ML20210B725

Summarizes Current Status of Insp Program at Facility & Documents Recommendation That Licensee Should Be Released to Proceed Beyond First NRC Hold Point of 5% Power.Restart Staff Will Scrutinize Shift Cohesiveness & Decisiveness

ML20210B725
Person / Time
Site:	Fermi
Issue date:	09/12/1986
From:	Norelius C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
To:	James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III)
Shared Package
ML20210B687	List: ML20210B682 ML20210B725
References
NUDOCS 8609180153
Download: ML20210B725 (8)

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po* Ma UNITED STATES y*f NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMisslON REcsoN m E' 799 ROO&tvCLY MOAD v OLEN ELLYM. ILLINott 40137 SEP t1 1986 n

8 MEMORANDUM FOR: James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator THRU: Charles E. Norelius, Director, Division of delis

) e orPro,jects FROM: Edward G. Greenman, Jirector, Femi Restart Staff

SUBJECT:

FERMI RESTART: NRC FIVE PERCENT POWER HOLD POINT The purpose of this memorandum is to sumarize the current status of the NRC inspection program at Fermi 2 and to document my recommendation that the licensee should be released to proceed beyond the first NRC hold point of five percent power. As I advised you earlier. I have held discussions with Mr. J.

Calhoun, Chairman of the Independent Overview Comittee. Mr. Calhoun confirmed that on September 8,1986, the committee provided a favorable verbal recomendation and on September 10, 1986 provided the licensee with a formal recomendation (Enclosure 2) to proceed with power escalation up to the twenty percent level.

Over the past several months, I have met with various licensed and unlicensed personnel, evaluated the Fermi 2 requalification program, and have developed my own I metconfidence with shift supervision in the overall capability of the operations staff. Additionally, as a performance and our expectations. group Whileon September 10, 1986 to discuss their I continue to observe some inexperience in overall knowledge and performance skills, both licensed and non-licensed personnel are performing their duties. As evidence of this, out of the eight reportable events since reactor startup occurred on Au safety system challenge was caused by personnel error. gust 4, 1986, While I do notonly viewone this as unexpected, it will merit continued NRC attention. Once you authorize operation at increased power levels, the restart staff will scrutinize shift cohesiveness and decisiveness in decision making, the number and in particular, the nature of personnel errors, the handling of operational priorities, the quality of instrumentation and control work, and the performance of health physics personnel. The licensee must also aggressively pursue maintenance activities. -

6 8609180153 860912 PDR P

ADOCK 05000341 PDR

James G. Keppler W 12 M ,

i I find that licensee management is oriented towards nuclear safety. Throughout.

the testing program and low power operations to date, they have demonstrated  ;

caution and proceeded at a deliberate pace. The licensee is operating with a  ;

philosophy of reviewing and addressing problem areas as they occur. There appears to be no rush to go into power escalation. Further, I am confident with the group vice president and his role in managing and directing facility operations.  ;

Enclosure 1 is a sumary of our team assessment of the plant's status and '

equipment operability, operator knowledge and performance, requalification program evaluation, startup test program status, allegation followup and enforcement action status.

Based on our conclusions, as contained herein, and the unanimous recomendation of the restart staff, I recomend that you authorize the licensee to proceed ,

with operation to the next hold point (completion of the test program at the ,

t 20% power level). All members of the restart staff concur and this recomen-4 dation is issued with the concurrence of all Region III Division Directors and l

after consultation with the Offices of NRR and I&E. I have further determined

! that Mr. B. Ralph Sylvia, Group Vice President Nuclear, is authorized to act for Mr. W. J. McCarthy, Chainnan of the Board, with respect to the 51 hold ,

point, contained in NRC Region III Confirmatory Action Letter 85-10 dated July ,

16, 1985, which is consistent with the utility's 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter response.

(&k. - -- >

Edward G. Greenma:1, Director i Fermi Restart Staff l

Enclosures:

1. Sumary of Assessment

. 2. Overview Committee Recomunendation ,

cc w/ enclosures:

J. Partlow, IE L. Wheeler, IE R. Bernero, NRR E. Adensam, NRR D. Lynch, NRR A. B. Davis, RIII C. J. Paperiello, RIII i

N. Chrissotimos RIII J

W. G. Guldemond, RIII G. C. Wright, RIII

R. DeFayette, RIII J. Strasas, RIII R. Lickus, RIII W. Rogers SRI RIII

i ENCLOSURE 1

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ASSESSMENT OF DETROIT EDISON COMPANY Readiness to Proceed Beyond 51 Power

. 1. Inspection Coverage Immediately prior to the August startup, and continuing through the ,

heatup phase (e.g. from "0" power to 5% power) the NRC Restart Staff provided augmented inspection coverage for Femi 2, which included a continuous control room coverage for approximately 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> from the time that control- rods were started to be withdrawn until the reactor was

, critical and stable at slightly less than 1% power. Subsequent to the initial coverage and during five percent power operation inspections focused on observations and evaluations of: control room operations;

performance of major tests; major maintenance items; instrumentation and control problems; lessons learned from events; and corrective actions.

