ML20206M297

Forwards TMI Monthly Status Rept for 881007-1105

ML20206M297
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	11/15/1988
From:	Cowgill C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:	Bettenhausen L NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
References
NUDOCS 8811300519
Download: ML20206M297 (7)

Text

. .

~

NOV 151988 Docket Nos. 50-289; 50-320 MEMORANDUM FOR: Lee H. Bettenhausen, Chief, Projects Branch No. 1, Division of Reactor Projects FROM: Curtis J. Cowgill, Chief, Saactor Projects Section 1A, DRP

SUBJECT:

THI STATUS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 7 - NOVEMBER 5, 1988 Enclosed is the TMI Resident Office monthly status report, which covers both TMI-1 and TMI-2. Th's report is to provide NRC management ;nd the public with highlights of significant events at TMI-1 and THI-2 from an NRC regulatory perspective.

ORKilNAL SIGNED BY Curtis J. Cowgill, Chief Re.ctor Projects Section 1A

Enclosure:

As sta'.ed cc w/ enclosure:

S. Varga, NRR

• J. Stolz, NRR R. Hernan, NRR M. Masnik, NRR

, T. Martin, EDO 1 J. Partlow, NRR 4 J. Roe, NRR L. Whitney, NRR T. Gerusky, BRP/ DER, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania  :

Governor's Office of Policy, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania  !

THI Alert Susquehanna Valley Alliance Friends & Family of TMI

0. Davonport L. Drey E. Haraler A. Herman H. Hucker J. Johnsrud P. Smith H. Spinelli C. Wolfe Concerned Mothers and Women Public Document Recm Local Public Document Room 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY TMI STAit'5 REPORT - 0001.0.0 I 11/29/80 '

0011300519 001115 PDR ADOCK 05000209 i%

R PNV

. -s

,., i .-

Lee.H. Bettenhausen 2 bcc w/ enclosure:

K. Abraham, RI (2 copies)

M. Miller, RI W. Kane, RI R. Conte, RI (8 copies)

W. Baunack, RI C. Crwgill, RI J. Vechselberger, RI J. ' jell, NRR Region I Docket Room (w/ concurrences) f RI: P RI: DRPH y CCowgill LBetteghausen 11/14/88 1;j {

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY TH1 STATUS REPORT - 0002.0.0 11/29/80 l

ENCLOSURE TMI-1 AND TMI 2 STATUS~

REPORT FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBTR 7 .TdTEMBER 5, 1988~ ,

1. TMI .i  !

a. Facility Operations Summary During the repart period, the licensee decided to shut dcwn the reactor to troubleshoot and repair the cause of an oil leak in the lubricating system for the "C" reactor coolant pump (RCF). On October 17, 1988, the plant was taken off line, repairs were completed, and power operations i were resumed on Octobcr 19, 1988. Also, on October 30, 1988, a reactor l trip occurred due to high Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure. As of l November 5, 1988, the TMI-1 reactor was at 100 percen+ power with Tave j

at 579 F and RCS pressure at 2155 psig. l l b. Items of Special Interest j Outage for Reactor Coolant Pump 011 Leak

{

At 1 06 p.m. on October 17, 1988, the licensee shut down the reactor to  ;

ar c4 .sh repairs to the lube oil system piping on the "C" RCP motor, t A seak developed on the lube oil syste and the licensee made reactor building entries on Gctober 14, 15, anc '6, 1988, to add oil to the  ;

l system. The leak point could not be specifically determined. Also, J

because of relatively high vibrations on tne "0" RCP, the licensee de-cided to re-balance this pump.  ;

The licensee representative traced the oil leak to an area near an oil

, cooler for the RCP. They originally thought the leak was from a piping i cunnection. With the pipe connection repair completed and pending some i additional balancing work on the "D" RCP, the licensee decided to start i l up the reactor (critie.al 11:18 a.m., October 18,1988). Subsequently,  !

the post-maintenance test on the "C" RCP revealed that the oil leak was

, from the oil cooler itself. In light of the new work, the licensee de-l cided to shut down the reactor. Following completivn of work on both i l RCP's, the licensee then conducted another reactor start-up (critical 3:41 p.m., October 19,1938).

