ML20206F751

Order Imposing Civil Penalty in Amount of $50,000 Due to Violations Involving Radiation Safety Program

ML20206F751
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	11/17/1988
From:	Taylor J NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	FLORIDA POWER CORP.
Shared Package
ML20206F744	List: ML20206F742 ML20206F751
References
EA-87-216, NUDOCS 8811210314
Download: ML20206F751 (11)

Text

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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR RECULATORY C09tISS!0N in the Hatter of Docket No. 50-302 Crystal River Unit 3 License No. DPR-72 Crystal River, Florida EA 87-216 ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY l

I Florida Pcwer Corporation, Crystal River, Flcrida (licensee) is the holder of Operating License No. OPR-72(license) issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Cosmis-sfon (Corrission or NRC) on January 28, 1977. The license authorizes the licensee to operate the Crystal River facility in accordance with the condi.

tions specified therein. L I

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NRC inspections of the licensee's activities under the license were conducted f

on October 14-16, 1987 and January 5-7, 1908. The results of these inspections I i

indicated that the licensee had not conducted its activities in full ccrpliance i with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Impesition  !

of Civil Per.alty (NOV) was served upon the licensee by letter dated March 17,  !

1988. The NOV stated the nature of the violations, the provisions of the NRC's [

requirements that the license had violated, and the amount of the civil penalty proposed for the violations. The licensee responded to the NOV by letter dated  ;

Nay 16, 1988. In its response, the licensee admitted certain violations, denied other violations, and stated that the Enforcement Policy had been inappropriately (

i dpplied in this Case and thdt the facts of the matter support full remission of t r the civil renalty, j t

i GS11210314 881117 E SS 3A PDC

2-After consideration of the licensee's response and the statements of fact, eFplanations, and argurent for mitigation contained therein, the Deputy Execu-tive Director for Regional Operations has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the violations, except for Violation I.C.4, occurred as stated and, for reasons set forth in the attached Appendix, the penalty proposed for the violations described in the Notice of Violation and Proposed leposition of Civil Penalty should be mitigated by 50 percent and imposed.

IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2282, PL 96-295 and 10 CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: [

The licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000) within 30 days of the date of this Order, by check, draf t, or money order, payable to the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.  ;

i Nuclear Reyulatory Connission, ATTN: Docurent Control Desk, Wast.ing. '

ton, D.C. 20555.

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t Y  ;

The licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date 'of this Order. A j request for a hearing shall be clearly marked as a "Request for an Enforcement  !

i Hearing" and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. ,

Nuclear Regulatory Comission, ATTH: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. l C

20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II,101 Marietta  ;

Street, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30323.

[

If a hearing is requested, the Comission will issue an Order designating the  !

J time and place of the hearing. If the licensee fails to request a hearing  ;

I within 30 days of the date of this Order, the provisions to this Order shall be  !

r effective without further proceedings. If payrrent has not been made by that '

time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney Ceneral for collection. ,

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In the event the licensee requests a hearing as provided above, the issues to l .- be considered at such hearing shall be whether the lictr.see comitted the  !

violations that are denied and whether the proposed civil penalty mitigated by l 50 percent should be irposed. [

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i FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI0tt  !

I A

hWb CIsM.Tey' Deputy Executive Director [

h r Operat<ons Oated at Rockville, l'arylano e this pfl'ay of Novetter 1988 l i

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APPENDIX ,

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION INTRODUCTION On October 14-16, 1987 and January 5-7, 1988, inspections were conducted at the Crystal River facility. Violations identified during these inspections led to the issuance of a Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty on March 17, 1988. Florida Pcwer Corporation, in their response, admitted violations I.A.1 and 2, I.C.3 and 5, II.A and B; denied violations I.B. I.C.1.2 and 4 and requested mitigation of the civil penalty. Provided belcw are: (1)a restaterent of each violation denied, (2) a surnmary of the licensee's response regarding each denied violation, (3) NRC's evaluation of the licensee's response, (4) the licensee's request in support of withdrawal of the proposed civil penalty, and (5) NRC's conclusions regarding the violations and the proposed civil penalty.

