05000254/LER-1997-005-03, :on 970319,HPCI Subsystem Was Made Inoperable to Protect Equipment Due to Uncertainties Re Abandoned Power Feed Cable,Which Had Been Inappropriately Abandoned. Plant Design Documents Have Been Updated

:on 970319,HPCI Subsystem Was Made Inoperable to Protect Equipment Due to Uncertainties Re Abandoned Power Feed Cable,Which Had Been Inappropriately Abandoned. Plant Design Documents Have Been Updated

ML20140D010
Person / Time
Site:	Quad Cities
Issue date:	04/15/1997
From:	Peterson C COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20140D006	List: 05000254/LER-1997-005, Forwards LER 97-005-00 IAW Requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) W/Listed Commitments 05000254/LER-1997-005-03, :on 970319,HPCI Subsystem Was Made Inoperable to Protect Equipment Due to Uncertainties Re Abandoned Power Feed Cable,Which Had Been Inappropriately Abandoned. Plant Design Documents Have Been Updated
References
LER-97-005-03, LER-97-5-3, NUDOCS 9704220076
Download: ML20140D010 (4)

LER-1997-005, on 970319,HPCI Subsystem Was Made Inoperable to Protect Equipment Due to Uncertainties Re Abandoned Power Feed Cable,Which Had Been Inappropriately Abandoned. Plant Design Documents Have Been Updated

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)
2541997005R03 - NRC Website

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

Form Rev,2.0 f acihty Name (1-)

Docket Number G)

Page (3)

Quad Citi:s Nnit One 0l5l0l0l0l2l5l4 1 l of l 0 l 4 Titta (4)

The High Pressure Coolant injection Subsystem was Made Inoperable to Protect Equipment Due to Uncertainties Related to an Abandoned Power Feed Cable, Which Had Been inappropriately Abandoned.

Ennt Date (5)

LER Number (6)

Report Date (7)

Other Facihties involved (3)

Month Day Year Year Sequential Revision Month Day Year Facility Docket Numberts)

Number Number Names 015l0l0l0l l

l 0l3 1l9 9l7 9l7 0l0j5 0l0 0l4 1l5 9l7 0l5l0l0l0]

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OPERATING THis REPORT IS SUBMITTED PUR$UANT 'r0 THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10CFR MODE (9)

(Check one or more of the following) (1l) 1 20.402(b) 20.405(c) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 73.71(b)

LOWER 20.405(a)(1)(i) 50.36(c)(1) x 50.73(a)G)(v)

- 73.71(c)

LEVEL

- 20.405(a)(1)Oi) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)G)(vii)

Other (Specify (10) l8l o

20 405(a)(1)(iii) 50.73(a)c)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) m Abstract 20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)C)(ii) 50.73(a)G)(viii)(B) below and in

- 20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)G)(iii) 50.73(a)G)(x)

Text)

LICENSEE CONIACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME TELEPHON1* NUMBER AREA CODE 1

Ch.rlo P terson, Regulatory Affairs Manager, ext. 3609 3l0l9 6l5l4l-l2l2l4l1

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1 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) l CAU3E 5Y5 TEM COMPONENT MANUFACIURER REPORTABLE

CAUSE

SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TO NPRDS TO NPRDS j

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I 5UP 'LEMENTAL REPORT EXPEt;& w (14)

Expected Month Day Year Submsssion lYES (If yes. complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

"T"lNO Dnie (15) l l

l AB5TRACI (Lanit to 1400 spaces, i.e., appronunately fineen omgle-space typewnuen hnos) (16; 1

ABSTRACT:

The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Subsystem was declared inoperable at 2200 hours0.0255 days <br />0.611 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.371e-4 months <br /> on 031997 when the HPCI Gland Seal Condenser Exhauster (GSCE) control switch was placed in the pull-to-lock (PTL) control position by the Unit One Nuclear Station Operator. The GSCE was placed in PTL due to a concern with the power feed cable to the exhauster.

Cable damage had been noted to a cable believed to provide power to the GSCE. At 2315 hours0.0268 days <br />0.643 hours <br />0.00383 weeks <br />8.808575e-4 months <br /> on 031997 it was determined that the damaged cable had been abandoned and the GSCE was placed back into the automatic control mcde making the HPCI subsystem operable. An Emergency Notification System (ENS) call was made at 2346 hours0.0272 days <br />0.652 hours <br />0.00388 weeks <br />8.92653e-4 months <br /> due to the HPCI subsystem inoperability.

