ML20215E301
| ML20215E301 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Berkeley Research Reactor |
| Issue date: | 08/20/1968 |
| From: | Maslach G CALIFORNIA, UNIV. OF, BERKELEY, CA |
| To: | Rich Smith US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215E220 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-86-811 904-68, NUDOCS 8612220072 | |
| Download: ML20215E301 (2) | |
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UNIVERSITY OF CALIFO A, BERKELEY sgnKELEY, DAY 13
- 1RVINE
- LOS ANCELES
- RIVERSIDE
- SAN DIECO
- SAN FRAFCESCO SANTA BARBARA
- SANTA CRUZ
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COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA August 20, 1968 904-68 Mr. R. W. Smith Division of Compliance, Region V U. S. Atomic Energy Commission g
2111 Bancroft Way Berkeley, California i
Dear Mr. Smith:
This letter is intended as a reply to your letter of July 10, regarding
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the recent inspection of our TRIGA reactor facility by Mr. R. T. Dodds.
I have consulted the Reactor Administrator, Professor Hans Mark, regarding the j
four items of non-compliance noted by Mr. Dodds. I am outlining below our position regarding each of the items listed by Mr. Dodds, as well as the cor-rective measures which have been taken.
Item A).
The substitution of the Reuter-Stokes ion chamber for the safety channel detector (gamma chamber) was made in the course of experiments to determine the cause of variations in the response of the gamma chamber as a function of time.
The substitution was not intended to be a permanent change of the facility.
In spite of this, a Design Change Authorization according to the procedures laid out in the 10CFR50.59 should have been executed.
In the future, an appropriate Design Change Authorization will be written should a repetition of this experiment be necessary.
Item B).
In the experiment mentioned here, a BF neutron flu monitor 3
was placed in the central thimble for an overnight measurement of the back-ground flux. Due to an oversight on our part, the insertion was not logged in on the night of February 19, 1968, although it was recorded on the next evening and on all subsequent evenings when the experiment was performed. Two measures to correct the situation have been taken.
The reactor staff was informed by the Reactor Supervisor that all reactor safety circuits must be operable whenever, anything is placed in the core.
(See attached memorandum).
In addition, the reactor staff has been instructed to keep an accurate current log of all in-core experiments.
Furthermore, all objects placed in the core will be described.
In order to make certain that our records of each experi-ment performed are as complete as possible, we have made appropriate arrange-ments for an internal audit of our records once a month.
In this way, we hope to avoid errors of the kind cited here and to tighten our procedures for recording experiments.
Item C).
In the Experiment Request Form for this experiment, in which large reactivity worths of boron and cadmium samples were measured, no specific estimates of the expected reactivity worths were recorded on the forms.
Hence-forth, the reactor secff will be careful to see to it that reactivity worth 8612220072 861216 hRC 011 PDR
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Mr. R. W. Smith i
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l estimates for all experiments are recorded in the Experiment Request Forms f
prior to approval.
Item D).
The Technical Specifications, in Section I.2, and the Administrative Procedures of the facility give the authority to classify experiments to the Reactor Supervisor with the approval of the Reactor Health Physicist.
In their judgment, the experiment cited was placed in Class II and procedures appropriate for this class of experiments were followed. We con-cede that in this case, our judgment may have been in error. We are proposing two steps which will make it less probable that errors of this type will occur.
We are revising our criteria for experimental classification with the object of establishing firmer guidelines for the reactor staff when classification decisions are made. We are also establishing better mechanisms for informing the Reactor Hazards Subcommittee of our experience in various experiments.
This will include a discussion of unusual occurrenceg, a reading by title of all Class I and Class II experiments and more thorough written reports by the Reactor Health Physicist.
In this way, Reactor Hazards Subcommittee members will have an opportunity to question our judgment on experimental classification should they so desire.
In summary, we recognize that we were operating in violation of our Technical Specification on all the items listed.
In each case, corrective action has already been taken.
Sincerely yours,
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George J. Maslach Dean, College of Engineering GJM/HM:ms
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