I. VIOLATION I.B Restatement of Violation 10 CFR 19.12 requires that all individuals working in or frequenting any portion of a restricted area shall be instructed in the purpose and functions of protective devices employed, shall be instructed of their responsibility to report promptly to the licensee any condition which miy lead to or cause a violation of Commission regulations and licenses or unnecessary exposure to radiation or to radioactive raterial, and shall be instructed in the appropriate response to warnirgs made in the event of any unusual occurrence or malfunction that may involve exposure to radiation or radioactive material. The extent of these instructicns shall be corrensurate with potential radiation health protection prcblems in the restricted area.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to adequately provide instruc.

tion to an Auxiliary Nuclear Operator working in the restricted area of the Reactor Building on October 9,- 1987, on the limitations and possible failure modes of a radiation survey instrument that had been provided for his use in controliing his exposure in the restricted area and on the apprerriate response to take when the radiation level present exceeded the maximum scale reading on the radiation survey meter.

Sumary of Licensee's Response Florida Power Corporation denies the violation and believes it should be withdrawn. The ANO received training on radiation detection instruments during the Radiation Frotection lesson provided in the Assistant Nuclear Auxiliary Operator course and the Auxiliary tuclear Operator courses for ren-licensed operators. This training included information on radiation detection principles, icni7ation charbors, propertional counters, and Geiger-Mueller (GM) tubes. The radiatier detection instrument utilized by the ANO did rot respond incorrectly er fail, it ir.dicated an off-scale reading in response to the high radiation field to which it was exposed.

Based on the irdividual's training and extensive work experitoce history including ruclear navy expericree, non-licensed operator trainirg, General

Appendix -?-

Employee Training, and his Crystal River Unit 3 (CR-3) work experience, it is reasonable to assume he knew the correct response to an off-scale radiation detection instrument. It is also clear from the AN0's actions (i.e. pattern of brick removal, dosimetry positioning, warning of others, etc.),thatadditionaltrainingwasunnecessary. The ANO failed to take the proper actions not out of lack of training but due to his decision to perform work that exceeded the authorized scope of approved activities.

Florida Power Corporation subsequently provided specific supplemental retraining to the AN0 on the use and limitations of survey instruments.

Radiation Safety Procedures have also been enhanced with respect to response to off-scale readings, and General Employee Training has been enhanced to include failure modes of survey instruments. These actions by Florida Power Corporation represent positive actions to improve the training and instruction already provided to radiation workers. The NOV could be read to assur.e that adoption of these additional reasures is an indication that previous practices were insufficient to meet regulatory requirements. Such a view is contrary to the Enforcement Policy in that it could discourage improvements out of fear that the NRC will construe such improvements as an admission of past violations.

NRC Evaluation The inspection revealed that the ANO was trained in certain subjects related to survey instrurents but, was not trained on the limitations and possible failure modes of radiation survey instruments and the correct response to take to off-scale readings. The inspector reviewed the lesson plans with licensee representatives and verified that these subjects were not addressed. The licensees subsequent staterent that these topics were added to the training program also indicates they were not there when reviewed by the inspector. The st6ff cannot agree with the licensee's statement that it is reasonable to assure the individual knew the correct response to an off-scale instrument since the individual was confronted with that very situation and did not respond appropriately. Supporting this posi'eion is the fact that the seccnd ANO also failed to respond to an off-scale survey instrument, indicting there most likely was a deficiency in their training in this area. The AN0s stated in interviews with the inspector that they had not received training on the correct response to take when off-scale instrument readings are observed. The NRC decision to cite this violation was based on a review of the facts and was not, as claimed by the licensee, based on construing their corrective actions as an admission of a violation. This violation was first presented in the October 16, 1987 exit interview as docurented in the inspection report which occurred prior to the ccrrective actions described by the licensee.

