ML20215E242
| ML20215E242 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Berkeley Research Reactor |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1980 |
| From: | Lim T CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, BERKELEY, CA |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215E220 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-811 NUDOCS 8612180416 | |
| Download: ML20215E242 (11) | |
Text
. g.,
{
g NUCLEAR ENGINEERING REACTOR LABORATORY TRIGA MARK III Facility
~
University of California Be rkeley, California BERKELEY RESEARCII REACTOR ANNUAL REPORT OF OPERATIONS January 1, 1980 through December 31, 1980 (BRR Technical Speci fica t ions 6. 7. 2)
Dr. Tek 11.
1, i m Reactor Supervisor f0p6e61216 DR GEORCE86-81g PDR k(3 d.. I h! M
_f2 [:
([.
p Emergency Shutdowns and Inadvertent Scrams Date Scram Circuit Reasons 1-2-80 Period Operators error 1
1-23-80 Linear power Operators error 4-22-80 Linear power Operators error 5-8-80 Period Operators error 12-10-80 Linear power Operators error q
12-29-80 Linear power Operators error 1
k Operators Training
, n May of 1980, one reactor operator passed the Nuclear I
Regulatory Commission Reactor Operators examination.
Requalification Training Program In accordance with regulations a successful requalification written examination was given to licensed operators and senior operators in November 1980.
Exercise Security and emergency evacuation exercises were performed
'during the months of June and December 1980.
Both the reactor staff and campus police participated in the drills.
In addition a special training tour for the Berkeley Fire Department was given in July 1980.
Tours Tours of the reactor laboratory for students and the general public are held on special request only.
i I
6
-^^^ -^ ^~'^
~~
w..
UNIVERSITI OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY f!
% ib BERKELEY
- DAVIS
- IRVINE
- 145 ANCELES
- RIVERSIDE
- SAN DIEGO
- SAN FRANCISCO kf SANTA BARBARA
- SANTA CRUZ
._v COLLEGE OF 1.NCINEERING DERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720 DEPARTMENT OF NUCLEAR ENGINEERING Docket No. 50-224 bbrch 20, 1981 License No. R-101
' 't, g
[
Ip q Director
'l Office of Inspection and Enforcement g
Region V e
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
-,[
Suite 201, Walnut breck Plaza 1990 N. California Boulevard Walnut Creek CA 94596
Dear Sir:
Enclosed is a copy of the Berkeley Research Reactor Annual Report for the calendar year 1980.
f Since ely yours,
}
Dr. T. fl. Lim Till: irs Reactor Supervisor Enc.
e b
1 n
s gg C.
&m,-
c.. pr':
b 4.
OFFICE.OF PUBLIC INFORMATION fk$ h $$ i N
Ml E W Mim :D W iE M b i n;.101 SPROUL' Hall; BERKELEY, CA 94720 1
- ^
h,Auwsa.....w.u.k
h
.s 4/9/81--Hafner--File 7784 STATEMENT BY CHANCELLOR IRA MICHAEL HEYMAN April 9, 1981 Because the proximity of the University's small TRIGA research reactor to an active carthquake fault raises, understandably, questions of public health and safety, I recently studied again the facts of that situation here in Berkeley.
Both the campus and the community want to be sure that the reactor, in its regular operation or under earthquake conditions, does not pose a significant public hazard.
To this end, I reviewed the role of the reactor in the teaching and research of the University, reassessed it in relation to public health and safety, and discussed it with knowledgeable, critical faculty members.
What I have found reaffirms my earlier conclusions that the reactor does not pose si~gnificant dangers to those of us who live and work in Berkeley.
There is no new information on the matter which changes those conclusions.
The. record of 60 TRIGA reactors in operation around the world for over' 15 years substantiates the success'of the designers' goal of a reactor that is "both foolproof and Ph.D.-proof."
Because the reactor was built to work against itself even in r'eaching the low level of reaction which it can achieve,.that record is without an accident or any evidence of critical malfunct' ion.
The reactor here in Berkeley plays an important role in teaching.
