ML20205G722

Safety Evaluation Supporting Amends 102 & 92 to Licenses DPR-39 & DPR-48

ML20205G722
Person / Time
Site:	Zion  File:ZionSolutions icon.png
Issue date:	03/19/1987
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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ML20205F536	List: ML20205F531 ML20205F589 ML20205G722
References
NUDOCS 8703310525
Download: ML20205G722 (3)

Text

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jensaseg r UNITEJ STATES k NUCLEAR REIULATORY COMMISSION

[ WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 1

l o....

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! SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULA710N i RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO. 102 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-39 AND AMENDMENT NO. 92 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. OPR-48 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY ZION NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 DOCKET NOS. 50-295 AND 50-304

1. Introduction I

By letter dated October 16, 1986, Commonwealth Edison Company proposed Technical Specification changes for the Zion Units 1 and 2 to resolve an inconsistency between the FSAR safety analysis and the Zion Technical Specifications. The inconsistency involves the number of reactor coolant pumps assumed to be operating in PODE 3 (hot standby) during a postulated control rod bank withdrawal accident.

The Zion FSAR describes a rod bank withdrawal accident from a suberitical condition. According to the current 71on Technical Specifications, Section 3.3.1, a single reactor coolant pump is sufficient to remove decay heat from the core'in MODE 3. However, for Hot Zero Power (HIP) conditions operation is bounded by the following three accidents: (11 steamline break, (2) rod ejection,and(3) rod bank withdrawal from suberitical. All these accidents assure four reactor coolant pumps in operation. For the steam 11ne break and the rod ejection accidents, the operation of only a single reactor coolant pump will not affect the analytical resulth in the FSAR. However, the safety '

margin may be reduced during a rod bank withdrawal from subcritical conditions with less than four reactor coolant pumps in operation. Thus, there is an inconsistency between the Technical $pecification reouirements and the accident analysis. .

0703310525 DR 070319 ADOCK 05000295 PDR

1. To remedy this incensistency, the licensee proposes to modify the Technical Specificationssuchthat(1) all four reactor coolant pumps must be in operation in MODE 3 when any control rod drive mechanism (CRIF1 is energized, and (2) all CRDMs must be immediately de-energized when there are Iess than The de-energizing of CRDMs may be four coolant pumps in operation in PODE 3.

accomplished by opening the reactor trip breakers or shutting down the rod drive motor generr. tor sets.

Our evaluation is provided in the following section.

2. Evaluation Sections 3.3, paces 73 and 73a, under the heading " LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION" is revised to reflect the new requirements that all four coolant s

pumps must be operating in MODE 3 when any CRDM is energized, and all CRDv must be innediately de-energized when there are less than four coolant pumps in operation. By doing so the licensee removes the inconsistency between the Technical Specifications and the FSAR analyses. We consider these chances acceptable.

Section 4.3 page 73 under the heading " SURVEILLANCE PErju!REMENTS" is revised to show that all reactor coolant loops should be verified to be operating in We thus MODE 3. This change is consistent with the ifcensee's proposals.

consider this acceptable.

Section 3.3.1 and 4.3.1 under the heading " BASES" are revised to describe the consistency between the Technical Specification recuirements and the accident analyses. We consider this change acceptable.

3. Technical Findings We have reviewed the Zion Units 1 and ? Technical Specification changes

' concerning reactor coolant pump operability. The changes make the Technical Ve, Specifications consistent with the accident analyses in MODE 3.

therefore, conclude that the Technical Specification changes for reactor coolent pump operability in MODE 3 are acceptable for Zion Units 1 and 9

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ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION These amendments involve a change in the installation or use of th facilities components located within the restricted areas as defined in 10 CFR 20. The staff has determined that these amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Comission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding. Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of these amendments.

CONCLUSION We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Comission's regulations and the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the comon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: March 19, 1987 PRINCIPAL CONTRIBUTOR:

S. L. Wu I

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