ML20214P178

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Recommends Closure of Allegation 4-85-A-093.Alleger Provided Fictitious Name & Address & Cannot Be Contacted
ML20214P178
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/29/1986
From: Jaudon J
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Emerson M
NRC
Shared Package
ML20214P025 List:
References
FOIA-86-687 NUDOCS 8612040102
Download: ML20214P178 (2)


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NUCL E AR REGUL ATORY COP,1%1SSION j

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fiE.YORANDUli FOR: fi. E. Emerson, Allegation Coordinator FRON:

J. P. Jaudon, Chief, Reactor Project Section A, DRSP SUSJECT:

ALLEGATION 4-85-A-093 This recommends closure of the subject allegation.

Background:

This allegation was received by mail.

The name and return accress of the alleger were apparently fictitious.

The typing and style of the allegation closely resembled previously received allegations from allegers using apparently fictitious names and return address.

Since this allegation was against Stone and Webster, it was turned over to Gulf States Utilities (GSU).

Region IV Action: The Senior Resident Enspector (SRI) has followed up on the,/

GSU investigation of.this allegation. itis report, which includes GSU's T'

report as an enclosure, is attaci'ed.

Recommended Action:

Based on review of the attachment, I recommend closure of the subject allegation.

Since the alleger used a fictitious name and address, there is no way to contact him.

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Jaudon, Chi ei.

or Project Section A

Attachment:

As stated gj20 2 861125 GUSTE86-687 PDR.

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IILEGATION FEVIFK

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CASE NUMBER 4-85-A-093 DATE OPENED 09/09/85 FACILITY NAME River Bend 50-458 SUB.'ECT Unacceptable station service transformer, incorrect specs for 600V power cables SOURCE OF ALLEGATION Private citizen NUM3ER OF ALLEG.

3 ASSIGNED TO RPS A CROSS REF. NO.

ACTION SCHEDULED Awaiting licensee report, and if warranted, inspection FIRST/LAST NAME J. Jaudon DATE ASSIGNED 09/10/85 REPORT NUMBER lst:

2nd:

Lst:

FTS NUMBER 8-728-8100 DUE DATE 11/08/85 ALLEGATION SUBSTANT N

ENFORCEMENT ACTION SORT CODE X

DATE CLOSED 05/29/86 ACTION OFFICE RIV MAN HOURS REPORT PREPAFATION ASSIST DETAILS: A11eger wrote I&E HQ, letter forwarded to RIV 09/09/85. A11eger stated three main concerns:

(1) unacceptable specs for station service transformer, (2) incorrect specs for 600V power cables, and (3) Stone & Webster is not responsive or at best slow in correcting known deficiencies, and if corrections are made, these changes create new problems. Letter to alleger returned 11/5/85 "no such address." Allegation now treated as anonymous.

Fictitious name & add. used by Algr. Jaudon's 5/29/86 memo closes file.

1 ISGLOSE ils

OUL STATER UTILIT1E6 COMPANY

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anta cose een es64004 See tee 1 September 17, 1986 RBG-24405 File No. G9.5 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nashington, D.C.

20555

Dear Mr. Denton:

River Bend Station - Unit 1 Docket No. 50-458 Gulf States Utilities (GSU) hereby files an application for an amendment to the River Bond Station Unit 1

Technical Specifications, Appendix A to Facility Operating License NPF-47, pursuant to 10CFR50.90. contains the information for Staff review of this request. provides the requested revisions to the River Bend Station Technical Specifications.

The revisions discussed in Enclosure 1 are required to prevent l

impending River Bend Station shutdown and therefore represent emergency circumstances as discussed in 10CFR50.91.

Pursuant to 10CFR170.12, CSU has enclosed a check in the amount of one-hundred and fifty. dollars

($150.00) for a

license l

amendment application fee.

Pursuant to 10CFR50.91(b) (1), the State of Louisiane, Department of Environmental Quality - Nuclear Energy Division has been notified of this amendment request.

Additionally the Regional Administrator of Region IV and the Senior Resident Inspector have been provided copies of this application.

Your prompt attention to this application is l

appreciat.ed.