The licensee's corrective actions appear appropriate and in no way were used as a basis for identifying this circumstance as a violation, f*C Conclusion For the atose reason, the NRC staf f concludes that the violation occurred ab stated.

Appendix 11. Y10LAT!0N !.C.

Restatement of Violation Technical Specification 6.11 requires that procedures for personnel radiation protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20 and shall be approved, raintained, and adhered to for all operations involving personnel radiation exposure.

Technical .decification 6.8.1.b requires that written procedures shall te established, implemented, and maintained covering refueling operations.

Contrary to the above, the licensee's procedures for personnel radiation protection and refueling operations were inadequate as evidenced by the October 8, 1987 rea: tor cavity access shielding removal event in that they did not specify that:

1. permanent shielding reroved during outage activities is to be rein-stalled properly.

2. health physics is to be notified prior to the removal of permanent shielding;

3. health physics is to be notified when unexpected radiological conditions are encountered or scope of previously authorized work changed; 4 high radiation areas in the Reactor Building area are to be posted and centro 11ed following a plant shutdown and prior to allowing general access; ard

5. personnel assigned to observe for seal leakage in the Reactor Build-ing while filling the fuel transfer canal are to be instructed in the procedure for observing leaks and the precautions to be observed while performing that task, particularly with regard to entries into the reactor cavity.

Sumary of Licensee's Response Florida Power Corporation admits the violation based on exarples 3 and 5 but denies the violation with respect to exarples 1, 2, and 4 A. Licensee's Coment On Violation I.C.1 The original anction of the lead bricks placed at the reactor cavity access wts two fold. First to function as shielding and second as a barrier to prevent inadvertent access to the cavity area. Since FPC admits Violation I.A.1 which states the barrier was iradequate to meet the locked gate criteria, the shielding cual uias cf the barrier is the issue here. FPC cuntends that work instructions a"e adequate to ceritrol the ruoval and reinstallation of shielding.

. t Appendix The lead bricks were installed properly at the end of CR-3's 1985 refueling outage as can be shown by the reduction of radiation levels  !

, on radiation surveys taken in the reactor cavity area following the '

installation of the lead bricks. Shielding installation instructions i are routinely included on Radiation Work Permits in the "Rer. arks and Special Instructions" section. A review of RWP's85-550 and 85-551 '

wr.ich covered installation and removal of shielding for the 1985

, refuel outage provided the fallowing instructions:

s (a) HP to direct placement of shielding, j (b) HP to be present at the start of each ,tob. j These RWPs show that it is standard practice at CR-3 for Health  :

4 Physics to oversee evolutions involving shielding, i FPC concludes that the lead bricks at the reactor cavity access were installed properly after the 1985 refuel outage inasmuch as they 1 provided adequate shielding prior to their unauthorized removal, i Therefore, adequate guidancu was provided for the control of shield-Ing.

l NRC Evaluation i

At the time the shield wall was replaced in 1985, the licensee intended the shield wall to function as the physical barrie:* to access the cavity area. The wall also served a rediation shielding function. The craft group reinstalled the shield wall without any j written specificatiers and the adequacy of their work, either as a barrier or as shielding, was not formally reviewed upon completten, i The instructicns provided cn RWP's85-550 and 85-551 were also l inadequate in that they failed to provide specificatiens for rein-stallation of this shielding (e.g., shims were to be added such that 1 the bricks could not be easily reinoved) and they did not call for HP l to te present at the completion of the shielding installation to i ensure that the shield had been properly installed. Thus, the l l licensee did not have adequate procedures in place to ensure that the I i

shielding was properly reinstalled.

I B. Licensee's Corinent On Violation I.C.2 '

All radiation workers at CR-3 are required to comply with Radiation .

