ML20213F773
| ML20213F773 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Three Mile Island  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1985 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR (OIA) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20213F753 | List: |
| References | |
| CIV-PEN, EA-84-137, NUDOCS 8611170159 | |
| Download: ML20213F773 (73) | |
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'b UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
( NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the matter of:
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR AND AUDITOR Interview of Richard D. Parks (Closed Session)
Docket No.
Location: Bethesda, Maryland Date: Pages: 1 - 85 Monday, June 24, 1985 8611170159 861106 PDR ADOCK 05000320 Q PDR ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES i' Court Reporters 1625 I St., N.W.
Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
( 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR AND AUDITOR 4
5 ***
6 INTERVIEW OF RICHARD D. PARKS 7 CIDSED SESSION 8 ***
9 10 The interview of Mr. Richard D. Parks commenced.
11 pursuant to notice, at.11 15 o' clock, a.m., Monday, June 24, 12 1985 in Room 461, U.S. Nuclear Reg,ulatory Commission, 4340 13 East-West Highway, Bethesda, Maryland.
14 15 ***
16 APPEARANCES:
17 MR. KEITH LOGAN 18 Assistant Director for investigations OlA 19 MR. MICHAEL AUERBACH 20 Senior Auditor, OlA 21 MR. HARRY BOULDEN 22 Branch Chief, Technical Audits, OlA 28 MR. TOM DEVINE 24 GAP, on behalf of Richard D. Parks 25
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2 MR. LOGAN: Okay, we will be starting today. This 3 is the 25th of June 1985, a discussion on Three Mile Island. .
4 Mr. Richard parks, if you will stand and take the 5 oath, please?
6 Whereupon, 7 RICHARD PARKS 8 was called as a witness in the above entitled matter, and 9 having been first duly affirmed, was examined and testified as 10 follows:
11 MR. LOGAN: We have presented you yesterday with a 12 copy of a Report of Interview that was completed by OlA dated
( 13 June 23, 1983.
14 It has come to our attention that you believe there 15 may be some inaccuracies in the presentation of your comments 16 in the course of that interview. And what we would like to do 17 right now is go through that Report of Interview with you and 18 correct anything whic'h you feel may be an inaccuracy within 19 that report.
20 if you would like to start, we will include that 21 Draft Report in its entirety with the transcript of this l
22 meeting, and if you can just start as you will on each of'the 28 sections of it, picking up those points that you feel need l
24 clarification.
25 FIR . DEVINE: Excuse me, Keith, what did you mean by i
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, 1 Dr,a f t Report?
2 MR. LOGAN: This is the draft, the ono you have in 8 front of you. Not a draft report, draft being a being a 4 predecisional piece of writing. This meaning a draft, a 5 version of the report, Okay.
6 This is the same thing we provided to you yesterday.
7 MR. DEVINE: Mr. Park's Report of Interview?
8 MR. LOG 4N: Right. We have had it retyped, triple 9 spaced, so that it is easier to read. And, of course, in the 10 process would be able to be edited much easier.
11 MR. WARD: The only change we made to this report at 12 all was to add on June 23rd, 1983, because actual Report of
( IS Interview wouldn't have that on this sheet.
14 THE WITNESS: Well, I would like to start by saying 15 that I have fewer problems with the Report of interview, than 16 I have with the way the Office of the OIA -- I never could 17 figure out what that stood for --
Inspector and Auditor --
the 18 way the investigation of OlA was handled to begin with.
19 Most of my problems that I have, that I would like l
20 to clear up on the record deal with the way that whole 21 investigation was handled. And, as we have already discussed l
l 22 before we went on the record, I will now, and stand ready at 23 any time to cooperate with you guys in any fashion to 24 completely clear up the record.
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25 I have reviewed and have in my possession here in l
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, 1 Dr.a f t Report?
2 MR. LOGAN: This is the draft, the one you have in 3 front of you. Not a draft report, draft being a being a 4 predecisional piece of writing. This meaning a draft, a 5 version of the report. Okay.
6 This is the same thing we provided to you yesterday.
7 MR. DEVlNE: Mr. Park's Report of Interview?
8 MR. LOG 4N: Right. We have had it retyped, triple 9 spaced, so that it is easier to read. And, of course, in the 10 process would be able to be edited much easier.
l 11 MR. WARD: The only change we made to this report at 12 all was to add on June '2Srd, 1983, because actual Report of
( 13 Interview wouldn*t have that on this sheet.
14 THE WITNESS: Well, I would like to start by saying 1
15 that I have fewer problems with the Report of Interview, than 16 I have with the way the Office of the OIA --
I never could 17 figure out what that stood for -- Inspector and Auditor --
the 18 way the investigation of OlA was handled to begin with.
19 Most of my problems that I have, that I would like 20 to clear up on the record deal with the way that whole 21 investigation was handled. And, as we have already discussed 22 before we went on the record, I will now, and stand ready at 23 any time to cooperate with you guys in any fashion to 24 completely clear up the record.
25 1 have reviewed and have in my possession here in
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4 1 D.C. all t he documer.
- s I need to complete that except for the
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2 Septemb'er 1989 01 investigation report with all of its 8 attachments. However, due to the short amount of time that i 4 have left in the area, I will write it up and I will send it 5 to you guys and it will be notarized and in the form of a 6 sworn statement.
7 So, what I will do is, I will go ahead and just make 8 the corrections to the Report of Interview and then just 9 basically list in a glossary fashion, some of the problems 10 that I have come across in the conduct of the investigation, 11 such as you would basically know what I am going to be writing 12 about in the near future.
( 1S MR. LOGAN: Obviously, our first point today is to 14 go over the draft report.
15 THE WITNESS: Correct.
16 MR. LOGAN: If you will start, then.
17 THE WITNESS: On page 2, bottom paragraph --
l 18 don't really understand why it was necessary for them to list 19 what my functions were at TMl since it was not germane to the 20 OIA investigation. Although, since they did bother to list ,
21 it, I would like to point out that during the performance of 22 all those functions that they do have listed here, I had i
- 23 quite numerous times, the requirement to interface in a 24 liaison function with the NRC on a daily basis, almost 25 Therefore, I did develop a working relationship with i
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5 1 al1 the guys, including Lake Barrett.
l 2 MR. LOGAN: So, as the paragraph indicating, "as 8 stated parks described being formerly employed by Bechtel as a 4 senior startup engineer" you would like to include in that 5 paragraph information which indicates that you had liaison 6 function with NRC?
7 THE WITNESS: It was a requirement of my job, either 8 myself or Bubba Marshall interfaced with them on anything that 9 originated out of the site operations group.
10 MR. LOGAN: Okay.
11 THE WITNESS: Next paragraph starts. "In 12 approximately mid-November."
( 13 On page 5 --
14 MR. LOGAN: paragraph starting --
15 THE WITNESS: paragraph starting on " February 11, 16 1983 King informed" -- e s it reads in my statement, it states 17 " King informed the site operations' staff "
It should amended 18 Just to say, " selected members of the site operations' staff "
19 because it was more than just general discussion with some of 20 the guys.
21 MR. LOGAN: Selected members.
22 THE WITNESS: On page 8.
28 MR. LOGAN: Starting with paragraph --
, 24 THE WITNESS: On February 25 t h, 1983. I would like 25 to amend that to reflect the fact NRC contacted me and
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. 1 requested that I come to their offices, which at that point I 2
did meet with Wiebe and we did go into Lake Barret t 's of f ice.
3 MR. LOGAN: Okay, on February 25, 1989, NRC 4 contacted Parks and he met with --
correct?
5 THE WITNESS: Correct.
6 They requested that I come to their offices.
7 MR. LOGAN: Okay.
8 THE WITNESS: Okay. Now, what it does not show here 9 was that Barrett informed me --
10 MR. LOGAN: In that same paragraph?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes. That t hey -- being the NRC, that 12 was Joe Wiebe and Tony Fasano -- or at least I am assuming
( IS Tony was involved in it. I know for a fact that Joe Wiebe 14 was. They had been in the process over the last week of' 15 reviewing the status of the polar crane, the procedures 16 involved, et cetera, et cetera, interviewing various people.
17 And Barrett assured me that on that date, during 18 that meeting, the NRC had reviewed everything with the polar 19 crane and could find no problems with it.
20 It has been construed in some of the reports that 21 Barrett said they had not found any problems they were not 22 already aware of.
28 MR. LOGAN: You were told at that point exactly 24 what?
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25 THE WITNESS: That NRC had reviewed the polar crane
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[ 1 and c ou,l d find no problems wit it.
2 MR. WARD: Was that the polar crane procedure, or S was that the polar crane operations?
4 THE WITNESS: polar crane, period. Because I had 5 already identified some fairly far-reaching concerns.
6 MR. WARD: That is the equipment itself?
7 THE WITNESS: Right.
8 And on February 18th, the week prior to this meeting 9 when I first talked with Joe Wiebe, identified to him that i 10 had issued four pages of comments regarding the polar crane 11 load test procedure, I know Joe attempted to get them -- l 12 don't know if he ever did get a copy of the comments. I have
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13 never been shown by the NRC if they had those comments. And 14 to this day those comments have never been answered by anyone.
15 i know it took the NRC a year to get the answer to 16 one of the first questions, so I would really like to know the i
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- 17 answer to them.
18 MR. WARD: Who had those?
19 THE WITNESS: Who had what?
l 20 MR. WARD: The comments?
21 THE WITNESS: I lasued the comments to Mike Radbill, 22 who is head of the polar Crane Task Force. And, of course, 28 you know it kind of escalated up over a period of a week or 24 two there. Who actually ended up with the comments, I don't 25 know. I would assume Charlie Hanson out of Licensing Division
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, 1 pr.obably had a lot to do with it, because some of the
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2 questions had to do with licensing matters.
8 MR. LOGAN: Do you have a copy of those comments?
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, I sure do.
5 MR. LOGAN: Would you like to provide them to us 6 again. We will make them part of the record, 7 THE WITNESS: Sure.
8 I would assume you still have them, don't you, Tom?
9 MR. DEVlNE: I hope so.
10 THE WITNESS: So do 1 11 But any fashion, I can reference you with enough 12 identifiers to where you should be able to find it from either
( 18 Ol or the utility if you wish.
14 MR. WARD: Mike Radbill --
15 MR. LOGAN: Do you have them with you?
16 MR. DEVINE: T.h os e comments? No. We have two 17 drawers worth of TMl cleanup documents, Keith, and I didn't 18 bring the files. But if you want them, I will look for them.