8'ncerely,

. C. Doddens Vice President River send Nuclear Group Enclosures t

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C00 MIS $10N j

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STATE OF LOUISIANA

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PARISH 0F WEST FELICIANA

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In the Matter of

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Docket No. 50-458 50-459 GULF STATES UTILITIES COMPANY

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(RiverBandStation, Unit 1)

AFFIDAVIT J.

C.

Deddens, being duly sworn, states that he is a Vice President of Gulf States Utilities Company; that he is authorized on the part of said compcny to sign and file with the Nuclear Regulatory Comission the documents attached hereto; and that all such documents are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

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J. C Deddens p

Subscribed and sworn to before me. a Notary Pu ic in nd for the, State and Paris) above named, this /

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1 an W. Middlebrooks otary Public in and'for West Feliciana Parish.

Louisiana l

My Conunission is for Life.

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ENCLOSURE 1

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I.

Proposed Revision Technical 83ecification 3.6.4, Table 3.6.4-1, Item a.1 identifies tse RHR/RCIC Steam Supply valve IE51*MOVF076 as a primary containment automatic isolation valve.

The proposed change adds a

one-time footnote applicable to valve 1E51*MOVF076 to remove its requirements for operability through October 4, 1986.

On September 8, l'996 with the plant in mode 1 at 100% power, a functional test was performed on the "RCIC WARMUP LINE ISO VLV E51-F076 NOT FULLY CLO8ED" annunciator.

As the operator proceeded to otroke the valv's

gen, the MOV76 breaker tripped.

Investigation determined de valve motor to be grounded and' the valve to be open.

By taking the appropriate actions in the Technical Specifications the operator declared MOV76 inoperable and deactivated and secured in the isolated position the outside containment isolation valve 1251*MOVF064.

This action renders the Reactor Core Is51ation Cooling (RCIC) system inoperable and requires plant shutdown on September 22, 1986 per Technical Specifications 3/4.7.3.

The MOV76 is a 3/4" bypass line valve used for prewarming the RCIC steam line and currently will not close upon manual or automatic isolation.

In order to isolate the 1KJBE15 penetration the outboard isolation valve (MOV64) is required to be closed.

The proposed technical specification change will temprarily eliminate the requirement that the 1KJ3E15 penetration be completely isolated and'will allow the RCIC system ~ to be functionally operable.

This request would be for 'the time period through October 4,1986 at which time a

-c' shutdown is scheduled and the MOV76 valve would be repaired.

Safety Evaluation The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system isolation trip setpoints are identified in Table 3.3.2-2, Item 5 of the River Bend Technical Specification.

In the event of a

significant leak from the RCIC steam supply system in the auxiliary building, the RCIC system would be automatically isolated due to high ambient temperature in the RCIC equipnt room, high RCIC steam line flow or RCIC steam suply low pressure.

These automatic isolations would initiate the closure of E51*MOV's 63, 64, and 76.

"For these events, only the outboard isolation v'alve Mov64 needs to be closed to seal off the break.

In the event the MOV64 did not close and MOV63 did close, the blowdown flow rate for a oceplete severance of the RCIC steam line would be

' reduced within 10 seconds from flow through a 8" sain line

to flow through a 3/4" bypass steam line corresponding to less yhan 44/sec.

(i. e.

30 p).

Feedwater flow could h

easily. provide make-up for this fluid Icss.

If feedwater is not available

, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system could be used to provide cooling water to the vessel thereby preventing uncovering any reactor fuel.

There is a manually operated 3/4" valve, V15, in the bypass steam line in the drywell just upstream of MOV76 whic3, upon reactor shutdown, could be manually closed to isolate the primary containment.

Additionally, de automatic MOV64, located in the auxiliary

building, could be manually closed depending on local conditions.

A potentially more serious postulated loss-of-coolant accident requhring RCIC system isolation would be the Design Basis Accident where the reactor. core is uncovered and fuel rod failures occur, thereby releasing fission products.

For this event the airborne fission products could be transported through a closed system via the main steam line, the RCIC steam line, the RCIC bypass steam

line, the RCIC steam line to the RCIC turbine and back to the suppression pol.

