ML20198A053
| ML20198A053 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Comanche Peak  |
| Issue date: | 05/15/1986 |
| From: | Garde B Citizens Association for Sound Energy, TRIAL LAWYERS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, P.C. |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| References | |
| CON-#286-212 OL, NUDOCS 8605200316 | |
| Download: ML20198A053 (28) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA :
y(S' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ;-
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ps BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 4. '
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,7 In the Matter of ) '
,. ,i TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING COMPANY, et al )
Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 hb
- (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2) )
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.744 the Citizens Association for Sound Energy (CASE) requests the release of all documents y
generated by the NRC staff relating to the internal investigation of the "T-shirt incident" and other matters. The NRC staff has declined to provide the documents to CASE.
The documents sought by CASE are relevant to three issues already in litigation before the Board: the "T-shirt incident," the liner plant documentation deficiencies, and the Lipinsky memorandum.
CASE has already obtained and does not here seek the internal investigation itself. CASE received a copy of the investigation and supporting materials from the Government Accountability Project, which obtained the release of the investigation from the Commission in response to a separate request.
(A copy of the summary of the investigation is attached to this h
pleading).
Instead, CASE seeks all memorandum prepared by the members of a
the staff which comment on the findings and conclusions of the Office i
of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) investigation.
o 3 SOS
4 BACKGROUND 10 CFR 2.744 requires that CASE first seek discovery
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from the staff through the Executive Director for Operations.
CASE made such a request (March 7, 1986 and April 8, 1986). The staff denied the documents on the grounds of relevancy. (April 25, 1986).
In addition to the requirements of 10 CFR 2.744, the Board has continually instructed the parties to proceed with discovery h
informally prior to asking the Board to rule on formal discovery requests. CASE believes our three month pursuit of the sought after documents, and the additional efforts by GAP through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) demonstrates that further informal and direct- ~
l to-the-staff formal avenues are not productive.
RELEVANCY i
According to the April 25, 1986 letter from staff the documents were denied because:
1 GAP has sought the documents requested in several FOIA requests, (86-84;86-133). None of the documents has produced substantive replies. Although GAP intends to pursue the documents through the court such a circuitous route is expensive and time-consumite. Moreover, there is no legal basis by which CASE can be compelled to rely upon limited rights available to GAP, not a party to this proceeding and not affiliated with CASE, in lieu of its lawfully discovery rights here. Of course, CASE has availed itself of information made available to GAP to avoid delay and unnecessary discovery in this proceeding.
.The OIA Raport procento an cascasment of the
' staff's hcndling of ths T-ehirt incidsnt and not an assessment of the licensee's activities.
Consequently, as the staff has previously argued, it is not relevant to the issues before the Licensing Board.
)
CASE disagrees and asserts that the documents which it now seeks, the staff's own commentary on the OIA report, is extremely relevant to the issues before the Board in order h
to enable the Board to fully evaluate the facts and circumstances of the three incidents already before the Board including any
" lessons learned" or lessons not learned by the staff in the handling of these ratters.
CASE has continually asserted that, historically, the NRC staff in Region IV has been unable or unwilling to take affirma-tive action to prevent harassment or intimidation of workers, or adequately identify 2 the full scope of hardware or documentation I deficiencies.
i h 2 See, CASE's Proposed Standard for Litigating Allegations of Intimidation, June, 1986.
[
l CASE will also demonstrate that the regulatory
" check and balance system" failed to such an extent that itforce.
became part of the problems encountered by the work i
Instead of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission being interested in or willing to isolate and identify those problem areas which should have long ago indicated f serious problems with the implementation with Appendix B the NRC Staff did nothing. Instead of providing relief when employees of have turned to the NRC the regulators
!. engaged in undermining the concerns of the work force, revealing their identity, and actively engaging in the
$ non-disclosure of generic design and construction.
See also pp 237-246 of Fact, August, 1984, of" CASE's Preliminary Proposed Findings Insensitivity / Inaccessibility /
Inattentiveness of NRC," which concludes:
(footnote continued)
h As the record of this casa demonstratos, it is clear that CASE has placed into issue in this proceeding the staff's enforcement activities regarding Comanche Peak, including but not limited to the staff's response to substantive complaints as well as complaints of harassment and intimidation by the workforce.
No summary disposition has been granted on that issue which would i exclude this discovery..
The Board's failure to exclude discovery on these i
matters is well founded. The whole question of the extent to 1 1
which conclusions can be reached about the adequacy of past design and l l
construction depends upon the establishment of the historical work l l
environment at the plant. Tbc work environment concerns are also prospective. Thus, a work environment that encouraged the free flow of information and discussion about deficiencies, including the freedom of workers to go to the NRC without fear of reprisal, would lend some credibility to the notion that all known defects or deficiencies have been or will be identified through the CPRT, and no new problems will develop.
(continued from previous page)
The NRC has added to the discouragement of QC inspectors at Comanche Peak in a number of ways. First, the NRC Staff has remained essentially inaccessible to QC personnel who may have wished to voice concerns.
Further, the NRC has displayed remarkable insensitivity to QC concerns by divulging the names of inspectors who approached the NRC with an expectation of confidenti-ality. Finally, on a number of occasions the NRC failed to respond to concerns voiced by QC inspectors, thereby exacerbating the impact of harassing or intimidating incidents.
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On the othsr hand if a workar Ya=, or is, faced with choosing between an unreceptive management and a hostile NRC who ignores his/her concerns, or worse yet - turns them immediately
) 'back to the management he/she fears in the first~ place. (i.e.,
Atchison's breach of confidentiality, the T-shirt incident), then the ;
work environment was not, and is not conducive to the guarantee of a
" safety first" attitude.
I The Comanche Peak plant continues to be built in and under the scrutiny of Region IV personnel. If the personnel involved or the NRC management persist in its belief that the staff conduct during the T-shirt incident, was acceptable or that ignoring substantive concerns of workers is acceptable, those opinions are t
probative evidence for this hearing which CASE has a right to discover.
In short, CASE requests that the Board permit' discovery under 10 CFR 2.744 of the documents generated by the staff in response to the OIA investigation on'the grounds that such documents are relevant to this pr ceeding and cannot be reasonably obtained elsewhere.
Respectfully submitted, th Billie Pirner Garde Representative for Plaintiff
' Trial Lawyers for Public Justice 2000 P Street, N.W.
Suite 611 Washington, D.C. 20036 cc: Service List May 15, 1986
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h O!RY OFICL August 30, 1985 MEi.'ORANCUM FOR: Chairman Palladino .
Commissioner Roberts Commissioner Asselstine . , ' .- -
Conr:issioner Bernthal T ', 1 Commissioner Zech n .. .: . - .
