ML20212G052

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Comment Supporting Proposed Rules 10CFR50 & 72 Re Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors
ML20212G052
Person / Time
Site: Calvert Cliffs  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 09/22/1999
From: Cruse C
IES UTILITIES INC., (FORMERLY IOWA ELECTRIC LIGHT
To:
NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-64FR36291, RULE-PR-50, RULE-PR-72 64FR36291-00024, NUDOCS 9909290067
Download: ML20212G052 (6)


Text

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. Charles H. Cruse Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant

. Vic] Pr:sident 1650 Calvert Chffs Parkway Nuclear Enern g ,

Lusby, Maryland 20657 410 495-4455

'99 SF 27 P2 04 A Member of the Constellation Energy Group p September 22,1999 l

DOCKET NUMBER l

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,DC 205$5 PROPOSED (4 # R36:(9/ RUI.E ATTENTION: Secretary, Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff

SUBJECT:

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Proposed Rulemaking for Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Reactors; 64 Federal Register 36293, July 6,1999

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Baltimore Gas and Electric Company submits comments on the subject rulemaking for 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73, Reporting Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants, and associated guidance, NUREG-1022, j Revisiva 2, Event Reporting Guidelines,in Attachment A.  !

In general, we support the proposed changes to these rules noticed in 64FR36293 - July 6,1999 and NUREG-1022, Revision 2. We also applaud the Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff ef1' orts to work  ;

with interested parties, including the nuclear power industry and the Nuclear Energy Institute, to develop a consensus concerning the subject rulemaking and changes to NUREG-1022.

I We endorse the comments made by Nuclear Energy Institute concerning the rulemaking and associated ]

guidance, and add the co nments in Attachment (1) concerning the proposed rulemaking. We also have l 2

added comments concerning draft NUREG-1022, Revision 2 in Attachment (2).

Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,  ;

l for  !

Charles H. Cruse h(

Vice President-Nuclear Energy j

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CHC/CDS/bjd l Attachments: (1) Comments on Proposed Rulemaking for Reporting Requirements for Nuclear  !

Reactors; 64 FR 36293 ,

,7q (2) Comments on NUREG-1022, Revision 2 )

9909290067 990922  :

PDR PR s x 64rna6291 eon KwQ j j

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Rulemakings and Adjudicotions Staff September 22,1999 Page 2 -

v t, : Document Control Desk, NRC 11. J. Miller, NRC R. S. Fleishman, Esquire' Resident Inspector, NRC J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. I. McLean, DNR S. S. Bajwa, NRC J. II. Walter, PSC A. W. Dromerick, NRC

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l ATTACIIMENT (1) J COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING FOR REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS; 64 FR 36293 l

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Baltimore Gas and Electric Comhny Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Septemher 22,1999

g ATTACIIMENT (1)

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED RULEMAKING FOR REPORTING REQUIRElWENTS FOR NUCLEAR REACTORS; 64 FR 36293 l

1. . Licensee Event Report Format and Content We believe that utilization of the " check-the-box" format for Licensee Event Report (LER) reporting should be reconsidered. The " check-the-box" approach would reduce the burden on licensees for LER report preparation while still supplying the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with the information they need to conduct their mission. A " check-the-box" format could be crafied that would make LER data entry easier, more consistent, and less ambiguous. We believe that a " check- )

the-box" format can be developed that will not make LERs rnore difficult for the general public to J understr.nd, but actually increase public understanding by providing more concise and consistent j information across the industry concerning reportable events. 1

