ML20055C600
| ML20055C600 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crystal River  |
| Issue date: | 05/24/1990 |
| From: | Thompson H NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | FLORIDA POWER CORP. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20055C599 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-89-118, NUDOCS 9005290024 | |
| Download: ML20055C600 (11) | |
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-UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of-
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Docket No.
50-302
' Florida Power Corporation
)
License No.
DPR-72 (Crystal River Unit 3)
)
EA 89-118 ORDER IMPOSING CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY 1
1 Florida Power Corporation (Licensee) is the holder of Operating License No.
DPR-72 issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Commission or NRC) on
' January 28, 1977. The license authorizes the Licensee to operate the Crystal River facility in accordance with the conditions specified therein.
11 An inspection of the Licensee's activities was conducted on April 24-28, 1989.
.The results.of this: inspection indicated that the Licensee had not conducted its' activities in full compliance with NRC requirements. A written Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty (Notice) was served upon the
-Licensee =by letter dated September 13, 1989. The Notice states the nature of the violations, the provision of the NRC's requirements that the Licensee had violated,.and the amount of the civil penalty proposed for the violations. The Licensee responded to the Notice by letter dated October 17, 1989.
In its response, the Licensee admitted the violations but argued that the NRC Enforcement Policy had been improperly applied in determining the amount of the civil penalty proposed. The Licensee argued that proper application of the facts would result in the NP,C staff changing its conclusion that the Licensee
-had failed to implement a-satisfactory EQ program prior to plant operation
-following the November 30, 1985 deadline for compliance with 10 CFR 50.49.
Further, the Licensee argued that, based on the facts, significant mitigation of the' proposed civil penalty was warranted,
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III After consideration of the Licensee's response and the statements of fact, u-explanation, and argument for mitigation contained therein, the NRC staff has determined, as set forth in the Appendix to this Order, that the violations occurred as stated and that the penalty proposed for the violations designated in the Notice should be imposed.
IV In view of the foregoing and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10.CFR 2.205, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
L The Licensee pay a civil penalty in the amount of $100,000 within 30 days of the date of this Order, by check, draf t, or money order, payable to the> Treasurer of the United States and mailed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document
-Control Desk, Washington, D.C.
20555.
V The Licensee may request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order.
A request for a hearing should be clearly marked as a " Request for an Enforcement dearing" and shall be addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
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' Nuclear Regulatory Commission,. ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Washingtor.
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20555.
Copies also shall be sent to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear. Regulatoryg
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Commission'and the Atsistant General Counsel for Hearings and Enforcement, at the-same address and to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region II, 101 Marietta" Street, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30323.
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If a' ht.aring'is requested, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of the hearing.
If the Licensee fails to request a hearing within 30 days of the date of this Order, the provisions of this Order shall be a
effective without further proceedings..If payment has not been made by that
- time, the matter may be referred to the Attorney General for collection.
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l'n the event the Licensee requests a hearing as proviced above, the issues to
' be' considered at such hearing shall be:-
-whether, on-the basis of the violations set forth in the Notice, which-are admitted by the Licensee, this Order should be sustained.
l FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION r
D lugh L'. Thompso/9[7:Jr.
L i
n De ty Executive' Dir r for l
Nuclear Materials Sa ety, Safeguards, and Operations Support 4
Dated at Rockville, Maryland thisf/tA day of May 1990 3
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APPENDIX
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EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 1
1989, a Not' ice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil On'Septecer 13) was issued for violations identified during an NRC inspection.
Penalty (Notice Florida; Power Corporation (FPC or Licensee) responded to the Notice on October 11% 1989 -(Response). The Licensee admits the violations, but requests that.the NRC' staff-reconsider its conclusion that the violations identified indicateaprogrammaticfailureintheareaofenvironmentalqualification(EQ) warranting a civil penalty and also requests mitigation of the civil penalty based oncthe factors of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRC's evaluation and conclusions regarding the licensee's requests are addressed below.
Restatement of Violations A.
.10 CFR 50.49(a) requires each holder of a license for operation of a nuclear power plant to establish a program for qualifying electric equip-ment identified in 10 CFR 50.49(b).
