Text

Forwards Revised Requests for Exemption from Requirements of 10CFR50,App R for Fire Areas.Revs Deemed Necessary Based on NRC Audit During Wk of 850819
	ML20138G213
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	10/18/1985
From:	Mcdonald R; ALABAMA POWER CO.
To:	Varga S; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	TAC-57854, TAC-57855, TAC-57856, TAC-60032, NUDOCS 8510250428
	Download: ML20138G213 (100)
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Meiling Address '

6 ortn 18 S t Post Office Box 2641 Birmingham, Alabama 35291 Telephone 205 783-6090

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R. P. Mcdonald sn"Ich'BuINg Alabama power October 18, 1985 "#""**'

Docket Nos. 50-348 Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Mr. S. A. Varga Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 .

10CFR50.48 and 10CFR50, Appendix R Fire Protection Exemption Requests Gentlemen:

Alabama Power Company submitted exemption requests to the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix R by letter dated May 31, 1985 for Unit i fire areas.

This submittal was supplemented by letters dated June 26, 1985 and July 19, 1985.

An NRC audit of these exemption request submittals was performed the week of August 19, 1985. Based upon this audit, revisions to several exemption requests were deemed necessary. Attached is a copy of the revised exemption requests identified as a result of the NRC audit. These revised exemption requests include proposed modifications identified during the audi t. Installation of these proposed modifications will be completed during the first outage of sufficient duration subsequent to design and procurement completion, but no later than the Unit 1 seventh refueling outage currently scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1986.

If there are any questions, please advise.

Yours very tr ly, 5'

R. P. Mcdonald

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RPM /DHJ:ddb-D43 Attachments M

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Mr. S. A. Yarga October 18, 1985 Nuclear Regulatory Co=iission Page 2 !

cc: Mr. L. B. Long Dr. J. N. Grace Mr. E. A. Reeves Mr. W. H. Bradford 6

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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-16 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-013 LOCATION: UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING VERTICAL CABLE CHASE Fire area 1-013 consists of rooms 227 (el 128 ft - 0 in.). 300 (el 141 ft -0 in.) - 465 and 466 (el 155 ft -0 in.). and 500 (el 168 ft - 6 in.). All fire area boundary walls, floor, and ceiling are 3-hour fire rated and fire area boundary doors are UL Class A fire rated.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A. INSTRUMENT AIR Fire area 1-013 contains control and power cables for the train-B electrical distribution system. An analysis of the potential effects of fire induced failures of these cables demonstrates that the plant could experience a total loss of the electrical train-B distribution system. This could result in the following safe shutdown equipment becoming inoperable in the closed position.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room OlB13HV2228-B Backup Air /N2 Supply to Pressurizer PORVs In addition, fire area 1-013 contains control cables associated with valve 01813HV2228-B and the following Unit-1 service air compressors.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1P19M001A-N Service Air Compressor - 1A N1P19M0018-N Service Air Compressor - IB N1P19M001C-N Service Air Compressor - IC N1P19M001D-N Service Air Compressor - 1D The analysis of the potential effects of fire induced failures on these cables demonstrates that valve 01B13HV2228-B could become inoperable in the closed position and all service air compressors could be disabled.

1-16-1 Hev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT )

l 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION l 1

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Justification The only safe shutdown components which require instrument air are the pressurizer PORVs which are required to be operable for RCS depressurization. RCS depressurization is a long term action required to initiate RHR. This allows adequate time for manual action to be performed to restore instrument air / backup N2 to the pressurizer PORVs. The plant has existing procedures to restore the instrument air on loss of the service air compressors. Once air is restored, valve N1P19HV3885-B can be l I

manually operated to restore air to the pressurizer PORVs.

B. DEPRESSURIZATION/ LETDOWN AND RCS BOUNDARY Fire area 1-013 contains HSP control cables for the following safe shutdown components:

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION QlB31PCV0445A-A Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve QlB13MOV8000A-A Pressurizer PORV Block Valve OlB13SV2213A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve QlB135V2214A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve The subject cables are associated with control functions from the hot shutdown panel Q1H21NBAPP2605G-A. In addition control cables which shift control from the main control board to hot shutdown panel via the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 2-A are in this fire area. A fire induced failure causing multiple hot shorts could cause these components to become inoperable in either closed or open condition, resulting in the plants inability to depressurize, letdown, or maintain the RCS boundary as may be required.

Justification Fire induced failure (hot shorts) to the control cooles for the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 2-A could cause control for the power operated relief and blocking valves, and the reactor head vent valves, to shift from the normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel. Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway or open circuits) of the control cables for Q1B31PCV0445A-A, power operated relief valve, and Q1B13SV2213A-A, and Q1B13SV2214A-A reactor head vent valves, could result in the i

valves failing in undesirable position. The power relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position. In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manual operation (handle) of the effected relays, thereby shifting control to the main control board. To l l-16-2 Rev. 1

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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l lt 10CFR50 APPENDIK "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION i

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remove power from transfer relays, open breaker 17 on 125V dc

distribution panel 1B (Q1R41LOOlB-A) located in fire area 1-043, i

room 0343. Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-1 (0lH22L002-A) located in fire area 1-035, room 0347 and manually shift transfer i relays TR1 (QlB13SV2213A-A). TR2 (Q1B13SV2214A-A). TR3

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(QlB31PCV0445A-A) and TRS (QlB13MOV8000A-A), placing control back j to main control board, to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown /bou:'dary problem.

, C. MAKEUP AND St.'.L INTEGRITY:

i Fire area 1-013 contains control cables which could transfer the i control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel for the following safe shutdown valve. -

VALVE FUNCTION 4

Q1E21LCV0ll5B-A RNST to Charging Pump Suction

! Effects of a fire could make this valve inoperable from the main control room and fail in the closed position.

In addition redundant valve ole 21LCV0ll5D-B could fail in the i closed position due to loss of the electrical Train-B power.

l Justification A review of the electrical circuitry associated with components i required for normal makeup shows that normal makeup capability is i

! not affected due to a fire in fire area 1-013. '

D. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION i

! pire area 1-013 contains hot shutdown panel control cables for ,

J the following safe shutdown components.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION

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OlN11SV3369AC-A Main Steam Isolation SG-1A 1

01N11SV3369BC-A Main Steam Isolation SG-1B Q1NilSV3369CC-A Main Steam Isolation SG-1C ,

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! The subject cables are associated with control function from the hot shutdown panel OlH21NBAFP2605G-A. In addition, control

i cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via transfer relay cabinet 01H22 LOO 3-A are in this i fire area. A fire induced failure causing multiple hot shorts i could cause these components to become inoperable in the open j position.

i i 1-16-3 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION In addition, electrical train-B main steam isolation valves could become inoperable in the open position due to loss of electrical train-B distribution system.

Justification Fire induced failures (hot shorts) to control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 3-A could cause control for the main steam isolation valves Q1N11SV3369AC-A, Q1N11SV3369BC-A, and Q1NilSV3369CC-A to shift from normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel. Subsequent fire induced failures of the cables for the main steam isolation valves listed above, could result in the valves becoming inoperable in the open position. In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manual operation (handle) of the effected relay, thereby shifting control to the main control board. To remove power from transfer relays, open breaker 17 on 125V de distribution panel IB as described in "B" above. Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-2 (01H22 LOO 3-A) located in fire area 1-006, room 0190 and manually shift transfer relays TR6 (Q1NilSV3369AC-A). TR7 (OlNilSV3369BC-A) and TR8 (Q1N11SV3369CC-A), placing control back to main control board, to allow operator to achieve main steam isolation.

