8249 with Manual (non-isolating) Valves 3MU-1257 and 3MU-1258 respectively, and to de-terminate and abandon cables in place the associated cables. All lifted wires shall be tagged and the control switches for the solenoid valves on Control Panel 3CR-52 and the valve position indicating lights in Control Panel 3CR~57 will be removed and i replaced with blank cover plates. The CEMS Computer inputs will be '

deleted and the I/O list and software modified to reflect this deletion.

Safety Evaluation:

This modification involves two (2) separate plant functions: The Main Steam Drains and Containment Isolation.

FSAR Sections 10.3 and 10.4.9.2.2.2 discuss the design basis for the Main Steam Drains and Main Steam Supply to the Aux. Feedwater Turbine respectively. The change does not adversely affect the operation of these Main Steam (MS) System functions which remain as originally intended. The design bases are not affected either. No changes are required to these portions of the FSAR. '

FSAR Section 6.2.4 discusses the design basis for the Containment Isolation System (CIS) and Section 7.3 discusses the Main Steam Isolation Signal (MSIS). A subsequent change to the description of the CIS and FSAR sections 6.24 and 7.3 is required. In both cases, references to isolation of the drain lines upon MSIS shall be deleted.

FSAR Table 15.6-9, which addresses radiological consequences of a postulated steam generator tube rupture, will also be revised.

As a result of the changes made to the Containment Isolation System, specifically to the MSIS, a review of the Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) and the Steam Generator (S/G) tube rupture accident analyses were performed.

The effects of the potential breaks on the analysis of the MSLB scenario are negligible; however, the offsite dose limits associated with the S/G tube rupture incident are increased. Therefore, this change required prior NRC approval in accordance with 10CFR 50.59 (c) which has been received per Licensee Amendment No. 35 dated May 16, 1986; as such this change can be implemented and the following is maintained; i

Facility Change 3-86-6377 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation: (Continued)

1. The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased. The design accidents applicable to this system are the MSLB and S/G tube rupture. Changes made in accordance.with this PFC do not affect any components cn systems which could affect the integrity of the steam lines or the S/G tubes.

2. The consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will be increased. There is an increase in offsite doses associated with the S/G. tube rupture incident. The proposed change would increase the doses approximately 2.5 times the estimated Cycle I rates referenced in the existing FSAR evaluation. While this increase is significant, it is still only 25% of the 10CFR100 limits and considerably less than the offsite dose consequences for the limiiing large break loss of coolant accident.

3. This modification will not create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment different than any type previously evaluated in the FSAR. There are no changes in design function of the Main Steam System and there are no additional administrative or operational constraints imposed on the Main Steam System. There are no significant changes in the design function of the Containment

. Isolation System and there are no additional administrative or operational constraints imposed on the CIS.

4. The margin of safety, as defined in the revised Technical Specification, is not significantly reduced by this change. The change has no significant effect on existing Limiting Conditions of Operation. Surveillance requirements governed by the revised Technical Specification are tsduced as a result of the deletion of the subject Containment Isolation valves. Technical Specification 3/4.3, 3/4.6 and 3/4.7 have baen revised to reflect the described changes.

This modification does not impact the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA).

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l Facility Change 3-86-6460 Title Addition of Main Control Room Annunciators for Radiation Monitoring System Description These modifications will allow the control room operator to ascertain monitor failure on high radiation, without leaving the Control Room. This change adds new annunciator subpanels in close proximity to the corresponding main annunciators with Hi Radiation and fail alarms for each radiation monitor. Fail alarms will include, as appropriate, signals for channel failure, low process flow and alarm disable (NORAD). Each subpanel annunciator is connected to a main annunciator window, and each subpanel alarms only after a main window alarms. Reflash is also incorporated in the design. The subpanel windows are colored to match their main window counterpart priority codes. A new control room cabinet, 3L60, contains the subpanel annunciator logic cards.

A number of the main annunciator windows are modified and regrouped to correlate with the subpanel annunciators which have nameplates that identify their associated main windows. The main control board annunciator switch station, with individual switches, controls both the main and subpanel annunciator windows.

To connect the new subpanels and the new panel 3L-60 with the main annunciators, cable will be routed in cable trays and through new conduit supported by hangers.

Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be increased as a result of this change. The installation of this equipment does not adversely affect any safety related equipment or any equipment important to safety. Existing relay contacts in the radiation monitors are used and in some cases new relays are added. The new connections and associated equipment and the new relays are of the same Quality Class and Seismic Category as the equipment affected. All accident scenarios, probabilities and consequences remain bounded by the existing FSAR analysis, after considering the implementation of this modification.