10 CFR 50.49(b) defines equipment important to safety and includes:
l (1) Safety-related electric equipment, i.e., equipment relied upon to remain functional during and following design basis event.
(2) Certain post-accident monitoring equipment.
10 CFR 50.49(d) requires the. licensee to prepare a list of electric equipment important to safety covered by this section.
10 CFR 50.49(f) requires that each item of electric equipment important to safety shall be qualified by testing and/or analysis under postulated environmental conditions.
10 CFR 50.49(j) requires that a record of qualification for the electric equipment important to safety, as identified on the Master List, be j
r maintained in an auditable form for the. entire period during which the covered-item is installed in the nuclear power plant.
Contrary to the above, since November 30, 1985 the licensee failed to comply with the above EQ requirements as evidenced by the following-
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violations:
f 1.
On December 9, 1988, it was discovered that certain safety-related l-motor control centers in the Auxiliary Building had not been demon-strated to be qualified for the environmental conditions resulting L
from a postulated auxiliary steam line crack.
2.
On December 16, 1988, it was identified that valve motor operators p
FWV-14 and 15 and WDV-406 contained tape splices and the licensee L
could not demonstrate qualification for the valve motor operators in that the licensee did not have a record of qualification for the tape splices.
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As of-April 24.1989, the licensee did not have a record of qualification'for'Kerite Tape splices such as the one used in electrical-penetration EPA-412, 1
5.1 4.
As of April 24, 1989, three GEMS Containment Sump Level transmitters (WD 303-LT-A&B and WD 302-LT-B) were found to be in a configuration, other'than the tested configuration in that.the associated junction boxes were not filled witt silicone ~ oil. The licensee did not'have.
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analysis,to demonstrate t..e acceptability of the installed condition.
5.-
.The record of qualification for certain ASCO solenoid valves such as those used in the Main' Steam Isolation Valves was-deficient in that it did.not adequately support a 40-year qualified life for the.
e solenoid valves when considering the effects of~ elevated localized temperatures from the hot process piping.-
6.
Electrical penetration EPA-128, which contains the cables for 1
required post accident monitoring temperature elements'AH-536,.537,-
538 and 539-TE, was not on the master list of electric equipment important to safety.
~7.
The four Limitorque valve motor operators associated with valves RCV-11 CAV 1, 3, and 4, respectively, were installed inside contain-ment without functioning T-drains and. grease reliefs. ; Qualification of these operators was based upon a tested configuration which.
. included functioning T-drains and grease reliefs;: however, -the-licensee did not have analysis to demonstrate the-acceptability of the installed configuration.
8.
Weidmuller terminal blocks were not properly qualified for use inside-(
containment in that the qualification documentation did not contain E
insulation resistance values taken during:the accident profile testing and did not contain analysis to demonstrate the acceptability c
of the installation'of these terminal. blocks in: junction boxes, which
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differed from those tested, in that the installed boxes had no weep holes.
m 9.
Valve RC-11 was-found installed in a configuration other than the tested' configuration and the licensee did not have analysis to 1
demonstrate the' acceptability of the installed configuration.
Specifically, the valve.was found with degraded grease in gear box and cracked wiring insulation.
- 10. Transmitters RC-163 ALT, RC-163 BLT, RC-164 ALT, RC-164 BLT, RC-14A delta PT-1-3, RC-14B delta PT 1-3, SP-31 LT, SP-32 LT, SP-21 LT, SP-22 LT, SP-23 LT and SP-24 LT were installed in configurations other than the tested configuration and the licensee did not have.
analysis to demonstrate the acceptability of the installed configu-rations.
Specifically, the transmitters were installed below the design basis accident flood level but the associated cables and splices had not been qualified for submergence, r
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Appendix -
11.
Eleven butt splices on Main Steam pressure transmitters MS-106 PT, i
through MS-133 PT and Emergency Feedwater Flow Transmitters EF-24 FT through-EF-26 FT were found installed with Raychem WCSF-115 sleeves-instead of the required WCSF-070 sleeves and the licensee did not I
- have analysis to demonstrate the acceptability of_ the installed configuration.
