ML20197C682
| ML20197C682 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Rancho Seco |
| Issue date: | 10/30/1986 |
| From: | Julie Ward SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT |
| To: | Miraglia F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197C690 | List: |
| References | |
| JEW-86-652, TAC-61631, TAC-62083, TAC-62983, NUDOCS 8611060350 | |
| Download: ML20197C682 (392) | |
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$SMUD SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT P. O. Box 15830, Sacramento CA 95852-1830,(916) 452 3211 AN ELECTRIC SYSTEM SERVING THE HEART OF CALIFORNIA JEW 86-652 October 30, 1986 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention: Frank J. Miraglia, Jr.
Division of PWR L'icensing-B U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington D C 20555 Docket 50-312 Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station Unit il DISTRICT RESPONSE TO NRC REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
References:
- 1. NRC to SMUD May 30, 198t
- 2. Enclosure 2 of NRC to SMUD, September 5, 1986
Dear Mr. Miraglia:
In order to gather additional technical information necessary for the preparation of an SER supporting the restart of Rancho Seco, a technical team, under the direction of Mr. Richard Kendall, visited the site from September 9th through September 11, 1986 to meet with District personnel. Daring that meeting, the District discussed in detail, with the NRC team, its responses to the questions contained in references 1 & 2. Attachment 1 documents the District's response to the referenced questions as presented by the District during the meeting. Additional supporting technical information as requested by the team is also included in the attachment. ICS and NNI schematic drawings along with the Instrument Air System p&ID will be sent under separate cover. If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact Ray Ashley, our Manager of Nuclear Licensing. Sincerely, n Ward l Deputy General Manager, Nuclear ) Attachments l cc: Sydney Miner, NRC, Bethesda Tony D'angelo, NRC, Rancho Seco 0 86110603Sc 861030 PDR ADOCh 0000 ]2 g\s P i l DISTRICT HEADQUART6RS O 6201 S Stroot, Sacramento CA 95817 1899
JEW 86-652 October 30, 1986 be: W. K. Latham w/o attachment J. E. Ward (4) w/o attachment K. Perkins/G. Coward w/o attachment R. L. Ashley w/o attachment D. Poole/B. Croley/T. Tucker w/o attachment D. Gillispie/G. Cranston w/o attachment T. Lutkehaus/J. Shetler w/o attachment S. Knight w/o attachment R. Colombo w/o attachment P. G. Delezenski w/ attachment G. C. Andognini (MS 200) w/o attachment Fourth Floor Files w/ attachment Licensing Files (MS 37) w/ attachment R.S. Adm. Files (MS 203) w/ attachment Plaza 50 Files w/ attachment i 1 j t I
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. RANCHO SECO CORRESPONDENCE CHECK SHEET Letter No: JEW 86-652 Final Agency Due Date: 10/15/86 Responsible Dato Submitted to Individual: Jerry Williams / Linda Conklin Licensing /NORC: 10/7/86 Regulatory Agency: NRC (NRR)
Title or
Subject:
District Response to NRC Request for Information Summary: During week of 9/9/86, an NRC technical team visited Rancho Seco to discuss the Districts response to NRC request for information in referfnses (1) & (2). A sinnificant number of questions focused on ICS/NNI modification activities as well as SPDS/R.G. 1.97/CRDR and EFIC. This letter documents the Districts response as presented to the NRC team during_its visit. Commitments in this letter: Commitments in this package have been reviewed by PAG at various times throughout the QCI-12 process. In addition, a_ preliminary version of the report was sent for review by all interested departments and mananement.(See attadth
.rpggj Furthermore, the report contains a disclaimer stating: "The followinn responses include modifications which are currently scheduled to be implemented prior to restart. Since designs and system reviews are in progress, some details may change."
Commitment Assigned to: Due Date: I Commitment Number: Final Letter Concurrence with Dates: Licensing /NORC Record Summary:
' ^
v Disc pl e S pe visor: '
- w. (1) NRC to SMUD 5/30/86 Principal Project Engir er: (2) NRC to SMUD Enclosure 2, pI -
fl 975/86 T). Tbo l et l_ _ Z h ! j/ ( 2
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Manager, e i Manager y Nuc.Eng' oc. Ops: R.Adje g Licensing:, g . gt'.hg NORC: 3 da fa
/~Other: __ __O ~5N bec _[h Licensing /NORC Correspondence Closeout Summary: ,
Correspondence Signed By: Date: Original & CC Distributed By: Date: BCC Distnbuted: Date: SYVD 14 2 4 1 H 4
r SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT RESPONSE TO NRC'S REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON
"?STRUMENT AND CONTROL SYSTEMS r]
l 1 E THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES INCLUDE MODIFICATIONS WHICH ARE CURRENTLY SCHEDULED TO BE IMPLEMENTED PRI,OR TO RESTART. SINCE DESIGNS AND SYSTEM REVIEWS ARE IN PROGRESS, SOME DETAILS MAY CHANGE. n v \ J
l REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION INDEX Page 1.0 INTEGRATED CONTROL SYSTEM (ICS) - (3.1) 1 1.0a Address Correlation of ICS Power Supplies to Onsite 1 Emergency Buses 1.0b Identify the Class IE or Non-Class IE Qualification of 1 Power Supplies & Distribution Systems ' 1.0c Identify components and Systems Controlled by ICS 2 1.0d Include Diagrams of Controls and Power Supplies 3 1.1 Loss of ICS dc Power Issue - (3.1) 1.la State Position of Components Controlled by ICS Following 4 Loss of de Power 1.lb Explain how a Single Power Supply Monitor (PSM) Failure 5 Caused Total Loss of de Power 1.lc Identify similar S1 and S2 Switches in the Plant 5 1.ld Address Root Cause Determination 5 1.le Address Sensitivity of Resistance at Input of PSM 6 1.lf Address Delay Trip of S1 and S2 Switches 7 1.19 Request that a FMEA be done for PSM and ICS and 8 Interfacing Systems [ 1.lh Address Loss of Remote Control of Affected Valves from 10 , Control i 1.11 Discuss the Independence of ICS with Respect to ESPAS 11 such as MSLFL, EPIC 1.11 Address Backup Controls and Locations, and Indicate if 11 , they are Independent of ICS, and are Governed by ! Tech. Specs. and are Safety Related i 1.1k Address Vulnerability of Total Loss of ICS de Power as a 15 nceult of Singic Psilure of PSM 1.11 Propose Independent PSM per Power Supply 15 1.lm Assess Failures of Loss of dc Power Relay to Connect 15 . Battery-Backed Power Source , 1.In Address Qualification and Testability of Above Relay 15 ; 1.lo Discuss " Crosstalk
- Problems if Redundant PSM are used 16 1.lp Discuss Remote Shutdown Panel Capability 16 i
1.1q Additional 1.1 ICS/NNI Questions 17 Note Numbers in parenthesis refer to the NRC Draft SER Outline O i
Page 1.2 Restoration of ICS de Power Issue - (3.1) 20 O (_/ 1.2a Indicate Position of Components Following Restoration 20 of ICS Power including: 1.2a-1 Analysis to Determine the Position of Components 20 Upon Restoration of ICS Power 1.2a-2 Effect of These Positions on Plant Transient 20 Condition and Safety Margin 1.2a-3 How These Ef fects are Minimized 20 1.3 Additional Issues - Address the Following: - (3.1) 20 1.3a Total Loss of ac Power 20 1.3b Single Failure Vulnerability of Automatic Bus Transfer 21 Switch 1.3c Partial Loss of ac Power or dc Power 21 1.3d Partial Restoration of ac of dc Power 22 1.3d-1 Indicate if Issues have been addressed by SMUD 22 1.3d-2 How does a loss of partial power effect the plant? 23 1.3d-3 How does Repowering effect the plant? 24 1.3d-4 Discuss Effect of other ICS Failures and Indicate 24 whether these should be more or less severe than loss of power events 2.0 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (AFW) SYSTEM - (3.1) 26 26 O 2.0a 2.0b Include Functional Diagram State Whether the Motor or the Turbine of the AFW Dual 26 Drive Pump are Auto Start 2.1 AFW Control valves Behavior on Loss of ICS Issue - (3.1) 26 2.2 emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) system Iccuc - (3.1) 25 2.2a Discuss Comment in page 10-3, Item 11, NUREG-1195 26 2.2b Discuss SG Overall Protection 27 2.2c Why Are We Not Installing EFIC Time Delays for Restart? 28 3.0 MAIN FEEDWATER (MFW) SYSTEM - (3.1) 29 3.0a Include Functional Diagram 29 3.1 MFW Control Valves & Pump Speed Behavior on Loss of ICL 29 and Line Isolation Issue 3.la Address the Role Played by ICS on Isolation 29 3.lb Address Feasibility of Status Quo Position 29 of Components Following Loss of ICS O 11 L
Pagt
- 4.0 MAIN STEAM SYSTEM - (3.1) 30 4.0a Include Functional Diagram 30 4.0b Discuss Reasons for Placing Cover on Main l
Steam Relief Valves to Prevent Vacuum Leaks 30 4.1 Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs) Behavior on__ Loss of ICS Issue 30
\
4.la Address the Modification that the valve will 30 Open to its 50% Positloa if the ICS is not Powered 4.lb Address the Effect of Failure of ICS Aux Relay 30 in all the Components where it Participates 4.lc Indicate Whether Valves can be Modulated 30 4.ld Role Played by IDADS in Monitoring ADV Solenoids 31 4.le Discuss Independence of Power Supply From ICS 31 4.2 Turbine Bypass Valves (TBVs) Behavior on Loss of ICS Issue 31 4.2a Address the Modification that the valve will 31 i Open to its 50% Position if the ICS is not Powered 4.2b Address the Effect of Failure of ICS Aux Relay 32 in all the components where it participates 4.2c Indicate Whether Valves can be Modulated 32 l 4.2d Role Played by IDADS in Monitoring ADV Solenoids 32 l 4.2e Discuss Independence of Power Supply From ICS 33 4.3 Main Steam Line Failure Logic Response Time Issuc 33 4.3a Review Licensee Submittal of February 19, 1986, 33 Page 12 and provide the SMUD resolution 4.4 Steam Generator Overfill Protection Issue 34 4.4a Provide OMUD Recolution of the I cuo 34 5.0 MAKEUP /HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEM - (3.2) 35 5.0a Include Functional Diagrams 35 5.0b Discuss Alarms and Protective Interlocks 35 5.1 Loss of Pump Suction Issue 37 5.la Address Consequences of Loosing RCP Seal Injection 37 Plow when Pumps are not Running 5.lb Address Vulnerability of RCP Seal Injection to Single 38 Failure Concurrent with Loss of Offsite Power 5.2 Additional HPI Question 5.2a Address the replacement of erroneous HPI Transmitters 38 O 111 t- -
Pagt 6.0 REMOTE AND LOCAL INDICATIONS - (4.5 and 4.6) 39 () 6.1 Display and Alarm System Description - Provide the Following: 39 6.la Include SPDS, Annunciator, RG 1.97, Instrumentation 39 Bailey Computer, Interim Data Acquisition Display System (IDADS) and NNI 6.lb Indicate whether Systems are Safety-Related 40 6.lc Identify Power Supply Division as Related to Division 42 for ICS and NNI 6.ld Address Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation 42 6.2 Indication Issues - Discuss the Following: 42 6.2a Loss of ICS Power Alarm and Interactions with Fan 42 Power Failure 6.2b Main Feedwater (MFW) Flow Recorders Affected by the ICS 46 6.2c Generator Frequency Indicator 47 6.2d Difference Between SG Level Valves Monitored by SPDS 48 and Other Control Room Indications 6.2e HPI/RCS Injection Valve Position 48 6.2f Main System Relief Valve Open Monitor 49 Reactor Building Radiation Monitor 50 6.29 6.2h Address Increase of Sample Frequency of IDADS 50 6.21 Address Loss of Indication when ICS Power is not 50 Available 6.2j Discuss the Independence of PWR to Instruments 51 6.2k Discuss Adequacy of Remaining Instrumentation 51 O Following Power Failure of ICS or NNI 7.0 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ICS, NNI AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS ISSUE - (3.1) 52 7.1 Provide a Discussion of this Issue 52 8.0 OTHER ISSUES 54 8.1 Diesel cenerators Capacity Issue - Discuss the Following: - (4.7) 54 (Discussion will be Supplied in a Separate District Response) l l iv L
P?gt 8.2 containment Isolation of Essential Systems Issue - (3.2) 54 8.2a Address Damage to Radiation Monitor 54 8.2b Address the Response to Item II.E.4.2 of NUREG-0737 56 8.3 Immediate Loss of Air Supply to ICS Components Issue - (3.1) 57 8.3a Address Safety-Related Classification of Air Supply 57 System 8.3b Indicate if Air Supply System is Connected to the 59 Emergency Buses 8.3b-1 Discuss the Rupture of Airline 59 8.3b-2 Address the Consequences of Losing Air Supply 59 System as a Result of Losing Offsite Power 8.4 Loss of Offsite Power Concurrent with the Loss of ICS Issue - (3.1) 60 8.4a Provide a Discussion of this Issue ' 60 9.0 HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES - (3.6) 61 9.1 Address the Need for Better Diagnostic for Breaker Position 61 Indication, e.g., Simplified Electrical Schematics - (3.6.1) 9.2 Address the Need for Valve Position Indication for TBVs, ADVs, 61 and AFW Control Valves - (3.6.2) 9.3 Address the Need to Correct the Noise Problem with Control 62 Room HVAC - (3.6.3) 9.4 Address the Desirability of Having Separate Alarms for "ICS" 62 and " Fan Power Failure" - (3.6.4) 10.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 63 10.1 Address the Existing Requirements Governing the Operability 63 of Systems and Components Addressed Herein 10.2 Address the Need for Changing Technical Specifications 63 as Operating Procedures are Revised i v l O L
i LIST OF FIGURES , i t i Figure 1.0a-1 Emergency Diesel Generator Power Distribution Train A l Figure 1.0a-2 Emergency Diesel Generator Power Distribution Train B j Figure 1.0b-1 ICS Power
! Figure 1.0b-2 NNI-X Power l Figure 1.0b-3 NNI-Y/Z Power
} Figure 1.0d-l NNI-X 118 VAC Power Distribution Schematic Diagram l Figure 1.0d-2 NNI-X 118 VAC Power Distribution Schematic Diagram ' j Figure 1.0d-3 NNI-Y 118 VAC Power Distribution Schematic Diagram i Figure 1.0d-4 NNI-Y 118 VAC Power Distribution Schematic Diagram i Figure 1.0d-5 ICS Power Distribution Schematic Diagram l Figure 1.0d-6 ICS Power Distribution Schematic Diagram Figure 1.0d-7 NNI-Z Power Distribution Schematic Diagram i Figure 1.la-1 ICS/NNI Controlled Components j Figure 1.lp-l Emergency Shutdown Panel Power Supply , i Figure 1.1p-2 Emergency Shutdown Panel (H2SD) j Figure 1.1p-3 Legend for H2SD i Figure 1.1p-4 Loop Diagram Control PNL, Shutdown Isolation H2SD ) Figure 1.3c-1 ICS Power Distribution 1 Figure 1.3c-2 X Power Supply i Figure 1.3c-3 Y and Z Power Supplies Figure 3.0a-1 Main Feedwater System Figure 3.la-1 EFIC/ICS Control MFW Valves i i O Figure Figure 3.la-2 3.la-3 EFIC Control MFW Valves EFIC/ICS Control of MFW Block Valves Figure 3.la-4 EPIC Control of MFW Isolation Valves ,
; Figure 4.0a-1 Main Steam System L j Figure 4.0a-2 Major Steam Valves !
j Figure 4.0b-1 Punction of Covers on Discharge Elbows of MSR f i Rellet Valve j Figure 5.0a-1 Simplified PEID for Seal Injection and Makeup System , j Figure 6.lc-1 Computer and Signal Conversion Power Supplies j Figure 8.3a-1 ADV Control Scheme and Air Supply i Figure 8.3a-2 TBV Control Scheme and Air Supply f !! Figure 8.4a-1 Power Supply Matrix t l Figure 9.1-1 S1/S2 Switches ' Figure 9.1-2 ICS/NNI Power Distribution Labels , Figure 10.2-1 Proceduce Change Flow Diagram , ,3 ! i i i 1 vi e k i l 1 I l- - - . _ . - . - - . - - . - . . . - - , - . . -. - _ - - . --. - .