Safety Procedures (RSPs). General E:nployee Training also specifies

- to rever remove temporary shielding without Health Physics approval, t l The procedure RSP-101, "Basic Radiological Safety Information and l Instructions for Radiation Workers," revision 8, was in effect at the tire of the incident and states in Section 3.1.3, "Fules within the i RCA." step 3.1.3.7, "notify Health Thysics personnel and ebtain  !

appropriate approvals prior to breeching any container, cor tainment,  !

system and/or component integrity." Section 2.3.5 defines contain-  ;

r.ent(s)/ccntainer(s) as "any device (e.g., l'ag, box, dru , tent, i l

I

Appendix glove box, etc.) used to control the release of radioactive material or radiation." The lead bricks served as a containment device and a ,

radiological control device in regard to the high radiation area that existed in the cavity area. The ANO proceeded to remove the shield-ing contrary to radiation protection program instructions and

, procedural requirements in an effort to discover leakage from the seal plate. If the ANO had folicwed RSP-101, he would have contacted ,

Health Physics prior to removing the shielding as required.

NRC Evalustion  ;

The inspector determined that the licensee's procedures did contain guidance on notifying health physics before removing temporary  ;

sh hlding but did not address comparable controls for permanent j shielaing. The licensees posttion that shielding is censidered a "containment device" and is therefore covered by their procedure goes J beyond what one would reasonably expect a radiation worker to consicer f a containment. It should be noted that at the time of the inspection i the licensee did not offer the explanation that they considered their i shielding as containment. Assuming procedure RSP-101 was intended  ;

to address shielding, its guidance was inadequate to convey its f intent, i

! C. Licensee's Comment On Yiolation !.C.4 l l In order for the Reactor Building to be accessed. RWPs must be f 2

issued. ror an RWP to be issued, surveys must be perforred in the designated work areas. When high radiation areas are identified  !

a during these surveys, they must be posted cr.d controlled. Therefore, i following a plant shutdown, surveys must he performed and high l I radiation areas posted and centrolled prior to allcwing general l j access to the Peactor Building. These actions are covered in HPP-106, ,

t "Radiation Work Permit Procedure." and HPP-202, "Scheduled Radio-logical Surveys and Centrols." Therefore procedures are adequate to assure the Reactor Building is posted ard controlled followir.g a  !

plant shutdown and prior to allewing general eccess. [

NRC Evaluation -

i This violation is withdrawn.

!!!. LICENSEE'S REQUEST FOR WITHORAWAL OF THE CIVIL PENALTY I i

Sumary of Licensee's Fosition l Florida Power Corporation believes that the violations were the result of actions by individuals beyond the autterized scope and are not indicative ,

! of programatic weaknesses in the radiation protectier progran. The h0V l l and the associated civil penalty could be read to imply that the adoption j

! of isfrevements in response to the events in questien is an indication of  !

i deficiencies in the progract. Such a view is furc4 mentally unfair and is l i cor.trary to tre Enforcenent Policy in that it may t(rd to discourage f I soluntary improverents by licensees. The licensee urges caution is using i

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Appendix the term "reactor cavity access" since this event differed significantly from this class of events in the industry's experience since access, per se, was never attempted. l The licensee reviewed the applicability of the mitigation factors in the i NRC Enforcement Policy. The licensee promptly identified the problem and -

l voluntarily reported the event to the hRC telephonically and with an LER. I Imediate and followup corrective actions were extensive, j The licensee discussed the factors for escalation of the civil penalty stated in the March 17, 15E8 letter transmitting the NOV. The licensee  ;

acknowledges that there had been an outstandog work order since 1985 to l provide a lockable barrier for the cavity atass, but priority on complet-ing it was based on the presumed edequacy of the lead bricks as a barrior.

Personnel who observed the ANO had reason to believe that he was authorized r to rtNye the lead bricks, there was no reason for them to report any I apparent improper radiological activities and none of the personnel had j authority to stop the work 1 -

In regard to the events described in the second violation, they were  !