The onsite team and Restart Director subsequently completed the assessment of the utility's readiness to support power escalation and operation up to 20% power on September 11, 1986. A fomal request to authorize operation in excess of 5% was received by NRC Region III on September 11, 1986.

i 2. Testing Program t

During the heatup test phase (from startup to 5% power) which was designed to verify the operation of some of the major reactor systems, the licensee

, completed demonstration runs and surveillance tests of the RCIC and HPCI systems and declared them operable. The south reactor feedwater pump, which failed during operation in 1985 and had been rebuilt, also was tested, vibration measurements made, and the pump and tertaine verified to be functioning properly. Similar measurements also were made on the north reactor feedwater pump. Vibration measurements were taken on the main steam bypass lines to verify that the modifications made following discovery of cracks in 1985 corrected the problem. Analyses of the measurements indicated that the bypass lines were satisfactory, however, the lines will continue to be monitored as power is increased. Most of the other startup tests required during the heatup phase, including scram time testing of l all control rods, were completed in 1985 following initial criticality and

! startup. The previously perfomed tests were not repeated during the present heatup testing phase. The NRC startup team has concluded that the test program has been effective in identifying equipment problems.

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3. Plant Status / Equipment Operability As of 8:00 a.m. September 12, 1986, the plant was operating routinely at 4% power. The licensee had completed its evaluation of test data and equipment perfomance and was waiting release from the NRC 5% hold point

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I to proceed to Test Condition #1 (operation up to 20% power). On  :

September 10, 1986, a high differential pressure was identified on the off gas system which rendered the system inoperable The problem involved  :

moisture carryover into the system sand filters. This is the only major r piece of plant equipment which prevents the licensee from exceeding 5%

power due to its effect on plant operation. Resolution and return of the system to an operable status is expected on or about September 13-14, 1986. ,

This problem is not considered a safety issue nor is it related to the NRC imposed 5% power restriction.

The startup team staff has had a concern with the maintenance program and -

has so informed the licensee. This concern developed from, among other  :

things, repeat problems with several systems during the heatup phase testing. For example, there were recurring problems with HPCI, the startup level controller, control rod drive accumulators, south reactor '

feed pump, and steam jet air ejectors. Although the problems were corrected, these and similar problems will undoubteoly continue to occur as unused systems are operated under real conditions for the first time. Although i individually the problems may not be significant, collectively they are indicative of a weakness in the maintenance area. The licensee has been ,

advised that additional attention is needed in this area to assure that these and similar problems are effectively resolved. Aggressive handling ,

and prioritization will be required in the maintenance area and in the Instrumentation and Control Group during and beyond Test Condition 1 (20% l power hold point). The team will continue to monitor this area closely. t i There was an unscheduled reactor shutdown on September 2,1986, to repair i l a malfunctioning torus-to-reactor building vacutan breaker isolation valve. The problem was determined to be binding of the valve shaft with i a fiberglass bearing (bushing). The valve was repaired, the local leak rate test completed successfully, and the reactor restarted on September 6.

This was the third valve to have similar problems (one was in September ,

1984, and another in November,1985). The licensee has requested it's Nuclear Engineering Department to evaluate a different type of bearing >

material and/or a possible reorientation of the valve. The vendor has also recommended the use of stainless steel components in the valve assedly to minimize corrosion. In the short ters the licensee is '

trending valve stroke times as an indicator of pending problems. This is acceptable in the near term.  :

4. Operator ~Perfonnance  :

During the startup, the restart team observed control room operations continuously for approximately 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />, focusing on communications ar.ong  !

shift personnel; operator adherence to procedures; operator recognition ,

of and response to annunciators; involvement of shift supervisors in plant '

operations; and congestion in the control room. The startup team and the resident inspectors are unanimous in their belief that the licensee i personnel performed in a satisfactory manner in all the areas. ,

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They were aware of plant conditions, communicated with management and with each other, had good shift turnovers, used current procedures, reacted '

, properly to alarms, knew their procedures, and operated well. -

The team could identify no serious problems with their performance. ,

Later in the heatup test program there was a reactor operator error when >

an out of sequence control rod was inserted in a controlled reactor '

shutdown. The operator noticed the error when he~ selected the next rod, i The operator stopped all rod manipulations and notified the shift supervisor ,

of his mistake. Operations were not resumed until the reactor engineer was consulted and determined that in the condition the reactor was in '

(only about 25 rods remaining to be inserted) it would not be necessary to withdraw the mispositioned rod to return to the original sequence of rod .

insertions.

Also during this phase of testing a reactor scram occurred. On August 29, 1986 the operators were transferring the water supply for the north reactor feedwater pump from the east heater feed pump to the center heater ,

! feed pump when the north reactor feedwater pump tripped. Subsequent  !

investigation revealed that the discharge valve for the center heater feed '

l pump was closed thus when the east heater feed pump was stopped no water was forwarded to the north reactor feedwater pump and the pump tripped on

! low suction pressure. During recovery operations the operators adjusted ,

t the reactor flow limiter down to 3% which caused the main steam bypass ,

valves to close and pressure to increase above the scram point. During

recovery from the scram the cooldown rate exceeded the administrative guidelines of 90' per hour, did not exceed the Technical Specification limit of 100' per hour. Had the operators been more attentive to the available indications and closed the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) i sooner (this was done about 53 minutes after the scram) the 90' rate probably would not have been exceeded. The startup team has concluded that -

this scram was avoidable. The utility has been practicing evolutions of this type to avoid recurrence . l Just prior to the initial restart, the NRC conducted requalification examinations for several reactor operators and senior reactor operators. .