E. FALSE SI, CVI, AND CI SAFETY SIGNAL INITIATION l Fire area 1-013 contains instrumentation cables and power supply cables which are not required for post-fire shutdown, but due to fire induced failures could potentially initiate a false SI/CVI/CI safety signal from the solid state protection system.

Justification Plant procedures exist, or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI, and CI safety signals from the main control room and can be used, if required, for a fire in this area.

Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above actions for a fire in this area.

I 1-16-4 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA: 1-013 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY 227, A, B, C Cable 16,524 lb(a) 256,281(a) <3-1/2 h(a) 300, A, B, C insul.(a) 465 -

466, A and 500 A Vertical Cable Chase

a. Applies to rooms 227, 300, 465, 466, and 500 collectively.

DESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Doors: UL Class A fire-rated doors exist between rooms 300 and 319 (area 1-042), 465 and the primary access point, and 466 and the primary access point (area 1-004).

Piping and Electrical Penetrations: Penetrations through area boundary are sealed with silicone foam.

Ventilation: Normal supply and exhaust is provided by cable chase supply and exhaust fan. Fire dampers are provided where ducts penetrate through the floors within the area and where area boundaries are penetrated.

Floor Drains: A 4-inch diameter floor drain having 100 gal /m capacity is located in the bottom of the chase and drains to the floor drain tank.

FIRE PROTECTION Ionization smoke detectors are located throughout the area. An automatic water suppression system is provided for this area.

Two portable fire extinguishers, and two water hose stations located outside room 300 (el 139 ft - 0 in.) in area 1-042 are available as backup.

1-16-5 Rev. 1

. J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-17 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-020 LOCATION: NON-RAD. SIDE CORRIDOR - AUXILIARY BUILDING.

EL 121 FT - 0 IN.

i Fire area 1-020 consists of rooms 234, 228, 211, 210, 213, 244, 225, and 245 which constitute the corridor, battery service area, and battery room mezzanine on el 121 ft - 0 in. on the non-rad.

side of the auxiliary building.

EXEMPTION An exemption to section III.G.2.c is requested to the extent that

) it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be l enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating.

4 CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A. INSTRUMENT AIR FOR PRESSURIZER PORVs Fire area 1-020 contains control and power cables for the train-B electrical distribution system. An analysis of the potential l

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effects of fire induced failures of these cables demonstrates that the plant could experience a total loss of the electrical

train-B distribution system. This could result in the following i instrument air isolation valves becoming inoperable in the closed position. These valves isolate the primary air and backup air /N2 to the pressurizer PORVs.

f EQUIPMENT FUNCTION l

N1P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to the Penetrations Room Q1B13HV2228-B Backup Air /N2 Supply to Pressurizer

PORVs l Justification l

l The pressurizer PORVs are required to be operable for RCS depressurization. RCS depressurization is a long term action

required to initiate RHR. Adequate time is available to manually l operate N1P19HV3885-B and restore air to the pressurizer PORVs, 1-17-1 Rev. 1

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i J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 1

10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION i

B. PRESSURIZATION, LETDOWN. RCS BOUNDARY Fire area 1-020 contains HSP control cables for the following safe shutdown components:

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION QlB31PCV0445A-A Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve OlB13MOV8000A-A Pressurizer PORV Block Valve OlB13SV2213A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve QlB13SV2214A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve 1 The subject cables are associated with control functions from the

hot shutdown panel. In addition, control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via transfer relays are in this fire area. A fire induced failure causing multiple and selective shorts could cause these components to become inoperable in either a closed or open condition, resulting in the plant's inability to depressurize, letdown, or maintain the RCS boundary as may be required.

I Justification Fire induced failures (hot shorts) within the control cables for the transfer relays could cause control of the valves to shift 4 from the main control board to the remote hot shutdown panel.

4 Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway or open circuits) of the control cables for 01B31PCV0445A-A, power operated relief valve, and Q1B13SV2213A-A, and Q1B13SV2214A-A reactor head vent valves. could i result in the valves failing in undesirable positions. The power relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position. In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing

! power from the transfer relays and manually aligning the affected i' relay (handle is provided), thereby shifting control to the main control bo,ard. To remove power from the transfer relay open breaker 17 on oc distribution panel IB (QlR41 LOO 1B-A) in fire area 1

1-043 Room 0343. Then go to transfer relay cabinet 01H22 LOO 2-A in r fire area 1-035 room 347 and manually shift transfer relays TR1 (01B135V2213A-A). TR2 (01B13SV2214A-A). TR3 (OlB13PCV0445A-A), and TR5 (01B13MOV8000A-A) restoring control to the main control board l to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.

i C. CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL INDICATION

} Fire area 1-020 contains instrumentation cables for redundant condensate storage tank level instrument channels.

l EOUIPMENT FUNCTION 1

Q1P15LT515-A CST Level Train A OlP15LT516-B CST Level Train B l l-17-2 Rev. 1 1

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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area I shows that the plant could lose both trains of CST level indication.

Justification Verification of condensate storage tank level is a long term consideration. In the event that both channels of CST level are disabled. manual operator action can be taken to determine CST level independent of fire area 1-020.

D. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION Fire area 1-020 contains hot shutdown panel control cables for the following safe shutdown components.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1NilSV3369AC-A Main Steam Isolation SG-1A OlN11SV3369BC-A Main Steam Isolation SG-1B Q1NilSV3369CC-A Main Steam Isolation SG-lC The subject cables are associated with the control function from the hot shutdown panel OlH21NBAPP2605G-A. In addition, control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via the transfer relay cabinet OlH22 LOO 3-A are in this fire area. A fire induced failure causing multiple hot shorts could cause these components to become inoperable in the open position. In addition, electrical train-B main steam isolation valves could become inoperable in the open position due to loss of the electrical train-B distribution system.

Justification Fire induced failures (hot shorts) within control cables for the transfer relays could cause control for the main steam isolation valves ClN11SV3369AC-A. 01N11SV3369BC-A. and Q1N11SV3369CC-A to shift from the main control board to the remote hot shutdown panel. Subsequent fire induced failures of the cables for the main steam isolation valves listed above, could result in the valves becoming inoperable in the open position. In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manually resetting the affected relays (handle is provided), thereby shifting control to the main control board. This will enable the plant to maintain main steam isolation using the train-A isolation valves. To remove power from transfer relays, open breaker 17 on 125V de distribution panel 18 as described in "B" above. Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-2 (0lH22L003-A) located in fire area 1-006. room 0190 and manually shift transfer relays TR6 (OlN11SV3369AC-A), TR7 (0lNilSV3369BC-A) and TR8 (OlNilSV3369CC-A), placing control back to main control board, to allow operator to achieve main steam isolation.

l l-17-3 ,

Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION E. FALSE SI, CI, AND CVI SAFETY SIGNAL INITIATION Fire area 1-020 contains power supply cables which, potentially 4 initiate a false SI, CVI, and CI safety signal from the solid t

state protection system.

Justification

Plant procedures exist, or will be developed. for resetting j spurious SI. CVI, and CI safety signals from the main control room and can be used, if required, for a fire in this area.

F. MAIN STEAM RELEASE Fire area 1-020 contains control cables required for post-fire operation of the main steam atmospheric relief valves. An j analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables i

demonstrates tnat the valves could become electrically inoperable in the closed position.

