Similar Documents at Zion |
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Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20217J4791999-10-18018 October 1999 SER Approving Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR73 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.NRC Concluded That Proposed Alternative Measures for Protection Against Radiological Sabotage Meets Requirements of 10CFR73.55 ML20211K0401999-08-31031 August 1999 SER Accepting Approval of Defueled Station Emergency Plan & Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.47, Emergency Plans for Plants,Units 1 & 2 ML20236U6331998-07-24024 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 179 & 166 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20236S3281998-07-20020 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Certified Fuel Handlers Training & Retraining Program ML20198P8361998-01-0909 January 1998 SER Accepting Determination of Zone of Influnce for Coatings in Containment of Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20198P8721998-01-0909 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Request for Alternative Insp Requirements for Augmented Exam of Reactor Presure Vessels for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20202F0761997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Proposed Alternative Contained in Request for Relief CR-13,Rev 1,of Removing Only Insulation Classified as Removable.Staff Determined That Submittal Does Not Provide Acceptable Level of Quality ML20132F5111996-12-20020 December 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 177 & 164 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20135D8971996-11-25025 November 1996 Corrected SE Supporting Amends 176 & 163 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20134P7941996-11-25025 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 176 & 163 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20134H6781996-11-12012 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 175 & 162 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20134F9851996-11-0606 November 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 174 & 161 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20129H2901996-10-29029 October 1996 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 173 & 160 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20059E2871993-12-30030 December 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 57,57,45,45,93,77,152 & 140 to Licenses NPF-37,NPF-66,NPF-72,NPF-77,NPF-11,NPF-18, DPR-39 & DPR-48 Respectively ML20058G2981993-11-29029 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 151 & 139 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48 ML20059M7851993-11-15015 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 150 & 138 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20059L7511993-11-10010 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Category 3 Qualification in Lieu of Category 2 for Pressure Monitoring Instrumentation ML20059L6801993-11-0909 November 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Update to Plant Reg Guide 1.97 Parameter Summary Table ML20058E6661993-10-22022 October 1993 Corrected SE Re Revised Fuel Handling Accident Inside Containment.Se Mistakenly Gives Decontamination Factor for Elemental Iodine Value of 100 Instead of 133 ML20059B1961993-10-22022 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 930913 Reanalysis of Fuel Handling Accident Inside Containment ML20059A7211993-10-14014 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 149 & 137 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20059C5521993-10-13013 October 1993 Corrected Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 148 & 136 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20057F8351993-10-13013 October 1993 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 148 & 136 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20057A2091993-08-31031 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Denying Addl Exemptions from Fire Protection Requirements of 10CFR50,app R.Conclusions Reached When Granting Exemptions in 830307 & 880607 SEs Still Valid ML20056H5001993-08-27027 August 1993 Safety Evaluation Re Fire Protection Open Items from Section 3.2.1 of 780310 Safety Evaluation ML20057B1711993-03-24024 March 1993 Safety Evaluation Granting Relief Requests to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48 Re Second 10-yr Interval Inservice Testing Plan for Pumps & Valves ML20056C0501992-06-0909 June 1992 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 138 & 127 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20058D8081990-10-31031 October 1990 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 120 & 109 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20247E7421989-09-0808 September 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 118 & 107 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20245F1631989-08-0101 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 117 & 106 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20247P9591989-05-30030 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 116 & 105 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20247M7431989-05-22022 May 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Compliance W/Atws Rule 10CFR50.62 ML20245H8051989-04-27027 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 115 & 104 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20244E4141989-04-14014 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util post-accident Monitoring Instrumentation Per Reg Guide 1.97 & Generic Ltr 82-33 ML20196B8081988-12-0202 December 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Items 3.1.3 & 3.2.3 Re post-maint Testing Requirements ML20207K9971988-10-11011 October 1988 SER Supporting Amends 113 & 102 