ML20202B383
| ML20202B383 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1997 |
| From: | Teator J NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202B220 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-97-365 1-96-005, 1-96-5, NUDOCS 9712030101 | |
| Download: ML20202B383 (28) | |
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CASE No. 1 96-005 c"%
- , s United States 5
'l Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,,,,,/
Report of Investigation VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR 30WER STAT::0N:
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST A SENIOR ENGINEER i FOR RAISING CONCERNS OVER A DESIGN CHANGE l l
TO ~HE ADVANCD OF GAS SYSTEM Office of Investigations Reported by 01: RI e
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Title:
VERMONT YANKEE NUCLEAR POWER STATION:
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST A SENIOR ENGINEER FOR RAISING CONCERNS A DESIGN CHANGE TO THE ADVANCED OFF GAS SYSTEM Licensee: Case No.: 1 96 005 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Report Date: . lune 18, 1997 Cor RD 5.porationBox 169. Ferry Road Control Office: 01:RI Brattleboro. VT 05301 Status: CLOSED Docket No.: 50 271 Reviewed and Approved by:
Reported by:
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k kIce Jef fNy A. Teator. Special Agent
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Barry R.) Letts Director Offi:e of Jnvestigations Office of Investigations Field Office. Region I Field Office Region I i
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SYNOPSIS On February 12, 1996, the Office of Investigations (01), Region I (RI),
initiated an investigation to track an anonymous allegation of discrimination at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY), which was provided to the In June 1996, the NRC by the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution. Inc.
investigation was upgraded to a high priority and focused on determining whether a VY Senior Engineer had been discriminated and retaliated against for raising concerns over a design change to the VY Advanced Off Gas System (A0GS) proceeding without first addressing discrepencies that had been identified in the existing wiring of the A0GS and the wiring drawings that were produced for the design change, Based on the evidence developed during the investigation 01 did not substantiate that the Senior Engineer was retaliated or discriminated against for raising his A0GS concerns.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS ,
PJLgt SYNOPSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 .
. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES ........................... 5 i DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION ......................... 7 Applicable Regulations ....._,................ 7 Purmse of Investigation ...................... 7 i
Baccground ............................. 7 Interview of A11eger ........................ 8 Coordination with Regional Staff .................. 9 Review of Documentation . . . . . . . . . .-. . . . . . . . . . . . 10 .
Allegation (MASSEY wss Discriminated and Retaliated Against for-Raising Concerns With the ACGS and the Proposed A0GS Design Change) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Summar 11 Agent'y of Evidence s Analysis . . . . .. .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. ... .. .. .. .. .. ... .. 18 '
Conclusion ......,..................20 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 LIST OF EXHIBITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 t
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LIST OF INTERVIEWEES I
Exhibit BUTEAU,Bernie,VY,ImprovedTechnicalSpecificationProjectManager 25 l
CALCHERA, Jim, VY, Project Engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 !
CASEY, Lou, Yankee Atomic Erergy Company (YAEC), Er.gineer, ,
Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) Department . . . . . . . . . 30 & 38 CORBETT, Patrick, VY Project Engineering Managei' . . . . . . . . . . . . .
24 ,
DAYTON, Jim, Contract Electrician, Fischbach Power Services Inc. . . . . 34 t
EICHENHOLZ, Harold, NRC, RI, Project Engineer, Projects Branch 5
. . . . 15 GOSEKAMP - Michael, VY, Engineering and Maintenance Training Supervisor .. 6 37 HENGERLE, George, YAEC, Senior I&C Engineer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . j HOUDE, Da *. Contract Senior Engineer,-Fischbach Power Services. Inc , , . 43 MASSEY, James, VY, Senior Engineer (former), Electrical Engineering ,
and Construction Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3&9 .
McELWEE, Dave.-VY, Engineer. Operations Support Department . . ...... 5 :
McKENNEY. Patrick, VY, Lead Electrical Engineer. Performance t Engineering Department .................... 25 & 36 ;
41 ORRIS, John, VY, Director, Human Resources Department . . . . . . . . . .
OSMONO. John, VY, Electrical Engineer / Environmental-31 Qualification Coordinator . . . . . . . , , . . . . . . . . . . .
PHILLIPS, David, VY, Senior Instrumentation and Controls (I&C)
Technician . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . , , . . . . . . 20 ,
ROUTHIER. Rick. Contract Electrician, F h chbach Power Services, Inc. ............................. 39 & 40 TESSIER, Michael. VY, Project Engineer Electrical Engineering ;
Department. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22 j VIBERT, Roger YAEC. Lead Electrical /I&C Supervisor . . . . . . . . . . 32 i
WITTMER, Bill, VY, Maintenance Production Supervisor . . . ._. . . . . . 21 l
- WRIGHT. George, Contract Senior Engineer, Fischbach Power Services, Inc .
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DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION
- Acolicable ReaulatioDji l 10 CFR 50,5: Deliberate misconduct j 10,CFR 50.7: Employee protection i
7 Puroose of Investiaation On February 12. 1995, the Office of Investigations (01), Region I (RI),
initiated an investigation to track an anonymous allegation of discrimination at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station (VY), which was provided to the !
NRC by the New England Coalition on Nuclear Pollution. Inc. (Exhibit 1). In. !
June 1996, the investigation was upgraded to a high priority and focused on i
determining whether VY Senior Engineer James MASSEY was discriminated and 1
retaliated 1, gainst for raising safety concerns over a design change to the Advanced Off Gas System (A0GS) proceeding without first addressing ;
-discrepancies that had been identified in the existing wiring of the A0GS and
.the wiring drawings that were produced for the design change (Exhibit 2). ;
MASSEY reported and documented his concerns to his supervisor, Pat CORBETT, and other VY managers, who MASSEY alleges retaliated against him by:
- 1) giving him a November 15, 1994, disciplinary letter for pour job performance on the A0GS (Exhibit 2A): 2) giving him a poor job performance evaluation for the 1994 calendar year (Exhibit 2B): and 3) removing him as ,
Project Manager (PM) on the A0GS design change project in February 1995
' (Exhibit 3, pp. 46 52 and 70). e Backaround On or about December 28, 1995. VY was informed by the Brattleboro Reformer newspaper that it had-received a copy of an undated anonymous letter making !
certain allegations concerning the function and management of the A0GS (Exhibit 4, p. 3).