This change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, r.or does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR. These changes will enhance plant operation and will aid the operators in assessing the radiation monitor status by noting the alarm status on the main annunciator panel and determining any individual monitor by checking the nearby annunciator subpanel. The new connections and associated equipment are the same quality class and seismic category as the existing annunciators, circuits and cabinets affected.

li Facility Change 3-86-6460-(Continued)

Safety Evaluation (Continued)

This modification has no effect on any Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements or Limiting Conditions for Operation. ,

Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical i Specification is not altered.

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1 Facility Change 3-86-6571

. Title Upgrade Computer Room HVAC Recirculation for New Plant Monitoring System (PMS) Computer Description This mo'dification will increase the capacity of the computer room HVAC system by,incteasing the size of the chilled water piping on the recirculation cooling unit in this room. This unit consists of a blower which pushes air through a chilled water cooling coil. Also, three=

booster fans with associated ducting will be added to improve air circulation in the room. These modifications wil1~ ensure that the cooling design basis of the room will continue to be met when the new PMS computer is added in the future. This HVAC system is part of the control room complex HVAC system.

Safety Evaluation Although this modification will require a change to FSAR Table 9.4-5 to reflect the increased capacity of the computer room cooling coil and the addition of the booster fans, there will be no impact on the original design basis of the control room HVAC system during normal or emergency modes as defined in FSAR Sections 9.4.2.1.1 and 9.4.2.2.1. Thus, neither the consequences nor the probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment irpportant to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will be affected, nor will the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR be created.

The equipment affected by this change is part of the Control Room Emergency Air Clean Up System governed by Technical Specification 3/4.7.5. However, this change has no effect on any Liraiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance requirements. Because the modified HVAC system will continue to meet its design basis, there will be no reduction

'in any margin of safety, associated with the Technical Specifications.

This modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis.

Facility Change 3-86-6571.1 1

j Title Plant Monitoring System (PMS) Computer Replacement Description l

This is one of four change packages that will be implemented to replace the PMS computer. This package modifies the operator console in the control room by replacing three CRT's, three display generators, one keyboard, two Data Acquisition Unit chassis, and one power supply. The replacement units are physically and functionally similar to the original i units but are compatible with the new PMS software. Also, a new conduit i and power cable will be routed to the control room to provide alternate power for the operator console.

The PMS is being replaced because it is difficult to maintain and obsolete.

Safety Evaluation The PMS equipment modified by this change is all non-safety-related and, as such, is not part of the accident analysis of the plant. The new equipment is functionally similar to the original equipment and does not interact with safety-related systems, therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR has not been created.

The equipment modified by this change is not covered by any Technical Specification. This change has no effect on any Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance requirement of any existing Technical Specification. Therefore, no Technical Specification basis or associated margin of safety is affected.

A revision to the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will be required to reflect the additional cable routing for the alternate power supply. However, permissible fire loading limits previously analyzed will not be exceeded, and thus this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis.

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Facility Change 3-86-6591 Title Addition of 3-hour Fire Rated Penetration Seals Description This design change provides for the installation of approximately 146 3-hour fire rated penetration seals in unsealed or ron-fire rated sealed penetrations which are located on heavy concrete (HC) walls at the Safety Equipment Building elevations (-) 15'-6", (-) 5'-6", and 53'-0". It also provides for the installation of one (1) 3-hour fire rat .d damper at elevation 8'-0" between Room 017 and Room 022 (Fire Area. .'ones 2-SE-(-15)-136 and 2-SE-(-5)-135A.)

This change ensures adequate separation between redundant trains to safe shutdown equipment and provides 3-hour fire barrier integrity.

Safety Evaluation j

The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR Section IIIA will not be increased as a result of this change. This change will not affect the design bases of any safety related systems and does not require modification to safety related structures, components or systems, i As such, this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not affected by this change. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) or Surveillance Requirements. This change however, will affect the Fire Prctection System, and the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) will require revision to reflect the addition of penetration seals and fire dampers to the heavy concrete walls. Also, the Fire Barrier Surveillance Procedures have to be modified and, the FHA wall rating will require a change from HC to 3-hour rated. The additional fire loading will not exceed the permissible limits previously analyzed, therefore, this modification neither adversely impacts the Fire Protection System / Program nor violates the Fire Hazards Analysis.

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Facility Change 3-86-6593.1 Title Spray Chemical Addition System Replacement with a TSP Passive System  :

Description -

The existing Spray Chemical Addition System (SCAS) adds NaOH into the borated containment. spray water for removing iodine from the containment atmosphere during the. initial phase of containment spray following a LOCA. In addition, during the long term recirculation by the SCAS phase, the pH level of the containment spray water is maintained to minimize the potential for chloride induced stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel. The system consists of a Spray Additive Tank with electric heaters, two injection pumps, and associated heat traced piping, valves and controls.

