ML20203E727
| ML20203E727 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1986 |
| From: | Tucker H DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | Harold Denton, Youngblood B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203E733 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8604240349 | |
| Download: ML20203E727 (53) | |
Text
o Duxn Pownn GOMIRNY 1*,0. ISO X W ilflO CIIAHLOTrE, N.C. Ull242 HALH.Tt'CKER Trazenown vara rurmos=v (7M) (17:HNil nm..
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April 15, 1986 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 ATTENTION: V B.J..Youngblood; Director PWR Project Directorate No. 4
Dear Mr. Youngblood:
By letter dated October 2, 1985, Duke provided to the NRC a document entitled "McGuire Nuclear Station, Fire Protection Review, Revised September 1985".
Attached please find Revision 4, March 1986, to this document. This revision primarily updates information regarding the cold shutdown equipment.
Appendix R to 10CFR50 requires that alternative or dedicated shutdown capability be provided, for all specific fire areas, "to achieve and maintain subcritical reactivity conditions in the reactor, maintain reactor coolant inventory, achieve and maintain hot standby conditions, achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter". The primary functions necessary to achieve shutdown are 1) circulation and heat removal, 2) boration and makeup, 3) depressurization of the Reactor Coolant System and 4) sealwater 5) sampling and 6) process monitoring and control.
The capability to safely shutdown the unit in the event of fire has been greatly enhanced by the addition of the standby shutdown system. This system provides all the functions, including dedicated power supplies, necessary to secure and maintain the unit in the hot standby condition (i.e., natural circulation mode) for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> without offsite power. While in the standby shutdown mode of operation, damage control measures can be taken, as necessary, to restore capability to achieve cold shutdown.
The fire recovery scenarios that can be postulated are innumerable.
However, there exists a minimum of electrical components required to operate or monitor the minimum set of mechanical components required to achieve cold shutdown from a hot standby condition without offsite power within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
This minimum set is identified in the updated tables and descriptions being provided. The attached pages should be inserted in your manual as replacement for existing pages as noted.
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8604240349 860415 00N WOW PDR ADOCK 05000369 F
PDR i
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e Mr. Harold R. Denton April 15, 1986 Page 2 This document is provided to supplement information contained in the McGuire FSAR and reflects the plant design as previously reviewed and approved by the NRC.
Accordingly, no additional reviews are requested and no license fees are provided.
Very'truly yours,
'# phe~1,_
Hal B. Tucker RLG/jgm Attachment xc:
Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II 101 Marietta Street, WN, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Mr. W.T. Orders NRC Resident Inspector McGuire Nuclear Station 3
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1 McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW
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DUKE POWER COMPANY O
SEPTEMBER 1977 DUKE POWER COMPANY 422 SOUTH CHURCH STREET CHARLOTTE, NORTH CAROLINA 28242
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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION FIRE PROTECTION REVIEW i
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Revision Log:
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January 1979 l
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September 1982 l
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September 1985 4.
March 1986 O
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LIST OF TABLES TABLE TITLE PAGE 0-1.1 Summary Hazard Analysis, Elev 695+0 C-6 0-1. 2 Summary Hazard Analysis, Elev 716+0 C-14 0-1.3 Summary Hazard Analys.is, Elev 733+0 C-31 0-1.4 Summary Hatard Analysis, Elev 750+0 C-46 0-1. 5 Summary Hazard Analysis, Elev 767+0 C-57 0- 1. 6 Summary Hazard Analysis, Elev 786+0 C-62 0-1.7 Summary Hazard Analysis, Reactor Building C-75 l
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A fire protection audit was conducted by a team consisting of a Mechanical / Nuclear Systems
- Engineer, Electrical Control Systems
- Engineer, Electrical Cable Layout Designer and Fire Protection Engineer.
This team conducted a design review and onsite inspection to verify that at least one normal plant train of electrical power / control and mechanical systems required to achieve safe shutdown is separated from Standby Shutdown System components by one of the following methods (as stated in 10CFR50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2):
Outside of Containment i
1.
By three hour fire rated barrier.
' tervening combustibles with fire detec-2.
By twenty feet without
]
tion and suppression provided in tr.- area.
3.
By 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire rated barrier with fire detection and suppression provided in the area.
Inside Containment 4.
By 20 feet without intervening combustibles.
5.
Installation of automatic suppression and detection.
6.
By radiant energy heat shield.
l The purpose of this effort was to assure that the capability exists to shutdown affected unit (s) following loss of function in any given fire area due to fire.
A fire area is considered that portion of the plant which is separated from the remainder of the plant by three hour rated barriers, i.e., walls, floors or ceiling (see Appendix E - H. B. Tucker's April 14, 1983 letter to J.
P.
O'Reilly regarding openings between O
C-1 Rev. 4
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floors, and August 3,1984 letter to H. R. Denton regarding penetrations
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in rated fire barriers.)
The analysis defines each fire area, identifies equipment located in the area, and notes the method identified above for meeting separation criteria.
The capability to safely shutdown the unit in the event of fire has been greatly enhanced by the addition of the standby shutdown system.
This system provides all the functions, including dedicated power supplies, necessary to secure and maintain the unit in the hot standby condition (i.e.,
natural circulation mode) for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> without offsite power.
While in the standby shutdown mode of operation, damage control measures can be taken, as necessary, to restore capability to achieve cold shutdown.
The fire recovery scenarios that can be postulated are innumerable.
However, there exists.a minimum set of equipment required to achieve cold shutdown from a hot standby condition without offsite power within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
Such equipment would be utilized if cold shutdown is being achieved from the SSF.
Certain passive components are identified as Cold Shutdown equipment only because they exist in the flow path designated for cold shutdown.
Thcse components are only required to sit idle and maintain the integrity of the system.
O C-2 Rev. 4
Supplement No. 6 of the McGuire Nuclear Station Safety Evaluation Report includes a detailed review and description of the Standby Shutdown System.
In addition, SECY letter 83-269, dated July 5, 1983 notes acceptance of manual operation of valves, switches and circuit breakers and are not considered a repair.
FIRE AREA 1 (Reference Drawings MFP-1, MC-1200-1-A)
A.
Description of Fire Area l
Drawing MFP-1 shows the boundaries of Fire Area 1 and MC-1200-1-A shows the location of the following major equipment:
SAFETY COLD EQUIPMENT (SYSTEM)
RELATED SHUTDOWN O
RHR Pumps (ND)
X X
Containment Spray Pumps (NS)
X RHR and Cont Spray Rooms Sump Pumps (WL)
Component Cooling Drain Tank (KC)
X Combustible materials, fire protection equipment and means of complying with Appendix R are listed in Table D-1.1.
B.
Construction Boundaries of Fire Area 1 are walls, floors and ceilings of reinforced concrete which provide the required three hour barrier.