On December 28, 1995. VY put together an investigative team cons'. sting of VY Engineer David McELWEE (Exhibit 5) VY Engineering and Maintenance Training 1
Supervisor Michael G0SEKAMP (Exhibit 6), and VY and Yankee Atomic Energy Company (YAEC) Executive Director of QA Russell CLARK (Exhibit 7) to conduct an investigation into the anonymous allegations that: 1) the A0GS had been allowed to deteriorate over the years, and as a result, the plant is i discharging illegal amounts of radioactivity: 2) in order to save money, plant managers cancelled a plan by engineers to refurbish the A0GS during the 1995 RFO: 3) the engineers that spoke out against cancelling the plan were punished ,
and had a bad report inserted in their personnel files: 4) recently the A0GS was declared out of operation because critical monitoring eauipment was not calibrated properly, and the condition existed for years: and 5) the YAEC Vice >
President knew about tha problems and did nothing, because it would affect his job if he had to tell VY managers that they were not operating the plant properly (Exhibit 4, pp. 3 and 4).. ,
j E ED C OF CE I Case No. 1 96 005 7
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During the VY investiga) MASSEY and twenty one others were formally interviewed. On January E7, 1996, the VY investigative team concluded that the anonymous allegations were entirely unfounded (Exhibit 4, p. 5).
On January 3, 1996, NRC:RI paneled the anonymous allegations, which were already under review by VY, and decided to refer it to the licensee for investigation and have OI review the final report (Exhibit 1).
The potential discrimination victim, James NASSEY, d e ribed in the anony'r,,ous letter, was sought out and identified by the NRC in ne ch 1996, but MASSEY ;
declined to confirm or deny that discrimination was an issue related to the time that he was the A0GS PM, Numerous attempts to schedule an interview with ,
MASSEY, through his attorney David GIBSON, were unsuccessful during March 1996, and MASSEY was given until April 5, 1996, to contact 01:RI if he felt that he had a legitimate complaint, or the matter would be closed (Exhibit 8). ;
During April 1996 MASSEY's attorney contacted 01:RI to state that MASSEY now wanted to talk to 01:RI, Through coordination between 01, NRC:RI Division of Reactor Safety _(DRS), and MASSEY's attorney. it was decided that 01 and a rApresentative of DRS would interview MASSEY, after MASSEY had an opportunity to review the DRS inspection report concerning the A0GS (Exhibit 8),
On J ee 5, 1996. MASSEY was interviewed by 01:RI Senior Special Agent Richaro M3takas, NRC:RI, DRS Reactor Engineer Jchn CALVERT, and NRC VY Senior Resident Inspector Bill COOK (Exhibit 3). MASSEY stated that his problems with VY management began when he raised concerns with the design of the new VY t
security gate house in June 1992 (Exhibit 3, pp. 38 43).
Based on the uncertainty that MASSEY was alleging harassment bnd discrimination as a result of an NRC protected activity (Exhibit 3.
p ). 38 43), MASSEY war. re interviewed by SA Matakas on June 19. 1996, During tlat interview MASSEY stated that the problems he identified with the VY ,
security gate house had "nothing to do with NRC requirements (Exhibit 9)."
NRC Inspection Report No. 50 271/96 03, dated May 3, 1996, documented a review of the current technical status of the ADGS and concluded that, ". . . the inspector found no engineering, operation, or maintenance indications in the last five years that the A0G system functionality was im3 aired in such a manner that led to degraded conditions that exceeded Tec1nical Specification requirements, either for minimum channel availability. A0G related instrumentation, or system operability" (Exhibit 16, p. 1).
HRC Inspection Report No. 50 271/97 02, dated April 9, 1997, concluded that there was no immediate safety concern 01 a wiring deficiency involving the crossing of neutral connections on the A0GS, and that the performance history
- of the A0GS demonstrated the system's capability to comply with the applicable NRC and state effluent release regulations (Exhibit 17, p. 7).
Interview of Allecer MASSEY was interviewed by OI on June 5 and 19,1996 (Exhibits 3 and 9).
MASSEY was hired as an Electrical Engin r by VY in 1978.
m 1, L l F0$REC PldIC DISCLOSbRE WITN11T I MPPROVAL d jI LO ICE / OF CE NVE g GATJ g Rg Case No. 1 96 05- 8
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f MASSEY stated that he and a lot of other employees had concerns with tne ,
general electrical wiring design and 3rints of the A0GS in 1982, and that when employees shut off the power supply tiey received electrical shocks (Exhibit 3, pp. 11 13). ,
MASSEY was assigned to be PM on the A0GS design change in February 1994 !
(Exhibit 3 p. 37). He worked c'9sely on that assign'nent with.YAEC A0GS PH i Lou CASEY, and Contract Electrician Rick Rr/JTHIER. MASSEY was, responsible for insuring that the design was completed and ready tc be implemented during the March 1995 refuel outage (Exhibit 3, p _38).
r During the spring and summer of 1994, MASSEY brought to his supervisor, Pat CORBETT. VY Plant Manager Jim PELLETIER, and CASEY, the concerns he had with the A0GS design change proceeding (Exhibit 3, pp. 16 36).
MASSEY alleges that as a result of previously raising problems with the VY security gate house design (Exhibit 3, pp. 38 43), and his safety concerns with the A0GS and the design change )roceeding, he was discriminated and retaliated against by CORBE1T und otler VY managers (Exhibit 3, pp. 46 52, and 70).
MASSEY was concerned that someone could get hurt or shocked because of the design prob
- ems and electrical drawing discrepancies, and over the safety and effectiveness of attempting to implement the design change with the existing drawing errors (Exnibit 3, pp. 58 and 59).
