ML20138G890

Technical Evaluation of Dcrdr for Ft Calhoun Station

ML20138G890
Person / Time
Site:	Fort Calhoun
Issue date:	08/28/1985
From:	SCIENCE APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORP. (FORMERLY
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20138G864	List: ML20138G890
References
CON-NRC-03-82-096, CON-NRC-3-82-96, RTR-NUREG-0737, RTR-NUREG-737 NUDOCS 8510280074
Download: ML20138G890 (45)

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i ATTACHMENT _..

TECHNICAL EVALUATION .

OF THE DETAILED CONTROL ROOM DESIGN REVIEW FOR FORT CALHOUN STATION AUGUST 28, 1985 Prepared for:

U.S. Eclear Regulatory Comission

Washington, D.C. 20555 Contract NRC-03-82-096 4

Prepared by:

Science Applications International Corporation 1710 Goodridge Drive - -

McLean, Virginia 22102 P

O 8510280074 851017 PDR ADOCK 05000285 f F PDR l

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FOREWORD This Technical Evaluation Report (TER) documents the findings from an evaluation of Omaha Public Power District's Detailed Control Room Design Review for its Fort Calhoun Station. SAIC's evaluation was performed in support of the Human Factors Engineering Branch of the Division of Human Factors Safety under Contract NRC-03-82-096 Technical Assistance in Support of Reactor Licensing Actions: Program III. SAIC previously participated in the review of the Program Plan and in the in-progress audit at Fort Calhoun Station.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Section B AC KG R O'J N D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' . 1 3

DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Establishment of a qualified multidisciplinary review team. . . . 3 Function and task analyses to identify control room operator tasks and information and control requirements during emergency operations ..................... 6

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A comparison .of display and control requirements with a control room : inventory .................... 9 A control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles ................... 11 Assessment of Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) to determine which are significant and should be corrected . . . . . . . . . . 14 Selection of design improvements ................ 16 Verification that selected improvements will provide the necessary correction and verification that improvements will not introduce new HEDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Coordination of control room improvements with changes from other programs such as the safety parameter dispicy system (SPDS), operator training, Reg. Guide 1.97 instrumentation, and upgraded emergency operation procedures (EOPs). . . . . . . 19 Proposed corrective actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 l

Proposed schedules for implementing HED corrections . . . . . . . 22 Justifications for HEDs to be left uncorrected ......... 22 Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 l CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 l .

t RE FE RE N C E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 APPENDIX A - Concerns related to the control room survey . . . . . . . 30 11

TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

Section g

! APPENDIX B - Generic HEDs which appear to require equiment lists but are without them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 APPENDIX C - HEDs for which some correction is proposed. . . . . . . . 33

APPENDIX D - HEDs for which no correction is proposed. . . . . . . . . 36 APPENDIX E - Comments and concerns related to the resolution of speci fi c HE Ds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 9 -

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4 Technical Evaluation of the Detailed Control Room Design Paview i for Fort Calhoun Station BACKGROUND Licensees and applicants for operating licenses shall conduct a Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR). The objective is to " improve the ability of nuclear power plant control room operators to prevent accidents or cope with accidents if they occur by improving the information provided

-to them" (NUREG-0660, Item I.D - Reference 1). The need to conduct a DCRDR was confirmed in NUREG-0737 and Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 (Keference 2).

DCRDR requirements in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 replaced those in earlier i

documents. Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requires each applicant or licensee to conduct a DCRDR on a schedule negotiated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

NUREG-0700 (Reference 3) describes four phases of the DCRDR and provides applicants and licensees with guidelines for the conduct of the DCRDR. The phases are:

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1. Planning f 2. Review ,

l 3. Assessment and implementation

4. Reporting.

The requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 indicate the need to include a number of elements in the DCRDR. They are:

1. Establishment of a qualified multidisciplinary review team.

2. Function and task analyses to identify control room operator tasks e and information and control requirements during emergency opera-tions.

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3. A comparison of display and control requirements with a control room inventory.

4. A control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles. ,

5. Assessment of human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) to determine which are significant and should be corrected.

6. Selection of design improvements.

7. Verification that selected design improvements will provide the necessary correction.

8. Verification that improvements will not introduce new HEDs.

9. Coordination of control room improvements with changes from other programs such as the safety parameter display system (SPDS),

operator training, Reg. Guide 1.97 instrumentation, and upgraded emergency operating procedures (EOPs).

Licensees are expected to complete Element I during the DCRDR's planning phase. Elements 2 through 4 during the DCRDR's review phase, and Elements 5 through 8 during the DCRDR's assessment and implementation phase. Comple-tion of Element 9 is . expected to cut across the planning, review, and assessment and implementation phases.

A Summary Report is to be submitted at the end of the DCRDR. As a minimum it shall:

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1. Outline proposed control room changes.

2. Outline proposed schedules for implementation.

3. Provide summary justification for HEDs with safety significance to be left uncorrected or partially corrected.

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The NRC staff evaluates the organization, process, and results of the DCRDR.

Results of the evaluation are documented in a Safety Evaluation Report (SER) publis'"d within two months after receipt of the Summary Report.

DISCUSSION Omaha Public Power District (OPPD) submitted to the NRC a DCRDR Program Plan for the Fort Calhoun Station on 25 October 1983 (References 4 and 5). NRC staff comments on that Program Plan were forwarded to OPPD on 30 December 1983 (Reference 6). Based on review of the DCRDR Program Plan, the NRC staff and its consultants conducted an in-progress audit of the Fort Calhoun DCRDR. An in-progress audit report was forwarded to OPPD by letter dated 25 March 1985 (Reference 7). OPPD submitted a Summary Report for the Fort Calhoun Statthn on 1 April 1985 (References 8 and 9) and responded to the in-progress audit report on May 2,1985 and June 15,1985 (References 10 and 11). The current SAIC technical evaluation of the Fort Calhoun Station DCRDR, provided below, is based on all information available to date and is arranged in order of the DCRDR elements identified in Supplement I to NUREG-0737.

Establishment of a qualified multidisciplinary review team. The organiza-tion for conduct of a successful DCRDR can vary widely, but is expected to conform to some general criteria. Overall administrative leadership should be provided by a utility employee. The DCRDR team should be given suffi-cient authority to carry out its mission. A core group of specialists in the fields of human factors engineering, plant operations, instrument and control engineering, and nuclear engineering are expected to participate with assistance as required from other disciplines. Staffing for each technical task should bring appropriate expertise to bear. Human factors l

expertise should be included in the staffing for most, if not all, technical l

tasks. Finally, the DCRDR team should receive an orientation which contributes to the success of the DCRDR. Section 18.1. Appendix A, of NUREG-0800 (Reference 12) describes criteria for the multidisciplinary review team in more detail. .

The Summary Report represents the OPPD organization for the DCRDR as two-layered with a five-member management team, and a core working group consisting of five primary members. The management team consists of three 3

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OPPD staff, and two consultants from the General Physics Corporation (GPC).

The core working group is chaired by an OPPD member of the management team who serves as the DCRDR project manager. The assumption of management responsibility of the DCRDR by OPPD staff is consistent with NRC guidelines.

The core working group consists of four 0 PPD staff members, with access to 1 i

other technical specialists as required, and a GPC project manager with other GPC technical specialists available as needed.

Examination of the resumes of the review team members indicated that each of the disciplines described in Section 18.1. Appendix A. NUREG-0800 was ava ilabl e. In addition OPPD indicated that supplemental expertise was available in the operations and technical fields as required. Audit results

~~ " indicated that a, number of disciplines have been brought to bear on each DCRDR activity. -Par'ticipating disciplines generally meet the NRC guidelines for each activity.

