ML20148S021
| ML20148S021 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/06/1988 |
| From: | NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| REF-10CFR9.7 NUDOCS 8804150248 | |
| Download: ML20148S021 (76) | |
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
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Title:
BRIEFING ON BASIC SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS l
Location: Washington. DC l l
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'leanesday, April 6, 1988 i
Pages: 1 - 41 i
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l Ann Riley & Associates Court Reporters 1625 i Street, N.W., Suite 921 Washington, D.C. 20006 (202) 293-3950 kkk4I[8((j000406 PDR t
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i 1 UNITED' STATES OF AMERICA i
2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 3 ***
4 BRIEFING ON BASIC SAFETY PRINCIPLES FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
- t i 5 ***
6 PUBLIC MEETING 7 ***
8 Nuclear Regulatory Commission 9 Room 1130 10 1717 H Street, Northwest ,
11 Washington, D.C.
12 13 Wednesday, April 6, 1988 14 ,
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15 The Commission met in open session, pursuant to 16 notice, at 2 :00 p.m. , the Honorable LANDO W. ZECH, Chairman of 17 the Commission, presiding.
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19 COMMISSIONERS PRESENT' l
20 LANDO W. ZECH, Chairman of the Commission 21 THOMAS M. ROBERTS, Member of the Commission 22 KENNETH CARR, Member of the Commission 23 i
's 24 l 25 i
i S
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2 3 STAFF AND PRESENTERS SEATED AT THE COMMISSION TABLE:
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6 S. CHILX 7 V. STELI4 8 H. DENTON 9 W. PARLER 10 H. KOUTS 11 12 f
\ 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
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- 1 PRDCIEDINGS f
1' 2 {2:00 p.m.)
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.
l Commissioner Bernthal and commissioner Rogers will not be with 4
5 us this afternoon. Commissioner Roberts will be joining us 6 shortly.
7 This afternoon the Commission will be briefed on the
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8 International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group -- the INSAG 9 report, entitled "Basic Safety Principles for Nuclear Power 10 Plants." This report was recently released by the 11 International Atomic Energy Agency at their symposium on severe 12 accidents in March of 1988.
, 13 Dr. Herb Kouts was chairman of the INSAG working 14 group who prepared this report, and is here today to summarize 15 the recommendations of the document.
16 I would like to welcome you today here, Dr. Kouts.
17 We appreciate your long and substantial service to our country 18 and we are delighted that you are with us here today. It is ny I
j 19 understanding that the Executive Director for Operations, Mr.
l 20 victor Stello, and Mr. Harold Denton, the Director of our l
21 Office of Governmental and Public Affairs, will also provide l l 22 their insights into this significant report.
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l 23 The report promotes a safety philosophy for everyono 1
fi 24 involved in all the various aspects of commercial nuclear power 25 plant development and operation. The Commission has recently 1
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4 4
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,- 1 received copies of the IAEA report, which we have here, and we
. T 2 will of course take some time to review the report itself, but 3 we are pleased to have this briefing today.
4 I understand copies of the slides to be used during 5 the presentation are available in the back of the room.
1 6 I emphasizo that this is an information briefing and 7 no formal Commission' action is anticipated at the meeting 8 t oday.
9 Do any of my fellow commissioners have any opening 10 comments?
11 (No response.)
12 CHAIRMAN ZECH: If not, Mr. Denton, would you please f
1 13 proceed?
14 MR. DENTON: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
15 The International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group, so-16 called INSAG, was formed in 1985 by the Director General, so i 17 they are an advisory body to the Director General of the It.EA.
I 18 It had a dozen or 13 members, all of whom were well known' i 19 experts in reactor safety. It includes Dr. Kouts, of course, 20 and people you know -- Dr. Birkhofer, Mr. Tanguy, Mr.
21 Siderenko.
1 22 This group wrote the official IAEA report on the 23 Chernobyl accident, and I believe it was that accident that i
24 really was the impetus for producing this basic principles l 25 report that we have today, and the report does talk about
5 l r
. 1 principles for existing and future reactor types, but there is 2 special attention given in it to those principles that emerged i 3 from post-accident analyses. i i
4 Herb will be the first speaker. Herb, of course, is -
5 well known to you, is of April 1st, he stepped down from his 6 job as the head chairman of the Department of Nuclear Energy at 7 Brookhaven to become a scientist again, apparently after 8 serving in that capacity for over a decade - and, of course,
]
9 you remember he used to be Director of the Division of Research 10 right here in the NRC. I 11 After Herb's presentation, Vic will describe and l 12 discuss the uses that the NRC might make of this report. ,
( 13 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Thank you very much.
14 Dr. Kouts, welcome again. Please proceed.
15 MR. KOUTS: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, i 16 Commissioners. ,
17 The document I am going to talk about is "Basic l l
18 Safety Principles for Nuclear Power Plants." It follows the l l
l 19 jntent that the International Atomic Energy Agency and its 20 Director General had when they formed INSAG in 1985, which was 21 te develop, where possible, commonly shared safety principles, I
22 commonly shared meaning commonly shared across the surface of l
\ l I 23 the earth.
- 24 This was a concept, in fact, which dates to Mr.
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25 Manning Hunsing, who foresaw the need for an organization and i
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t !
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- 1 an activity of this sort a few years before, and through the l
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j 2 National Association of Engineering Societies arranged for the i
) 3 International Atomic Energy Agency to try the INSAG concept and i 3
i 4 its activity on a trial basis.
]
5 It was after the Chernobyl accident in 1986 that 4
6 there was a meeting in Vienna sponsored by the International i
7 Atomic Energy Agency, at which one of the principal t
8 recommendations was that INSAG should now get on with the job i i
9 of preparing these commonly shared safety principles, and that l 10 has been the origin of this book.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. !
i a
t 12 (Slide.) )
)1 13 MR. f00TS: In agreeing to do this, INSAG was >
! 14 motivated by the realization that -- as my first slide ;
15 I 1 indicates -- that although there are some 400 nuclear plants i <
1
] 16 which have come to fruition in the world, two of these have had l 17 severe accidents which have destroyed them, and this led in I
i I 18 turn to some 31 deaths of individuals who were involved in the t
i f 1
19 CLernobyl accident, r I ,
20 Now in other activities, in other industrial l i
21 industries hich have as extensive a background as nuclear i J !