AGENT'S NOTE: Based on the information provided by VY and an interview of a VY employee who was shocked while working on the A0GS, MASSEY's allegation that a lot of employees were shocked while working on the A0GS, due to inaccuracies in the wiring drawings, is not supported ,
(Exhibit 14).
Coordination with Reaional Staff DRS Engineer Calvert and NRC VY Resident Inspector Bill COOK participated in the June 5,1996, interview to get on understanding of MASSEY's technical Concerns.
On June 26, 1996, at a monthly investigation prioritization meeting, the investigation was upgraded to a high priority. In June 1996, a copy of the transcript of interview and June 19, 1996, interview report were provided to NRC Regional Counsel Karla SMITil, to review and make a determination on
'whether MASSEY's complaint was within the scope of 10 CFR 50.7 (Exhibit 10).
01 received a response from the Regional Counsel (Exhibit 11), and also orovided a copy of the transcript and interview report to the NRC Office of General Counsel (0GC) for further review and a determination of whether MASSEY's complaint was within the scope of 10 CFR 50.7 (Exhibit 12). On July 23,1996, OGC advised that there was sufficient-information provided by ,
MASSEY to link his concerns with the A0GS to his neg6tive job performance- ,
-appraisal (Exhibit 13). .
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NRC:RIProjectEngineerHaroldEICHENMDLZwasalsointerviewedbythe '
reporting agent regarding MASSEY's allegations (Exhibit 15).
Reviewof,JggJi.entath0 -
l Documents regarding the A0GS. dated November 18, 1991 (Exhibit 26),
February 11, 1992 (Lxhibit 27), February 14, 1992 (Exhibit 28), March 16, 1992 (SMMt 29), and June 18, 1992 (Exhibit 30, pp. 4 13), produced by and i pr0vided to individuals other than MASSEY, indicate that the problems with the A0GS niring were documented and understood, and that a plan was being generated to inprove the A0GS and its drawings for the 1995 refueling outage, On May 9,1995, VY comoleted a review, at MASSEY's request, of his 1994 job performance appraisal.' Four VY employees (including Bill WITTHER, a long time friend of MASSEY's) con 6JCted the review and Concluded that the appraisal "genei n ly and fairly" depicted MASSEY's performance over the review period (Exhibit 18, pp. I and 2).
VY employee Farcuk BAXTER, another member of the team which reviewed MASSEY's 1994 job perfor'mce eva'uatiern wrote on June 5,1995, that: 1) CASEY proceeded with 15; r W a!' chage development, but was unable to get MASSEY to participate, because KOED was either out sick or attending to other higher ariority tasks: 2) insterd of complying with the direction J.covided by CORBETT, MASSEY aut all of his ef4rts into his crusade to nalt the design change; and 3) T1e independent investigation team of VY Lead Electrical Engineer Pat McKENNEY and YAEC Senior I&C Engineer George HENGERLE (who were charged with reviewing the design change to verify that it could proceed) pointed out that the success of the aroject would require close cooperation and coordination between MASSEY and CASEY. According to BAXTER, Mc(ENNEY later reflecteu that that never did occur and was the primary cau e for failure of the A0GS design to be ready for implementation during the March 1995 refueling outage (Exhi. sit 19, p. 2).
BAXTER also wrote that he had worked closely with MASSEY over the period of i one year and opined that HASSEY had the following serious handicaps: 1) he is lazy: 2) he is stubborn and inflexible, and sees no one's viewpoint but his own: 3) he is short tempered, temperamental, and irrational: and 4) he is unprofessional in his dealings with peers and superiors (Exhibit 19, p. 3).
MASSEY's Job Performance ADoraisals MASSEY was rated as a 6"(' Meets Requirements / Fully Satisfactory") in his job performance evaluations for the 1991 1993 calendar years. In the Additional Supervisory Comments and Development / Improvement sections, it indicates that:
- 1) MASSEY had a negative attitude and resistance towards rules and policies
.which he found excessive: 2) MASSEY had an overly vocal opposition to the point that it had an affect on junior members of the desartment: 3) MASSEY needs to be more open minded and consider alternatives )efore makinn a decision: 4) MAS.5Y9 sometimes was not open to ideas of others: 5)MASSEYwas somewhat dissatisfied in his present por,ition and sometimes let his negative
~ feelings becm.e to apparent to his coworkers: 6) MASSEY must still improve co'r.pliance with what appear to him to be restrictive plant policies and
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i procedures: 7) MASSEY normally knows what needs to be accomplished for a j project, but it is very difficult for him to track his progress and milestones: and B) when MASSEY has reached a conclusion relative to a subject, he sometimes closes his mind to other alternatives and refuses to listen to or consider other options (Exhibits 19A, 19B, and 19C),
MASSEY Pat CORBE1T as a 4 was rated by(VY Electrical Engineering and Construction Manag the 1994 calendar year, in oart, because, " Jim was not a successful project manager and does not have tie skills to >erform many of the other functions '
routinely performed by the department" (Exhibit 28),
I A11ecation: MASSEY was Discriminated and Retaliated Against for Raising Concerns With the A0GS and the Proposed A0GS Desigr! Change Summary of Evidence Evidence and Testimony Relatino to Events Prior to MASSEY's Protected Activity Testimony of PHILLIPS VY Electrical Engineering and Construction Manager David PHILLIPS supervised r MASSEY from the beginning of 1992 until the end of 1993 (Exhibit 20, p. 1),
In 19B0 MASSEY transferred from the VY Engineering Department to the ,Y 1 Construction Department because MASSEY didn't like the engineering ty>e of
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work and preferred doing the " hands on " out in the field type of wor (Exhibit 20, p. 1),
In 1991 James PELLETIER, VY Vice President of Engineering, reorganized VY, which brought MASSEY back into the Engineering Department. After the reorganization, MASSEY was given responsibility to perform engineering and construction tasks. While he (PHILLIPS) was MASSEY's supervisor, he tried to assign MASSEY construction type projects and activities to keep MASSEY happy and to use his construction expertise (Exhibit 20, p. 2).