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48, Respectively ML20155G5771988-06-0707 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Recommending That Util 840727 Exemption Request from Sections III.G.2 & III.G.3 of 10CFR50,App R Be Granted.One Exemption Request Determined as Unnecessary ML20154A7781988-04-15015 April 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 112 & 110 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20151M1281988-04-0606 April 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 111 & 100 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20148P4951988-04-0404 April 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 110 & 99 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20150F0601988-03-28028 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 109 & 98 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20147B8831988-02-26026 February 1988 SER Re Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events.Nrc Concludes That Many of 30 Measurements Added to List in WCAP-10962 Not Credible ML20149H5541988-02-0505 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 108 to License DPR-39 ML20237H5511987-08-17017 August 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 107 & 97 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20236J3961987-07-20020 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 106 & 96 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20235E9171987-06-23023 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 105 & 95 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20213G6351987-05-0808 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 104 & 94 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20215K3831987-05-0707 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Util 861229 Submittal Concerning Matl Properties for Fracture Toughness Requirements for Protection Against PTS Events,Per 10CFR50.61.Reported Values of Copper & Nickel Content Unacceptable ML20205Q9561987-03-26026 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 103 & 93 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20205G7221987-03-19019 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 102 & 92 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48 1999-08-31
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217J4791999-10-18018 October 1999 SER Approving Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR73 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.NRC Concluded That Proposed Alternative Measures for Protection Against Radiological Sabotage Meets Requirements of 10CFR73.55 A99026, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20217A1691999-09-22022 September 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Engine Sys,Inc Controllers,Manufactured Between Dec 1997 & May 1999,that May Have Questionable Soldering Workmanship.Caused by Inadequate Personnel Training.Sent Rept to All Nuclear Customers A99023, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20211K0401999-08-31031 August 1999 SER Accepting Approval of Defueled Station Emergency Plan & Exemption from Certain Requirements of 10CFR50.47, Emergency Plans for Plants,Units 1 & 2 A99022, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With A99021, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With A99019, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195B2591999-05-19019 May 1999 Rev 66a to CE-1-A,consisting of Proposed Changes to QAP for Dnps,Qcs,Znps,Lcs,Byron & Braidwood Stations A99016, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20195H9521999-04-30030 April 1999 Revised Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2 A99013, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20207M9231999-03-12012 March 1999 Amended Part 21 Rept Re Cooper-Bessemer Ksv EDG Power Piston Failure.Total of 198 or More Pistons Have Been Measured at Seven Different Sites.All Potentially Defective Pistons Have Been Removed from Svc Based on Encl Results A990101, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1999 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20205M7061998-12-31031 December 1998 Unicom Corp 1998 Summary Annual Rept. with A99002, Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1998 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With A98062, Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1998-11-30030 November 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1998 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20196J0061998-11-19019 November 1998 Rev 66 to Topical Rept CE-1-A, QA Program ML20196A4191998-11-19019 November 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting QA TR CE-1-A,Rev 66 Re Changes in Independent & Onsite Review Organization by Creating NSRB A98057, Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1998-10-31031 October 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1998 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With A98052, Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With1998-09-30030 September 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1998 for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2.With A98049, Special Rept 304-123-98-001SR:on 980902,valid Failure Rept for 2A EDG Occurred.Cause Unknown.Util Submitted Written Certification of Permanent Cessation of Operations at Zion Station,Units 1 & 21998-09-25025 September 1998 Special Rept 304-123-98-001SR:on 980902,valid Failure Rept for 2A EDG Occurred.Cause Unknown.Util Submitted Written Certification of Permanent Cessation of Operations at Zion Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20195D1221998-08-31031 August 1998 DSAR, for Zion Station A98048, Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 2.With1998-08-31031 August 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Aug 1998 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 2.With