FRCM: Sharon R. Connelly, Director '
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Office of Inspector and Auditor " ~ " " ~ ' " "
SUBJECT:
CONAtlCHE PEAK - GAP ALLEGATIONS (LACK OF ilRC aCTI0ff '.iHEN NOTIFIED OF WRCitGDOING BY UTILITY)
The attached report documents the Office of Insoector and Auditor's (OIA) investigation into allegations by Ms. Billie Pirner Garde, Director, Citizens Clinic, Government Accountability Project (GAP) that Region IV ana the Office of Investigations (0I) took no action when reports of wrongdoing ay Texas Utilities Generating Company (TUGCO) management and employees were received.
TUGC0 is the applicant at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (SES).
Ms. Garde outlined three instances when Regicn IV and OI allegedly failed to respond to reports of wrongdoing by TUGCO:
On March 8,1984, the Comanche Peak SES Quality Assurance Supervisor detained eA ht quality control insoectors in a room then searched their desks an'd confiscated inspection reports documenting numerous deficiencies with electrical equipment.
In September 1983, TUGC0 management pressured a contract inspector to reword his inspection report concerning the adequacy of the paint coatings program at Comanche Peak SES.
TUGC0 had falsified inspection reports concerning improcer installation of liner plates for the scent fuel tank, refueling cavities, and two transfer canals.
OIA investigation disclosed that Region IV initially took no action when several anonymous callers and the TUGC0 Vice President for Nuclear Operations reported that some Comanche Peak SES quality control insoectors had been M&M g, C0itTACT: George l'ulley , 0!A 49-24473
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sequestered in a recm and their desks were being searched. By the. time Regiorr IV acted to obtain firsthancr information, the incident was over. When Region IV later learned that TUGC0 management had confiscated inspection documents from desks of quality control inspectors, the region acted promptly to secure custody of the documents and to place them under NRC control. OIA learned that once OE ensured the seized inspection records were under NRC control, that office took no further action into this matter because no allegations of harassment or intimidation were made.
In regard to the alleged inaction by Region IV and 0I when notified that a contrt.ct inspector had been pressured to reword an inspection report, 01A's investigation developed no information that the contract insoector made an allegation to the NRC that he hac been unduly pressured, harassed, or intimidated by his employer or TUGC0 to retract his inspection report.
Our investigation into actions by Region IV and OI when notified that TUGC0 had falsified inspection reports concerning the spent fuel tank liner plates determined that as a result of the allegations received in April 1981, 01 conducted an investigation into falsification of inspection reports by TUGC0 and the NRC Comanche Peak Technical Review Team (TRT) reviewed the technical issues. OIA learned, however, that in August 1983, 01 had received information that TUGC0 was allegedly falsifying liner plate inspection documents. 01 did not identify this as an OI matter; therefore, no investigation of the alleged falsification of inspection documents was conducted at that time. However, as a result of the information received in April 1984, the allegations originally raised in August 1983 were investigated
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.by OI.
Conclusion
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The facts developed during this investigation indicate that Region IV was not [
sufficiently sensitive to reports concerning the detention of Comanche Peak '
OIA lqualitycontrol'inspectorsandthesearchoftheirdesksandfiles.
believes that Region IV 60uld have more prcmptly responded to the anonymous
, allegations by actirs to gather firsthand information about the ongoing l incident. Regio' W won d have then been better able to decide whether the i situation was a TU J ' s or-management dispute or whether additional NRC
- involvement was requitea.
l The OIA investigation did not develop any indication that the contract l inspector believed or reported that he was harassed, intimidated, or unduly i pressured in connection with his inspection report. Consecuently, we believe j Region IV and OI acted appropriately in tnis matter.
- OIA believes that Region IV and OI responded appropriately to recorts received i in April'1984. alleging falsification of inspection reports concerning the spent fuel pool liner plates. As a result of these allegations, the OI Field Office, Region IV, conducted an investigation into possible licensee wrongdoing and the NRC Comanche Peak TRT reviewed the technical cencerns with the spent fuel pool liner plates. OIA noted, however, that the OI Field Office, Region IV had received information in August 1983, that inspection L- .-
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reports for the spent fuel pool liner plates were being falsely prepared.
Because this was not identified as an 01 matter at that time, investigation of this issue was inappropriately delayed until the allegations were again received in April 1984.
s cc: W. Dircks, EDO, w/ attach S. Hayes, 01, w/o attach W. Magee, GCM, w/o attaen THIS REPORT IS BEING PROVIDED FOR THE CCMMISSION'S /
INFORMATION. N0 ACTION SY THE COMMISSION IS REQUIRED AT THIS TIME.
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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION TITLE: COMAtICHE PEAK - GAP ALLEGATIONS (LACK 0F NRC
. ACTION WHEN NOTIFIED OF WRONGD0ING BY UTILITY)
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PREPARED BY:
g Georg hh
. Mulley, Jr.
8'30' 8f DATE:
Investigator, 01A . .
APPROVED BY:
fQ Y f'1" Sharon R. Co elly V
DATE: f _ 3 e _ g g "*
Director, OIA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR & AUDITOR U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g g3- 2&%Q 9 -l'7pp-FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/ R ACY ACT EXEMPTION .(.h.)...(.h) b ( i 0FFICIA SE ONLY
@dM I h{.I BACKGROUND On November 1,1984, Ms. Billie Pirner Garde, Director, Citizen's Clinic, Government Accountability Project (GAP), Institute for Policy Studies, was interviewed by the Office of Inspector and Auditor (0IA), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concerning allegations of NRC misconduct regarding the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (SES) (Attachment 1). During the interview, Garde alleged that Region IV, NRC, and the Office of Investigations (01), NRC, did not properly respond when notified of possible wrongdoing by Texas Utilities Generating Company (TUGCO), the applicant at Comanche Peak SES, Garde outlined three instances when Region IV and 0I allegedly failed to act when notified of wrongdoing by TUGCO:
On March 8,1984, the Comanche Peak SES Quality Assurance (QA) Supervisor detained eight quality control (QC) inspectors in a room then searched their desks and confiscated inspection reports documenting numerous deficiencies with electrical equipment.
In September 1983, TUGC0 management pressured a contract inspector to reword his inspection report concerning the adequacy of the paint coatings program at Comanene Peak SES. i TUGC0 had falsified inspection reports concerning improper installation of liner plates for the spent fuel tank, refueling cavities, and two transfer canals. ,
i On November 13,1984, 0IA initiated an investigation into the alleged inaction by Region IV and OI when notified of these instances cf wrongdoing by TUGCO.
SUMMARY
Region IV and 0I allegedly failed to act when notified that on March 8,1984, the Comanche Peak SES OA Supervisor detained eignt OC insoectors in a room then searened their desks and confiscated inspection recorts documenting numerous deficiencies with electrical eouicment.
Paul S. Check, Deputy Regional Administrator, Region IV, NRC, when interviewed (Attachment 2) stated that at about 9:00 a.m. , March 8,1984, he received a telephone call from TUGC0 Vice President for Nuclear Goerations, Billy Ray
.Clements, who briefed Check on what Clements described as " provocative behavior" on the part of electrical QC inspectors at Comanche Peak SES.