The initial results of the examinations were mixed and indicated that several of the examinees may not have passed the simulator part of the examination. A Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) was issued to remove ,

these individuals from shift until a reexamination could be conducted.

The reexamination was conducted about two weeks later and all examinees passed the test. The CAL then was rescinded and the operators returned to ,

normal shift duties.  ;

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i t Members of the startup team also observed the response of operations caused by a fire in an electrical breaker.

personnel The responsetowas a real calm emergenc{1 and d:, berate, the emergency plan was followed, the fire extinguished, and sne reactor was controlled at all times.

The reactor was subsequently shut down voluntarily by the licensee.

The team reviewed records of the licensee's control room audit program and occasionally observed audits in progress. The Team Director also observed i

one complete audit. The records and observations indicated that audits were i being performed on time and were thorough. To date, every shift has been audited at least once. About six unsatisfactory check marks were identified by the audit teams. One of these identified by the Detroit Edison Group Vice President involved the unawareness by a reactor operator of the complete status of some of the systems on one of the control panels he was monitoring. The team views continuation of the audit program and strengthening of criteria as a sound approach.

. 5. Pending Major Enforcement Issues There are currently three potential escalated enforcement issues which occurred recently and which must be resolved. These relate to:

1. Miswiring of an isolation valve

2. Wrong size fuse in EDG service water pump

3. Flow switch in sprinkler system to diesel fire pump room.

The issues have been reviewed by the Division of Reactor Projects and the Division of Reactor Safety who concluded that the items are not an impediment to power escalation.

6. Allegations

'l A review completed on September 12, 1986 indicates there are no outstanding allegations which would impact on power escalation up to 20 per cent power (TestCondition1).

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7. Restart Conditions All requirements for escalation to Test Condition #1 have been met

. 7.1.1. HPCI was retested and declared operable, j 7.1.2. RCIC was verified operable.

i 7.1.3. The main steam relief valves and ADS were verified operable l by the licensee.

7.1.4. The main steam bypass line was monitored during testing.

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7.1.5, The south reactor feed pump performance was verified by test.

7.1.6. The operation and performance of the off gas system was verified by test (Note: a problem developed in this system on September 10, 1986, which must be resolved to support continued power escalation.

7.1.7 The Reactor Operations Improvement Plan (ROIP) goals are being met or are trending toward the established goals. No performance indicators are at the management attention level.

7.2. The IOC has made its reconnendation for escalation of power.

7.3. The Chairman of the Board has authorized the Vice President to approve escalation.

7.4. Open item 85043-07 will be completed (this item requires the Regional Administrator to grant permission to increase power).

7.5 The three valves with a potential closing logic problem (discovered during the heatup phase testing) were modified. .

7.6. The wiring on the modified Limitorque valves were verified to be correct (a problem with one of these valves was discovered during the heatup phase testing). ,

7.7. The startup team verified with a regional inspector that open item 85003-01 which is related to certain surveillance procedures, is not a restraint on the licensee.

7.8. The On Site Review Comittee has reviewed the results of the heatup phase tests and has approved power escalation.

8. Conclusions The licensee's testing program up to this plateau essentially has been completed in conformance with their comitments and regulatory requirements. The material equipment status of the plant remains acceptable. Although some minor' deficiencies exist, none would affect ,

safe power operations. As of September 10, 1986, the only equipment problems which would impact on operation above five percent is resolution of a moisture carry over in the offgas system. Based on the above results and information, the startup inspection team recommends that Fermi 2 be given approval to proceed to Test Condition 1 which will allow operations i up to 20% power, i

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N GENERAL PHYSlCG CORPORATION l MEMORANDUM MTE September 10,1986 CP-M-200722 70: 8. Ralph Sylvie FROM: Jack R. Calhoun, Chelrman independent Overview CommitLee

SUBJECT:

Fermi 2 Power increase _ ,

3 We have received And reviewed your memoranda dated September 2.1946 and September 5. l986 erd have been briefe:f by Messrs. Lessor ard Neely regarding their d!acusslora with ybu and your s'taff.

We cornider that the (svaes raised in my memoryxtam to you dated August 15.1966 are fully resolved. It is ow telderstanding that the Quality Asswance Department is performing en audit of Perwnnel Ouallflestions and Tr61ning. We will plan to review that audit as part of ow orgoire evalustions.

At this time, the trdepwxfent Overviex Committee has determirM that it has no cther issues which restrain your increasing Formi 2 power to 20 % and per forming the rclated start @ tests.

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. _, i l , Calhoun

• JRCipc CC: Murray Miles Walter McCarttry

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Sol Levy Charles Heidet Jim Green Tom Randano -

Jim Neely Frart, Agosti t

Leo Lessor Robert Lenert l

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