I 1 22 power has, this might be considered a not bad level of safety, 23 but INSAG recognized that the nuclear field is faced with !
l 4 24 stronger requirements than have been imposed on other l I
d 25 industrint endeavors, and even a safety record which is good j i
l
7
. 1 for most industrial operations would not be edequate for the
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2 nuclear field.
3 So the safety principles are directed toward an ,
4 improvement of that record, and I will tell, as I go on, just 5 how trat improvement is to be achieved.
6 Also guiding the deliberations that led to the 7 document was a realization that especially since the Chernobyl 8 accident P +e has boen a maturing and a converging of cdrtain 9 concepts t 1 the world, so that this seemed 4 propitious 10 time for trying to achieve the kind of document which tiad been 11 sought from a group of this sort.
]
12 Commonly shared safety 9tinciples now seem to be:ome !
4
\ 13 a possibility. '
f 14 (Slide.)
)
15 MR. KOUTS: Furthermore, again, as on my next slide, j 16 the international consequences of accidents in nuclear power j 17 plants were also recognized following the Chernobyl accident !
i 18 and it became clear that we now have a need for safety i 19 principles which can be accepted on an international basis, so 20 that activities in one country can be acceptable, or at least 21 there is a tcuchstone to determine whether the activities are i
22 acceptable in other countries as well.
23 So these are the motivations which led to preparation j 24 of this document at this time.
25 The document begins with some introductory i
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- i l
8 1 discussion, such as a preface and an introductory part, in I
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2 which certain areas which are necessary for the interpretation 3 and appilaation of the principles are taken up.
4 First of all, the document is directed toward nuclear 5 plants of current types. Now by current types, I mean not only 6 light water reactors, which of course we are predominantly 7 interested in in this country, but other nuclear power plant 8 trpes which may be used in different countries around the 9 orld. That includes fast breeder reactors as they are used in 10 France and in the Soviet Union, gas cooled reactors as they are 11 used in a number of countries, heavy water reactors -- all 12 reactors of current types had their safety characteristics r
(. 13 examined from a standpoint of formulation of this document and 14 it is meant to apply universally to all of '.hese.
15 low, there are some restrictions in the document.
16 First of all, it is a document which is pertinent to l
17 electricity generating plants. We have concentrated on this.
18 However, it was pointed out by our Soviet colleague that a 19 number of pinnts in the Soviet Union are now directed toward 20 space heating of apartment buildings, industrial complexes and 21 that the safety principles that we were devising had more 22 general applicability -- or most of them did, at any rate, and 23 so it is pointed out that this broader applicability is still 24 possible.
4 25 However, ,there are some nuclear plants that are under
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,- 1 consideration, particularly in this country, which some of l t
2 their proponents have terned "inherently safo" types. We did 3 not up take up the question of inherently safe reactors. We 4 took the view that these are safety principles that are meant 5 to be applied universally, and if there are certain principles 6 which be virtue of plant design are not necessarily to be 7 covered by these principles, this is a situation which one 8 would have to argue again, rather than argue from the other 9 end.
10 That is the coverage from a standpoint of which 11 plants are treated.
12 The question of new plants versus old plants also l'
\_ 13 cones up, and the question of backfit. As you will see, wo 14 have different objectives for old plants and for new plants and 15 make the comment that for backfitting with respect to old 16 plants, one has to take into account a number of 17 considerations. There must be a balance, a balance being 18 achieved through a cost benefit study to determine to what 19 extent the backfit is required.
20 Recognizing that nothing is absolutely safe and the 21 search for absolute safety is a fruitless one, secondly it is 22 necessary to optimize the use of resources. One would not want 23 to devote large amounts of resources to areas of improvement i 24 that have only marginal benefit.
25 Thirdly, that some improvements have downsides as
10
,. I well, and it is necessary to consider what might be wrong with k' an "improvement" as well as what might be achieved with it.
2 3 So these are the considerations that have to be taken 4 into consideration in the backfit situation.
5 IS11de.]
6 MR. KOUTS: In the next slide, I have a note to the 7 effect that we have to recognize that, although nuclear plants 8 use high technology, and this is considered by many people to 9 be a source of fear, at least by the general public, because 10 high technologi is so poorly understood, in fact, it is 11 necessary and it is proper to take advantage of high technology 12 to achieve safety in nuclear power, and, as a matter of fact, f
1 13 with high technology, one can achieve higher levels of safety 14 than one can achieve in ordinary industrial endeavors.
15 This is a source of strength and not of weakness, and 16 it is, in fact, the underpinning of safety in nuclear power, 17 because it's the basis for use of defense in-depth and safety 18 rests on defense in-depth in this field.
19 [ Slide.)
20 MR. KOUTS: Emphasized in the document is a concept !
21 of safety culture which is a concept which was stated in our 22 report on the Chernobyl accident. Safety culture is the 23 pervasive presence of safety thinking which must accompany i 24 activities by all individuals who are active in the process of 25 p.oduction of nuclear power. It's a safety thinking among all i
11 1 those concerned in these activities and we bring in the concept 2 of safety culture and its application in many places throughout 3 the document. I would like to return to this shortly.
4 (Slide.]
5 MR. KOUTS: A couple of more aspects of the document.
6 The document is not a regulatory document. It is not directed 7 toward regulatory use. That is, it's not formulated in a style 8 which could be readily adopted by regulatory organizations. It 9 is, in fact, a document which is directed more to the nuclear 10 industry, and is associated with what we consider to be the 11 quest for excellence which nuclear industry should be expected 12 to be undertaking.
f i 13 For this reason, the document is written in the 14 present tense. Everything is said as if the practices and the 15 principles which are discussed in the document are, in fact, in 16 current use. Now, as a matter of fact, almost everything in 17 the document is in current use in one place or another. After 18 all, we were seeking commonly safety principles and if wo 19 introduced ideas which were radical, or brand new, they would 20 not be commonly shared principles.