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. EQUIPMENT FUNCTION 01NilPV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A)

{ 01N11PV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1B)

{ 01N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1C)

, Justification l~

One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and related ,

steam generator is required to be operable to achieve steam I

release for cooldown. The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies. The operator i would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air

! supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator. Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-020. The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with

! the use of manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was l demonstrated daring the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown

! startup testing. Consequently, a fire in area 1-020 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

I G. RCS SAMPLING i

A fire in area 1-020 could result in the loss of the train-B electrical distribution system. This could cause the following samples valves to fail closed.

1-17-4 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION VALVES FUNCTION QlP15SV3881-B Pressurizer Sample OlP155V3332-B Pressurizer Sample OlP155V3101-B RCS Loop 1 Hot Leg sample OlP15SV3333-B RCS Hot Leg Sample S

OlP15SV3105-B RHR Heat Exchanger Sample OlP15SV3106-B RHR Heat Exchanger Sample In addition, cables for neutron flux monitors N1C55NE0031-P1, N1C55NE0032-P2, and OlC55NE0048A-A are in the fire area. An analysis of the potential effects of fire induced failures of these cables demonstrates that these monitors may become inoperable.

7 Justification i

An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by manually operating RHR heat exchanger sample valves Q1P15SV3105-B or OlP15SV3106-B.

H. MAKEUP AND RCP SEAL INTEGRITY Control cables for the following valves are routed through fire area 1-020.

VALVES FUNCTION ole 21LCV0115B-A RWST to Charging Pump Suction >

4 ole 21LCV0115D-B RWST to Charging Pump Suction

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Control cables in area 1-020 for QlE21LCV0115B-A and i

Q1E21LCV0115D-B are associated with control of the valves from [

the hot shutdown panel. In addition, control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via transfer relays are in the fire area. A fire induced failure

. causing multiple and selective shorts could cause these

' components to become electrically inoperable in the closed i position. At a point in the shutdown process one of these valves l may be required to be open to line up charging pump suction to i

the RWST. ;

Justification !

A fire in area 1-020 could result in a loss of Train B power. l Therefore, this justification addresses the operation of the

! Train A RWST to charging pump suction valve only. In the i

unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occurring, the valve '

i can be aligned by removing power from the transfer relay and

, manually aligning the affected relay (handle is provided),

l thereby shifting control to the main control board. To remove ,

i power from the transfer relay open breaker 17 on de distribution l l

1-17-5 Rev. 1 f

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, J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT

-10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION panel 1B (QlR41LOOlB-A) in fire area 1-043 Room 0343. Then go to transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 2-A in fire area 1-035 room 347 and manually shift transfer relays TR4 (Q1E21LCV0115B-A) restoring control to the main control board to allow the operator to align charging pump suction to the RWST. In the interin, charging flow can be maintained with make-up via the normal make-up system.

Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above action for a fire in this area.

I. NON-FIRE RATED HATCH COVERS Two hatchways in room 234 directly above one another have non-rated steel plate covers. These hatchways communicate with fire area 1-042 and 1-006.

Justification The sprinkler system installed in room 234 will serve the purpose of a water curtain to prevent the passage of a fire from area i 1-020 to the adjacent fire areas via the non-rated steel hatches. Sprinkler systems existing in the hatch area of the fire areas above and below room 234 will prevent the spread of fire from these areas into area 1-020.

J. FIRE DOORS The doors between room 235 (area 1-023) and 234 (area 1-020) are provided with removable transoms. The door and transom assembly

, cannot be certified as UL Class A.

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j. Justification The doors between roces 235 (area 1-023) and 234 (area 1-020) are f provided with removabte transoms to facilitate the movement of .

large equipment. The transoms have been certified by the vendor as being constructed of materials and in a manner similar to that of the UL Class A criteria. The door and transom assembly has ,

not, and cannot, be certified as Class A; however, this assembly

< meets the highest fire rating standards and provides sufficient i fire retardancy capability. (Reference APC letter to NRC dated April 16, 1981.) [

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1-17-6 Rev. 1 l

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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA: 1-020 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft2 1 SEVERITY 210 A, B -

Corridor Channel 2 211 B. A Corridor Channels 3 and 4 213 Battery Service C Room 228 B. C Corridor 234 -

Cable 2,296 lb(a) 27,754(a) <30 min (a)

Hallway insul.(a) 244 Roof. A, B Battery Channels B Room, 1 and 2 El 131 ft -

0 in 245 Roof, B. A Battery Channels ,

A Room, 1 and 2 -

El 131 ft -

0 in.

225 Battery C Cable insul. 137 lb 14.556 <10 min ;

Charger Panels 14 lb .

4 (a) Applies to rooms 210, 211, 213, 228, 234, 244, and 245 collectively.

DESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete with removable steel plate hatches between ,

rooms 234 and 345 (area 1-042) and between 234 and 185 (area 1-6). l t

1-17-7 Rev. 1

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e J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Doors: A UL Class B door exists between room 234 and stairway No. 1: two airtight UL Class A doors exist between rooms 234 and 235 (area 1-23); an airtight UL Class A door exists between rooms 228 and 233 (area 1-21) and rooms 228 and 229 (area 1-21); and a UL Class A door exists between rooms 210 and 254 (area 1-12),

rooms 211 and 226 (area 1-19). rooms 210 and 201 (area 1-14),

rooms 210 and 202 (area 1-15), rooms 213 and 212 (area 1-16),

rooms 213 and 214 (area 1-17), rooms 225 and 224 (area 1-18), and rooms 225 and 226 (area 1-19).

Piping and Electrical Penetrations: Penetrations through the area boundary are sealed.

Ventilation: Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste HVAC system. There is an individual room cooler serving room 225. Fire damper doors are provided at duct penetrations in the area boundaries.

Floor Drains: Five 4-in. diameter floor drains having a 100-gal /m capacity each are provided throughout the area. These drains discharge to a sump in room 185 (area 1-6) which has two pumps of 100-gal /m capacity each with discharge to the floor drain tank.

FIRE PROTECTION An ionization smoke detection system provides coverage to the entire area. Automatic water suppression systems cover the entire area except room 225.

A CO2 hose reel is located in room 210. A water hose is provided in rooms 211 and 234. Portable extinguishers are provided throughout the area.

EXISTING FIRE PROTECTION JUSTIFICATION Room 225 is not covered by an automatic suppression system. The room does mot contain redundant safe shutdown cable or equipment.

1-17-8 Rev. 1

t J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFRSO APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-18 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-075 LOCATION: UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING TO DIESEL BUILDING CABLE TUNNEL TRAIN A Fire area 1-075 consists of a cable tunnel running from the Unit 1 auxiliary building to the diesel generator building. The fire area boundary floor, ceiling, and walls are 3-hour fire rated. A UL Class A fire-rated door exists between the tunnel and the diesel building. A non-fire-rated watertight door and bulkhead exist between the tunnel and auxiliary building room 251 (area 1-031). A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door leading into the auxiliary building.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire detection system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION ,

A. TOTAL LOSS OF ELECTRICAL TRAIN-A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM A fire in area 1-075 could potentially result in fire damage to the electrical circuitry of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 train-A diesel generators. This condition along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit 1 could result in total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system. This could result in the loss of RCS hot leg temperature indication and neutron flux monitoring instrumentation.