Reportedly, some of the electrical QC inspectors were wearing T-shirts with the message "I pick nits" printed on them. Additionally, the QC inspectors were finding numerous problems with electrical construction allegedly as a result of conducting " destructive" inspections. Clements stated he was concerned for the safety of the QC inspectors because craft workers might retaliate for what the QC inspectors were doing. For this reason, the QC inspectors had been sequestered in a room and were going to be interviewed by TUGC0 management. After the telephone conversation, Check discussed the situation with Richard P. Denise, Director, Division of Reactor Safety anc Projects, Region IV. They agreed that Region IV would wait for further information before taking any action.
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2 At about 11:00 a.m., March 8, 1984, Check received another telephone call from Clements to update him on the ongoing situation at Comanche Peak SES.
Clements reported that the QC inspectors had been sant home and they would be allowed to return when properly attired. Clements also reported there was no evidence that the QC inspectors had engaged in sabotage during their inspections. Check, Denise, and William Brown, the Regional Attorney, dis-cussed the information from Clements and agreed that TUGC0 seemed to be handling the situation responsibly. Because there was no health and safety issue, Check did not see any need for immediate NRC involvement in what appeared to be a labor-management problem.
Soon after the secono telephone call from Clements, a meeting was held at Region IV to discuss the situation at Comanche Peak SES. The consensus of the participants at the meeting was there was no need for NRC involvement in the situation at Comanche Peak SES. It was suggested that Region IV contact the NRC resident inspectors at Comanche Peak SES and have them observe and gather more information on what was happening.
Although unsure of the details, Check recalled that sometime after the tele-phone calls from Clements, Region IV learned that TUGC0 had seized records from the desks of the QC inspectors. In the event the documents might, at a y later date, be evidence or be of interest to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (ASLB), Region IV immediately took action to confiscate the documents from TUGC0 and secure them in the NRC's Resident Inspector's office for safe-keeping.
Paul S. Check prepared notes concerning his telephone conversations with Bill Clements and his recollection of the events regarding the Comanche Peak SES T-shirt incident (Attachment 3). The notes by Check indicate that Region IV thought the utility was handling the incident in a responsible manner. A decision was made to ask the NRC Resident Inspectors at Comanche Peak SES to observe, but not interfere with, the developing situation.
In a July 10, 1984, deposition before the Atomic Safety and Licensin (ASLB) in the matter of Comanche Peak SES (excerpts at Attachment d)g Board Billy Ray Clements stated that during the morning of the T-shirt incident at Comanche Peak SES, he was informed of the ongoing incident while at his office in Dallas, Texas. Clements then telephoned Paul Check and informed him of the situation. Clements reported to Check that QC inspectors wearing T-shirts bearing some reference to " nit-picking" were being kept in a rocm at Ccmanche Peak SES. Clements told Check that the reason for the detention of the QC inspectors was possible animosity between TUGC0 construction workers and QC inspectors. Clements did not want any physical violence or verbal abuse between these groups of employees.
In testimony before the ASLB on September 11, 1984, in the matter of the Comanche Peak SES (excerpts at Attachment 5), Clements stated that during the day of the T-shirt incident, he telephonically discussed the situation with Region IV at least three or four times. Af ter reviewing the handwritten notes prepared by Check to document the telephone conversations between Clements and Check (Attachment 3) Clements confirmed to the ASLB that the first page and a half of the notes accurately recorded wnat he told Region IV. However, Clements could not recall making the comments listed under " Update" on the -
bottom of the second page of the notes. Additionally, Clements was not Mi i MC OTV_
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3-certain if the names listed in the notes were correct. Clements also commented that some background information concerning the meaning of the saying "I pick nits" was not recorded in Check's notes. In response to a question, Clements stated that he did not consider the inspections being conducted by the electrical inspectors as being destructive or sabotage. He considered the inspectors as just being over-aggressive.
Ricnard P. Denise, Director, Division of Reactor Safety and Projects, Region IV, when interviewed (Attachment 6) stated that at about 9:30 a.m. ,
March 8,1984, he was advised by Check that Billy Clements had teleononically reported to Region IV that some Comanche Peak SES QC inspectors had arrived at work wearing T-shirts bearing the statement "I pick nits." TUGC0 management apparently considered the T-shirts to be provocative and TUGC0 was concerned for the safety of the inspectors. For this reason, the QC inspectors had been sequestered in a room and were going to be interviewed by a TUGC0 consultant.
Reportedly, this situation had developed from a belief that the QC inspectors had been conducting destructive testing of electrical construction.
Denise and Check briefly discussed the information provided by Clements. They were primarily concerned with whether the QC inspectors were engaged in sabotage that should be investigated by NRC. Check considered the situation to be a labor-management problem, and he thought Region IV should wait for further information from Clements before Region IV took any action. On the other hand, Denise thought Region IV should act to gather more information about the ongoing situation and then decide if the Region should become involved. Check and Denise agreed to await further information from Clements before taking any action.
At about 11:00 a.m. , March 8,1984, Clements telephoned Check and stated that TUGC0 had no proof of destructive testing and there was no clear evidence of sabotage. Clements also advised that the OC inspectors would be sent home without pay until the T-shirts were taken off and that they could return to their jobs if they were still there. Clements stated that TUGC0 would keep Region IV informed.
At about noon, March 8, 1984, a meeting was held between Check; Cenise; Eric H. Johnson, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch II, Division of Safety and Projects, Region IV; and Doyle M. Hunnicutt, Chief, Reactor Project Section B, Reactor Projects Branch 2, Region IV. At the meeting, Hunnicutt indicated he had spoken with the NRC resident inspectors at Comanche Peak SES that morning and they had told him they had just received telephone calls regarding the ongoing incident. Apparently the resident inspectors had taken no action in response to the information except to notify Hunnicutt.
Hunnicutt instructed the resident inspectors to not become involved in what he considered to be a labor-management problem. Hunnicutt briefed the meeting er what the resident inspectors had told him abcut the situation at Ccmanche Peak and it was at this time that Denise learned the OC inspectors had reportedly been physically detained, locked in a room, and escorted when they left the room. Cenise stated that Hunnicutt did not mention at the meeting that documents had been seized. During this meeting, Denise recommended, and it was agreed to, that the Senior Resident Inspector for Operations at Comanche Peak SES would go to the location of the incident, learn what was transpiring, '
and take pictures of the inspectors in their T-shirts and of the " sabotage" arrim a e 'M nui V
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. 4 areas. Cenise asked Hunnicutt to relay these instructions to the resident inspectors. Apparently, Hunnicutt passed the instructions to the resident inspectors at about 12:30 p.m., March 8, 1984; however, by this time the incident was over and the QC inspectors had been escorted off the site.
At 11:13 a.m., March 9, 1984, Clements again telephoned Check to provide an update. Denise was present for the telephone conversation. Among other topics, Clements reported that TUGC0 had looked at the QC inspector's personal belongings for inspection documents. It seemed that TUGC0 was interested in non-conformance reports. This was the first indication that TUGC0 was reviewing inspection documents.