21 So, you will find that much of what I have to say, 22 reflects practices that you are familiar with. You will find 23 that the document, however, written in this way, is a
- 24 structured document which tells why and what and how to achieve 25 What is recommended.
I
s 12 1 The report was originally, in our first thoughts, to 2 be a kind of deductive report. We wanted to establish 3 objectives to be achieved and then, to whatever extent we 4 could, derive from the objectives the things which should be 5 done to achieve the objectives. We found that this is not 6 really possible. It's not possible to derive all of nuclear 7 plant safety as an exercise in logic from the objectives 8 themselves, but this led us to a tiered approach in which we 9 have objectives, some fundamental principles and some specific 10 principles; each layer of which overlays those below and in 11 which each successive tier becomes more specific. We ended 12 these tiers, however, before we got to specific types of f
k 13 nuclear plants because we wanted the generality.
14 (Slide.)
15 MR. KOUTS: We have three objectives. Twelve 16 fundamental principles and fifty specific principles in the 17 document and the specific principles are more specific 18 applications of the general principles, but you will find that 19 specific principles commonly are related to more than one 20 fundamental principle; and they all are related to several of 21 the objectives. I'd like to just go through the objectives.
I 22 (Slide.)
23 MR. KOUTS: As I said, there are three objectives.
{ 24 They are not independent objectives. They are interrelated.
25 There is a general objective and there are two objectives
.13 e- 1 which, in a. sense, are means of achieving the general
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2 objective. The general objective is to protect individuals, 3 society and the environment by establishing and maintaining in 4 nuclear power plants, an effective defense against radiological 5 hazard. This is a concept which is not unfamiliar to you 6 gentlemen and, as a matter of fact, is not inconsistent with 7 objectives which you have discussed as safety goals in your 8 deliberations. In fact, we see this as representative of an 9 international consensus on safety goals, or on safety 10 objectives, as these have been discussed in many countries.
11 (Slide.)
12 MR. KOUTS: The second safety objective is a jn
- 1. 13 radiation protection objective. I have given it a shorthand 14 statement on my slide. It really reads, "to ensure in normal 15 operation, that radiation exposure within the plant and due to j i
16 any release of radioactive material from the plant, is kept as 17 low as reasonably achievable," which is the ALARA concept, "and 18 to ensure mitigation of radiation exposure due to accidente."
19 Each of these objectives and each of the principles which l
20 follow as concise a statement of the principle and the 21 objective as we could possibly give it. The idea being, that 22 we wanted to achieve a statement which somehow could be born in 23 mind. But, we could not enfold in the statement itself all of i 24 the things we wanted say in this connection.
25 So, there is a discussion section which follows, and I
14
- 1 ~the discussion section enlarges on the short statement, gives 2 the extent of it, gives the exceptions to it, and clarifies the 3 meaning. That's done in the objectives I'm reading out and, 4 for instance, in this particular objective, there's a 5 discussion of non-stochiastic and stochiastic effects of 6 radiation and the fact that the statement itself is directed 7 toward both of these kinds of radiation. The second safety 8 objective is a very long one, and a very important one. It's 9 on page 8 of your document and I've given it just a shorthand 10 statement on my slide which is that accidents are to be 11 prevented and especially to be prevented are accidents with 12 high consequences.
f"
( 13 (Slide.)
14 MR. KOUTS: In fact, there are three aspects to this i 15 technical safety objective; the prevention of accidents, the 16 prevention of accidents with high consequences and the 17 prevention of high consequences from accidents; and these are 18 not really the same thing. They are different things and they 19 are implemented in different ways in the course of the 1
20 document's unfolding. I 21 There is a target which is established in the 22 discussion of the technical safety objective. This target is a 23 probability of severe core damage for nuclear power plants q' 24 which does not exceed 10 to the minus four per year for 25 existing plants, 10,to the minus 5 for plants in the future,
.15 1 for plants of future construction and off-site consequences 2 which require extensive off-site measures, or any off-site 3 measures at all, an order of magnitude less probable than these 4 numbers. This is a safety objective which, again, you-would 5 not find unfamiliar to you.
6 [ Slide.]
7 MR. KOUTS: There are twelve fundamental principles; 8 three of these are related to management, three of them to 9 defense in-depth, and six of them, for want of a better tern, 10 are called technical principles, and I'd like to run through 11 them with some reasonable speed, if I may, and then go into 12 some of the specific principles.
/
i 13 The fundamental principles on management; the first 14 of these is that an established safety culture governs the 15 actions and interactions of all individuals and organizations 16 engaged in nuclear power activities. In this principle, we 17 state the components of a safety culture. There are many 18 components and many implications of the concept.
19 Included are: the requirement for dedication and 20 accountability on the part of all individuals involved in these 21 activities, a dedication which starts with senior management of 22 the organizations involved, including the senior management of 23 the operating organization, who establish clear policies and g 24 clear lines of responsibility and communication among their 25 staff, with strict adherence to requirements, with reviews and
4 16 e- 1 training of their staff, leading to an openness with respect to
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2 safety questions on the part of the staff and a questioning 3 attitude concerning safety matters. This is the principle 4 which outlines-the requirements to be achieved in the quest for 5 excellence.
6 [ Slide.]
7 MR. KOUTS: The second fundar. ental principle is one 8 which is closely related to this Commission. That is, that the 9 ultimate responsibility -- I'm sorry, I'm not at that one --
10 this says that the ultimate responsibility for the safety of 11 the nuclear power plant rests with the operating organization.
12 This is in no way diluted by the separate activities and
- g. .
5- 13 responsibilities of designers, suppliers, constructors and 14 regulators. In this, we are not discussing financial 15 responsibility, but moral and procedural responsibility.
