ML20204J311
| ML20204J311 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 08/28/1987 |
| From: | Carey J DUQUESNE LIGHT CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-1275 2NRC-7-197, TAC-63534, NUDOCS 8810250088 | |
| Download: ML20204J311 (2) | |
Text
..
r yn k
7-s.,.e,. <. -
't j ouquesneuct ttL*i" August 28, 1987
)
s w w ort n w r w 2NRC-7-197
%e 3 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission N
Document Control Desk Attn:
Washington, LC 20555 Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit No. 2 Roforence:
Docket No. 50-412 Beaver Valley Unit 2 Power Ascension Test Schedule Deviation IGOntlemen:
dis 7ussions between NRC Staff and K. D. Grada of Duquesne Company on August 25, 26 and 27, we requested NRC approval of aThis As per Light revised power ascension test schedule.
deferral of IST 2.21.A.02 "Main Steam Isolation valve" Power" and IST 2.04.03 "Turbine Trip with Loss of Offsite orary r
at Lead".
These tests were originally scheduled to be sure at K
, formed at 30% power.esca'. ate power to 50%, prior to performing these two
- tests, is for the purpore of accomplishing the following Our request to objectives:
flows through the Heater
- Drains, Moisture Separator and Reheater Drains o
Maximize system Systems for the purpose of flushing those systems and Extraction Steam, improving plant chemistry for future high power operations.
more effective clean out and inspection of the condenser hotwell during a scheduled outage in o
Provide a
early September.
This will result in enhanced main unit reliability for subsequent power operations.
activities that have to additional maintenance performed on the balance of plant equipment during the Identify be 1
aforementioned outage.
ot' approximately five days at 50% power i
Following a
period reduce power to our committed values and conduct understand that this deviation is acceptable operation, we will brief duration of the elevated power condition and the We 7ese two tests.
l sed on the 1
% d11owing considerations:
Main Steam Isolation Valves have previously been stroke tested and met their isolatior time criteria.
The GS102500sa e70s2s N f/M'Mn No: #[
KDR ADock0500g2 w wurmm mau.mmemwam,,m {_ _,e.,,n,,,,,_,___,
- _ _ _..,~. _.. _. _ _
.. tr ~ - ---
m.
"IhlicypowarStation,UnitNo.2
,No. 50-412, License No. NPF.73 No. 2 Power Ascensicn Test Schedule Deviation
(,
N~-l) 2 o
The Emergency Diesei Generators nave previously.been tested and demonstrated their ability to re-energize the emorgency buses, o
The Turbine Trip and Reactor Trip functions have bien demonstrated during unplanned trips with the unit connected to the grid on August 18 and August 25.
Six sdditional reactor trips have occurred during pro-commercial operation.
o The positive aspects associated with operating at 50%
power 40 acccmplish the previously identified oojectives prior to our scheduled outage.
In addition to these discussions, the Project Manager expressed hio concerns over the number of plant trips that have occurred at Unit 2.
Each of these events were discussed in detail as to their
- ccuses and corrective actions.
Whilo we recognize the unocceptability of reactor trips and will continue to make every effort in minimizing thom, we do not believe that our experience is cignificantly differont than other plants during this phase of cporation.
Draft FURIG-1275 (March 1987) provides a comprehensive rcview of the startup experience of 16 plants. We note on page 12 the pre-commercial trip frequency, for the plants evaluated, 7^^ *,le dbetween 4
and 23 with an average of 12.8 trips during this
(
- -L-Je.
Wo would also point out that only two Beaver Valley Unit 2 7 trips have occurred with the unit synchronized to the grid.
We believe that incraased ir.dustry attention must be given to the trips that occur with the unit on-line because o significant number of automatic actions occur under these conditions.
This data base should be separated from reactor trips that occur in lower operating
- modas, which could only amount to an insertion of the' shutdown banks, with no other concurrent automatic actions.
While we do not consider cny cha11onge on a
safety system acceptable, on a risk assessment
- basis, the challenges that occur with the unit synchronized have a higher potential for sequential failures and should be separated from tho overall trip data base for this reason.
We appreciate the responsiveness of the staff on this schedulo change and believe it will provide boneficial results during cubsequent power operations.
Very tru
- yours, J. J. Carey Senior Vice President
)
J p m,x.n. - - -,a.un,-.m a,s.- ~.u,wa.m,muwa:.muunnww w.w mwma m