At about 3:17 p.m. , March 9,1984, Denise and Eric Johnson had a telephone conversation with David N. Chapman, Quality Assurance Manager, TUGCO. Chapman reviewed the incident and discussed some perceptions of the inspectors. The inspectors thought TUGC0 management was putting too much emphasis on non-problems and that the incident on March 8,1984, resulted from the lack of supervisor communications. The inspectors did not want to make a big scene and now realized how the T-shirts could be considered provocative and non-professional. Chapman further related that TUGC0 had removed documents from the inspector's work area. This was the first time that Denise was informed that documents had been seized by TUSCO. During the telephone conversation, Chapman was asked to lock up the documents that were seized, limit access only to NRC and a selected TUGC0 reviewer, and to get the boxes of material to the NRC resident inspector. Chapman agreed to deliver the material to the NRC Senior Resident Inspector for Construction.
At about 4:00 p.m. , March 9,1984, Denise briefed Hunnicutt on the information provided by Chapman and instructed Hunnicutt to ensure the documents were secured by NRC.
Richard P. Denise prepared notes concerning his knowledge of the events surrounding the T-shirt incident (Attachment 7). These notes were used to support Denise's recollection of the incident.
In a memorandum dated April 20, 1984 (Attachment 8), Richard P. Denise instructed Doyle M. Hunnicutt to copy the material seized by TUGCO, forward a copy of the material to Region IV and send a copy of relevant material to each QC inspector, and retain the seized material at the Senior Resident Inspector for Construction's office.
Doyle M. Hunnicutt, Chief, Reactor Project Section B, Reactor Project Branch 2, Region IV, when interviewed (Attachment 9), stated his recollection of the circumstances surrounding the March 8, 1984, T-shirt incident at Comanche Peak SES was very vague. However, Hunnicutt stated he testified at length before the ASLB in October 1984 concerning the incident. At that time, Hunnicutt's memory was much fresher concerning what took place. Hunnicutt stated the testimony he provided the ASLB was correct, and he had no changes.
In prepared testimony for the ASL3 (Attachment 10) Coyle M. Hunnicutt detailed his involvement in the March 8, 1984, "T-shirt incicent" at Comanche Peak SES.
Hunnicutt stated that at about 11:00 a.m. , March 8,1984, the Senior Resident Inspectors at Comanche Peak SES telephoned him at Region IV and reported to him that an anonymous caller had relayed information to the NRC resident
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l inspectors concerning an event taking place at Comanche Peak SES. Both Senior Resident Inspectors told Hunnicutt that the caller stated that Comanche Peak SES management and Brown and Root (B&R) security personnel were going through desk drawers and files in the electrical and mechanical quality control office in the safeguarcs building. The caller had also stated he was concerned that some inspectors were being detained by the licensee. The caller had requested that an NRC representative come to the safeguards building. Hunnicutt instructed the Resident Inspectors not to go to the safeguards building until he discussed the situation with Region IV management. Hunnicutt stated that at that time he believed that the issue was a TUGC0 labor-management prcblem and not something affecting the health and safety of the plant. At about noon, March 8, 1984, a Region IV reactor inspector visiting Comanche Peak SES telephoned Hunnicutt and stated he had received an anonymous telephone call and shortly thereafter a visit from an individual who did not disclose his name. Both the telephone caller and the individual expressed concern about licensee personnel going through the personal effects and records in the desks of inspectors in the safeguards building. The caller and the person who came to the NRC office told the reactor inspector that the cause of the management action was the wearing of T-shirts by QC inspectors bearing a statement referring to " nit pickers".
Following the telephone calls, Hunnicutt discussed the information with his Branch Chief, Eric H. Johnson, and it was decided that Region IV shculd be alert to the concerns of these individuals but should not participate in the ongoing incident between Comanche Peak management and the T-shirt personnel.
These instructions were relayed to the NRC inspectors at Ccmanche Peak SES.
Subsequently, a meeting was held between Hunnicutt, Johnson, and Richard Denise. During this meeting Hunnicutt discussed the telechone conversations and what could be accomplished by NRC involvement. After this meeting, the three participants discussed the entire situation with Paul Check. During the meeting Check stated that Billy Clements of TUGC0 had also telephoned him concerning the incident with the T-shirts. The four then determined that there was no indication that NRC regulations had been violated nor that there was a threat to health and safety of the plant. However, it was decided to monitor the incident and gather more kncwledge of what was hapoening. Consequently, between 12:30 p.m. and 1:00 p.m. , March 8,1984, Hunnicutt telephonically instructed the Senior Resident Inspector for Operations at Comanche Peak SES to make a reasonable attempt to meet with the T-shirt personnel. The Senior Resident Inspector for Operations was also instructed to attempt to take photographs of the inspectors wearing the T-shirts and to attempt to photograph any electrical wiring which appeared to have been damaged. At about 1:30 p.m. , March 8,1984, the Senior Resident Inspector for Operations telephoned Hunnicutt and informed him that the QC inspectors had already been escorted off the site and that he had been unable to take any pictures. The Senior Resident Inspector had found one wire which appeared to have some scratch marks but had no other indication of damage.
Sometime during the afternoon of March 8,1984, Hunnicutt was informed by Paul Check that Ccmanche Peak management had taken dccumentary material frem the desks of the OC inspectors. Check indicated he had been told this by Billy Clements. There were subsequent discussions between Hunnicutt, Johnscn, Denise, and Check, and on the afternoon of March 9, 1984, the NRC Senior Resident Inspector for Construction at Comanche Peak was instructed by Hunnicutt and Johnson, who had been instructed by Denise, to request that Comanche Peak SES management turn over to the NRC the documents taken from l r.,m u MC N V a ....a
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6 desks, lockers, or other locations during the T-shirt incident. It was Hunnicutt's understanding that the reascn for taking custody of these documents was that, while there was nothing to indicate that NRC involvement was warranted at that time, there existed the possibility that later events might involve the NRC. It was decided to acquire the materials against that possibility. Shortly after relaying the instructions to the Senior Resident Inspector for Construction, Hunnicutt received a telephone call that the documents haa been secured.
On March 13, 1984, acting on instructions from Richaro Denise, Hunnicutt completed an inventory of each of the eight packages of material that were seized. Hunnicutt identified nothing which would raise health and safety concerns with the NRC.
On about April 2,1984, Hunnicutt was requested by Denise to prepare a list of interview questions and interview some or all of the eight QC inspectors involved in the T-shirt incident. The purpose of the interviews was to provide the NRC with a better understanding of the events of March 8,1984, and to help determine whether there should have been NRC involvement. On April 5, 1984, Hunnicutt and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector for Construction interviewed three QC inspectors selected at random. The answers to the questions were somewhat similar from all three inspectors interviewed.
No additional QC inspectors involved in the T-shirt incident were interviewed because the first three gave fairly consistent answers.