16 This responsibility is such that when a nuclear plant 17 operator accepts his plant from whoever has constructed it for 1
18 him, he accepts all responsibility for what has gone before and 19 what is to go after. This is a cradle-to-grave responsibility.
20 At the same time, there are other responsibilities of 21 other organizations involved; suppliers, constructors, 22 designers and also a responsibility of the technical community 23 to ensure that the proper backup in safety is always available
- 24 to be used by the industry.
25 (Slide.) j
4 19
.. 1 MR. KOUTS: The next fundamental principle-is the one i
2 I started to refer to. The Government establishes the legal 3 framework for nuclear industry and independent regulatory 4 organization. This is, again, shorthand and I really want to 5 read the full statement as it is in the document. "The 6 principle establishes the legal framework for a nuclear 7 industry and an independent regulatory organization which is 8 responsible for licensing and regulatory control of nuclear 9 power plants and for enforcing the relevant regulations. The 10 separation between the responsibilities of the regulating 11 organization and those of other parties is clear; such that the 12 regulators retain their independence as a safety authority and f~
( 13 are protected from undue pressure."
14 This last statement is one which we were requested 15 specifically to have put in by some of the smaller countries in 16 which the maintenance of this clear responsibility by the 17 regulatory organization is sometimes jeopardized.
18 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Would you elaborate on that?
19 What undue pressures?
20 MR. KOUTS: Well, this was a subject for long 21 discussion inside our group as we wrote this, and the pressures 22 themselves were never clearly stated by the individuals who 23 said that they felt them in their countries.
l '
i 24 These are pressures in countries where the 25 independence of the regulatory organization is not so clear at
.I8 1 the out set, and I could name countries which I feel have this 2 problem, but I don't think this is an appropriate time to do 3 so.
4 Generally, however, these are usually small countries 5 in which governmental organization is not as extensive and well 6 developed as it is in this country.
7 As you know, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has 8 this unique character of not being an administrative 9 organization responsible to the administrative side of the 10 government, and it has a legislative responsibility and an 11 administrative responsibility as well. This is not so in many 12 countries, and the common thing in most countries is that the l'
( 13 regulatory organization is directly under the administration of 14 the country, so that the possibility for pressures to be i
15 applied exists there as is does not exist in the United States. l 16 I hope that makes it a little clearer.
1 17 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: Well, that's fine. Thank you. I 18 [ Slide.)
19 MR. KOUTS: The principles of defense-in-depth are l l
20 three in number.
21 The first of these is a statement to be achieved 22 through defense-in-depth and that is my shorthand statement on 23 the next slide. Defense-in-depth is provided through a set of
( 24 physical barriers which are meant to ensure that radioactive 25 material in the plant is confined in regions where it is
.19 1 supposed to be. These ' barriers are not to be jeopardized, and 2 for this reasons various mechanisms and procedures are built 3 into the plant design and into plant operations -- to ensure 4 that the barriers remain intact and that radioactive material 5 continues to be confined.
6 There is an appendix in the report which discussed 7 defense-in-depth very extensively, and I recommend it to the 8 readers. It is a very good appendix. It was largely put 9 together by our Soviet compatriots.
10 (Slide.)
11 MR. KOUTS: The next principle of defense-in-depth 12 says that particular attention is provided to the primary means
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(mi 13 of achieving safety, which is the prevention of accidents, 14 particularly those which could cause severe core damage.
15 This principle in its discussion makes it clear that 16 this is to be achieved through a number of measures which are 17 necessary -- quality in construction and design, inspection in 18 the process of construction and design, monitoring in 19 construction, design and in operation at a later time, and 20 appropriate training of all individuals who will have 21 responsibilities in the operation of the plant.
22 (Slide.)
23 MR. KOUTS: The next fundamental principle is on i 24 accident mitigation and management. It says that in plant and 25 off site mitigation measures are available or prepared for
1 l
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. 1 20 1 which would ensure substantial reduction of the effects of any
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j 2 . accidental release of radioactive material.
I 3 There are, in fact, several components to this l 4 fundamental principle, and they are discussed in connection i
5 with it. !
6 The first of these is accident management, and 7 accident management is given a strong position in this report.
8 I will take up accident management on its own in a little 9 while.
10 A second part is engineered safety features which are 11 accident management features built into the design which 12 provide an inherent mitigative component to the design of the je:
Ti 13 plant.
14 And the last is off-site counter measures which may 15 be prepared for in the event -- to be exercised in the event 16 that all other measures to prevent the accident have not been 17 successful.
I 18 There are then a number of fundamental principles 19 dealing with more technical matters and I'll go through t hese !
20 quickly.
21 [ Slide.)
22 HR. KOUTS: There is the fundamental principle on 23 design involving assured practices. Nuclear power plant d 24 technology is based on engineering practices which have proven 25 by testing and experience and are reflected approved codes l
1
21 f- 1 and standards and other appropriately documented statements.
1 2 This is the requirement for standards and for use of.such 3 standards, not only in the design of a plant but in the supply 4 of components,.in the manufacture and in the operation at a 5 .later time. In all of these, and in maintenance and repair, in 6 all of these activities use of approved, appropriate standards 7 is called for.
8 [ Slide.)
9 MR. KOUTS: There is a fundamental principle on 10 quality assurance, which is closely related. Quality assurance 11 is applied throughout nuclear power plant activities as part of 12 a comprehensive system to ensure with high confidence that all
- s. 13 items delivered and services and tasks performed meet specific 14 requirements. This has essentially the same coverage as the 15 previous principle and is related to achievement of quality and 16 to the documentation of this achievement.
17 (Slide.)
18 MR. KOUTS: A fundamental principle of training:
19 Personnel engaged in activities bearing on nuclear power plant 20 safety are trained and qualified. Design and operations 21 promote safety through preventing wrong actions and 22 compensating for their effects. This is the human factors 23 principle, and included in the discussion are the means by 3
24 which human factors can be built on in order to achieve safety 25 and to avoid problems.
. 22
,.- 1 [ Slide.]