I OPPD described DCRDR orientation and training as having been based on previous experience gained from normal job assignments and some extra study in the area of the review. Non-0 PPD personnel did receive an orientation program which consisted of observing normal plant operation and the use of emergency procedures. Non-0 PPD personnel also underwent OPPD's General Employee Training Course in order to familiarize them with safety and security issues.

In most respects it appears that the requirement for the establishment of a multidisciplinary review team is being satisfied. However, several concerns have been identified. One concern, identified in the in-progress audit, was i that there were no human factors specialists present during the initial assessment of HEDs and selection of design improvements. Instead OPPD indicated that it had sent preliminary assessments and design selections to l

GPC for review and comment. Because human factors specialists have legiti-I mate roles in the assessment of HEDs and in the selection and verification

! of design improvements, the in-progress audit team recommended that human j

factors specialists be more directly involved in the assessment, selection, and verification activities which are part of the Fort Calhoun DCRDR. In i parti'al response to the audit team's concern, the Summary Report describes a

" Correction Phase" which includes selection and verification of design improvements. OPPD committed to implementation of proposed HED corrections l

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on the control room mock-up prior to installation in the actual control i room. DPPD further committed to review of the revised mock-up by human factors and operations personne!. In our judgment, adherence to the above commitments can resolve the concern with respect to the selection and veri-fication of design improvements. OPPD should ensure that human factors and operations personnel activities include:

1. Identification of proposed corrections that either do not resolve HEDs or introduce new HEDs.

2. Participation in selection of new proposed corrections to resolve problems identified in 1, above.

The Summary Rep' ort" did not address more direct participation of human factors personnel in HED assessment. OPPD should assure that GPC comments on preliminary assessments are considered in determining final assessments.

Any differences remaining after thorough discussion of the issues should be resolved in a conservative direction with respect to plant safety.

An additional concern was identified through review of the Summary Report.

Information on the bottom of page 44 and top of page 47 in that document

! suggests that the DCRDR's verification eiements may become the responsibility of the engineering group in charge of a " Human Factors Maintenance Plan" (HFMP). We cannot be certain of OPPD's intent but feel the need to express c.oncern. The.HFMP can be a positive step toward preserving and extending the benefits of the DCRDR, but assignment of verification responsibilities to a group other than the multidisciplinary review team may result in less than acceptable DCRDR results. There is no

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assurance that the engineering group responsible for the HFMP will have appropriate qualifications for conduct of DCRDR taska.. Moreover, regardless

! of the engineering group's qualifications, transfer of responsibility is l likely to break continuity of the DCRDR. We recommend that control of all i DCRDR activities remain the responsibility of the existing multidisciplinary review team. Transfer of responsibility for design of the operator interface with the control room would be better implemented after completion of the DCRDR.

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The Summary Report acknowledges the need for coordination between the ,

multidisciplinary review team and the engineering group responsible for the HFMP. I f, in fact, OPPD intends to assign responsibility for the verification elements to a group other than the existing multidisciplinary review team, they should assure that the coordination is suff1cient to ,

minimize problems due to lack of continuity. OPPD should also assure that appropriate expertise (including human factors and operations) be brought to bear on the verification tasks and any required iterations of those tasks with the selection of design improvements. An auditable record of personnel qualifications and technical task assignments should be maintained.

A final concern with respect to the multidisciplinary review team ris

~' identified through review of the 2 May 1985 letter from OPPD to the NRC.

That letter indicated that an annunciator system study and a labeling /demar-cation / color coding study are to be performed by a consultant. As indicated by the in-progress audit report, the DCRDR will not be complete until those studies (and one for the SPDS) are complete. Performance of the studies by a consultant is acceptable, but CPPD should assure that they are performed by qualified personnel. An auditable record of personnel qualifications and technical task assignments should be maintained. OPPD should also assure the studies are coordinated with appropriate elements of the DCRDR (e.g.,

celection and verification of design improvements). Coordination may best j be accomplished by making the consultants responsible to the existing multi-i disciplinary review team.

Function and task analyses to identi fy control room operator tasks and information and control requirements durina emergency operations. The pur-l pose of the function and task analyses is to identify the control room l operators' tasks during emergency operations and to determine the informa-tion and control capabilities the operators need to perform those tasks. An l

acceptable process for conducting the function and task analyses is:

1. Analyze the functions performed by systems in responding to tran-i sients and accidents in order to identify and describe t, hose tasks operators are expected to perform.

2. For each task identified in Item 1 above, determine the information (e.g., parameter, value, status) which signals the need to perform 6

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7 0 6 the task, the control capabilities needed to perform the task, and the feedback information needed to monitor task performance.

) Operator tasks will have been identified and described (in item 1 above), and the information and control capabilities needed to f l

perform those tasks are being identified (in item 2).

3. Analyze the information and control capability needs identified in Item 2 above to determine appropriate characteristics for displays

. and controls to sati:'.= those needs. Information characteristics include parametre type, dynamic range, setpoints, resolutien/ accu-racy, speed ri response, units and the need for trending, alarming, etc. Control characteristics include type (discrete or continu-ous), rate, gain, response requirements locking functions, and feedback information associated with control use.

The described process is prescriptive. It should identify in detail what operators need to do in order to control the systems which mitigate the consequences of transients'and accidents. In addition to its use in the

! DCRDR, it should be the basis for complete and technically adequate E0Ps.

! Identification of tasks and necessary information and control capabilities should be based on engineering analyses and be independent of displays and controls currently in the control room.

At the time of MRC's in-progress audit, the upgraded E0P's for Fort Calhoun

had not been written. The following , schedule for development and implemen-tation of upgraded E0P's was provided to the audit team by OPPD:

i 1 March 1985 Submit Procedures Generation Package (PGP) 7 June 1985 New E0P's Written i 5 August 1985 Commence E0P Training i 11 October 1985 Upgraded E0P's Implemented Since upgraded E0P's were not available. OPPD used the Combustion Engineer-ing Emergency Procedures Guidelines (CE EPGs), number CEN-I52, revised 2 May i

1984, to perform the function and task analyses. A 7 September 1984 NRC I memorandum (Reference 13) summarizing the results of a 29 August 1984 meet-ing between the NRC staff and the Combustion Engineering (Werations Group ,

! subcommittee states:

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...The EPGs (Emergency Procedure Guidelines) do not expiteitly identify the information and control needs beyond the safety func-tion level which are necessary for preparing emergency operating  ;

procedures (EOPs) and determining the adequacy of existing instru- l mentation and controls."

2. "Because these information and control needs are not included in j the EPGs, further analysis and documentation is required..."  !

OPPD utilized the CE EPGs to establish a baseline of emergency procedures to derive information and control requirements for the Fort Calhoun control l room. The EPds include both Optimal Recovery Guidelines (Volume I, for use if the specific accident has already been diagnosed), and Functional j i Recovery Guidelines * (Volume II, for use if a positive diagnosis has not been  !

completed, but a challenge to a critical safety function is occurring). j During the in-progress audit. OPPD indicated that all possible success paths l were considered. Tasks which were duplicated in several Functional Recovery j Guidelines were analyzed only once to reduce the task analysis effort.