Reinforced concrete wills roviding a 3-hour fire barrier separate redundant RHR pumis.
O Access to the area is by two separate open spiral stairs shown on referenced drawings.
C-3 Rev. 4
O Floor drains are provided in rooms and will handle the sprinkler water flow.
Mechanical and Electrical penetrations in rated barriers are sealed with an approved, 3-hour rated silicone foam barrier.
Ventilation ducts through rated barriers are protected with I hour UL rated dampers.
C.
Fire Detection and Suppression Each room is provided with automatic detection which alarms and annunciates in the Control Room.
Fixed water sprinklers are provided in each RHR Pump Room and connecting corridor.
Manual hose stations are provided in the corriders leading to each room.
D.
Consequences of a Fire 1)
With Suppression system functioning:
The fixed water sprinklers in the RHR Pump Rooms are designed to extinguish fires in the area should they occur and prevent their spread to redundant equipment.
Rated barriers forming the fire area boundaries ensure the fire would be contained.
(See Appendix E-H.
B.
Tucker's April 14, 1983 letter to J. P. O'Reilly regarding openings between floors.)
Automatic detection in each ND Pump Room will alert personnel in time for manual suppression to extinguish postulated fires.
Rated barriers between redundant pumps assure availability of at least one pump.
O C-4 Rev. 4
O 2)
With no suppression functioning:
V A fire in any room could possibly cause loss of that piece of equipment if no suppression system functioned.
With barriers between re6.indant
- pumps, normal shutdown capability would not be affected.
i The rated barriers would ensure that the fire would be contained in Fire Area 1.
(See Appendix E - H.
B. Tucker's April 14, 1983 letter to J.
P.
O'Reilly regarding openings between floors.)
In addition, the capability to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions utilizing the SSS is assured in this area by virtue of location of SSS - required equipment and cabling outside this fire area and breaker coordination on non-required SSS loads.
The design of normal plant systems has been reviewed for spurious operations relative to SSS j
operation and has been found acceptable.
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SUMMARY
OF FIRE PROTECTION FOR ELEVATION 695 + 0 7-1.
Automatic detection with local alarm and alarm and annunciation in the control room for rooms 500 through 508.
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2.
Fixed water sprinklers in RHR Pump rooms 500, 501, 506, and 507.
3.
Penetrations through fire barriers are sealed with silicone foam.
4.
Hose stations are provided for backup protection.
5.
Sprinklers in the RHR Pump rooms extended to provide protection for the corridor connecting the two pump room entrances.
lI 6.
The Standby Shutdown System (SSS) provides a means to bring the unit to the hot standby condition independent from the normal unit systems and equipment.
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Reinforced concrete walls providing a 3-hour fire barrier separate j
redundant RHR pumps.
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FIRE AREAS 2, 2A, 3 and 3A (Reference Drawings MFP-2, MC-1201-4-A) v A.
Description of Fire Area Drawing MFP-2 shows the boundaries of Fire Areas 2, 2A, 3 and 3A and drawing MC-1201-4-A shows the location of the following major equipment:
1 SAFETY COLD EQUIPMENT (SYSTEM)
RELATED SHUTDOWN Nuclear Service Water Strainers (RN)
X X
- Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (CA)
X X
Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (CA)
X Auxiliary Control Shutdown Panel X
Groundwater Drainage Sump Pumps (WZ)
C Containment Ventilation Unit Condensate Drain Tank (WL)
Containment Ventilation Unit Condensate Drain Tank Pumps (WL)
- The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is separated from the Motor Driven Pumps by three hour barriers and protected by a separate automatic Halon 1301 suppression system.
(Fire Areas 2A and 3A)
Either the Motor Driven or the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is adequate for unit shutdown under normal conditions.
The Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump is required as part of the SSS to provide a means of achievi 'g hot standby conditions for fires in Fire Areas 2 and 3.
Comt.ustible materials, fire protection equipment and means of l
complying with Appendix R are listed in Table D-1.2.
l C-8 Rev, 4
B.
Construction U
i The boundaries for Fire Areas 2 and 3 are walls, floors and ceilings constructed using reinforced concrete providing 3-hour barriers for each area.
Compressed cork is installed in the seismic expansion l
joint at all interfaces with the Reactor Building.
Three-hour rated concrete block walls separate the Motor Driven and Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.
Pipe supports and restraints penetrate these walls through a sleeve which is sealed in accordance with mechanical pipe penetration specifications.
(See Appendix E - H. B. Tucker's August 3,1984 letter to H. R. Denton).
Access to Fire Area 2 and 3 is by stairwells enclosed by 3-hour rated block walls with 3-hour rated fire doors and frames con-structed equivalent to those approved by Underwriter's Laboratory.
Hardware has been added to these doors which has not been subjected to fire tests.
(Se Appendix E - H.
B. Tucker's August 3, 1984 a
letter to H. R. Denton).
i Floor drains are provided which will handle sprinkler flow.
Mechanical and electrical penetrations are sealed with an approved 3-hour silicone foam barrier or have been qualified through testing and/or analysis.
Ventilation ducts penetrating rated barriers are protected with 11s hours UL rated dampers.
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C.
Fire Detection and Suppression i
Each area is provided with automatic detection which alarms and annunciates in the Control Room.
l Fixed water sprinklers are provided to protect the Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps (Fire Areas 2 and 3).
A Halon 1301 l
System protects each Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (Fire Areas 2A and 3A).
C-9 REV. 4
FIRE AREA 4 (Reference Drawings MFP-2, MC-1201-1-A, A, and A)
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A.
Description of Fire Area 3
j Drawing MFP-2 shows the boundaries of Fire Area 4 and Drawings MC-l 1201-1-A, A and A, show locations of the following major pieces of safety related equipment.
SAFETY COLD EQUIPMENT (SYSTEM) (ROOM NO)
RELATED SHUTDOWN 4
Nuclear Service Water Pumps (RN) (649)
X X
I Evaporator Feed Pumps (NB) (620)
X Safety Injection Pumps (NI) (626, 628,
)
633, 635)
X Waste Gas Comp Pkg (WG) (607, 608)
X Centrifugal Charging Pumps (NV) (627, j
630, 634, 637)
X X
Reciprocating Charging Pump (NV) (629, 636)
X Waste Drain Tank Pump (WL) (639)
-l Waste Drain Tank (WL) (640)
X Combustible materials, fire protection equipment, means of comply-ing with Appendix R and location of other pieces of equipment are listed in Table 0-1.2.
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4 B.
Construction The boundaries for Fire Area 4 are walls, floors and ceilings constructed using reinforced concrete providing 3-hour barriers for i
the area.
(See Appendix E - H. B. Tucker's April 14, 1983 letter to J. P. O'Reilly regarding openings between floors).
Compressed tork is installed in the seismic expansion joint at all interfaces with l
the Reactor Building.