2 MR. KOUTS: There is a principle on safety analyses 3 which states -- I have a paraphrase in my slide -- detailed 4 safety assessments are made before design and operation.of a 5 plant begin. These are well documented, independently reviewed 6 and updated as necessary. This principle is stated in such a 7 way that it does not'specify the number of reviews to be called 8 for.
9 Now in the course of a safety review, one could have 10 one-step licensing, one could have two-step licensing, 11 depending on the national requirements and the specific needs.
12 The principle describes the contents of a safety analysis f
i 13 report and introduces the need for probablistic analysis to 14 accompany deterministic analysis in the safety review.
15 A fundamental principle on radiation protection which 16 implements the objective on radiation protection -- I need not 17 read it.
18 (Slide.)
19 MR. KOUTS: A fundamental principle on operating 20 experience feedback and the need for safety research, which we 21 consider extremely important. Organizations concerned ensure 22 that operating experience and the results of research relevant 23 to safety are exchanged, reviewed and analyzed and that lessons f 24 are learned and acted on, and this is a responsibility and a 25 principle which applies to many organizations at the same time
23 gr 1 -- to plant staff, to the regulatory organization and to
.2 industry.
3 [ Slide.]
4 MR. KOUTS: This is the last of the fundamental 5 principles. As I have said, there are 50 specific principles.
6 The principles of a specific character are put in a form which 7 advances from the earliest concepts of the plant -- when siting 8 is being considered -- to the time when the plant is in 9 operation and even may go through to decommissioning.
10 Those principles are included in the first five 11 categories on this slide: siting, design, manufacturing and 12 construction, commissioning and operation. There are also two 3m
(_ 13 other categories of specific principles, dealing with the 14 possibility that accidents might occur to plants and that there 15 will be a need to do something as a result.
16 l l
So, there are three principles on accident management l
17 and three principles on accident preparedness. '
18 (Slide.]
19 MR. KOUTS: As I said earlier, these are concepts, I
20 principles and objectives which one finds broadly used l 1
21 throughout industry, throughout the world. Some of the 22 concepts we have pushed a little farther than one finds in many 23 places, and I have listed the principal ones of these on my
( 24 next slide.
25 That is, first of all, the use of probabilistic risk
24 p' 1 analysis in safety analysis at the outset. I should say first t
2 that these may not be absolutely new to the Nuclear Regulatory 3 Commission. Some of these are in fact being implemented by the 4 Commission, but they are not -- all of them -- broadly accepted 5 in this form throughout the world. PRA to be used in safety 6 analysis.
7 The second is reliability targets for safety systems.
8 In some quarters it has been proposed that reliability targets 9 be established on the basis of various events having assigned 10 probabilitics associated with them for each plant. This would 11 be a sub-division of probability of accident occurrence which 12 we are not in accord with. We do not believe that this makes p
k 13 very much sense. It does not allow for the constructors, 14 designers and operators of nuclear plants to make the trade-15 offs on safety which are necessary to achieve optimum safety, 16 but this particular concept is stated in the form that if any j l
17 safety analysis which includes a risk assessment, credit is 18 taken for a certain reliability of a certain safety component 19 of the plant. There should be some basis for judging that that 20 reliability is achieved, and this is precisely what is said 21 here.
22 There is a discussion in the specific principles of l
23 training and qualification of maintenance personnel. This goes j l
{ 24 beyond what is done in many places, but we recognize that many 25 of the problems that are had with respect to nuclear plants are i
25
,. 1 the result of failures in m91ntenance and maintenance
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2 organizations.
3 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Could you talk to us just a little 4 bit more on the reliability targets, just very briefly. In 5 other words, could you elaborate on how the reliability tarnet 6 could be demonstrated, perhaps for a new safety system that 7 might be contemplated. What was the discussion that resulted 8 in your reference to reliability targets in safety systems?
9 MR. KOUTS: The discussion did not establish how 10 reliability targets should be verified. That is a matter which 11 will have to be taken up in connection with each application.
12 I could direct a few of my thoughts toward this.
f R 13 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Yes, please do -- just briefly.
14 Thank you.
15 MR. KOUTS: Some application of this principle is 16 already made within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. There 17 are reliability targets for containments which require testing 18 of containments as the -- I'm not sure which appendix to Part 19 50. Appendix J of Part 50 applies here. There are reliability 20 targets for the emergency diesel systems. There are well-21 established methods by which reliability of these components is 22 established and maintained in the process of operation, well, 23 before operation and after operation of the plant.
5 24 CHAIRMAN ZECH: I was thinking of specifically for 25 advanced reactor designs and perhaps for designs in advanced
26 1 reactors you don't really have the established data.for what 2 kind of reliability targets and how would you proceed towards 3 something you don't have all the data for.
4 Did you have any discussion on that?
5 MR. KOUTS: Well, we did in an earlier principle, 6 where we talked about proven engineering principles, in which 7 we talk about how tests are to be made on a component or system 8 basis or either in miniature -- not in miniature -- scale 9 tests, or on systems as they are to be constructed and used or 10 how reliability could be based on firmly established analytical 11 models and how these models are to be verified and on what 1z basis reliability can be vested in them.
[
%. 13 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Thank you.
14 MR. KOUTS: There is a discussion of this in that 15 section.
16 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Thank you.
17 To get back to the training and qualification of 18 maintenance personnel, this is the concept which extends 19 somewhat beyond its application in many places. We also have a 20 similar extension with respect to the instruction of operating 21 staff in the results of probabilistic risk assessments l
22 pertinent to the plant. I 23 This does not mean that operating staff are to be 24
( instructed in the PRA or to be even able to understand the PRA, 25 but they should understand the significance of the PRA from the
i 27 l 1 standpoint of what are the possible things they should be 1
2 prepared to work against in the operation of the plant.
3 (Slide.]
4 MR. KOUTS: Finally, we include a section on. accident 5 management and discuss accident management procedures and 6 training.
7 7 would like to briefly illustrate the design process 8 as part of the document devoted to specific principles. The 9 design process has three specific principles attached to it, 10 one on proven management, one on proven technology and the 11 general basis for design. The general basis for design is an 12 extremely important principle and a very long one.