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The OPPD task analysis for Fort Calhoun used, as a starting point, the  !

operator tasks identified by the EPGs. Since the CE EPGs are not explicit f l beyond the safety function level, the task analysis worksheet with all of j i the subtasks required to support the safety function step (" level") of the l EPG was " pre-filled." That is, plant-specific subtasks were identified j

prior to seeing the control room. The source of identifying all subtasks l

! was an operations engineer using existing plant: l

1. Operating procedures J

2. Operating instructions

3. Emergency operating procedures, f Once all possible subtasks were filled in, operations-oriented subject I matter experts filled in the necessary information and control capabilities.  ;

Instrument and control characteristics, associated with the necessary infor- i nation and control capabilities were also identified. These pre-fill

' activities were performed without reference to the Fort Calhoun control room l l or mock-up.

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As noted, the current task analysis effort was based on CE EPGs. OPPD has f'

committed to conduct anot rer formal task analysis, equivalent to that already accomplished, upon completion of the upgraded E0Ps. The latest schedule information, provided in OPPD's 15 June 1985 letter indicated that upgraded E0Ps would be available for task analysis on 7 September 1985. The task analysis is to be completed prior to Cycle 10 startup. *he task analy-  ;

sis based on the upgraded E0Ps should identify any new or modified tasks, the information and control capabilities necessary to complete those tasks, i and the displays and controls (including appropriate characteristics) required to satisfy information and control capability needs. In our judg-ment, the organization and process for conducting the task analysis satisfy I the requirement. Completion of the function and task analysis element

~ depends upon completion of the additional task analysis using upgraded E0Ps.

l A Comparison of display and control requirements with a control room inven-

,t o_rl. The purpose of comparing display and control requirements with a control room inventory is to determine the availability and suitability of '

2 displays and controls required for performance of the E0P's. Success of

! this element depends on the quality of the function and task analyses and the control room inventory. Display and control requirements should be derived from analyses which are sufficiently detailed to support development of complete and technically adequate E0Ps. Characteristics appropriate to the task should be described for each display and control need identified by l the function and task analyses. The control room inventory should be a l complete representation,of displays and controls currently in the control l room. The inventory should include appropriate characteristics of current l

displays and controls in order to allow meaningful comparison with the I

} results of the function and task analyses. Unavailable or unsuitable i

displays and controls should be documented as HEDs.

l A full-scale photographic mock-up of the Fort Calhoun control room was f

j constructed and is being used extensively throughout the DCRDR. OPPD is using the mock-up as the control room inventory. The in-progress audit team j

found the fidelity of the mock-up to be sufficient to permit an adequate l comparison of existing displays and controls with those determined'necessary

! from the task analysis.

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At the time of the audit, OPPD was aware of changes to the control room that were completed after construction of the mock-up. These changes were not reflected in the mock-up. The audit team recommended that any differences l between the mock-up and control room be considered in deterinining the I availability and suitability of necessary displays and controls. The OPPD Summary Report indicates that control room modifications not reflected in the mock-up were reviewed and found not to affect the process - results of the task analysis (which, in OPPD's Summary Report, includes validation of control room function and verification of task performance capability).

OPPD should continue to evaluate differences between the mock-up and control room for impact on on-going DCRDR activities (e.g., task analysis using upgraded E0Ps, additional studies, verification that improvements provide necessary correction, and verification that improvements will not introduce new HEDs). .  ;

A validation of control room functions was performed as part of the Fort Calhoun DCRDR. OPPD indicated during the in-progress audit that each func-tional recovery success , path was walked-through on the mo:k-up, using the pre-filled task analysis worksheet. The Summary Report stated that human factors specialists conducted the walk-throughs using a reactor operator and an assistant reactor operator from the Fort Calhoun operating sta ff.

Operators were asked to verbalize:

1. The parameter being controlled or monitored

2. The component being utilized and its characteristics

3. Redundant information provision and location Multiple failures were postulated to ensure all possible situations were recorded. The walk-throughs were videotaped to document the validation and to provide records for later analysis.

The in-progress audit team understood that a first analysis of the video-tapes was to be completed by 15 February 1985. That analysis was to support verification of task performance capabilities. The "B" side of the task analysis worksheet was to be filled in, answering questions about the availability and suitability of required displays and controls identified by the task analysis. Displays and controls found to be not available or not l

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suitable were to be addressed by comments entered on Side 8 of the work-sheet. Those comments would result in HEDs.

The in-progress audit team also understood that a second analysis of the videotapes was to be completed by 1 March 1985. The objective of that analysis was to prepare link analysis diagrams for each emergency operation.

The analysis was to consider control room layout and its relation to crew performance of sequential tasks. HEDs were to have been written as appro-priate. Finally, the in-progress audit team understood that OPPD would conduct real-time walk-throughs in validating the upgraded E0Ps to ensure i that any workload problems which might exist in performing the E0Ps would be

' identified and dealt with appropriately. The Summary Report makes no men-

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~' tion of the link analysis or real-time walk-throughs. Both would contribute to the success of the DCRDR, and we recommend that they be completed if they have not been.

I In our judgment, the organization and process for comparing display and control requirements with a control room inventory satisfy the requirement.

Completion of that element of the DCRDR depends upon comparison of display and control requirements identified in the additional task analysis using upgraded E0Ps with the control room mock-up. That comparison should ensu;e that the control room supports the upgraded E0Ps.

A control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human factors principles. The key to a successful control room survey is a systematic comparison of the control room against accepted human engineering guide-lines. One accepted set of h aan engineering guidelines is provided by Section 6 of MUREG-0700. Discrepancies between the control room and human engineering guidelines should be documented as HEDs. ,

At the time of the in-progress audit, OPPD indicated the control room survey was complete with the exceptions of annunciators, computers /SPDS, and meter banding / labeling / demarcation / color coding. The core working group compared the control room mock-up, actual control room, and remote shutdown panels with guidelines in Section 6 of MUREG-0700.

During the survey, comparison with some NUREG-0700 guidelines was on a l control room-wide basis. Comparison with the remaining NUREG-0700 guide-11

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lines was on an item-by-item basis. Both item-specific and generic HEDs were recorded. The Summary Report indicates that HEDs resulting from the survey, as well as from other DCRDR elements, were placed into a dBASE III Data Base Management System. This programmable system has mul,tisort and storage functions to facilitate assessment and evaluation.

The methodology for conducting the control room survey appeared to be ade-quate. However, a limited review of control room survey documentation made during the in-progress audit suggested that the survey was incomplete.

Concerns related to a number of NUREG-0700 guideline areas were listed in an attachment to the in-progress audit report. That attachment is dupitcated in this report as Appendix A. The inadequacy of the control room survey was confirmed through discussions during the in-progress audit. HEDs listed in the Summary Rpport indicate that some of the control room survey areas in question have been addressed since the in-progress audit. There is, how-ever, no evidence that a number of the areas in question have been addressed yet. OPPD should assure the completeness of the control room survey in order to satisfy the requirement.

The in-progress audit team was also concerned about generic HEDs that were recorded without an accompanying equipment list. HEDs 93 and 152 were cited in the in-progress report as examples. Failure to provide equipment lists makes identification of all instances of the HED difficult and may not allow for detailed assessment of HEDs and selection and verification of design improvements. The Summary Report, provides some response to this concern.

Appendices 4A through 4F in that document provide equipment lists linked to a number of HEDs. The concern is not, however, completely resolved.

Appendix 4A of the Summary Report purportedly provides a list of "GEMAC" controllers, but no list is actually provided. In addition, some generic HEDs that require accompanying equipment lists still do not have those lists. Appendix B of this document provides a list of generic HEDs which appear to require equipment lists but are without them. OPPD should assure that all instances of generic HEDs are appropriately assessed, and that design improvements are selected and verified. .