A list of eight questions prepared by Hunnicutt as well as Summaries of Interview documenting the three interviews of QC inspectors conducted by Hunnicutt were reviewed (Attachment 11). The responses from the three QC inspectors were similar.
In testimony before the ASLB on October 1, 1984, in the matter of Comanche Peak SES (excerpts at Attachment 12) Doyle M. Hunnicutt testified concerning his recollections of the T-shirt incident. Concerning tnose matters of interest to 0IA, Hunnicutt's testimony agreed with the information in his prepared testimony.
James E. Cummins, Senior Resident Inspector for Construction, Comanche Peak SES, when interviewed (Attachment 13) stated he recalled that at about 11:00 a.m., March 8,1984, he was in the office of the Senior Resident Inspector for Operations, Comanche Peak SES, when he answered an anonymous telephone call which asked him to go to the TUGC0 QC offices in the North Island area of Comanche Peak SES. The caller claimed that TUGC0 management had sequestered some QC inspectors in a room and were going through their desks. Cummins telephoned his supervisor, Doyle M. Hunnicutt, at Region IV, and relayed the information to him. Cummins was instructed by Hunnicutt to not get involved in what appeared to be a TUGC0 labor-management issue.
Cummins later received a telephone call from Hunnicutt who stated he had talked to Region IV management and the original instructions to not get involved still applied. Later that morning, Cummins learned from a Region IV reactor inspector who was at Comanche Peak that he had received a telepnone call and a visit from an anonymous QC inspector who recorted TUGCO's detentien of QC inspectors and search of their desks. Cummins later received another anonymous telephone call requesting NRC involvement in the ongoing incident. '
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7 In the afternoon of March 9,1984, Cumins received telephone instructions from Hunnicutt to obtain from the TUGC0 OC Supervisor at Comanche Peak SES all the documents which had been confiscated by TUGC0 on March 8, 1984 Cummins complied with these instructions and secured the documents in the NRC trailer at Comanche Peak SES.
Early in April 1984, Cumins and Hunnicutt interviewed three or four of the TUGC0 QC inspectors who had been detained on March 8, 1984 The QC inspectors told Cumins and Hunnicutt that they were not trying to deliver a message by wearing the T-shirts and that TUGC0 management had over reacted to the situa-tion.
In testimony before the ASLB on July 17, 1984, in the matter of Comanche Peak SES (excerpts at Attachment 14), James E. Cumins provided his recollections of the T-shirt incident. Although in more detail, Cumins' testimony before the ASLB agreed with the information he provided OIA.
Ben B. Hayes, Director, Office of Investigations (OI), NRC, when interviewed (Attachment 15) stated he did not specifically recall receiving a telephone call from Billie Garde on the evening of March 8, 1984, to notify him of the detention and seizure of inspection records at Comanche Peak SES. However, Hayes had no reason to doubt that Garde, in fact, telephoned him. Hayes did recall that Richard K. Herr, Director, 01 Field Office, Region IV, had checked with Region IV and learned that the records seized by TUGC0 had already been confiscated by Region IV and were under NRC control. Upon learning that Region IV had control of the records, OI's involvement in the incident ceased.
Hayes comented that had there been an allegation of harassment or intimidation of the QC inspectors, 0I would have investigated. However, no such allegation was ever made.
Hayes ccmmented that sometime in the Summer 1984, he participated in interviews of those QC inspectors still employed at Comanche Peak SES who had been involved in the March 8, 1984, incident. The puroose of the interviews was to learn from the QC inspectors the circumstances surrounding the incident. The QC inspectors stated the issue had been resolved and no one had been fired. None of the QC inspectors made any allegation of harassment or intimidation. Generally, the QC inspectors thought TUGC0 management overreacted to the situation. All the inspectors interviewed stated they did not change any of their inspection procedures and still wrote non conformance reports whenever they observed deficiencies.
Region IV and 01 allegedly failed to act when notified that in September 1983, TUGC0 management oressured a contract inspector to reword nis inscection report concerning tne adecuacy of tne oaint coatings program at Comanche Peak SE5.
Donald D. Driskill, Investigator, 0I Field Office, Region IV, when interviewed (Attachment 16), stated that on September 12, 1983, during an interview of a witness regarding an ongoing OI investigation, he received a copy of a
" Departmental Correspondence" memorandum prepared by Joseph J. Lipinsky, the 08 Cannon and Sons Company (OB Cannon) Cuality Assurance / Quality Control Manager. In the memorandum Lipinsky documented his evaluation of the protective paint coatings program at Comanche Peak SES.
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A review of the memorandum by Oriskill disclosed that Lipinsky visited Comanche Peak SES between July 26-28, 1983, to evaluate the TUGC0 paint coatings program. The memorandum documented a variety of problems with the coatings program. Several weeks after receipt of the Lipinsky memorandum, Driskill prepared an 0I Report of Inquiry to transfer the technical information in the report to Region IV. The reason for the transfer was the memorandum contained information about a poor TUGC0 paint coatings program; however, it did not contain any information regarding licensee misconduct.
Oriskill forwarded the draft Report of Inouiry to his supervisor, Richard Herr, Director, 01 Field Office, Region IV. Herr suggested that Oriskill talk to Lipinsky to confirm that Lipinsky wrote the memorandum and to determine if he had any information to give NRC. On October 14, 1983, Driskill telephonically interviewed Lipinsky. Lipinsky was surprised and concerned that Driskill had a copy of the memorandum and was reluctant to discuss the memorandum with Oriskill. Lipinsky stated.the memorandum was an internal document which was not to be released outside of 08 Cannon. Lipinsky related the memorandum was intended as a trip report to inform his management about what he found during his visit to Comanche Peak SES. Lipinksy further related that the purpose of his July 26-28, 1983, visit to Comanche Peak SES was to evaluate the quality of the Comanche Peak SES protective paint coatings program in accordance with a Consulting Services Contract that 08 Cannon had with TUGCO. Lipinsky further stated his memorandum contained his personal opinion, and OB Cannon Vice President, R.B. Roth, to whom the memorandum was addressed did not agree with Lipinsky on all points contained in the memorandum.
After his telephone interview with Lipinsky, Driskill prepared an 01 Report of Inquiry (Q4-83-026). A copy of the October 18, 1983, 01 Report of Inquiry, along with a copy of the Lipinsky memorandum was forwarded to Region IV for their review of the technical issues. There were no allegations of impropriety for 01 to investigate.
On November 10, 1983, Brooks Griffin, Investigator, 01 Field Office, Region IV, interviewed Lipinsky who was at Comanche Peak SES to discuss the contents of his memorandum with TUGCO. During the interview, Griffin let Lipinsky read a copy of Oriskill's 01 Report of Inquiry, 04-83-026. Lipinsky had no problem with the report and stated that Oriskill had fairly and honestly characterized the October 14, 1983, telephone conversation. Lioinsky made no allegations of harassment or intimioation to Griffin.