PHILLIPS described MASSEY as a good worker, very detailed, meticulous, and sometimes overly thorough and stubborn, to the point where if he got something in his head, he wouldn't look for any alternative to what he believed was correct. If MASSEY had confidence in someone's But, if abilities, he would consider MASSEY didn't know or respect that person's input or recommendation.
a person, then he wouldn't listen to that person (Exhibit 20, pp. I and 2),
MASSEY had the necessary abilities to be a successful PM, and MASSEY had the ability to develop and implement a design, but PHILLIPS believes that MASSEY didn't like to do it. MASSEY was a stickler for wanting correct drawings of the systems that he was performing work cn (Exhibit 20, p. 2),
PHILLIPS' supervisor, Bernie BUTEAU, " jumped on him," and " reamed him out" about MASSEY on one thing after another. Specifically, for not properly supervising MASSEY, because MASSEY was an embarrassment to VY Nuclear Engineering Manager Bernie BUTEAU and PELLETIER for the following reasons:
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- 1) MASSEY said what he falt like saying: 2) BUTEAU and PELLETIER took MASSEY's i every little infraction as a personal affront: and 3) MASSEY didn't like the '
plant bureaucracy interfering with him doing his job (Exhibit 20. pp. 2 and !
3). !
- PHILLIPS recalled an incident where MASSEY verbally abused a VY security !
superviscr. PHILLIPS spoke to MASSEY about his behavior, but did not i officially document it or discipline him. When BUTEAU found out about it.
BUTEAU directed him to give MASSEY a September 21, 1993. formal written reprimand (Exhibit 20 p. 2 and Exhibit 20A).
PHILLIPS believes that BUTEAU's disapproval of his supervision of MASSEY led. !
in part, to him (PHILLIPS) being removed from his Electrical Engineering and <
Construction De)artment Manager position at the end of 1993. PHILLIPS does not recall MASSEY raising any nuclear safety concerns during the time period that he supervised him (January 1992 to December 1993) (Exhibit 20 pp. 2 and 3).
MASSEY and PELLETIER had "run ins" for years, and it is PHILLIPS' opinion that
_PELLETIER and BUTEAU were out to get MASSEY. and were looking for a reason to get rid of him (Exhibit 20. p. 3).
Testimony of WITTHER WITTHER has known MASSEY for close to twenty years as a friend peer and subordinate of his. He supervised MASSEY from 1982 to 1984. while he (WITTMER) was the Maintenance and Construction Superintendent, and from 1987 to 1990, when he (WITTHER) was the Construction Superintendent. He described MASSEY as a good, strong, dedicated and above average employee. He never i knew MASSEY to shirk his job responsibilities. MASSEY was not the type of employee who would keep quiet if he felt something was wrong on a job (Exhibit 21). ,
MASSEY's and PELLETIER's relationship starting deteriorating in the mid 1980s.
PELLETIER wanted conformity and in his management style PELLETIER expected every engineer to be able to >erform the same, whether the engineer fit that management style or not (Exhi)it 21),
i PELLETIER criticized WITTHER's supervision of MASSEY. MASSEY was not a degreed engineer: MASSEY was from "the old school." unorthodox, but with a wealth of knowledge. PELLETIER preferred that HASSEY perform his job duties in a more orthodox manner, but WITTHER gave MASSEY more latitude on goals and procedural compliance, when PELLETIER did not want that ty)e of latitude given to any employee. WITTMER's strongest disagreements with PELLETIER were over his supervision of MASSEY. PELLETIER questioned MASSEY's viability to the company several times during the 1980s.
WITTHER was removed from his position in 1990 because his management style conflicted with PELLETIER's. WITTHER added that MASSEY is a purist who wants things to be correct and right, but that MASSEY ic also reasonable if you go through an issue-and explain.it to him (Exhibit 21).
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As a result of the 1991 VY reorganization BUTEAU was named the Nuclear-Engineering Director. HASSEY's and BUTEAU's relationship was " rocky" right t
i from the beginning of BUTEAU's supervision of MASSEY in late 1989 or early 1990, WI1THER described BUTEAU as "very willing" to take PELLETIER*s l' direction and im)lement it down the management chain. WITTMER said that BUTEAU, and MASSEY's direct supervisor, Pat CORBETT, had the same management style as PELLETIER (Exhibit 21).
Testimony of CORBElI . j In January 1994, CORBETT became the Electrical Engineering and Construction Manager and MASSEY's suDervisor. BUTEAUwasCORBCTT'ssupervisor. Between 1984 and 1994, CORBETT was MASSEY's peer. CORBETT feels that MASSEY's l previous supervisors had not a>propriately su>ervised or held MASSEY accountable, compared to what le believed BUTEAU expected of his managers (Exhibit 24, p. 1). CORBETT's 1994 job performance evaluation was based, in part, on how effectively he supervised HASSEv and others (Exhibit 24, p. 8), ;
TestimonyofBUTEAU BUTEAU served as the VY Nuclear Engineering Director from February 1991 until
- 0ctober 1995. BUTEAU stated that he can document job performance problems with MASSEY dating back to 1993, but he can recall PASSEY performing poorly '
from the February 1991 time period. BUTEAU first realized that MASSEY had ,
performance deficiencies because of the difference between MASSEY and what he '
saw and expected from his other senior engineers (Exhibit 25 p. 1).
Up until the 1991 reorganization MASSEY was the Electrical Construction Supervisor and acted in a fairly autonomous manner. After the 1991 .
4 reorganization, MASSEY was no longer a supervisor, and BUTEAU made it known -
that he cxpected work to be performed in compliance with VY procedures.
MASSEY had an overall bad attitude with VY after the 1991 reorg wization (Exhibit 25. pp. 1 and 2)
BUTEAU counseled and rated PHILLIPS on his general supervision of MASSEY, so that MASSEY would meet his job perfonnance expectations, with PHILLIPS working with MASSEY to make him a productive employee (Exhibit 25. p. 2).