2. Use of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) as a Direct Input to NRC Performance Indicator Program Through our participation in the development of the new NRC Performance Indicator Program, we have become aware that each event reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), "Any event ... that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems . ." will be counted as a Safety System Functional Failure. It appears that the reportability criteria and the Safety System Functional Failure Performance Indicator are not u.tirely analogous. The Performance Indicator Program is being proposed to track actual Safety System Functional Failures while 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) requires reporting of events that alone could have caused a failure of a safety system. Many of the events reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) do not result in actual safety system failures but potential safety system failures. We understand the need of NRC for information regarding potential safety system failures. However, we suggest careful and coordinated consideration among the NRC staff responsible for this rule and the Performance Indicator Program to ensure that use of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) reports as indicators of safety system functional failures is reviewed to ensure that the reports are not being misapplied.
3. Enforcement Criteria Discussion in Proposed Rulemaking We believe that the proposed categorization of failures to provide required 1-hour or 8-hour non-emergency telephone notifications pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 as Severity Level Ill violations is too harsh in most cases. In most cues,' the information provided in these non-emergency notifications has low safety significance. We suggest that Section IV.7 Enforcement, paragraph (1)(b) be modified to include only missed notifications that have safety significance; or relocated to an  !

example of a Level IV violation; or deleted.

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l ATTACHMENT (2) l l

COMMENTS ON NUREG-1022, REVISION 2 I

I Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant September 22,1999

ATTACHMENT (2) l' l COMMENTS ON NUREG-1022, REVISION 2 Section 2.5, Time Limits for Reporting l

The fact that reporting times in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1) and (b)(2) are keyed to the " occurrence of the event

- or condition" and LER submittals are keyed to " discovery of the event or condition" is confusing. Often,

" discovery" of conditions reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 occurs at a time that is greater than the allowed time period for making a telephone notification. For example, it is rare for reportable events involving engineering analysis or equipment fabrication issues to be discovered at the same time that they actually occur. Such delayed discoveries are common and would result in frequent violations of the 1-hour and 8-  ;

hour notification requirements by licensees. We feel that requiring the 1-hour and 8-hour clock to start "from the occurrence" of an event is often an unrealistic or impossible requirement to meet. We suggest j the. wording of the rule be changed to include "ofihe discovery" in place of"of the occurrence." [see i paragraphs 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1) and (b)(2)]

Section 3.2.4, Degraded Condition We have always viewed 10 CFR 50.72(b)(i)(ii) and 50.73(a)(2)(ii) as very serious events with high {

thresholds. Significant degradation of principal safety barriers and unanalyzed conditions that significantly affect plant safety should include events where the plant's safety analyses would not be met in the event of a design basis accident and cases where unanalyzed conditions significantly affect plant  ;

safety. {

One of the examples of unanalyzed events does not appear to significantly affect plant safety. The example is a missing fire barrier, such that the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains is lacking (pg 33 of draft NUREG-1022, Revision 2). While we agree this is an unanalyzed condition, we question whether this type of event "significantly" affects plant safety. Under the example cited above, most cases ofinoperable Appendix R fire penetration seals would be considered reportable events. Such events do not strike us as meeting the threshold of "significantly" affect plant safety, because they are normally mitigated by the availability of suppression and/or detection systems as well as {

other fire prevention strategies such as control of combustible loading, etc. We suggest the example be l deleted.

Section 3.2.8, Common Cause Failures ofIndependent Trains or Channels l l

- Examples (1), (2), and (4) of this section would, in our judgement, also be reportable under )

59.72(b)(2)(iii) and 50.73(a)(2)(v),"Any event or condition that ... could have prevented fulfillment of j the safety function ..." We suggest that more concise examples be used that are reportable only under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii). Use of such examples will serve to better distinguish the differences between these ,

reporting criteria and make this rule easier to understand by licensees.

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Section 4.2.4, ENS Event Notification Worksheet (Form 361)

The ENS Event Notification Worksheet appears to have two errors. On page 1 of the sheet under the section titled, "4-Hr Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)" are two line items, "(iv)(A) Air Release > 2x App B" and "(iv)(B) Liq. Release > 2x App B." These line items should read "(iv)(A) Air Release > 20x App B" and "(iv)(B) Liq. Release > 20x App B." In addition, the Event Notification Worksheet must be revised to reflect the changes to 10 CFR 50.72 and 73 and Section 4.2.4 of NUREG-1022, Revision 2 j must be revised to reference the new version of the Event Notification Worksheet.

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