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C-11 Rev. 4
SU M RY OF FIRE PROTECTION FOR ELEVATION 716+0 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP (AFP) ROOMS 1.
Automatic detection with local alarm and alarm and annunciation in the control room.
4 2.
Photo-electric detectors provided in the turbine-driven AFP rooms.
3.
Fixed water sprinklers provided in rooms 600 and 601.
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A Halon 31 system protects the turbine-driven AFP rooms 6008 and 6018.
S 5.
Hose stations are provided as backup protection for Halon and Spr'inkler Systems.
l 6.
Penetrations through fire barriers are sealed with silicone foam.
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7.
Three-hour rated concrete block walls separate the Motor Driven and Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps.
REMAINDER OF ELEVATION 716+0 i
1.
Fixed water sprinklers are provided for the Centrifugal Charging Pump rooms 627, 630, 634 and 637, 2.
Penetrations in fire barriers ar( sealed with silicone foam or have been qualified through testing ane/or analysis.
3.
Barriers rated at 1 -hours are erected to separate Train A and i
Train B Nuclear Service Water (NSW) pumps.
4.
Fixed water sprinklers are provided over the NSW pumps and extended twenty feet north to GG line to cover heavy cable concentration.
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5.
Curbs are provided to control sprinkler discharge.
6.
Hose stations are provided as backup to sprinkler systems.
7.
Automatic detection with local alarm and alarm and annunciation in the control room is provided for cable trays.
8.
The SSS provides a means to bring the unit to hot standby condition independent from the normal unit systems and equipment.
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C-19 Rev. 4
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l FIRE AREAS 5, 6, 7 and 8 (Reference Drawings MFP-3, MC 1203-2-A and A)
A.
Description of Fire Area i
l Drawing MFP-3 shown the boundaries of Fire Areas 5, 6, 7 and 8 and drawings MC-1203-2-A and A show the location of the following major pieces of safety related equipment.
-l SAFETY COLD EQUIPMENT (SYSTEM)
RELATED SHUTDOWN l
Emergency Diesal Generator and X
X1 l
associated egoipment, instrumentation l
and controls l
10nly one train of the above equipment is needed for cold shutdown Combustible materials, fire protection equipment and means of complying with Appendix R are listed in Table 0-1.3.
B.
Construction The boundaries of Fire Areas 5, 6, 7 and 8 are:
Exterior
- walls, floors and ceilings reinforced concrete construction providing three hour barriers.
Interior wall between the Diesel Rooms and Auxiliary Building and the walls separating redundant diesels - three-hour rated concrete block construction.
Access to these Fire Areas is by 3-hour rated fire doors or equiva-lent construction label or pressure / flood doors shown on the l
attached drawin0s.
Hardware has been added to these doors which has not been subjected to fire tests.
(See Appendix E - H. B. Tucker's l
August 3, 1984 letter to H. R. Denton.)
C-20 REV. 4 L
Floor drains provided in each area will handle water from hose stations.
Mechanical and electrical penetrations are sealed with an approved 3-hour rated silicone foam barrier or have been qualified through testing and/or analysis.
C.
Fire Detection and Suppression Each Fire Area (5, 6, 7 and 8) is provided with automatic detection which alarms and annunciates in the Control Room.
An automatic Halon 1301 system is provided for protection of the diesels.
The system is actuated by fixed temperature (190 F) detectors which also alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
The Halon.1301 system may also be activated manually if required.
Manual hose stations are provided as backup for the Halon protec-V tion.
D.
Consequences of a Fire 1.
With suppression system functioning:
The Halon 1301 system is designed to extinguish fires should they occur in one of these areas and normal shutdown capacity would be available from offsite power or the redundant diesel generator as conditions warrant.
2.
With g suppression system functioning:
A fire could possibly cause loss of one train if no suppression system functioned; however, the rated barriers separating redundant trains and containing the fire would provide shutdown capability from the redundant train or the SSS.
No modifications will be made to the Day Tank since a fire would be confined to a single area and the redundant diesel would be available for shutdown.
C-21 Rev. 4
FIRE AREAS 9 and 10 (Reference Drawings MFP-3 and MC 1202-5-A)
A.
Description of Fire Area 3
Drawing MFP-3 shows the boundaries of Fire Areas 9 and 10 and Drawing MC 1202-5-A shows the location of the following major pieces of equipment.
SAFETY COLD EQUIPMENT (SYSTEM)
RELATED SHUTDOWN RCP D Breaker RCP B Breaker Pressurizer Htr Panel B Pressurizer Htr Panel D Channel B Hydrogen l
Recombiner Pwr Panel X
600V MCC MXM 600V MCC MXMA ATC26 (EZA)
X Combustible materials, fire protection equipment and means of complying with Appendix R are listed in Table 0-1.3.
B.
Construction Floors, ceilings and walls forming fire boundaries between Fire Area 9 and 10 and the Reactor Building are reinforced concrete construc-i tion providing 3-hour barriers.
Boundary walls separating Fire l
Areas 9 and 10 from other fire areas are 3-hour rated concrete l
block or structural steel stud and drywall construction.
Compressed cork is installed in the seismic expansion joint at the floor and l
wall interfaces with the Reactor Building. A 3-hour rated silicone 4
j foam barrier is provided at the ceiling.
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Access to these fire areas is by 3-hour rated fire doors, with rated frames, or equivalent construction label as shown on the attached drawings.
Doors between Diesel Buildings and Fire Areas 9 and 10 are pressure / flood doors.
Electrical penetrations going into the containment annulus are sealed with a 3-hour rated, UL Listed Multi-Cable Transit.
Other electrical penetrations are sealed with an approved 3-hour rated silicone foam barrier.
Spare penetrations are sealed with welded steel plate or pipe caps. (See Appendix E - H. B. Tucker's August 3, 1984 letter to H. R. Denton).
Annulus pressure integrity is assured at the personnel airlocks by an enclosure constructed of silicone foam sandwiched between steel plating.
(See Appendix E - H. B. Tucker's August 3,1984 letter to H. R. Denton).
C.
Fire Detection and Suppression O
Each Fire Area is provided with automatic detection which alarms and annunciates in the Control Room.
Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided for suppression.
D.
Consequences of a Fire 1.
With suppression system functioning:
Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are available to extinguish a fire should it occur and normal shutdown capability would be available from the redundant train.
2.
With n_o suppression system functioning:
A fire could possibly cause loss of one train if no suppression system functioned; however, the fire would be contained in this area and normal shutdown capability from the redundant train would be available.
O C-23 Rev. 4
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FIRE AREAS 11 and 12 (Reference Drawings MFP-3 and MC 1202-5-A)
A.