The following actions contributed to this event: (1) The damaged cable had been improperly abandoned and (2) a previous Problem Identification Form (PIF) did not properly correct this problem, Corrective actions for this event include:

(1) updating the plant design documents to properly reflect the status of this abandoned cable; (2) laoeling this abandoned cable at each accessible location along its route and (3) reviewing and revising as necessary the Abandoned Equipment Procedure.

There was no effect on the public or the control room personnel due to this eWnt and the safety consequences were minimal.

LER254\\9N)05.WPF 9704220076 970415 PDR ADOCK 05000254 S

PDR

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LICENSEE EVEN'T REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rsv. 2.0 FACILTTY NAME (1)

DCCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

PAGE (3)

Year Sequential Revision Number Number Quad Citirs Unit One 0l5l0l0l0l2l5l4 9l7 0l0l5 0l0 2 lOFj 0 l 4 TEXT Energy industry identification System (Ell 5) codes are identined in the text as [XX)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

4 General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor - 2511 MWt rated core thermal power.

. EVENT IDENTIFICATION: The High Pressure Coolant Injection Subsystem was Made Inoperable to Protect Equipment Due to Uncertainties Related to an Abandoned Powe-. eed Cable, Which Had B en Inappropriately Abandoned.

A.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EVENT

Unit: One Event Date: 031997 Event Time:

2200 Reactor Mode: 1 Mode Name:

POWER OPERATION Power Level: 80%

POWER OPERATION Mode (1): Mode switch in the RUN position with average reactor coolant temperature at any temperature.

B.

EVENT DESCRIPTION

On 031997 while performing a walkdown in the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI)[BJ) Subsystem Room, Station Support Engineering (SSE) personnel identified a damaged cable in the riser section of a cable tray.

SSE initiated Problem

)

Identification Form (PIF) #97-0965 and submitted it to the Shift Engineer (SE).

After a review of PIF #97-0965, the SE sent Electrical Maintenance (EM) personnel out to identify the damaged cable.

The EM's hand traced the damaged cable from the riser section of the cable tray to a wall penetration where the cable was identified as cable number #13975.

Cable #13975 was identified on cable tabulation drawing 4E-1904H as the feed cable for the HPCI Gland Seal Condenser Exhauster (GSCE)[DGS].

The EM's proceeded to 250 Volt Direct Current (VDC) Motor Control Center (MCC) 1A, Compartment C02 and verified that cable 1

1. 13975 was in fact terminated as indicated on the cable tabulation drawings.

Due to the possibility of further cable damage, the SE had the HPCI GSCE control switch placed in the Pull-to Lock (PTL) position at 2200 hours0.0255 days <br />0.611 hours <br />0.00364 weeks <br />8.371e-4 months <br /> to prevent inadvertent actuation. When the control switch was placed in PTL, the HPCI system was declared inoperable, an Emergency Notification System phone call was placed at 2346 hours0.0272 days <br />0.652 hours <br />0.00388 weeks <br />8.92653e-4 months <br /> and the unit entered a 14 day Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) per Technical Specification 3.5.A.3.

The EM's continued tracing cable #13975 to the first junction box back from the HPCI GSCE, where they found the damaged cable cut, taped and labeled as abandoned.

It was determined that there were duplicate cables for cable #13975. One cable was in good condition and terminated as indicated on the cable tabulation drawing. The other cable, which was the damaged cable, had been cut, taped and labeled as abandoned, however it did not have it's installation status reflected on the cable tabulation drawings. At 2315 hours0.0268 days <br />0.643 hours <br />0.00383 weeks <br />8.808575e-4 months <br />, after determining the damaged cable status as abandoned, the HPCI GSCE switch was placed in automatic control position and the HPCI subsystem was declared operable.

LER254\\9"h005,WPF

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e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT n.ER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rw,2.0 F ACILITY N AME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMBER (6)

FAGE (3)

Year Sequennal Revision Number Number Quad Citils Unit ome 0l5l0lol0l2l5l4 9l7 0l0l5 olo 3 lOFl o l 4 TEXT Energy industry identification dystem (Ells) codes are identified in the text as IXXj i

C.