Dud to the magnitude of the problem and implications for schedule interfer-ence, OPPD decided the annunciators, labeling, meter banding, demarcation, color coding, and computer terminals (i.e., the SPDS) through additional 12 l

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studies. These studies appear to combine aspects of the control room survey with the selection and verification of design improvement. They were not '

scheduled to be completed prior to 1 April 1985, when OPPD submitted its Summary Report.

The methodology for the annunciator study had not been finalized when the Summary Report was submitted. OPPD anticipates using a consultant to per-

form a study of the system using NUREG/CR-3217. "Near Term Improvements for Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Annunciation Systems" (Reference 14), to determine how the annunciator system can be upgraded. The in-progress audit team recommended that guidelines in NUREG-0700 be considered as well. The Summary Report also notes that these guidelines will be used along with the

~ guidelines in NUREG/CR-3217.

l The Summary Report outlined four other survey-related studies. Those studies were:

1. Labeling

2. Meter banding

3. Demarcation

4. Color coding Review of the Summary Report descriptions of the four studies indicates that they will complete several parts of the control room survey about which the NRC expressed concern during the in-progress audit. OPPD should assure that the studies are apprcoriately staffed and that appropriate criteria (e.g.,

those in Section 6 of NUREG-0700) are used. HEDs generated by the studies should be treated just as those generated by earlier portions of the DCRDR.

Human factors review of the SPDS was mentioned but not described in the Summary Report. The in-progress audit team understood that the study was to examine the software, hardware, and location aspects of the SPDS/ computer already installed (but not declared ope ational) in the control room. The in-progress audit team further understood that the criteria in MUREG-0835 (Reference 15) would be used to develop HEDs for the SPDS. Huma'n factors review of the SPDS is required by Supplement 1 to MUREG-0737. OPPD should complete review of the SPDS in a timely fashion to assure consistency with the control room and with good human engineering practices.

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The control room survey is not complete. OPPD should address concerns in Appendices A and 8 and complete the additional studies in order to satisfy the requirement in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737.

, Assessment of HEDs to determine which are significant and should be cor-rected HEDs should be assessed for significance. The potential for operator error and the consequence of that error in terms of plant safety should be systematically considered in that assessment. Both the individual and aggregate effects of HEDs should be considered. The result of the assess-ment process is a determination of which HEDs should be corrected because of

- their potential impact on plant safety. Decisions about whether HEDs are significant 16 terms of potential impact on plant safety should not be /

~ compromised by consideration of such issues as the means and potential cost of correcting tNose HEDs.

OPPD describes the assessment of HEDs in pages 31-40 of the Summary Report.

The first assessment task was to screen the problems, potential problems, j and HEDs identified during the review phase. The screening determined whether or not an individual problem, potential problem, or HED was valid.

All invalid HEDs were documented. The remaining valid HEDs were recorded on forms along with other information (e.g., location, NUREG-0700 reference) so that HEDs could be considered by system and work station, topic and compo-nent item. The next step was the identification of HEDs with " obvious enhancement solutions." The obvious enhancement step was said to make it

... unnecessary to subject the HED to the more time-consuming process of determining significance, cost-effectiveness, etc." The remainder of the assessment process, as described during the in-progress audit, involves assignment of two numbers to each HED. The first number is a categorization (criticality rating) that considers documented potential for error and safety status evaluations. Several questions (of the type recommended in Exhibit 2-2. Appendix A SRP Section 18.1) are answered in assigning the criticality index. The second number is an 07." priority rating and deals with the necessity for correction. Once O fe, everal questions must be answered (similar to the Exhibit 2-2 com sq has) to establis,h the pri-ority. The means and cost of correcting an HED are not considered in the assessment process. The process for categorizing and prioritizing appears to be consistent with NRC guidelines.

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Assessment of HEDs and formulation of recommendations for improvements had just begun at the time of the in-progress audit. HEDs identified by the '

control room survey had undergone a preliminary assessment. The in-progress audit team reviewed the organization, process, and results of that preliminary assessment. The following concerns were identified:

1. Although the assessment process appeared to be consistent with NRC guidelines, the methodology for assignment of the criticality rating was not always followed (e.g., numerous HEDs concerning labeling on safety-related panels / equipment were assigned criti-cality IV, which means " low potential for error, nonsa fety related").

2. Numerous HEDs were written with inadequate detail. Much investiga-tion was required on the part of, the review team to clarify the -

meaning of the HED as written. In many cases, the core working group had to assume that the deficiency covered " instrument XYZ."

No attempt had been made to record this supplementary investigation or assumptions to provide an auditable record.

3. Human factors specialists were r40t at the core working group meet-ings in which preliminary assessments were made. Rather GPC per-sonnel reviewed and commented on OPPD's preliminary assessments at a later time.

Review of the Summary " Report did not indicate that the above problems have been resolved. For example, HEDs 4 and 244 are generic HEDs which apply to a large number of J handle switches. Some of these switches operate equip-ment needed to respond to transients and accidents. Despite that fact both l HEDs have " blanket" categorizations of "3" indicating they apply to non-

! safety-related items. Several HEDs still appear to lack sufficient detail to allow assessment, and selection and verification of design improvements, (e.g., HEDs 93 and 152 do not have equipment lists which. identify the components requiring attention). The Summary Report does not indicate that human factors specialists are attending core working group meetings in which prelifr.inary HED assessments are made.

l l

! 15 l

l In order to satisfy the requirement, the core working gros,' should adhere to ,

the assessment methodology presented by OPPD. In addition, it is recom-mended that clarifying information, obtained during core working group deliberations, be recorded on HED sheets so an auditable record can show exactly what the problem was that produced the HED and why it should be resolved. Inclusion of clarifying information should enhance the assessment of HEDs, as well as selection and verification of. design improvements. NRC guidelines recommend participation of human factor specialists in all DCRDR tasks. In our judgment, the Fort Calhoun DCRDR would be enhanced by more direct participation of human factors specialists in the assessment of HEDs and the selection and verification of design improvements.

- Selection of desian improvements. The purpose of selecting design improve-ments is, as a-minimum, to correct safety significant HEDs. Selection of design improvements should include a systematic process for development and comparison of alternative means for resolving HEDs. Both enhancement and design modification may be considered.

OPPD had begun the process of selecting design improvements at the time of the in-progress audit. The process involved OPPD members of the core work-ing group formulating preliminary recommendations for correction on an HED-by-HED basis. There did not appear to be a procedure for the integration of the solutions on a control room-wide basis. Human factors specialists from GPC then reviewed the DPPD recommendations and provided comments. The preliminary recommendations for resolving HEDs and GPC comments on those recommendations were to be reviewed by 0 PPD core working group members prior to final recommendations being made. Once selected, final recommendations will be processed through the standard DPPD administrative channels for design changes.

The Summary Report does not address the selection of design improvements in detail, however, it does provide a summary of HED resolutions. That summary was as follows:

0 e

16

___ - _~ _ -____ -

CATEGORIES OF HEDs Category Number Labeling / Demarcation 136 ,

Annunciator Upgrade Study 44 Refer to Training Department 20 -

SPDS Human Factors Study 2 Deleted 57 Incorrect Information Misinterpretation of Job Responsibility Duplicate Delete

- -- No Change Recommended 149 Plant Speci.ftc EOP Task Analysis 10 Changes Other Than Above 79 Based on the above summary, OPPD plans to correct approximately 300 of the nearly 500 HEDs identified by the DCRDR. About 60% of the HEDs to be corrected will be addressed by the additional studies discussed in this report's section on the control room survey. The Summary Report indicates ,

that those studies will include aspects of the selection of design improve-ments. By addressing groups of HEDs, the additional studies should con-tribute to integration of solutions on a control room wide basis. OPPD should assure that the, resolutions developed within each study work with those developed within the other studies and with those developed outside the studies. Satisfaction of this requirement depends upon OPPD's comple-tion of all efforts to select design improvements.