Description of Fire Area i
Drawing MFP-3 shows the boundaries of Fire Area 11 and 12 and a
Drawing MC 1202-5-A shows the location of the following major pieces i
of equipment:
SAFETY COLD i
EQUIPMENT (SYSTEM)
RELATED SHUTDOWN Transf ELXD (EPC)
X Transf ELXF (EPC)
X X
Transf ELXB (EPC)
X X
X X
X l
4 Combustible materials, fire protection equipment and means of complying with Appendix R are listed in Table D-1.3.
B.
Construction Floors, ceilings and walls forming boundaries between Fire Areas 11 1
and 12 and the Turbine Building are reinforced concrete construction i
providing 3-hour barriers.
Boundary walls separating Fire Areas 11 and 12 from other fire areas are 3-hour rated concrete block or I
structural steel stud and drywall construction. Compressed cork is l
installed in the seismic expansion joint at the floor and wall interfaces with the Diesel Building.
A 3-hour rated silicone foam barrier is provided at the ceiling.
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Access to these fire areas is by 3-hour UL rated fire doors, with rated frames, or equivalent construction, as shown on the attached i
drawings.
Doors between Turbine Building and Fire Areas 11 and 12 are pressure / flood doors.
i Electrical penetrations are sealed with an approved 3-hour rated silicone foam barrier.
C.
Fire Detection and Suppression j
Each Fire Area is provided with automatic detectors which alarm and j
annunciate in the Control Room.
Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided for suppression.
l l
0.
Consequences of a Fire l,
1.
With suppression system functioning:
Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are available to extinguish a fire should it occur and normal shutdown s
capability would be available from the redundant train.
l 2.
With no suppression system functioning:
A fire could possibly cause loss of one train if no suppression system functioned; however, the fire would be contained in this area and normal shutdown capability from the redundant train j
would be available.
1 To insure Train A shutdown capability in the Unit 1 Train B switchgear room (Fire Area 11), some Train A shutdown division cabling were wrapped in a fire retardant blanket.
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C-25 Rev. 4 i
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l FIRE AREA 13 (Reference Drawing MFP-3 and MC 1202-4) l A.
Description of Fire Area i
Drawing MFP-3 shows the boundaries of Fire Area 13 and MC 1202-4 shows the location of the following major pieces of equipment:
\\
l SAFETY COLD
)
EQUIPMENT (SYSTEM)
RELATED SHUTDOWN i
l Vital Batteries EVCA, EVCB, EVCC, EVCD X
j Aux Control Batteries CXA, CXB Battery Chargers X
i j
Combustible materials, fire protection equipment and means of I
complying with Appendix R are listed in Table D-1.3.
B.
Construction 5
Floor and ceiling fire area boundaries are reinforced concrete construction providing 3-hour barriers.
Boundary walls are 3-hour rated concrete block or structural steel stud and drywall t
construction.
Each battery noted in A above is separated from the remainder of Fire Area 13 by 3-hour rated concrete block walls provided with UL i
approved 3-hour rated fire doors and frames.
l f
Access to Area 13 is through any of the eight (8) entrances which are equipped with 3-hour UL Approved doors or are equivalent con-i struction labeled.
Hardware has been added to these doors which has not been subjected to fire tests. (See Appendix E - H. B. Tuck 6r's August 3, 1984 letter to H. R. Denton).
i Floor drains are provided in the pipe trenches along column lines 54 and 58 and will handle water from hose stations and sprinkler i
systems located in the area.
C-26 REV. 4
l FIRE AREA 14 (Reference Drawing MFP-3, MC 1202-2-A and MC 1202-3-A)
A.
Description of Fire Area Orawing MFP-3 shows the boundaries of Fire Area 14 and drawings i
MC-1202-2-A and A show locations of the following major pieces of safety related equipment:
)
SAFETY COLO
)
EQUIPMENT (SYSTEM) (RO3M NO.)
RELATED SHUT 00WN Seal Water HX (NV) (721, 725)
X X
l 600V MCC EMXB, EMXB-1, EMXB-2, 3MXB-3 (EPE) (722, 724)
X l
Component Cooling Pumps (KC) (723)
X X
X i
Volume Control Tank (NV) (728, 790)
X X
RC Filters (NV) (729, 789)
X RHR HX (ND) (732, 733, 785, 786)
X X
Boric Acid Tanks (NV) (737, 748)
X l
Boric Acid Transfer Pumps (NV) (737, 748)
X Seal Water Filter (NV) (738, 779)
X X
Seal Water Injection Filter (NV) (739, 740)
X X
i l
Combustible materials, fire protection equipment, means of comply-ing with Appendix R and location of other pieces of equipment are i
listed in Table-1.3.
{
B.
Construction
(
)
Walls, floors and ceilings are reinforced concrete construction providing 3-hour boundaries for the Fire Area.
(See Appendix *E -
{
H.
B.
Tucker's April 14, 1983 letter to J. P. O'Reilly regarding l
openings between floors).
Compressed cork is installed in the l
j seismic expansion joint at all interfaces with the Reactor Build-l ing.
C-28 Rev. 4 I
i i
1\\-hour rated gypsum board walls separate Train A and Train B Component Cooling Pumps.
Cable tray hangers penetrate these barriers.
(See Appendix E - H. B. Tucker's August 3,1984 letter to H. R. Denton).
Structural steel stud and drywall construction walls provide protection for safety related 600V motor control centers.
Access to Fire Area 14 is through any of five (5) entrances which are equipped with 3-hour UL approved doors or are equivalent construction label.
Floor drains provided in areas protected by fixed water sprinklers will handle sprinkler flow.
Mechanical and electrical penetrations in rated barriers are sealed with an approved 3-hour silicone foam seal or have been qualified through testing and/or analysis.
Ventilation ducts penetrating rated barriers are protected with I hour UL rated fire dampers.
C.
Fire Detection and Suppression Cable tray
- runs, safety related pumps and areas containing combustibles are provided with automatic detectors which alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
Fixeo water sprinklers, with alarm to the Control Room, are provided for the Component Cooling Pumps.
Manual hose stations are provided throughout the elevation as backup to the sprinklers.
O C-29 Rev. 4
f)\\
D.
Consequences of a Fire L.
1.
With suppression system functioning:
The fixed water sprinklers are designed to extinguish fires
^
should they occur in those protected areas and either the normal or SSS shutdown capability would be available.
2.
With no suppression functioning:
A fire could possibly cause loss of equipment in an area if no suppression systems functioned; however, rated boundaries would contain the fire within the area.
The capability to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions utilizing the SSS is assured in this area by virtue of location of SSS - required equipment and cabling outside this fire area and breaker coordination on non-required SSS loads.
The design of normal plant systems has been reviewed for p.,
spurious operations relative to SSS operation and has been s
1 V
found acceptable.