On January 16, 1984, while he was in the office of David N. Chapman, QA Manager, TUGCO, Driskill obtained a copy of the transcript of the November 10-11, 1983, meeting between Lipinsky and TUGCO. Driskill reviewed the transcript and provided a copy to Region IV management as an attachment to a February 7, 1984, 01 Report of Inquiry Supplemental. Oriskill did not identify any indications of harassment and intimidation during his review of the transcript.
Oriskill commented that prior to September 1983, OI had conducted several investigations at Comanche Peak SES based en allegations from QC inspectors in the paint coatings department. Additionally, Region IV had been involved in
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reviewing and inspecting the paint coatings program at Comanche Peak. 01's investigations concerned intimidation of QC personnel in the paint coatings group; falsification of paint coatings QC records; and discrimination against a paint coatings QC inspector. Additionally, 01 conducted an inquiry into an allegation concerning the use of improper coating procedures. Among other things, between September and November 1983, Region IV had an NRC inspector from Region III, who was an expert in the paint coatings area, inspect the paint coatings program at Ccmanche Peak SES. Also, in January 1984, Region IV contracted with Brookhaven National Laboratory, to review the paint coatings program.
01 Report of Inquiry 04-83-026, dated October 18, 1983, prepared by Donald D.
Driskill (Attachment 17) was reviewed. The information contained in the Report of Inquiry agreed with the information provided by Driskill during the OIA interview. The inouiry report documented Driskill's receipt of the
" Departmental Correspondence" memorandum and his interview of Lipinsky. As an exhibit to the Report of Inquiry was a ccpy of the " Departmental Correspon-dence." The Report of Inquiry does not contain any allegation of licensee misconduct.
01 Report of Inquiry Supplemental Q4-83-026, dated February 7,1984, prepared by Donald D. Driskill (Attachment 18) was reviewed. The Supplemental Report of Inquiry had as an exhibit a copy of the transcript of the November 10-11, 1983, meeting between TUGC0 and 0.8. Cannon personnel. The transcriot did not contain any indication of harassment or intimidation of Lipinsky by TUGC0 personnel.
Brooks Griffin, Investigator, OI Field Office, Region IV, when interviewed (Attachment 19), stated that on November 10, 1983, while at Comanche Peak SES he interviewed Lipinsky. During the interview, Griffin showed Lipinsky the OI Report of Inquiry, QA-83-026, prepared by Driskill to document the October 14, 1983, telephone conversation between Driskill and Licinsky. Lipinsky read the report and stated it accurately documented what he told Driskill during the telephone interview.
During the interview, Lipinsky told Griffin that he had been asked to come to Comanche Peak SES to discuss a paint coatings contract. When he arrived at the site he was called into a room where Donald Tolson, the Comanche Peak QA Manager, read the internal memorandum Lipinsky had written to his supervisor concerning his inspection of the Comanche Peak SES paint coatings program.
Tolson then discussed why Lipinsky was wrong. Because Lipinsky was not prepared for the interview, the only reply he had for Tolton was that if what Tolson was saying by way of explanation was true then there was no prcblem.
Additionally, because Lipinsky had not talked to many paint coatings QC inspectors nor had he been allowed to review TUGCO's records to any extent, he did not have sufficient background to refute Tolson. Lipinsky's memo to his supervisor was essentially based on the interview of one TUGC0 QA inspector who told Lipinsky what he thought the problem areas were. Lipinsky did not intend for his memorandum to become public. He had out his findings in writing with the thougnt that OB Cannon could obtain a paint coatings contract at Comanche Peak SES. Lipinsky was concerned that his memo becoming public knowleoge could adversely affect his future in the nuclear inaustry because he would be associated with a leak of internal information.
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U T IL9n' u a N 8 10 During the interview, Lipinsky never indicated nor alleged to Griffin that he had been harassed or intimidated. Lipinsky stated he was under pressure because he was unprepared to respond to questions being asked during his meeting with TUGC0.
Joseph Gallo, an attorney with the law firm of Isham, Lincoln, and Beal, and the legal representative of Joseph J. Lipinsky, was contacted in an effort to interview Lipinsky (Attachment 20). Gallo stated that Lipinsky was in the process of testifying before the ASLB concerning his inspection of the Comanche Peak SES paint coatings program and the memorandum he subsequently prepared to document his findings. Lipinsky had been directed by the ASLB not to discuss his testimony with any third party. Because the proposed 01A interview of Lipinsky would be directly related to the matters testified to by Lipinsky before the ASLB, it would not be possible for Lipinsky to be inter-viewed.
OIA reviewed the testimony of Joseph J. Licinsky given before the ASLB between flovember 19-21, 1984, regarding Comanche Peak SES (Attachment 21). Lipinsky related during his testimony that he did not believe he was harassed, intimi dated, or unduly pressured by CB Cannon or TUGC0 to change his August 8,1983,
" Departmental Correspondence" memorandum regarding his evaluation of the Comanche Peak paint coatings program. Lipinsky's testimony provided no indication that he ever reported to the ilRC that he was being harassed or intimidated as a result of the findings cocumented in the memorandum.
In prepared testimony for the ASLB (Attachment 22), Joseph J. Lipinsky detailed his inspection of the Comanche Peak SES paint coatings program, tne preparation of a draft report for OB Cannon management documenting his evaluation of the paint coatings program, and subsecuent discussions of his evaluation with 0B Cannon and TUGC0 management, as well as, the f1RC Office of Investigations. Lipinsky testified that his supervisor slightly modified his memorandum concerning the ability of OB Cannon to accomplish any rework of the Comanche Peak SES paint coatings. Although asked by his supervisor on several occasions to sign the revised report, Lipinsky refused. Lipinsky stated that each time he refused, the matter was dropped. Lipinsky stated that his employment status at 08 Cannon was not threatened in any way by the fact he had written the memorandum, that it had leaked to the public, or that he refused to sign the revised report. Lipinsky stated he was not " railroaded" into changing his opinion. Lipinsky did not indicate that he alleged to 0I that he was being harassed or intimidated.
In an affidavit dated September 28, 1984, before the ASLB concerning Comanene Peak SES (Attachment 23), Joseph J. Lipinsky recounted the circumstances surrounding his preparation of the " Departmental Correspondence" memorandum concerning his evaluation of the Comanche Peak SES paint coatings program.
The affidavit discus:cd in some detail each of the areas mentioned in the memorandum and the fact that the observations and conclusions in the memorandum no longer represented his views or the views of CB Cannon. In the affidavit, Lipinsky asserted he had not been induced in any way to retract nis memorandun, and he had not been subjected to any harassment, intimidation or threats by his employer, the applicants, or anyone associated with the proceeding.
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w n'9t p n ; r'. ? 'f V i ! < U u U. V VI. V 4, s. A 11 Recion IV and OI allegedly failed to act wnen notified that TUGC0 had falsi-fiec inscection reports concernino imoroper installation of liner ciates for the scent fuei tank, refueling cavities, ana two transfer canals.