Any leakage occurring through valve packing and would be minimal and processed via the Stan@y Gas Treatment system.

However, in order for the fission products to even get out of the containment into the auxiliary building through, primary the RCIC system piping it would regire first that the Design Basis Accident event occur.

Based on WASH 1400 table III 4-1 tg probability of the Design Basis Accident event is 1.0x10 per hour of reactor operation.

Considering that the reactor will be oprated for less than

/

15 days with

MOV76, open and usig an additional conservatism of a

factor of 30, would result in the possibility.of a Design Basig Accident event to occur during L

those'15 days to be 1.08x10 gfbh Then, fora'nyfissionkroductstogetpastMov64, l

it would repire that MOV64 fa led to close.

BasedonIEEEStandarg wk 500-1977 there would be 2.5 failures of the valve in 10 actuations.

Assuming a

conservative estimate of 50 isolation actuations of MOV64 per calendar year and an additional conservatism of a

factor of 10 resulted in a probability of the failure of ggv64 to close in the 15 day time period to be 5.14x10 Therefore, the overall probability of unisolated fission product release in conjunction with a Design Basis Analysis into the RCIC eteam piping outside the primary containment would be the product i

of the Design Dasis Accident event to occur and the MOV64 failure _3go close during the 15 day time period or 5.55x10 This probabglity is more than an order of magnitude lower than 10" which is assumed incredible.

Therefore,. leaving the MOV76 valve stuck in an open position

while isolation valve MOV63 and MOV64 are open during day pqriod is considered a

15 to be at an acceptable level of

(

risk for continued plant operation and the LCo for. the failure of MOV76 to isolate may remove operability requirements through October 4, 1986.

No Sionificant Nazards Evaluation The proposed amendment to the Technical Specifications a.

would not involve a

significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the potentially unisolated penetration is limited to a 3/4" line discharging to a closed system that returns to the containment.

Thus, there is no increase in the probability or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.

b.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any ac'cident previously evaluated because no new modes of operation are introduced and no change to the plant design has been made.

Thus, there are no new or different kinds of accident from any accident previously evaluated, c.

The proposed change does reduction in the margin of safety becausenot involve a significant this event is expected to have a

probability that is non-credible.

Because the unisolated penetration is limited to a 3/4' line that discharges to a closed j

system, the potential increcse in. offsite dose is I

insignificant.

Thus, there is no significant reduction in the' margin of safety.

22.

Revised Technical Specifications The requested revision is provided as Enclosure 2.

222. Interim Compensatory Measures River Band Station currently meets the requirements of Technical specifications Therefore, no interim compensatory measures are re. quired.

IV.

Bases for amorgeney circumstances With the RCIC system inoperable as the result of MOV64 being

closed, River Band Station will be required to shutdown on September 22, 1986.

The ' closure of the Nov64 valve

t precludes the use of the RCIC system as a means of maintaining reactor water level since the use of RCIC

(.

requires the prewarming vater hammer in that line. of the RCIC steam line to prevent To operate past september 22, 1986 under the current Technical specifications would require the Mov76 isolation valve to be manually closed MoV63 and Mov64 to be opened.

and In order to isolate MOV76 the RCIC rystem would have to initially be placed in standby and a drywell entry at reduced reactor power (approximately it -

mode 2).

It is expected that three (3) workers would be inside the drywellforapproxgmately30minutesatextreme temperatures (approximately 135 F) and would receive about 0.2. MAN-REM.

The hour unit unavailability orextreme conditions with an estimated 12 the justify these emergency circumstances.resulting plant shutdown V.

Schedule for Attaining Compliance As indicated in Item III

above, River Bend Station is currently in compliance with the applicable Technical Specifications.

VI.

Notification of State Personnel t

A copy of the State of Louisiana, Department of Environmentalthis amendm Quality Nuclear Energy Division.

The notified of this request.

Gtate has been verbally VII. Environmental Impact Appraisal In the event did'not close upon its isolation signalthat the RCIC outboard isolation v there would be a

i potential pathway containment via the RCIC steam supplyfor fission products to exit the p line.