AGENT'S NOTE: VY Counsel HICKEY provided PHILLIPS' job performance evaluations (Exhibit 25, pp. 7 39) for the 1992 nd 1993 calendar years and MASSEY is discussed in them. Also, PHILLIPS provided the re>orting agent with copies of notes (Exhibit 25, pp. 5 and 6) that he toot during his meetings with BUTEAU, where BUTEAU talked with him about su>ervising ;
MASSEY. The notes corroborate that BUTEAU was dissatisfied witi PHILLIPS' supervision of MASSEY, and that BUTEAU wanted PHILLIPS to
" work on EJM [MASSEY) about doing senicr work.* i Testimony of TESSIER and CALCHERA.
VY-Project Engineers Michael TESSIER (Exhibit'22) and Jim CALCHERA
-(Exhibit 23), _also stated that, over the years, MASSEY had conflicts with
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senior VY management, to include CORBETT, BUTEAU, PELLETIER, and former VY President Gary WIEGAND.
Igstimony of EICHENHOLZ EICHENHOLZ was the NRC VY Senior Resident Inspector from January 1990 to June 1995. From 1973 until 1979 he worked for VY and with MASSEY in the Electrical Engineering Department (Exhibit 15).
During the 1991 VY reorganization MASSEY was moved from the Construction side ,
of the plant to the Nuclear Engineering Department. At that time. EICHENHOLZ prophesied that would cause some of the effected em)loyees a "hard time," in meeting the new management expectations that would )e placed on them.
EICHENHOLZ commented that a construction engineer, like MASSEY, did not translate into beino aole to successfully perform the job function of a design engineer, because MASSEY was not a design engineer, E1CHENHOLZ opined that BUTEAU and CORBETT were out to get rid of MASSEY because he wasn't performing like a design. engineer (Exhibit 15),
Evidence and Testimony Related to MASSEY'S Protected Activity on the A0GS CALCHERA (Exhibit 23), VY Electrical Engineer John OSMOND (Exhibit 31), YAEC Lead Electrical /I&C Supervisor Roger VIBERT (Exhibit 32). TESSIER (Exhibit 22), VY Contract Senior Engineer George WRIGHT (Exhibit 33), VY Contract Electrician Jim DAYTON (Exhibit 34), McKENNEY (Exhibits 35, pp. 1 3, and 36), HENGERLE (Exhibit 37), CASEY (Exhibits 30 and 3B), WITTHER <
(Exhibit 21), PHILLIPS (Exhibit 20), VY Contract Electrician Rick ROUTHIER (Exhibits 39 and 40), CORBETT (Exhibit 24, p). 2 3), and BUTEAU (Exhibit 25,
- p. 3), were aware that HASSEY did not want t1e proposed design change to proceed, without first performing a complete verification of the A0GS wiring system, due to inaccurate drawings produced before the design change and during the design change process.
CORBETT, WITTHER (Exhibit 21) TESSIER (Exhibit 22), PHILLIPS (Exhibit 20,
- p. 3), HENGERLE (Exhibit 37) and ROUTHIER (Exhibit 39) agreed that there were problems with the A0GS drawings. Because of that, CORBETT gave MASSEY mere resources and took- MASSEY c'i of all his other work, as stated in the April 11, 1994, memoranduo (Exhibit 24, pp. 13 15), so he could work solely on tie design change. _CORB'.TT said that he applied more and more resources to resolve the drawing dir.ereaancies, to move the design forward, and to try and compromise with MASSEY (Ex11 bit 24, p. 2).
DAYTON, who assisted ROUTHIER with the review of the revised A0GS drawings, found CASEY's drawings to be accurate, and did not fully understand what MASSEY's concerns were with the project proceeding (Exhibit 34).
Because MASSEY still had concerns with the design change proceeding, on May 25, 1994, CORBETT and VIBERT selected McKENNEY and HENGERLE to perform an independent-review of MASSEY's concerns and provide an independent assessment to determine whether the design change could be s2fely and successfully implemented, without first >erforming a significant effort to verify and upgrade the A0GS drawings (Exhibit 35, pp. I and 4).
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On June 3,1994 McKENNEY and HENGERLE concluded that the design change could i be completed and safely implemented (Exhibit 35,'pp.1 and 5 7; and Exhibit 37). VIBERT (Exhibit 32), CORBETT (Exhibit 24. p. 2), and ROUTHIER l (Exhibit 39) agreed with the conclusion.
CORBETT said that the more data that came in, the more it did not su> port MASSEY's claims, in that the drawings were not that bad, and the pro)lem was i not as~large as MASSEY believed it to be (Exhibit 24, p. 2).
CORBETT also spoke to ROUTHIER many times about MASSEY's concerns, and ,
i ROUTHIER felt that the design change could go forward, together with the process to verify and upgrade the drawings being done (Exhibit 24, p. 2).- ,
CORBETT's contemporaneous notes, dated May 24, 1994, corroborate one of those-conversations with ROUTHIER (Exhibit 40A).
CALCHERA (Exhibit 23). DAYTON (Exhibit 34), ROUTHIER (Exhibits 39 and 40,
- p. 3), McKENNEY (Exhibit 35, p. 1), VIBERT (Exhibit 32), CORBETT (Exhibit 24,
- p. 2), BUTEAU (Exhibit 25.-p. 3), CASEY (Exhibit 38, p. 3) and WRIGHT (Exhibit 33) either did not agree with, or understand MASSEY's concerns with the design change, or his interpretation of the seriousness of the problems with the drawings.
On June 9, 1994, CORBETT met with MASSEY to discuss ". . . A0G improvements and to document expectations related to the project. As a result of differences of opinion that exist, and as a result of EJM memo of 6/6/94 (Exhibit 38A), it is necessary to document the resolution of the concerns and .
the agreed upon approach to moving forward with the project" (Exhibit 24,
- p. 17).