LIST OF ATTACHMENTS O Attachment 1.lg-1 (31pgs)ICS/NNI DFC Report, w/o Attachments Attachment 1.lj-1 Plant Control and Indication Attachment 1.1o-1 Crosstalk Discussion Attachment 1.3-1 ICS Instrumentation of Control Which is not Functional on Loss of ICS AC Power Only Attachment 1.3-2 (2pgs) ICS Instrumentation or Control Which is Functional on Loss of ICS AC Power Only Attachment 1.3-3 (10pgs) NNI and ICS Instrumentation or Control Which is not Functional on Loss of ICS AC Power Only Attachment 1.3-4 (5pgs) NNI and ICS Instrumentation or Control Which is Functional on Loss of ICS AC Power Only " Attachment 6.la-1 (2pgs) General Outline of Functions that IDADS and DRMS-Accomplish Attachment 6.ld-l Inadequate Core Cooling Display Attachment 6.id-2 (6pgs) Reactor Inventory Tracking System (RITS) Information Package Attachment 6.2a-1 (4pgs) Evaluate ICS Annunciator and NNI Closure Report . Attachment 6.2d-1 (13pgs)SPDS vs Strip Chart for OTSG Operate Level Closure Report Attachment 6.2f-l Simplified Code Safety Diagram ' Attachment 6.2f-2 Main Steam Safety Valve Position Indication Loop Attachment 8.3a-1(23pgs) Report of the Deterministic Failure Consequence Analysis for the Instrument Air System Attachment 8.3a-2( 37 pgs ) Instrument Air System / Service Air System-System () Status R,eport Attachment 9.1-2 (7pgs) ECN, DBR and Test Specification for R-0472 Attachment 9.1-3 (6pgs) Casualty Procedure C.14; Partial Loss of NNI Power Attachment 9.1-4 (8 pgs ) Casualty Procedure C.15; Loss of NNI "X" Power Attachment 9.1-5 (8pgs) Casualty Procedure C.16; Loss of NNI 'Y" Power Attachment 9.1-6 (9 pgs ) Casualty Procedure C.17; Complete Loss of NNI Po.'er Attachment 9.1-7 (Spgs) Cacualty Procedure C.40; Lecc/nectoration of ICS Power Attachment 9.2-1 ( 3 pgJ ) ECN R-0828; valve Position Indication ADV's, TBV's, MFW and S-U Feedwater Valve Attachment 9.2-2 (8pgs) Design Basis Report for ECN R-0823; Valve Position Indication ADV's, TBV's, MFW and S-U Peedwater Valve Attachment 9.3-1 (85 pgs) HVAC System - System Status Report vii O S L
} 1.0 Integrated control system (Ics) 1.0a Address Correlation of ICS Power Supplies to Onsite Emergency 1 Buses I
Response
Power supply arrangement is shown on attached Figures 1.0a-1 ]
- ' and 1.0a-2. There is a normal source and an alternate ac source to ICS/NNI cabinets. The normal power supply source to these cabinets is from load center S3B2 through Battery i
- Charger H4BGB, and the alternate source is from load center S3A2 through Battery Charger H4BGA. The normal supply is backed by Diesel Generator GEB2 and Battery BGB. The alternate j power supply has Diesel Generator GEA2 and Battery BGA as i backup source. .In case of the loss of normal power supply, j bus S3B2 is loaded to Diesel Generator GEB2. On loss of Diesel Generator GEB2, Battery BGB would continue to supply the ! ICS/NNI through inverter SlGB. On depletion of Battery BGB, up J to a predetermined voltage level, the Automatic Bus Transfer Switch (ABT) in the ICS/NNI cabinets would transfer to the j alternate power source S3A2/ Diesel Generator GEA2. These two l power supply sources are independent of each other and there is l no tie between the two sources upstream of the ABT, up to and including the Diesel Generator Buses between the normal and alternate power supply to the ICS/NNI cabinets. ) 1.0b Identify the Class lE or Non-Class lE Qualifica_ tion of Power J Supplies and Distribution Systems O Response j Battery chargers, H4BGA and H4BGB, act as isolation devices between Class 1 and Class 2 power supplies. Equipment l Battery chargers downstream of battery chargers are Class 2. l are accepted as isolation devices by IEEE STD 384-1977. l Figures 1.0b-1 through 1.0b-3 show internal power distribution j system in ICS/NNI cabinets. f 1 l
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J 1 1 l NRCREPOR(c) Page 1 l 4 1 i \
1.0c Idintify compon:nts and Systsms controlled by tha ICS
Response
The following Systems / Components are controlled by the ICS: O System / Component Drawing PULSER (77) N21.01-71 TURBINE GOV VALVE PY-20561, 63, 64, 66 N21.01-72 TSVs E/P ROD INSERT / WITHDRAW N21.01-75 DEMAND = POWER
- FY-20525 E/P N21.01-79 MFW VALVE LOOP A
- FY-20575 E/P N21.01-79 SU VALVE LOOP A ,
- FY-20526 E/P N21.01-80 MFW VALVE LOOP B
- FY-20576 E/P N21.01-80 SU VALVE LOOP B FW PUMP SPEED N21.01-81
() PUMP A FW PUMP SPEED N21.01-81 ' PUMP B The following Systems / Components are controlled by the NNI: HY-22011 E/P N15.07-76 LETDOWN BYPASS PLOW PRESSURIZER CONTROL, N1'5.07-64 HEATER, SPRAY, EMOV FY-23606A N15.07-74 E/P RCP SEAL SUPPLY LY-21503 N15.07-74 E/P RC MAKE-UP FLOW
- Receive priority close commands from EFIC NRCREPOR(c) Page 2 1
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1.0d Includa Di& grams of Centrols and Power Supplies
Response
Power supply diagrams (Figures 1.0a and 1.0b) and control schematics (Figures 1.0d-l Thru 1.0d-7) are attached.
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1.1 Loma of ICS dc Powtr Isaun 1.la State Position of Components Controlled by ICS following Loss of dc Power , O Response The atmospheric dump valves and the auxiliary feedwater valves are a part of EFIC and will have control from EPIC, independent of ICS. Turbine bypass valve control is not required to maintain RCS temperature and pressure control within the post trip window. On loss of ICS power, the TBV's will be automatically closed. Main teedwater valve, startup feedwater valve and Main Feedwater block valve fail positions were found to be acceptable. The Auxiliary Steam reducing station will now fail at setpoint. This will maintain the amount of steam flow and eliminate the header overpressure problem. The auxiliary steam station will continue to control header pressure at the last setpoint. The operator can change the setpoint if desired. The Pulser (77) and Rod Insert / Withdraw fail positions were acceptable, since the reactor and main turbine will trip after
- a loss of ICS power. Manual rod control is still available at the Diamond station, and manual control of the turbine is available at the Westinghouse Control Station.
The PORV failure position of closed is acceptable. This (V~T prevents opening of the PORV when not required, and the code safeties still provide overpressure protection. The pressurizer Spray valve failure position of closed is acceptable. This prevents an unwanted decrease in plant pressure with the code safeties providing overpressure protection. The Pressurizer Heaters failure position of off is acceptable. This is consistent with the pressurizer spray valve failure mode and also insures that pressurizer heaters are not energized without being covered by water. The pressurizer makeup valve fai. lure position of 50% open is acceptable. This establishes a makeup flow path. The operator may secure the flow by closing SFAS valve SV-22604 from the main control room. NRCREPOR(c) Page 4 b v
, - - .---- ------- -a , - - - - - ,-
' The RC pump ssal supply valve failure position of 50% open is acceptable. This position insures continuous flow to the reactor coolant pump seals. The operator may secure flow by () closing SFAS valve SV-23616 from the main control room. The letdown bypass flow control valve failure position of 50% open is acceptable. This position insures continuous letdown flow. The operator may secure flow by closing SFAS valve SV-22009 from the main control room. See attached Figure 1.la-1, sheet 1 for ICS controlled components and sheet 2 for NNI controlled components. 1.lb Explain how a Single Power Supply Monitor (PSM) Failure Caused Total Loss of dc Power. Res ponse Evidence, obtained after the December 26, 1985 trip, supports the District's belief that the power supply monitor did not fai'l but, in fact, performed its required function. Test ' results by Scientific Application International Corporation (SAIC) have shown that, although the PSM that was installed in the ICS did have a cold solder joint, this could not have caused the 12/26/85 trip (See 1.ld). 1.lc Identify Similar Si and S2 Switches in the Plant
Response
() Similar shunt trip switches are installed in the NNI X and NNI Y power supply systems; two in NNI X and two in NNI Y. The switches are Heinemannn Electric Co.., Cat. No. 70-333-2 part number 1942310A16. All S1 and S2 switches will be replaced every five (5) years per the manufacturer's recommendations. 1.ld Address Root Cause Determination
Response
Investigation of the de power distribution af ter the December 26, 1985 trip, revealed a bad crimp of a solderless terminal lug connection on the positive 24V de distribution bus in the ICS cabinet #1. This bus is connected to the main positive 24V de power auctioneer bus panel in Cabinet 43. This bad termination point caused a high resistance in series with the power supply monitors +24V de sensing lead. This resistance, which would have varied depending upon how bad the connection was and its state of deterioration,'could have caused a sufficient voltage drop to cause the power supply monitor to-trip S1 and S2, the ac input to all de power supplies. This problem was further adversely affected by a higher than normal curtent flowing through this bad connection due to additional electronic modules that were fed by this bus. The power supply monitor and 23 other electronic modules are installed in the ICS cabinet #2 that is fed by this bus. () ICS cabinet #1 does not contain any de loads fed by this bus; it is only a distribution point. NRCREPOR(c) Page 5
The additional current drawn by the 23~ electronic modules l 1 calculated to be in the order of 500 ma and the 65 ma drawn by the PSM would cause a voltage drop sufficient to cause a trip by the PSM if the resistance was as little as four (4) ohms. The power supply monitor is set to trip at 22 . volts dc. i Therefore, a voltage drop of (.565) x (4) = 2.26 volts would be suffic'ient to cause the PSM to trip. 1.le Address Sensitivity of Resistance at Input'of PSM l
- Response '
I The PSM is sensitive to resistance at the input terminals, j because it is sensing a voltage that will be reduced due to the current drawn through any external resistance. The design that i was installed in the ICS during the December 26, 1985 trip , subjected the PSM to unnecessary voltage drops on its censing
! leads due to external resistance, because the'PSM was included l in a ' daisy chain" that provided power to 23 additional
} electronic modules. That is, the current required by the 23 electronic modules caused any external resistance to be more of + a problem than it would have been if the PSM had been connected , to the main de buses by its own sensing leads. As discussed in 4 the root cause determination, if the current across the assumed 4 ohm resistor was only due to the PSM, i.e., 65 ma, the < voltage drop would have been only 0.26 volts. The 0.26 volt , l drop would not have been enough to cause the PSM to trip. The i voltage seen by the PSM would have been +23.74V de, which is l not low enough to trip the PSM. Considering only the 65 ma j current, the resistance required to lower the voltage to the
- trip voltage (22V) would be 30.77 ohms. This value has been ~
j verified by the testing lab (SAIC). Since the December 26, 1985 trip, a modification has been.made ' a to the ICS power supply monitor sensing circuitry to wire two l individual #20 AWG leads directly to two termination points on l l each of the main + 24V de buses. This modification will 4 greatly reduce the possibility of problems with resistance i between the buses and the PSM inputs, since each PSM sensing ' i input will be terminated to two independent points on each main bus. ~ i ' j l i 1.le supplemental Are PSM modifications consistent with BWOG recommendations and SAIC recommendations? l I Response l The B&W Owners Group (BWOG) has recommended modification of PSM l wiring in a similar manner as Rancho Seco. SAIC made various I recommendations that included the modification that Rancho Seco ! implemented. In addition, they recommended monitoring the lower level + 24v de distribution buses for alarm conditions, i The recommendations will be further reviewed by the BWOG. l NRCREPOR(c) Page 6 E-_ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _I . _ _ __ ._
1.lf Address Delaysd Trip of Si and S2 Switchss
Response
/~ The shunt trip switches Si and S2 were provided with the ICS kT/ a'nd NNI dc power supply auctioneer panels. These switches open the ac power to all de power supplies in these individual systems for loss of eithe,r the + or - 24v de buses. In order to reduce the number of trips due to short duration power losses, the switches were to have approximately 0.5 seconds delay between the time the PSM demanded a trip and the time the switches actually opened. After the 12/26/85 plant trip, tests were performed on the switches from the ICS and found to trip in only 0.14 to 0.16 seconds.
1.lf supplemental Will the time delays for S1 and S2 be changed? If they are shipped with a 0.2 to 0.8 second time delay, can 0.5 seconds be achieved? What is reasonable time band?
Response
The manufacturer, Heinemann Electric Co., provided the information that the delay time is checked at the factory prior to shipment and is acceptable if the delay time is between 0.2 and 0.8 seconds. Also, they recommended replacement of the switches after five years of usage. No design changes are deemed necessary, because operating experience has shown no spurious trips have occurred due to (} reduced time delays. Also, SAIC stated that the delay was supply voltage sensitive and that delay increased with a ' reduction of supply voltage. At an ac voltage of 57 volts, the switches will not open at all. This information will be considered in any design changes that might be made to reduce the possibilities of spurious trips. To increase the delay time, a series resistance can be inserted into the shunt trip circuit that is controlled by the PSM to provide up to several seconds of delay, if an analysis of the systems (ICS/NNI) shows that system performance is not detrimentally affected. During testing at SAIC, one of the switches was disassembled and inspected. It was found to be very clean inside and no damage or deterioration was evident. NRCREPOR(c) Page 7 0
1.19 Request th2t a FMEA be dona for PSM and ICS Interfacing Systams f.s Presently, the S&W Owners Group initiated a " generic" (Davis (,) Besse) FMEA which is ccheduled for completion within a four (4) month time frame (approximately 12/1/86). Upon completion, B&W site specific FMEA will be initiated. The Rancho Seco FMEA is expected to be complete in early 1987. 1.lg Supplemental
- 1. Did the Deterministic Failure Consequence (DFC)' review the old (1979) FMEA?
Response
BAW-1564 of 8-79, ICS Reliability Analysis in . conjunction with the site specific ICS schematic diagrams, was the basis for the first two to three weeks of the DFC review. From 5-12-86 through 6-3-86, a step-by-step comparison was made with plant specific prints and line items of the FMEA. Each were yellow liced and data sheets were developed in accordance with ':he DFC guidelines of QCI-12. From 6-4-86 through completion of the review and final report, a different approach was used. This redirection shifted the review emphasis to the effects on ICS upon loss of ac or dc power and loss of NNI ac or dc power. Where applicable, the FMEA continued to serve as a base document. (-) . In this capacity, it was used as a weighted decision factor when a particular power, supply failure produced conflicting process errors. See Attachment 1.g-1 (ICS/NNI DFC Report, w/o Attachments)
- 2. Were recommendations reviewed?