19 The first thing I would do is check the Of report.
20 The September 1983 01 report has --
actusily it is probably 21 the most expeditious way for you to get them. We gave the 22 Office of investigation everything that was evidence and they 28 gave us a receipt for all of it, and we indexed in the 01 24 report all the documents that have been placed in the record.
25 If that is not the most expeditious way, I will go
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9 1 back and retrieve it.
f 2 MR. LOGAN: 01 report name and number, do you happen S to have that?
4 MR. DEVINE: September 1983 01 report. That is the 5 best I can do.
6 I think I said it was --
I seem to remember 7 yesterday discussion about this, and I thought it might be 001 8 because the May 1984 one was 002. But we decided that was the 9 docket number and they.all were 002.
10 MR. LOGAN: What we will do is go back and look at 11 that report However, if you would like to ensure that those 12 comments specifically do become a part of this file, then 13 please send them forward to us.
14 MR. DEVlNE: That's the polar crane load test 15 procedure comments, right?
16 THE WITNESS: Uh, huh.
17 Down at the bottom of that same paragraph, 18 continuing on, starting with the two sentences: "Barrett then 19 asked parks if he wished for an NRC Office of Investigations 20 inquiry " the next sentence, parks responded that he wished to 21 hold that decision in abeyance pending the results of a QA/QC 22 review.
23 What they did delete from here was the reason i 24 wanted to hold off on that, was to wait for that review to 25 see what else happened. It says QA/QC was already looking
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, 1 ., i n,t o it. I felt possibly management might back off and be
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2 quiet about it and leave me alone.
B What they also neglect there is that we did have a 4 discussion, Barrett and myself, regarding Larry King's 5 dismissal the day before. I don't remember all the details on 6 it, but we did talk about Larry being dismissed.
7 MR. LOGAN: What would you like to include other 8 than the fact that you want to explain why you want to hold 9 that decision in abeyance? Is there anything else that you 10 want to add at this point?
11 THE WITNESS: No, not on that particular subject.
12 1 Just wanted to add during that meeting that I '19 Barrett and I did discuss King's dismissal the day before.
14 MR. LOGAN: The February 25th meeting?
15 THE WITNESS: Correct That was why I brought up 16 the question, what would.NRC do if I were suddenly transferred 17 or terminated or what have you? And he said the NRC would 18 take a dim view of i t '.
19 MR. LOGAN: Go on.
20 THE WITNESS: Okay. On page 10 --
21 MR. LOGAN: Paragraph starting?
22 THE WITNESS: Parks and the Quiltec Consulting 23 issue. And the sentence, "Accordingly on March 10th, 1983, 24 Parks returned"--
25 MR. LOGAN: Paragraph starts out on March 9, 1993.
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Go ahead.
I 2 THE WITNESS: Anyway, the sentence, "Accordingly on 3 March 10th, 1983, parks returned to NRC office and again met 4 with Wiebe. parks asked Carl Hrbac to accompany him to the 5 meeting as a witness, and Hrbac agreed."
6 Okay. That paragraph continues along with a 7 break, describing that Wiebe gave me a slip of paper with the 8 Department of Labor address and phone number on it. The 9 report identified that Wiebe, with Barrett's knowledge, gave 10 me the address of the local Harrisburg DOL.
11 Out that is incorrect. They gave me only the 12 address of Washington D.C. Department of Labor Office, which I
( 13 found kind of surprising. Even though I was unfamiliar with 14 the routine at that time, I was led to believe that I had to 15 file something in D.C. Either to write to them, send a letter 16 to them of some sort or another, or go there in person.
17 MR. LOGAN: You don't think that is the only number 18 they might have had?
19 THE WITNESS: I seriously doubt it, if they go to 20 all the trouble referring to it as the Harrisburg memo, they 21 should at least get the details straight, because I still have 22 that memo that Wiebe gave me.
23 And there again I have never found any response from 24 the OIA identifying why Wiebe and Barrett supposedly on 25 Christopher's directions, did reverse their opinion saying
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that in the course of events from February 25th to March 10th, i
2 why it suddenly was no longer an issue that 01 could look into 3 and it was an employer / employee relationship problem.
4 To me i t shows bias on the part of the NRC.
5 MR. LOGAN: Would you like to make some prefatory 6 comments for the record here?
7 THE WITNESS: Yes.
8 MR. LOGAN: You are indicating at one point you were 9 advised what?
10 THE WITNESS: Well, on February 28th, I was -- 25th, 11 my mistake, the meeting of the NRC previous to this where 12 Barrett was in attendance, he always requested, did I want an
, I, 13 01 investigation, and I told him then I wanted to wait until 14 the QA people to complete their review.
15 QA completed their review on March 9th. I believe 16 it was on March 9th that Blaine Bower issued some letters to 17 Baum and King and other management officials stating the 18 problems that he i den-t i f i ed . And i go into that in my
- 19 original affidavit.
20 And so the very next day, when 1 --
same day that 21 Blaine issued hin comments in the Q4s, since I was 22 instrumental in pressuring King to get the QA investigation to 28 begin with, when the results of that investigation came out, 1 24 was accused by Bob Arnold of, you know, being an employee or 25 being involved with the Quiltec Corporation, which I was
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, 1 ', innocent of it
( 2 So, when I went back to NRC telling them I felt they 3 were taking more steps to go after me, I was told that 1 4 couldn't get an 01 investigation. That is specifically what 5 I went there for.
6 MR. LOOAN: OlA investigation?
7 THE WITNESS: 01, 8 MR. LOGAN: 01 investigation. Okay, 9 THE WITNESS: And me being harassed.
10 That's why 1 took Carl Hrbac with me, because i 11 wanted him to witness what was said, because I was really 12 beginning, by that time, to suspect the NRC.
I 13 And to make a long story short, Wiebe just gave us 14 the brushoff. Told us I couldn't request an 01 investigation, 15 that it was an employer / employee problem, that i had to take 16 it to the Department of Labor, 17 That was a crock. And I knew it was a crock, 13 because I knew the issues, and what was happening to me was 19 definitely in the court of the Office of Investigations. And 20 yet they refused to have anything to do with it.
21 And all the other reports that have been issued 22 since then have all stated that that direction came from Keith 23 Christopher, head of 01 --
or whatever his official function 24 la down in Region i 25 MR, LOOAN: He's the regional manager for the Office
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o f. Investigation.
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2 THE WITNESS: Okay.
3 Supposedly that was all with Barrett's blessings.
4 And I would like to know why that was changed. To me, in my 5 opinion, that shows that Batrett and company were 6 automatically taking GAU and Bechtel's side of it, that I was 7 guilty of wrongdoing, without ever being investigated.
G MR. DEVINE: Could i just add another thing. -
9 MR. LOGAN: Yes.
10 MR. DEVINE: He probably never would have come to 4
11 GAP if the NRC had a l l cwed him to open a case with the office 12 that actually had jurisdiction. parks came to gap because f 13 there was nowhere else for him to go. He was desperate, he 14 was worried about his family. And the NRC basically had told 15 him this is something you take to the Department of Labor, an 16 agency with which he is completely unfamiliar. And he was 17 going to have to find a lawyer to get some help with it, and 18 he did, 19 But that, for what it is worth, it wasn't really 20 necessary, it shouldn't have been necessary that he had to 21 seek us out.
22 MR. WARD: Maybe I lost something here, but we are 23 discussing the March 9th meeting with Wiebe, where in fact you 24 had received a phonecall from King that Arnold was attempting 25 to implicate you in Quiltec?
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THE WITNESS: That's correct.
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2 MR. WARD:- This was concerning Quiltec, this 3 implication, this meeting?
4 THE UlTNESS: Let me explain to you what was going 5 on.
6 Larry King was terminated, supposedly, for his role 7 with Quiltec. And during this time, from the time Larry King 8 was terminated, f r ecs February 18th, when I was first 9 threatened with transfer --
okay -- until March 10th, there 10 were a lot of other things going on. Like me being relieved 11 of my role -- I can't even think --
as the alternate startup 12 and test manager, and b'eing superceded as the alternate test
( 1? work group chairman.
14 And I was getting a lot of pressure put on me 4- you 15 k n cw , not peer pressure but actual management pressure. I was 16 losing responsibilities,.I was being basically condemned to 17 Coventry, you know, sitting at my desk losing more and more 18 responsibility, and p'ressured to sign off on the functional 19 test procedure for the polar crane, and I wouldn't do it 20 So, as i became more adamant about identifying the 21 problems and taking my stand, they became more adamant in 22 retaliating against me. So, I figured that was the last 23 straw, and too bad it didn't work out that way.
- 24 But, when Bob Arnold started trying to get Larry 25 King to declare that I was an employee of Quiltec, you know, i
, ( 16 1 it didn't take --
a blind man could have read the handwriting 2 on the wall. And I knew that'they were definitely determined 8 to get rid of me. Larry was already out the door. Ed Gischel 4 had been pressured to go take a neuropsychological 5 examination. And I was the last one standing in their way on 6 that polar crane.
7 If they could have gotten me silent and completely 8 out of the picture, they could do anything they wanted to.
9 MR. WARD: One more question, I just want to go 10 back and clarify.
11 You said Mike Radbill was polar crane task force?
12 THE WITNESS: Yes.
( 13 MR. WARD And Charlie Hanson, who is licensing?
14 THE WITNESS: Licensing, correct. ~
15 MR. WARD: And both of these were employees of 16 which?
17 THE WITNESS: Bechtel.
18 MR. LOGAN: This information, does it currently 19 pertain to a matter that you have presented to the Office of 20 Investigations for investigation on a matter that is pending?
21 Or, is anything pending at the Department of labor 22 based upon this?
23 THE WITNESS: There is nothing pending at the 24 Department of Labor on this. And I believe that 01 has 25 concluded all their investigations on what i identified to
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I 17 1 *- them at TM1 2 MR. LOGAN: With regard to your position. In other 8 words, the action that was taken,1 purportedly against you.
4 There is nothing that is pending now with any other --
5 MR. DEVINE: The resolution of litigation was as 6 follows:
7 Rick filed a Department of Labor complaint on the G first two personnel actions taken against him removing 9 responsibilities on site.