(Gv)
C-30 Rey, 4
g-p_s
\\
}
\\
)
)
_J
~_J BUILDING: AUXILIARY continued ELEVATICN: 733 + 0 (Ref. Dwg. MfP-3)
FIRE AREA ROOM NO.
EQUIPMENT /USE COMBUSTIBLE TYPE PRIHARY BACK-UP APPENDIX R MATERIAL DETECTION PROTECTION PROTECTION COMPLIANCE 776 Cation Bed Demin 777 Waste Evan Feed Filters HS 778 Recycle Holdup Tank B HS 779 Seal Water Inj. Filter HS 780 (cal Water Inj. Filter HS 781 Seal Water Inj. Filter HS 782 Fuel Pool Cooling Post Filter HS 783 Fuel Pool Cooling Pre-Filter HS 784 Fuel Pool Skimmer Filter HS 785 RHR HX 2A n
Cont Spray HX2A 786 RHR HX 2B Cent Spray HX2B 787 Corridar Cable Ins 1-R/R HS 7a7A Stairway 7e8 l
789 RC Filters 790 Volume Control Tank 13 III.G.2.a 9
III.G.2.a S
III.G.2.a 11 III.G.2.a 10 III.G.2.a 7
III.G.2.a 8
III.G.2.a 12 III.G.2.a 14 III.G.2.a Rev. 4
[^N
SUMMARY
OF FIRE PROTECTION FOR ELEVATION 733+0 C
BATTERY ROOM (701) 1.
Hose stations provided as primary protection.
2.
Automatic detection with local alarm and alarm and annunciation in the control room.
3.
Fixed water sprinklers installed under cable tray stacks at east and west ends of room.
Isolation valves are located in stairways.
4.
Penetrations through fire barriers are sealed with silicone foam.
5.
Dampers in HVAC ducts are rated 3-hours.
6.
Fire rated concrete block walls separate each battery room from the remaining area.
(o) w/
SWITCHGEAR ROOMS (705 and 716) 1.
Automatic detection with local alarm and alarm and annunciation in the control room.
2.
Hose stations provide primary protection.
3.
Penetrations through fire barriers are sealed with silicone foam.
4.
Switchgear from which Residual Heat Removal, Nuclear Service Water and Component Cooling Water Pumps can be manually controlled are provided with battery powered emergency lights.
ELECTRICALPENETRATIONROOMS(702and7131 1.
Automatic detection with local alarm and alarm and annunciation in
)
the control room.
v C-36 Rev. 4
j.
l 2.
Hose stations provide primary protection.
4
]
3.
Penetrations through fire barriers are sealed with silicone foam j
or multi-cable transits.
Spare penetrations are sealed with welded steel plate or pipe caps.
Process piping penetrations incorporate a special guarded mechanical sleeve assembly.
DIESEL GENERATOR ROOMS (702, 703, 714 and 715) i i
1.
Automatic Halon 1301 system provides primary protection.
J 2.
Hose stations provide backup for Halon 1301 system.
3.
Penetrations through fire barriers are sealed with silicone foam.
Other penetrations are sealed airtight for Halon.
i i
4.
Automatic detection with local alarm and alarm and annunciation in the control room.
O l
S.
Interior wall separating redundant diesels is three hour rated concrete block construction.
4 J
i I
i
^
l i
i C-37 Rev. 4 i
FIRE AREA 15 and 16, 17 and 18 (Reference Drawings MFP-4 and MC 1204-5-A)
O These Fire Areas correspond to Fire Areas 9,10,11 and 12 on Elevation 733+0.
The Description, Construction, Fire Detection and Suppression and Consequences of a Fire with and without suppression functioning are the same as described in Fire Areas 9,10,11 and 12 except as noted below.
The equipment in these areas is the redundant train; therefore, safe shutdown capability of the plant would not be affected by fire.
j l
Compressed cork has been removed from the floor, ceiliag and wall of Fire Areas 15 and 16 where they abutt the Reactor and Diesel Buildings and the floor of Fire Areas 17 and 18 where they abutt the Diesel Building.
An approved 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated material is installed in the voids as stated in correspondence of September 28, 1983 from H. B. Tucker to J. P. O'Reilly.
The doors accessing Fire Areas 17 and 18 have been mortised to accept hardware which was not subjected to the fire test in determining the fire rating of the door.
(See Appendix E - H.
B.
Tucker's August 3,1984 letter to H. R. Denton).
I I
1 1
C-39 REV. 4 l
a
I Access to Areas 19 and 20 is through any of four (4) entrances which are protected with UL Approved 3-hour rated fire doors and frames or equivalent construction label.
Hardware has been added to these i
doors which has not been subjected to fire tests.
(See Appendix E -
H. B. Tucker's August 3, 1984 letter to H. R. Denton).
Mechanical and electrical penetrations in rated barriers are sealed with an approved 3-hour silicone foam seal.
The ventilation duct
~
penetrating the barrier between the cable rooms is sealed with 3-hour UL rated fire damper.
Other dampers are rated 1 -hours by Underwriters Laboratories.
j C.
Fire Detection and Suppression The Cable Rooms are provided with automatic detectors which alarm i
and annunciate in the Control Room.
Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided for f
fire suppression.
A manually actuated, fog / mist type sprinkler system is installed in I
each cable room to provide additional protection.
i
}
D.
Consequences of a Fire i
i 1.
With fire suppression systems functioning:
Manual hose
- stations, portable extinguishers and fixed j
suppression system, as appropriate, would be used to extin-guish a fire.
Normal unit shutdown would be considered avail-
{
able as it is unlikely a fire would damage both trains.
Safe
)
shutdown capability would be available from the SSS.
2.
With n_o suppression system functioning:
A fire could possibly cause loss of redundant trains of equipment if no suppression systems functioned; however, boundary walls would contain the fire within the area.
C-41 REV. 4 i
FIRE AREA 21 (Reference Drawing MFP-4, MC 1204-1-A, A and A)
A.
Description of Fire Area Drawing MFP-4 shows the boundaries of Fire Area 21 and Drawings MC 1204-1-A, A and A show locations of the following major pieces of equipment:
SAFETY COLD EQUIPMENT RELATED SHUTDOWN Component Cooling Pumps (KC) (806)
X X
KC HX (KC) (806)
X X
X Letdown HX (NV)
X X
Letdown Reheat, Letdown Chiller and Moderating HX's (NR)
(810,823)
X Accumulator Water Tank (NI) (811, 824)
X Fuel Pool Cooling Pumps (KF) (816)
X KF HX's (KF) (816, 829)
X UHI Accumulator Gas Tank (NI) (817, 830)
X 600V MCC IEMXH, 2EMXA (EPE) (820)
X Combustible materials, fire protection equipment, means of complying with Appendix R as well as individual room inventories of equipment, are listed in Table 0-1.4.
B.
Construction The boundaries for Fire Area 21 are walls, floors, ceilings constructed using reinforced concrete providing a 3-hour barrier.