ML20237E2331998-08-21021 August 1998 Revised Pages of Section 20 of Rev 66 to CE-1-A, QA Topical Rept A98042, Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 21998-07-31031 July 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for July 1998 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20236U6331998-07-24024 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 179 & 166 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48,respectively ML20236S3281998-07-20020 July 1998 Safety Evaluation Supporting Certified Fuel Handlers Training & Retraining Program A98041, Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Zion Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 21998-06-30030 June 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for June 1998 for Zion Nuclear Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20236J7911998-06-12012 June 1998 LER 98-S02-00:on 980517,first Shift Security Officer Reported Being Wounded by Unknown Subject Who Fled Area. Caused by accidental,self-inflicted Gunshot Wound.Removed Officer from Duty & Charged Officer W/Filing False Rept A98039, Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Zion Generating Station,Units 1 & 21998-05-31031 May 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for May 1998 for Zion Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 A98035, Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 21998-04-30030 April 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Apr 1998 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 2 A98033, Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 21998-03-31031 March 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Mar 1998 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 2 A98029, Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 21998-02-28028 February 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Feb 1998 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 2 A98015, Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1998 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 21998-01-31031 January 1998 Monthly Operating Repts for Jan 1998 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199K1651998-01-23023 January 1998 Rev 65h to Topical Rept CE-1-A, Comm Ed QA Tr ML20198P8361998-01-0909 January 1998 SER Accepting Determination of Zone of Influnce for Coatings in Containment of Plant,Units 1 & 2 ML20198P8721998-01-0909 January 1998 Safety Evaluation Accepting Request for Alternative Insp Requirements for Augmented Exam of Reactor Presure Vessels for Zion Nuclear Power Station,Units 1 & 2 A98034, 1997 Annual 10CFR50.59 Summary Rept1997-12-31031 December 1997 1997 Annual 10CFR50.59 Summary Rept ML20216D3611997-12-31031 December 1997 Unicom Corp 1997 Summary Annual Rept A98004, Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1997 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 21997-12-31031 December 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Dec 1997 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20202F1451997-12-0303 December 1997 Independent Investigation Team Rept on Safety Conscious Work Environment at Zion Station ML20202F0761997-12-0202 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Denying Licensee Proposed Alternative Contained in Request for Relief CR-13,Rev 1,of Removing Only Insulation Classified as Removable.Staff Determined That Submittal Does Not Provide Acceptable Level of Quality A97076, Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1997 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 21997-11-30030 November 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Nov 1997 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20199J5931997-11-26026 November 1997 SG Insp Results,Fall 1996 Refueling Outage 14 (Z2R14) A97063, Special Rept 295-123-97-002SR:on 971014,failure of 1B EDG Occurred.Exam of Nipple Fractured Surface Revealed Failure Occurred Through Thread Root.Unit 1 Defueled & Unit 2 in Mode 5 Throughout Event1997-11-13013 November 1997 Special Rept 295-123-97-002SR:on 971014,failure of 1B EDG Occurred.Exam of Nipple Fractured Surface Revealed Failure Occurred Through Thread Root.Unit 1 Defueled & Unit 2 in Mode 5 Throughout Event A97069, Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1997 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 21997-10-31031 October 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Oct 1997 for Zion Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20211M0181997-10-0707 October 1997 Special Rept 295-123-97-001SR:on 970904,OA Motor Declared Inoperable Due to Pin Hole Leaks Identified on Pressure Regulating Relief valve,0FP0052.Procedure Was Rewritten to Ensure 0FP0052 Would Maintain Same Pressure When Fully Open A97058, Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1997 for Zion Generating Station,Units 1 & 21997-09-30030 September 1997 Monthly Operating Repts for Sept 1997 for Zion Generating Station,Units 1 & 2 ML20210V2401997-09-19019 September 1997 Rev 65g to Topical Rept CE-1-A, Comm Ed QA Manual 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
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.,' /*'% UNITED STATES 3" t NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j i #l .g WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
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.....J SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 98 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-39 AND AMENDMENT NO. 88~ TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-48 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-295 AND 50-304 INTRODUCTION-Combustion Engineering Report CEN-331, Revision 1, was submitted by I Comonwealth Edison Company (Ceco) by letter dated June 16, 1986, (Ref. 1) to support a technical specification change allowing installation of steam generator repair sleeves in Zion Units 1 and 2.