10 While that investigation was ongoing, the employer 11 suspended him with pay.
12 Rick filed another Department of Labor complaint.
f 19 The Department of Labor ended up ruling after the Wage and 14 Hour Division investigation, that he was correct in his 15 charges. There had been discrimination against him.
16 Bechtel appealed the decision and we settled the 17 case in the sunner of 1983 when Bechtel agreed to transfer 1G Rick to an equivalent position at the Coolwater Coal 19 Gasification plant.
20 He subsequently was laid off from that job in early 21 19P4. I think there may be appended Office of Investigations 22 case on the 1984 Coolwater layoff.
29 However by September of 1983, 01 had issued it t 24 report on the TMI cleanup reprisal charges filed by Rick, as 25 well as the other two principal figures, King and Gischel
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He currently has litigation pending against Bechtel 2 for the cleanup dispute, as well as the Coolwater layoff.
8 MR. LOGAN: But with regard to TM1 and the things 4 which took place there, nothing is pending?
5 MR. DEVINE: I think --
I'm almost positive that is 6 right. is that correct, Rick?
7 THE WITNESS: As far as I know.
8 MR. DEVINE: The only thing that I can think of that 9 might be pending, Keith, is the Coolwater layoff. And we did 10 tie that into TMl somewhat, but it was indirect.
11 THE WITNESS: You wouldn't happen to have a copy of 12 my regional affidavit here, would you, Tom?
i i 13 MR. DEVINE: Yes.
14 THE WITNESS: Good. I was looking for that, 15 Could we stop and go off the record a minute. I 10 need to check for something in my regional affidavit, 17 MR. LOGAN: It was Mr. park's request that we stop i
I 18 and go off the record for a minute.
19 (Off the record.)
20 MR. LOGAN: Back on the record.
21 Mr. parks, we are back on the record.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes. I would like to go back also to 28 add on the February 25th meeting with Lake Barrett When i 24 had gone in there, there were several --
one of the things 1 25 discussed with him was one of the rumors going around on the
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site was that myself and Bubba Marshall were being
(. 2 investigated by the NRC for attitudes displayed during the 8 head lift meetings. That is addressed on page 29 of my 4 original affidavit, 5 1 did talk to Barrett about that, and Barrett never 6 made any response to me at all. I was concerned that, you 7 know, somehow or other it was getting out that the NRC was 8 investigating what was going on and that it was more or less 9 being tied back with me. And yet, Barrett offered no 10 reassurances or nothing.
11 I make that comment because all through this whole 12 process it seemed that'Barrett was more concerned with
( 13 protecting the relationship that was going on between the NRC 14 and GAU than for offering any good guidance or consolation or 15 anything else to myself, Ed Gischel or Larry Kin 2 16 But where I would like to go on to, going back to 17 the March 10 meeting with Joe Wiebe, after i left that 19 meeting, later on that day, no more than two, two and a half 19 hours later, no more than three for sure, Joe Chwastyk called 20 me into his office. Joe was the acting site operations 21 officer.
22 MR. LOGAN: Opell that, please?
28 THE UlTNESSr i believe it is C-h-w-a-s-t-y-k.
- 24 And when Joe called me into his office, he wanted to 25 know what I had been doing with NRC that day. And that the
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management knew I had gone to NRC and that they were going to 2 get me.
3 Joe and I had always had a fairly decent working 4 relationship. You know, friendly. Not in a social sort of 5 way, but friends at work. And I took that as a warning, that.
6 you know, I was really in hot water, especially when Joe 7 suggested I better go get a lawyer.
G MR. LOGAN: Is this all material which has been 9 covered in the 01 investigation?
10 is there any need to reiterate this now?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, there as a need to reiterate 12 that, because the only way to my knowledge that the 13 information could have cene to our --
come to management I had 14 been talking with NRC, was from the NRC. And, although this 15 information was presented t o 01, Of never looked into that 16 aspect of it. -
17 MR. LOGANr No, they wouldn't have.
18 THE WITNESS': I don't believe anybody else has.
19 MR. DEVINE: Was this presented to OIA the first 20 time around?
21 THE WITNESS: Uh, huh.
22 That is what we are here for, to correct the record, 23 right?
i 24 MR. DEVlNE: Right.
25 THE WITNESS: So, I would like to have that added on
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there, that I personally believe that the NRC contacted GPU 2 managem'ont and wanted to know what was I doing coming back.
3 MR. LOGAN: Who at the NRC would you believe may 4 have contacted GpU management?
5 THE WITNESS: It would either be Joe Wiebe or Lake 6 Garrett, because i only talked with Joe Wiebe.
7 MR. DEVlNEt Was it obvious why I mentioned --
why I 8 asked Rick to confirm that that point was raised with OIA the 9 first time around? '
10 One of the things that has confused us about the 014 11 report was that it covered --
12 MR. LOGAN: The interview here?
( 13 MR. DEVINE: it is reflected in the Report of 14 Interview and in the report --
is that it covered a lot of the 15 s ait.e territory as the 01 report. It didn*t cover --
it 16 didn't include some of the topics that we raised that were 17 within the jurisdiction of 014. And I never did understand 18 why you had two agencies both covering topics that were under 10 the jurisdiction of the Office uf Investigations for a wide 20 overlap.
21 And OlA hadn't covered all the issues under its 22 jurisdiction.
28 MR. LOGAN: One of the reasons you are going to have 24 some overlap is if allegations are brought up or statements 25 are made. And in order to provide a thorough report, those
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issues must be brought 'u p again.
(' 2 As far as investigative matters, we would not 8 investigate within the Office of Inspector and Auditor, those 4 allegations which are the primary jurisdiction of the Office 5 of Investigations. That would be Mr. Hayes and his staff who 6 would have that responsibility and we would not do it.
7 The area that DIA would look into would be NRC 8 employee misconduct, and I believe that is one of the 9 statements which is being made here. That there was an 10 improper discussion with GpU regarding Mr. parks comments on 11 some of the problems which existed at TMl And that would
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12 appropriately be something that OlA could look into.
( 1 ?. MR. DEVINE: I just wanted to make clear that that i
14 is what our gripes, that we are coming in to participate;to 15 try to solve the problems, air the grievances that we had with 16 the first DIA report 17 And one of them is that there appeared to be 19 somewhat of a jurisdictional raid by OIA on Ol's territory.
19 And it created some confusion because the reports --
you are 20 right, obviously right in your statement of comparative 21 jurisdictions. But the reports can be used as a paper, an 22 on paper debate. You could have OlA representing the TM1 28 program office and the licensee versus 01 representing the 24 whistleblower's point of view if you wanted to construct a 25 direct clash like that.
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1 And that leaves some confusion as to what the
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2 agency's position is. And indeed, it was reported that way.
8 The two reports came out the same day which contradicted each 4 other.
5 And the other gripe is that we had some real serious 6 concerns witn the NRC staff and they weren't discussed in this 7 report.
8 MR. LOOAN: Certainly, the position of this office 9 is to do what is right, re2ardless of who may agree or 10 not agree with the findings. We are simply out to find the 11 truth of any matter which is shown to be relevant to the 12 function of this office or to the function of the agency.
( IS I don't see that there is any jurisdictional problem, and 1 14 certainly can't comment on what it may be perceived that 15 happened a year or two ago. And I am really not looking to 16 address that at this polnt, if there are problems with this 17 interview, with the report, we can talk about those as it is 18 relevant.
19 Certainly, some of the things that are being 20 mentioned here that are not included, you know we will make ,
21 them a part of the record. But obviously it should be 22 understood that an investigator attempts to report those facts 23 and that information which is both relevant and material to
( 24 the allegations that he is investigating. And, if there was 25 something which was not included and is relevant, we have
( /
24
~
1 every intention of making that part of that investigation.
(
2 THE WITNESS: Can I ask a question here? I hate to 8 Interrupt --
4 MR. LOGAN: So that is essentially what i am 5 saying. I don't want you to misconstrue the fact that every 6 word that you said was not included in the interview. But, if 7 there is something which was relevant which was not --
and you 8
have made a couple of points here today, and we are certainly 9 going to make sure that they are included. And they will be, 10 both in terms of the focus of what we are going to do 11 subsequent to this meeting, as well as the fact that this 12 entire conversation will be part of the record and will be an
(-
13 attachment included in our files.
14 So, you know your concerns are going to be well 15 noted.
16 THE WITNESS: My question was, is part of your i
17 reconstructing the record going to consist of looking into the 18 way McKenna and Bowers handled the investigation?
19 MR. LOGAN: If it appears that there was --
let me 20 say this. What we are going to do is ensure that everything 21 that is within the jurisdiction of this office is 22 investigated.
23 If you are making another allegation regarding
( 24 Mr. McKenna and Mr. Bowers, then perhaps we should address 25 that issue after we cover the Report of interview.
( (
25 1
MR. DEVINE:
(* Keith. I feel that we need to find out 2 --
Rick and I need to find out why we are here.
8 MR. LOGAN: To clear the record.
4 MR. DEVINE: I am getting more and more confused 5 about this.
6 To clear the record? Maybe you can get a little 7 more specific with me. Maybe I should explain why I am O confused, if it is not obvious.
9 I thought it would be obvious why we are here, that 10 we have griped about poor quality of the OlA report and your 11 going back to find out.any problems with how OIA had conducted 12 the investigation. And that is what I just, almost assumed
(
1 ?.
when I was contacted indirectly through the other folks from 14 your office.
15 But I am really concerned now with what is going on 16 here. One of the things that bothered me was that this SN4FU 17 happened on the 01 report. I am just very surprised that you 13 are surprised about so'me of the things that have come out in 19 the September 1988 01 report.
20 MR. LOGAN: Which SNAFU?
21 MR. DEVINE:
I That we asked for the report yesterday 22 for Rick to prepare his rebuttal analysis of the September 23 1988 OIA report, that you were obviously genuinely confused
( 24 about what report we were talking about, and we got the wrong 25 one.
I
(; (
26
. 1 And t o me , if OlA is involved in some sort of a 2 serious project here, which is due in five days, one of the 8 first things that would have happened, is that that' record 4 would have been studied. It is the basic record of the case.
5 A number of times this morning you made statements 6 such as, "What would you like to cover, if you want this on 7 the record." l'm wondering if this process is a courtesy 8 interview for Mr. parks to get some things off his chest, or 9 if you folks have an agenda that ycu are following, some leads 10 that you are trying to pursue here, that preceded this 11 interview.