B.-
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures appropriate to the circumstances.
Contrary to the above, procedures MP-405 and PM-133 were not appropriate for the circumstances in which they were used in that they lacked suffi-cient detail to ensure the qualified status of certain ecuipment required a
by 10 CFR 50.49 was maintained.
Specifically, HP-405 dic not properly consider vendor bend radius limitations for cables and PN-133 did not properly consider vendor requirenents for bearing lubrication.
This -is a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I).
Sununary of Licensee's Response FPC admits that the violations occurred and does not take issue with the facts stated in the Notice.
However, FPC believes that the NRC staff incorrectly concluded that FPC failed to implement a comprehensive EQ program in 1985, resulting in significant'EQ deficiencies and also incorrectly concluded that a civil penalty was warranted.
The Licensee-bases its position that the NRC staff improperly concluded that:
FPC had failed to implement a comprehensive EQ program on a number of factors.
First, FPC argues that the limited scopes of a number of the NRC inssections
- were inadequate to assess the overall EQ program at Crystal River, tlat FPC's identification of a considerable number of the violations at issue is indica-tive of;a satisfactory EQ program, and that.the limited significance of the L
violations does not. support the NRC staff's conclusion.
Second, FPC' contends that the evolution of EQ expectations by the NRC staff, and not the lack of an
' acceptable existing EQ program, has been responsible for the NRC staff's percep-tion of the FPC program.
Finally, FPC argues that the hRC staff has apparently g
f viewed FPC's extensive EQ upgrade program, which went far beyond corrective actions for the violations at issue, as an admission of a progransnatic breakdown.
FPC also requests mitigation of the proposed civil penalty on the basis that~ the c
L uitigating and escalating factors in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (NRC Enforcement L
Policy),Section V.B., were not appropriately considered and applied in asses-cing the proposed civil penalty.
FPC bases its request for further considera-
- tion of mitigation.on the following:
(1) the majority of the issues identified in the Notice were identified by FPC and properly reported, (2) corrective J
actions involved significant efforts beyond the NRC-identified deficiencies, l
FPC's "EQ Enhancement Plan" went well beyond correcting known problems and the
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scheduleofcorrectiveactionswasquiteaggressive,(3)FPChasnoadverse past performance in the EQ area,-(4) although it had specific prior notification for several items, several'other items were site-specific for which the licensee had no prior notice, and (5) the Notice addresses multiple examples of generally isolated and' minor EQ discrepancies of limited safety significance.
NRC Evaluation of Licensee's Response NRC Inspection Report 50-302/85-09 sent to FPC by a letter dated June 10, 1985' documented the NRC staff's review of the Crystrl River EQ program. Thet inspection made a broad review of the proposed EQ program for the plant and determined that, while considerable progress had been made toward implementing the program, a substantial amount of work needed to be dcne prior to restart from the refueling outage that was in progress at the time of the inspection, in order to meet the requirements of 10'CFR 50.49. With that inspection.as a reference point, the NRC staff concluded, based on the subsequent more narrowly focused inspections, that the types of violations subsequently identified by FPC and the NRC inspectors represented a breakdown in the Crystal River EQ program.
The conclusion that the violations found represented a significant progransnatic
- weakness was reached because, in numerous instances, the violations identified-were issues that should have been resolved based on the findings of the 1985.
inspection or.NRC generic correspondence issued both before and after that inspection, but prior to November 30, 1985. That being the case, the NRC staff concludes that the fact that the Licensee subsequently identified some of the violations is irrelevant to this' discussion because the issue is not who 4
identified the violations but whether an adequate program would have originally left:such issues _ unresolved. The NRC staff acknowledges that a nuuber of the violations are not extren,ely significant individually.
However, as explained.
above, the. Licensee's arior opportunities to address the deficiencies is the-primary concern.
Furtier, as discusseo later in this Appendix, the NRC staff's recognition of the le uer significance of some of the violations was accounted for by aggregating the violations found as a Severity Level'III problem and not escalating the civil penalty based on multiple examples.