It is used for coven regular courses in Nuclear Engineerina, Public IIcalth, Mechanical Engineering, Biophysics and Chemistry.
h
-more-
/
HEYMAN STATEMENT-2 Over the past five years, 50 faculty members and research associates havelused the reactor for experiments, including biologists, medical J
d:ctors, physicists, archa'eologists, zoologists, public health researchers I
cnd others.
i v.
r Research studies have included air pollution analysis, creation of radioisotopes for medical and biological experiments, development of nuclear medicine instrumentation, radiation damage in organic materials, studies of physical properties of materials, analysis of trace elements in biological samples as part of a study of metabolism during human pregnancy, determining the age and origin of ancient crtifacts, determining the age of moon rocks, helping to determine the geological history of the earth through' analysis of trace elements in core samples and production of isotopes used in behavioral studies of small mammal populations.
These studies have all been done by Berkeley faculty.
In addition, the reactor is used by faculty and researchers from other institutions.
These include calcium turnover studies by UCSF, high altitude pollution studies and calcium metabolism studies of astronauts by NASA, lithium concentration studies in the brains of normal and mentally disturbed patients.by Stanford, exp'criments relating to the development of a fusion reactor by LBL, studies of the dynam'ics of movement of Bay mud through a study of trace elements by the San Francisco Port Authority, and studies of arsenic.. concentrations in people and the environment near gold fields by.the University of Ghana, f
The reactor, therefore, has an important role in research and
\\ \\
teaching.
It has contributed to several of the University's most significant recent scholarly findings, and to progress in seeking solutions to major health problems both in this country and abroad.
-more-
}
HEYMAN STAT'EMENT-3 In its teaching and research uses, the reactor does produce rcdioactivity. mst of the radioactivity is produced and rmains within the fuel elment which are alloy bars encased in stainless steel.
There are about 100
+
of these elements, each half as long and twice as thick as a broom h:ndle, and they constitute the reactor's core.
The core sits in a pool of water which acts as a shield.
A small amount of radioactivity is produced outside the fuel elements by the emission of neutrons during the reactor's operation.
It is this neutron-generated radioactivity which is used in the experiments conducted in the laboratory.
l Also produced through the neutrons irteraction with the pool I
water are argon-41 and nitrogen-16, gases which are radioactive.
l The nitrogen-16 has a half-life of only 7 seconds and hence decays bafore it can leave the laboratory.
Some of the argon-41, which has a half-life of two hours, is v:nted from the reactor laboratory 50 feet up to the roof of Etcheverry Hall where it is re' leased into the air.
The quantity released during a year is only 1/1000th of the maximum allowed.
A' radiation dosimeter on the Etcheverry roof directly in the exhaust air stream has detect no increase above the naturalfbackground radiation.
Natural background radiation i~s due in almost equal parts to radioactivity in the carth and to cosmic radiation.
It is alsq possible for the neutrons to produce some radioactivity in impurities which enter the water, despite constant filtration.
4 Such radioactive material is removed by filtration.
What aboutian earthquake?
Would it make a health hazard out of the rcactor, thr'eatening the public health and safety of all of us
~
here in Berkeley?
-more-
./
r
~
((
(f c
f HEYMAN STATEMENT-4 r
l The issue is not one of possible. nuclear explosion, and no one predicts that, knowing it is not possible.
1 The question is what radioactivity would be released if the reactor U
i cnd the laboratory were badly damaged or destroyed by an earthquake.
j This is not a new question.
The reactor and the laboratory were i
constructed with the likelihood of earthquakes as part of the planning I
process.
The results of such planning include 1) A sensor which stops all electricity going to the reactor in the event of an earthquake of 5 or higher on the Richter scale.
Without electricity the chain reaction ccnnot continue.
- 2) A water cooling and fil'tration system which retains the pool water ('which shields the reactor) within the laboratory.
~
- 3) A ventilation system which seals off the laboratory automatically on failure of power or rise in radioactive content.of the air.