Reactor Trip on October' 30, 1988 i i i

. On October 30, 1988, at 8:59 a.m., a reactor trip occurred due to hir'1 I

RCS pressure. Based on the nost-trip review, the licensee determined that the main turbine control valves went shut. With the control valves shut, high pressure developed in the steam generator (SG) causing the safety valves to lift (maximum SG pressure was 1060 psig).

f 0FFICIAL RE( N COPY TMI STA' .S REPORT - 0003.0.0  !

11/29/80 h

Encipsure 2 5everal seconds later high RCS pressure developed because of ths loss of heat removal in the SG's. The Reactor Pro'.ection System (RPS) then properly tripped the reactor.

The post-trip plant response was normal. There was no challenge to the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or the Heat Sink Protection System (HSPS) (safety gr:de initiation and control for the dmergency Fcedwater System). Also, there was no challenge to the Power Operated Relief Valve or the pressurizer safety valves (maximum RCS pressure was 2362 psig).

There was no indication of a radiation release based on a review of plant effluent moni+ ors. Operators initially reported to the NRC Operations Center a stuck open SG safety valve. However, af ter they lowered turbine header pressure, the valve successfully seated.

The licensee made a 10 CFR 50.70 notification at 9:59 a.m., well within allowable reporting requirements; however, the NRC Operations Center first learned of the trip by a local citizen who heard the noise and had

<tsual observation of the SG safety valves lifting.

The licensee's post-trip review determined that it was safe to start up the reactor, although the specific reason for the turbine stop valve closure could not be determined. They determined that more root cause analysis (RCA) on the main turbine's Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC)

System and the plant's Integrated Control System (ICS) was necessary.

The licensee declared the reactor critical at 10:51 p.m. 0:teber 30,1988.

During testing, the licensee found a malfunctioning power supply in the EHC system, which they replaced. They also found a bad "control card" for one of six intercept valves. The licensee suspected that, if an inte-cept valve went shut, the Main Turbine Monitoring system would sense a power load imbalance that might cause the control valves to go shut.

They replaced this control card and thty were to review the affect of the faulty power supply on the 'tHC system. Also, the licensee is pur-suing additional bench testing on suspect equipmera in an attempt to better underttand the cause of the malfunction.

Other plant Transients Two other minor transient s occurred. On October 11, 1983, an electronic component failed in the unit's Integrated Control System (ICS). At 2:10 p.m., operators observed a drop in steam generator "A" and "B" levels from 19 parcent and 78 percent to 75 percent and 74 percent, respe r ly, with a corresponding partial insertion of control rods. This ap-runback appeared momentarily and then plant parameters appeared 'n to normal. Within a short time period, the transient condition .. ad, Operators took manual control of the ICS to prevent further oscillations and stabilized the plant while Instrument and Control (I&C) technicians identified and corrected the problem. Licensee personnel attributed the problem to a faulty analog memory module that is a component of the unit load demand of the ICS. Plant power decreased approximately 4 percent OFFICIAL RECORD COPY TMI STATUS REPORT - 0004.0.0 11/29/80

Enclosure 3 during the trans' int, which was terminated at 2:21 p.m. Upor replacing the analog memory module, plant conditions returned to normal with the ICS in auto.

On October 13, 1938, another minor plant transient occurred when an I&C technician inadvertently removed an electronic module from service. The technicians were troubleshooting the cause of spurious signals in an electronic component that provides Reactor Coolant System (RCS) hot leg temperature (T-hot) input to the ICS, Subsequent to troubleshooting the instrument loop, the technician removed the wrong module to determine if it was also functioning properly.

Removing t.he other module from service caused an immediate reduction in feedwater flow to the steam generators through the British Thermal Units (BTU) limits function of the ICS. Being prepared for such a plant tr&n-sient, the control room operato.'s responded in restoring feedwater flow.

Instrument and Control (I&C) technicians also quickly restored the input signal; together these actions prevented a plant trip The transient was short-lived as the plant was quickly returned ts :teady-state, full power operation.

2. TMI-2 Faci'ity Activities Sur. ary During the reporting period, cutting of the grid forging continued at a slow l pace. This third of five plates comprising the Lower Core Support Assembly

! (LCSA) is the largest of the five plates and proved to be very difficult to cut into the planned four sections for removal. The plasma arc torch is un-able to make complete cuts 1.nd much re-cutting and clearing of cut paths was required. Decontamination of plant surfaces continued at a reduced pace.