Although the Licensee asserts that evolving EQ expectations on the part of the NRC staff have teen responsible for the NRC staff's current perception of EQ issues,-the Licensee fails to support that contention with any examples of such evolving regulatory pcsitions. Conversely, the NRC staff provided the Licensee, in the cover letter to the Notice, with numerous examples of pre-November 30, 1985 generic correspondence which support the NRC staff's position that, for many of the' identified deficiencies there was an existing rather than evolving, regulatory position.
With regard to the Licensee's contention that the NRC staff viewed FPC EQ upgrade program as an acmission of a programmatic breakdcwn, the NRC staff can only state that the conclusions reached above are alone sufficient to conclude that there was a arogram breakdcwn. Therefore, what the NRC staff thought or concluded about tie FPC upgrade is not relevant.
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n Appendix- -
The NRC Enforcement Policy factor of " Identification and Reporting' allows for up to a 50 percent-reduction of the base civil penalty when a licensee identi-fies the violation and proniptly reports the violation of the NRC. No ccnsider-ation for. a reduction in the penalty will be given if the licensee does not take insuediate action to correct the problem upon identification. Furthermore, the base penalty may be increased by as much as 50 percent if the NRC identi-fies the violation provided the licensee should have reasonably discovered the violation before the NRC identified it.
In applying this factor, consideration is given to, among other things, the o)portunity available to discover the violation, the ease of discovery and tie promptness and completeness of any required report. The NRC staff acknowledges that some of the violations in this case were identified by the Licensee.
However, the NRC inspectors also identified an approximately equal number of the violations.. Further, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee should have discovered and acted on many of the deficiencies much earlier than was done.
As stated in the Licensee's Response.no new requirements have been imposed regarding EQ since the promul-gation of 10 CFR 50.49 on November 30, 1985. The NRC staff's evaluation rele-vant to this factor considered what information has been available to the' Licensee to assist in discovering that the equipment was not qualified at the time of the inspection.
In the case of Crystal River 3, NRC staff concludes that adequate information was provided through NRC Information Notices, Bulletins,) Circulars and Inspection Reports (identified in the cover letter to the Notice which should have led the Licensee to identify the problems more t
.promptly, had adequate management and programmatic controls been im)1emented to act on the available information.
Based on these considerations, t1e NRC staff found that mitigation.was not warranted for the identification and reporting i
factor.
The NRC Enforcement-Policy factor of " Corrective Action To Prevent Recurrence" allows for up to a 50 percent increase or decrease in the base civil penalty based on the promptness and extent to which the licensee takes corrective action, including actions to prevent recurrence. The NRC staff acknowledges that FPC has taken appro)riate corrective action to resolve the specific violations identified.
iowever, the broad-based corrective actions, in such l
areas as training, which the NRC staff normally consicers when evaluating whether mitigation of a civil penalty is appropriate for a licensee's ccrrectiu action, that have been included in FPC EQ Enhancement Program are yet to be completed. The NRC staff's concern with the timeliness of FPC's broad corrective actions was expressed at the enforcenent conference and was asuin notec in the cover letter to the Notice.
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While the previous discussion alone is sufficient to justify not mitigating the civil penalty for the Licensee's corrective actions, the NRC staff also consi-dered the overall circumstances of this case in ceciding whether such mitigation of the civil penalty should be applied. Having concludeo that a prograrratic I
breakdown in the management controls cf the EQ program at Crystal River 3 occurred L
and n,indful of the Enforcement Policy's guidance calling for application of' maximum enforcement authority in such cases, the NRC staff reasorec that mitigt-
' tion for corrective actions shculd only be applied for truly comprehensive anc' timely corrective actions. As the NRC staff has concluded above, the Licensee's L
broad-based corrective actions were not timely and, therefore, mitigation for L
corrective actions is not warranted in this case of a programatic breakdown.
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Appendix. -
The NRC Enforcement. Policy allows up to a 100 percent increase in:the base civil penalty under the factor of " Prior Notice of Similar Events" where the
-licensee had prior knowledge of a potential problem as a result of a licensee jl review, a specific NRC or industry notification or other reasonable indication j
of a potential problem, and failed to take effective. preventative steps. The NRC Enforcement Policy factor of "Past Performance" allows for an increase of the base civil penalty by es much as 100 percent for prior poor performance or a-reduction of the base civil penalty by as much as 100 >ercent for prior good performance.