H. Brooks Griffin, Investigator, 0I Field Office 01, Region IV, when interviewed (Attachment 24), stated that on April 6,1984, he interviewed a confidential GAP witness concerning alleged falsification by TUGC0 of liner plate inspection reports at Comanche Peak SES. The GAP witness reported that she had been instructed to sign off on inspection travelers for quality control (QC) insoections on liner plates she had not performed. This interview was the first involvement by OI in the alleged TUGC0 falsification of liner plate inspection reports. On April 6,1984, Griffin interviewed a second GAP witness who provided corroborating testimony concerning the allegations made during the first interview. During both interviews, Thomas Ippolito, former Project Manager, Comanche Peak SES Technical Review Team (TRT), was present and received copies of both statements.
As a result of the information provided by botn GAP witnesses, OI and the Comanche Peak SES TRT worked together for about a month to review liner plate allegations / problems. After the review, 01 assumed investigative jurisdiction on matters involving possible licensee wrongdoing, and the TRT took responsibility for reviewing the technical issues concerning whether the liner plates were properly manufactured and installed.
During the first of September 1984, Griffin and Tom Currie, EG&G, Idaho, reviewed TUGC0 inspection travelers, and on September 10, 1984, Griffin began active investigation of the allegations of wrongdoing contained in the state-ments of the GAP witnesses. OI Report of Investigation (4-84-039), which was in draft form at the time of the 0IA interview, documented this investigation which consisted of interviews of 16 licensee personnel, including everyone mentioned by the first GAP witness. Many of these interviews were conducted between September and Cctober 1984 Griffin noted that the first GAP witness alleged she was told to sign inspection travelers for inspections of liner plates she did not conduct. However, the practice of " late entry sign-offs,"
where an inspector signs inspection documents for inspections the inspector did not perform as long as there are inspection documents to support the traveler, is common. Apparently, as far as the NRC technical staff and the nuclear industry are concerned, there is no problem with this practice.
Because the first GAP witness had reservations about what she was asked to do by TUGC0 management, she noted on the travelers the fact the entries she made were late. She also incorporated the old construction documents which bore previous QC inspector signatures for inspection steps into the traveler package by renumbering the documents. During any future review, these steps would identify that the entry was a late entry sign-off and the documents used to support the entry would be available.
Although the first GAP witness was concerned with signing for ins::ecticns she did not personally conduct, the OI investigation did not focus on tnat allegation because the practice of late entry sign-offs was not considered improper. However, through a series of interviews, Griffin was able to determine exactly what instructions the first GAP witness receivec from TUGC0 management. It was learned that the instructions to the first witness were to sign-off on the travelers whether or not construction documents (NDE chits) existed to support that inspections were actually conducted. The OI nenne ? t 'inr een y 7 14 Y -
(Kr H i ; i w i w o u. w s.un-4 12 investigation determined that management instructions to sign-off on travelers for which no back-up documents were available were improper.
Griffin further related that on August 24, 1983, he interviewed Arvil Dillingham, Jr., a former B&R general foreman at Comanche Peak SES.
This interview was conducted during the course of an 01 investigation (4-84-006) into allegations of intimidation of employees at Comanche Peak SES.
During the interview, Dillingham provided information concerning his belief that inspection travelers concerning liner plates had been falsified. The purpose of the OI interview of Dillingham was to investigate alleged intimidation at Comanche Peak SES. 01 believed that Dillingham's allegations concerning the liner plates had previously been addressed; therefore, 0I oid not identify his belief that the travelers had been falsified as being an 01 matter. OI referred the Dillingham statement, which contained numerous technical allegations many of which had already been addressed, to Region IV.
Region IV was to refer back to 01 any allegations of wrongdoing that it developed. 01 never received any feedback from Region IV. However, as a result of the information providec during the April 6,1984, interviews of GAP witnesses, the allegations of liner plate inspection traveler falsification, originally mentioned by Dillingham, were thoroughly investigated by 01.
OIA reviewed the transcript of an interview of the first GAP witness conducted at 2:37 p.m. , April 6,1984, by H. Brooks Griffin, 01, and Thomas Ippolito, Comanche Peak SES (TRT) (Attachment 25). Discussed during the interview were numerous technical allegations which were raised by the GAP witness. These allegations were subsequently segregated and issued NRC allegation tracking numbers. Also discussed in detail, on page 60, was an allegation that TUGC0 management wanted the GAP witness to sign between 112-142 travellers for the stainless steel liner plates for the spent fuel pool. The GAP witness was concerned that she was signing for inspections that she did not personally conduct.
01A reviewed the transcript of an interview of a second GAP witness conducted at 6:55 p.m. , April 6,1984, by H. Brooks Griffin, 01, and Thomas Ippolito, Comanche Peak TRT (Attachment 26). Discussed during the interview were numerous technical allegations raised by the GAP witness. Also briefly commented on by the second GAP witness, on page 88 of the transcript, was her knowledge of falsification of documentation. The second GAP witness cor-roborated the testimony of the first GAP witness.
OIA reviewed the transcript of an interview of Arvill Dillingham, Jr., con-ducted on August 24, 1983, by Richard K. Herr and H. Brooks Griffin, 01 Field Office, Region V (excerpts at Attachment 27). Among the allegations documented in the transcript, Dillingham discussed his concern that travelers for stainless steel fuel liner plates were being falsely prepared.
Thomas F. Westerman, Enforcement Officer, Region IV, when interviewed (Attach-ment 28), stated that upon ccmpletion of the OI investigation into the concerns raised by Arvill Dillingnam, Jr., in his August 24, 1983, interview, 0I provided Westerman with a copy of the transcript. In addition to the August 24, 1983, transcript, Westerman had on file two other affidavits by Dillingham dated March 31, 1983, and June 27, 1983, whicn documented his concerns with the construction at Comanche Peak.
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- w i t u.m u s i. Jai t. r 13 Although the issues raised by Dillingham in the first two affidavits had previously been investigated by NRC, in April 1984 Westennan provided the three affidavits to a Region IV inspector for review and research. However, also in April 1984, the NRC Comanche Peak TRT arrived at Region IV to review and attempt to resolve allegations of construction deficiencies at Comanche Peak SES. Consequently, the TRT assumed responsibility for all allegations at Comanche Peak SES. The Dillinghan affidavits, as well as any other allegations concerning the liner plates at Comanche Peak, were turned over to the TRT for resolution.
In a memorandum dated April 4,1984, (Attachment 29) H. Brooks Griffin, 0I Field Office, Region IV, provided Thomas F. Westennan, Inspection and Enforcement Officer, Region IV, with a copy of the transcript of the OI interview of Arvill Dillingham.
In a Technical Interview conducted on December 10, 1984, (excerpts at Attach-ment 30) between the NRC Comanche Peak TRT and intervenors, the issue of the stainless steel spent fuel pool liners was discussed. Both technical and falsification issues were discussed. Vincent S. Noonan, Project Director for the Comanche Peak TRT, stated he had issued a memorandum to the NRC staff directing them to fonnalize a position on whether the spent fuel pool liners were safety or non-safety related. Also during the interview, it was noted that the alleged falsification gf the inspection travelers for the spent fuel pool liners was the subject of a separate investigation by OI.