(+
t 13 I have two slides with respect to each one of these.
14 Design management, statement of design managemant, assignment 15 and subdivision of responsibility for safety are kept well 16 defined throughout the design phase and during any subsequent 17 modification.
18 To illustrate how the discussion goes, design 19 management is to be under a single manager, the design manager, 20 who is responsible entirely for the design of the plhnt, and 21 who is responsible for establishing an organization with clear 22 interfaces and clear assignment of responsibility.
23 He does include in his staff a safety coordinating
( 24 group which is responsible of ensuring that all of the 25 activities associated with building and the safety of the plant
28
,- 1 are adequately met and who is also responsible for coordinating t.~
2 the safety aspects of these among the various groups. This 3 safety coordinating group is also responsible for ensuring that 4 the operating group-is coordinated to the assigned group.
5 This is a practice which architect engineers commonly use.
6 Quality assurance is used in the design configuration control, 7 is importantly implied.
8 COMMISSIONER CARR: Now that single manager design 9 concept goes from a reactor all the way through balance of 10 plant?
11 MR. KOUTS: Yes. There is one man who's responsible 12 for putting it all together.
/
13 i CHAIRMAN ZECH: Let me ask a question, too, on this 14 design management subject. For example, I didn't see that the 15 report addresses the question of containment performance.
16 Maybe you didn't get into that level of specifics, but it seems 17 to me that I would be interested to know if there was any 18 discussion of current containment performance or any objectives 19 for future plants for containment performance? Was that 20 discussed under this design concept that we are looking at 21 here?
22 MR. KOUTS: No. Containment was not specifically 23 discussed, but the concept of confinement was discussed, 4' 24 confinement as a means of restricting the dispersal of 25 radioactive material in case it becomes liberated from fuel.
l
.29
. 1 The activity of confinement is discussed at
)
i' 2 substantial length. What think you are asking about is found 3 only in this objective -- technical safety objective -- in 4 which we state that the probability that off-site measures 5 would be needed as a result of an accident should be at least 6 an order of magnitude less than the probably of severe core 7 damage itself.
8 So this in itself contains implicitly a kind of 9 containment / performance criteria, without specifically saying 10 so.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH: But you didn't get into the specifics 12 of containment performance?
"t 33 MR. KOUTS: No, we did not.
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right.
15 MR. KOUTS: We recognized the fact that the objective 1
16 of confining radioactive material after an accident can be met l
l 17 by a number of methods and it gets very complicated to try to l 18 analyze them method by method.
19 CHAIRMAN ZECH: But you didn't get into any of those l
20 specific methods? J 21 MR. KOUTS: No, we did not.
22 CilAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Thank you. You may 23 proceed.
i 24 (Slide.)
25 MR. KOUTS: The second specific principle is a
30 l
r 1 restatement of design purposes of the use of proven technology L
2 as stated in the fundamental principles, and I will just pass 3 over those two slides and get into the general basis -- it 4 should be "general basis" instead of "general basic" for 5 design.
6 [ Slide.]
7 MR. KOUTS: As I said, this is a very important 8 principle, and I would just Jike to read it. "A nuclear power 9 plant is designed to cope with a set of events including normal 10 conditions, anticipated operational occurrences, extreme 11 external events and accident conditions. For this purpose, 12 conservative rules and criteria incorporating safety margins f'
S. 13 are used to establish design requirements. Comprehensive 14 analyses are c&rried out to evaluate the safety performance or 15 capability of the various components and systems of the plant."
16 (Slids.)
17 hR. KOUTS: In the discussion section, it is made 18 clear chat this means that no plant damage should result from 19 normal operation. No plant damage should result from 20 reasonably expected events. The role of engineered safety 21 features is then introduced and design basis accidents ar:1 22 defined. There is a somewhat new concept here, because it is 23 pointed out that the including of engineered safety features to j 24 prevent plant damage should lead in the long term to the 25 elimination of any risk outliers in the safety analysis.
31
.c - 1 There should be no single means by which the plant is J
2 threatened in a way outside compared to any other way.
3 COMMISSIONER CARR: By plant damage you mean core 4 damage?
5 MR. KOUTS: Yes, we mean care damage.
6 [ Slide.]
7 MR. KOUTS: My last slide relates to accident 8 management, and I state it simply to emphasize the fact that 9 accident management is dealt with at such length in the report.
10 This is not a report. This is not a set of big safety 11 principles addressed to accidents. It is a set of safety 12 principles addressed to maintaining the safety of the --
%: 13 protecting the safety of the public, primarily through 14 protecting the plant itself, but recognizing the fact that 15 accident management measures are necessary.
16 I'll simply say, however, that the report recognizes 17 two levels of safety -- of accident management.
18 TL first of these is accident management to prevent 19 any accident initiator from developing a sequence which could 20 threaten the existence of the plant and its safety.
21 The second is accident management after the fact, l l
22 after an accident damaging the core. l l
23 CHAIRMAN ZECH: In your discussions of this accident
( 24 management topic, did you -- did the group try to come up with 25 any definition of the large off-site release?
32
.- 1 MR. KOUTS: No, we did not define a large, off-site k
2 release -- a large off-site release is one which requires 3 extensive measures off-site. That is the closest we came to 4 it.
5 CHAIRMAN 2ECH: All right.
6 MR. KOUTS: We did not include action levels or any 7 concepts of that sort in this report.
8 CHAIRMAN 2ECH: You didn't get into the specifics in 9 that regard?
10 MR. KOUTS: No, we did not. That scenario we leave 11 to organizations like the International Radiation Protection 12 Committee.
[
( 13 That is the report, Mr. Chairman.
14 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right, thank you very much, Dr.
15 Kouts. Appreciate it very much.
4 16 Mr. Stello, did you have some comments to make? I 17 know you attended, with Mr. Denton, I believe, the meeting in
{ 18 Sorrento recently, where I believe this was a subject of a 19 discussion over there.