12 The comments that just came up about a breach of 13 confidentiality probably triggered my outburst here.
14 The idea that your questioning if Mr. parks has a 15 concern about this, and that it is something that could be 16 gone into -- what is the point of this?
17 Yes, he raised this the first time and that is why 1 18 want to specify this. He brought this up with Mr. McKenna and 19 Mr. Bowers. He went to the NRC about serious problems et the 20 cleanup. They since have been confirmed as that. ,
21 Within a very short time period his boss was telling 22 him, you better get a lawyer.
28 That is a serious offense by the NRC. It is not a l
24 few words that were in the interview and missed. That was an 25 important charge.
1
( l -
27 1 Are you folks here to follow up on that?
(.
2 That is the basis for my asking you this very basic 8 question, why are we here? Rick is real busy, his life is in 4 transition. I have a heavy docket.
5 What is happening?
6 MR. LOGAN: We will go back to the original 7 statement. We are here to make sure the record is correct.
8 Now, where the investigation goes, Tom, will be 9 determined upon the facts which were brought out and made part 10 of this record.
11 MR. DEVINE: So. .- this a preliminary step? Is 12 that what you are saying?
i 18 MR. LOGAN: It will be a preliminary step if you are 14 going to introduce to me new facts, other than the ones that 15 have been brought out in the prior statement. The statement i 16 am referring to is the Report of Interview that I have in i
17 front of me.
18 Now, if you'are going to bring out facts which you 19 are saying are new facts, which should have been included in 20 the original Report of Interview that were not included in 21 that Report of interview, then we will look at those.
22 if it is simply a matter of clarifying something>
28 then we are just going to do that.
24 One other thing that we are going to mention is, you 25 asked for a report yesterday. Okay. And that was Report
( (. 28 1 -
HSS-OO2 regarding TMl 2 You were provided with that report.
3 You are now saying it was not the report that you 4 requested.
..s 5 You certainly would have had the opportunity to 6 look at that report and tell me before you left if it was not 7 the report that you had asked for.
8 So, I don't think that it is a question of confusion 9 on our part, as you are stating, and we will certainly make 10 every effort to get the correct report. I think the confusion 11 existed yesterday as to which report was required.
12 So, I think let's be fair in that presentation. You
( 13 asked for the reports, the reports were given, and that is as 14 far as it went. Now, if there is another report that is 15 needed, then fine, we will make every effort to get that 16 report, also. .
17 Mr. parks, you were going to say something?
18 THE WITNESS: Yes. The issue of whether we got the 19 right report yesterday or not, that's an unfortunate 20 circumstance, as far as I'm concerned.
21 1 don't blame you, I don't think - you know, we are 22 just as guilty of not verifying that that was a proper report 23 as everybody else is. That's not the point.
24 But the point of, are we going to raise new 25 evidence, no, because we went into such great detail with
4
( ( 29 1 everything before, not only with 01 but also with OIA, and,
(' 2 you know, part.of the problem was with Of and anybody else 1 8 dealt with throughout this whole fiasco, we got a statement 4 either where we sat down and agreed word for word as it read 5 here on these 01 reports, and I signed each and every page and 6 swore to it, or we got transcripts from sworn testimony, or 7 what-have you.
8 '
But throughout the CIA report that was issued in 9 September of last year, nothing was sworn. It was McKenna --
10 and what was the other guy's name -- Bowers? It was their 11 words of what was said, and that is the problem, my major 12 problem, the way OlA investigation was handled.
13 That's why l'm concerned with the way they're going 14 to handle it, it's going to be investigated.
15 Can you tell me if you're like the l&E department, 16 where you have an operations manual that you follow on how you 17 take testimony or how you take another person's words? Do 18 they have to sign what you said?
19 MR. LOGAN: No.
20 THE (J I TNESS : That's a problem.
21 MR. LOGAN: Testimony or an interview may be taken 22 in a number of ways:
28 One of the ways is obviously the way we are doing it 24 here. It's an interview on the record from which a tranz ript 25 is going to be made.
l l
. - l i
( ( !
30
.~ 1 A second one is a formal interview which is not on
('
l 2 the record where a statement :s taken, summarizing the salient '
B points of that interview, and those facts which both the 4 interviewee and the interviewer wish to bring out are 5 sunma r i zed , stated, and signed by the parties.
6 And a third way of doing it is the way McKenna and 7 Bowers did it, which is the investigators will write up a 8 record of the interview, and that will stand as what was said 9 at the interview.
10 THE WITNESS: That's why we're here right now.
11 MR. LOGAN: That's exactly the point. You are 12 saying tht what they d'id was not an accurate recitation of the k 13 facts which were pertinent to that investigation, and we are 14 here to make sure that those facts get into the record.
15 Now if those facts indicate further investigation 16 has to be done, then further investigation will be done.
17 If those facts do not sustain that, then they will 18 not be.
19 MR. DEUINE: .K e i t h , I didn't mean to be unfair with 20 you folks. My frustration, I guess, was due to the lack of 21 the familiarity with a lot of the points that Rick raised that 22 1 have been perceiving this morning. And one thing that has 28 been on my mind for my client is whether he should be i 24 undergoing an exhaustive analysis comparing the 01 report, the 25 OIA report, and the factual inaccuracies, systematically
( ( -
31
, 1- discussing with you all the factual inaccuracies that we think
(
2 are in the CIA report, just from reading any given page of 3 it. And it is not just a matter of missed signals about the 4 September 1983 01 report. I wonder if you studied that report 5 and that record and have become familiar with it.
6 Some of the questions that were asked this morning 7 were questions about who basic players in this case are.
8 These are basic actors in the story. There seems to be a lack 9 of familiarity of who.they are.
10 There are questions being raised about issues that 11 came up in Rick's initial affidavit. I think my resentment 12 about coming in here, and what appears to be premature, maybe
( 13 can be cleared up easily. Maybe it's a misunderstanding.
14 What is the background for this interview? Were you 15 just sort of asking us to come in, and if you are impressed by l
16 the points that we've made, then you'd start working on it 17 further? Are you in the middle of something? Where do we fit t
l 18 into your process here?
19 MR. LOGAN: The process is essentially this:
20 There are, it's my understanding, inaccuracies in 21 the information that was reported by Mr. McKenna and 22 Mr. Bowers. And I understand that some of those inaccuracies 23 were raised by GAP. And what we are here to do is to remove j 24 from the recitation of that interview any inaccuracies which 1
25 may exist, and to include any facts, any information you have, 1
I
( f
^
32 1 which is relevant, that should have been included in that
(.
2 interview. And if it means going forward with more 3 investigations, or if it means correcting problems, or results 4 of the investigation because of inaccurate facts, then we are 5 going to correct that and go forward with those new issues.
6 Now you have said to me that there are issues that 7 have not been reported. I think one has been mentioned here, 8 that the NRC was contacted and it resulted in an action 9 against Mr. parks. That is new to me, it's not in Mr. parks' 10 interview, and it most appropriately should be. That's one of 11 the things that we're going to include.
12 Now, if you choose not to make any additional
(- 13 statements for the record, that is your choice. We are 14 interested in what Mr. parks had to say. Were we not 15 interested, we would not have invited him here.
16 The thrust of this whole investigative process is to 17 arrive at the truth, and if there has been wrongdoing on
( 18 anybody's part, we will point that out.
19 MR. DEUINE: Maybe it would just finally put things 20 in perspective for me, because I'm still a little confused.
21 MR. WARD: Let me clarify one of your points.
I l
22 Mr. Devine.
23 You mentioned about discussing these personnel and
( 24 what their positions were. We are in a brand new interview, 25 okay? And any time you take an interview --
and you should
-~ , _ ___ _ _ __ __ _ _ -
o
( b;~
33 1 know this from reading our reports -- you always clarify who 2 the people were in that report, whether it's one statement or S 50. And that's for our records, so we are positive we are 4 talking about the same people.
5 MR. DEVINE: Sure.
6 MR. WARD: So any time we do an interview, you will 7 see we always have a description of the person's job, who they 8 were, who they worked for. So that clarifies that portion.
9 MR. DEVINE: Sure.
10 MR. WARD: The second thing is, back in November 10, 11 1983, you had responded to, I guess, the OGC with a complaint 12 that the OIA investigation was insufficient.
("
13 MR. DEVINE: That's right.
14 MR. WARD: Well, not by our fault, this is coming up 15 new. Okay? And we have to clarify these points. Now, like 16 Keith said, anything that develops out of this that requires 17 additional investigations will be conducted. They will be 18 conducted. Okay?
19 But the first thing we have to do is make sure that 20 you are satisfied, because you are the complainant, in having 21 this interview corrected, so that we know it's correct.
22 I mean if I'm working off something that is 23 incorrect, I'm not going to be doing the job you want,'or 1
24 that's required.
25 THE UlTNESS: The whole thing of it is, I had this
[ :-
.. 1 , meeting with these guys in, you know, June or July of 1983.
2 Now here it is two years later, and you're handing me a 10 or 3 11, 12 page document saying, " Hey, boy, what kind of problems 4 have you got with what somebody else wrote as their 5 interpretation of what you had to say?" And then you read 6 through the OIA report, and it's always their interpretation 7 of what the other person had to say about what the perceived 8 problems'were.
9 I tell you, -1 think this is a waste of time.
10 Basically I'm very dissatisfied with this, because from what 11 Bowers and McKenna saw as the problem, they wrote it pretty 12 well as to what they saw. But they just neglected to include 13 key events, or what i saw was the problem.
14 if I clearly pointed a finger at an NRC person, it's f.
15 not in here. Nowhere is it in here. The closest they come to 16 identifying what i perceived as a problem with the NRC goes on 17 to the very next paragraph or the next two paragraphs down 18 where i talk about Barrett addressing the Concerned Mothers in 19 Middletown. That was part of the testimony one of the 20 Concerned Mothers in Middletown even went to the Congressional 21 hearing in April 1993 to give, was the fact that Barrett 22 assured them that there were no problems at TMI-2, there was 23 nothing wrong with the polar crane, and that the people who 24 were raising all those problems had ulterior motives. But you 25 don't see that anywhere, you don't see that in the OlA report.
( -
~
35 1 -
All you see about he is saying there's no problems 2 with the polar crane that he wasn't aware of, That was a 3 lie. Barrett even went back after that meeting, go onto the 4 mothers of Middletown because they were relating to me some of 5 the things he had to say about me. He didn't feel he could 6 any longer be open and honest with them.