This pathway i

would. be through the valve all the way to the RCIC turbine controlinoperable and open MOV76 iso valve MOV45.

However, these fission products would still be contained within a closed system.

Furthermore, leakage from the RCIC i

closed avstem within the Auxiliary Building would be minimal (i.e. val.ve packing) and would be diluted and filtered through the standby Cas Treatment System.

Therefore, the overall change to the total Design Basis Accident fission produce release is insignificant.

dose for the exclusion area fram the DesignThe current FBAR thyroid Basis Accident i

is 29 Rem (FSAR table i

regulatory allowable dose. 15.6-7) which is below the 30 Rom i

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i RNCLOSURE 2 PROPOSED REVISED RIVER BEND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS O

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.ls TA8tE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

CollTA11gElli Ale pitVWELL ISotATI0lt VALVES lWT_ES IOI Subject to a Type C Teak rate test at a test pressure of 7.6 psig except as 03 otherwise'noted.

Also iselstes the drywell.

("I Testable check valve.

IO Isolates en Its-PLCS air ifne high flow or StS-PLCS air 11 pressure.

3 header to Main Steam Line low differential (0) Beceives a remote menen1 (solation signal N

Thir line is sealed by the penetration valve leakage contal systen (PVLCS) valves sealed by the PVLCS is not included in 0.60 La Type 8 and C test total The combine (8) 1kis valva sealed by the sata steam positive l StS-PLCS are tested fa accordance with Surveillance Regsfrweent 4 613 f teakage control sy not auraswt the limit specified in Specification 3.6.1.3.c.

o verify that leakage does Type 8 and C test total.

This leakage is not included in the 0.60 La

'OI Het sid> Ject to* Type C leakage tests.

Valve (s) will be included in the Type A test.

r U} Valve is hydrostatically leak tested at a test pressure of s 36 psig (11 P hydrostatically tested valves is not included in the 0.60 La Type 8 and C test total a.

The leakage from Ik} Ilot sehject to a Type A, 8. er C 1eek rete test.

(I} Valve groups listed are desfoneted in Table 3 3 2 L 814 Vahnt lE5t*M8VF07Es is nel rogueled A b OPECABLE &co.h Celo&.e 4 Miu,.

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Tas vovenen a emu. s.muuswT ontraus usten snow DATE TAAWS ouur aTATes urunts couemy Df0CE NUMSER o4 EXPLANADON 06 M M 86 075158 NET Application fee - operating licensa change Raquest #86-051 j

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SEP 191996 Docket No. 50-458 Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.

Senior Vice President River Bend Nuclear Group Gulf States Utilities Company Post Office Box 2951 Beaumont, Texas 77704 ATTN: Mr. 'J. E. Booker

Dear Mr. Cahill:

SUBJECT:

AMENDMENT TO RIVER BEND STATION OPERATING LICENSE, NPF-47 This confirms our telep' hone authorization given on September 19, 1986, for the change in the Technical Specifications for River Bend Station, Unit 1, as requested in your letters of September 17, 1986 and September 19, 1986.

Facility Operating License NPF-47 is amended on September 19, 1986 by permitting valve IE51*MOVF076 not to be required to be OPERABLE through October 4, 1986, thus not requiring valve 1E51*MOVF064 to be shut and thereby permitting RCIC to be operable.

The formal license amendment, our completed safety evaluation, and the Federal Register Notice for this change to the Technical Specifications for River Bend Station Unit.1 is being processed and copies of these documents will be sent to you in the near future.

Q Sincerely,

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Robert M. Bernero, Director Division of BWR Licensing 1

cc: See next page O

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A Mr. William J. Cahill, Jr.

Gulf States Utilities Company River Bend Nuclear Plant cc:

-Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq.

Ms. Linda B. Watkins/Mr. Steven Irving Conner and Wetterhahn Attorney at Law 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 355 Napoleon Street Washington, D.C.