Response
Section 3 of the FMEA contained six recommendations. Three I were ICS related, and three were balance of plant (BOP) related. These recommendations are: ICS - Related Recommendations A. NNI/ICS Power Supply Reliability NRCREPOR(c) page 8
A significant modification is being davaloped to provida the NNI/ICS with more reliable normal and alternate power supplies. This will include state-of-the-art r's battery-backed inverters. Normal power supply to ICS/NNI
\s-} will be from SlGB inverter and alternate from SIGA inverter. Both of these inverters are 50 KVA each. The present inverters Sic, SlD, and SlJ are 12.5 KVA each.
In addition, ICS an'd NNI-X 24V de power supplies are to be replaced with higher load rating units to increase the margin between load rating and the actual load. B. Reliability of Input Signals from NI/RPS system to the ICS -- specifically, the RC Flow Signal A modification will be installed that will provide the ICS with a stable, calculated RCS flow signal whenever 4 RCPs are running. On loss of any one RCP, actual RCS flow signals will control the ICS. C. ICS/ BOP Systems Tuning, particularly Feedwater, Condensate and ICS Controls . The Nuclear Operations and Nuclear Engineering System Engineers for ICS are developing a startup testing program to tune the ICS with all associated inputs and outputs as the plant is brought from cold shutdown through hot shutdown to full power operation. BOP Related Recommendations ) {"'
- A. MFW Pump Turbine Minimum Speed Control - to Prevent Loss of MFW or indication of.MFW A series of modifications are being developed that will trip the MFW pump turbines on loss of ac or dc power to the NNI/ICS. This will ensure steam flow and feedwater flows are controlled by systems independent of NNI/ICS whenever these systems suffer an ac or de power loss.
l The results of these modifications will be that the plant I - goes to hot shutdown and stable plant conditions. B. A Means to Prevent or Mitigate the Consequences of a Stuck-Open MFW Startup Valve The installation of EPIC will provide a main feedwater isolation valve downstream of the MFW and SUFW valves that can be operated from the Control Room. Operator action will be required on a stuck-open SUFW valve following a plant trip to prevent an OTSG overfill and attendant RCS overcooling. Automatic MFW overfill NRCREPOR(c) Page 9 O
- - . , , - - - - n - - - - - - , , . - - . -
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isolation will be available through EFIC, howsvar the I setpoint'will be set at minimum sensitivity for at least one fuel cycle until appropriate operational data has been gathered. Modifications are being made to provide the Control Roo'm Operator with valve position indication for the MFW, SUFW, APW, MFW Blocks, TBV's and ADV's. Therefore, detection of a stuck-open valve can be by position indication or process indication. C. A Means to Prevent or Mitigate the Consequences of a l i Stuck-Open Turbine Bypass Valve
Response
See Section 4.2 1 4 - 1.lh Address Loss of Remote Control of Affected Valves from Control Room. This response should also state position of components controlled by ICS following loss of de power.
Response
See Section 1.la. 1 1.11, Discuss the Independence of ICS with Respect to ESPAS such as j - MSLFL, EPIC )
Response
, ()
Currently ICS does not supply any inputs to the SFAS system as defined nor does the SFAS system supply inputs to ICS. r Several Functions which will be performed by EFIC were previously performed by ICS: I
) 1. Control of ADV's j 2. Control of AFW j MSLFL was previously independent of ICS/NNI and will b.e replaced by EPIC.
Modifications will be installed to provide the fallowing functions on loss of ICS de or ac power independent of ICS or 4- NNI:
- 1. Close TBVs upon loss of ICS power.
]
- 2. Trip MFPs d
i t NRCREPOR(c) Page 10 l . 7y.---.&-9. , - + --- %-y-e.-... ~ .-4----,g. .3-,.w-- -. r,_,.,_,y, , _ -.- - ---= w - g-- - - "+"'*--'-7 --' ' -"YP* '-T^'-
Supplemental information for NNI: NNI provides several control room indications which monitor () SFAS parameters. The Deterministic Failure Consequence (DFC) analysis for NNI/ICS identified six parameters that should be indicated on the SFAS panel (H2SF) independent of NNI signals. See DFC summary report, problem number ten. (Attachment 1.lg-1). 1.11 Supplemental - Explain Relationship of SFAS with AFW (Post EPIC)
Response
In the past, SFAS actuation on low RC pressure or high R.B. pressure would send signals directly to the appropriate AFW motor control centers. "A" channel SFAS would start AFW pump P-319 and cause valve SFV-20578 to open fully. "B" channel SFAS would cause AFW pump P-318 to start using its turbine driver by opening valve SFV-30801 and it would cause valve SFV-20577 to open fully. Post EFIC, the SFAS will not interact directly with any AFW system component. "A" channel SFAS will send a signal to the "A" channel' of EFIC causing a full "A" EFIC AFW initiate. i.e., P-319 will start and the safety grade AFW flow /SG level controls will become operational. "B" channel SFAS will send a signal to the "B" channel of EFIC causing a full "B" EPIC AFW initiate. i.e., P-318 will start on its turbine driver, and the safety grade AFW flow /SG level controls will become (). operational. Indication that SFAS has signdlled EFIC to start AFW will be displayed on the SFAS control panel H2SF along with indication that EFIC has actually started AFW. 1.lj Address Backup Controls and Locations, and Indicate if they are Independent of ICS, and are Governed by Tech. Specs, and are Safety Related.
Response
EFIC is safety related, will be governed by Tech. Specs., and is independent of ICS and NNI. the following are backup indications and controls locat5d on or.near HISS which may be used on loss of ICS or NNI: (See Attachment 1.lj-1 for integrated list) l l v NRCREPOR(c) Page 11
INDICATOR DESCRIPTION
- 1. LI-20505A OTSG A Low Range Level
() 2. 3. LI-20505B LI-20507A OTSG A Low Range Level OTSG A High Range Level
- 4. LI-20507B OTSG A High Range Level
- 5. LI-20506A OTSG B Low Range Level
- 6. LI-20506B OTSG B Low Range Level
- 7. LI-20508A OTSG B High Range Level
- 8. LI-20508B OTSG B High Range Level
- 9. PI-20545A OTSG A Pressure
- 10. PI-20545B OTSG A Pressure
- 11. FI-31803 AFW Flow to OTSG A
- 12. FI-31802 AFW Flow to OTSG A
- 13. PI-20546A OTSG B Pressure
- 14. PI-20546B OTSG B Pressure
- 15. PI-31903 AFW Flow to OTSG B
- 16. FI-31902 APW Flow to OTSG B
- 17. HIC-20527A AFW to OTSG A Control Valve FV-20527
- 18. HIC-20531 AFW to OTSG A Control Valve FV-20531
- 19. HIC-20528A AFW to OTSG B Control Valve FV-20528 -
- 20. HIC-20532 AFW to OTSG B Control Valve FV-20532
- 21. PI-30801 AFW Pump P-318 Discharge Pressure
- 22. PI-31901 AFW Pump P-319 Discharge Pressure
- 23. HIC-20571A ADV Control Loop A
- 24. HIC-20562A ADV Control Loop B O
9 i
~
NRCREPOR(c) Page 12
SPDS also has the following backup indication indBpendant of ICS and NNI: () SPDS PT TRANSDUCER DESCRIPTION
- 1. T9015 TE-21023C Tc Loop A
- 2. T9014 TE-21024C Tc Loop B
- 3. T90ll TY-21033 Th Loop A
- 4. T9010 TY-21030 Th Loop B
- 5. L9801 LT-20501 OTSG A. Full Range
- 6. .L9802 LT-20502 OTSG B Full Range 7 L9803 UT-20503A OTSG A Operate Range
- 8. L9804 LT-20504B OTSG B Operate Range
- 9. L9003 LT-26507 CPT A Level
- 10. L9004 LT-26506 CPT B Level ~
- 11. L9000 LT-23502A Makeup Tank Level
- 12. F9000 FT-23603 Makeup Flow j 13. F9015 FT-22013 Letdown Flow 1 14. F9001 FT-23805 HPI Flow SFV-23809
- 15. F9003 Pr-23807 HPI Flow SFV-23811 '
- 16. F9002 FT-23806 HPI Flow SFV-23810
- 17. F9004 FT-23808 HPI Flow SFV-23812
- 18. F9005 FT-26003 Decay Heat A Flow
- 19. F9006 FT-26004 Decay Heat B Flow
- 20. L9005 LT-21503A PZR Level A
- 21. L9006 LT-21503B PZR Level B
- 22. L9007 LT-21503C PZR Level C
- 23. L9818 LT-20508A OTSG B HIGH RANGE 4
() 24. 25. L9819 L9822 LT-20507A LT-20508B OTSG A HIGH RANGE OTSG B HIGH RANGE
- 26. L9823 LT-20507B OTSG A HIGH RANGE
- 27. P9800 PT-20546A OTSG B PRESSURE
- 28. P9801 PT-20545A OTSG A PRESSURE
- 29. P9802 PT-20546B OTSG B PRESSURE 30 .P9803 PT-20545B OTSG A PRESSURE 4
W NRCREPOR(c) Page 13 2 . - - . , ,
In addition instrumentation on the Boron Shutdown panel (H4BS) independent of ICS and NNI is also available: () INDICATOR DESCRIPTION
- 1. TI-21025F Tc Loop A
- 2. TI-21033A .Th Loop A
- 3. LI-20501B OTSG A Level
- 4. PI-20543E OTSG A Pressure
- 5. PI-21043A RCS Pressure
- 6. XI-0000lc Neutron Source Range
- 7. LI-21503E PZR Level
- 8. LI-21503F PZR Level
- 9. LI-21502D Makeup Tank Level
- 10. TI-21024D Tc Loop B
- 11. TI-21034A Th Loop B
- 12. LI-20502B OTSG B Level
- 13. PI-20543F OTSG B Pressure .
A cold shutdown recorder will be added to HlCO which will ' monitor the following parameters independent of ICS or NNI: INDICATOR DESCRIPTION l
- 1. PT-21043 RCS Loop A Pressure
- 2. PT-21042 RCS Loop B Pressure
- 3. LT-21503D PZR Level
- 4. LT-23502C Makeup Tank Level O s.
6.
-T=-21o24c TE-21025C To coee B Tc Loop A
- 7. LT-20501A OTSG A' Level ,
- 8. LT-20502A OTSG B Level
- 9. TE-21033 Th Loop A
- 10. TE-21030 Th Loop B
- 11. XE-01019 Incore Thermocouple
- 12. XE-01035 Incore Thermocouple
- 13. PT-20543D OTSG B Pressure
- 14. PT-20543C OTSG A Pressure
- 15. XE-00005 Source Range A
- 16. XE-00006 Source Range B
- 17. PT-23606A RCP Seal Supply
- 18. PT-22013A Letdown Flow i 19. FT-23603A Makeup Flow 20.. PDT-23003A Makeup Filter dp
- 21. TE-20541A Secondary Steam Temperature A
- 22. TE-20542A Secondary Steam Temperature B NRCREPOR(c) Page 14 l
1.lk Address Vulnerability of Total Loss of ICS dc Power as a Result of Single Failure of PSM
Response
After the 12/26/85 plant trip, the District requested Babcock & Wilcox to do an analysis of the track record of the power supply monitors in regard to plant trips associated with loss of ICS/NNI power. As a result of this analysis it was determined that for 17 loss of ICS/NNI power supply plant trips at B&W power plants, only one trip which at the time could have been attributed to tailure of a PSM. That trip was the 12/2o/85 trip at Rancho Seco. ,
. Therefoce, since the 12/26/85 trip now is believed to have been caused by proper operation of the PSM, there are no trips that can be attributed to failure of a PSM. Also, it was determined i
t that out of four or five challenges to the PSM to function, no ' known failures to trip have been experienced. As a result of-this analysis of over 150 PSM-years of service and other tests ' performed, the District feels that even though the PSM is a single point of failure, the reliability of the PSM does not make it a candidate for a highly vulnerable failure point. l 1.11 Propose Independent PSM per Power Supply
Response
g Modifications have provided all backup instrumentation and/or g(m/ control such that the plant may be brought 'tx) cold shutdown and remain within the post trip window. In addition, independent PSMs will not improve the overall reliability of the ICS. , Therefore, the District does not believe independent PSMs are required nor would they improve the function of the ICS, NNI or the power supply monitors. 1.lm Assess Failures of Loss of de Power Relay to Connect Battery - Backed Power Source Res ponse The District considered adding a + 24V de battery system to backup the ICS and NNI de buses. Subsequent analysis showed that improving the ac and de power sources would provide a greater increase in reliability. 1.ln Address Qualification and Testability of Above Relay
Response
Since the ICS and NNI cabinets are not backed up by 24V de battery system, failures of loss of de power relay connected to battery backed power sobree is not applicable. Neither is ' qualification and testing of those relays. l () NRCREPOR(c) Page 15
l ! 1.10 Discus 8
- Crosstalk" Problems if Rsdundant PSMs are used. ,
Response
Crosstalk between power supply monitors was shown by bench O- - testing three power supply monitors connected in parallel and external resistance used to simulate the type of problem experienced in the 12/26/85 plant trip. It was found that the j PSMs would change state when the setpoint voltage was reached on the PSMs. As a result of changing state the relays would cease i to conduct, thereby reducing the voltage drop across the external resistance and cause the voltage at the input to the PSM to go above the setpoint value making the PSM return.to the normal untripped condition. In this manner, the PSM would cause j the sensed voltage to lower below the setpoint value and repeat these actions as long as the test voltage was at a point close j to the setpoint. This " Crosstalk" could be a source of problems in using multiple power supply monitors. See discussion on crosstalk, attachment 1.1o-1. j 1.lp Discuss Emergency Shutdown Panel Capability . Res ponse l The designated remote shutdown panel for Rancho Seco (Equipment l No. H2SD) will provide alternate shutdown capability as required by section III-G-3 of Appendix R to 10CFR50. This basically enables the operators to bring the plant to cold shutdown in the event of Control Room evacuation due to fire in the Control Room.
The Shutdown Panel H2SD is located in the West Switchgear Room on the grade level of the Auxiliary Building. The necessary indication and control required on the Emergency Shutdown Panel
! is defined by the Appendix R Evaluation. The following ! indication is provided on the Shutdown Panel: 1 1. Steam Generator A Level (EFIC) I
- 2. Steam Generator B Level (EFIC) j '3. Steam Generator A Pressure (EFIC)
- 4. Steam Generator B Pressure (EFIC)
- 5. Pressurizer Level (LI-21503D) 1 6. Makeup Tank Level (LI-20503C)
- 7. RCS Loop A Cold Leg Temperature (TI-21025E)
{ 8. RCS Loop B Cold Leg Temperature (TI-21024C) 4 9. RCS Loop A Hot Leg Temperature (TI-21031C)
- 10. RCS Loop B Hot Leg Temperature (TI-21032C) i 11. RCS Loop A Pressure (PI-21051)
- 12. RCS Loop B Pressure (PI-21050) ,
- 13. Pressurizer Level (LI-21503B) )
I w NRCREPOR(c) Page 16 O i i
Power for items 1 through 10 above is provided by a power g supply in the Shutdown Panel. Power for item 12 is provided by ij s_ the Rochester Signal Conversion Cabinet H4SCB. Power for items 11 and 13 is provided by the Rochester Signal Conversion Cabinet H4SCA. 120V ac to the Emergency Shutdown Panel H2SD is provided from the battery backed inverter Sic which is Class
- 1. The circuit from the panel to H2SD is class I.