These are in addition to the reactor's built-in safeguards which are designed to take advantage of the relevant laws of physics using temperature to shut down the machine.
And all of trege are in addition to the limit.s already imposed by the reactor's low operating power.
-In 1979 the Nuclear Regu'latory Commission hypothesized the impact
~
of a major' earthquake on'the Bcrkeley reactor.
.It. factored ~into its
' study. tlie breaching. of the,-reactor laboratory's walls, 'the, cracking of the pool so. that all water escapes and the rupturing of all of the fuel elements.
The Commission then estimated the effect in terms of radiation to 3
1 Mdch a person at.the site might be subjected.
In other words, to f
determine the maximum hazard under the most disastrous conditions.
0 With the catastrophic conditions'which the commission postulated',
i t
a person standing at the breached wall, and therefore subject to f
-more-
1.
g
.y.
HEYMAN STATEMENT-5,
maximum exposure from released radioactivity, would receive at most a radiation dose on the order of a year's accumulation of natural background
'/
radiation in Berkeley.
4 Some informed critics believe that total destruction of the reactor by a catastrophic earthquake could produce radiation exposure to the public somewhat larger than those calculated for the NRC " worst case".
Even these much more pessimistic estimates, however, entail radiation doses whose danger to health is small compared to everyday hazards and incomparably smaller than the more direct hazards of an earthquake large enough to danage the reactor.
Because the earthquake hypothesis has concerned some, I asked that the reactor laboratory be studied anew for its seismic safety.
The conclusion of off-campus seismic safety specialists is that, "in a majcr earthquake, we would expect damage to the exterior walls and a tendency for the joint between the prestressed tee flanges to slide.
There is. virtually no possibility of collapse."
They define a " major earthquake" as one of 7-7.5 magnitude on the Hayward Fault.
They further found that "it would be highly unlikely that any object dislodged from the tower (of Etcheverry^ Hall) by the most severe earthquakk could harm that portion of the building (housing the re' actor). "
Base'd on my review, I believe the re' actor does not constitute a-significant risk to public health and safety under maximum adverse eeismi~c condition.
With less hazardous' everyday conditions, the reactor poses negligible risk to public health.
At the same time, its operation makes regular contributions to the improvement of our lives through its use for teaching and research.
- 1
I c
(
ntnxtixy: nownmEYT CF CHGUSTRY
/
May 29, 1980 g
Chancellor Albert Bowker and J[g Provost George Maslach 8-California Hall Berkeley Campus M
^7)
Dear ChancellorBowker and Provost Maslach:
i Following two detailed conversations with Mr. Al Chafee, an inspector of the Nuclear Regulatory Commissionis regional office in Walnut Creek, I learned that there is an inconsistency between the By-Laws of our Reactor Hazards Committee and the Technical Specifications (" Tech Specs") of the TRIGA Research Reactor in Etcheverry Hall.
Mr. Chafce is considering reporting this, as well as a deficiency he finds in the frequency of our audits, to the regional office.
The regional office may consider the facts and then, possibly, issue a warning or a " citation".
I spoke frankly with Mr. Chafee requesting that we would be happy l
to correct promptly all such deficiencies and of course avoid
{
anything that reads as a " citation" no matter how minor the cause.
a) Professor Buxbaum has reported to the Committee his audit dealing with reactor records.
A copy is enclosed, b) Puture audits will be done more frequently, at least one per calendar quarter, removing one By-Law / Tech Spec inconsistency.
c) The Committee wishes to amend (by majority vote) the presently-approved By-Laws approved by you by letter on January 4, 1960, addressed to me:
Please simply add to the end of paragraph 3, " Meetings", the sentences,
{
" Minutes of all Committee meetings will be distributed to all members, and then approved at the next meeting. Decisions of the Committee shall be by majority vote of those present and voting."
(In fact, we have always done so.)
l I explained to Mr. Chafee that this Committee has a dual role, and it operates in a spirit of consensus and academic collegiality as is proper for an administrative advisory Committee.
Neverthe-less, there are technical reasons for these changes to satisfy the Committeels function in the eyes of the NRC and its licensing i
function.