Justification A.1 RCS Hot Leg Temperature Indication INSTRUMENTATION PUNCTION N1B21TE413(LOOP-1) RCS Hot Leg Temperature. Indication N1B21TE423(LOOP-2) RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1B21TE433(LOOP-3) RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication Each RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loop is powered from channelized inverter-1A. Inverter-1A is powered from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus lA. A fire in area 1-075 along with 1-18-1 Rev. 1

e %

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit 1 could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter lA: however, inverter lA will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus lA and will supply power to the instrument loops for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . ,If after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months power is lost. RCS hot leg temperature indication is available from the core exit thermocouples. Core i exit thermocouple temperature indication will not be affected by a fire in area 1-075. In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G. 1.97 will provide a redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N1B21TE413 N1B21TE423. and N1B21TE433. In order to implement this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification. Based upon the R.G.

1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is currently planned for the seventh refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986. After implementation of this modification, a fire in area 1-075 will not affect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS hot leg temperature.

A.2 Neutron Flux Monitor Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION .

01C55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor NIC55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor Source range neutron flux monitors N1C55NE0031-P1 and NIC55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters lA and 18.

The post-accident neutron-flux monitor 02C55NE0048A-A is powered from inverter-lF. Inverters lA, 1B, and 1F are all powered from 600 V-ac MCC-1A or 125 V-de bus-1A. Therefore, neutron flux monitoring following potential fire damage in area 1-075 and the resultant loss of 600 V-ac MCC 1A will be available for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RHR Hx No. I and No. 2 sample valves 01P15HV3105-B and OlP15HV3106-B for determination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area 1-075.

B. MAIN STEAM RELEASE A total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system, as discussed under " Condition A " could render main steam atmospheric relief vales electrically inoperable in the closed position.

1-10-2 Hev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve l (S.G.-1A)

Q1NilPV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1B)

OlN11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1C)

Justification -

One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown. The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator. Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-075. The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was -

demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing. Consequently, a fire in area 1-075 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

Plant procedures will be developed to include above actions for a fire in this area.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA: 1-075 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBCRS/ SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY LBtu/ft 81 SEVERITY Cable Tunnel A Cable insul. 32,650 lb 59,600 <1 h pESIGN_ FEATURES Construction: Floor, ceiling, and walls forming area boundary area of reinforced concrete.

1-18-3 Rev. 1

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% D J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Doors: The door to diesel building is UL Class A fire-rated.

The door between tunnel and auxiliary building (area 1-031) is a .'

non-fire-rated watertight door. A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the non-rated door with the exception of the .

hinges.

Piping and Electrical Penetrations: All wall penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings. Bulkhead between- cable tunnel and auxiliary building (area 1-031) is non-fire rated.

Ventilation: None Floor drains: The floor drainage has a capacity of 100 gal /m which discharges to yard drains. A sump and sump pump are Provided.

FIRE PROTECTION An automatic water suppression system is installed in this area.

JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION The watertight door and the bulkhead between auxiliary building (area 1-031) and cable tunnel (area 1-075) do not comply with 3-hour fire rated boundary requirements. However, a fire in area 1-075 propagating into area 1-031 will not have any additional impact on Unit-1 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both the areas. In addition, the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under a fire protection surveillance program.

l 1-18-4 Hev. 1

- J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l

10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION i

EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-29 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-030 LOCATIO'N: UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING CABLE CHASE TRAIN B and 139 Fire area 1-030 consists of rooms 249 (el All121 ft -area fire 0 inboundary ft - 0 in.) and 252 (el 127 ft - 0 in.)

walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-hour fire rated, except for the door and bulkhead between room 252 and cabla tunnel (area 1-076) which are non-fire rated and watertight. A fire-resistant coatinp has been applied to the watertight door on fire area 1-076 side. UL Class A fire rated door exists between rooms 249 and .35 (area 1-023).

EXEMPTION i

Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a one-hour fire rating.

CONDITION REOUIRING EXEMPTION I TOTAL LOSS OF THE ELECTRICAL TRAIN-B DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ,

Fire area 1-030 contains power and control cables for the electrical train-B distribution system.

The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area shows that the plant could lose train-B emergency diesel backup power. In the evert of a postulated loss of offiste power (LOSP) for Unit 1 along with a fire in this area, the plant could lose the total electrical train-B distribution system and make the j

following redundant safe shutdown components inoperable in the closed position.

~

KQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room 01B13HV2228-B Backup Air /N2 Supply to Pressurizer PORVs Q1B31PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PORV, Train A

Q1B31PCV0444B-B Pressurizer PORV, Train B Q1E21HV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray i

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. d J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Justification Failure of valve Q1E21HV8145-N in the closed position will disable the pressurizer auxiliary spray system which provides one method to achieve depressurization of the RCS.

Pressurizer PORVs Q1B31PCV0445A-A and Q1B31PCV0444B-B provide another means of achieving RCS depressurization. Valves N1P19HV3885-B and 01B13HV2228-B will fail in the closed position on loss of train-B de power, This will isolate the instrument air supply to the pressurizer PORVs Q1B31PCV0445A-A and OlB31PCV0444B-B. PORV Q1B31PCV0444B-B will also be inoperable due to loss of the train-B de power supply. However, the train-A de supply to PORV OlB31PCV0445A-A is not affected due to a fire in this area. Since only one of the PORVs is required for RCS depressurization, and RCS depressurization is a long term requirement, the operator has adequate time to take manual action to restore the instrument air by handwheel operation of valve N1P19HV3885-B.

Once air is restored. PORV OlB31PCV0445A-A will be operable to achieve RCS depressurization.

Plant procedures will be revised to include the above action for a fire in area 1-030.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION -

FIRE AREA: 1-030 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUGTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL __ OUANTIIX (Btu /ft 81 SEVERITY 249 and 252 B Cable insul. 5,760 lb 423,898(a) <8 h Cable Chase Rooms

a. Area average DESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floors, ceilings, and walls forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Doors: An non-fire rated watertight door is installed in the steel bulkhead between room 252 and train-B cable tunnel (area 1-29-2 Rev. 1

. J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT

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10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 1-076) leading to diesel building and an airtight UL Class A fire rated door exists between rooms 249 and 235 (area 1-023). A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the tunnel side of the non-rated door with the exception of the hinges.

Pipe and Electrical Penetrations: All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Bulkhead between this fire area and the cable tunnel (Area 1-076) is non-fire rated. ,

Ventilation: No normal ventilation is provided. Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Floor Drains: No floor drains are provided.

FIRE PROTECTION A smoke detection system and automatic water suppression system are installed in this area. The manual hose station located in I room 234 (area 1-020) is available for use in this area.

JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION The watertight door and bulkhead between auxiliary building (area 1-030) and cable tunnel (area 1-076) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements. However a fire in area 1-030 propagating into area 1-076 will not have any additional impact on Unit-2 safe shutdown, because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both the areas. In addition, the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under a fire protection surveillance program.

l l-29-3 Rev. 1

s J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-30 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-076 LOCATION: UNIT 1 AUXILIARY' BUILDING TO DIESEL BUILDING CABLE TUNNEL TRAIN B Fire area 1-076 consists of a cable tunnel running from the Unit-1 auxiliary building to the diesel building. The fire area boundary walls, floor, and ceiling are 3-hour fire rated except for a non-fire rated watertight door and bulkhead which exist between the cable tunnel and the auxiliary building (area 1-030). A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door leading into the auxiliary building. A UL Class A fire rated door exists between the cable tunnel and the diesel building.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire detection system.

CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTION TOTAL LOSS OF THE ELECTRICAL TRAIN-B DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Fire area 1-076 contains electrical power and control cables for the electrical train-B distribution system.