Verification that selected improvements will provide the necessary correc-tion and verification that improvements will not introduce new HEDs._ A key criterion of DCRDR success is a consistent, coherent, and effective inter-face between the operator and the control room. One good way to satisfy that criterion is through iteration of the processes of selection of design improvements, verification that selected design improvements will provide the necessary correction, and verification that improvements will not intro-duce new HEDs. Techniques for the verification process might include partial resurveys on mocked-up panels, applied experiments, engineering 17 t ..

l . . .

analyses, environmental surveys, and operator interviews. Each iteration of the selection and verification processes should reduce inconsistencies in the operator-control room interface while increasing the coherence and effectiveness of that interface. The consistency, coherence, and effective-ness' of the entire operator-control room interface is important to operator performance. Thus, evaluation of both the changed and unchanged portions of the control room is necessary during the verification processes.

The NRC staff's Program Plan comments noted that OPPD had no established methodology for accomplishing the verification that selected improvements provide correction and the verification that improvements will not introduce new HEDs. At the time of the in-progress audit, there was still no detailed

- -- methodology apparent to accomplish verification requirements. There was, however, some indication that labels, color, codes, and demarcation would be applied to the mock-up prior to implementation in the control room. The audit team understood that if that activity took place. it would be done after the April 1,1985 submission of the Summary Report. In the in-progress audit team's judgment. OPPD had not yet developed an acceptable method or schedule for satisfying the verification requirements.

In the Summary Report. OPPD states its intention to employ the CR mock-up as a means to verify design improvements. A serviceable sock-up of the Fort Calhoun control room has been developed for use in the DCRDR. OPPD intends to implement many HED corrections on that mock-up prior to installation in the actual control room. The modified mock-up will then be reviewed by human factors specialists to ensure that the improvements provide correction of the HEDs without introducing new ones. Operations personnel will review the sock-up to assure that proposed fixes are operationally proper and beneficial. OPPD states that "the verification process will attempt to reduce any inconsistencies in the operator-control room system and will increase the coherence and effectiveness of that interface." The possi-bility that selected design improvements may need to be modified as the result of verification activities was addressed.

OPPD appears to have plans for a fairly rigorous verification process, but detailed methodologies to be used in that process were not described.

Reasonable methodologies might be:

I 18

. , at . . , ,, .

o s .

l I

1. Comparison of the modified control room design with the NUREG-0700 human factors guidelines.

4

2. Comparison of the modified control room design with the instrumen-4 tation and controls requirements identified during the system func- J tion and task analysis of the control room. -

3. Obtaining feedback from licensed operators on the compatibility of the changes with the new E0Ps.

OPPD did not indicate how the verification process will be performed on the modified remote shutdown area.

The verificatioti process is not complete. The Summary Report indicates that I

about 60% of the HEDs to be corrected are linked to the additional studies.

The proposed corrective actions must then be subjected to the verification process to ensure consistent, coherent, and effective improvements.

Coordination of control room improvements with changes from other programs such as the' safety parameter display system (SPDS), operator training. Rec.

Guide 1.97 instrumentation. and upgraded emeraency operating procedures.

Improvement of emergency response capability requires coordination of the DCRDR with other activities. Satisfaction of Reg. Guide 1.97 requirements and addition of the SPDS will require modifications and additions to the '

control room. Those modifications, and additions should be specifically addressed by the DCRDR. Exactly how they are addressed will depend on a i number of factors including the relative timing of various emergency f response capability upgrades. Regardless of the means for coordination, the l result should be integration of Reg. Guide 1.97 instrumentation and SPDS j

equipment into a consistent, coherent, and effective control room interface ~

with the operators. .

l

)

The in-progress audit team understood that proposed modifications and addi-tions to the control room resulting from Reg. Guide 1.97 would be subjected to human factors review prior to installation. The Summary Repor't does not discuss modifications and additions to the control room resulting from Reg.

Guide 1.97.

OPPD should assure that the operator's interface with Reg.

19

. s .

Guide 1.97 instrumentation is consistent with good human engineering l practices and with the remainder of the control room.

The Summary Report ' indicates that the SPDS is being subjected to a separate human factors review. Two HEDs identified during the DCRDR will be addressed by that study. OPPD does not intend for the human fact' ors review of the SPDS to be part of the DCRDR. Although the DCRDR and SPDS efforts may be separate, the coordination requirement implies that the operator interface with the SPDS should be consistent not only with good human engi-neering practices but with the control room as well. OPPD should assure that consistency.

4

- Ideally coordination of the DCRDR with upgrade of the E0Ps should begin with a detailed tasklanalysis which supports both. Coordination of the DCRDR and upgrade of the E0Ps which begins with the generic emergency response guidelines developed by owners groups is also possible. The result of coordinating the DCRDR with upgrade of the E0Ps should be a control room which supports complete and technically adequate E0Ps.

A task analysis based on CE EPGs has been performed. Comparison of task analysis results with the control room sock-up resulted in several HEDs.

The Summary Report indicates that an additional task analysis using the upgraded E0Ps will be performed. That task analysis should work to ensure that the control room supports the instrument and control requirements of complete and technically adequate E0Ps.

There are two aspects to coordination of the DCRDR with training. One is the use of training to resolve HEDs. The other is familiarization of the operators with what may be fairly extensive control room modification and enhancement. The result should be operators who are thoroughly familiar with their revised control room interface and who have the specific knowledge necessary to deal with HEDs which are appropriately resolved by training.

The Summary Report indicates that some HEDs are to be addressed by training.

Those' HEDs have been forwarded to the training department for resolution, and OPPD considers them to be outside the scope of the DCRDR. If the coordination requirement is to be satisfied, proposed corrections for those 20 i .

HEDs should be treated as any other proposed correction. OPPD should verify that the proposed training actually corrects the HEDs and does not result in '

new HEDs. Schedules for initial and requalification training should be developed. With respect to the other aspect of coordination with training, the in-progress audit team understood that the training planned for imple-menting the new E0Ps would also add?ess modifications to the control room resulting from the DCRDR. That approach appears acceptable if the timing of the training and development of proposed corrective actions is appropriate.

i I

Proposed corrective actions. On page 44 of the Summary Report OPPD states.

" Recommendations for resolutions of HEDs may be altered vf s the verification process, therefore the recommendations provided in Volume II, Appendix 4

- should not be considered commitments." In addition to the failure to make

, firm commitments 0 PPD has deferred selection of design improvements for many HEDs to separate studies. As a result, our current evaluation of proposed corrective actions is based on review team recommendations only and is limited to those HEDs for which actual correction (rather than future study) is proposed.

HEDs for which some correction is proposed by OPPD are listed in Appendix C.

Sections 1, 2, and 3. Section 1 lists 65 HEDs for which recommended correction appears adequate. Section 2 lists 223 HEDs for which selection l

of design improvements has been deferred to separate studies or referred to another group. Section 3 lists 6 HEDs for which we could not evaluate the recommended correction., We recommend that commitments for HED corrections developed in the separate studies and final commitments for HED corrections already developed be reported in a Supplement to the Summary Report. OPPD has committed to several such supplements by letter dated June 15, 1985.

They are:

Annunciator Study . August 15, 1986 SPDS Review August 15, 1985 Labeling / demarcation / color code study February 15, 1985 Provision of that information, along with final commitments for HED

( corrections already developed, is essential to satisfaction of the l

Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requirement that the Summary Report outline I

proposed control room changes.