I promised Mr. Chafee that we wou1Q comply with these requirements, and immediately notify the regional office of the l
NRC no later than May 30, 1980 and compliance at all levels.,in an effort to show cooperation l
I also invited Mr. Chafee to attend the May 29 meeting of the Committee to offer any suggestions he may wish to offer about the Reactor.
Indeed, I would hope that the above faults would be the most serious that could ever be found.
S ycercy y Samuel S. Markowitm, Chairman Reactor Hazards Committee, cc: Mr. Al Chafee, Inspector and
- 1979_80, w Mr. Jesse Crews, Assoc. Dir.
Regional Office of NRC, g\\*j!
Walnut Creek Plaza,,1 No. Calif. Ed.
WalnutCrg,y,,g.,PLQLt
)
y,,,_,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,t,,,,
G
- r. rn ir,4 10 A r..nt a vh rus7.AhDS COMJilTTEE
~T
(
o.
An' audit of the radiation monitoring system and records of the TRIGA Mark III nuclear research reactor at Etcheverry Hall, U.C. Berkeley was conducted by the undersigned on May 12, 1980, as required under the quarterly audit schedule of the operating license.
The installation requirements for radiation monitoring systems, l
and the records of such monitoring (in particular area monitors, stack-gas monitors, air particulate monitors and water monitors) were reviewed to determine the facility's compliance with applicable regulations and technical specifications, including Technical Spec-ifications 3.5 and 6.6 (1) and (j).
Personal dose records also were reviewed.
The record-keeping procedures and records were found to be in compliance with applicable requirements, and reasonably assure the continued availability of records of activity and of personal exposure.
l.
Activity Records. Area, stackgas, air particulate and water quality records were inspected, as were records of special monitoring systems which are not presently in operation but whose capability is a desired feature of the facility (an iodine count monitor and a gamma (multi-channel) analyzer for all radioisotopes).
The area (fixed) monitors of course are detectors, not counters; therefore, no record of their activity (other than of weekly tests of their operability and annual calibration records) are possible or required.
The stackgas monitor readings are keypunched for printout and analysis; these printouts and an output tape, both of which were inspected, are permanent records, as is a strip chart of stackgas air quality. A similar strip chart of air particulates is kept on per-i manent record, which was inspected.
The water quality monitor is trapsient and not recorded, but a weekly function-operability record and periodic calibration record are kept and were inspected, as was 3
a non-operating (and non-required) continuous-strip chart water l
monitoring record capability.
Also inspected were the records of an unofficial and non-required set of stackgas monitors: a continuour strip chart recording, a weekly and (major) monthly function-operability check, and a monthly printout-analysis of output radiation.
t All the above records were found to be in place, complete, secure, accessibic and legible.
- 2. Personal dose records.
Film badges of various levels of sophistication and short-term visitors' electrostatic dosimeters, as well as their use and readout records, were inspected.
The badges are read by their vendor and a continuous cumulative record of all individ-uals with recordable exposure is kept both at the facility as well as at the vendor's business location.
The dosimeters are read by users j
and recorded at the facility.
A random check of the set kept at the facility indicated that these records were complete and consecutive, well-ordered and secure.
These are permanent records in a secure setting appropriate to long-term access.
Further, three extra personal dosimetry analyres (by name) are kept in permanent storage at the Campus h
s
~( (
o.
Environmental Health and Safety Office, the Reactor Supervisor's Office, and the Reactor Health Physicist's Office respectively.
Student dose records are kept on class cards; these and the dosimeter readings are sent periodically to the Environmental Health and Safety Office for storage.
Visitors' "in-and-out" dose readings are checked with each visitor, and a dose record on them is kept in permanent book form.
In addition, a stamped entry record for each person-entry into the "high activity" room below the reactor catwalk is kept in a separate operating log by date.
3.
Environmental Monitoring System Records There exist also certain environmental monitors (and records),
as required by Technical Specifications No. 6.6 (g). These include static dosimeters and air samplers at various locations external to the facility. (such as on the roof of Cory Hall).