In a memorandum dated Decemoer 7,1984, (Attachment 31) from Vincent S.
Noonan, Project Director, Comanche Peak TRT, to various NRC Branch Chiefs, Noonan requested that the staff prepare a statement of the NRC staff's position on the need for the spent fuel pool liner to be designed and constructed as a Seismic Category I structure, and/or a safety-related,10 CFR 50, Appendix B structure. As enclosures to the memorandum were two NRC Inspection Reports, 50-445/77-13 and 50-445/79-15, which provided information on Region IV's past inspections of the spent fuel pool liner.
Inspection Report 77-13 documented Region IV's inspection of the welding of fillet joints for the attachment of leak chase channels and of tacks for the attachment of backing bars for the butt weld seams for stainless steel liners.
Inspection Report 79-15 documented a special investigation of allegations received regarding improper and potentially very poor welding of inter-plate seams in the Unit 1 Refueling Pool, spent fuel pools, and transfer canal of tne common facility Fuel Handling Building.
Conclusion The facts developed during this investigation indicate that Region IV was not sufficiently sensitive to reports concerning the detention by TUGC0 management of Comanche Peak SES quality control inspectors and the subsequent search of their desks and files. OIA believes that Region IV should have more promptly responded to the anonymous allegations by acting to gather firsthand information concerning the ongoing incicent. Regicn IV woulc have then been better able to decide whether the situation was a TUGC0 labor-maragement dispute or whether additional NRC involvement was required.
I The OIA investigation did not develop any indication that the 08 Cannon inspector believed or reported that he was harassed, intimated, or unduly errmt ?,1 tiX M 1 V i+i.o i ,o .m .1
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14 pressured in connectici. with his " Departmental Correspondence" memorandum.
Consequently, we believe Region IV and 0I acted appropriately in this matter.
01A believes that Region IV and 0I responded appropriately to reports received in April 1984, concerning the alleged falsification of spent fuel pool liner plates by TUGCO. As a result of these allegations, the 01 Field Office, Region IV, conducted an investigation into possible licensee wrongdoing and the NRC Comanche Peak TRT reviewed the technical concerns with the spent fuel pool liner plates. OIA noted, however, that the 01 Field Office, Region IV received information in August 1983, that inspection reports for the spent fuel pool liner plates were being falsely prepared. Because this was not identified as an 0I matter at that time, investigation of this issue was inappropriately delayed until the allegations were again received in April 1984 pp.Mj $0
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. I ATTACHMENTS
- 1. Report of Interview - Billie P. Garde, dated November 7, 1984
- 2. Report of Interview - Paul S. Check, dated May 1,1985.
- 3. Notes by Paul S. Check re Ccmanche Peak.
4 Excerpts of Deposition of Billy R. Clements, dated July 10, 1984
- 5. Excerpts of Testimony of Billy R. Clements, dated September 11, 1984
- 6. Report of Interview - Richard P. Denise, dated May 3, 1985.
- 7. Notes by Richard P. Denise re Comanche Peak.
- 8. Memo,
Subject:
B&R QC Inspection Material Impounded by NRC at CPSES, dated April 20, 1984
- 9. Report of Interview - Doyle M. Hunnicutt, dated May 9,1985.
- 10. Testimony of Doyle M. Hunnicutt, w/ attachments.
- 11. List of questions and Summaries of Interview.
- 12. Excerpts of Testimony of Doyle M. Hunnicutt, dated October 1, 1984
- 13. Report of Interview - James E. Cummins, dated May 6,1985.
- 14. Excerpts of Testimony of James E. Cummins, dated July 17, 1984
- 15. Report of Interview - Ben B. Hayes, dated May 6, 1985.
- 16. Report of Interview - Donald D. Driskill, dated May 6,1985.
- 17. 01 Report of Inquiry, 04-83-026, dated October 18, 1983.
- 18. OI Report of Inquiry Supplemental, 04-83-026, dated February 7,1984
- 19. Report of Interview - Brooks Griffin, dated May 2,1985. '
- 20. Report of Interview - Joseph Gallo, dated May 8, 1985.
- 21. Review of Testimony, dated May 29, 1985.
- 22. Testimony of Joseph J. Lipinsky.
- 23. Affidavit of Joseph J. Lipinsky, dated September 28, 1984.
4 24 Report of Interview - Brooks Griffin, dated May 2,1985.
- 25. Confidential Interview, dated 2
- 37 p.m. , April 6,1984
- 26. Confidential Interview, dated 6:55 p.m., April 6,1984
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- 27. Interview of Arvill Dillingham Jr., dated August 24, 1983.
- 28. Report of Interview - Thomas F. Westerman, dated May 3,1985.
- 29. Memo,
Subject:
Release of Portions of Dillingham's Transcript.
- 30. Excerpts of Technical Interview, dated December 10, 1984.
- 31. Memo,
Subject:
Preparation of a Statement on the NRC Staff's Position on the Spent Fuel-Liner, w/ attachments, dated December 7,1984.
o \
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
)
TEXAS UTILITIES GENERATING )
COMPANY, et al. ) Docket Nos. 50-445-OL
) and 50-446-OL (Comanche Peak Steam Electric )
Station, Units 1 and 2) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE By my signature below, I hereby certify that true and correct copies of CASE's REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY with attachment have been sent to the persons listed below this 15th day of May 1986 by: Express mail where indicated by *; Hand-delivery where indicated by **; and First Class Mail unless otherwise indicated.
Administrative Judge Peter B. Bloch**
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Kenneth A. McCollom 1107 West Knapp Stillwater, Oklahoma 74075 Dr. Walter H. Jordan 881 W. Outer Drive Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37830 Elizabeth B. Johnson Oak Ridge National Laboratory P.O. Box X, Building 3500 Oak Ridge, TN 37830 l
.-_ ...._J
\
Ellen Ginsberg, Esq.**
U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Robert A. Wooldridge, Esquire Worsham, Forsythe, Sampels
& Wooldridge 2001 Bryan Tower, Suite 3200 Dallas, Texas 75201 Nicholas Reynolds, Esquire Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell & Reynolds 1200 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036 Stuart Treby, Esquire **
Geary S. Mizuno, Esquire Office of Executive Legal Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Docketing & Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Renea Hicks, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Supreme Court Building Austin, Texas 78711 Mrs. Juanita Ellis President, CASE 1426 S. Polk Dallas, Texas 75224 Mr. W.G. Counsil Executive Vice. President Texas Utilities Generating Co.
Skyway Tower, 25th Floor 400 N. Olive Street Dallas, Texas 75201 Mr. Roy P. Lessy, Jr.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
-Mr. Thomas G. Dignan, Jr.
Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 hi ?. Ou /c i BILLIE P. GARDEf 9
k a
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