7 And nobody from the NRC has ever gone and talked to 8 Joyce Coradi. And yet I gave them, McKenna and Bowers, Joyce 9 Coradi's name. But they weren't concerned enough to even 10 include it in their report, let alone follow up on it.
11 So, basically this whole thing is worthless. The 12 OIA report is filled throughout with inaccuracies and 19 shortcomings, where they chose to neglect what the rules in 14 the ball game were.
15 They didn't go after the players. They were more 16 concerned about helping the players slide home safe. That's 17 my personal opinion of everything on it.
13 MR. LOGAN: One of the things that I would like to 19 mention is part of the record is a letter to the Commission 20 dated November 10, 1983 from Tom Covine, Legal Director of 21 GAP.
22 One of the comments made in there was Mr. Parks 28 charges that DIA violated the conditions of this interview.
24 OIA failed to obtain a signed statement from Mr. Parks, as 25 promised, and said the report summarized June 23 Interview
4
( l -
36 l 1 with Mr. parks and counsel. Neither was given the promised 2 chance to review the summary for accuracy. Consequently, it 3 does not accurately reflect, either by the facts of the case 4 or the presentation made to 01A by Mr. parks and his counsel.
5 That is specifically one of the points that we're here to 6 rectify.
7 As to why you are here, it is your letter, 8 Mr. Devine, and we are trying to set the record straight with 9 regard to that interview. That interview was a key element in 10 the course of the investigation.
11 Now, if that interview is not correct, then that may 12 require the need for further investigation. So the first step
(
13 in our approach to reviewing the investigation is to set the 14 record straight with regard to Mr. parks' interview, and that 15 is the primary purpose of this meeting.
16 MR. DEVINE: Keith. I certainly agree that 17 correcting the inaccuracies in Mr. parks' interview is a i 18 necessary and important step. I am wondering about the big l
19 picture and how far along we are in whatever process CIA has 20 been considering.
21 For example, have you folks studied the September 22 1988 01 report, the record to date? We are doing that same l
28 thing on Diablo Canyon, and the investigators came in or the i
( 24 auditors came in and they studied the record very thoroughly. ,
1 l
25 They had highly specific questions, pages they had extracted l
l 1
- _ - - - .1
( -
37
. 1 f r ora this voluminous record, and there is obviously particular 2 problems that they were discussing with --
they were very a familiar with the record. There were specific points that 4 they had to clear up with witnesses.
5 Are we at that stage of your case here, or is this 6 --
are we kicking off the process with this interview?
7 MR. LOGAN: The first thing we're going to do is to 8 clarify the record with regard to the allegations that are 9 being made by Mr. parks.
10 MR. DEUINE: Okay. I think i understand, then, 11 Keith.
12 MR. LOGAN: Thank you.
( .
13 THE WITNESS: I am ready to go on.
14 MR. LOGAN: Continue.
15 THE WITNESS: On page 12, with the paragraph 16 starting with " parks' comment regarding possible NRC 17 personnel," if you drop one down, I believe it's the last 18 sentence in that paragraph starting with, "At this point in 19 the interview," It goes on to say Devine explained the 20 Government Accountability project has in its possession 21 handwritten notes to or from Barrett and GpU regarding various 22 issues which are considered to be unauthorized, informal forms 23 of communication between the NRC and the licensee.
t[ 24 One of the interview notes that you guys had was to 25 get the copies of those memos, and even the reiteration of
38 1
what they put in their own report, that they still Is 2 misconstrued to you because it was handwritten notes. We 3 never talked about handwritten notes. Those -- any notes that
- 4. we had --
the only one that we still have in our possession, I 5 personally have, is the note Joe Wiebe gave me with DOL's 6 address in Washington, D.C.
7 MR. LOGAN: You believe that was what was referenced 8 here?
9 THE WITNESS; I know that's what I told them about.
10 The other thing was the memos, the note sent back 11 ano forth from Barrett were sent from Barrett to GPU Licensing 12 concerning RCS train-d'wn o procedures, head-lift procedures, i 18 and disapproving the polar crane operating procedure. And 14 those were the ones that I went into. And that's the one i 15 was identifying. And you and i even talked about them 16 yesterday, the difference in the heading and --
17 MR. LOGAN: Those are the two notes, the ones that 18 you showed me yesterday?
19 THE WITNESS: Right. You can delete the whole thing 20 or not delete it.
21 MR. LOGAN: They're not handwritten notes.
22 THE WITNESS: They're not handwritten notes. They l
23 are, I guess you could say, self-authorized notes.
24 The point I was making to those guys was that they 25 were not listed on the docket. They are not identified in 1
[ ( .
39
- I such a way that they could be put in either the public 2 Document Room or in the licensee file or anything else. They 3 were not readily available to be made publicly available. But 4 anything that reported about how glowing a job they were doing 5 was always transmitted into the docket number. And that was 6 the point I was trying to make with these guys, 7 MR. LOGAN
- Okay. What we'll do is we'll identify 8 those notes and include them.
a.
9 MR. DEVINE: I want to make a point at this stage.
10 Since there is a note from Mr. McKenna that is part of your 11 investigative file, which states -- which summarizes what Rick 12 just read from the report of interview, states Mr. Devine did
( 13 not provide those notes and that Mr. McKenna doubts they ever 14 existed, in my opinion that is a fairly significant inference, 15 that as an attorney I was taking credit for evidence which
- 16 didn't exist, which would be a false statement to the 17 government.
18 I think that the implied criticism was based on a 19 misunderstanding that I hope we have cleared up, and I will 20 double-check in my files.
21 I would like to say, however, that Mr. McKenna did 22 not check with me to follow up on providing this information 23 and to the extent that I had promised to give him something
/ 24 which I didn't, some t i mes there's loose ends that we lose 25 track of. I think that the criticism and the serious nature
( ( .
40 1 of the inference was premature, in light of his failure to i
2 make any further attempts to seek the numbers.
3 THE WITNESS: Continuing on to the next paragraph, 4 same page, the paragraph that starts, "As another example of 5 alleged impropriety," that whole paragraph needs to be deleted 6 and rewritten.
7 What I identified to those guys was that Barrett --
8 1 was approached, first of all, by a lady by the name of Joyce 9 Coradi, the Concerned Mothers of Middletown. I believe her 10 name spelling is C-o-r-a-d-i, but I wouldn't swear to it.
11 There may be two Os.
12 Joyce informed me that she had attended --
I guess
( 13 Barrett used to hold like a weekly or a twice-a-month type 14 meetings with Coricerned Mothers of Middletown and a couple of 15 other local intervenors. During this particular session on 16 that date -- at least I believe it was the same date, i 17 believe the date is accurate in that statement --
it was 18 brought up about myse'If and Larry King and Ed Gisher went 19 public, and the Concerned Mothers of Middletown, needless to i
20 say, were ready and more than willing to agree with everything 21 we had to say because it was anything that would have been on 22 the NRC and the utility.
23 But Barrett assured them, number one, that there 24 was nothing wrong with the polar crane down at TMi, there was 25 nothing wrong with it, with anything that they were doing down
( 41
. I at TMI, and the people who were raising those issues had
('
2 ulterior motives.
3 And Joyce informed me that she responded, well, that !
4 implies that you have very neurotic people down there handling 5 the whole program, especially since the three guys were fairly G high-placed, you know, engineers on the program. And that's 7 when Barrett went into his dissertation about that I had 8 ulterior motives, but there was no need for me to go public 9 because the subsequent investigation by Bechtel would have 10 exonerated me of any wrongdoing.
11 Here was a guy, within a month of me going public, 12 who I had went to and begged for help the first time, and he i 13 couldn't lift a finger to help me, but in my opinion, even 14 though I didn't visually see him relate information to the 15 utility, helped to do everything he could to grease the skids 16 to slide me off of that one.
17 Now here he is going out to concerned people in the 18 area, telling them first of all that I'm neurotic, that I had 19 an ulterior motive, and that I jumped the gun, because I would 20 have been exonerated.
21 Well, why didn't he do anything in the first place l
22 to help me be exonerated of any wrongdoing? Here is a man I
23 trying to color one thing one way to put the utility in a very
( 24 favorable light, yet doing everything he possibly can, short 25 of libel or slander, to reassure the local population, "You
4
( I -
42
- 1. don't have to worry about parks and those other guys, they're
(-
2 a bunch of wh a,c k o s . "
3 There's something seriously wrong with that.
4 Seriously wrong with it. And I pray to God you call and 5 contact Joyce Coradi, because, boy, are you guys going to get 6 an earful 7 MR. WARD: He did say this to the Concerned Mothers 8 of Middletown, Joyce Coradi?
9 THE WITNESS: Yes.
10 MR. WARD: She does have that information?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes.
12 MR. WARD: And he mentioned that you were neurotic?
( 1? THE WITNESS: No, that was Joyce's terminology, that 14 if we were doing it because we had ulterior motives, then 15 there were neurotic people down there calling the shot.
16 That's my major complaint, was, number one, he was classifying 17 us, and me particularly, as having ulterior motives, and that 18 i shouldn't have gone public to try to protect myself, because 19 the investigation would have exonerated me.
20 But anything you read from Bechtel concerning their 21 investigation into me, they didn't exonerate me, not at all.
22 They're still claiming that they had grounds to fire me, but 23 didn't do it, even though they subsequently did.
24 That's the problem that I identified to those guys, 25 and I was very explicit. And yet it doesn't reflect it in
(.
r-43 1 their report. The only thing that is reflected in their
(, ,
2 report or in their statament of the interview was that Barrett S was saying there was no problems that they were not already 4 aware of.
5 So those guys wrote the report in the way they 6 wanted it.
7 MR. WARD: Did you bring this out in your 23rd 8 affidavit?
9 THE WITNESS: April 23rd of '8S?
10 MR. WARD: Yes.
1,1 THE WITNESS: To be perfectly honest with you, 1 12 don't recall, but I would be more inclined to seriously doubt
( 13 it, because it was basically covering, you know, my suspension 14 frcm the project and the safety-related aspects of the 15 engineering change modifications that had been issued since 16 the accident. .
17 MR. WARD: Rick, do you recall when they did this 18 interview, if they had discussed with you the reason for the 1
19 interview was a clarification of your -- was it April 23rd l
20 interview affidavit? !
1 21 THE WITNESS: I don't think so. I seem to recall !
I 22 that it was more geared towards my March 2 Sed affidavit.