20 Perhaps you could give us your views on discussions 1
21 at that time very briefly, and then perhaps comment on Dr. l 22 Kouts' presentation.
23 MR. STELLO: Let me start by observing that as I read
( 24 and understood this report, a number of times in fact, it 25 became clear to me that this is the kind of document that has i
33 1 considerable value to the entire nuclear industry.
2 The point I made at that time, which I firmly 3 believe, if.some of the utilities that have had difficulty in 4 the United States had read, understood and faithfully 5 Implemented the basic philosophy and policy of this document, 6 they would not have had problems.
7 I think there is a message in here for all the 8 industry, not just the owners and operators of the utility, but 9 the architect engineers, consultants, regulators, DOE, and 10 anyone else associated with the nuclear industry would benefit 11 would from reading and studying this document.
12 That led me to what I think is the first point I wish l'
k 13 to make, the question of what further distribution ought this 14 document have in the United States, what ought be NRC's view, 15 and I would recommend with the Commission's concurrence that we 16 would undertake widespread, and have gotten permission to copy 17 the document, widespread distribution in the United States to 18 bring this document into the hands of organizations that would 19 indeed benefit from it.
20 I don't believe that it's even close to suggesting or 21 recommending to the Commission any mechanism by which the 22 Commission would formally incorporate or adopt such a document 23 as part of our regulatory process. That would be some i 24 considerable time in the future, if at all. If, indeed, there 25 is any need to suggest that this ought to, in any way, shape or l
34 j
- 1 form, be folded in as a requirement.
t 2 In fact, I don't think the document is written in 3 such a way that it is, indeed, intended to be requirements as 4 Dr. Kouts has already said.
5 There is going to be a task, and I don't know what 6 the next steps will be with IAEA, of responding to the request 7 from 1AEA to all the member countries of which the United 8 States is a member, of what our comments might be and 9 suggestions back to IAEA, and I think the commission may want 10 to consider whether it wishes to offer itself as a vehicle to 11 coordinate the kind of response that go back to IAEA. That's a 12 question that I think will be coming to us shortly.
J' 1 13 I think there's no question that within the technical 14 staff, within the general staff of the NRC, that we will -- in 15 fact, I've started to make copies to distribute within the 16 staff so the staff would have the benefit of reading it. I 17 think it is a good document. I think it would not be, in my 18 view, productive to try to fine-tune this document with a lot 19 of detailed requirements. I think the document will serve a 20 very useful purpose. We need to take some next steps and come l
21 back to the Commission at some point in the future; perhaps as 1
22 long as six months from now, depending on what IAEA's views are l l
23 on the document. I suspect it will be a long term affair.
( 24 It's up to the Commission, I think, to react, at 25 least, informally. I would suggest that what I do is to draft
- 35
.- 1 a letter and get videspresd distribution of the document, of a
L 2 the information to the industry as.the first step and let the 3 others follow as they will.
4 Harold, did you want to say anything?
5 MR. DENTON: No.
6 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Don't have anything else, Mr. Denton, 7 to add to that?
8 MR. DENTON: No.
9 CHAIRMAN ZECH: You were at the meeting too, where 10 they discussed the report. Do you subscribe to what Mr. Stello 11 has said and he'd given his views on the value of the document.
12 MR. DENTON: I think the document is a milestone.
f
- 5. 13 That it's got -- a particular virtue is it's scrutable and 14 readable. So much of the technical literature has been written 15 in jargon, in the past, and in textbooks which deal with 16 reactor physics issues and thermal hydraulics. These are 17 stated in principles that everyone in the industry can l l
18 understand and apply and I think the Committee's done a great 19 job in pulling them together and they are -- they're all that 20 new or novel, but the fact that they're in one olace and in one 21 setting you can read them, is a real accomplishment, and I 22 think the group was well -- the report was well received in the 23 meeting where they were presented.
l i 24 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right, thank you very much.
25 Questions from my follow Commissioners? Commissioner Roberts?
36 g 1 COMMISSIONER ROBERTS: No.
t 2 CHAIRMAN 2EC!I: Commissioner Carr?
3 COMMISSIONER CARR: Yes, I've got one question for 4 Dr. Kouts. Why did you not consider Wind Scale a severe 5 accident?
6 MR. KOUTS: Well, Wind Scale was certainly a severe 7 accident, but it was not to a nuclear power plar.t; it was to a 8 production plant. Even though -- it was a dual purpose plant, 9 of course. It's certainly not a plant of modern type, because 10 it was an air-cooled reactor. That is essentially it.
11 COMMISSIONER CARR: Okay, I would say that the 12 document's a very nice policy statement for overall policy. I i ;-
( 13 certainly, as part of the Commission, wouldn't have any 14 hesitation in endorsing it as a policy statement, if that's 15 what the IAEA expects or something. If they want comments, 16 that -- it's more or less a motherhood type statement and so 17 you could -- it's good words and I think, as you said, Vic, 18 people should have read it a lot of years ago and heeded it and 19 so I offer that comment anyway.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Thank you very much.
21 MR. DENTON: If I could respond to that. I think the 22 IAEA will br assing for comments and I would think our aim 23 would be to review it thoroughly, with the aim toward improving 5 24 it and fostering its use. We'll get that opportunity.
l 25 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right, fine, thank you. Dr.
37
, 1 Kouts, I just had one question. Did the discussion of human k
2 factors and personnel errors come into the group's critique and 3 analysis of all of the principles that we've talked about here 4 today?
5 MR. KOUTS: Very much so. One of the fundamental 6 principles is a human factors principle. We discussed this to 7 a considerable extent and came to the conclusion that human 8 factors have to enter into accident prevention and accident 9 mitigation in two ways. One of these is through design of the 10 plant in the first place; design in such a way as to reduce the 11 possibility that incorrect things will done and correct things 12 will be done when they're necessary, and the second is through 13 extensive training and qualification of personnel. These are 14 points which are strongly emphasized in the document.
15 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Did the group think that there was 16 adequate attention being given to human factors, as regards 17 commercial nuclear power plants today?
