ML20211P713

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Revised Tech Spec Pages 3/4 1-6,1-7,1-8 & 1-11,supporting Application for Amend to License NPF-11 to Permit Operation W/Crd 10-47 Withdrawn for Remainder of Cycle 2
ML20211P713
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/15/1986
From:
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20211P641 List:
References
NUDOCS 8612190126
Download: ML20211P713 (7)


Text

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ATTAC19 TENT B TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REQUEST r anar:LE COUNTY STATION UNIT 1 PROPOSED CHANGE TO APPENDIX A TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION TO OPERATING LICENSE NPF-Il REVISED PAGES: 3/4 1-6 -

3/4 1-7 3/4 1-8 {

3/4 1-11 2519K 8612190126 861215 3 pga ADOOK 0500 P

j REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM CONTROL R00 MAXIMUM SCRAM INSERTION TIMES

' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.2 The maximp scram insertion time of each control rod from the fully t:ithdrawn position to notch position 05, based on de-energization of the scram pilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed 7.0 seconds.

APPLICA81LITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS I and 2.

j ACTION:

l l a. With the maximum scram insertion time of one or more control rods exceeding 7.0 seconds:

4 1. Declare the control rod (s) with the slow insertion time inoperable,j and Perform the Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.1.3.2.c l

2. '

at least once per 60 days when operation is continued with three or more control rods with maximum scram insertion times

,! in excess of 7.0 seconds.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTOOWN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not appitcable. l l,

, SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.2 The maximum scram insertion time of the control rods shall be demonstrated through measurement with reactor coolant pressure greater than or equal to 950 psig and, during single control rod scram time tests, the control rod drive pumps isolated from the accumulators:

a. For all control rods prior to THERMAL POWER exceeding 40% of RATED l THERMAL POWER following CORE ALTERATIONS
  • or after a reactor shutdown l that is greater than 120 days, For specifically affected individual control rods following f

l b.

l maintenance on or modification to the control rod or control rod drive system which could affect the scram insertion time of those specific control rods, and l c. For at least IDE of the control rods, on a rotating basis, at least

! once per 120 days of operation.

"Except movement of SRM, IRM or special movable detectors or normal. control rod movement.

l 4-Conho) vod 10-41 mag use pesih'on % as $e. Full 3 wi$dewn pnkn -for Cge.h 2, 3/4 1-6 Amendment No. IB LA SALLE - UNIT 1 l . .

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM

. CONTROL R00 AVE 9 AGE SCRAM !NSERTION TIMES

' LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERA' ION 3.1.3.3 The average scram insertion time of all OPERABLE control rods from thefullywithdrawnpositiod?basedonde-energizationofthescrampilot valve solenoids as time zero, shall not exceed any of the following:

Position Inserted From Average Scram Inser-Fully Withdrawn tion Time (Seconds) 45 0.43 39 0.86 25 1.93 05 3.49 APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2. .

ACTION:

With the average scram insertion time exceeding any of the above limits, be in at least HOT SHUT 00WN within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SURVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.3 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by scram time testing from the fully withdrawn position as required by Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.2.

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  1. - Codvol rod 10-47 mag use posMn % a5 Me Ell 3 JMdmwn pahen for C9e\e 2

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LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-7 l

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REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM FOUR CONTROL ROD GROUP SCRAM INSERTION TIMES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.4 Theaveragescraminsertiontime,fromthefullywithdrawnpositionf f;r the three fastest control rods in each group of four control rods arranged l in a two-by-two array, based on deenergization of the scram pilot. valve solenoids cs time zero, shall not exceed any of the following:

Position Inserted From Average Scram Inser-Fully Withdrawn tion Time (Seconds) 45 0.45 39 0.92 25 2.05 05 3.70 APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2.

ACTION:

a. With the average scram insertion times of control rods exceeding the l above limits: .
1. Declare the control rods with the slower than average scram l insertion times inoperable until an analysis is performed to determine that required scram reactivity remains for the slow

' four control rod group, and

2. Perform the Surveillance Requirements of Specification 4.1.3.2.c l at least once per 60 days when operation is continued with an average scram insertion time (s) in excess of the average scram insertion time limit.

Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. The provisions af Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. l SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.3.4 All control rods shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by scram time testing from the fully withdrawn position as required by Surveillance Requirement 4.1.3.2.
  • - Co&ol ved 10 'n nm3 use podb % as & EllWbe posrb Ib C ele 2, 3 Amendment No. 18 LA SALLE - UNIT 1 3/4 1-8
  • REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEM 4 CONTROL ROD ORIVE COUPLING l LIMITING CON 0! TION FOR OPERATION 3.1.3.6 All control rods shall be coupled to their drive mechanisms.

APPLICA8ILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*. l ACTION:

a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 1 and 2 with one control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism:
1. Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, either:

a) If permitted by the RWM and RSCS, insert the control rod drive mechanism to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod, and:

1) Observing any indicated response of the nuclear instrumentation, and

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2) Demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position.

b) If recoupling is not accomplished on the first attempt or, i if not permitted by the RWM or RSCS then until permitted by the RWM and RSCS, declare the control rod inoperable and insert the control rod and disarm the associated r, direction'al control valves ** either:

1) Electrically, or f Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust 2) water isolation valves.
2. Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

t l

> b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5" with a withdrawn control rod not coupled

' to its associated drive mechanism, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, either:

1. Insert the control rod to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod and demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position, or
2. If recoupling is not accomplished, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves ** either:

a) Electrically, or b) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

"At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed

  • i per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.
    • May be rearmed intermittently, under da' ministrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

3/4 1-11 Amendment No. 38 (A SALLE - UNIT 1

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qa cy\e 2 4t Co,dvol ved 10-47 is exempffrovidect fAe rod is full 3 nserted, i when less 4Ran w egual +o 20% of RATED THERMAL PONER and nedvan. s%wenta+lon response is ver$ed. during rod wH%usal 1

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ATTACHMENT C TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGE REOUEST LASALLE COUNTY STATION UNIT 1 SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION Commonwealth Edison has evaluated the proposed Technical Specification Amendment and determined that it does not represent a significant hazards consideration. Based on the criteria for defining a eignificant hazards consideration established in 10 CFR 50.90, operation of LaSalle County Station Unit 1 in accordance with the proposed amendment will not

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because the probability or consequence of an Control Rod Drop Accident (RDA) is not increased since CRD 10-47 will be inserted when less than or equal to 20% power, and neutron instrumentation response will be verified when the CRD (10-47) is withdrawn at greater than 20% power. Should instrumentation response not occur during the withdrawal of CRD 10-47, the rod will be inserted. Degradation of scram performance is not expected, however, scram times of CRD 10-47 will be monitored and conservatively measured for surveillance purposes.
2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated because all possible combinations of accidents involving Potentially uncoupled rods have been analyzed and the analysis provided the basis for the Control Rod Drop Accident.

That event is discussed in item 1 above.

3. Involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety because the l

Bank Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) rules allow for the rod to be inserted to position 00 and still be in an analyzed condition.

Verification of instrumentation response ensures rod following when the drive is withdrawn. Degradation of scram performance is not expected, however, scram times of CRD 10-47 will be monitored and will be conservatively measured for surveillance purposes.

Based on the preceeding discussion, it is concluded that the proposed technical specification amendment clearly falls within all acceptable l criteria with respect to the system or component, the consequences of previously evaluated accidents will not be increased and the margin of safety will not be decreased. Therefore, based on the guidance provided in the Federal Register and the criteria established in 10CFR 50.92(c), the proposed change does not constitute a significant hazards consideration.

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