In this case, the NRC staff escalated the fase civil penalty a 1
total of 100 percent when taking the above two factors into consideration. The factors are discussed together because,. in this case, the November 30, 1965.
deadline for compliance with 10 CFR 50.49 caused the NRC staff to address previous NRC inspection findings and previous Licensee initiatives in the specific area of concern before and after the deadline differently. Normally, previous NRC inspection. findings and licensee initiatives at the plant under consideration in a particular enforcement action are considered elements of past performance. However in this case, because no enforceable performance standard for EQ existed prior to the deadline, such activities performed before the deadline have been considered as elements of prior notice along with the elements normally 'onsidered as prior notice such as NRC generic correspondence.
Following the November 30, 1985 deadline, previous NRC inspection findings and Licensee initiatives.are considered elements of past performance, as they normally are, along with such elements as Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)results.
Escalation for prior notice is clearly warranted in this case given the numerous NRC generic documents that should have alerted FPC to EQ problems subsequently discovered. Additionally, the NRC staff's pre-deadline inspection of the Crystal River EQ program afforded the Licensee a significant opportunity to address i
potential problems., However, despite such notice, the Licensee carried out a
-.very narrowly focused program and failed to take adv6ntage the opportunity the inspection results offered.
Forexamp~le,duringtheNRCinspection(Inspection No.50-302/85-09) conducted.on March 4-8, 1985, issues related to T-drains were discussed and the Licensee indicated that an inspection would be performed to verify the presence of T-drains on Limitorque valve operators. Licensee Event Report (LER)'89-016 and subsequent revisions indicated that each of the 21 EQ.
valve actuators in the Reactor Building were inspecteo but not until 1986. These inspections discovered deficiencies related to T-drains and grease reliefs including the fact that, when 13 EQ valve actuator motors were installed in the
- Reactor Building in 1985 as part of the Licensee's modification program, specific instructions for verification of T-drains and grease reliefs were only provided for nine of the actuators. Another example of the Licensee's prior notice for an EQ problem related to the discovery of high tempergture damage to the motor cables associated with the PORV Block valve, RCV-11. The Licensee was aware of
.the high temperature heating problems in 1981,1983, and 1985, yet failed to-take the necessary steps to revise the qualified life of the cables and actuators in the EQ Program.
Finally, problems with States /ZWM terminal blocks and Kerite tape-type terminals were discussed in NRC Inspection Leport No. 50-302/85-C9.
Nevertheless in 1988, the Licensee still had unqualified States terminal blocks in the RCS Vent System, failed to remove Kerite tape-type terminals from the EQ program and failed to ensure the Weidmuller terminal blocks were installed in the tested configuration.
In sumary, the NRC staff concludes that 50% escalation for prior notice is justified.
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. Appendix -
With regard to past. performance, the Licensee's overall performance in relevant 1
SALP areas such as engineering and quality programs, when considered along with NRC inspection findings and Licensee EQ activities after the EQ deadline, justify escalation of the base civil penalty under the past performance factor. An
. example of the Licensee's poor prior performance relates-to the Licensee's handling of the T-drain problem discussed above. After the Licensee discovered and docunented the problem in 1986, it did not effect corrective actions until 1989.. In sunmary, the NRC staff ccocludes that 50% escalation for prior. pocr performance is justified. Full escalation of 100% as allowed by the Enforcement Policy was deemed inappropriate give the unique relationship in this case between this factor and prior notice as discussed more fully above.
No escalation of the civil penalty was applied for the factor of " Multiple
_ Occurrences" because that factor was considered in categorizing the violation at Severity Level III.
NRC Conclusion The NRC staff has concluded that the Licensee has provided neither an adequate basis to cause the NRC to recharacterize its assessment of the Crystal River l
EQ program nor an adequate basis for mitigation of the base civil penalty.
Consequently, the proposed civil penalty in the amount of $100,000 should be imposed.
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