The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area

, shows tha'. the plant could lose train-B emergency diesel backup

! power. In the event of a postulated loss of offsite power (LOSP) l for' Unit-1 along with a fire in this area, the plant could experience a total loss electrical train-B distribution system and make the following redundant safe shutdown components inoperable in the closed position.

t EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room OlB13HV2228-B Backup Air /N2 Supply to Pressurizer PORVs OlB31PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PORV. Train A OlB31PCV0444B-B Pressurizer PORV. Train B ole 21HV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray 1-30-1 Rev. 1

m J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Justification Failure of valve QlE21HV8145-N in the closed position will disable the pressurizer auxiliary spray system which provides one method to achieve depressurization of the RCS.

Pressurizer PORVs OlB31PCV0445A-A and OlB31PCV0444B-B provide another means of achieving RCS depressurization. Valves N1P19HV3885-B and OlB13HV2228-B will fail in the closed position on loss of train-B de power. This will isolate the instrument air supply to the pressurizer PORVs QlB31PCV0445A-A and QlB31PCV0444B-B. PORV OlB31PCV0444B-B will also be inoperable due to loss of the train-B de power supply. However, the train-A de supply to PORV Q1B31PCV0445A-A is not affected due to a fire in this area. Since only one of the PORVs is required for RCS depressurization and RCS depressurization is a long term requirement, the operator has adequate time to take manual action to restore the instrument air by handwheel operation of valve N1P19HV3885-B.

Once air is restored. PORV OlB31PCV0445A-A will be operable to achieve RCS depressurization.

Plant procedures will be revised to include the above action for a fire in area 1-076.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA: 1-076 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 21 SEVERITY j Cable Tunnel B Cable insul. 21,554 lb 39,000 <30 min DESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area l boundary are of reinforced concrete.

i Doors: The door to the diesel building is a UL Class A fire rated door. The door in the steel bulkhead between the tunnel and auxiliary building is a non-fire rated watertight door with a l fire-resistant coating applied to the tunnel side with the exception of hinges.

1-30-2 Rev. 1

t. l J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Pipe and Electrical Penetrations: All wall penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings. Bulkhead between cable tunnel and auxiliary building (area 1-030) is watertight and non-fire rated.

Ventilation: No normal ventilation is provided.

Floor Drains: The floor drainage has a capacity of 100 gal /m which discharges to yard dr,ains. A sump and sump pump are provided.

FIRE PROTECTION An automatic water suppression system are provided in this area.

JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION The watertight door and bulkhead between the cable tunnel (area 1-076) and the auxiliary building (area 1-030) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements. However a fire in area 1-076 propagating into area 1-030 will not have any additional impact on Unit-2 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both the areas. In addition, the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under a fire protection surveillance program.

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1 1-30-3 Rev. 1 l

3 J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-31 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-009 LOCATION: TRAIN-B INSIDE CABLE CHASES. AUXILIARY BUILDING EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire detection system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A. INSTRUMENT AIR FOR PRESSURIZER PORVs Fire area 1-009 contains control and power cables for the train-B electrical distribution system. An analysis of the potential ,

effects of fire induced failures of these cables demonstrates that the plant could experience a total loss of the electrical train-B distribution system. This could result in the following instrument air isolation valves becoming inoperable in the c'osed position. These valves isolate the primary air and backup air /N2 to the pressurizer PORVs.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room QlB13HV2228-B Backup Air /N2 Supply to Pressurizer PORVs Justification The pressurizer PORVs are required to be operable for RCS depressurization. RCS depressurization is a long term action required to initiate RHR. Adequate time is available to manually operate N1P19HV3885-B and restore air to the pressurizer PORVs.

Plant procedures will be written to incorporate this action for a fire in area 1-009.

B. AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES i Auxiliary feedwater isolation valves OlN23MOV3764B, OlN23MOV3764C, and Q1N23MOV3764E are redundant to one another from the point of view that they isolate flow in redundant

! auxiliary feedwater supply lines. Control cables for all three valves are routed through the fire area. The analysis of the potential effects of a fire on these control cables shows that spurious operation of the auxiliary feedwater isolation valves could occur, resulting in auxiliary feedwater flow isolation.

l 1-31-1 Rev. 1

. - - - - - . _ - ~ __. - . - . . . -- . - _ _

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Modification I The control cable associated with at least one of the auxiliary feedwater isolation valves has been protected by two 1-in. layers of Kaowool blanket with an overall layer of Zetex fabric. The subject valves and associated cables are as follows:

OlN23MOV3764B: lVBFV-MSC Q1N23MOV3764C: lVBFV-Y2C Q1N23MOV3764E: lVBFV-R2C C. SERVICE WATER DISCHARGE VALVE FOR CCW HX 1B Fire area 1-009 contains a control cable for the CCW heat exchanger 1B service water discharge valve (Q1P16SV3009-B). A fire induced failure resulting in a hot short from adjacent cables in the same raceway, could energize the solenoid and close 4

the valve. This condition can impact safe-shutdown only when CCW heat exchanger 1B is aligned and operating as the Train A heat exchanger.

Justification Plant procedures will be written to maintain valve QlP16SV3009-B in the open position by de-energizing the valve whenever CCW heat exchanger 1B is aligned and operating as the Train A heat exchanger.

D. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION Multiple cable failures can cause the redundant steam generator l IC main steam isolation valves (Q1N11SV3369BC-A and

. Q1N11SV3370BC-A) to become electrically inoperative in the open i

position.

Justification 2

In the event that the steam generator 1C main steam isolation valves fail to isolate due to fire induced failures, the main turbine stop valves would provide isolation.

j E. RCS BOUNDARY INTEGRITY A fire causing multiple hot shorts (shorts between control cables sharing the same raceway) could cause the train-B pressurizer PORV, (01B31PCV0444B-B) and/or the train-B reactor vessel head vent valves (Q1B13SV2213B-B and Q1813SV2214B-B) to open. The i pressurizer PORV blocking valve (QlB13MOV8000B-B) could become i electrically inoperative in the open position.

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1-31-2 Rev. 1

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J. M. PARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION )

l Justification In the unlikely event that the multiple hot shorts occur, the condition can be mitigated by removing 125 V-dc power from cables in the shared raceway. This can be accomplished by opening the breaker on 125 V-dc switchgear bus 1B (QlR42B001B-B) for 125 V-dc ,

distribution panels 1D. lE. and 1F. In the interim, alternate charging flow is available to keep up with the spurious letdown.

Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above actions for a fire in this area.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA: 1-009 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLE _S TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft2 1 SEVERITY 117 Cable B Cable insul. 4,489 lb 2,921,199 <9 h Chase 246 Cable B Cable insul. 2,135 lb 180,180 <2-1/2 h Chase DESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Doors: Airtight UL Class A doors are located between rooms 117 and 185 (area 1-6) and between rooms 117 and 335 (area 1-41); an airtight UL Class A door exists between rooms 246 and 343 (area 1-41).

Piping and Electrical Penetrations: All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Ventilation: There is no normal ventilation for this area.

Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Floor Drains: There are no floor drains.

l FIRE PROTECTION l

A smoke detection system and automatic water suppression system are provided throughout the chase. In addition, water hoses and portable extinguishers located in room 185 (area 1-6) and room 319 (area 1-42) are available for use in the area.