Compressed cork is installed in the seismic expansion joint at all l
interfaces with the Reactor Building.
O C-43 Rev. 4
i One and one-half hour rated gypsum board walls separate Train A and l
Train B Component Cooling Pumps.
Cable tray hangers and supports penetrate these barriers.
(See Appendix E - H. 8. Tucker's August 3, 1984 letter to H. R. Denton).
Access to the area is by any of four (4) separate entrances pro-l tected by UL Approved 3-hour rated fire doors and frames or equi-valent construction label in addition to two separate open spiral l
stairs as shown on the attached drawings.
(See Appendix E H.
B.
Tucker's April 14, 1983 letter to J. P. O'Reilly regarding openings between floors).
i l
Mechanical and electrical penetrations in rated barriers are sealed l
with an approved, 3-hour rated silicone foam seal or have been qualified through testing and/or analysis.
Ventilation ducts in rated barriers are protected with lls hour UL rated fire dampers.
C.
Fire Detection and Suppression l
Cable tray
- runs, safe shutdown pumps and areas containing combustible materials are provided with automatic detectors which alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
Individual rooms are l
listed in Table 0-1.4.
l Fixed water sprinklers are provided with alarm to the Control Room for the Component Cooling Pumps.
Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided throughout the elevation as backup to the sprinklers.
D.
Consequence of a Fire 1.
With suppression system functioning:
The fixed water sprinkler systems are designed to extinguish C-44 Rev. 4 i
f
fires should they occur.
Either the normal or SSS shutdown capability would be available.
2.
With g suppression system functioning:
A fire could possibly cause loss of equipment in an area if no suppression system functioned; however, the rated boun'daries would contain the fire within the fire area.
The capability to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions utilizing the SSS is assured in this area by virtue of location of SSS - required equipment and cabling outside this fire area and breaker coordination on non-required 555 loads.
The design of normal plant systems has been reviewed for spurious operations relative to SSS operation and has been found acceptable, b)
'w.
O v
C-45 Rev. 4
,~
f' i
\\
~_s v
BUILDING: AUXILitRY ELEVATION: 750 + 0 (Ref. Dwg. MFP-4)
FIRE AREA ROOM NO.
EQUIPMENT /USE CCM3USTIBLE TYPE PRIMARY BACK-UP APPENDIX R MATERIAL DETECTION PROTECTION PROTECTION CCHPLIANCE 814 Not Used
$15 Corridor Cable Ins I-R/R HS 815A Stairway 816 Fuel Pool Cooling HX's
- Oil, I-R/R HS Fuel Pool Skimmer Pump Cable Ins Fuel Fool Cooling Pumps Boric Acid Batching Tank 816A Fuel Pool Cooling Demin HS 817 Mech Penet Raom HS Accumulator Gas Tank Cont Sample Clower 818 Waste Drumming Station HS mg 81SA Resin Batching Tank HS N
819 Stairway Lobby 819A Stairway 820 Inst Ctg Room HS 821 600V MCC Cable Ins I-R/R HS 2EMxA 822 Letdown HX HS 823 Letdown Reheat HX HS Letdown Chiller HX Moderating NX i
824 Hatch Area Cable Ins I-R/R HS Accumulator Water Tank 825 826 Not Used 827 Not Used 4
I.
+
SUMARY OF FIRE PROTECTION FOR ELEVATION 750+0 CABLE ROOMS (801 and 8010)
)
1.
Automatic detection with local alarm and ' alarm and annunciation in the control room.
I 2.
Hose stations are provided as primary protectipn.
3.
Fog-type, manual water spray system installed for backup protection.
l 4.
Penetratiors through fire walls sealed with silicone foam.
5l Damper in ventilation opening between cable rooms is 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire rated. Other dampers are rated 1 hours1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
SWITCHGEAR AND PENETRATION ROOMS O
1.
Same as Elevation 733+0 2.<
Silicone foam has been installed in the expansion joint at interfaces with the Reactor and Diesel Buildings.
REMAINDER OF ELEVATION 750+0 1.
Automatic detection with local alarm and alarm and annunciation in the control room.
2.
Fixed water sprinklers installed to protect component cooling water pumps and extended twenty feet to HH line to protect heavy cable l
concentration.
l f
3.
Barrier constructed between Train A and Train B component cooling pumps.
O C-49 Rev. 4 s
FIRE AREAS 22 and 23 (Reference Drawings MFP-5 and MC 1205-5-A)
A.
Description of Fire Area Drawing MFP-5 shows the boundaries of Fire Areas 22 and 23 and MC 1205-5-A shows locations of the following major pieces of equipment:
I SAFETY COLD EQUIPMENT (SYSTEM)
RELATED SHUTDOWN MG Sets Control Rod Drive Pwr Sup Reactor Trip SWGR (IRE)
X l
Combustible materials, fire protection equipment and means of complying with Appendix R are listed in Table D-1.5.
B.
Construction Boundaries for Fire Areas 22 and 23 are walls, floors and ceilings of reinforced concrete construction providing 3-hour barriers.
l Compressed cork is installed in the seismic expansion joint at wall and roof interfaces with the Reactor Building.
Silicone foam rated at 3-hours is installed at the floor interface.
Access to the Areas is through UL Approved, 3-hour rated fire doors and frames or equivalent construction label as shown on attached drawings.
Hardware has been added to these doors which has not been subjected to fire tests.
(See Appendix E - H. B. Tucker's August 3, 1984 letter to H. R. Denton).
Mechanical and electrical penetrations in rated barriers are sehled l
with an approved silicone foam or multi-cable transits rated at 3-hours.
Ventilation ducts are protected with UL Listed,1 -hour rated fire dampers.
C-51 REV. 4
1 FIRE AREA 24 (Reference Drawing MFP-5 and MC 1205-4)
A.
Description of Fire Area Drawing MFP-5 shows the boundaries of Fire Area 24 and Drawing MC 1205-4 shows the arrangement of the Control Room.
2 B.
Construction Walls forming the boundaries of Fire Area 24 on the Auxiliary Building side of A-A Line are structural steel stud and drywall or 3-hour rated concrete block construction.
The boundary wall separating the Control Room from the Service Building is reinforced concrete construction providing a 3-hour barrier.
Access to the Control Room is through UL Approved, 3-hour rated fire doors (and frames) or equivalent construction located in all four walls.
Doors entering the Control Room from the Service Building are special design for impact and bullet resistant.
All doors are equipped with hardware which has not been subjected to fire tests.
(See Appendix E - H.
B. Tucker's August 3, 1984 letter to H. R.
Denton).
Mechanical and electrical penetrations are sealed with an approved 3-hour rated silicone foam penetration seal.
Ventilation ducts in rated barriers are protected with 1 -hour UL rated fire dampers.
C.