Combustion Engineering (C-E) provides a leak tight sleeve which is welded to the steam generator tube near each end of the sleeve. The sleeve spans the degraded area of the parent steam generator tube in,the tube sheet region.
The operation of Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) steam generators has in some instances, resulted in localized corrosive attack on the inside (primary side)
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or outside (secondary side) of the steam generator tubing. This corrosive attack results in a reduction in steam generator tube wall thickness. Steam generator tubing has been designed with considerable margin between the actual wall thickness and the wall thickness required to meet structural r'equirements.
Thus it has not been necessary to take corrective action unless structural' limits are being approached. '
Historically, the corrective action taken where steam generator tube wall degradatiorF has been severe has been to install plugs at the inlet and outlet of the steam generator tube when the reduction in wall thickness reached a calculated value referred to as a plugging criteria. -Eddy current testing (ECT) has been used to measure steam generator tubing degradation and the tube plugging criteria accounts for ECT measurement uncertainty.
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8612050013 861118 '
PDR ADOCK 05000295 P PDR g
2 Installation of steam generator tube plugs removes the heat' transfer surface of the plugged tube from service and leads to a reduction in the primary coolant flow rate available for core cooling. Installation of welded steam generator sleeves does not significantly affect the heat transfer capability of the tube being sleeved and a large number of sleeves can be installed without significantly affecting primary flow rate.
ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA The objectives of installing sleeves in steam generator tubes are twofold.
The sleeve must maintain structural integrity of the steam generator tube during normal operating and postulated accident conditions. Additionally, the "
I sleeve must prevent leakage in the event of a through hole in the wall of the steam generator tube. Tests and analyses were performed to demonstrate the capability of the sleeves to perform these functions under normal operating and postulated accident conditions.
Plugs are installed in the sleeved steam generator tubes when the tubes cannot be successfully repaired with sleeves.
SLEEVE DESIGN AND PROCESS DESCRIPTION The sleeve design qualified by CE is inserted in a degraded or defective tube to a point above the tubesheet but below the first support plate.
The sleeve material is thermally treated Inconel 690. The outside diameter of the sleeve was selected to provide a generous clearance between the sleeve and steam generator tube so that the sleeve slides freely through the tube during installation. There were two considerations in selecting the sleeve l thickness. First, the sleeve has sufficient thickness so that the steam ;
generator tube with the sleeve bridging the degraded section of the tube meets the structural requirements of the undamaged portion of the steam generator tube. This consideration assumes no benefit from the tube behind the sleeve.
Second, there is a large margin in thickness over what is required structurally to allow for sleeve eddy current measurement uncertainty. the inside diameter of the sleeve is large enough so that the flow rate and heat transfer capability of the steam generator tube are not significantly affected by sleeve installation.
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The sle~ eve is chamfered at the upper end to prevent hang-up with equipment which is used to instaff the sleeve or inspect the sleeve and the tube. Means are
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provided for temporary mechanical support of tha sleeve prior to welding.
Inasmuch as each sleeve is welded at both ends to each tube being sleeved, this process is considered to provide a leak tig% repair. Essentially the process t consists of cleaning the tube to be sleeved at the areas of the welds, insertion of the sleeve, expansion in the upper weld area, welding and inspection.
t Plugs will be installed if sleeve installation is not successful or if there l
is unacceptable degradation of s'leeves or sleeved steam generator tubes.
Analyses and testing demonstrated that the welded plug design which is provided by C-E is leak tight and will meet structural requirements during nomal operating and postulated accident conditions.