CORBETT documented the results of the June 9,1994 meeting with MASSEY in a June 20, 1994, memorandum, which CORBETT provided to MASSEY and which MASSEY signed on June 22, 1994. In the memorandum..CORBETT listed his future expectations of how MASSEY would pursue the completion of the design change (Exhibit 24, pp. 17 19).
On June 22, 1994, MASSEY responded by writing that he would continue to ,
proceed with the design as CORBETT requested and added, "I have expressed, and I want to make it perfectly clear. that with this many wiring / design errors in A0G, Vermont Yankee is taken [ sic] an unnecessary risk to safe plant operation, and this design shouldn't be done until all the wiring / design errors have been identified an corrected" (Exhibit 24, p. 19).
McKENNEY (Exhibit 35, pp. 2 and Exhibit 36), ROUTHIER (Exhibit 40, p. 2),
HENGERLE (Exhibit 37), and CORBETT (Exhibit 24, pp. 3 and 4) stated that MASSEY did not meet CORBETT's job expectations and continued to voice his concerns, without moving the design change process forward to insure that it would be ready for presentation and approval prior to the upcoming pl:nned refuel outage. >
ROUTHIER (Exhibit 39'and 40, p. 2). VIBERT (Exhibit 32). TESSIER (Exhibit 22).
McKENNEY (Exhibit 35, and 36, p. 2) CALCHERA (Exhibit 23), WRIGHT (Exhibit 33) and HENGERLE (Exhibit 37) generally stated that regarding YAEC
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A0GS Project Manager Lou CASEY, MASSEY: 1) held CASEY's work abilities in very low regard: 2) showed very little wterest and cooperation in working with CASEY: 3) did not want to communicate or share information with CASEY: and
- 4) did not establish good te wwork, nor did he actively support CASEY during the design change.
McKENNEY added that MASSEY saw the drawing discrepancies as a chance to act in an overview position for a complete review of the A0GS, instead of " buckling down" and working to get the design change completed. McKENNEY believes that MASSEY's removal from the project was justified bemuse MASSEY's oversight of the project caused VY to waste money snd resources (Exhibit 35, p. 2),
CORBETT agreed that the failure to have the design ready for the outag, was not all MASSEY's fault, but, as a senior engineer, it was expected that HASSEY would pursue the resolution of the discreaancies and problems with CASEY and YAEC because every des 19n change )rcject 1as those type of problems. He feels that MASSEY performed poorly on tie A0GS project, and in general, the managing of problems and moving forward. He said that MASSEY would raise a drawing discrepaacy and then expect someone else to resolve it, commenting that if MASSEY had put as much energy into the resolution of the problems, as he did in raising them, then he would have solved them (Exhibit 24, pp. 2 and 3).
CORBETT stated that in November 1994 the outage management team was getting concerned because the ADGS design was not ready or completed, and because of that, the plug started to be pulled on the project being included in the outage schedule. He called Novaber 1994 tie " final hour" on whether the design package would be ready for the outage (Exhibit 24, p. 3).
CORBETT stated that he gave MASSEY the November 15, 1994, disciplinary letter (Exhibit 24, pp. 16 and 17), primarily as a result of MASSEY's poor performance on the A0GS design change project. He specifically cited MASSEY's failure to prepare periodic reports, including those related to the project, in conformance with VY procedures and requirements (Exhibit 24, p. 3).
AGENT'S NOTE: RC4JTHIER and VY Counsel Patrick HICKEY provided copies of two periodic reports, dated July 26, 1994 (Exhibit 40, pp. 6 and 7), and August 24, 1994 (Exhibit 40, Sp. 13 16). Nn other evidence was presented, which would show tlat MASSEY produced other periodic reports.
CORBETT generated MASSEY's November 1994 termination letter (Exhibit 24, pp. 22 and 23), as a result of MASSEY*s failure to have the A0GS design properly completed for its presentation to the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) on November 2, 1994. CORBETT stated that he never had a
" bigger disconnect" between what was expected of a document to be presented to PORC, and what MASSEY produced just prior to the presentation (Exhibit 24,
- p. 3).
VY Human Resources Group Director John ORRIS stated that MASSEY was not terminated in November 1994 because he worked for VY for seventeen years, and, although MASSEY was having significant job performance difficulties, that type of termination was "not the way things haapened at VY." ORRIS also said that there was also no basis to terminate MASSEY based on one job performance
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review period, adding that for an employee to be terminated, there is a need for more history of poor performance (Exhibit 41).
On December 22, 1994, PELLETIER removed the A0GS design change from the outage work list because. *. . . we have repeatedly failed to deliver on completion dates and there is rn basis for confidence we will meet any given date at the moment" (Exhibit 42).
BUTEAU said that the A0GS dnign was removed frcm the outage work list because of the failure to deliver 4"t design changes in time to the outage planning group. BU' EAU stated that there is pressure on all VY employees to deliver the designs on time to the outage planning group, but when the A0GS design was delivered to CORBETT, it did not comply with VY procedures an: as totally unacceptable. That led to MASSEY receiving a written disciplinary letter from CORBETT on November 15, 1994 (Exhibit 210. BUTEAU commented that, not only had MASSEY failed to deliver a design which met VY proceNreo, but he realized, at that point, that he had a senior engineer in the denartment who did not understand the design process (Exhibit 25, p. 3).
BUTEAU believes tha a lot of the performance issues that CORBETT had with MA5SEY resulted fron, COP.BETT holding MASSEY accountable for his job performance. BUTEAU said that there is no doubt in his mind that they were
" putting the squeeze" on MASSEY, that he at least perform as well as other engineers. and that he follos and comply with VY procedures. He added that every engineer of MASSEY's grade had listed in their job description that they will follow VY procedures. BUTEAU said that MASSEY was subsequently removed from the A0GS design change project because of poor job performance (Exhibit 25, p. 3).