23 MR. WARD: March 23rd?
i 24 MR. LOGAN: March Elst?
25 THE WITNESS: Maybe it was March 21st.
I i
I
s . .
C r 44 1 MR. WARD: The affidavit I'm talking about --
s s 2 THE WITNESS: That's the big one. That's March 3 21st. I submitted a second affidavit in April, like April 4 21st or 22nd, something like that.
5 MR. WARD: This is April 22nd in Harrisburg. Is 6 this the one?
7 THE WITNESS: No, that's a prepared statement.
8 -
MR. WARD: Okay.
9 THE WITNESS: There was a subsequent within --
10 within the 30-day timeframe of me being' suspended, I submitted 11 a second affidavit, detailing how I was suspended and going 12 into safety-related aspects of the engineering change
( '13 modification process at TMI 'since the accident, and how they 14 deleted one of the safety reviews off of it.
15 MR. WARD: Who was that submitted to?
16 THE WITNESS: , Department of Labor.
17 MR. WARD: Was it ever submitted to NRC?
18 THE WITNESS: Yes.
19 MR. WARD: Do you know who at NRC?
20 THE WITNESS: Knowing the way GAP does business, I'm 21 sure a lot of people at NRC got it the same day the Department 22 of Labor did.
23 I would suggest you talk to Tom when he comes back 24 in the room, to see who in the NRC was the recipient of that 25 affidavit. Because I did talk in great detail with the Office
(.
- 45 1 . of Investigation investigators about my second affidavit also.
k 2 MR. WARD: What was the exact date of that?
3 THE WITNESS: I'd say April 21st, 22nds something 4 like that. I wouldn't swear to it.
5 MR. WARD: 19837 6 THE WITNESS: Correct. It was within 30 days of my 7 dismissal Otherwise the Department of Labor complaint would 8 have been invalid.
9 But, you know, that brings up the point I do not 10 recall McKenna and Bowers specifically stating that they 11 wished to cover that, but I do know that I did go into detail 12 with them about one of'the processes that was deleted with the
{ 13 NRC's knowledge on the ECM or engineering change modification 14 process at TMl during the post-accident conditions. Onerof 15 tne safety reviews that was intentionally deleted had never 16 been reimplemented.
17 01 did look into that, the technical aspects of it, 18 and did basically rul'e in my favor saying that I was correct
! 19 on the September 1983 report.
20 But DIA, I don't guess, ever bothered to look into 21 why NRC never reinstituted it. So I don't know. There again, i
l 22 it's not covered. It's not covered in their report.
28 MR. WARD: If you look at the next paragraph on this
. 24 affidavit, starting with "Throughout the interview with parks 25 and Devine."
l _. ___ _ _ __. __ .__ _ _ .._ _ __
. ( . r.
46 1 THE WITNESS: Right.
(- 2 MR. WARD: it goes on, it says it was explained and a reiterated that the OIA inquiry regarding concerns expressed 4 by parks were primarily focused on NRC personnel impropriety.
5 it was reiterated that the NRC Office of Investigation, 01, 6 had created a task force to address the myriad technical issue 7 concerns as expressed by Parks in his March 21, 1983 8 affidavit.
9 it also goes on to say therefore OlA did not pursue 6
10 these purely technical issues.
. 11 Do you recall that?
12 THE WITNESS: You mean the conversation --
( IS MR. WARD: Right.
14 THE WITNESS: I'm sure I can't recall it directly, i 15 picture in my mind Bowers and McKenna saying it to me , but I'm 16 fairly confident they expressed t o me they were only going to l
} 17 look into the NRC role, not anything else outside -- not i
a i 18 germane to their f u n c't i o n .
I i
19 MR. WARD: During this conversation, at this point
! 20 in that interview, did they bring up the facts that they had 5 21 the March 23rd affidavit?
h
{ 22 THE WITNESS: I don't really recall whether they 23 identified if they had it or not. Now Tom may be able to J
h 24 remember when he comes back in the room. I would suggest that l
! 25 you ask him. But I am confident enough that no one, through E
. . o.
47 1
a .I l the interviews I went to, anybody that didn't have a copy
(. 2 of the affidavit, we made sure they did have a copy of it.
3 That was the primary function of it, was to get to the bottom 4 of all the issues addressed in that affidavit.
5 MR. WARD: From what I have read in this interview, 6 and I have read your affidavits, and I have read the one 7 statement, prepared statement of the 22nd and so f orth, it 8 appears that this interview was conducted based on that March 9 23rd affidavit to bring out the points, the salient points 10 regarding NRC impropriety. That's why I'm asking the '
11 question. Some of the issues that might not be covered in 12 this, which aren't covered in that 23rd affidavit. That's why
( 13 I want to know if they discussed that, if they had gone 14 through it with you.
15 THE UlTNESS: We did not, that I cara recall, sit 16 there and read through, page by page of my March 23rd 17 affidavit, which was -- we being Tom and myself when we met 18 with McKenna and Bowers. We had a lot of the same type of 19 discussions with them as what we're having with you right 20 now. They had no prepared agenda. Everybody else that i ever 21 had any dealing with at NRC, all through the TMI process, 1 22 went into a room, they had a list as long as your left leg of 23 questions that they wanted me to elucidate on.
I l 24 OlA would have been just as happy if I'd said, well, i
25 you guys can take a flying hike.
. ( (.
48 1 MR. WARD: Let me clarify what you just said. We do 2 have a prepared agenda for this.
3 THE WITNESS: I'm talking about 1988 meetings not 4 you guys.
5 MR. WARD: Okay. Because our prepared agenda is, 6 one, to correct the inaccuracles and clarify the sallent 7 points in this interview, report of interview, t
8 The~second is to develop any new information you 9 possibly have that's not covered here, or that you remembered 10 subsequent to that interview.
11 THE WITNESS: I'd like to take exception to that 12 word, new information. This is basically a rehash of a very
(- 18 painful and troubled time in my life. And I'm so sick of 14 talking about it, it really disgusts me that I have to come 15 back two years from now and straighten out an interview that i 16 put a little bit of faith, a little bit -- not very much --
17 and a little bit of faith and trust in that was going to be 18 handled appropriately.
19 1 was shocked when I read the OlA report. Not only 20 did it not include most of the details I felt were NRC 21 improprieties, but the ones they did address, they were more l
22 concerned about proving Barrett and company were innocent of l 23 any wrongdoing about playing softball with us, or by having a l
l ( 24 meal with Arnold. He could sleep with Arnold for all I care.
l 25 But in his official function he has obligations he ought to
{
l l
l
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49 1 1ive up to.
)
(- 2 Yes, I do lay most of the blame on Barrett's 8 doorstep, because he was the one that cracked the whip and the 4 rest of the guys danced to his tune.
,, 5 But I'm kind of wandering off the subject. I have 6 to apologize for that.
7 MR. WARD: Let me clarify what i mean by new 8 information. New information we don't have in that file, 9 that's new to us.
10 THE WITNESS: I have to apologize about being 11 sensitive about new information. To me that implied I was 12 withholding for two years. I haven't withheld anything.
( 13 MR.' WARD: It would be new information to us ,
14 because it's not in the file.
15 THE WITNESS: I'd like to take a break.
16 MR. LOGAN: We,can take a break at this time.
17 CRecess.3 l
18 MR. LOGAN: Back on the record.
l l 19 THE WITNESS: To pick up where we left off on that i
20 same sentence, that same paragraph we just read into the 21 record off the prepared CIA statement, I would like to skip i
22 down to the sentence in that paragraph that starts with, 23 " Consequently numerous attempts during the interview by parks I
24 and Devine to speak of various purely technical safety issues 25 concerned were referred to by DIA representativer as the
e
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50 1 responsibility of the ongoing Of task force efforts."
(
2 I see no reason why that should ever have been in 8 there. If I had prepared that statement, I neuer would have '
4 put it in there. There, in my opinion, it shows bias on the 5 part of the investigators that I was speaking with. '
6 i don't recall that after the initial ground work 7 was laid, I don't recall elaborating in great detail on f
8 anything except NRC.
9 Do you, Tom?
10 MR. DEUINE: We didn't have any dispute about that.
11 We were familiar with the l iim i t s of OIA's jurisdiction when we 12 walked in, or I was. My surprise was more the degree that the
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13 report did go into those issues, rather than OlA's inability 14 to cover them systematically during the interview.
15 MR. (JARD: To the best of your recollection, though, 16 did they bring that up? Did they tell you that this was --
17 MR. DEUINE: That's correct, they explicitly 18 informed us of the ju'risdictional limits of your office here.
19 THE WITNESS; Besides, I had already met several 20 times previous with 01. I knew what Ol's function was.
21 MR. DEVINE: I guess we thought it was a little bit 22 patronizing. It's not really material and it's not relevant.
28 But for what it's worth, they informed us that, and we didn't
( 24 have any problem with it.
25 THE WITNESS: Basically, as far as a review of this
P *
/
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l.
51 1 document, that's about it. But, you know, I really have some
( 2 very serious problems with the way Of performed their S investigation, the way they documented their investigation, 4 their interviews.
5 MR. LOGAN: Comments other than those brought out by 6 Mr. Devine in his November 10 letter?
7 THE WITNESS: I don't know for sure which comments 8 you're talking about.
9 MR. LOGAN: Okay.
10 THE WITNESS: The last time I read that letter was 11 November 1983.
12 MR. LOGAN: Do you have a copy of it?
( IS THE WITNESS: No , not with me.
14 MR. LOGAN: You do have a copy?
15 THE WITNESS: I do have a copy of it.
16 MR. LOGAN: You indicated during the break that you i
! 17 could provide us with some additional information, and you i
18 would like the opport' unity to do so. However, it would take i
19 30 days approximately to get it to us?
20 THE WITNESS: Correct.
l 21 MR. LOGAN: We would be happy to receive that. If i
! 22 you could, of course, in that time review Mr. Devine's 'l e t't e r I
23 to us and anything you would like to add to that.
. 24 THE WITNESS: I would like to add something right I
\
25 now. That report, the OlA report, was issued in September of l l 1 1
'. (. .
52 .
~
1 1983. 1, through Tom, responded to that with my concerns, my 2 initial analysis of that report on more of a broad scope 3 rather than minor details. We responded November of 1983.
4 MR. LOGAN: This letter?
5 THE WITNESS: Correct. There was no action on the 6 part of the NRC to do anything with it until after the TMl-1 7 restart hearing and license was granted. Now I would like to I
8 know why nothing was done between November of 1983 and May of 9 1985.