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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 4

10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 4

EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-11 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-012 LOCATION: UNIT 1 AUKILIARY BUILDING LOCAL HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL ROOM Fire area 1-012 consists of only room number 254 and is bounded

j. by 3-hour fire rated floor, ceiling, and walls, and UL Class A fire rated doors.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it

- requires one train of redundant safe. shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A. MAIN STEAM RELEASE FOR COOLDOWN Fire area 1-012 contains electrical train-A control cables j associated with the following main steam atmospheric relief j valves.

EOUIPMENT wrmcTION

Q1N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A) l Q1NilPV33718-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-18)

) 01N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1C)

The analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables shows that the main steam atmospheric relief valves could become .

inoperable in the closed position. l I Justification c

i One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown. The atmospheric relief valves are i provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

! The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate '

the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator. Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible

! despite a fire in area 1-012. The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was 1-32-1 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing. Consequently, a fire in area 1-012 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

B. HOT SHUTDOWN PANEL Firo area 1-012 contains hot shutdown panel control cables for the following safe shutdown equipment.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION OlB31PCV0445A-A Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve QlB13MOV8000A-A Pressurizer PORV Block Valve Q1B13SV2213A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve QlB13SV2214A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve In addition, control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via transfer relays are in this fire area. A fire induced failure causing multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV and reactor head vent paths.

Justification Fire induced failures (hot shorts) to the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 2-A could cause control for the pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves and the reactor head vent valves, to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel. Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) of the control cables for OlB31PCV0445A-A, pressurizer power operated relief valve, and OlB13SV2213A-A and QlB13SV2214A-A, reactor head vent valves, could result in the valves being energized to open. The power relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open i position. In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manual operation (handle) of the affected relays thereby shifting control to the main control board. To remove power from the transfer relay open breaker 17 on de distribution panel IB (QlR41LOOlB-A) in fire area 1-043 room 0343. Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-1 in fire area 1-035 room 0347 and manually shift transfer relays TR1 (OlB13SV2213A-A), TR2 (01B13SV2214A-A), TR3 (QlB31PCV0445A-A),

and TRS (QlB13MOV8000A-A) placing control back to main control board to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.

Plant procedures will be written to incorporate above actions for a fire in this area 1-012.

1-32-2 Rev. 1

1 g J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA: 1-012 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY 254 Hallway A,B Cable insul. 1.405 lb 63,382 <1 h and Local Panels 29 lb Hot Shutdown Panel Room DESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Doors: UL Class A rated doors are installed between rooms 254 and 2254 (area 2-012) and between rooms 254 and 211 (area-1-020).

Piping and Electrical Penetrations: All wall penetrations are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating.

Ventilation: No normal ventilation is provided. Fire and smoke removal capacity has not been provided.

Floor Drain: No floor drains are provided.

FIRE PROTECTION A smoke detection system is provided for the room. A CO2 hose reel located in room 210 (area 1-020) is available for use.

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f J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-33 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-031 LOCATION: UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING CABLE CHASE TRAIN A Fire area 1-031 consists of rooms 250 (el 121 ft -O in, and 139 ft -0 in.) and 251 (el 127 ft - O in.). All area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-hour fire rated except for a non-rated bulkhead between 'this fire area and the cable tunnel (area 1-075). A non-fire rated watertight door and bulkhead exist between room 251 and cable tunnel (area 1-075), and a UL Class A fire rated door exists between room 250 and 235 (arc 3 1-023). A fire resistant coating has been applied to the watertight door on fire area 1-075 side.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating.

CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTION A. TOTAL LOSS OF ELECTRICAL TRAIN A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM A fire in area 1-031 could potentially result in fire damage to the electrical circuitry of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 train-A diesel generators. This condition along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit I could result in total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system. This could result in the loss of RCS hot leg temperature indication and neutron flux monitoring instrumentation.

Justifications A.1 RCS Hot Leg Temperature Indication i

INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION i N1821TE413(LOOP-1) RCS Hot Leg Temperature. Indication

! N1B21TE423(LOOP-2) RCS Hot Leg Temperature. Indication N1B21TE433(LOOP-3) RCS Hot Leg Temperature. Indication l

Each RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loop is powered from channelized inverter-1A. Inverter-1A is powered from 1-33-1 Rev. 1 l

1 - _. - -_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .. . _ _ _

F* ,

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus lA. A fire in area 1-031 along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit 1 could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter lA, however, inverter lA will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus lA and will supply power to the instrument loops for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months ; If after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature indication is available from the core exit thermocouples. Core exit thermocouple temperature indication will not be effected by a fire in area 1-031. In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G. 1.97 will provide a redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N1B21TE413 N1B21TE423, and N1B21TE433. In order to implement this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification. Based upon the R.G.

1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is currently planned for the seventh refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986. After implementation of this modification, a fire in area 1-031 will not effect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS hot leg temperature.

A.2 Neutron Flux Monitor Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION QlC55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor Source range neutron flux monitors NIC55NE0031-P1 and NIC55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters lA and 18.

The post-accident neutron flux monitor OlC55NE0048A- A is powered from inverter-1F. Inverters lA, 1B, and 1F are all powered from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus-1A. Therefore, neutron flux monitoring following potential fire damage in area 1-031 and the resultant loss of 600 V-ac MCC 1A will be available for a minimum '

l of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RHR Hx No. 1 and No. 2 sample valves OlP15HV3105-B and 1 OlP15HV3106-B for determination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area 1-031.

B. MAIN STEAM RELEASE FOR COOLDOWN A total loss the electrical train A distribution system, as discussed under " Condition A", could render main steam atmospheric relief valves electrically inoperable in the closed position.

1-33-2 Rev. I

o .

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EOUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1NilPV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric selief Valve (S.G.-1A)

OlNilPV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1B)

OlN11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-lC)

Justification One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are. required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown. The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator. Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-031. The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing. Consequently, a fire in area 1-031 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

Plant procedures will be developed to include above actions for a fire in area 1-031.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA: 1-031 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 81 SEVERITY 250 and 251 A Cable insul. 12,303 lb 794,491 <9 h Cable Chase DESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floors, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Doors: Airtight UL Class A door exists between rooms 250 and 235 (area 1-023). A non-fire rated watertight door exists between room 251 and the cable tunnel (area 1-075). A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the tunnel side of the non-rated door with the exception of the hinges.

1-33-3 Rev. 1 l

7,

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Pipe and Electrical Penetrations: All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Bulkhead between this fire area and cable tunnel (area 1-075) is watertight and non-fire rated.

Ventilation: There is no normal ventilation for this area and fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Floor Drains: There are no. floor drains.

FIRE PROTECTION A smoke detection system and automatic sprinkler water suppression system are provided in this area. In addition, the water hose located in room 234 (area 1-020) is available for use as backup.

JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTON:

The watertight door and bulthead between auxiliary building (area 1-031) and cable tunnel (area 1-075) does not comply with 3-h fire-rated boundary requirements. However a fire in area 1-031 Propagating into area 1-075 will not have any addition impact on Unit-2 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both the areas. In addition, the fire-resistant coatings on the subject door will be placed under a fire protection surveillance program.

1 1-33-4 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT t 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-34 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-005 LOCATION: UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING. EL 100 FT - 0 IN. CHARGING PUMP ROOMS AND STORAGE AREAS Fire area 1-005 consists of the three charging pump rooms (173, 174, and 181), a hallway (172), a general storage area (171), and a contaminated storage area (182). The fire area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-hour fire rated except for the containment wall. The fire area boundary door is fire rated.