All of the above-described monitors and records were inspected during the audit, to the extent they are located at the facility.
All were found complete (on sampling), accessible, secure and Icgible.
In summary, the required records comply with applicable provisions of Technical Specifications and regulations concerning their function, scope and retention.
Resp ctfully submitted,
/ddl#/ k uu ar Richard M. Buxbaum 29 lby 1980 Received by the Committee and discussed at its meeting on May 29, 1980.
i M[
Markowitz,hairman Samuel S.
I
&f a
e PRELIMINARY fl0TIFICATI0tl May M, 1980 PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVEJIT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PHO-V 35 This oreliminary notification constitutes EAP,LY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or public interest significance.
The information presented is as initially received without verification or evaluation and is basically all that is known by IE staff on this date.
FACILITY: University of California, Berkeley Research Reactor (Triga)
Berkeley, California Docket No. 50-224 SUSJECT:
ACCIDENTAL RELEASE OF RADI0 ACTIVITY
}
As part of a class experiment, the licensee had irradiated a uranium sample in the reactor. Shortly after the sample was returned via the pneumatic sample transfer system (rabbit system) to the receiving station within a ventilation hood, the facility noble gas stack monitor alarmed. Upon investigation, the licensee discovered that the sealed polyethylene sample holder had cracked, thereby releasing the trapped fission gases. This occurred at approximately 3:00 PM on May 15, 1980. The licensee considers radiciodine to be the limiting radioisotope and has calculated the maximum possible activity released to the environment to be as follows:
I-131, 3.73 uCi; I-132, 471 uCi; I-133, 85 uCi; I-134, 2143 uCi; I-135, 248 uCi. Based on the ventilation exhaust flowrate, the licensee has calculated a 24-hour average release concentration from the stack of 0.3 MPC for I-131, 1.0 MPC for I-132, 2.0 MPC for I-133, 3 MPC for I-134 and 2.5 MPC for I-135. These values are significantly below the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 20.403(b)(2) but the licensee made a 24-hour report i
pursuant to technical specifications.
There were no personnel exposures f
involved.
The U.C. Berkeley facility is located near the Region V (San Francisco) office I
I and an inspector has been dispatched to review the occurrence.
The licensee and Region V do not plan to issue a press release but media interest could occur because of continuing public interest in the U.C. Berkeley facility.
This preliminary notification is issued for information only. Region V will followup and close out this event.
)
v, a
)
C' s v
i g[
J
i
- /
=
t PRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION LPRELIMINARY NOTIFICATION OF EVOIT OR UNUSUAL OCCURRENCE PHO-V 35 (Cont.)
This oreliminary notification constitutes EARLY notice of events of POSSIBLE safety or oublic interest sionificance. The information presented is as initially received without verification or evaluation and is basically all that is kr.own by IE staff on this date.
j RegionVwasnotifiedoftNisoccurrenceat12:15PMonMay 16, 1980'by a telephone call from the licensee.
CONTACT:
G. P. Yuhas, 463-3748 i
Distribution:
Transmitted H St 23 2 A:
Chairnan Ahearne Commissioner Bradford S. J. Chilk, SECY Cormissioner Kennedy Commissioner Hendrie C. C. Kammerer, CA Comnissioner Gilinsky ACRS (For Distribution)
Transmitted: HNBB[33 P Bldg 3 O b IE:X00S M I (IE:HQ Dist.)
W. J. Dircks H. R. Denton, URR C. flichelson, AE00 R. J. Mattson, NRR J. J. Fouchard, PA D. Vassallo, NRR Landow 3,?'716 min./page)
H. fi. Haller, tiPA D. Eisenhut,flRR J. J. Cummings, 0!A R. G. Ryan, OSP D. R. liuller, NRR H. K. Shanar. ELD SS Bldg 53
(MAIL)
Other J. Davis, f215S R. Minogue, SD Regional Offices 3 N R. Budnitz, RES IE:X005 2
(Time)
RV Form 211
.