20006 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802 Mr. Edward Grant Mr. William H. Spell, Administrator Director - Nuclear Licensing Nuclear Energy Division Gulf States Utilities Company Louisiana Department of P. O. Box 2951 Environmental Affairs Beaumont, Texas 77704 P. O. Box 14690 Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70893 Richard M. Troy, Jr., Esq.

Assistant' Attorney General in Charge Mr. J. David McNeill, III State of Louisiana Department of Justice William G. Davis, Esq.

234 Loyola Avenue Department of Justice New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 Attorney General's Office 7434 Perkins Road Resident Inspector Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70808 P. O. Box 1051 St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 H. Anne Plettinger J

3456 Villa Rose Drive Gretchen R. Rothschild Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806 Louisianians for Safe Energy, Inc.

4

-1659 Glenmore Avenue Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70775 President of West Feliciana Police Jury Regional Administrator, Region IV P. O. Box 1921 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775 Office of Executive Director for Operations i

611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, Texas 76011 t

Mr. J. E. Booker Manager-Engineering, Nuclear Fuels &

Licensing Gulf States Utilities Company P. O. Box 2951 Beaumont, Texas 77704 m

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. TABLE 3.6.4-1 (Continued)

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_t3NITAIIOGif M DRMLL IS01ATIGI VALVES 1..-

leutINun Seton 0Amy P91ETRATICII i sTSyBI VALVElaseER

_ laseER VAL GROyPII ISOLATION TM CDNTAIf9EENT U

a. Automette Issistion valves j

(seconds) sypass paju (Yes/Me)

i.. Prieury'Contefamant *I (Con.tfachd)

I M & EIC Stena Sep.

15E1*iWIVF063 I em & ItcIC. Steam sg.

1E51890VF07E g 1KJ5*Z15 2

9.9 No IKJ5*Z15 2

13.4 No W R & RCIC Steam sep.

1E518pOYFD64 f

ac1C Pump sec.-ssop. Feel 1ES1*f0WF0310 IKJB'Z15 2

9.9 No IKJB*Z16 2

30.5 h

RCIC Turtrine Exh.-sepp. Nel 1E51*f0VRT77 IKJO*Z17 3'

'14.2 No lI iActt Turbine Exh. Vac. Skrs.

IE51*pOvF078 IKJB*IISB.C 3

16.5 He

! Cent./Dryuelt Purge $g.

1HVR*A0V165 IKJB*Z31 8

3 No cent./Dryven Purge t'

, cent./Dryme11 Penge.s,.

1HvrADV123 IKan*Z31 8

3 No Outlet 1HVa*ADV128 1RJB*Z33 8

3 No e

cent./Drywell Purge Outlet 1HVR*ADY166 Ilus*Ill 8

3 No i

r ; hiemet samp. ssp.

1ssaasov13e 1KJB*Z6015 10 3

No.

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_ TABLE 3.8.4-1 (Continued) teNTADOEM NS ONVUER 150ULMON VAurES INTES 4

I DI Seject to a 1)pe C 1sek rate test at a test pressure of 7 5 II Also 1selsteg the drywell. ~

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psig except as otherwise'noted.

j *I Testable check valve.

kO 1selates en II5-PLCS air ifne high flew or MS-PLCS air line W

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pressure.

Beceives a remete eenmal isolation sfemel.

to Stein Steam t.ine low differential

! 'I k0 This line is seeled by the penetration valve leakage cont l

valves sealed by the PVLCS is not included in 0.60 La Type e a d crol system (P I'

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k 'I RS-PLES are tested la accordance with Serve 111ance RaguiThi test total.

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system OtS-PLCS).

i act awmad the limit specified in Specificatten 3.613 crgment.4.6.1.3.f to verify that leaka 1

j is Type 8 and C test total.

ii

)IIst s$ ject te* Type C leakage tests.

This leakage is not included in the 0.60 La

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Valve (s) wf11 he included is the Type A test.

O alve is hydrostatically leek tested at a test press t j.

V

' ht sg 1.1 Pa). The 1eekage from Not subject to a Type A, S. er C 1eek rate test.

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Valve groups Ifsted are designated in Table 3.3.2-1 Velve IE51*NIWF07Is esusesegW h OPE N bl* h S N-l j

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