21

. c, .

~

Proposed schedules for implementino HED corrections. The schedule for implementing HED corrections is briefly discussed in the Summary Report.

That schedule uses plant refueling outages as milestones for implementation of verified modifications in the control room. The Summary Report indicates that HED corrections will be made during the 1985,1987, and 1988 refueling outages, but no implementation dates are provided for corre'ctions to specific HEDs. The Summary Report states that several criteria were used in determining the implementation schedule. They were:

1. Plant outage schedule (e.g., refueling)

2. Manpower requirements

3. Integration of correction with other planned station design changes

4. Integration of corrections with training requirements'for those changes  ?

5. Development of procedural changes '

6. Requirements for engineering, purchasing, installation, and testing.

The Summary Report further states that "Hany corrections can be implemented quickly regardless of their assigned priority, however; corrections for some of the highest priority HEDs may require a good deal of time for engineering

design, purchasing, and installation." Finally, the Summary Report indicates that interim corrections are not required.

Although OPPD indicatest that an implementation schedule for HED corrections I exists, no details were provided. OPPD should assure that factors cited in the Summary Report are carefully considered in developing an appropriately phased, detailed implementation schedule. Human factors issues and the possible need for interim solutions, particularly for safety significant HEDs with long implementation schedules, should be considered in developing l

the implementation schedule.

l Justifications for HEDs to be left uncorrected. HEDs for which no correction is proposed are listed in Appendix D. Sections 1.,2. and 3.

Section 1 lists 68 HEDs for which the justification for taking no corrective actio'n appears appropriate. Section 2 contains a list of 4 HEDs for which the justification does not appear adequate. Section 3 contains a list of 130 HEDs for which we could not evaluate the justification for no l l

1 22 l

l l . . _ . - ___ _ . _ _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - _ .

i

.s . I l

i correction. The in-progress audit team indicated concern about the adequacy of justifications for not correcting HEDs. For many HEDs the auditable record was not sufficiently detailed to permit the justification for no corrective action to be evaluated. That condition remains, as evidenced by the size of Appendix D. Section 3. We recommend that 0 PPD supplement its Summary Report to provide adequate justification for not correcting HEDs.

Provision of that information is essential to satisfaction of the Supplement I to NUREG-0737 requirement that the Summary Report provide summary justification for safety significant HEDs to be left uncorrected or partially corrected.

Note that seme HEDs may not need to be resolved as part of the DCRDR, but they may indicate a legitimate concern that should receive some management review instead hf the cursory treatment indicated in the Summary Report.

These HEDs are identified in Sections 2 and 3 of Appendix D.

Other. Although not a requirement of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, review of operating experience is beneficial to the DCRDR. OPPD has included an i operating experience review in the Fort Calhoun DCRDR. That effort con-

sisted of two parts; one part considered all " operations incident reports" (an internal report that may cause an LER to be generated), and Combustion

! Engineering LERs. A total of nine LERs were identified (two plant specific) that may result in HEDs being prepared. The second portion of the effort consisted of preparation of an operator questionnaire containing questions of the type suggested by NUREG-0700. .That questionnaire was distributed for review by plant operations personnel, and served as the framework for an interview of plant operators by GPC personnel. The interviews resulted in a large number of HEDs being written.

At the in-progress audit. OPPD discussed the possibility of an ongoing program (the HFMP) to provide a human factors review of all future modifica-tions to the control room and alternate shutdown panel. The Summary Report confirms that this plan will be developed with the aid of the CRDR team.

The program includes plans for the training of design engineers in the use of GPC-generated checklists and documentation of control room co'nventions and standards resulting from the DCRDR. The maintenance and application of such a data base would be a positive extension of the DCRDR and would help OPPD protect its investment in an improved operator interface with the 23 l

i

o ~ .

control room. Review of the HFMD identified one concern. OPPD stated that j

" Selected modifications will ... be reviewed by a human factors specialist j either before or soon after implementation depending upon the safety and j economic significance of the modification." We recommend that human factors reviews be'made prior to the installation of any modifications into the control room. ,

CONCLUSION l

l i The DCRDR for Fort Calhoun Station is underway. A Program Plan was submitted 25 October 1983. That plan was reviewed and NRC staff comments were provided 30 December 1983. An in-progress audit was conducted 4-8 February 1985. The in-progress audit report was forwarded to OPPD on 25 March 1985. The Summary Report was submitted on 1 April 1985 and supplemen-tal information was pro'vided May 2,1985 and June 15, 1985. Review of all information available to date indicates that the Fort Calhoun Station DCRDR is incomplete. The following is a list of activities that should be com-pleted to satisfy the DCRDR requirements in Supplement I to NUREG-0737. It is recommended that this' information be documented in a supplement to the Summary Report. Based on a review of the supplement to the Summary Report, a pre-implementation audit may be necessary.

i 1. Multidisciplinary review team

a. Assure control of the DCRDR remains the responsibility of the existing multidisciplinary review team or assure coordination

! between old and new managers be sufficient to minimize problems due to lack of continuity.

l I b. If control of the DCRDR is transferred, maintain an auditable record of personnel qualifications and technical task l

assignments.

c. Assure that personnel performing the separate studies are appropriately qualified and that an auditable record of their qualifications and activities is maintained.

24 s

i

2. Function and task analysis ,

l

a. Complete the task analysis effort using the plant-specific i upgraded E0Ps.

i

3. Comparison of display and control requirements with a control room inventory

) a. Compara results of task analysis using the upgraded plant-l specific E0Ps with the control room mock-up.

b. Assure differences between the control room and mock-up are taken into account.

!  ?

l 4. Control room survey

a. Assure completeness of the control room survey (refer to ,

i Appendix A).

b. Assure generic HEDs are accompanied by lists of equipment to which they apply (refer to Appendix B).

l c. Complete control room survey activities associated with the j separate studies.

5. Assessment

a. Assure the assessment process is consistent with that found to be acceptable during the in-progress audit.

l j b. Assure GPC comments on previously made preljninary assessments i are considered in determining final assessments.

c. Assure involvement of human factors specialists in the assessment of any new HEDs identified by the ongoing DCRDR.

25 i

. = - - _ _- . - . . . _ -

. s .  !

6. Selection of design improvements

a. Complete selection of design improvements for HEDs deferred to separate studies.

b. Maintain an auditable record of the HED resolution process for HEDs referred to other groups.

7-8. Verifications

a. Conduct the proposed correction phase on the revised mock-up.

4

b. Iterate verification with solution of design improvements until problems are resolved.

c. Assure direct participation of human factors specialists and on-shift operators in the iterative selection and verification

! of design improvements.

9. Coordination

a. Assure that the separate studies are coordinated with all j

appropriate elements of the DCRDR.

b. Assure that the opera. tor's interface with Reg. Guide 1.97 l instrumentation and the SPDS is consistent with good human i factors engineering practice and the remainder of the control

room.

c. Assure verification of training resolutions for HEDs and l scheduling of initial and requalification training.

! 10. Sumary Report ,

a. Provide final commitments for HED corrections already developed and commitments for correction of HEDs whose resolution has been deferred to separate studies.

26 l

l l

b

b. Provide implementation schedules for HED correction.

c. Provide adequate justification for HEDs which will not be  :

corrected.

'I

} .-

)

4 5

I 4

r 0

}

)

27 4

1 REFERENCES

1. NUREG-0660, "NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, May 1980; revision 1, August 1980.

2. NUREG-0737 Supplement 1. " Clarification of TMI Action Plan Require-ments " U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, December 1982.

3. NUREG-0700. " Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews " U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. April,1983.