Fire Detection and Suppression i
The Control Room is provided with automatic detectors throughout the room and in the control board which alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
Portable extinguishers are provided in the Control Room.
Manual hose stations are located in each Electrical Penetration Room opening off the Control Room.
C-53 REV. 4
. _..._._. _._..,._ _ _ _ -- _.- _. ~. _,_-_ _.._ _. _ _
FIRE AREA 25 (Reference Drawing MFP-5, MC 1205-2-A and MC 1205-3-A)
A.
Description of Fire Area I
Drawing MFP-5 shows the boundaries of Fire Area 25 and Drawings MC 1205-2-A and MC 1205-3-A show locations of the following major pieces of equipment:
SAFETY COLD EQUIPMENT (SYSTEM)
RELATED SHUTDOWN Control Area Vent Equipment X
Comp Cooling Surge Tanks (KC)
X X
l Ice Machines (NF)
Baron Chiller Surge Tanks (NR)
X j
Combustible materials, fire protection equipment and means of complying with Appendix R are listed in Table D-1.5.
B.
Construction
- Walls, floors and ceilings are reinforced concrete constructed
{
providing 3-hour fire boundaries.
Compressed cork is installed in l
the seismic expansion joint at all interfaces with the Reactor i
Building.
Access to the area is through UL Approved 3-hour rated fire doors and frames or equivalent construction and two open spinal stairs as shown on attached drawings.
(See Appendix E - H. B. Tucker's April 14,1983 letter to J. P. O'Reilly regarding openings between
]
i floors).
- O C-55 Rev. 4
FIRE AREAS 26 and 27 (Reference Drawing MFP-6, MC 1206-2-A and MC 1206-7-A)
A.
Description of Fire Area Drawing MFP-6 shows the boundaries of Fire areas 26 and 27 and Drawings MC 1206-2-A and A show details of the Fuel Buildings.
Combustible materials, fire protection equipment and means of complying with Appendix R are listed in Table D-1.6.
B.
Construction Walls, floor and ceiling fire boundaries to Q-Q Line are reinforced cor. crete construction providing a 3-hour barrier between the Fuel
{
Pool and the Auxiliary Building.
Compressed cork is installed in I
the seismic expansion joint at all interfaces with the Reactor Building.
O
't From Q-Q Line to T-T line walls are either concrete block or insulated aluminum siding, Access to the area is via 3-hour rated stairways equipped with UL Approved, 3-hour fire rated doors and frames or are equivalent construction label.
Doors in the Personnel Airlock Enclosure are pressure / flood doors.
Mechanical and electrical penetrations are sealed with an approved silicone foam rated at 3-hours.
Ventilation ducts in rated barriers are protected with I hour OL rated fire dampers.
Annulus pressure integrity is assured at the personnel airlocks by an enclosure constructed of silicone foam sandwiched between steel plating.
(See Appendix E - H. B. Tucker's August 3,1984 letter to H. R. Denton).
V C-60 Rev. 4
Fire Areas 28, 29 (Reference Drawings MFP-4, MFP-5, and MFP-6)
O A.
Description of Fire Areas Drawings MFP-4, MFP-5 and MFP-6 show boundaries of Fire Areas 28 and 29.
Fire Area 28 is the Unit 1 interior doghouse.
Fire Area 29 is the Unit 2 interior doghouse.
Mechanical piping drawings show location of major pieces of equipment in the area.
SAFETY COLD
- EQUIPMENT RELATED SHUTDOWN Main Steam Isolation Valves X
Main Steam Line Piping X
Auxiliary Feedwater Line Piping X
Main Steam PORV's X
- NOTE:
A fire in the interior doghouse could affect the ability to supply feedwater to the B and C steam generators and interrupt the steam supply to the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump.
How-ever, the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps will still be capable of supplying adequate auxiliary feedwater to the A and D steam generators which are fed through the exterior doghouse.
B.
Construction Boundaries for Fire Areas 28 and 29 are walls, floors and roof of reinforced concrete construction.
Walls and floors whic.: adjoin other plant areas are sealed with three hour fire rated assemblies.
Steam pipe penetration openings are not sealed but are above the roof of the remainder of the auxiliary building.
O C-64 Rev. 4
Access to the areas is through low yield pressure doors.
These doors are equipped with hardware which has not been subjected to fire tests.
j C.
Fire Suppression Portable fire extinguishers, located in penetration and other plant areas, would be used as primary suppression capability for fire in the interior doghouses.
Fire hose stations in penetration rooms adjoining doghouses have 75 foot hoses.
If necessary, additional lengths of hose could be used to extend fire hose capability into interior doghouses.
D.
Consequences of a Fire 1.
With suppression system functioning:
Portable extinguishers and possibly manual fire hose would be I
used to extinguish fires should they occur.
Consequences of fire are not expected to be severe since combustible material (plastic cable insulation) is not spread throughout the large open area such that any fire should be confined to the location of origin.
Therefore, both normal unit and 555 shutdown capa-bility should be available.
With No suppression system functioning:
2.
o A fire could possibly cause loss of ability to supply feed-water to steam generators B and C, and loss of steam supply to turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump, thereby disabling the SSS.
s O
C-65 REV. 4
The capability to achieve and maintain hot standby condition from the Control Room is assured because motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps will still be capable of supplying feedwater to A and D steam generators which are fed through exterior dog-houses.
O O
C-66 Rev. 4
c Fire Areas 30, 31 (Reference Drawings MFP-4, MFP-5, and MFP-6)
A.
Description of Fire Areas Drawings MFP-4, MFP-5 and MFP-6 show boundaries of Fire Areas 30 and 31.
Fire Area 30 is the Unit 1 exterior doghouse.
Fire Area 31 is the Unit 2 exterior doghouse.
Mechanical piping drawings show location of major pieces of equipment in the area.
SAFETY COLD EQUIPMENT RELATED SHUTDOWN Main Steam Isolation Valves X
Main Steam Line Piping X
Auxiliary Feedwater Line Piping X
Main Steam PORV's X
B.
Construction Boundaries for Fire Areas 30 and 31 are constructed of reinforced concrete.
The pipe shaf t which connects these areas with other plant areas are sealed with three hour fire rated assemblies.
Access to the areas is through low yield pressure doors.
These doors are equipped with hardware which has not been subjected to fire tests.
C.
Fire Suppression Should fire occur in exterior doghouses, the fire brigade would bring portable fire extinguishers to fight the fire.
An option for a severe fire would be to use fire hose supplied by a yard fire hydrant.
O C-67 REV. 4
4 D.
Consequences of a Fire O
i 1.
With suppression system functioning:
Portable extinguishers and possibly manual fire hose would be used to extinguish fires should they occur.
Consequences of fire are not expected to be severe since combustible material (plastic cable insulation) is not spread throughout the large open area, such that any fire should be confined to the loca-tion of origin.