The following control is also provided on the Shutdown Panel:
- 1. HPI Loop A SFV-23811 (HS-23811A)
- 2. Makeup Tank Isolation SFV-23508 (HS-23508)
- 3. DHR Pump A Suction from BWST SFV-25003 (HS-25003D)
- 4. Auxiliary Feedwater Control to both SG's (EFIC)
- 5. Turbine Bypass Valves Closure (HS-20561A)
- 6. Atmospheric Dump Valves control loop B (HIC-20562B)
- 7. Atmospheric Dump valves control loop A (HIC-20571B)
The above controls were added to H.2SD to consolidate controls for some of the required shutdown operations and minimize the number of operators needed to bring the plant to safe shutdown in the event of Control Room evacuation. Source range neutron flux indication is available through the use of a portable flux amplifier / indicator in conjunction with ' signal cable disconnect capability at the existing channel A source range neutron flux signal at Reactor Building () penetration H7RP67. This amplifier / indicator is powered from the Shutdown Panel. In conclusion the Shutdown Panel was not designed to be a backup to the ICS; but is independent of ICS and therefore could be used for plant shutdown. This would, however, be inconvenient and the operator could more readily use the SPDS or the Boron Analyzer Panel B4BS (in the area just outside the primary operating area) for the same indication functions as the Emergency Shutdown Panel and take manual control in the Control Room. Additionally, the SPDS will have all hot shutdown parameters independent of ICS and NNI. And a new recorder on ElCO will have all parameters needed for cold shutdown independent of ICS & NNI. 1.lp-l Power supply arrangement to the Shutdown panel is shown on Figure 1.lp. The power supply to this panel is from SIC vital bus. This is an independent vital bus from the one that powers ICS/NNI vital buses. Figures 1.lp-2 thru 4 provide additional.information. 1.lg Additional 1.1 ICS/NNI Questions 1.lg.1 What is the justifications for tripping the MFW pumps on loss of ICS instead of failing them 'as-is*7 Q:/~N NRCREPOR(c) Page 17
Response
Loss of ICS power drives the MFW pump speed to minimum r~ speed, currently 2600 RPM. At this speed, insufficient head is developed to feed the steam generators even though the same power failure drives the two MFW and 2 startup FW valves to about 50%. Operator action is required to stop
~
inadvertent feedwater flow to the steam generators if secondary pressure drops to or below condensate pump discharge pressure following a plant trip. The steam-line-failure logic (SLFL) should isolate the main feedwater flow ahead of the condensate flow, but may not i with the condensate pumps in series with the idling MFW pumps. It is therefore preferable to promptly trip the MFW pumps. This reduces their steam. drain (a hedge against overcooling), reduces the likelihood of unintended steam generator feed and sets the stage for AFW to become the source of auto-feedwater control without operator action required. .The operators can restart the MFW pump if desirable. , The current MFW pump speed control scheme includes inputs from the MFW valve dp signals (low select at 35 psid loop A or B) and total feedwater demand (proportional to megawatt demand). On loss of ICS power (de) the MFW valves fail to 50% (a function of the + 10V de control circuitry). The MFW block valves, downstream of the MFW control valves,
' receive a "close" signal as a result of the power loss.
(~%) This isolates the 50% failed open MFW control valves. Loop v A & B SUFW and control valves however are not isolated and - are driven to 50% as a result of the power loss. If feedpump speed control failed "as-is" on loss of ICS de power, uncontrolled feed to the steam generators could exist. Operator action (manually tripping the MFW pumps or manual initiation of EFIC MFW isolation would be required to prevent unintended feed. Loss of ICS de power will continue to result in a plant trip. Only a major redesign of the ICS will eliminate this reaction. The systems perturbations brought on by a plant trip, i.e. steam relief, pegging steam, changing auxiliary steam loads, feedwater flow adjustments are best compensated for by auto control schemes. EPIC will provide auto feed and auto pressure (ADV) control. Auxiliary steam and pegging steam controls continue to function on loss of
- ICS dc (or ac) power. By automatically tripping the MFW pumps, operator actions are primarily verification of auto-controls func'tions as opposed to requiring mitigation of process reactions.
NRCREPOR(c) Page 18
t 1.lg.2 Give the District Philosophy for Loss of NNI/ICS. () Response Loss of NNI/ICS will result in a plant trip. Improvements in power supplies and hardening of selected signals will reduce the likelihood of NNI/ICS loss but will not change the fact that a trip will occur. Operator training and procedures that are applicable to NNI/ICS initiated transients focus on the need for establishing stable plant conditions. These conditions are to be established before any troubleshooting of the NNI/ICS systems takes place. A series of modifications will be completed before startup that will either, 1) transfer control power to an , I unaffected source on loss of NNI/ICS power, or 2) permanently remove critical equipment from NNI/ICS control (EFIC). The result of these modifications will be to ' I establish controlled RCS heat-removal following loss of NNI/ICS power, placing the plant in the " Post-Trip Window" as defined by ATOG based EOP procedures. Operator action required will be verification that auto-actions have occurred and stable conditions have been achieved. 1.lg.3 Describe / Justify Known Safe State () Response An Emergency Operating Procedures Technical Bases (updated ATOG) Document was issued'9-3-85 by the BWOG Owners Group ' Operator Support Committee. This Technical Bases Document ? explains in detail the intent and technique of responding to off-normal plant condition with ATOG procedures. Chapter II Section 3.1.1 describes the use of the Post-Trip window. The window is part of the SPDS post-trip display. By maintaining RCS pressure-temperature relationship within this identified window, the operator is assured the plant has been brought to a known safe condition. If the P-T relationship results'in the plant being operated outside the window, operator action is required, in accordance with established emergency procedures, to stabilize the plant parameters. There can be cases where stabilization would be achieved outside the post-trip window but still in a known (heat production equal to heat removal), safe (reactor shutdown by greater than or equal to -l% dk/k) condition. 1 () NRCREPOR(c) Page 19
I D 6 O l ICS/NNI CONT ROLLED COMPONENT S f Type of 1 Al terna te j Loss of ICS de Control Type of failure on Control from Position on Restoration Power Prior to in Control Manual loss of ICS CR Independent Dec. 26, 1985 Roois Control dc Power of ICS Power of Power Valve / Device Closed 50s Bailey Hand'/ Local Turbine Dypass Closed Closed or Auto w/ Sam Valve Manual at 50% open ' Closed 501 Bailey Hand / Local Main Feedwater 50% open -------- Auto w/ Sam Valve i 501 Bailey Hand / Local
,50 % open
-------- Closed Startup Auto w/ Sam feedwater Valve Closed Remote Manual Local Closed -------- Closed Main Feedwa'ter Push-Button Block Valve T r i p p e d'. Must Hin Speed Lov ej oy & Bailey Local Main reedwater Tripped be reset prior Hand / Auto w/ Sam i Pump lurbine to restart At setpoint 501 Open Bailey Setpoint Local Aux Steam At setpoint --------
Manual Control Reducing Setpoint Station Bailey Hand / Westinghouse As is - ------- Turbine As is Pulser (77) Auto w/ Sam Speed Control In manual Turh. Gov. in Control Rooc Diamond control a
--------- Control Rods As is Bailey Hand /
Rod insert / As is in Control RooC in manual Auto w/ Sam withdraw DMD = pwr 505 Open EFIC Local and N/A EFIC- EFIC Until Atmospheric Manually. Reset Remote Manual Dump Valve at CR & H2SD EFIC Local and Aux feedwater N/A IIIC EFIC Untti 50% open Manually Reset Remote Manual Valve at CR 8 H2SD Figure 1.la-1 l
' Page 1 of 2
ss O O O i ICS/NNI CONTROLLED COMPONENTS (CONTINUED) in addition the f ollowing valves and control are powered from NNI but have no alternate , control. Failure on l 4 railure on Position on Loss of ICS dc Type of Type of j loss of NNI Restoration Power prior to Control in Manual of Power Dec. 26 1985 Control Room Control Valve / Device dc Power PORV Closed As demanded Closed Auto / Remote None Manual Pressurtzer Closed As demanded Closed Auto / Remote None Spray Valvp Manual i Pressurtzer off As demanded Off Auto / Remote None l Heaters Manual & Bailey , Hand / Auto w/ Sam f Pressurizer 50% open Closed 501 Open Bailey Hand / Local Auto w/ Sam j Makeup Valve RC Pump Seal 50% open Closed 50% Open Bailey Hand / Local Supply Auto w/ Sam Letdown Bypass 50% open At Setpoint 501 Open Setpoint Local Flow Control i 1 Figure I.la-l Page 2 of 2 l i
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- INDICATION i
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1.2 Restoration of- ICS dc Power Issue
,-( ) 1.2a Indicate Position of Components Following Restoration of ICS Power including:
1.2a-1 Analysis to Determine the Position of Components Upon Restoration of ICS power.
Response
See Table 1.la 1.2a Effect of These Positions on Plant Transient conditions and Safety Margin. Response -- See Table 1.la 1.2a-3 How These Effects are Minimized.
Response
See Table 1.la 1.3 Additional Issues - Address the Following: 1.3a Total Loss of ac Power Res ponse lO l' ICS ac power is utilized to drive a series of steam and feedwater control valves in addition to,a few process instruments. These instruments fail to 50% of range and the valves either fail as is , or respond to de control at a reduced rate. l On a total loss of ac power, two (2) ICS control functions j 'were determined to be critical: i 1
- 1. Control of TBV's
- 2. Control MFW i Therefore modifications will be installed which will, on i total loss of ac power to the ICS, perform the following functions:
- 1. Close TBV's upon loss of ICS power. (See 4.2)
- 2. Trip the MFW pumps. ,
W 1 l () NRCREPOR(c) Page 20
-- ,--w- -
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Attachment 1.3-1 is a complete list of all instrumentation or controls which.will not function on a total loss of ac (). power to ICS. Other instruments requiring ICS de power are assumed to be operational (see. Attachment 1.3-2). Supplemental information for NNI Total loss of NNI ac causes loss of inputs to ICS. Therefore on loss of.NNI, modifications are being made to cause a trip of ICS dc power to force the plant to a known safe state (see Attachments 1.3-3 and 1.3-4). On total loss of ICS and NNI, backup instrumentation and control is provided in the control room to bring the plant to cold shutdown within the post trip window. See item 1.lj for a listing of backup instrumentation and controls. 1.3b Single Failure Vulnerability of Automatic Bus Transfer Switch
Response
The Automatic Bus Transfer (ABT) switch is a very reliable piece of equipment. In all the years of operation at Rancho Seco, there have been no failures. The vendor confirmed that the unit is very reliable. In the unlikely event of a failure of the ABT or a cable downstream to the ABT, the 120 Vac ICS bus will be lost. 1.3c Partial Loss of ac Power or dc Power
Response
ICS Power supply is from two completely independent diesel and battery backed buses. ICS' ac power is provided by inverter SlGB and backed up by SlGA via an Auto Bus Transfer (ABT) switch. Since all ac loads, except the de power supplies, are downstream of the ABT, there is no single component which can cause a partial loss of ICS ac power (see simplified schematic of ICS power distribution, Figure 1.3c-1). ICS dc. power is provided by two load sharing power supplies for the + and -24V de buses. Each bus has one de power supply powered from SlGA and the other from SlGB upstream of the ABT. Therefore on the loss of an ac bus or a single power supply, the dc buses are unaffected. On a fault which causes the + or
-24v de bus to fail, the power monitor will trip S1 and S2 causing a total loss of ICS de power addressed above.
NRCREPOR(c) Page 21
Supplemental information for NNI: (~#
) For loss of NNI X, Y, or Z de or X or Y ac power bus, ICS i 24V de supply will be tripped to force the plant to a known safe condition. (See Figures 1.3c-2 and 3) 1.3d Partial Restoration of ac or dc Power 1.3d-l Indicate if Issues have been Addressed by SMUD Res ponse Casualty Procedures (CP's) are formatted to provide the most obvious problems visible to the control room operator.
These include Control Room Annunciators, equipment trips indicated process upsets. CP's are event orientated procedures, i.e., the operator must determine the nature of the upset and then initiate corrective actions. This is in contrast with post trip ATOG procedures (EOP's) that are symptom oriented and intended to stabilize plant parameters without necessarily determining the specific initiating , upset cause. CP's are recovery oriented for returning the plant to an acceptable level of normal operation following completion of applicable EOP steps. Casualty Procedures for addressing partial or complete loss I\ of ICS/NNI power are: w) C-14 Partial Loss of NNI Power C-15 Loss of NNI X Power C-16 Loss of NNI Y Power C-17 Complete Loss of NNI Power C-40 Loss / Restoration of ICS Power Planned modifications that will, on loss of ICS/NNI ac or de, place the plant in het shutdown will result in a common operator response for any one of these f ailures. Casualty Procedures will be modified to address recovery of the applicable ac or de power. Specific steps will be identified to ensure that restoration of a faulted power source does not result in a plant upset. Current CP's for partial or total loss of ac or de power to ICS/NNI do not reflect the several modifications being developed to reduce the impact of these failures. Procedure revisions and additional training will be completed prior to restart to ensure control room operations can identify and initiate corrective actions in response to identified symptoms. () NRCREPOR(c) Page 22
1.3d-2 How does a loss of partial. power effect the plant? () Casualty Procedure C.14, Partial Loss of NNI Power addresses the required operator actions to alarm conditions indicating. loss of a power supply (NNI X or Y ac or de and Z dc). Since X, Y and Z de power supplies are each redundant, loss of a single de power supply (partial loss) will shift the full load onto the redundant unit and the plant is not affected. Prompt operator action is called for to evaluate, determine cause and restore conditions to normal as quickly as possible. This action is only to restore normal operating margin (total load capacity - actual load) on the affected power supply. No plant transient should occur. , X and Y ac power supplies are redundant and loss of the normal ac input will result in transfer of an ABT to the ' backup ac input. The transfer of the ABT is fast enough to ensure no plant transient is initiated. The load side of each NNI ABT is a series of fuse protected, individual ac circuits. These are process sensors, indicators and controllers. Individual fuse failures are group alarmed in the control room and singly indicated at the fuse with blown fuse lights. O There are identified ac loads in both X and Y systems that, upon fuse failure, lead to a plant trip. Others can lead to , a process or indication upset of. a sufficiently low order that no trip should occur. Should an ac fuse blos and a plant trip evolve, the operators are trained to complete applicable sections of the Emergency Procedures before addressing C.14. Use of C.14 will result in the fuse being replaced or the circuit repaired after stable plant conditions have been verified.. C.14 also addresses the required operator actions necessary to promptly restore normal ac power. It should be noted that Casualty Procedures are event oriented procedures. By definition Emergency Procedures, which are symptom oriented are not called for (or have been completed) when CP's are being used in the control room. 9 j () NRCREPOR(c) Page 23 l
1.3d-3 How Does Repowering Ef fect the Plant?
Response
(
\ In the case where a single redundant de power supply failed or the normal ac supply failed resulting in an ABT action, restoration of normal power should have no effect on the plant since power will'not be lost to the modules and transmitters.
In the case where a load fuse has blown, restoration of power will restore any auto functions left in effect prior to the event. Since there is such a wide variety of possible failure modes a procedure for each fuse is . impractical. Operators are trained to place the affected controls in manual and to be particularly alert to control, iterations when restoring power. When the Ics is repowered, control is returned to ICS by operator action only (e.g. returning TBV switch from "CLOSE" to " NORMAL"). , 1.3d-4 Discuss Ef fect of Other ICS Failures and Indicate Whether These Should be More or Less Severe Than Loss of Power Events Loss of ICS/NNI ac or dc power will result in a plant trip. Modifications are being developed to ensure the plant is placed in a known, safe condition (hot shutdown) to reduce f'% the impact of this type of failure.