Self expanding cork is installed between the fire area boundary walls and the containment.

EXEMPTION An exemption to section III.G.2.a is requested to the extent that it requires a 3-hour fire barrier between redundant safe shutdown cabling and equipment (Condition A).

An exemption is also requested to section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cable to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and automatic fire suppression system (Conditions B and C).

CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTION A. PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF THE CHARGING PUMPS The fire area contains the three redundant charging pumps, related valves, and air handling units. Fire area 1-005 was subdivided into the four zones identified below to perform the fire hazards analysis.

Zone 1: Room 181 - Train-A Charging Pump Room Zone 2: Room 174 - Swing Charging Pump Room Zone 3: Room 173 - Train-B Charging Pump Room Zone 4: Rooms 171, 172, and 183 - Storage Rooms and Hallway The analysis is based on the premise that a fire would be contained in one of the four zones listed above.

I Justification The charging pump rooms (173, 174, and 181) are watertight with 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete walls. Penetrations in the pump room walls internal to fire area 1-005 are sealed to provide a watertight boundary. The seals utilized to provide the watertight boundary are of the type (foam, welded plate, or grout) to provide an adequate barrier to inhibit the spread of 1-34-1 Rev. 1

- . _ _ = - - - ,

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE IIAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION fire, smoke, or gas. The doors are watertight and are normally maintained closed. Lubricating oil and cable insulation are the only combustibles present in the pump rooms. Lubricating oil would be contained within the individual rooms or would drain into the sump servicing the room. In addition. there is a fixed suppression system installed in rooms 172 (hallway) and 171 which provide additional protection in the area of the pump room doors that communicate with this hallway. Room 171 is a designated combustible material storage area with 3-hour fire rated boundaries and door. Smoke detection systems are installed throughout the area including the three charging pump rooms. The maximum combustible in-citu loading in any room of this fire area is estimated to be less than 48.000 Btu /ft2 with a maximum fire severity of less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . Based upon the evaluation of the protection provided, a credible fire would be contained within the zone of its initiation. Credit has been taken for the

! separation afforded by the subject room boundaries. As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, to ensure that the as-built configuration is maintained, the sealed penetrations shall be placed in the surveillance program.

B. RWST ISOLATION VALVES Room 172 in fire area 1-005 contains the redundant RWST isolation valves (LCV115B and LCVll5D). CVCS makeup valves FCVil4A and FCV113B and control cables for CVCS makeup valves (FCVll3A-A and FCVil4B-A). The CVCS makeup valves control the flow of boric acid from the boric acid transfer pumps and control the flow of primary water from the primary water makeup pump. Fire barriers

~ are not provided for the valves or cables. The analysis of the effects of a fire in the area shows that the RWST isolation valves cculd become electrically inoperable in the closed position and makeup to either the VCT or charging pump suction header could be isolated.

Justification A fire barrier will be provided for the portions of raceway sections AHFA15. AHF031 AHDB12. AFD-30 AEF028 that carry cables for RWST isolation valve LCVil5B-A in Room 172. Given a fire in Room 172 this modification will ensure that all cables required for the operation of the redundant RWST isolation valves (LCV115B l and LCV115D) are protected by a fire barrier.

Although the redundant RWST isolation valve operators are in Room 172 they are separated by a distance of 18 feet. The duration and severity of a fire in room 172 would be limited due to low quantities of combustibles and partial automatic fire suppression system coverage. The combustible loading in room 172 consists of cable insulation and is of such quantity that the maximum l expected fire severity is less than 30 minutes.

I l-34-2 Rev. 1 ,

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. _ _ _ _ y . - - ,.m._ - . _ . _ -- . . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ - _ _ _

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION i

In the event the redundant RWST isolation valve motor operators are damaged by a fire and can not be electrically operated, the additional fire barriers proposed under Reactor Coolant Boundary Integrity will ensure that RCS letdown can be isolated thus increasing the time margin avaiable to establish makeup.

C. REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY INTEGRITY Control cables of the train-A pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves QlB31PCV0445A-A and Q1B13MOV8000A-A and the reactor head vent valves Q1B13SV2213A-A and OlB13SV2214A-A are j located in fire area 1-005. The subject cables are associated i with the control function from the hot shutdown panel Q1H21NBAFP2605G-A. In addition, control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 2-A are in this area. A fire induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV and reactor head vent paths.

, JUSTIFICATION I A fire barrier will be provided for raceway section AHDB12 over

{ its entire route within Fire Area 1-005. This modification will l protect cables for the subject reactor coolant boundary integrity l valves in all portions of Fire Area 1-005 with the exception of Room 181. The modification will ensure that a single fire can not impact the RWST isolation valve operators and cause spurious l letdewn.

Based on the modification proposed above the following scenario

> applies to a fire in Room 181 only. A fire in Room 181 will not j impact the operation of Train B RWST isoation valve (LCVil5B-A). i Fire induced failures (hot shorts) within the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 2-A resulting from a fire in Room 181 could cause control for the pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves and the reactor head vent valves to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel. Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) of the i control cables for OlB31PCV0445A-A, pressurizer power operated

, relief valve, and OlB13SV2213A-A and OlB13SV2214A-A, reactor head l Vent valves, could result in the valves being energized to open.

l The power relief blocking valves (MOV) could become electrically

! inoperative in the open position. In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manually aligning the affected relay (handle is provided), thereby shifting control to i the main control board. To remove power from the transfer relay

! open breaker 17 on dc distribution panel IB (QlR41LOOlB-A) in i

i 1-34-3 Rev. 1

r J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REF. VALUATION fire area 1-043 Room 0343. Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-1 in fire area 1-035 room 347 and manually shift transfer relays TR1 (01B13SV2213A-A). TR2 (01B13SV2214A-A), TR3 (QlB13PCV0445A-A), and TRS (01B13MOV8000A-A) restoring control to the main control board to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA: 1-005 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 2 SEVERITY TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 173 B Cable insul. 148 lb 27,563 <30 min Charging / Lube oil 35 gal Safety Injection Pump Room 174 A, B, C Cable insul. 103 lb 28,508 <30 min Charging / Lube oil 35 gal Safety Injection Pump Room 181 A Cable insul. 625 lb 47,414 <1 h Charging / Lube oil 35 gal Safety Injection Pump Room 171 Cable insul.

Combustible Storage Area (a) 172 A. C Cable insul. 2,393 lb(D) 31,820(b) <30 min (b)

Hallway -

182 A Cable insul.

Contaminated Storage Area

a. Room 171 is occasionally utilized to store combustible material, usually in the form of contaminated clothing, cables, and tools in drums.

b. Applies to rooms 171, 172, and 182 collectively.

1-34-4 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFRSO APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION DESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete. Self-expanding cork is installed between the fire area boundary walls and the containment. Room 171 is bounded by 3-hour fire rated walls.

Doors: A fire-rated airtight door is installed between rooms 172 and 161 (area 1-4) and between rooms 171 and 172.

Pipe and Electrical Penetrations: All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

I Ventilation: There is no normal ventilation for the area. There is a Class A fire damper door installed in each of the four ventilation openings through the area ceiling into room 223 (area 1-1). Fixed smoke removal capability is not provided.

Floor Drains: A 4-in. diameter floor drain having a 100-gal /m capacity is installed in each of rooms 173, 174, and 191 and drains to a separate sump for each room. The sumps for rooms 173 and 181 are located inside the rooms, while the sump for room 174 is located immediately outside in room 172. The sumps each have two 100-gal /m pumps that discharge to the waste holdup tank or the floor drain tank. Four 4-in diameter floor drains each having a 100-gal /m capacity are located throughout the remainder of the area and drain into the floor drain tank.