BUTEAU is not aware of any hidden agenda to get rid of MASSEY. He said that it was just their objective to have a 3rofessional staff which met his high standards, and MASSEY wasn't meeting t1em in almost every regard. He said that they " bent over backwards' to deal with MASSEY's " backlash" to their job
>erformance expectations, going as far as offering him a position in the iaintenance Department, where it was believed that MASSEY could be successful (Exhibit 45, pp. 1, 4, and 7 9).
BUTEAU said tnat VY 6..anagement and MASSEY never came to an agreement on his position on the A0GS design change, despite it being independently reviewed by other experts who agreed that the design change could continue. He said that he feels bad about what has happened to MASSEY, but that MASSEY brought it upon himself (Exhibit 25, p. 4).
CALCHERA stated that MASSEY believes he got the poor review because he "put the brakes" on the A0GS design change, because he didn't want to pursue it with the wiring problems and discrepancies. CALCHERA said that MASSEY told him that he believed his problems with VY management began as a result of his invol.ement in the VY gate house modification project, which cost VY a lot of money (Exhibit 23, p. 2),
ROUTHIER said that there is no doubt in his mind that HASSEY did not fulfill his responsibilities in the A0GS design change project, in that HASSEY didn't TICE[dQ IC DISCLOSURE ITIKUTMPRQV OD /
DIRECTOR. E OF VESTIGATIpNS BfgIh Case No. 1 96 005 17
i want to comunicate_ or share information with CASEY. He said that HASSEY was determined not to let the design be implemented, because MASSEY wanted to do a i wiring verification of the entire A0GS (Exhibit 39). '
ROUTHIER feels that blame for the failure of the desigr change should be !
shared by all for not meeting project milestones and project completion. He- '
commented that on other design changes that he had worked on, if there were design problems, there was adecuate communication to get them resolved, but l that did not exist on this pro;ect. He said that VY believed that MASSEY would use his expertise to assist CASEY on the project, but MASSEY did not -
help or assist CASEY, and VY management should have been "more in tune" with '
that fact. He added that a lot of people worked hard on the >roject, but MASSEY *iasn't one of them. He doesn t feel that MASSEY gave lis best effort ontheproject(Exhibit 40),
ROUTHIER said that he physically inspected thirty percent of the wiring in the !
control room 9 50 sanel (part of the A0GS) and felt that review, the work he ,
had done with MASSEY, and the work he personally performed during the 1995 refuel outage, uncovered very few errors in the drawings. That proved to him that they had been correct.- that a total wiring verification effort was not necessary, and that the design could have been safely implemented without a complete review (Exhibit 40),
ROUTHIER (Exhibit 40, pp. 2 and 3), McKENNEY (Exhibit 36), and CASEY l (Exhibit 38) stated that the wiring verification work didn't take as long, or cost as much money as MASSEY believed it would, because only a small number of wring discrepancies were found, WITTMER does not believe that VY management took disciplinary action against MASSEY because he pursued his concerns with the A0GS design change, but took ;
the action because of the way in which MASSEY pursued his concerns. He said that MASSEY: 1) is bull headed: 2) did not beat to the same drum as VY '
management wanted him to: and 3) was going to do the job the way he felt it needed to be done, rather than working as a team with others assigned to the A0GS project. WITTHER feels that MASSEY, and those who disagreed with him on the A0GS design, were both talking, but neither side was listening to what the other was saying. He felt that VY management was telling MASSEY to do the design their way, when MASSEY wanted to do it his way. WITTMER added that there was a lot of miscommunication by both sides, but HASSEY did not " tow the party line," as to how they wanted to do business (Exhibit 21).
Aaent's Analysis The testimory provided and records reviewed indicate that: 1) MASSEY engaged in protected activity as a result of reporting his concerns to Vermont Yankee (VY) Yankee Atomic Energy Company (YAEC) employees and/or management on the AOUS design change proceeding without performing a complete verification
- of the system's electrical wiring: 2) VY and YAEC management acknowledged that MASSEY had those concerns; and 3) MASSEY's receipt of a November 15, 1994,
" Written Notification of Unacceptable Job Performance" from CORBETT, a poor job performance review for the 1994 calendar year from CORBETT, and his ,
removal from the A0GS design change project in February 1995 are viewed by
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MASSEY as adverse actions resulting from him raising concerns with the A0GS design change. As discussed belcw, the evidence developed during this investigation does not support MASSEY's allegation that the actions taken against him were discriminatory or retaliatory in nature.
A number of witnesses testified that MASSEY had run ins with PELLETIER, BUTEAU and other VY managers for a number of years, and that WITTMER and PHILLIPS, MASSEY's su)ervisors prior to CORBETT, werc counseled by BUTEAU and PELLETIER regarding t1eir ineffective supervision of MASSEY, As a result of the 1991 reorganization, BUTEAU became the Engineering Director and MASSEY was brought
/ under BUTEAU's supervisory chain, and, thus, between the new organization and BUlEAU's expectations, MASSEY's jo'u yerformance expectations were changed, CORBETT testified that he believed t1at HASSEY had not been previously properly su>ervised or held accountable, With that in mind, CORBETT supervised iASSEY during 1994, with the oirection and understanding that HASSEY was to be held accountable for his work, All of these things occurred prior to MASSEY raising any concerns witn the A0GS design change, It is clear what MASSEY's concerns were with the project going forward, It is also clear that MASSEY's supervisor CORBETT (with BUTEAU's agreement) recognized and acknowledged the concerns in April 11 and May 25, 1994, memorandums and adjusted resources (including making MASSEY almost totally dedicated to the project for the remainder of 1994) to address the electrical drawing discrepancies. The April 11, 1994, memorandum also concluded that the drawing improvement effort could be performed in parallel with the design 3 preparation. That remorandum was produced by CORBETT and MASSEY, Because MASSEY still had concerns with the design change aroceeding, on May 25, 1994 CORBETT and VIBERT selected McKENNEY and ME4GERLE to perform an independent assessment of MASSEY's concerns. That assessment concluded that the A0G modification project could be completed and safely implemented if schedule and resource issues were addressed, CORBETT met with MASSEY on June 9, 1994, to discuss the issues, the assessment, and CORBETT's expectations that MASSEY would work towards completion of the design change, CORBETT documented this conversation and his expectations in a June 22, 1994, memorandum, which was reviewed and signed by MASSEY, Based on interviews with McKENNEY, ROUTHIER, HENGERLE and CORBETT, MASSEY did not meet CORBETT's job expectations, and continued to voice his concerns, without moving the design change process foiward. His actions did not insure that it would ba ready for presentation and approval prior to the upcoming planned refuel outage.