10 MR. LOGAN: I have no idea.
11 THE WITNESS: There was sufficient concern by not 12 only myself and gap, but also Dr. Henry Myer's questioning the
( 13 Commissioners, and the Commissioners' counsel, on hey, we've 14 got two reports here that conflict. The reason they 15 conflicted was because CIA was absolving NRC of all and any 16 blame for anything.
17 I mean any person that walked over water better than 18 Lake Barrett was Christ. Nothing was ever resolved, nothing 19 was ever looked into. And the reason I contend, and I am 20 making the allegation right now NRC didn't want to look into 21 it because if they had proven any of the alleged illegalities 22 on improprieties on the part of any of the NRC people, it 23 could have withheld the license from Unit I restart. And I l
( 24 would really like to have --
you can take this whole 25 investigation and trash-can it if you'll just give me that one
( '
53
! 1 .
answer, why nobody looked into it.
2 MR. LOGAN: I don't know that no one looked into 3 it. Okay?
4 THE WITNESS: Nobody ever contacted us.
5 MR. DEVINE: Rick, I can help a little on that.
6 There was one point --
7 MR. LOGAN: There is a note that I see a letter from 8 Herzel P 'l a i n e , General Counsel, to you in San Luis Obispo.
9 That's dated November - 20 th , 1984 10 THE WITNESS: I have the original. I only got that 11 because I took my concerns to Admiral Zech. I was the one who 12 pushed it.
. 13 MR. LOGAN: That's not reflected in the letter.
14 CWitness indicating on letter.3 15 MR. LOGAN: To the Commission s right?
16 THE WITNESS: .I wrote the letter to begin with.
17 MR. LOGAN: it says to your letter July 24, 1984 to 18 the Commission regarding Three Mile Island, Unit 2.
19 THE WITNESS: Correct.
20 MR. LOGAN: Okay. You wanted to say something. Go 21 ahead.
22 THE WITNESS: I think I have said enough. I will 28 provide you with that analysis. It will be very detailed and
[ 24 substantiated with documents.
25 MR. LOGAN: We would appreciate it.
(-
(>.-
54 1
, THE WITNESS: I welcome the opportunity to cooperate 2 with you guys in any way to straighten this fiasco out.
8 MR. LOGAN: When you get situated at your'new 4 residence in California, if you would prepare that and send it 5 to us, what we will do is we'll go through it, review it, 6 compare that with the other relevant documents, and if there 7 are any questions, we will go back to you before we go 8 forward.'
9 THE WITNESS: For the next 30 days I would suggest, 10 so that you do not spin your wheels and' lose any progress, 1 11 would suggest you do a very in-depth review of the 1983 OIA 12 report and the 1983 Ol* report, and just take a look at the l', '13 differences between the two. Because that's what my report 14 coming to you will deal mostly with; that and every other part 15 of the public record generated since I went public in 1983.
16 MR. LOGAN: C er t a i n l y we are interested in arriving l
i 17 at the truth, and if the truth means that there is some I
18 wrongdoing on the part of NRC people, we won't hesitate to 19 show that. If the facts indicate there isn't, then we'll also l 20 state it that way.
21 THE WITNESS: Do you guys have any further 22 questions? 1*ll answer anything you have.
I 23 MR. WARD: I think we covered the other area I was j 24 interested in, about the notes in this affidavit. So I don't 25 think we have to go through those any further.
( .
ss 1
MR. LOGAN: Okay. With regard to the transcripts
(. 2 and to the signing and making of a statement, obviously you 3
won't have an opportunity to sign and make a statement today.
4 You have indicate you are going to have an 11:00 o' clock 5 appointment. If there is something you want to leave in a 6 signed statement for us, obviously you can do so. If not, we 7
have a complete record of everything that went on, and you 8 will have the opportunity to correct the record.
9 THE WITNESS: When will I get my copy of the 10 transcript?
11 MR. LOOAN: If you want to hang around'at your own 12 expense, you can have them tomorrow.
13
( THE WITNESS: No. That's what I like about you 14 guys. You're really concerned about your constituency.
15 MR. LOGAN: We're willing to make every effort to 16 arrive at the truth. If it means affording you the 17 opportunity to stay over at your own expense --
18 Claughter.1 19 THE UlTNESS: Of course, that's in consideration of 20 Uncle Ronnie's austerity budget program.
21 MR. LOGAN: We are reimbursing you for this trip, so 22 that should be noted.
28 THE WITNESS: All sparring aside, you do have the 24 address, Donna provided you with yesterday the California i
25 address?
56 1 MR. LOGAN: She gave that to Harry, not to me, but
(' 2 i+ Harry has it, it will be part of the record, yes.
8 Mr. Devine, is there anything else that you want to 4 add to the record?
i 5 MR. DEUlNE: No, thank you.
6 MR. WARD: I have nothing, l 7 MR. LOGAN: Okay. The time is approximately 10:17.
e We will conclude the record portion of this discussion on 9 Three Mile Island.
10 CWhereupon, at 10:17 o' clock a.m., the meeting was 1
11 adjourned.3 12 IS 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 k
25
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g
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1 CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER 2
3 4
5 This is to car,tify that the attached proceedings
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G before the United States Nuc l ear Regu l a t ory Canmi ss i on in the 7 matter c.f : OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR AND' AUDITOR e
, 9 Name of Aroceeding: Interview of Richard D. Parks 10 (Closed Session - Confidential Informatior 11 Docket No.
( 12 place- Bethesda, Maryland 1? Date: Tuesday, June 25, 1985 14 15 were hitid as herein appears and that this is the original 1G transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear 17 Pegulatory Commission, 13
'N 'r 19
- I!L' (Typed Name of Reporter) Mimie Meldzer 20 C1 22 23 Ann Riley & Associates. Ltd.
24 25
T. ( .
Interview of Richard D. Parks 1
Richard D. PARKS, accompanied by L'egal Counsel, Thomas M.-DEVINE, Legal Directer, Government Accountability Project (GAP) of the Institute for Policy Studies, 1901 Que Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009, was interviewed in the Office of the Assistant Director for Investigations, Office of Inspector and Auditor (01A), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on June 23, 1983.
PARKS was advised that the interview concerned obtaining any additional /-
amplifying information concerning the Three Mile Island (TMI) Nuclear Power Station other than that which had been provided by him in an affidavit executed March 21, 1983. Moreover, PARKS was informed that the specific areas of interest to 01A's investigation pertained to the information in his
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affidavit regarding allegations of harassment and possible retaliation by
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GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES NUCLEAR CORPORATION (GPUN)/P.ECHTEL NORTH AMERICAN POWER CORPORATION (BECHTEL) management toward employees; in addition, NRC's reperted breach of confidentiality concerning PARKS' reporting of safety concerns and other allegations of collusion between NRC and GPUN/BECHTEL were topics which OIA wished to discuss.
Relatedly, PARKS was informed that the scope of the OIA investigation did not encompass all aspects of his March 21, 1983, affidavit as a concurrent NRC Office of Investigations (01) inquiry was ongoing in related technical / safety.
areas regarding the licensee and its contractors.
Asstatedinhisaffidavit,PARKSdescrkbedbeingformerlyemployedbyBECHTEL as a senior start-up engineer at THI Unit 2. PARKS stated his duties include working as an Operations Engineer reporting directly to the Director of Site Operations (L. P. KING) and the Manager of Plant Operations (Joseph CHWASTYK). ,
In addition, PARKS described serving as alternative start-up and test supervi-sor for Unit 2, acting start-up and test manager from July 31, 1982, until August 9, 1982, and also serving as the alternate Test Work Group Chairman.
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In approximately mid-November 1982, PARKS stated Site Operations became involved in the Head lift Task Force (HLTF) regarding removal of the reactor vessel head at TMI-2. During subsecuent meetings between groups which com-prised the HLTF, it became somewhat apparent to assigned Site Operations
~
personnel (PARKS, KING, and Edwin H. GISCHEL, Plant Engineering Director) that
' there were significant deficiencies in the planned program to remove the reactor vessel head as well as subsequent activities to remove the fuel. To accomplish removal of the reactor vess.el head, a polar crane was to be utilized to remove other heavy equipment inside the containment and to stage n
any support equipment required to remove the damaged core from the reactJr vessel. GPUN had assigned BECHTEL to refurbish the reactor building palar I
1 crane to its undamaged condition. The issue of the polar crane becomes one of the focal points of the concerns, inter alia, expressed by PARKS in his March 21, 1983, affidavit.
Concerning the pola~r crane and other related issues (viz, HLTF and Safety Evaluation Reports (SER)), PARKS expressed an extreme degree of concern
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l regarding what he described as questionable activities by Lake H. BARRETT, 1
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4
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Deputy Director, NRC Three Mile Island Program Office (TMIPO). PARKS related that as he realized numerous concerns regarding the polar crane and related issues at TMI, it became som what apparent, in his opinion, that BARRETT was acting improperly in his dealings with GPUN/BECHTEL. In an attempt to main-tain a chronological sequence regarding these concerns, PARKS was requested to t
focus his attention on his initial contact with NRC personnel leading to his allegation of impropriety by BARRETT and/or other NRC personnel.
PARKS described meetings which were held during November 1982 through
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February 1983 between various GPUN/BECHTEL management personnel and sub-ordinate staff individuals involved in the polar crane and related issues.
Specifically, PARKS said that GPUN, on July 19, 1982, assigned BECHTEL to restore the polar crane to its undamaged condition pursuant to a July 14, 1982, work request (CA258). Subsequently, the HLTF was formed with Site Operations becoming involved circa November 1982. During the November 1982 -
January 1983 period, PARKS explained that several aspects of the SER being prepared for submission to the NRC were questioned by PARKS, KING, and
(. GISCHEL. These concerns included lack of appropriate calculations regarding
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possible load drop, lack of an integrated schedule to coordinate the polar !
crane with the reactor vessel head lif t schedule, modifications of various plant systems without appropriate engineering review, inadeouately cualified personnel involved in the HLTF and other relatively general concerns question-ing the applied technical methodology.
During the period January 20 to February 10, 1983, the Safety Evaluation Report for use of the polar crane was: reviewed by Site Operations. It was
( determined by the Manager of Plant Engineering (GISCHEL) that the polar crane safety evaluation was techr.ically unacceptable and suggested recuired pro-cedures were cited.