- - 4. Letter from W.C. Jones (OPPD) to J.R. Miller (NRC) dated October 25, 1983, submitting Detailed Control Room Review Program Plan for Fort Calhoun Station.

5. " Program Plan for the Fort Calhoun Control Room Design Review" dated October 14, 1983 Attachment to Reference 3.

6. Letter from J.R. Miller to W.C. Jones,

Subject:

" Review of the Fort Calhoun Station Detailed Control Room Design Review Program Plan Sup-plement I to NUREG-0737." December 30, 1983.

7. Letter from J.R. Miller to R.L. Andrews (OPPD).

Subject:

" Result of the In-Progress Audit of the Fort,Calhoun Station Detailed Control Room Design Review " March 25, 1985.

i 8. Letter from R.L. Andrews to J.R. Miller, Subject " Detailed Control Room Design Review," April 1, 1985.

9. " Control Room Design Review Summary Report for the Omaha Public Power l District Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station Volume 1: Methodology and l Results, Volume 2: Supporting Documentation " April 1,1985, 1 Attachment to Reference 8.

I

10. Letter from R.L. Andrews, Omaha Public Power District to J.R. Miller, i NRC, dated May 2,1985, addressing Detailed Control Room Design Review. j l

28

11. Letter from R.L. Andrews,0maha Pubite Power District to J.R. Miller, NRC, dated June 15, 1985, addressing Detailed Control Room Design Review.

12. NUREG-0800 (Standard Review Plan) Revision 0. Section 18.1 and Appen-dix A to Section 18.1, September 1984. .

13. " Task Analysis Requirements of Supplement I to NUREG-0737, Augast 29, 1984 Neeting with Combustion Engineering Group (CEOG) Operations Sub-committee," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.,

Transmitted September 7, 1984.

i .- 14. NUREG/CR-3217. "Nuar Tern Improvements for Nuclear Power Plant Control Room Annucia. tor.!ystems," U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. April, 1983.

15. NUREG-0835 (draft), " Human Factors Acceptance Criteria for the Safety Parameter Display System," USNRC, Washington. 0.C., October 1981.

1 i

l Fort Calhoun '

TAC Mumber 51161 SAIC 1-263-07-557-23 Contract NRC-03-82-096 29 I .. -. .

APPEi4 DIX A l

Concerns related to the control room survey. On the basis of a limited ,

audit of the OPPD control room survey documentation, concerns typified by i the following examples were raised:

4

. NUREG-0700 Reference NRC Concern

6.1.2.2e(2) Annunciator tiles / response buttons appear to be discrepant with 6.1.2.2e(2) but this was not identified as an HED

. . _. 6.1.5.1 & Temperature, humidity and ventilation not surveyed at 6.1.5.2  ; remote shutdown panel 6.1.5.1 & Concern about temperature humidity and ventilation being i 6.1.5.2 collected over a single 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period (Feb 83) 6.1.5.3 Was glare addressed, particularly as it related to the panel with neon bulbs i

6.1.5.4 Emergency Itghting not surveyed 4

6.2.1.2b Phone cords were long and laid on the floor but no HED (4)&(5) 6.2.1.8 Communications in emergency gear not surveyed 6.3 Annunciator survey with the DCRDR was not comprehensive due to annunciator upgrade study which is to be contracted separately. OPPD planned for this to be outside of the ,

scope of the DCRDR 6.4.1.1d Did not evaluate compatability with emergency gear 6.5.1.l f Was control room surveyed for compliance with " display fa ilure" 30

_m%ry-_ -- , . - , -----i.--.e.- , , , .y c- ,,,- ,,g e-, - . - - -,------m-.w,- . ., - -= -w y,-:rw --e-we----ww-ww=-T'=--re=www"-----he- - * - v+

s .

NUREG-0700

~

Reference NRC Concern il 6.5.1.5c Condensor A and B vacuum meters have unmarked intermediate grad'uations of 2.5 inches NG ABS 6.5.1.6 & Questiin of color use in control room doesn't appear to 6.6.6.3 have been surveyed - there appear to be several color conventions - were they reviewed for consistency, etc.?

l i

6.5.2.4b(1) Condensor A and 8 absolute pressure meters appear to be discrepant but were not documented as HED 6.5.3.2  ; HED is compounded by glare from overhead lights not identi-i fled '

6.6.1.1 HED written against panel AI-30 appears to more wide spread

] 6.6.2.9 Some labels (position labels) are obscured by control handles - no HED identified

6.6.3.3 & Were all abbreviations reviewed for standardization, avoid-l 6.6.3.6 ance of similarity, etc.?

i i

6.6.3.8 Controls under H2 sampling values don't appear to have '

(

position labels l

6.6.3.8 GEMAC controllers-Direction of motion (increase / decrease) was not identified for continuous motion rotary controls 6.6.4 Only one HED identified on label lettering, white on black I

labels  !

l 6.7 No survey of computer - The PRODAC 250 is being phased out and SPDS is on the way in i

l  :

i 6.8.2.3 HED against arrangement of switches within annunciator response group but not against location of group as a whole .

L 31 h i

APPENDIX B Generic HEDs which appear to require equipment lists but are without them.

Review of the Summary Report identified the following generic HEDs for which lists of equipment to which they apply appear necessary but were not pro-vided. .

15* 197 100 198 103 225 105* 226 119 238

.- 121 253

. 122 263 ,

133 274 140 296 144 415 152 481*

175 t

• Refers to GE-MAC controllers. The Summary Report indicated that a list of  ;

GE-MAC controllers was included as Appendix 4a. Although a title page for l Appendix 4a was provided, no list of GE-MAC controller followed the title  ;

t i page.

l l  ;

l

• i I

r i 32

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APPENDIX C HEDs for which some correction is proposed. The Summary Report for the Fort Calhoun Station Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) indicates that human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) listed in Sections 1. 2, and 3 of this appendix will be considere( for correction. Final close-out of the DCRDR depends on:

1. Verification that selected improvements will provide the necessary correction and verification that' improvements will not introduce new HEDs.

,_ 2. Final commitments and schedules from OPPD to implement the selected and verified design improvements.

s i Section 1. This section lists HEDs for which the proposed corrective action I

appears adequate pending verification.

2 78 124 265 4 80 125 266 13 81 127 267 14 82 129 268 '

j 16 85 160 274 17 87 162 281

25- 89' 164 282 26 92 166 285 l

27 95 222 288 i 31 101 239 297 39 103 240 385 41 110 244 445 56 112 246 463 62 113 250 478 64 114 256 480 67 120 263 481 -

, 482 l

l 33

Section 2. This section lists HEDs for which selection of design )

improvements has been deferred to an additional study or transferred to -

another group.

a. Deferred to an additional study:

6 77 141 168 199 221 255 311 340 466 7 94 142 169 200 223 258 312 341 469 11 96 143 171 201 224 261 316 342 470 21 98 144 174 202 225 264 317 343 471 24 104 145 175 203 226 283 318 344 472 28 105 146 176 204 227 289 319 345 475

.. 30 107 148 177 206 228 290 320 346 476 38 115 . 149 178 207 229 291 326 347 477 40 126 150 180 208 230 292 327 348 479 42 130 151 182 209 231 293 328 349 483 43 131 152 184 210 232 294 329 350 484 51 132 153 186 211 233 295 330 351 486 57 133 155 187 212 234 296 332 352 487 61 134 156 188 213 235 302 333 362 488 63 135 157 189 214 236 303 334 365 489 65 136 158 190 215 237 3 04 335 373 492 66 137 159 194 216 242 305 336 461 493 70 138 161 195 217 245 3 06 337 462 4 94 74 139 163 196 218 248 307 338 464 495 76 140 167 197 220 253 310 339 465 496

b. Transferred to another group:

Trainino Department E0P Uparade Team 372 434 441 390 426 435 442 391 427 436 443 392 430 437 444 -

i 431 438 446 432 439 447 433 440 a

34

. . o Section 3. This section lists HEDs for which the justification for not taking corrective action is too brief, ambiguous, or general to allow an adequate evaluation, or a physical audit is i necessary to allow an adequate evaluation.  ;

e 1 5 8 18 219 309 .

e

• 89

'O f

i l

h 35

APPENDIX 0 HEDs for which no correction is proposed. The Summary Report for the Fort Calhoun Station Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) indicates that Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) listed in Sections 1, 2, and 3 of this appendix will not be corrected.