\n)
The ICS receives 26 process-inputs. NNI provides 23, RPS provides neutron power and the turbine generator provides MWe and frequency. In' addition a number of equipment status inputs are received (number of running RCPs, FWPs, CRD positions, turbine condenser status) . Individual failures of these various inputs in an " upscale or downscale" mode is addressed in BAW 1564 (August 1979), Integrated Control System Reliability Analysis. This study details those ICS input failures that-will likely result in a reactor trip (15), that may result in a reactor trip (14) and tht may not be expected to result in a reactor trip (30). One input, station ground, is listed as having unpredictable results. Individual failures that do not result in a reactor trip can 1 be dealt with by the operators using manual or alternate j controls. Individual failures that result in a reactor trip will require operator evaluation to ensure the trip has 1) isolated the failed @rocess from hot shutdown control or 2) manual operation of the failed process is required. Page 24 {} NRChEPOR(c)
. __ _ _ ._.I
Adequate instrumentation is available in the Control Room to assist the control room operators in determining the. status of required hot shutdown parameters in the event of individual ICS input failures.
; Casualty and Abnormal Operation procedures are in place to provide guidance in response to these failures.
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2.0 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER (APW) SYSTEM - ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING: 2.0a Include Functional Diagram O Response l The AFW simplified drawing will be provided under the EFIC 4 submittal in November.. I 2.0b State Whether the Motor or the Turbine of the AFW Dual Drive Pump is Auto Start.
Response
! Turbine is the auto-start driver (auto-start opens valve HV-30801).
2.0 Supplement Provide the basis for selection of the 280 gpm per OTSG flowrate as
; the present failure position for the AFW flow control valves on loss of ICS power. Verify that this valve does not result in an " ) unacceptable undercooling or overcooling assuming no operator action l
to control APW flow for 10 minutes following a reactor trip from j full power.
Response
l This question is no longer applicable. EFIC controls AFW flow as j required to feed S.G. demand against a pre-set level. The normal
, pre-set level is approximately 28". If all-4 reactor coolant pumps
() are stopped the pre-set level is automatically changed to approximately 317" to promote and continue natural circulation in
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the primary system. , i 2.1 APW Control valves Behavior on Loss of ICS Issue Res ponse With the installation of EPIC, the AFW valves are not impacted by j loss of ICS. 2.2 Emergency Feedwater Initiation and Control (EFIC) System Issue 2.2a Discuss comment in page 10-3, Item 11, NUREG - 1195
Response
The NRC issued Safety Evaluation Reports (SER) in January and September 1982, assuming EFIC installation. On October 22, j 1982, the District indicated that it would install interim i safety grade AFW modifications and the EFIC was separate and beyond the AFW upgrade requirements of NUREG-0737. The District NRCREPOR(c) Page 26 4 b 4 1 _ _. _ , _ _ _ . . _ _ . . - _ . - . . _ - . _ - - _ - - - _ . _ ~ . _ _ . . - - _ _ _ . _ , _ _ . - - _ _ _ - _ , _ - . _ _ _ . _
+ 1 l indicated at that time that EFIC would be installed by Cycle 7. This schedule was confirmed by the District on December 14, 1982, at which time the Cycle 7 outage was expected to occur in () the Fall of 1984. The schedule for the interim safety grade modifications was specified in a confirmatory order dated March 14, 1983. On April 28, 1983, the District submitted a revised APW system description describing the interim AFW upgrades. NRR confirmed their understanding in a SER on the status of the AFW system dated September 26, 1983. Then in a series of living schedule submittals, the District informed the NRC that the EPIC installation was scheduled in two phases (Cycle 8 and Cycle 9). l This approach was understood and acknowledged, by the NRR staff during a meeting in October 1985, at which time, the District committed to accelerate the EPIC installation schedule to accomplish as much as possible during the Cycle 8 outage, with ' the balance of the installation to be completed during the Cycle 9 outage.
- While it has been the District's position in the past that provision of safety grade auto-start of APW via the SFAS was
< sufficient to meet the intent of NUREG 0737 item II.E.1.2, the point is no longer germane due to the decision to immediately install EPIC and related AFW upgrades. The upgraded APW with () EPIC meets fully the requirements of NUREG 0737 item II.E.1.2 including all long term requirements to design to IEEE-279. This is underscored by the SER received for this concept in i , j April 1983, and September 1983. 2.2b Discuss SG Overfill Protection i Response ! Steam Generator MFW Automatic overfill protection will be I provided via EFIC in concert with the MFW control valves and MFW isolation valves. However, the overfill setpoint will be set at i its maximum value of 619". This will allow data collection to determine a safe margin between operation at high power levels and the trip setpoint. Steam Generator overfill protection for an AFW overfill event will be via level alarms on IDADS, with remote manual isolation via the AFW Control and Isolation valves. l . Having no automatic protection for APW overfill is justified since it is a slow developing transient which allows time for operator intervention. The operator will still be alerted to an overfill via the MFWOP circuits, and controls and indications are available to the ope'eator to isolate AFW from the control room. Additional information will be provided in a subsequent submittal. O RCREFoR<c) Faee 27
2.2c Why is the District Not Installing EPIC Time Delays for Restart?
Response
7s is Design, procurement and manufacture of the delay modules is being pursued on an expedited basis. However delivery of modules cannot be assured in sufficient time to support the start-up schedule. The use of the delay modules will assist EPIC by filtering transient pressure conditions in the main steam lines and steam generators to give greater margin between EFIC's initiating setpoints and normal operating parameters. Operating experiences at ANO-1 and CR-3 has shown that the time delays may be desirable for some EPIC initiations, but are not required to assure the safety function of EPIC. . Currently CR-3 is using a delay in its low SG level initiate circuits to avoid spurious APW initiations. ANO-1 has not had a serious problem with spurious initiations on low level and does not use a time delay. Since our EFIC low range level transmitter and tap arrangement ' is much more like ANO-1 than CR-3, we believe that spurious actuation of EFIC on SG low level will not be a serious problem here either. Also, even if AFW were to be spuriously initiated, due to a transient condition and if there is sufficient inventory in the steam generators, EPIC controls will not feed the steam generators. O
- i 4
l NRCREPOR(c) Page 28 J
3.0 MAIN FEEDWATER (MFW) SYSTEM !' 3.0a Include Functional Diagram
Response
I See Figure 3.0a-1 4 3.1 MFW Control Valves & Pump Speed Behaviour on Loss of ICS and Line Isolation Issue l 3.la Address the Role Played by ICS on Isolation
Response
{ Under normal Operation, ICS will control MFW. If ICS loses power the MFW pumps would be automatically tripped. Discussion on isolation by EFIC will be provided in a i separate submittal. I 3.lb Address Feasibility of Status Quo Position of Components t Following Loss of ICS 1
Response
The District has reviewed the desirability of adding backup batteries for the Hand / Auto stations. These batteries would keep the ICS components " frozen" in their last position for approximately 20 minutes when ICS de power is
- () lost. At this time, the District' believes the best way to l
ensure that the plant goes to a known safe state is to trip i the MFPs and activate EFIC* Control of SG pressure and level. ' i
! 3.1 Supplement
< Discuss alternatives to the present design response of the MFW start-up valve, control valve and pump speed control on loss of 3 ICS power and demonstrate why no change is required in the I present design, particularly in view of the addition of' feedwater to the depressurized OTSGs by the condensate pumps which contributed'to the overcooling or over-filling condition. j i Response The EFIC safety grade isolation of MFW occurs when S.G. pressure i drops below 600 psig (i.e., the shutoff head of the condensate j pumps). Therefore no auto closure of these valves need occur on loss of ICS power (note: MFW pumps are tripped on a loss of ICS power). i i - 1 NRCREPOR(c) Page 29 i !
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_ _ = ._ _ , _ _ . . 4.0 MAIN STEAM SYSTEM 4 i 4.0a Include Functional Diagram lO Response See Figure 4.0a-1 and 4.0a-2 4.0b Discuss Reasons for Placing Cover on Main Steam Relief
- Valves to prevent vacuum leaks
Response
i With a vacuum inside the moisture separator reheaters, and without the covers in place, the valve disc can be lif ted l due to a not upward force on the disc. The area acted on L by the vacuum is greater on the top side of the disc than , the bottom, thus resulting in the net upward force. See Figure 4.0b-1. The covers minimize the free flow of air and containment inleakage when the vacuum exists, they do not prevent it. We have initiated changes to provide sealing steam to the upper side of the valve discs to l ' assure that sufficient downward force on the disc exists to l prevent vacuum leakage. i 4.1 Atmospheric cump Valves (ADVs) Behavior on Loss of ICS Issue l i 4.la Address the modification that the Valve will open to its 50% position if the ICS is not powered. !C:)
- ' Response .
' ADV's will be controlled by EPIC totally independent of , ICS. The EFIC control signals to the ADV's are current loop type and will fail the ADVs closed on loss of EFIC power. MOVs are being added upstream of the ADVs. j Controls for the MOVs will be located in the control Room.
; 4.lb Address the effect of failure of ICS auxiliary relay in all I
components where it participates. i Response Since ADV control is being removed from the ICS, the I auxiliary relay will have no affect on them. I f 4.lc Indicate whether valves can be Modulated. f Response ! The ADV's can be modulated from the Control Room or the I
- Shutdown panel (H2SD). l I
1 v NRCREPOR(c) Page 30 !,(:) 1
i 4 4.ld Role Playsd by IDADS in Monitoring ADV Solenoida.
Response
l Not Applicable with EFIC and bottled backup instrument air 4 modifications. . 4.le Discuss Independence of Power Supply from ICS (ADV) r.esponse _ADVs will be controlled by EFIC which will have Class 1 power independent of ICS. ], 4.1 -Supplement SMUD has stated that upon loss of ICS power, ADV's and TBV's j will go to a " fail closed"-position. The operator will be able to cycle these valves to maintain the steam pressure about a
' nominal value. SMUD has not provided any justification as to i why this is the best alternative of controlling these valves.
i Also, discuss how the valve position is indicated to the control room operator during the loss of' ICS power. - 4
Response
With the installation of EPIC, some of the previous information i is no longer applicable. Hence,. loss of ICS power would have no j impact on the ADV's control. ADV's will be controlled by EFIC. Upon loss of ICS power, TBV's will close. The valve position
.() (open/midtravel/close) is indicated in the Control Room. The power for the valve position indication is independent of the ICS power. '
$ Steam Generator overpressure protection is provided by EFIC thru i the ADV's. At pressures between ADV and TBV setpoints the ICS will maintain the pressure thru the TBV's provided the condensers are available. If the ICS is not functional, EFIC I will control SG pressure thru the ADV's. i 4 1 4.2 Turbine Bypass Valves (TBV's) Behavior on Loss of ICS Issue
~
4.2a Address the modification that the valve will open to its 50% position if the ICS is.not powered. f
Response
l Upon loss of ICS power, the TBV's will go to fully closed position automatically. However, the operator has been. > provided with the capability to bypass the automatic closure signal provided condenser interlocks are met. In
- ) addition, the TBV's can be manually closed from the control
! Room and Remote Shutdown Panel (H2SD). The closure of the'
) TBV's, upon de-energization of the solenoid valves or loss of power to the solenoid valves is alarmed in IDADS. I 4 () NRCREPOR(c) 'Page 31 i i,
Prior to restart, motor operattd icolction valvga will ba added upstream of the Turbine Bypass valves. One valve powered with diesel backed class 1 power, will isolate main () steam flow from the "A" PV-20563. SG to TBV's PV-20561 and Another, also powered with diesel backed class 1 power, will isolate Main Steam flow from the 'B' SG to PV-20564 and PV-20566. Controls for each will be remote, manual, back-lighted pushbuttons located in the Control Room adjacent to steam isolation valve controls of similar functions.. 4.2b Address the Effect of Failure of ICS Aux Relay in all the Components Where it Participates Res ponse The auxiliary relay is located in the ICS cabinets to monitor both the ac and de power in the ICS. De-energizing the relay signals the loss of ICS power. The aux relay provides " Loss of ICS Power" signals to the TBV's only. Failure modes of the auxiliary relay are as follows:
- 1. Switch in " NORMAL" Position:
- Failure of'the Auxiliary relay contacts in the the closed position will cause the TBVs to remain _under ICS (Bailey Hand / Auto) control. Operators can close the valves by putting the autoclose switch in the
'CLOSE" position.
O
- Failure of the Auxiliary relay in the open position will remove ICS (Bailey H/A) control for the TBVs. '
The valves will remain closed. IDADs will alarm. ICS control can be returned by placing the autoclose switch in the "AUTOCLOSE DISABLE" position.
- 2. The 'CLOSE" AND "AUTOCLOSE DIS ABLE" modes are unaffected by the auxiliary relay.
4.2c Indicate whether valves can be modulated, i ! Res ponse , Upon loss of ICS power, the TBV's can not be modulated but I will be closed automatically and can be positioned to 50% { (providing condensor interlocks are met) from the Control Room or the remote shutdown panel. 4.2d Role Played by IDADS in Monitoring TBV solenoids.
Response
The loss of power t'D the TBV's solenoid valves is alarmed in IDADS. This will alert operators in the event that the switch is' erroneously placed in the "CLOSE" position. () NRCREPOR(c) Page 32
4.2e Discuss Independence of Power Supply from ICS A k_) Response Turbine bypass solenoids PY-20561A, PY-20563A, PY-20564A and PY-20566A when de-energized will close the Turbine Bypass Valves. Power supply to these solenoids is from 120V ac panel SIN 1-1 and is independent from the ICS power supply SlGB and SlGA. Power supply to the TBV solenoids can be de-energized from the switch on HlRI in the Control Room or H2SD at the remote shutdown panel. 4.2 Supplemental I Discass if SMUD has considered all common failure modes which could affect the ICS power as well as the alternate power for the AFW control valves, TBV's, and ADV's.
Response
The AFW control valves and ADV's are a part of EFIC and do not share the same assured power source as the ICS. ICS common mode problems no longer apply to these valves. The TBV's, on loss of ICS, have an alternate supply for control which is independent of ICS and is battery backed (See 1.la and 4.2e). 4.3 Main Steam Line Failure Logic Response Time Issue fS V 4.3a Review License Submittal of February 19, 1986, Page 12 and provide the SMUD Resolution (Main Steam Line Failure Logic Response Time Issue).
Response
The MSL Failure Logic used in December 1985 will be replaced in its entirety by EFIC. EFIC detection of a Steam Generator pressure less than 600 psig will be very rapid (less than 1 second), however output response to close the MFW control and isolation valves will be delayed by up to 10 seconds in order to allow a transient condition to clear prior to commanding closure of MFW. The IDADS sample rate of EFIC MSLFL has not yet been determined. Additional information will be provided in the November EFIC submittal. NRCREPOR(c) Page 33 l [) .x/ l
- _ - . , _ . - . _ . ~ - . __._ . _ _ _ . . __
6 I 4.3 Supplement () The present rate at which MSLPL is monitored by the Interim Data Acquisition and Display System Computer (IDADS) is once per i minute. However during the event the pressure was decreasing approximately 70 psig/ minute. Hence, the MSLFL did not alarm until the pressure was much lower than the setpoint. To resolve 3 this concern SMUD has a) a new setpoint and b) to increase the sample frequency for the MSLFL parameters by IDADS. However, SMUD did not provide the new rate at which the parameters will be sampled. Provide the new rate and discuss why it is considered to be optimum. l
Response
4 See 4.3a 4.4 Steam Generator Overfill Protection Issue 7 4.4a Provide the SMUD Resolution of this Issue, t 1 Res ponse See 2.2b. ] I } o 1 9 I i 3 l i l l () NRCREPOR(c) Page 34
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5.0 MAKEUP /HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION SYSTEM 5.0a Include functional diagrams
Response
See Figure 5.0a-1 5.0b Discuss alarms and protective interlocks r Response' , The Makeup /High Pressure Injection system is a multipurpose scheme that,among other tasks is responsible for providing Reactor Coolant Pump seal flow, normal Reactor Coolant System makeup flow and High pressure Injection flow to'the RCS during a safeguadd systems response. There are 3 identical high pressure (greater than or equal to 2500 psig), high capacity (greater than or equal to 375 gpm 0 1600 psig) multistage centrifugal pumps (HPI A and B & Makeup). The Makeup. pump is a swing pump,' ie, is provided with ' 1 electrical and mechanical flexibility to permit operati'on as a replacement for HPI A or B. Suitable interfacing is provided to the MU pump controls to ensure auto start as a safeguard pump when aligned as backup HPI to either the A or B safeguard trains. Normal operation calls for all three pumps to be crosstied into a common discharge header. This header provides high pressure () s (typically approximately 2850 psig) flow-to RCP seals
'(approximately 40 gpm total flow) and to RCS makeup (approximately 60 gpm) and is available to any of 4 HPI nozzles ,
to the RCS (one nozzle is common to normal RCS makeup through a separate flow path). The pump suctions are not common by normal lineup. HPI A and
- MU pump are routinely supplied by the Makeup Tank. An alternate supply can be provided from the Borated Water Storage Tank (safeguard or Control Room Operator initiated). HPI B is
< r'outinely supplied by BWST (valve position controlled by the Tech. Specs . ) . The mini-flow paths for all three pumps are ganged together and flow through two in-series valves (safeguards train A & B) enroute to the Makeup (MU) tank.