On February 11, 1983, KING informed Site Operations' staff of a meeting held to obtain the signatures of KING and GISCHEL, indicating their evaluation and approval of the polar crane SER. PARKS stated that KING and GISCHEL advised KANGA that they felt there were still significant problems with the polar crane program and would not sign the SER; KANGA stated he would tate the
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concerns of KING arid GISCHEL to Robert ARh0LD, GPUN President, as the next highest level.of management to resolve this matter.
However, PARKS related that on February 14, 1983, John J. BARTON, Deputy Director, TMI-2, GPUN, expressed his displeasure at KING and GISCHEL's refusal I
to sign the SER. Later that same date, KING and GISCHEL sent a memorandum to upper GPUN/BECHTEL management expressing their fundamental' disagreement with the polar crane program although recognizing management's prerogative to pro.ceed as they wish.
On February 15, 1983, a meeting with GPUN upper management personnel resulted in a decision to proceed with the polar crane issue notwithstanding the disapproval of Site Operations. Consequently, on February 17, 1983, KING asked PARKS to review the polar crane Load Test Procedure. PARKS expressed his concern regarding the lack of compliance with various technical require-ments and rotified KING. The following day, February 18, PARKS was approached by Edward KITLER, Supervisor of Start-up and Test, who asked PARKS what he was doing (regarding his refusal to approve the polar crane load procedure) saying
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that GPUN/BECHTEL managen.ent was " pissed'off" at him for his actions {in not approving the polar crane issues). In this way, PARKS advised he learned of the apparent possibility of potential transfer which he clearly interrupted as a form of management retaliation for disagreement with portions of the SER which were otherwise approved by the other members of the HLTF. Sirce such retaliation is protected under 10 CFR, Part 19, PARKS decided to report the matter to the NRC.
PARKS then related that after his conversation with KITLER (during the morning of February 18,1983) he telephoned Phil GRANT of the NRC's Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR), regarding procedures to report a reprisal threat.
At GRANT's suggestion, PARKS met later that same morning with Joel WIEBE, Senior Resident Inspector at THI, in WIEBE's office. PARKS advised he informed WIEBE of the above situation.which he considered a possible retal-iatory action by GPUN/BECHTEL and asked how he could proceed with reporting this threat. WIEBE informed PARKS that he would research the matter with the TMIPO and get back to PARKS with a response. PARKS stated that he requested
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that his identification not be made known to anyone for obvious reasons of
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possible additional' reprisal (s). WIEBE's response was reportedly that PARKS' identity would. not be made known "unless absolutely necessary."
At this point in the interview, DEVINE inter.iected a question specifically inquiring of PARKS whether he was infonned by WIEBE that he (PARKS) would be advised if his identity were necessary to be made known to any other per-sonnel. PARKS stated he did not specifically recall if that provision had been agreed to in the conversation with WIEBE; however, PARKS stated his presumption was that W!EBE would notify PARKS if his identity was disclosed.
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On February 25, 1983, PARKS again met with WIEBE at the NRC office and they proceeded directly into the office of Lake H. BARRETT, Deputy Director, TMIPO.
BARRETT explained that TMIPO personnel had reviewed PARKS' concerns regarding the polar crane. This TMIPO review included a surprise NRC inspection of BECHTEL polar crane calculations at their engineering office in Gaithersburg, Maryland. BARRETT then asked PARKS if he wished for an NRC Office of Inves-tigations inquiry regarding the possible threat of a retaliation transfer due to comments he made regarding the polar crane issue. PARKS responded that he
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( wished to " hold that decision in abeyance" pending the results of a Quality Assurance / Quality Control review. PARKS stated he then asked BARRETT what NRC would do if GPUN/8ECHTEL transferred him; BARRETT responded that the NRC could not do anything until that incident occurs although stating the NRC would certainly "take a dim view" of the matter.
4 At approximately 8 a.m. on February 28, 1983, PARKS learned that a meeting was to be held with upper level management GPUN/BECHTEL personnel; on February 26, 1983, ARN0LD, GPUN President, had appointed a readiness review comm.ittee to
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review the polar crane issue. PARKS explained that he offered te and did attend the meeting; after the meeting was adjourned, PARKS related he and Ron WARREN (plant engineering) were requested by Jim THEISING, Manager, Recovery Program (who coordinated the meeting), to remain behind for a moment.
THEISING, in the presence of WARREN, inquired what management could do to
" smooth over the growing split between Site Operations and the other organiza-tions."
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A brief discussion then followet regarding KING who had recently been sus-pended and other issues. THEISING informed PARKS that he was aware that a second or third level Site Operations supervisor had already spoken with the NRC; additionally, in light of the KING suspension and the recent termination
.i i of other employees to solve inter-departmental disagreements, he (THEISING) l, l could understand an individual reporting this situation to the NRC. PARKS i
, stated these comments by THEISING were clearly construed to mean THEISING was i
aware PARKS was the individual who had contacted the NRC. PARKS characterized this event as the first clear indication that his expressed required confiden-tiality, guaranteed in his meeting with WIEBE, had been violated.
i Continuing, PARKS then described receiving a telephone call at his residence on March 3, 1983, from KING. KING expressed his concern regarding the NRC having possibly violated PARKS' confidentiality. PARKS described how KING informed him of being telephoned by Keith CHRISTOPHER, NRC Region I Office of Investigations. KING reportedly stated that CHRISTOPHER was inquiring about KING's concerns of various problem areas at TMI; during this conversation,
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CHRISTOPHER asked KING if his safety concerns were the same as those related
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by PARKS. PARKS stated that his obvious kr.owledge by CHRISTOPHER of concerns expressed by PARKS, further supported PARKS' contention that the NRC had violated his requested confidentiality.
PARKS described a separate incident involving CHRISTOPHER and explained that some time on or about March 21, 1983,, he (PARKS) spoke with Special Agent Ron BRINKLEY, FBI, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (717-232-8686}. BRINKLEY report-edly was describing to PARKS a conversation that he (BRINKLEY) had with
( CHRISTOPHER. BRINKLEY reportedly stated that during a conversation regarding i
TMI/ PARKS and KING, CHRISTOPHER described PARKS / KING as " leaders of a gang of malcontents." PARKS explained that in his opinion, at a minimum, the coments reportedly made by CHRISTOPHER were entirely inappropriate and unprofessional and worthy of pursuit regarding CHRISTOPHER's continued suitability as an NRC investigator.
On March 9,1983, PARKS explained that he was again called at his residence by KING who explained that earlier that day he had spoken with ARNOLD, President, GPU, and it appeared apparent to KING that ARNOLD was attempting to implicate
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( PARKS in the QUILTEC, INC. Consulting Company issue and use that as the rationale for dismissing PARKS. Accordingly, on March 10, 1983, PARKS returned to the NRC office and again met with WlEBE. PARKS asked Cari HRBAC to accompany him to the meeting as a witness and HRBAC agreed.
PARKS, upon entering WlEBE's office, informed him that he wished to request a special investigation regarding th'e information which KING had related to him the previous evening. PARKS described that WIEBE somewhat summarily dismissed PARKS' comments and gave him a slip of paper with the U.S. Department of Labor address as well as the phone number of CHRISTOPHER. WIEBE explained that NRC's position regarding his situation was that it would not become involved in an employer / employee labor matter and described TMIPO having consulted on this matter with CHRISTOPHER. BOTH HRBAC and PARKS then expressed concern over the NRC's apparent lack of concern over retaliation and WlEBE merely reiterated his coerents that his situation would have to be pursued with the Department of Labor. PARKS advised that the comments of W EBE on March 10, 1983, directly conflict with the position taken by WlEBE on February 25, 1983, 1
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during the meeting between PARKS and BARRETT/WIEBE when PARKS was asked whether he wished to pursue the complaint and request an NRC investigation.
A PARKS' comments regarding possible NRC pert:nnel impropriety then returned to BARRETT. In this regard, PARKS explained how he had been informed by BARRETT that he (BARRETT) had initiated a draft review process in an attempt to assist GPU shorten review cycles and expedite clean up issues. PARKS explained that this initiative by BARRETT was a clear violation of procedures listed in the
[ Code of Federal Reculations and characteristic of a main problem theme high-lighted in the President Report of the near disaster accident at Three Mile Island (vis, failure to correctly follow appropriate administrative proce-dures). At this point in the interview, DEVINE explained that the Government Accountability Project has in its possession handwritten notes to/from BARRETT and GPU regarding various issues which are considered to be unauthorized, informal, forms of communications between the NRC and a licensee.
As another example of alleged impropriety on the part of BARRETT, PARKS described an April 22, 1983, address reportedly made by BARRETT to the
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Concerned Mothers of Middletown. During this session, BARRETT explained that.
there were essentially no safety problems associated with the polar crane issue which directly conflicted with official published NRC reports.
Throughout the interview with PARKS and DEVINE, it was explained and reiterated that the OIA inquiry regarding concerns expressed by PARKS were primarily focused on NRC personnel impropriety. It.was reiterated that the NRC Office of Investigations (01) had'. created a task force to address the i myriad technical issue concerns as expressed by PARKS in his March 21, 1963, affidavit and, therefore, OIA would not pursue these purely technical issues.
Consequently, numerous attempts during'the interview by PARKS /DEVINE to speak of various purely technical / safety issue concerns were referred to by OIA representatives as the responsibility of the ongoing OI task force efforts.
In this regard, PARKS /DEVINE admitted having met on several occasions with O!
personnel. Concluding, Investigator Ronald MEEKS, 01, was asked by Patrick MCKEhNA, OIA, to meet with PARKS and DEVINE in order that any concerns regarding technical / safety issues which had not been expressed / addressed might
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( c-be related to MEEKS for possible inclusion in the 01 efforts. Accordingly, the three men met following the O! A interview.
During the interview, i,t was continually explained that DIA needed specific information concerning reported violations of regulation or statute; DEVINE responded that they (he and PARKS) were not alleging illegality, but violation by BARRETT of Section 2302 B.8. of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 and by the NRC of 10 CFR 50 relative to GPU procedures. DEVINE said "...there were
( no problems with law, but there were with the mission of the agency... (NRC)."
Moreover, DEVINE concluded that he felt "...there was an NRC lack of respect for the administrative role of the licenset."
The approximately two and one half hour interview with PARKS /DEVINE concluded at approximately 1 p.m. on June 23, 1983.
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