18 i MR. KOUTS: I don't know that that question was ever
]
19 raised in exactly that form.
20 CHAIRMAN ZECH: But it was emphasized.
21 MR. KOUTS: Strongly emphasized, and, in fact, there 22 is a realization in the INSAG organization that the greatest 23 benefits to be gained in reactor safety in the future are l
j 24 probably in the field of human factors. And, as a matter of 25 fact, through accident manager-ent measures, measures to l l
38 I terminate a sequence of events that might be developing and
~i 2 through mitigation neasures, again procedures, procedure 3 development for this purpose; substantial benefit could be 4 gained in lowering risk levels in nuclear plants. This is 5 probably the direction which offers the greatest advantage in 6 the future in reduction of risk in nuclear plants.
7 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Was any significant discussion of 8 maintenance -- did that take place during the discussion 9 period? Maintenance of the power plants themselves?
10 MR. KOUTS: Absolutely.
11 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Could you tell as just a little bit 12 about that? I know there's a difference of philosophy in some l'
\. 13 of the various countries on it. Perhaps you could enlighten us 14 a little bit on the discussion that took place.
15 MR. KOUTS: We did not review the difference in the 16 way maintenance is treated in different countries, but we 17 certainly reviewed the implications of the reportable events as 18 they come into the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the fact 19 that they are approximately equally divided among .naintenance-20 caused problems and problems of other kinds. The fact that not 21 enough is being done with respect to maintenance personnel to 22 instruct them, to qualify them, and to make them aware of the 23 importance of their actions.
i 24 CHAIRMAN ZECH: Was there any discussion of testing 25 and surveillance, eqpecially at power levels?
39 1 MR. KOUTS: We did not discuss that, except for the 2 point made that no activities are to be done without written 3 procedures. Certainly that was discussed in connection with
- 4 the Chernobyl accident.
5 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Well, let me thank you ,
6 very much for your participation and a very fine report. I too 7 feel that -- you know, I recognize that it is difficult on an 8 international scale to attempt to put together a document that 9 can be acceptable to a broad group of nations. I think we 10 should recognize that, as you point out, it is basic safety 11 principles and you haven't gotten into the specifics, as you 12 have emphasized here today several times.
] \ 13 On the other hand, I agree with Mr. Denton and also 14 Mr. Stello that a document of this kind, that has considerable 1
- 15 value, especially written in language that can be understood --
16 and is not as technical as many of the documents that we deal 17 with on a day to day basis. So I think it does have 18 considerable value. I would certainly agree that it should be !
l 19 given widespread dissemination.
l 20 I think the Commission should review it carefully and 21 decide whether some further action and endorsemont on our part 22 would be appropriate. I think that most of the principles that 23 we talked about here today and that I've had a chance to review i 24 in the document are principles that -- as I say, most of them 25 are certainly generally ones that we have already adopted in ;
l l
40
,. 1 our country, and it isn't a lot of new, startling information.
J 2 it is a compilation in my view of generally sound principles 3 that can contribute towards safety.
4 So I would suggest that the staff review it carefully 5 too, and come to the Commission perhaps with a recommendation 6 for any further action that you-think should be warranted on 7 the part of the commi'ssion in commenting on or in support of 8 the document. It certainly seems one that should be generally 9 accepted. I think we would have to study it a little bit more 10 carefully to see if there is any parts of it that we might have 11 problems with, but I do think, Dr. Kouts, that you and your 12 colleagues have made a valuable contribution to providing in f
( 13 one document some principles that certainly look like they can 14 in general be acceptable.
15 They do, of course, as far as I can see -- I'll maybe 16 ask you one last question. As far as our development of the 17 safety goal, which took place over a very lengthy period of 18 time as you are well aware, it does appear to me that the 19 principles you have articulated here are quite consistent with 20 our development and our philosophy in developing the safety 21 goal.
22 Would you care to comment on that?
23 MR. KOUTS: I think they are completely consistent j 24 with the objectives that you have been discussing, yes.
25 CHAIRMAN ZECH: All right. Thank you very much.
l
41 f
,. - 1 Are there any other questions from my fellow t
2 Commissioners?
t 3 INo response.]
4 CHAIRMAN ZECH: If not, we thank you very much for a ,
I 5 very fine presentation and for your contribution again to our 6 country.
7 We stand adjourned.
8 [Whereupon, at 3:03 p.m., the briefing was 9 concluded.)
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I FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE DETAILED SAFETY ASSESSMENTS ARE MADE BEFORE DESIGN j
i AND OPERATION OF A PLANT BEGM. THESE ARE WELL DOCUMENTED AND INDEPENDENTLY REVIEWED, AND UPDATED AS
) NECESSARY.
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FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE r
I A SYSTEM OF RADIATION PROTECTION PRACTICES, CONSISTENT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ICRP AND THE 1AEA, IS FOLLOWED IN THE DESIGN, COMMISSIONING AND OPERATIONAL i PHASES.
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! FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE .
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- ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNED ENSURE THAT OPERATING i
I EXPERIENCE AND THE RESULTS OF RESEARCH RELEVANT TO SAFETY ARE EXCHANGED, REVIEWED, AND ANALYZED, AND THAT LESSONS ARE LEARNED AND ACTED ON.
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TRANSMITTAL TO:
Document Control Desk, 016 Phillips e f ADVANCED COPY TO: The Public Document Rocm DATE: ///#//
FROM: SECY Correspondence & Records Branch R
Atta:hed are copies of a Comission meeting transcript and related meeting document (s). They are being forwarded for entry on the Daily Accession List and I placement in the Public Document Room. No other distribution is requested or required. A Meeting
Title:
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Meeting Date: /h/ Open Closed Copies Item Description *:
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- 1. TRANSCRIPT u /A,-wLJ y
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- POR is advanced one copy of each document, two of each SECY paper.
C&R Branch files the original transcript, with attachments, withcut SECY $g papers, a alR8 l l l Yl IYYlhl lI kllIlYlklYll l lhlhl k h l l h l l l