MASSEY was characterized, in testimony and his performance evaluations, as an em)loyee who resisted policies and procedures, was not open to the ideas of otlers, and stubborn to the point closing his mind to alternatives and refusing to listen to or consider other options, In view of MASSEY's performance on the design change project, that characterization of MASSEY was proven correct, r
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4 In sungnation, CORBETT and VY management recognized HASSEY's concerns and took active measures to review, address, and resolve them. HASSEY disagreed with the conclusions of those reviews and failed to follow clear management expectations of his work on the project. Managenent docum!nted HASSEY's failure to perform in the November 15, 1994, written notification and his job performance evaluation. Subsequently, they removed HASSEY as A0GS PH for his failure.
Conclusion Based on the evidence developed during the investigation 01 did not substantiate that the Senior Engineer was retaliated or discriminated against for raising his A0GS concerns, c
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SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION CORBETT stated that in late 1995 or early 1996 VY management attempted to find MASSEY a position in the VY Haintenance Department, but MASSEY refused that transfer.
On November 1,1996, MASSEY was terminated from employment at VY for refusing to comply with " minimal" company leave requirements, after VY sent MASSEY five letters (Exhibit 44) requesting the information.
MASSEY did not file a discrimination complaint with the United States Department of Labor.
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LIST OF EXHIBITS Exhibit .
Noi pascriotion 1 Investigation Status Record (ISR), dated February 12, 1996, 2 ISR, dated June 30, 1996.
2A MASSEY's Written Notification of Unacceptable Job Performance, dated November 15, 1994.
2B MASSEY's Job Performance Appraisal, dated February 16, 1995.
3 Transcript of MASSEY Interview, dated June 5, 1996.
4 VY Investigative Report of Anonymous Allegations, dated January 17, 1996, with Cover Letter, dated March 4, 1996.
5 Interview Report of McELWEE, dated December 17, 1996.
6 Interview Report of GOSEKAMP. dated January 21, 1997.
7 Interview Report of CLARK, dated January 28, 1997.
8 ISR, dated March 31 and April 30, 1996.
9 Interview Report of MASSEY, dated June 19, 1996.
10 Matakas Memorandum to SMITH, undated.
11 SMITH 1.egal Analysis of MASSEY's Allegations.
12 Matakas Memorandum to OGC Staff Attorney, dated July 10, 1996.
13 OGC's Legal Analysis of MASSEY's Allegations, dated July 23, 1996.
14 01 Memorandum to File, dated January 14, 1997.
15 01 Memorandum of Conversation with EICHENHOLZ, dated April 10, 1997.
16 NRC Inspection Report No. 50 271/96 03, dated May 3, 1996.
17 NRC Inspection Report No. 50 271/97 02, dated April 9, 1997.
18 VY Review Committee Report, dated June 21, 1995.
19 BAXTER's " CONFIDENTIAL REPORT TO TEAM MEMBERS," dated June 5, 1995.
h CEs0 0F Of' G Case No. 1 96 005 2 J ,
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e 19A MASSEY's 1991 Job Performance Appraisal.
19B' MASSEY's 1992 Job Performance Appraisal.
19C MASSEY's 1993 Job Performance Appraisal, 20 Interview Report of PHILLIPS, dated December 17, 1996, 20A MASSEY's Written Notification of Unprofessional Work Behavior, dated September 21, 1993, 21 Interview Report of WITTHER, dated December 17, 1996.
22 Interview Report of TESSIER, dated January 22, 1997.
23 Interview Report of CALCHERA, dated January 23,1997, 24 Intcrview Report of CORBETT, dated December 19, 1996. ,
25: Interview Report of BUTEAU, dated December 18, 1996. _
26 BOWMAN Memorandum, to HERR 0N, dated November 18, 1991.
L 27 CASEY Hemorandum to MILLER, dated February 11, 1992.
28 SMITH Memorandum to PORTER, dated February 14, 1992, 29 HYAMS Memorandum to B0WMAN, dated March 16, 1992.
30 Interview Report of CASEY, dated December 16, 1996.
31 Interview Report of OSMOND, dated January 22, 1997.
32 Interview Report of VIBERT, dated January 29, 1997.
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33 Interview Report of WRIGHT, dated January 21, 1997.
34 Interview Report of DAYTON, dated January 22, 1997.
35 Interview Report of McKENNEY, dated December 18, 1996.
36 Interview Report of McKENNEY, dated January 21, 1997.
37 Interview Report of HENGERLE,. dated January 29, 1997.
38 Interview Report of CASEY, dated January 27, 1997, 38A MASSEY Hemorandum on "A.O.G Drawing Issue," dated June 6, 1994.
39 . Interview Report of ROUTHIER, dated December 18, 1996.
40 Interview Report of ROUTHIER, dated January 28, 1997.
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-- 40A' CORBETT's Notes of Conversation with ROU M ER, dated _May 24, 1994.
41 Intervie'w Report of_0RRIS. dated December 17, 1996,
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42 PELLETIER Hemorandum to CORBETT and MASSEY, dated December 22, 1994..
43 Interview Report of HOUDE, dated January 21,.1997.
44 MASSEY's Termination Letter, dated November 1, 1996, and Other VY letters:to MASSEY.
45- June 16. 1997. Cover Letter forwarding a Memorandum and Handwritten and Transcribed Notes of BUTEAU to 01.
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