This change renders inoperable and permanently abandons in place the existing SCAS and replaces it with a passive system for pH control by adding Trisodium Phosphate (TSP) to the containment floor area. Blind flanges and caps will be installed on the sodium hydroxide injection

. piping leading to the Containment Spray System. The nitrogen supply to the Spray Chemical Storage Tank will be closed and electrical power to the system components (pumps, heaters, valves, heat traces) will be disconnected. Handswitches and annunciator windows in the main control panel will be blanked off. This change also consists of installing trisodium phosphate in the baskets. Five perforated stainless baskets will be located at the containment floor level (Elevation 18'2") in the major flow paths to the containment emergency sump. Each basket is sized to hold a maximum of 70 cubic feet of hydrated TSP. The total storage capacity of 350 cubic feet exceeds the minimum Technical Specification requirement of 256 cubic feet. TSP will be used in place of NaOH to adjust the pH of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) solution. To minimize the potential for chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel components while minimizing the hydrogen produced by the corrosion of galvanized surfaces and zinc-based paints, the long-term pH of the ECCS solution is expected to be in the range of 7.0 to 9.5. Since the pH of the boric acid ECCS solution, without spray additive, will be approximately 4.0, baskets containing trisodium phosphate will be added to the containment to raise the long term ECCS solution pH into the required range.

Facility Change 3-86-6593.1- (Continued)

Safety Evaluation

. The probability of. occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR will not be-increased. This. change renders inoperable the existing SCAS and replaces it with TSP stored in baskets inside the containment. The SCAS is  ;

permanently isolated and abandoned in place. All electrical components  ;

are-de-energized. lThe' abandoned piping system will maintain its integrity )

to meet Seismic II/I requirements. The TSP' system is a passive method of pH. adjustment which is_ inherently more reliable than the SCAS in. reducing l the potential for plant shutdown caused by equipment malfunction, and in minimizing equipment corrosion post-LOCA. The TSP system has no significant impact on the radiological environment'in the plant area.

This change will not increase _ the consequences of an ' accident or-malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR,- nor will it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated-in the FSAR. The TSP system that replaces the SCAS will not cause any significant effect on the radiological consequences of a LOCA as the calculated doses remain well within the'10CFR100 guidelines. It will still provide long term pH adjustment to minimize the potentfal for stress corrosion cracking of austenitic stainless steel components. Moreover, the passive TSP system is more reliable than the SCAS. The-substitution of a passive system for an active system fo'r the mitigation of the consequences of a postulated LOCA actually reduces the potential radiological consequences and equipment corrosion due to the failure of the active Iodine Removal System.

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced since the passive TSP system is more reliable than the SCAS System it replaces, in controlling pH level of the containment spray water. Technical Specification Amendment 40 incorporates this change.

The TSP and baskets are non-combustible and the SCAS is deenergized and abandoned in place. Therefore, this change does not adversely impact the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA). However, it does require a change in the FHA.

r Facility Change 3-86-6621' Title Modificat' ion of the Hydraulic System for the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Actuator and Relocation of the' Limit Switch Assemblies for MSIV L3HV-8204 and 3HV-8205 Description This modification will modify the hydraulic system of the MSIV (Main Steam Isolation Valve) actuator by replacing the Marotta hydraulic dump valves-

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with Paul Munroe hydraulic dump valves and removing the restricting orifice provided with the Marotta valves.

In addition, this modification will relocate the MSIV ;(3HV-8204 and  !

3HV-8205)' limit switch assemblies from inside the yoke to outside the yoke with new. redesign limit switch assemblies by WKM to provide better access  !

for maintenance and adjustment.

The above. modifications are required to provide reliable operation of the MSIVs and to minimize spurious MSIV closures.

' Safety Evaluation The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, Sections 5.4.5 and 10.3 will not be increased as a result of this change.

These modifications will not affect the design basis of the main steam system, or any other safety related system. In the case of a hydraulic line break and resultant fluid loss, the MISV will close. A break in a hydraulic line will not create an unsafe plant condition and the new equipment will not create any internal missile effect.

All potential accidents and consequences are bounded by existing analyses and no new High Energy Line Break Analysis (HELBA) is required. As such this change does not increase the consequences or probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor does it create the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR.

l The margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification is not reduced. The equipment affected by this change is governed by, but does not modify, Technical Specifications 3/4.3.1, 3/4.6.3 and 3/4.7.1.5. This change will not affect any existing Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCO) or Surveillance Requirements.