The MU tank routinely receives water from RCP seal returns
' (less than 6 gpm total), MU pump mini-flow (approximately 105
' gpm, ef fectively a recirculation) and RCS letdown flow (adjusted by the operator to off-set RCP seal flow and normal ;
Makeup flow to maintain a steady Pressurizer level). l Periodically, under operation control, "new water' is introduced into the MU Eank to off-set system sampling and lt leakage.
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Ths MU tEnk is prcvidId with En outlet velvo (inist to HPI A and MU pump) thtt will clora on safsguards initiation to ensure the MU~ tank is not pumped dry, gas binding HPI A and/or the MU pump. The two mini-flow valves (common to all three pumps) also close on safeguard initiation to ensure full pump capacity is available to inject BWST water into the RCS. The MU pump, though routinely aligned hydraulically with HPI A, is electrically aligned to the B side electrical train. Since the MU Tank outlet valve routinely supplies the MU pump, its power and safeguard interface is routinely aligned to the A train. This ensures the MU pump suction is shifted to the BWST on initiation of safeguards A, yet unaffected on initiation of safeguards B. Should the MU pump be required to operate as backup for HPI A
'or B, the electrical and hydraulic alignment must be changed (in accordance with established procedures) to place MU pump flow, power and safeguards initiation into service in the A or B train. This activity consumes some 4 to 5 hours of ,
alignment, dual verification and surveillance testing to ensure two safeguard trains are available. The 12-26-85 transient resulted in all 3 pumps running due to safeguard initiation (MU pump continued to run as there was not a loss of bus voltage). Water to the pumps was provided from the BWST and pump mini-flow was isolated and MU tank outlet-valve closed, all as an automatic function of safeguards. (N Inflows to the MU Tank were stopped, again due to safeguards. Operator errors while taking action to restore the system to normal operation, following the need for safeg'uard actions, resulted in failure of the MU pump and transfer of BWST water into the Radwaste System. Post event reviews made recommendations to conduct adequate operator training and develop recovery procedures to ensure the error aete corrected. In addition consideration was to be given to providing " interlocks' in the high pressure injection system to prevent pump suction isolation or otherwise ensure mini-flow through a running pump. Procedures and training has been and will continue to be the first line of defense against operator error. Introducing new interlocks in to the multiple control schemes of HPI A & B, MU pump (A or B train select), MU Tank outlet (A or B train select), and HPI mini-flow valves (A and B trains) is in itself a considerable task. Additional systems consideration arei NRCREPOR(c) Page 36
BPI B mini-flow is routsd to the MU TInk and thsrefore' cannot get back to the B pump suction. Anytime HPI B is running, SWST water is being fed to the MU Tank at 105 gpm.
- NRC requires auto-restoration of RCP seal flcw. To ensure adequate pump flow when supplying RCP seals, the HPI pump selected must have mint-flow protection. To ensure adequate water is available, the selected HPI pump must be aligned to the BWST.
To ensure this complex system's compatibility with auto-seal restoration, guarantee adequate HPI pump mini-flow under all identified operational modes and ensure that BWST water is not diverted by default to the Radwaste System, a thorough system
- design review is necessary to ensure the design bases are met and identified operator traps are eliminated before any .
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interlocks are put in place. This study has been identified as a near-term item. 5.1 LOSS OF PUMP SUCTION ISSUE , j 5.la Address consequences of losing RCP Seal Injection Flow when
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pumps are not running. i
; Res ponse ! RCP seals are provided with two heat sinks. Either is capable of adequately protecting seals therefore ensuring against an RCP seal failure (LOCA).
O - Each heat sink is dependent on water flowing through the RCP seal. , HPI supplied cooling flows into the seal at a. pressure greater than RCS. Typically 7 to 10 gpm inflow to the seals results in about 1 gpm RCP seal return flow to the Makeup Tank having passed through the 3 stage seal. The remaining 6 to 9 gpm flows down through the RCP hydraulic bearing and into the RCS via the RCP thermal barrier (prevents RCS heat from rising into
- the pump seal area). Normal seal cooling is provided in this manner. ,
I The second heat sink is provided by passing Component Cooling Water (CCW) through the RCP seal and through attached heat exchangers that provide a tube /shell heat exchange for seal water to CCW. The driving force for the seal water through the heat exchangers and therefore through the RCP seal is an impeller attached to the RCP shaft. When.the RCP is running, seal water is driven through the lower hydraulic bearing, out to the heater exchanger and back into the upper seal as cooled water to be passed back"to the attached impeller. NRCREPOR(c) Page 37 (:)
The effectiveness of CCW cooling is significantly reduced when I the pump shaft is not turning. Some cooling is provided by the (%g CCW flowing around the pump casing but flow through the seal is V stopped. , Under the above conditions some RCS water will slowly flow into 3 the RCP seal area as leakage occurs to the seal return system } and slight leakage to atmosphere (within the containment j building). This leakage is gradual and the heat rises slowly in the seal area. Multiple 0-Rings are used in the seal assembly and all 0-Rings are temperature limited. Control Room temperature indication is provided to monitor RCP seals to aid in predicting RCP seal failures. An overheated RCP seal could t lead to failures and RCS leakage. l l
' Restoration of RCP seal injection at a controlled rate (ensure even temperature adjustment) is necessary to ensure seal failure does not occur.
Operating procedures are established and operators receive , i training on establishing (reestablishing) RCP seal flow. 5.lb Address vulnerability of RCP Seal Injection to Single Failure concurrent with Loss-of-Offsite Power j i .
Response
3 j On loss of offaite power, the Component Cooling Water as a heat sink is lost. RCP seal cooling is then dependent upon RCS seal O- supply from the HPI system. { - RCP seal supply can be provided by either HPI A or B or the , 4 Makeup' Pump. As long as either Diesel Generator is available l then one of the above pumps is available. On loss of air (possible on loss of offsite power) the RCP seal supply valve
! fails open. Individual manual throttle valves are unaffected and seal flow can be substained (or restored if pump restarts
) were required). I Should train A and B Diesel not run, seal cooling cannot be achieved and. seal failures may occur. Seal leakage to
! atmosphere (in containment building) is a gradual process.
Seal temperature information is available in the Control Room , to aid in evaluation of RCP seal heating. l 1 The only solution to RCP seal heating to the point of internal 0-Ring failures (resulting in a LOCA at the RCP seal) is to
! restore seal injection.
l 5.2 Additional HPI Question , 5.2a Address the replacement of erroneous HPI Transmitters
Response
O The two transmitters which are nonlinear'at low flow will be replaced with more accurate transmitters before startup. NRCREPOR(c) Page 38 i
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6.0 REMOTE AND LOCAL INDICATIONS 6.1 Display and Alarm Systems Description - Provide the Following: j 6.la Include SPDS, Annunciator, RG 1.97 Instrumentation, ' sailey Computer, Interim Data Acquisition and Display System (IDADS) and NNI.
Response
The Rancho Seco SPDS was designed to meet the appropriate ! requirements of NUREG 0696, Reg. Guido 1.97, NURBG 0737, l' and Supplement I to NUREG 0737. The SPDS was designed as a diagnostic tool compatible with the Abnormal Transient i Operating Guidelines (ATOG) and the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP's). . The SPDS is shown in the Control Room on two independent color monitors. All SPDS inputs can be shown on either monitor (i.e., channel A data can be called up on Channel B CRT). There are 5 basic displays with operator selectable enhancements and alphanumeric pages. Regardless of the screen selected by t the operator, 9 alerts are available to direct the > operators attention to off normal conditions. l . For hot-shutdown parameters, SPDS dependence on NNI driven inputs will be eliminated prior to startup. f The Rancho Seco RG 1.97 submittal identified the SPDS as the Category 1 variable display location. The proposed
, () changes to the SPDS screen will add new parameters and three alerts.
~
The annunicator system provides visible and audible alarms when various plant systems or equipment operate abnormally. The visible and audible alarm may be presented by the Bailey 855, the Interim Data Acquisition and Display System (IDADS), the Digital Radiation Monitoring System (DRMS) or a back-lighted window and chime. As part an on going annunciator study, hardwired annunciator windows and computer alarms will be prioritized. This study is scheduled for completion j prior to Cycle 8 startup with resulting modifications implemented as feasible. I NRCREPOR(c) Page 39 I i I^
.-.- ~.-. . , . _ - - _ . _ , . .. . , . .
The Plant Procsss Computer (Bailey 855) is primarily an l I operating tool that provides information to assist the operator in the efficient operation of the plant. The () computer system consists of a computer mainframe, programming facility, local and remote analog input peripherials, logic I/O peripheral, operator console, and other human communication peripherals. The Bailey computer performs calculations necessary to provide useful operating information and data for off-line core performance analysis and general fuel management calculations. It can also provide performance calculations for the balance of plant including turbine cycle performance calculations such as:
- Turbine cycle heat rate
- Turbine performance
- Feedwater-heater performance
- Feedwater Pump performance
'
- Condenser performance ,
j The Bailey 855 displays the requested point value on 2 4 digital indicators, one on HlCO (the computer console).
- and the other HlRI (Reactor and Integrated controls console).
For a brief discussion of IDADS (and DRMS) see Attachment 6.la-3. 6.lb Indicate Whether Systems Are Safety Related Res ponse The RG 1.97 Rancho Seco Category i variables displayed on the SPDS and the SPDS hardware will meet the Category 1 requirements of RG 1.97. No other indicating systems. have any safety significance. W NRCREPOR(c) Page 40 i l
The following table contains thS SMUD Category 2 Variables by R.G. 1.97 submittal variable number with - variable title and indication. VARI ABLE NO. VARIABLE TITLE DISPLAY 15 Degrees of Subcooling UI-21031 on E2SFA UI-21032 on 32SFB 17 Containment Sump Narrow IDADS - Lll53 Range Water Level . DADS - Lil54 LL on H2SFA LL on H2SFB 33 Effluent Radioactivity IDADS R-7044, R-7546 34 RER System Flow SPDS F9005, F9006 35 RER Heat Exchanger TE-26043, TE-26044 Outlet Temperature (Scheduled to be upgraded '
- display TBD) 36A Accumulator Tank Level LI-26505, LI-26506, (Core Flood Tank Level) LI-26507, LI-26508, SPDS L9003, L9004 39 Plow in HPI System FI-23805, FI-23806, FI-23807, FI-23808 on H2SFA/B 40 Plow in LPI System ,SPDS F9005, F9006 43 Primary System Safety XI-21506, XI-21507 Relief Valve Position and XI-21511 on H2PS, SPDS Z9109, Z9110, Z9111, Z9112, !
Z9119 and Z9120 I 45 Pressurizer Heater HIS-215L, HIS-215M on HlRC Status (Scheduled to be modified display TBD) 56 Heat Removal by Hand Switches on H2SFA and H2SF3 Containment Fan Removal System 57 Containment Atmosphere TE-52010, TE-52015 (Scheduled to Temperature be upgraded-display TBD) 62 CCW Temperature to ESF TE-48003, TE-48004 (NSCW TEMPS. System Scheduled to be upgraded-display TBD) 66 Emergency Ventilation IDADS Z2900 through Z2955
- Damper Position 67 Status of Standby Power Voltmeters and Ammeters on Panels H2ES and H2EW NRCREPOR(c) Page 41 1
I i v I l 6.lc Identify Power Supply Division as Related to Division for ' ICS and NNI
Response
See Figure 6.1c-1 showing the power supplies for display and alarms systems and Figure 1.0a-1 and 2 for ICS and NNI power supplies. 6.ld Address Reactor Vessel Level Instrumentation Res ponse During the Cycle 8 Refueling (next refueling) outage, reactor coolant inventory trending will be added as part of the Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) display (see Attachment 6.ld-1) to SPDS per the District's interpretation of the requirement' of NUREG 0737 item II.F.2 as discussed in the functional description j submittal Ron Rodriguez to Hugh Thompson Jr. dated December 30, 1985 (see Attachment 6.ld-2). The graphs j (middle of right side of display) will present a four to " five minute trend of vessel level updated every 15 sec. The real time value will display digitally and update l every two seconds. Since, when any RCP is running, the i vessel level indication is invalid, both vessel level and hot leg level will only be displayed when all four RCP's are stopped. When any pump is running, the area of the - display will be blank. The ICC alarm function will be
; () from the logical combination of RCP power monitors or low hot leg level and will be added to IDADS and as an alert' on SPDS during the Cycle 8 refueling outage. ,
6.2 Indication Issues - Discuss the F'llowing: o 6.2a Loss of ICS Power Alarm and Interaction with Fan Power I Failure.
Response
ICS ALARMS After the 12/26/85 transient, ICS/NNI annunciation was reviewed and modified as follows:
- 1. Failure Annunciator window H2PSB-64 "ICS SYSTEM FAILURE" will alarm on the' loss of the + or - 24 Vdc power buses only.
This alarm gives the control room operators an indication that ICS is no longer functioning.
< NRCREPOR(c) Page 42
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- 2. Trouble l fg The main control room annunciator window H2PSB-34, "ICS (o) TROUBLE" will alarm any of the following conditions:
- a. Any fuse blown in the ICS system
- b. Any cabinet fan -failure in the ICS system
- c. Any de power supply failure within the ICS system Blown fuse, fan failure and loss of a single power supply are on the same window because the operator's response is the same for all three conditions. The operator has to go to the ICS cabinets to determine which fuse has blown, I
l which fan has failed or which power supply has failed. If a blown fuse leads to a reactor trip, the operator dill get other alarms prior to the trip and post trip on the specific condition. The operator will respond to the specific alarms then p'roceed to clear the blown fuse. It was determined that none of these three items is , likely to cause a reactor trip or present an unsafe-condition during plant operations. All these items
- require investigation within the ICS cabinets to determine which fuse has blown (fuse holder indicates blown fuse), which fan has failed, or which power supply has failed (extinguish indicating light on ICS cabinet _
indicates failed power supply).
- 3. In addition ac faults within the ICS system are annunciated as follows: , . .
9
- a. For a fault downstream of a fuse,.the "ICS TROUBLE" alarm will actuate on the blown fuse.