Section 1. This section lists HEDs for which the justification for taking no corrective action appears adequate.

12 73 165 273 381* 425*

15 91 173 275 382* 448

,29 102 183 278 383 449

-32 106 205 279 384 452 44 116 241 287 399 455 45 117 247 321 413* 456 46 118 259 322 416* 457 50 121 269 359 418* 458 52 li3 270 366 422* 459 55 128 271 368 423* 460 68 154 272 379 424* 467 72 485

• May not need to be resolved as part of the DCRDR, but may indicate a legitimate concern -that should receive some management review instead of cursory reference to procedures, etc.

l Section 2. This section lists HEDs for which the justification is not adequate because it does not address operational or behavioral factors or issues.

88 1 91 286 377 O

36 l

l Section 3. This section lists HEOs for which the justification for not taking corrective action is too brief, ambiguous, or general-to allow an adequate evaluation, or a physical augit is necessary to allow an adequate evaluation. t 3 86 257 361* 404*

9 90 260 363* 405*

10 93 262 364 406*

19 97 276 367 407*

20 99 277 369 408*

22 100 280 370 409*

- - 23 108 234 371* 410 33 .

s 109 298 374* 411*

34 111 299 375 412*

35 119 300 376 414*

36 122 . 301 378* 415 37 147 308 380* 417*

47 170 313 386* 419*

48 172 314 387* 420*

49 179 315 388 421* I

- 53 181 323 389 428 i 54 185 324 393* 429 i 58 192 325 394 450 f j 59 1,93 33) 395 451 60 198 353 396 453 69 238 354* 397 454 71 243 355 398* 468 75 249 356* 400* 473 79 251 357* 401* 474 l 83 252 358* 402* 490 00 254 360* 403* 491 l

• May not need to be resolved as part of the DCRDR. but may indicate a legitimate concern that should receive some management review instead of cursory reference to procedures, etc.

37

. ~ .

APPENDIX E

! Comments and concerns related to the resolution of specific HEDs.

i HED(s) Comnent t

l 6, 103, 112 Controller output and direction of valve movement - Use

! 296 of directional arrow's acceptable, but a hardware change i may be preferable.

l 12 Labeling - It appears that this HED should be addressed by the Labeling / Demarcation project.

13, 39, 241. -

, Window replacement - Recommend panel drawing be avail-able in control room as verification tool or as back-up to procedure if more than one windor/ is removed.

1 i 18 and general OPPD should assure that proposed corrections should increase consistency of operator-control room interface.

19, 20, 22 Meters (sigma and perhaps other) - If absolute 23, 59, 90, readability is not necessary, is " zone readability" l

92, 251, 318 necessary? Would color banding be appropriate?

l c

30, 145, 152 La,beling/ demarcation enhancements can improve poor 153, 175, 176, control room interface with operators (e.g., control 206, 210, 264, selection, panel layout, control-display integration) 316 and but only to an extent. Appropriate movement of neces-general sary displays on controls should be considered as should removal of unnecessary displays and controls.

33, 34, 35 Radiation monitors with separate operational and cali-

- bration scales - Is improved labeling a reasonable alternative? ,

Legend light demarcation. Demarcation approach should 65 be consistent with that used in control room as a whole.

I 38

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HED(s) Comment l

68 Diesel frequency meter - Is improved labeling appropri-  ;

ate? I 73 Instrumentation used by maintenance, surveillance, and test personnel - Those persons can also make errors that have safety and availability consequences. Recommend some consideration be given to correction of HEDs written against such instrumentation.

82, 101, 121 Benchboard rail - The possibility of " reach" problems being introduced or aggravated should be considered on a

. ; control-by-control basis.

107 Letdown pressure - Recommend hardware change rather then label change.

111 Containment cooling coil outlet valves - Is flow of the parameter of interest? If so, is it displayed sepa-rately?

136, 147, 183 Temporary labels - Taken as a group, these HEDs left 189 reviewers confused about the definition, use, and co,ntrol of temporary labels. NUREG-0700 guidelines reconmend strict control of sucli labels.

151 Color shading - We recommend that any " color shading" l developed as part of the labeling demarcation project l follow the " keep it simple" principle (that principle should also be applied to other enhancements and the enhancement program as a whole).

181 Apparent use of Roman numerals - What was, cause of

confusion? Is there a problem with the font (s) used in the control room.

i 39 1

I I.- . _ . . . . . . _ - - . _ . _ . . . . . - . . _ . - . _

l

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HED(s) Comment 191. 193, 206 Panel layout - Consideration of transfer of training effects is important, however, in many cases negative transfer of training will be minimal if the change brings discrepant features of the control rooin into line with practices in the rest of the control room. Nega-tive transfer can be reduced with appropriate training.

220 H2 flow Path - A mimic, as opposed to demarcation, i

appears appropriate.

. - 248 H 2 monitor panel meters - Would improved labeling

; reinforce operator training concerning dual range meters and indicator lights.

i 270 Panel illumination - AI-33C/D not addressed by HED 124.

276, 298 Instruments on back panels - Should be addressed by task 313, 314 analysis using updated E0P's.

! 282, 283, 299 Control room noise - Is there a control on the number of people in the control room?

! 297 Benchboard rail , HED 297 appears to address more of the

con' trol room than HED 82. Should it be deleted?

312 Errors in control operation - It is not clear that labeling and demarcation will resolve the indicated problem.

364 Data available on the ERF - Do the upgraded E0Ps rely on the ERF computer to display necessary information? If so, is that information available in some other reason-able place in the event the ERF is lost?

40

4 HED(s) Comment I 367 P-250 numbers off scan - Does this apply to new ERF computer as well? Is there a better way to indicate questionable data?

375, 376 ERF speed and data points - This appears to be a legiti- ,

377, 378 mate topic for the human factors review of the SPOS. ,

380, 448, 449 These may need to be addressed by training.

l 432 Degradation of system instrumentation - This HED appears 1 -

to have strong ties with both the DCRDR and training.

We would expect active participation of personnel involved in both areas to resolve it.

l 4

j 483 Availability of pressurizer heater temperature - pres-

surizer or pressure and level are affected by more than pressurizer heater temperature and therefore those sea-i; sures do not provide unequivocal evidence of pressurizer i

heater temperature changes.

487 Availability of pressurizer spray flow - Pressurizer pressure and level are affected by more than pressurizer heater temperaturt and therefore those measures do not l provide unequivocal evidence of pressurizer spray i

effects.

490, 491 Scale units - Coordination between DCRDR and E0P cpgrade l

j efforts should assure that the control room supports the

procedures. That includes assuring that parameters are i

scaled in the control room in a way consistent with their appearance in the procedures. Operators should not have to make mental conversions use graphs, make guesses, etc. >

j 41 l

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