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Fa'cility Change '3-86-6655

-Title

-Addition of Interlock to Control Room Emergency HVAC System Logic Description The Control; Room emergency HVAC consists of-the following four components for the post accident control room operator ventilation: the Emergency Intake Units A207 (Train A); and, A206 (Train B), which supply outside air following initiation of a Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS) to the emergency recirculation units, and the Emergency Recirculation Units'E418-(Train A) and E419 (Train B) which take supply air from their train associated emergency intake unit.

'This change will provide an interlock to assure that the control room intake filtration unit does not operate if its associated recirculation filter fails to operate.

FSAR Appendix:158 describes the dose models used to evaluate the environmental consequences of postulated accidents. Specifically, '

Table 15-8 identifies the parameters used for evaluation of control room operator accident doses. The present FSAR design basis requires one emergency ventilation systera operating (e.g., Units A207-and E418 or A206 and E419) and no credit for emergency intake filters (A207 and A206).

By installing the interlock described above, the control room operator post accident dose will be reduced, given a failure of a recirculation fan.

The limiting single failure scenario for evaluating post accident control room operator dose is to assume both emergency intake units (A207 and A206) are operating and assume only one recirculation unit (E418 or E419) is operating. This limiting control room dose scenario assumes no credit for iodine removal by the intake filter, because the flow rate exceeds the Reg. Guide 1.52 control room guidelines for the filter. With one recirculating unit not operating, one half of the total intake filter air will go directly into the control room, resulting in higher control room radioactivity concentrations.

Thi: change will provide an interlock to assure that the control room intake filtration unit is tripped if a low flow signal is generated by its associated recirculation filter unit.

Facility Change 3-86-6655 (Continued)

Safety Evaluation I The probability of occurrence of an accident or malfunction of any equipment important to safety previously evaluated in FSAR will not be increased as a result of this change. This design change modifies the logic for the control of the control room intake and recirculation units, such that if either recirculation units fail, its train aligned intake unit will also trip. This change has no bearing on the probability of occurrence of an accident. It does mitigate'the result of an accident and equipment malfunction, by reducing the radiological consequences of a LOCA in the control room, increasing the probability of habitability of the control room which will, in turn, increase the margin of safety of normal operation or sLfe shutdown. This modification will decrease the reliability of the intake fan (required for 1/8" W.G.) by including an additional component in series. This is compensated for by the fact that the system will not meet single failure criteria. The control room parameters affected by this change are contained in FSAR Table 15.6-23 and FSAR Appendix B Table 158-5.

1 This change will not increase the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the FSAR, nor will the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a i different type than any previously evaluated in the FSAR. This change will reduce the control room radiological dose, therefore this system remains bounded by existing FSAR analysis. This reduction is reflected in the changes to FSAR Table 15.6-23 and Appendix B Table 15B-5. This change f mitigates the consequences of an accident, because the design is consistent with existing analysis (e.g., single failure criteria).

The margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced by this change. The control room emergency air cleanup system is governed by Technical Specification 3/4.7.5.

This change will not affect any Technical Specification Limiting Conditions for Operation or Surveillance Requirements.

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p 4 Enclosure.II-San Onofre Nuclear Generating' Station Units 1, 2 and 3-1986 Procedure Changes, Tests and Experiments -

All procedure changes in.1986 applicable to. San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 received a safety evaluation pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59. The safety evaluation concluded that none of the procedure changes involved an unreviewed safety question. The safety evaluations were reviewed and approved by the appropriate personnel as required by the.

Technical Specifications. .For each change, the respective review concluded

-that the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis' report was not increased, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report was not increased, and the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification was not reduced.

All tests and experiments conducted in 1986 for Units 1, 2 and 3 were considered described and bounded by the safety analysis report. . Therefore, there were no tests and experiments conducted in 1986 applicable to 10 CFR 50.59 reporting requirements.

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Southem Califomia Edison Company SAN ONOFRE NUCLE AR GENEp. ATING ST ATION P.O. BOX 128

$AN CLEMENTE. CALIFORNIA 92672 H E. MORGAN TELEPHONE ST At:ON MANAGE R (714)368 6241 June 30, 1987 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Docket Nos. 50-206, 50-361 and 50-362 Facility Change Annual Report San Gnofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59(b), this submittal provides the required annual report describing facility changes, procedure changes, tests, and experiments for Units 1, 2 and 3. This report covers the period of January 1 through December 31, 1986. Enclosure I contains a description and summary of facility changes which were approved for construction during 1986. Enclosure II contains a summary statement regarding procedure changes, tests and experiments for the reporting period.

If there are any questions regarding this report, please so advise.

Sincerely, Nk Enclosures cc: J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator, NRC Region V F. R. Huey, NRC Senior Resident Inspector, San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3 Institute of Nuclear Power Opertions (INP0) 45

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