ML20207K917

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Rev 3 to Sequoyah Element Nonrestart Justification Summary, Control Air Sys Adequacy
ML20207K917
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 12/23/1986
From: Mcnutt G, Russell J
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:
Shared Package
ML20207K654 List:
References
229.5(B), 229.5(B)-R03, 229.5(B)-R3, NUDOCS 8701090561
Download: ML20207K917 (4)


Text

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. an TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS REPORT NUMBER: 229.S(B)

SPECIAL PROGRAM REPORT TYPE:

{ SEQUOYAH ELEMENT NON-RESTART JUSTIFICATION SUMARY REVISION NUMBER: 3 TITLE: CONTROL AIR SYSTEM ADEQUACY (Element) PAGE 1 0F 2 REASON FOR REVISION:

To respond to TVA consents on Revision 2.

PREPARATION PREPARED BY:

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SIGNATURE SRP: w[ M 22 4 DATE SIGNATURE

  • DATE
  • SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.

APPROVED BY:'

( MtJAAb ECSP hAN#6ER itesr6 DATE uia MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER DATE 8701090561 PDR 861224 CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)

, ADOCK 05000327 PDR

i 6 SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT ENGINEERING RELATED EMPLOYEE CONCERNS (1 SPECIAL PROGRAM NON-RESTART JUSTIFICATION

SUMMARY

! SU8 CATEGORY / ELEMENT 229.S(8)

The employee concern has been assumed to apply to either the nonsafety-related Station Control and Service Air (SCSA) or the safety-related Auxiliary Control Air (ACA) subsystems. No safety-related components require function of the-SCSA in order to perform their safety functions, and therefore, failure of

! this subsystem would have no impact on plant safe shutdown. However, since the majority of the ACA subsystem is pressurized by the SCSA during normal plant operation, the ACA subsystem must be considered under the criteria for pipe breaks.* Under these criteria, the ACA is categorized as " low energy j piping" and no guillotine break assumption is required. A " critical crack" assumption is, however, required, and such a crack could result in loss of function of the affected train. Should a single failure occur in the unaffected train, causing total loss of all air, safe shutdown of both units j can be achieved, as stated in FSAR section 9.3.1.3.2.

The above discussion concerns loss of control air piping integrity as an initiating event. If the loss of integrity were to be considered as an event subsequent to another initiating event it would be considered under the single For SQN no passive failure failure criteria definition of a passive failure.

i is required to be assumed within the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> following the initiating

(- event. SQN criteria do not explicitly identify the magnitude of a piping system passive failure, but current industry, and regulatory, practice is to i.

consider only credible failures such as seal or gasket leakage, which would not be disabling failures for this system.

Considering the above, there is no licensing or engineering basis for the assumption stated in the EC. Furthermore, the SQN compressed air systems appear to meet all applicable requirements for pipe break and single failure assumptions. Therefore, no corrective action should be required prior to restart.

  • The term " criteria" relative to pipe break and to single failures as used herein refers to the SQN Design Criteria documents and to the SQN FSAR.

j ATTACHMENT: List of Issues for Mechanical ELEMENT NO. 229.5(B) i Date: 11/12/86 1

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LIST Of MICHANICAL ISSU(5 .'

_S M (5] ART - ELEMENT NUMBER 239 f" uY: L. Damon Date: 11/12/86 ELEMENI WHERE RESPON-

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13-05-348-002 1. Volume of air receives in control air LD 1. Review Control Air System (#32) Design criterla Control air systes does not system is insufficient to ensure and establish functional requirements under appear to have suf ficient - control systems function in the event postulated accident conditions.

volume to assure functionality of a gulliotine air line break.

If the system should espertence 2. Compare System 32 design criteria against flew a guillotine air line break. Otagram and FSAR descriptions.

Individual specifically requested a description of the maximum 3. Review SQN Safety Systems to see if any depend system volume and of appropriate . on Control Alr.

backup systems. Concern applies to Units 1 & 2. 4. Estabitsh seismic hazards integrity and tsela-

. tion capability of air receiver at any point of such Safety System dependency.

5. Validate concern and establish present disposition.

w 04850 - Page 1

O REFERENCE - ECPSI20J-ECPSI2IC TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY PAGE- - ' II5 p.

FRE90ENCY - REGUEST OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER RUN TIME - I2:57:I9 O DNP - ISSs - RNM EMPLOYEE CONCERN PR00 RAM SYSTEM cECPS) RuN DATE - I2es2ess LIST OF EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION CATEGORY: EN DES PROCESS & OUTPUT SUBCATEGORY: 22905 CONTROL AIR SYSTEM ADE9UACY FOLLONING PIPE BREAK O S GENERIC KEYNORD A N APPL QTC/NSRS P KEYNORD 5 CONCERN SUB R PLT BBSW INVESTIGATION S CONCERN KEYNORD C NUMBER CAT CAT D LOC FLeB REPORT R DESCRIPTION KEYuGRD D O

IN 348-002 EN 22905 N HBN NNYY SR CONTROL AIR SYSTEM DOES NOT APPEAR T DESIGN PROCESS T50023 K-FORM 0 NAVE SUFFICIENT VOLUME TO ASSURE F SPECIFICATIONS UNCTIONALITY IF THE SYSTEM SNOULD EX NVAC O' PERIENCE A auItt0 TIME AIR LINE BREAK EQUIPMENT

  • . INDIVIDUAL SPECIFICALLY REGUESTED A DESCRIPTION OF THE MAXIMUM SYSTEM VOLUME AVAILABLE AND OF APPROPRIATE O sACKUP SYSTEMS. CONCERN APrLIES TO UNITS Ia2 I C NCERNS FOR CATEGORY EN SUBCATEGORY 22905 O

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