- b. For a fault between the ABT and the fuses, the normal supply breaker in SlGB-1 panel will trip, the ABT will transfer to the alternate supply, and the associated breaker in S1J panel will also trip causing a total loss of power to the ICS system. The H2PSB-34 "ICS TROUBLE", H3PSB-64 "ICS SYSTEM FAILURE", H2PSB-23 "ICS OR NNI 120 VOLT POWER TRANSFER", will all alarm on this condition. In addition, SlGB-1 bus trouble will alarm in IDADS and H2ES-83 "NON-VITAL POWER BUS lE/lF/lJ TROUBLE" will alarm.
a NRCREPOR(c) Page 43
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- c. For a fault upstream of the ABT on the normtl supply, breaker in S1GB-1 panel will trip and.the ABT will transfer to the alternate supply. The H2PSB-34 "ICS
() TROUBLE", H2PSB-23 "ICS ON NNI 120 VOLT POWER TRANSFSR" will all alarm on this condition. In addition, SlGB-1 bus trouble will alarm in IDADS. For a fault upstream.of the ABT on the alternate supply, the breaker in SlJ will trip. The H2PSB-34 "ICS TROUBLE" will alarm on this condition and H2ES-83 "NON-VITAL POWER BUS lE/lF/lJ TROUBLE" will alarm. NNI Alarms
- 1. Failure Since NNI is-similar to ICS but with three (3) distinct de power distribution systems, three (3) annunciator windows will be used to alarm a loss of a + or - 24 Vdc power bus:
- a. H2PSA-52 "NNI Z FAILURE" alarms on a loss of -Z 24 Vdc '
power bus
- b. H2PSA-63 "NNI X FAILURE" alarms on a loss of +X or -X 24 Vdc power busses
- c. H2PSA-64 "NNI Y FAILURE" alarms on a loss of +Y or -Y 24 Vdc power busses
- 2. Trouble
() Annunciator window H2PSA-32 will be established as "NNI TROUBLE" and will alarm on any of the following conditions:
- a. Any fuse blown in the NNI system
- b. Any cabinet fan failure in the NNI system
- c. Any power supply failure within the NNI system Blown fuse, fan failure and loss of a single power supply are on the same window because the operator's response is the same for all. three conditions. The operator has to go to the NNI cabinets to determine which fuse has blown, which fan has failed or which power supply has failed. If a blown fuse leads to a reactor trip, the operator will get other alarms prior to the trip and post trip on the specific condition. The operator will respond to the specific alarms then proceed to clear the blown fuse.
NRCREPOR(c) Page 44 i
It was determined that Items 2 and 3 above are not likely to cause a reactor trip or present an unsafe condition during-plant operations. Item 1 above may lead to a reactor trip () but all other indications and controls not associated with the blown fuse remain operable and present no problems in staying within the post trip window. All these items require investigation within the NNI cabinets to determine j which fuse has blown (fuse holder indicates blown fuse), ' which fan has failed, or which power supply has failed i (extinguished indicating light on NNI cabinet indicates failed power supply). l
- 3. Ac faults within the NNI system are annunciated as follows:
- a. For a fault downstream of any fuse within any of the NNI sub-systems (X, Y or Z), the H2PSA-32 "NNI TROUBLE" alarm will actuate on a blown fuse.
- b. For a fault between the ABT and the fuses within the X '
power distribution system the normal supply breaker in SlGB-1 panel will trip, the ABT will transfer to the alternate supply and breaker in SlJ panel and this breaker will also trip causing a total loss of X power to the NNI system. The H2PSA-32 "NNI TROUBLE", H2PSA-63 "NN1 X FAILURE", H2PSB-23 "ICS OR NNI 120 VOLT POWER TRANSFER", H2ES-83 "NON-VITAL POWER BUS lE/lF/lJ TROUBLE" will all alarm on this condition. ( In addition, SlGB-1 bus trouble will alarm in IDADS.
- c. For a fault between the ABT and the fuses within the Y .
and Z power distribution systems, the normal supply breaker in S1GB-1 panel will trip, the ABT will transfer to the alternate supply and breaker in SlJ panel and this breaker will also trip causing a total loss of Y and Z power to the NNI system. -The H2PSA-32
) "NNI TROUBLE", H2PSA-64 "NNI Y FAILURE", H2PSA-52 "NNI Z FAILURE", H2PSB-23. "ICS OR NNI 120 VOLT POWER TRANSFER" AND H2ES-83 "NON-VITAL POWER BUS lE/lF/lJ TROUBLE" will all alarm on this condition. In addition SIGB-1 bus trouble will alarm in IDADS.
- d. For a fault upstream of the ABT in the X power
' distribution on the normal supply, breaker in SIGB-1 panel will trip and the ABT will transfer to the alternate supply. The H2PSA-32 "NNI TROUBLE", H2PSB-23 "ICS OR NNI 120 VOLT POWER TRANSFER" Will I alarm on this condition. In addition SIGB-1 bus l trouble will alarm in IDADS. For a fault on the alternate supp'ly, breaker in SlJ panel will trip. The H2PSA-32 "NNI TROUBLE" and H2ES-83 "NON-VITAL POWER BUS lE/lF/lJ TROUBLE" will alarm. NRCREPOR(c) Page 45 i l l l m-4 --e-.p---,-...~...g, - - -e-,...,.w, -. ,--.--e y. --
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- 5. For a fault upstretm of the ABT in ths Y and Z powar distribution on the normal supply, breaker in SlGB-1 panel will trip and the ABT will transfer to the alternate supply. The H2PSA-32 "NNI TROUBLE",
(.) H2PSB-23 "ICS OR NNI 120 VOLT POWER TRANSFER" and H2ES-66 will alarm on this condition. In addition, SIGB-1 bus trouble will alarm in IDADS. For a fault on the alternate supply, the associated breaker in SlJ panel will trip. The H2PSA-32 "NNI TROUBLE" and H2ES-83 "NON-VITAL POWER BUS lE/lF/lJ TROUBLE" will alarm. Also see Attachment 6.2a, Action Item Closure Report 3.f.7. 6.2a Supplemental . Are there any plans to put plexiglass cutouts in'the ICS/NNI cabinets to aid viewing of buses and power supplies? . Responce During the re-fusing of the NNI as a result of the " Light Bulb Incident", plexiglass cutouts were considered but not installed due to seismic considerations for the cabine'ts . External indications were installed on the NNI instead. Recent changes to the ICS installed external indication for the ICS. O 6.2b Main Feedwater (MFW) Flow Recorders Affected by the ICS.
Response
There are two MFW flow recorders affected by the ICS. These recorders are: LOOP A FW FLOW (FR 20525) and LOOP B FW FLOW (FR 20536) located on the HlRI console. These recorders are NNI ac powered. The de signals originate and are temperature compensated in the NNI. The signals are then conditioned by de powered ICS modules and terminate at the recorders. Failure Mode Recorder Reads l Loss of ICS de power Mid Scale Loss of ICS ac power Mid Scale Loss of NNI de power Mid Scale l Loss of NNI ac power Value prior to failure These recorders will be fitted with color coded labels to alert the operator of unreliable indication on receiving annunciation of fCS or NNI trouble or failure. NRCREPOR(c) Page 46 1 ~- ni r -
f 8 6.2b Supplcmintal Explain Why Midscale Failure is "OK" for NNI/ICS
. instruments.
Response
Assuming the question addresses failure modes due to loss > of NNI/ICS power it must be pointed out that mid-scale is not the only failure mode for a number of NNI/ICS instruments. Most NNI/ICS' indicators are powered by their respective ac power supplies and typically driven by de power (+ 10 V de) units. On loss of ac power the instrument wilf likely fail midscale and depending on the de driving signal may vary slightly about the midscale point. Since there is such a variety of potential failure modes in NNI/ICS instruments, operators are trained to utilize the independent SPDS indications when responding to a ' transient resulting from or associated with a loss of
! NNI/ICS ac or de power supply. Backup information on critical primary and secondary parameters is also available in the control room at the H2BS Panel (STA Panel).
Once the plant has been brought to a known safe condition, the operator can initiate action to restore () the NNI/ICS power in accordance with established procedures. . Should the power supply recovery effort be unsuccessful, a dedicated multi-point trend recorder, monitoring critical plant parameters is available in the control room to assist the operator in maneuvering the plant to a cold shutdown condition. The inputs to the recorder are independent of NNI/ICS power supplies. 1 The failure of NNI/ICS power supplies is adequately annunciated in the control room to inform the operator j that some failure mode exists in NNI/ICS instrumentation 4 and therefore the plant control should be based on SPDS j information. Additionally all ICS and NNI indicators I will be clearly labeled. 6.2c Generator Frequency Indicator
Response
The frequency meter is driven by the EHC but has some i signal conditionets that are ICS powered, therefore the meter fails on loss of ICS. This concern will be resolved through the modification to label ICS and NNI powered indicators. This meter will receive'a label () showing it is partially ICS powered. NRCREPOR(c) Page 47 , i
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6.2c Supplemental Explain Why Failure of the Frequency Meter is Acceptable () on Loss of ICS power.
Response
The frequency meter -(located on the HlSS console in the control room) is powered by ICS de power, but driven by the Turbine EHC system (speed error). On -loss of ICS ac or de power, a plant trip is initiated and the coast down of the turbine quickly takes the shaft speed below the instrument lower range of 57 HZ. The frequency meter plays no role in plant shutdown or recovery activities. This meter is only used in evaluating operational restrictions on the generator when operating under loaded conditions. 6.2d Difference Between SG Level Values Monitored by SPDS and Other control Room Indications , Res ponse During the 12/26/85 transient the operators reported that the SPDS did not read the same as the OTSG Operate Level Strip Chart Recorder. December 26, 1985 Transient Closure Report, Item 1.0 was prepared on this issue. (Attachment 6.2d-1) () This report concluded that the SPDS indicates within 1 to 2% of the OTSG Level recorder. This is deemed an acceptable tolerance for this indication. , 6.2e HPI/RCS Injection Valve Position: Res ponse The four (4) safety injection isolation valves are all indicated alike. Valves SFV-23809 and SFV-23811 are indicated on main control room panel H2SFA. Valves SFV-23810 and SFV-23812 are indicated on main control room panel H2SFB. Power for indication is from each individual valve's control power. Valve position is as follows:
- Close - green lights on
- Close to 1 1/2 turns open - green and red lights on
- 1 1/2 - 2 1/2 turns (preset balanced flow position -
white light on
- 21/2 turns to open - green and red lights on
- open - red light on NRCREPOR(c) Page 48 l
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J In addition, HPI B Stop chtck valva HV-23801 (normal condition - valve open with 52-2B179 clearance) indication is powered from SlB02 and indicated on Main () Control Room panel H2SFB as follows" Closed - green light on closed to open - green and red light on Open - red light on 6.2f Main Steam Relief Valve Open Monitor Res ponse Each Once-Through Steam Generator and its associated main steam piping is protected from overpressure by nine code i safety valves. The nine valves are grouped into four 1 sets of valves with graduated (increasing) setpoints. j The setpoints are 1050, 1070, 1090 and 1102.4 psig and the released fluid from the safety valves is directed to " the atmosphere through 9 individual 18 inch diameter i stacks extending above the turbine deck. The combined
- capacity of the safety valves allows full energy generated at the reactor high power level trip setpoint to be dissipated.
The tailpipe of each main steam code safety valve is monitored by an acoustic monitor (see attachment () , 6.2f-1). Each monitor provides an analog signal (proportional to valve flow) and an alarm to indicate an open valve. In the signal processing cabinet (remote , from the control room and the valves), the analog signal is displayed as ten levels of valve flow at the panel LEDs. The digital alarm status from each valve is monitored by the Interim Data Acquisition and Display System (IDADS point numbers Zl801 through Zl819 excluding Zl803). Each of these points is boPh alarmed and logged by IDADS (see attachment 6.2f-2). 6.2f Supplemental - Ic SMUD evaluating raising MSRV setpoints per B&WOG presentation?
Response
Yes, we are participating in this evaluation along with others as a part of an overall Main Steam Pressure Control Review being conducted with the owner's group Safety and Performance Improvement Program. NRCREPOR(c) Page 49
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6.29 RDEctor Building Ridiation Monitor Res ponse See 8.2a and attachment 6.la-3. 6.2h Address Increase of Sample Frequency of IDADS
Response
IDADS provides the capability of 5 dif ferent scan rates (sample frequencies). Variables with a slow time constant are scanned at a slower frequency while critical plant parameters are scanned by the fastest scan rate of 1 sec. (See 4.3) 6.2h Supplement - Address the IDADS sa,mple rate for EFIC.
Response
Software Changes Requests (SCRs) to accommodate the EPIC inputs have not been completed as yet. However, no outputs from EFIC to IDADS are required to alarm or - indicate in order for the Control Room operator to understand the status of or to operate EPIC AFW Controls. EFIC annunciated points and analog process values will be available on IDADS as a part of the plant trip history logging, will be available in the TSC as a part of the plant process indication, and will be potentially useful to off-line evaluations of any anomolaus EPIC behavior.
,IDADS scan rate for the thirty-two analog process variables (four (4) channels of SG pressure, SG high '
level, SG low level and Feedwater Flow) will be once each per second during initial plant operation with EFIC, but may be set .less frequently, later, if sufficiently covered for post accident analysis by other similar indications. Annunciated points will be 16gged at the time they occur. 6.21 Address Loss of Indication when ICS Power is not Available. Res ponse The following indication is affected on Loss of ICS dc power: Instrument Description Location XI-ll201 Neutron Error BlRI Console FR-20535 Loop A MFW Flow HlRI Console FR-20536 Loop B MFW Flow HlRI console SI-30101 - Generator Frequency HISS Console Meter NRCREPOR(c) Page 50 0 s_/ _ - ~ __ - .-
l Tha MFW recordsrs are powarsd from NNI and tha signal is conditioned by ICS. The indicator's power and signals come from NNI. On loss of ICS dc power, the MFW pumps are tripped and MFW flow indication is not required. Additionally, Generator Frequency.is no longer needed and Neutron Error becomes meaningless after the subsequent Reactor Trip. See attachment 1.3-1 for indication affected by loss of ICS ac power. On loss of NNI ac or de power, procedures and training direct the operator to ignore all NNI indication. See Attachment 1.3-3 for indication affected by loss of NNI ac power. 6.2j Discuss the Independence of PWR to Instruments.