Therefore, both normal unit and SSS shutdown capability should be available.
i-2.
With No suppression system functioning:
A fire could possibly cause loss of ability to supply feed-water to steam generators A and D.
The capability to achieve and maintain hot standby condition from the SSS is assured because the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump will be capable of supplying feedwater to steam generators B and C through interior doghouses.
1-1 f
1 l
l Rev. 4 C-68 i
i.
G
'l
.i f
i The Reactor Building will be considered separately from the Auxiliary Building. Although considered one fire area, the Reactor Building has been divided into three areas for simplification of description.
l e
f O
C-69 Rev. 4
.. ~
Fire Area RB-1 (Reference Drawing MC 1041-2)
A.
Description of Fire Area Drawing MC 1041-2 shows the boundaries of Fire Area 1, Annulus.
The Standby Makeup Pump is located in this area.
This pump is needed to bring the Unit to hot standby condition using the SSS, but is not used for a cold shutdown and is not safety related.
Combustible materials, fire protection equipment and means of complying with Appendix R are listed in Table D-1.7.
B.
Construction The outer wall of the Annulus is 3'-0" thick reinforced concrete construction.
The inner wall is the containment liner plate.
Access to the area is from the Electrical Penetration Room on Elevation 733 + 0 and the Personnel Airlock Enclosure Lobby on Elevation 778 + 10.
Floor drains are provided to handle sprinkler discharge water.
Mechanical and electrical penetrations are sealed to preserve the pressure boundaries.
A detailed description is provided in the McGuire Nuclear Station FSAR Section 3.8.
Electrical penetrations use the multi-cable transits referred to in the Auxiliary Building analysis.
Process piping penetrations incorporate a special guarded mechanical sleeve assembly.
Spare sleeves are sealed by welded steel plates or pipe caps.
(See Appendix E - H. B. Tucker's August 3, 1984 letter to H. R. Denton.)
C-70 Rev. 4
C.
Fire Detection and Suppression The annulus is provided with automatic detectors over safety related cables which alarm and annunciate in the Control Room.
Fixed water sprinklers in a pre-action arrangement are provided to extinguish fires should they occur in the Annulus.
A design density of 20 GPM per 100SF is adequate to extinguish a fire.
Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided in the Auxiliary Building Electrical Penetration Room to backup the fixed sprinkler system.
D.
Consequences of a Fire 1.
With suppression system functioning:
The fixed water sprinklers are designed to extinguish fires should they occur and unit shutdown would be by either normal equipment or SSS.
2.
With no suppression system functioning:
The automatic detection would alert station personnel of the fire condition and manual suppression with hose stations and portable extinguishers would be used.
Unit shutdown would employ either normal equipment or SSS.
Fire Areas RB-2 and RB-3 are inside containment and not accessible during operation.
If a fire should occur, the unit would be shutdown and the fire brigade would enter when conditions permitted.
Safe Shutdown would be maintained by either normal unit operation or with 555.
O C-71 Rev. 4
I For a postulated fire inside Containment or the Annulus, the capability I
to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions utilizing normal Train B safe shutdown equipment and SSS instrumentation, as necessary, is assured by virtue of equipment and power supply locations outside these fire areas, breaker coordination on required power supplies, and fire suppression features provided (Annulus).
d O
Rev. 4 C-72
(x Fire Area RB-2 (Reference Drawing MC 1041-2)
A.
Description of Fire Area Drawing MC 1041-2 shows the boundaries of Fire Area RB-2, Pipe I
Corridor.
i Combustible materials are listed in Table D-1.7.
B.
Construction The floor, interior wall and ceiling are reinforced concrete con-i struction.
The exterior wall is the containment liner plate.
Access to this area is from Elevation 738 + 3 through a hatch in the Emergency Personnel Lock area.
A Floor drains are provided to handle sprinkler discharge water.
C.
Fire Detection and Suppression Automatic detection is provided with alarm and annunciation in the Control Room.
Fixed water sprinklers are provided to extinguish fires should they occur.
Manual hose stations are provided to backup the fixed water sprinklers.
b)
C/
C-73 Rev. 4
i i
i Fire Area RB-3 (Reference Drawing MC 1041-2) i A.
Description of Fire Area j
i j
Drawing MC 1041-2 shows the boundaries of Fire Area RB-3 and the location of the following equipment:
I 1
l SAFETY COLD EQUIPMENT RELATED SHUTDOWN i
Reactor Coolant Pumps X
i Pressurizer Relief Tank l
X i
Lower Containment Filters t
l-Combustible materials are listed in Table D-1.7.
P o
B.
Construction i
The floor, ceiling and walls are reinforced concrete construction.
4 j
Access to the area is from Elevations 738 + 3 or 778 + 10 through I
the pressure doors at the Personnel Airlocks.
i 1
i C.
Fire Detection and Suppression a
f Automatic detection which alarms and annunciates in the Control Room
)
is provided over cable tray runs, the Reactor Coolant Pumps and other areas containing combustibles.
Fixed water sprinkers are provided to protect the RCP's and the motors have been modified to prevent oil spills as described in Section D.,
Paragraph 2.(a)(3).
!O C-74 Rev. 4 i
7,
O O
O TABLE D-1.7 BUILDING:
REACTOR ELEVATIONS: AS SHOWN FIRE EQUIPMENT /USE COMBUSTIBLE TYPE PRIMARY BACK-UP APPENDIX R AREA MATERIAL DETECTION PROTECTION PROTECTION COMPLIANCE Elev. 725 + 0 Pipe Corridor Cable Ins I
AE HS Inside Crane Wall RCP's (4)
Lube Oil Heat Sensitive AE HS i
Tape Cable Ins I-RR-FT HS Lower Cont Carbon SP HS
[
l Filters Elev. 738 + 0 Cable Ins I-R/R HS Annulus Cable Ins I-R/R AE PE RB-1 III.G.2.e RB-2 III.G.2.a RB-3 III.G.2.d E
T a
('
SUMMARY
OF FIRE PROTECTION FOR THE REACTOR BUILDINGS 1.
Automatic detection with local alarm and alarm and annunciation in the Control Room.
2.
Fixed water sprinklers for the pipe corridor, annulus, reactor coolant pumps and carbon filters.
3.
Hose stations are provided as backup for sprinklers.
4.
Fixed repeaters are provided for communication within containment.
O o
V C-76 Rev. 4
l
! OVERSIZE i DOCUMENT
~
PAGE PULLED
- l SEE APERTURE CARDS l
wuMsER or Paats S ACCESSION NUMsER(S):
% 0 + # Y O 'b 5 3 3CpD
%B APERTURE CARD /MARD COPY AVAILABLE FROM RECORD SERVICES BRANCN,TIDC FTS 492-3889 L