MATEPIALS SELECTION AND CORROSION CONSIDERATIONS The tubing from which the sleeves are fabricated is Inconel 690. It was procured according to ASME Poiler and Pressure Vessel Code Case N-20. In addition, a themal treatment is also specified in order to impart greater corrosion resistance and to lower the residual stress level in the tube.
1 The primary selection criterion for the sleeve material was its corrosion resis-tant in primary and faulty secondary PWR environments. Specific resistant to pure water and caustic stress corrosion cracking were considered.
I Information published in the open literature indicates that the corrosion product release rates of alloy 690 is superior to Alloy 600 in both high temperature ammoniated and borated waters. The corrosion rate of Alloy 600 is significantly higher, especially in borated waters, with the concurrent formation of thicker oxides. The latter is a potential concern during thermal transients which could initiate crud bursts.
C-E has conducted a number of bench and autoclave tests to evaluate the corrosion resistance of the welded sleeve joint. Of particular' interest is the effect of the mechanical expansion / weld residual stresses and the condition of the weld and weld heat affected zone. Various tests have or are presently being conducted under accelerated conditions to assess the sleeve-tube joint performance under nominal and potential faulted I
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environmental conditions. Corrosion testing of typical sleeve-tube assemblies that have been completed reveal no evidence of sleeve or tube corrosion considered detrimental under anticipated service conditions. In addition, this repair method has been used, thus far successfully, for sleeving at the Swedish Ringhals 2 plant and at R. E. Ginna.
PROCESS AND INSERVICE INSPECTION Three types of nondestructive examination are used during the sleeving process. They are as follows: eddy current testing (ECT), ultrasonic testing (UT), and visual.
A dual cross wound probe and bobbin probe using the multifrequency eddy current method will be used to perform a baseline inspection of the installed sleeve for future reference. The ECT fixture is used on a manipulator arm to position the probe.
Ultrasonic testing using an immersion technique with demineralized water as a couplant is used to inspect the upper tube to sleeve weld. A transducer is positioned in the weld area and is rotated with an electric motor to scan the weld. The pulse echo tester has the ability to interface with an on-line data reduction computer to produce a display /hardcopy during radial and axial scanning.
5 An eddy current test has been qualified for the inspection of installed welded sleeves to detect flaws in the pressure boundary. Eddy currents circulating in the sleeve and steam generator tube are interrupted by the presence of flaws in the material with a resultant change in test coil impedance. This impedance change is processed and displayed on the test instrument to indicate the presence of a flaw.
The pressure boundary is considered to be the sleeve up to and including the upper weld joint and the steam generator tube above the weld. Consequently,
. there are the three distinct regions relative to the inspection methods: 1) the sleeve below the weld, 2) the steam generator tube behind the top section of the sleeve (above the weld), and 3) the steam generator tube above the
,' sleeve.
Using specialized probes and multifrequency eddy current techniques, it has been demonstrated that a 40 percent through wall flaw (ASME calibration standard) is detectable anywhere in the tube behind the sleeve and above the weld. These techniques are also capable of detecting and sizing a 33%.through wall flaw (ASME calibration standard) in the sleeve below the weld region and detecting a 33% through wall flaw in the weld region. These inspection a capabilities are documented in the Combustion Engineering Report CEN-331.
Ceco has agreed in a letter dated September 24,1986, (Ref. 4) to provide NRC with the results of further testing that they are undertaking to quantify minimum detection and sizing capabilities. The proposed technical specifications contained in the April 24, 1986, letter (Ref. 2) as revised by the September 2, 1986 letter, (Ref. 3) from CECO reflect these values in the plugging limits in TS Section 4.3.1.B.4.A.6. .The basis for the plugging limit of 33% is discussed in the Mechanical Evalaution section below.
Visual examinations can be performed on the upper welds to support UT results and are performed on the lower welds to determine their integrity and acceptance. The welds are examined using a boroscope examination system. The lighting is supplied as an integral part of the visual examination system.
Each examination is recorded on video tape for optional later viewing and to provide a permanent record of each weld's condition.