Response
The instrumentation listed in 6.21 are powered by ICS (or NNI). , Backup instrumentation independent of ICS/NNI is available _(See 1.1j -for listing) . 6.2k Discuss Adequacy of Remaining Instrumentation Following Power Failure of.ICS or NNI. J
Response
See 1.lj for listing of instruments available following (} loss of NNI/ICS. s i I NRCREPOR(c) Page 51 0
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7.0 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN ICS, NNI AND PROTECTION SYSTEMS (RPS) l 7.0 Supplemental () State Whether RPS and SFAS are the Only Protection Systems that Interact with NNI/ICS
^
Response
The RPS and SFAS protection systems provide NNI/ICS with significant input for process indication and control. There are a series of lower order protection systems that also interface with NNI/ICS for indication and control. Not-necessarily in order of importance, these are: RCP Power Monitors Turbine / Generator Protection . Turbine Load Limit
- MFW Pump Discharge Pressure and Trip Status
- Secondary Pressure Control (Position status of TBV's)
- MFW Pump Status Condenser vacuum and Differential Pressure Status. ,
! These systems are interfaced with NNI/ICS in such a manner as to prevent NNI/ICS faults from being reflected back into the protection schemes. Failures within the individual protection schemes may drive the NNI/ICS and could lead to a plant trip. Operator action would be required to compensate for these , failures. l () 7.1 Provide a Discussion of this Issue Res ponse The NNI provides 23 process inputs to ICS. These inputs consist of various combinations of RCS flows & temperatures; OTSG pressures & levels; and feedwater flows, temperatures & differential pressures. In addition to NNI inputs, ICS receives inputs from generator MWe & frequency (currently tuned out of the control scheme) and neutron power (high signal selected in ICS). Each input to the ICS is buffered to ensure faults within the ICS are not reflected back to an input source. A fault within an ICS input source that results in an invalid l input signal will drive the ICS and therefore affect the ICS l process outputs. This can lead to turbine load, feedwater and reactor power mismatches that may trip the reactor. After a reactor trip the ICS' control input requirements are reduced to those needed to control,OTSG heat sink, and if necessary the ] operator can manually control the affected parameter. NRCREPOR(c) Page 52 O
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-- y - - - - - - - , - - - - - - -
Of the 23 NNI procass inputs to ICS, 12 can result in a plant-trip as a result of losing one of the 2 ac or 3 dc NNI power buses. Since EFIC will be installed the potential over or l () under cooling due to loss of power to ICS/NNI is greatly reduced. Loss of an RPS power supply does not drive the ICS because of the auctioneered input. Loss of the generator MWe can result in driving the ICS control scheme to full power. Loss of a single specific ICS input such as RPS, MWe or a single NNI signal will be addressed through the BWOG SPIP Program. . Modifications are being developed to drive the plant to a known safe condition (Hot Shutdown) on loss of ac or dc power supplies to either the NNI or ICS. These modifications will also eliminate 2 of the 12 NNI to ICS inputs that result in a plant trip. The. operator will have adequate information on redundant SPDS channels to verify the plant has stabilized at hot shutdown. Additionally, trended process monitoring independent of NNI and ICS will be provided in the Control Room to ensure the plant () can be taken to cold shutdown without NNI. Manual operation of some process controls outside the Control Room will be required, however the results of these manual actions can be , monitored from the Control Room. The NNI receives RC flow and RC pressure signals from the RPS, However, they are buffered and auctioneered. The NNI receives RC pressure signals from SFAS. They are buffered but not auctioneered. ( 4 4 W NRCREPOR(c) Page 53 4
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8.0 OTHER ISSUES 8.1 Diesel Generators Capacity Issue - Discuss the Following: Res ponse This issue will be address,ed in a separate submittal. 8.2 Containment Isolation of Essential Systems Issue 8.2a Address Damage to Radiation Monitor
Response
- 1. Engineering evaluation of damage to Reactor Building Atmosphere Radiation Monitor R-15001 which occurred following containment isolation upon SFAS actuation during the December 26, 1985 event.
- a. Extent of damage - R-15001A & B's Sample pump was damaged. The sample pump is a positive -
displacement type; Roots Blower AF model. The pump overheated and the pump's seals were damaged. ] b. Cause of damage - upon SFAS actuation, SPV-53612 and SPV-53613, closed. These valves isolated the containment from R15001A
& B by blocking both the monitor's supply and O return sample lines. This caused the monitor's sample pump to exceed it's rated differential pressure of 6 psig and thereby caused overheating and failure of the pump's seals.
A review was conducted of all valves that are driven closed as a result of safeguards initiation. Any pump or compressor who's inlet and/or outlet flow path could be affected was evaluated for NPSH and adequate system flow to prevent component over heating due to windage or cavitation. i The results of the review verified that there were no other pumps operating, or made available to operate, as a result of safeguards without adequate NPSH and adequate mini-flow. The review further verified that two radiation monitor compressors were isolated and continued to run with inadequate . mini-flow. NRCREPOR(c) Page 54 p , r , ,r - , - - > r - ,- . ~,- -
I J R-15001A & B containmtnt monitors compreccor j overheated, commenced to smoke and resulted ; in fire protection systems and alarm () initiations. The FP systems tripped the Radwaste area ventilation blowers and contributed significantly to the challenge to the operators in establishing normal plant conditions. R-15001C, D & E, in parallel with R-15001A & B was also isolated but did not overheat to the point of smoking. The investigation of why one compressor failed and the other did not is in progress at this time. No other compressors are isolated by safeguard actions.
- c. Ef fect on the capability to achieve a safe shutdown.
R-15001A & B have dual functions. During power operations, R15001A - E is in the Reactor Building Atmosphere mode and has the function of detecting unidentified Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary leakage. At shutdown conditions, R-15001A & B has the function of monitoring the Reactor Building () Stack Purge Effluent. Neither leak-detection nor Reactor Building ' purge effluent monitoring functions are directly related to the ca'pability to achieve a safe shutdown. R-15001A - E are QA Class II and not safety or emergency plan related,
- d. Availability of other radiation monitors.
All the radiation monitors required by the Technical Specifications will be available for plant restart. This includes R-15001A & B which were damaged. R-15001A & B have been repaired and corrective action has been taken to provide R-15001's sample pump loss of flow protection to prevent recurrence of pump damage.
- e. Corrective action taken on R-15001's sample pump NRCREPOR(c) Page 55
d A differential pressure switch will be installed across the sample pump. Upon exceeding a predetermined setpoint, the dp
-)
s_/ switch will provide a signal to the pump's motor controller which will automatically secure the motor thus protecting the pump. 8.2b Address the Response to Item II.E.4.2 of NUREG 0737
Response
Based on the District's Response to NUREG-0737 dated January 16, 1981, appropriate systems will be isolated following SFAS actuation and essential systems needed for safe shutdown or accident mitigation will be initiated (i.e. high pressure injection (HPI) system, Essential R.B. HVAC etc. ~ Containment pressure set points are set by the Rancho Seco Technical Specifications to four (4) psig maximum (the set point is somewhat below this to allow for instrument drif t) sequence of SPAS channel actuations i.e. channel lA, 1B, 2A, 2B, 3A,3B, 4A, 4B, ' will initiate activation of systems required to bring the plant to a safe shutdown condition or mitigate an accident, i.e. low pressure injection, Reactor Building Spray etc. l Purge valves and pressure equalizing valves - Tech Specs currently require these valves to be closed during operation. Item II.F.1.2 requires RB stack monitor for plant effluents. . Because we cannot operate purge or equalizing valves during operatiion, NRC has previously stated that we did not have to meet this requirement. Because the District has indicated the desire to use the equalizing valves at power, NRC letter dated December 4, 1984, has left item II.E.4.2 open. We are in the process of making a Technical Specification change to allow use of these valves. This also requires meeting Section II.F.1.2. NRCREPOR(c) Page 56
8.3 Immsdiate Lons'of Air Supply to ICS Components Issua 8.3a Address Safety-Related Classification of Air Supply () System Res ponse The air supply system for the' plant is called the Plant Air System which consists of Instrument Air System (IAS) and Service Air System (SAS). IAS provides dry and oil free air for the operation of the air operated devices. The plant air system is classified as a non-safety system. The normal instrument air supply for the control and actuation of the Main Feedwater and Startup Feedwater
. Control Valves comes from the plant air system. To assure that the MFW & SUFW valves will close and remdin closed if required by EFIC in the event of loss of of fsite power or loss of the instrument air supply, a two hour, seismic class 1, backup supply of air will be i provided. The backup system uses two sets of high pressure bottles and reducing stations with one set '
supplying air to MFW, SUFW, and non-ICS AFW valves associated with OTSG A; one set supplying air to MFW, SUFW, and non-ICS AFW valves associated with OTSG B. Each set uses high pressure air bottles headered through a pressure reduction valve to supply air to the valves at-a pressure of approximately 85-psig. Since the IAS supply pressure is approximately 100 psig, the backup air () supply will only function if the IAS supply is unable to supply air. Soft seated check valves and excess flow check valves are provided to prevent flow from the backup ' ! supply into the instrument air supply and to isolate a j depressurized branch of the air supply. I
- The normal instrument air supply for the control of the Turbine Bypass Valves (TBV's) comes from the Plant Air System. The backup supply of air is provided through an independent set of high pressure bottles. Since.the TSV's are not required to bring the plant to a known safe condition for the loss of air event, the backup air is classified as a non-safety system. However, Atmospheric Dump Valve ( ADV) controls are available to the operators independent of the ICS (see Figures 8.3a-1 and 8.3a-2).
The surveillance procedure will be provided to monitor the pressure in the bottles. The low pressure alarms are provided in the IDADS. The setpoint for alarming is selected such that at least two hours of air is available/ remains in the bottles after the low pressure 4 alarm is annunciated in the Control Room. NRCREPOR(c) Page 57 O
The speed changer valve for the Main Feedpump Turbine is supplied with instrument air. Upon loss of ICS power, MFW pump are tripped hence this component is not required h to function. 8.3 Supplemental
- 1. Instrument Air System PEIDs, DFC report and System Status Report should be made available. A table of failure modes for ICS and safety related components should be provided. Information on testing and maintenance should be included if available.
Response
See Section 1.la, Attachment 8.3a-1 (LAS DFC Report) and Attachment 8.3a-2 (IAS SSR).
- 2. Based on past concerns identified with regard to the functioning of the instrument air system, the staff believes that additional testing as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.68.3 beyond a loss of instrument air should be conducted. Specifically, the staff recommends that in addition to a sudden loss of air test, a gradual loss of pressure test should be performed and proper system response to this condition verified as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.68.3.
j () Res ponse The Rancho Seco instrument, air system will be , modified as a result'of the DFC in time for restart , j to include backup design features which will , significantly improve system reliability. These l modifications will provide the capability to respond l to either a sudden or gradual loss of instrument air pressure. These modifications include a backup diesel-driven air compressor and dryer package which is independent of site support systems (e.g., cooling water, power, etc.) and will start on low instrument air system pressure or loss of power. Independent compressed gas bottle supplies will also be provided for critical plant instrument air operated components as identified by DFC and EFIC components. This backup bottled gas system automatically supplies backup gas to the air operated components when the normal air NRCREPOR(c) Page 58
- -.. ~
y ~a., - cukplyislost'ordigradsd. Ltstly, a cross-tie from the existing Nitrogan Gus System is planntd to provide another backup gas source to the instrument air system, if ever needed. Testing of these (} modifications will be conducted with the plant on
- steam; generator cooling (subject to PRC approval) for both a sudden and gradual loss of normal instrument air. A functional test will be performed on a component level to verify and document the capabilities of the new modifications. The scope of i .this integrated test is presently being developed by the system review and the test program system status report for instrument air. . Proper backup system response to these conditions will be verified.
4 8.3b Indicate if Air supply System is Connected to the 4 Emergency ~ Buses, j Res ponse , Normal ai'r supply system is not considered a safety system,,hence the system is not connected to the Emergency buses. However a class 2 independent diesel - i driven air compressor supplies backup air to the IAS. In addition, certain critical valves (ADV, MFW, SUFW and AFW)- have' local class 1 backup air systems. , s 8.3b-1 Dishuss the Rupture of Airline. s
Response
() ' The excess flow check valves are used to prevent l flow-from the backup supply into the normal suppiyfand to isolate a depressurized normal air ' supply. lSoe Figures 8.3a-1 and 8.3a-2. 8.3b-2 Address the Consequences of Losing Air Supply System as a Result of Losing Offsite Power.
! Response i On the system level, upon loss of offsite power, the, normal air supply is not available. However, i
the diesel driven compressor will start- l automatically'apon sensing a low pressure in the i normal air supply system. In addition, loss of power to.the battery charger for the diesel ! driven compress'o'r will also start this compressor automati:cally. Additionally, a dedicated high i pressure air bottle system will be provided for the ICS. and EPIC components such as ADV's, TBV's, i MFW,.SUFW and AFW valves, which_are independent of offsito power.
~
NRCREPOR(c) Page 59 j O- . J' '*'s, i -
On the component level, loss of plant (instrument) air pressure will have no effect on () the ADV's and TBV's. On loss of plant and backup IAS'the ADV's and TBV's will.open due to steam system pressure. The MFW and SUFW valves will
" fail as is",, and air operated AFW control valves will fail open.
The loss of air will cause the speed changer valve to open which will drive the governor valve to the close position and MFW pump to stop. 8.4 Loss of Offsite Power Concurrent With the Loss of ICS Issue 8.4a Provide a Discussion of this Issue Res ponse On loss of ICS concurrent with the loss of of fsite power, , RCP's and Main feedwater pumps will be tripped. A trip of the reactor and the turbine will occur. The EFIC + system will be activated to bring the plant to hot + s shutdown. The power supply matrix, figure 8.4a-1 shows g
~*
independent diesel backed power suppies to the four EPIC channels which are not affected by the loss of offsite , , power or loss of ICS. , 1:
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- 3. I tillAL Al.lGt1MLili 0F TYPICAL OF 8 NilitOGEtt TWO VALVES $ l NOTES:
AB0vE _ _ _ _ __ _ .] 1. SYSTEM PRESSURE WILL OPEN Tile VALVE
- IF THE PNEUMATIC POWER IS LOST.
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- 3. RED a GREEN LIGitTS ARE PROVIDE 0 It4 THE C0t4IROL ROOM FOft VALVE POSITlorJ.
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- 4. STitEAM ISOLATION OFVALVE,S TBV C0tlift0LLEO Fit 0M CONTfl0L ft00M.
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1 9.0 HUMAN FACTORS ISSUES 9.1 Address the Need for Better Diagnostics for Breaker Position Indication, e.g., Simplified Electrical schematics (} Res ponse The Sl/S2 switches are typical " light switch" type switches, not' typical breaker switches. The switches are black with small white words on the inner curve of the switch. When the breakers tripped the switches tripped to the down position, but the "off" label wasn't obvious, because of the switch location. Human Factors enhancements which replaced the labels for these switches and the like NNI switches improved the interpretation of the status of the breaker. (See Figure 9.1-1 and Attachment 9.1-2). A simplified schematic for both the ICS system and the NNI system are part of the associated casualty procedures (see
. Attachments 9.1-3 thru 7). The same schematic is mounted as a label to the ICS and NNI cabinets (Figure 9.1-2). These schematics show the functionality of the power structures and relates the procedures to the associated physical plant equipment.
9.2 Address the Need for additional Valve Position Indication for TBV's, ADV's, MFW Control, and AFW Control Valves Res ponse TBV, ADV, AFW, MFW control and startup FW valve position [} '- indication are being added. Valve position indication lights are being added to provide the operator with positive indication. ECN R-0828 (attachment 9.2-1) provides the addition of indicating lights on the HlRI ' console (20 in total) powered independently of ICS for the TBV's, MFW control and startup valves. ADV position indication will be grouped into a set of lights for each steam line (see attachment 9.2-2, pages 5 to 8 for logic & P&ID's) Position indication will consist of two lights functioning as follows: Open: When valve is not in closed position the red lights will be on. Closed: When valve is not in the open position the green light will be on. Mid Travel: When the valve is in the intermediate position both lights will be on (see DBR attachment 9.2-2). NRCREPOR(c) Page 61 O
l l 9.3 Address the N3sd to Corre.ct the Noise Problem with Control Room HVAC ! Response See the System Status Report for the Control Room Essential HVAC, (Attachment 9.3-1). 9.4 Address the Desirability df Having Separate Alarms for "ICS" and " Fan-Power Failure"
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' NRCREPOR(c) Page 62 O
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10.0 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 10.1 Address the Existing Requirements Governing the Operability of Systems and Components Addressed Herein Res ponse The Rancho Seco Technical Specifications and Plant Procedures govern the operability of ' systems and their components. Although ICS and NNI are not covered by a technical specification, their operability is assured by maintenance, calibration, casualty and operating procedures. AFW is currently covered by technical specifications. The modifications for EPIC will require technical specification changes. 10.2 Address the Need for Changing Technical Specificati'ons as Operating Procedures are Revised
Response
Procedure changes which require a safety review are detailed in Rancho Seco Quality Control Instruction (QCI) number 18. The . procedure change, with its safety analysis,.i.s reviewed by the Plant Review Committee (PRC), among other items, for a Technical Specification change or addition. Af ter management ' and NRC approval the procedure and technical specification changes are implemented. A flow diagram of this process is included (see Figure 10.2-1). O
- NRCREPOR( c) Page 63 O
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