I cosoitted by the same individual, who was eventually terminated. The fact i that the individual was allowed to remain in the high radiation area was  ;

reasonable ccosidering the dose rates in the area, r in regard to the four prior notifications of similar events, the licensee f stated that workers were made aware of the hazard and the shield wall  !

barrier was evaluated for adequacy. No action taken by management can [

prevent individual actions which are cutside the beunds of preestablished i progratos. F HRC Evaluation The NRC Enforcerent Po ecy states that licensee's are generally held  ;

responsible for the 1 of their erployees. The staff believes that the f rnot cause of this pNelen was a lack of ranagen.ent controls in this area [

as evidenced by inadecuate training and supervir'on as detailed in the  :

NOV ano .;ot rerely employee misconduct. The NRC's characterization of i violations and severity levels was based on a review of the facts as [

dettreined by the cnsite inspections and the licensee's presentation at '

the Enforcement Conferences. The MC did not view the correctiva actions  !

as adM;sions of any prcble.it not otherwit.e fully supported and indicated I by the facts at hend. The NRC Enforcerert Folicy reccgnizes the ir.portance l of licensee initiative in identifying and correcting problems. The staff does not agree that this event was significantly different from other industry events of this type. A comon clerent of each uncontrolled I access to the cavity area involved potential or actual entry by personnel I while searching fer leaks. The ANO did not actually enter the cavity in [

this case, but could have had he reoved aaditional shielding bricks. It is fur.darental Wat individuals be knowledgeable of the potential hazards (

in the reretor cavity. The admissicn of Violation I.C.$ is in itself of I significance, f I

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l Appendix I Based upon the licensee's response regarding mitigation and escalation of the civil penalty, the NRC has reconsidered the amount of the civil penalty. ,

The NRC recognizes that the licensee reported these events, ever, though they were not required to be reported, and has c:'n extensive corrective N Radiation Safety action. However, the NRC maintains that the h .-

Program was deficient regarding the events becausc - " '1) the prior notice of similar reactor cavity events; (2) the f ac. a work order to install a strongback on the existing lead brick b- .ade with an appropriate locking device was outstanding sinc? 19' and if completed would have prevented the occurrence of the reactor cavity access event; (3) the fact that there were several opportunities to discover the reactor cavity access prNiem in that several members of the licensee's staff passed through the vicinity but did not recognize or report the problem; and (4) the fact that the violations involving u.. authorized entries are similar to violations occurring in 19E6. The NRC has also reevaluated this case with other similar cases including the two cMes the licensee noted in its response (EA 84-13 in'.olving Carolina Power and Light Company and EA 86-38 involving Florida Power and Light Company). These cases are not controlling since different circumstances were involved in each case. Even if similar circumstancos were involved, it is not clear that the results in the two cases noted by the licensee are justified under the present Enforcement Policy ir. view of the significance of the violations. Hcwever, after reconsidering your reporting of these events and your extensive corrective actions against your past performance and prior notice of similar events, the NRC is mitigating the civil penalty to $50,000.

IV. NRC Conclusion The NRC has reviewed Florida Power Corporation's response to the proposed imposition of civil penalty and argurrents for withdrawal of the civil penalty.

The NRC concludes that the violations, except for Violetion I.C.4, occurred is stated in the proposed imposition of civil penalty and that an adequate basis for mitigation of the civil penalty has been provided by the licensee.

Consequently, a proposed civil penalty in the aricunt of $50,000 should be imposed.

.. !, NOV 17 1999 Florida Power Corporation DISTRIBUTION:

PDR SECY CA JTaylor, DEDO MLErnst, RII JLieberman, OE EFlack, OE LChandler, OGC FIngram, PA Enforcement Coordinators RI, RII, RIII, RIV, RV BHayes, 01 SConnelly, OIA TMurley, NRR DNussbaumer, 0GPA EJordan, AE00 Day File EA File NRC Resident Inspector DRS Technical Assistant State of Florida DCS 9

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OE888 OGC 0i>9 RA:RTItee D (/  ;

EFlack LChandler MLErnst d'ibrnan J o r 11/9/88 11/9 /88 11//7/88 l'1/['j/88 1 / s8

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