APPARENT CAUSE OF THE EVENT:

The apparent cause of this event is a failure to properly abandon cable #13975 prior to 1988. According to maintenance history, this cable was abandoned some time before November 1988. When the cable was abandoned, a new cable was pulled for the purpose of feeding the HPCI GSCE. This new cable was given the same cable number as the damaged cable which was being abandoned in place. The electrical prints were not updated to reflect this change and both the old damaged cable (which was being abandoned) and the new GSCE power feed cable were given the same number. This led to the confusion on March 19, 1997.

l A contributing cause to this event was that a previously written PIF (PIF #94-2828) had been dispositioned improperly. This PIF was written on 111194 due to identified damage to the same cable. An issue screening was performed which determined that this cable was abandoned and there was no operability concern. The PIF was then closed out without taking corrective actions to update the plant design documents.

D.

SAFETY ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT:

)

The consequences of this event are considered minimal. There was no effect on the public or the control room personnel due to this event.

The Unit 1 HPCI subsystem was available to start automatically during the 75 minutes i

l that the GSCE control switch was in Pll. Had a design basis accident occurred while this switch was in PTL, HPCI would have started and refilled the reactor vessel as designed.

i The GSCE normally removes non-condensables from the Gland Condenser and maintains a j

slight negative pressure on the HPCI turbine seals. Without the GSCC running, steam would have begun leaking out of the HPCI turbine seals and the stop and control valve stems. This leakage would have added to the heat load in the HPCI room eventually causing the subsystem to isolate on High Area Temperature at 155 degrees Fahrenheit (F). A previous calculation performed by Nuclear Fuel Services Department shows that the HPCI subsystem would remain operable for at least 13 minutes after initiation with a GSC failure.

Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) analysis for small liquid break accidents show that the reactor would depressurize to allow for effective low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Subsystem (ECCS) operation within about 10 minutes.

Therefore it is reasonable to assume for a small break accident the HPCI subsystem would have fulfilled it's design function even with the GSCE in PTL.

If the HPCI subsystem had been needed to slowly cooldown the reactor or for reactor coolant 4

inventory control during a steamline break accident, the HPCI Subsystem would potentially not have been available.

LER254\\97\\005.WPF

e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Form Rzv. 2.0 FACILITY NAME (1)

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

LER NUMhER (6)

PAGE (3) i Year Sequential Revision Number Nurnber Quad Citi:s Unit one 0l5l0l0lol2l5l4 9l7 olol5 ol0 4 lOFl 0 l 4 I LXT Energy industry identi6 cation 6ystem (Ell 5) codes are identified in the text as (XXl Even if the HPCI Subsystem had not been able to operate for the required amount of time, the Automatic Depressurization (ADS)[RV) and the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI)[B0] subsystems were operable during this event and would also have provided protection for the fuel in the event of a LOCA.

E.

CORRECfIVE ACTIONS:

Corrective Actions Completed:

1.

The damaged cable was identified as abandoned and the HPCI GSCE was restored to an operable status.

2.

The cable was also labeled as abandoned at the cable tray in the HPCI room.

Corrective Actions to be Completed 1.

Update the plant design documents to reflect the status of this abandoned cable (Design Eng., NTS #2541809700501). This will be completed by 080197.

2.

Label this cable as abandoned at all accessible locations along its route (0ps.,

NTS #2541809700502). This will be completed by 081597.

1 3.

QCAP 0460-06, Abandoned Equipment Procedure, will be reviewed to ensure that the proper requirements are in place ta ensure drawing updates, cable numbering updates and labeling of abandoned cables (Design Eng., NTS #2541809700503).

This will be completed by 080197.

F.

PREVIOUS EVENTS:

1.

PIF #94-2828 identifies the same concern with the subject cable as this Licensee Event Report (LER). An issue screening was performed which determined that the i

cable was abandoned and no further corrective actions were taken under this PIF.

The HPCI subsystem was never made inoperable while addressing this PIF.

A review of the LER database was performed and there have been no LERs in the last two years caused by a failure of the abandoned equipment program or a misunderstanding caused by an inadequate design document.

G.

COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

There is no component failure associated with this event LER254\\97\\005.WPF