The inspections are performed to ascertain the mechanical and structural condition of each weld. Critical conditions which are checked include weld width and completenes's and the absence of' visibly noticeable indications such as cracks; pits, blow holes, and burn.thrcugh.
4 MECHANICAL EVALUATION
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Mechanical tests were performed on mockup stean generator tubes containing sleeves and plugs to provide qualified test data describing the basic properties-of the completed assemblies. These tests determined axial load,
. collapse, burst, and thermal cycling papability.
6 These tests demonstrate that the load capability of the upper and lower sleeve welds is sufficient to withstand thermally induced stresses in the weld resulting from temperature differential between the sleeve and the tube and the pressure induced stresses resulting from normal operating and postulated accident conditions. The burst and collapse pressures of the tested sleeve provided substantial margin over the limiting differential pressure. Mechanical testing indicated that the installed sleeve will withstand the cyclical loading resulting from power changes in the plant and other transients.
From testing it was determined that the welded plugs have sufficient load capacity to perform their function during normal operating and postulated accident conditions. The axial load required to loosen the plug from the sleeve-tube assembly is approximately four times greater than the design load.
The licensee has performed analyses to demonstrate the structural integrity of l the sleeve-tube assemblies and their compliance with design requirements. The methodology used is in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,Section III. .,
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. . 1 An evaluation was performed to NRC Regulatory Guide 1.121, " Bases for Plugging Degraded PWR Steam Generator Tubes." Based upon the allowable degradation limit calculated and allowing an appropriate margin for inservice inspection uncertainties and growth of degradation between inspections, the 33% plugging limit for steam generator tube sleeves contained in the proposed Technical Specifications for Zion 1 & 2 steam generators contained in the September 2, 1986 letter from Conrnonwealth Edison is adequate for the Combustion Engineeri.ng welded sleeve method.
Based upon test data to determine susceptibility to flow induced vibration, it was concluded that a sleeved tube is no more susceptible to vibration than a normal tube.
a Fatigue analysis of the upper and lower sleeve weld joint has been performed and shown to meet ASME Code allowables.
A comparison of the calculated failure modes and the test data indicate goo'd agreement. Safety factors were determined for hypothetical pipe break accidents, and the minimum safety factor demonstrated adequate conservatism.
The normal operations factor of safety, based on the full power restrained thermal expansion . loading, exceeded that required by Regulatory Guide 1.121.
CONCLUSION The staff concludes that the repair of the Zion steam generators utilizing the C-E welded sleeve design is acceptable. This conclusion is based upon 1) the analytical work performed by the sleeve vendor 2) the confirmatory testing performed by the sleeve vendor, and 3) the thus-far satisf(ctory performance of similar sleeves installed in Ringhals and Ginna.
The licensee has provided modifications to his Technical Specifications which contain appropriate surveillance requirements and plugging limits. The staff concurs with the licensee that sleeving is a satisfactory alternative to plugging and that the sleeves are satisfactory with regard to mechanical properties, corrosion resistance, and inspectability.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION These amendments involve a change in the installation or use of the fecilities. components located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR 20. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no sigrificant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation-exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec-51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.
t CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on.the considerations discussed above, that:
- (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such. activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Dated: November 18, 1986 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTOR:
David Sellers l
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REFERENCES
- 1. June 16, 1986, letter from P. C. LeBlond (CECO) to H. R. Denton (NRC) transmitting Combustion Enginering Report No. CEN-331, Revision 1.
- 2. April 24, 1986, letter from P. C. LeBlond to H. R. Denton transmitting proposed technical specification change.
- 3. September 2,1986,' letter..from P. C. LeBlond to H. R. Dent'on transmitting l ' ,- a revision to the techncial 'pecifications s change proposed in Ref. 2.
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, 4. September 24, 1986, letter from P. C. LeBlond to H. R. Denton transmitting supplementary information to Ref.1.
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