Five area > in tne auxiliary building were isolated from routine use and placed

in an interim status for meeting proposed Post-Defueling Monitored Storage (POMS) conditions.

Decortamination/Dese Reduction Activities Major work emphasis was applied to the reactor building to ensure that this i

portion of the decontamination effort will be comp 12ted first. The majority i of the 143 cubicles in the auxiliary / fuel handling buildings have been de-

{ contaminated and work remaining consists of verifying that the cubicle is l

isolated, equipment secured, and the cubicle is ready for the reduced moni-J toring which would accompany the PCMS phase.

I

3. NRC Staff Activities The NRC staff assigned on site consisted of the senior resident inspector, three resident inspectors, a project manager (for TMI-2), and a secretary.

During this ceriod, Region I isst.ed the following inspection reports.

OFFICIAL RECORD C0pY TMI STATUS REPORT - 0005.0.0 11/29/80

e Enclosure 4 TMI-1 (50-289) 88-16 on October 24, 1988, addressing various engineering / technical sup-port outstanding inspection findings. In the cover letter of that report, the NRC staff addressed a concern, which the licensee committed to re-solve, about the potential for overloading an emergency diesel generator.

88-17 on October 17, 1988, addressing the special (outage) team inspec-tion conducted August 8-19, 1988. The NRC staff identified two apparent violations: failure to adequately establish procedures in the operations and maintenance areas and failure to properly change maintenance proce-dures. The licensee had until November 17, 1988, to respond. Overali, the team concluded chat outage activities were conducted in a technically competent fashion.

88-18 on October 12, 1988, addressing routine power operations and the transition period for plant start-up from the last re'ueling outage.

Two apparent violations were identified: exceeding the cooldowo limits for the pressurizer and failure to adhere to low pressure protection limits for the RCS (no licensee response is required) and failure to properly review and approve a change to a maintanance procedure. The licensee had until November 12, 1988, to respond to thc latter violation.

In the cover letter of that report, the NRC staff provided an overall favorable conclusion on the licensee's performance, noting some areas of improvement needed.

88-23 on October 14, 1988, addressing the licensee's fire protection program. No violations were identified.

88-25 on October 14, 1953, addressing the licensee's corporate engineer-ing support functions for TMI-1 (and Oyster Creek). No violations wire identified.

TMI-2 (50-320) 88-14 on October 28, 1988, addressing routine TMI-2 defueling/decon-tamination activities. No violations were identified.

During October 18-19, 1938, the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) had a team on site to review the licensee-submitted Probabilistic Risk An-alysis (FRA) for THI-1.

During the week of October 31, 1998, NRR had a team at the corporate head-quarters and at the site to review selected licensee actions with respect to improvenents in the instrumentation and control functional areas at TMI-1.

A report will be issuec at a later date, t

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY TMI STATUS REPORT - 0006.0.0 11/29/80

Enclosure 5

4. Public Meetings On October 25, 1988, che members of the Advisory Panel on the Decontamination of THI-2 met with the NRC Commissioners. Arthur Morris, chairman of the p&nel and mayor of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, reported the panel's 8-2 vote against Post-Defueling Monitored Storage (PDMS). The panel members discussed their reasons for opposing PDMS. They primarily were the uncertainties in ultimate clean-up and decommissioning funding and the uncertainties in the time the facility would be in a POMS state. The next Advisory Panel meeting will be in early 1989; specifics regarding time and place will be announced in a future monthly st tus report, as well as routine news releases.

The At Mic 'afety and Licensing Board (ASLB) hearings on the disposal of accide it genec + i water ( AGW) at TMI-2 were held on October 31 - November 4,10's8, in Lar >,cer, Pennsylvania. They included an evening session on Nov aber 3, 1988, in which limited appearances were made by members of the

+

p tz' l i c . The hearings are scheduled to be completed on November 15, 1988, in P,thesda, Maryland.

i 1

I

! i i  !

i i

I r

i 0FFICIAL RECORD COPY TMI STATUS REPORT - 0007.0.0 !

11/29/80 l

- _ , ,