FIRE PROTECTION i

Smoke detection systems are installed throughout this area. A manual hose station, CO2 hose reel, portable extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment located in the corridor just outside the area are available for use in the area. An automatic sprinkler system is installed in rooms 171 and 172.

i i

j 1-34-5 Rev. 1

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t, J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-35 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-034 LOCATION: UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING. ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS ROOM TRAIN B AND PENETRATION ROOM FILTERATION SYSTEM EQUIPMENT ROOM Fire area 1-034 consists of rooms 334 and 317 at el 139 ft -0 in. The walls, ceilings, and floors forming the area boundary are 3-hour fire rated.

These rooms communicate via two stainless steel pipes used in the penetration room filteration system. The stainless steel pipes are encased in concrete and contain no combustibles. A self expanding cork is installed for the portions of the area boundary along the containment wall.

UL Class A fire rated doors exist between rooms 334 and 333 (area 1-035), 334 and stairwell no. 2, and 317 and 322 (area 1-004).

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a 1-hour rated fire barrier and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.

CONDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTION A. SERVICE WATER TO CCW HEAT EXCHANGER Fire area 1-034 contains power and control cables and equipment (MCC-lV) associated with the following valve.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION QlP16MOV3130B-B Service Water Inlet to CCW HX-1B The effects of a fire in area 1-034 upon the control cables of valve QlP16MOV3130B-B could fail the valve in the closed position causing a loss of service water to CCW heat exchanger IB. This condition can impact safe-shutdown only when CCW heat exchanger 1B is aligned and operating as the Train A heat exchanger.

Justification Plant procedures will be written to maintain valve QlP16MOV3130B-B in the open position by racking out the MCC breaker whenever CCW heat exchanger 1B is aligned and operating as the Train A heat exchanger.

1-35-1 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION ,

B. MAINTAIN SEAL-INJECTION FLOW B.1 Charging Pump Isolation Valves Fire area 1-034 contains power and control cables and equipment (MCC-IV) associated with the following valves.

EOUIPMENT FUNCTION QlE21MOV8130B-B Charging Pump Suction Header Isolation Valve Q1E21MOV8133B-B Charging Pump Discharge Header Isolation Valve For a fire in this area, seal injection flow will be established using either charging pump 1A or charging pump 1B aligned to electrical train-A power. Valves Q1E21MOV8130B-B (suction header) and Q1E21MOV8133B-B (discharge header) are required to be maintained in the open position to supply seal injection water from the RWST through charging pump 1A or 1B. Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the control cables for the subject valves, the valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperative. This will cause the plant to lose seal injection water and seal integrity. These valves cannot be locked in the open position because they are needed for train separation during a LOCA event.

Justification A design modification is proposed to install disconnect breakers in the power supply circuits of these valves outside the electrical penetration room during the next outage of sufficient duration subsequent to design and procurement completion. The next outage is currently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986. In the interim, the operators will be instructed of the potential inadvertent closure of the charging pump suction and discharge valves in the event of a fire in this area.

B.2 Charging Pump Miniflow Valves Fire area 1-034 contains power and control cables and equipment (MCC-IV) associated with the following valves:

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION QlE21MOV8109A-B Charging Pump 1A Miniflow Valve Q1E21MOV8109B-B Charging Pump 1B Miniflow Valve 1-35-2 Rev. 1

J. M. PARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Valve QlE21MOV8109A-B or QlE21MOV8109B-B is required to be maintained in the open position to establish miniflow for i charging pump 1A or 1B respectively. Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the control cables for the subject valves.

the valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperative, thereby isolating charging pump miniflow.

Justification The charging pump can be run safely with miniflow isolated and with a minimum of 24 gal /m of seal injection flow for a period of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . This will allow the operator time to deenergize MCC-lV and take manual action to open the valve and reestablish the miniflow. In addition, the operating charging pump flow can be l increased by opening the following valves from the main control I room.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION ole 21MOV8801A-A Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isol. Valve 3 QlE21MOV8803A-A Boron Injection Tank Inlet Isol. Valve l

The increased flow on charging pump will reduce heating of the 4

pump due to miniflow isolation and allow additional time for a

! manual action to open the miniflow valves. Letdown path is available through head vent valves OlB13SV2213A-A and

, Q1B13SV2214A-A.

C. RCS AND PRESSURIZER SAMPLE VALVES Fire area 1-034 contains control cables associated with the following valves:

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION OlP15HV3332-B Pressurizer Liquid Sample CTMT Isolation-Valve QlP15HV3103-A Pressurizer Liquid Sample CTMT

Isolation-Valve QlP15HV3765-A RCS Hot Leg Sample Line CTMT Isolation-Valve I RCS Hot Leg Sample Line CTMT Q1P15HV3333-B l Isolation-Valve RCS and pressurizer sample line valves QlP151fV3333-B, QlP15HV3765-A, Q1P15HV3332-B, and QlP15HV3103-A are required to j 4

be maintained in the closed position to maintain RCS boundary integrity. Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the control cables of the subject valves, the valves could fail in the open position and become inoperative.

l l-35-3 Rev. 1 i

, . - , , . - - -, _------,--,---e,-n-- - , - .

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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Justification 1

l The open position of the subject valves will allow an RCS sample to flow to the VCT, through the sample cooler. This flow is of e no immediate significance for safe shutdown. An operator action will be performed to close the manual valves QlP15V051A and QlP15V051B to stop the flow of RCS and pressurizer liquid. The valves QlP15V051A and QlP15V051B are located in the sample roon j 323 outside of fire area 1-034.

! D. RCS BOUNDARY INTEGRITY

! t

! Fire area 1-034 contains control cables associated with the

following safe shutdown equipment. .

1 EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1B31PCV0444B-B Pressurizer PORV ,

j OlB13MOV8000B-B Pressurizer PORV Block Valve

Q1B13SV2213B-B Reactor Head Vent Valve QlB13SV2214B-B Reactor Head Vent Valve i

, The subject cables are associated with control from both hot 4 shutdown panel and main control board. Fire induced failures having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV and reactor head vent paths.

i Justification Fire induced failure (hot short) of the individual control cables for Q1831PCV0444B-B (power operated relief valve) Q1B13SV2213B-B

and QlB13SV22148-B (reactor head vent valves), could result in the valves being energized to open. The power operated relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position. In the unlikely event of the multiple fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) occurring, this condition can be mitigated by i removing 125 V-dc power from cables in the shared raceway. This can be accomplished by opening breakers on the 125 V-dc switchgear bus 1B (QlR42B001B-B) for 125 V-dc distribution panels i 1D, 1E, and 1F, feeder breaker 12 on 125 V-dc distribution panel

N1R41LOOlG-N, and breaker 15 on 125 V-dc distribution panel

! N1R41LOOlH-N.

j i

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l l l-35-4 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" PIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION E. NORMAL CHARGING Fire area 1-034 contains control cables associated with the following safe shutdown equipment.

EOUIPMENT FUNCTION ole 21HV8146-N Regen. HX Disch Valve for Normal RCS Charging ole 21MOV8108-B Normal Charging Pump Isol Valve An analysis of the effects of a fire upon these cables shows that these valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperable.

Justification Failure of the subject valves in the closed position will cause loss of normal RCS charging path. Charging pump flow is available for seal injection system. In case of uncontrolled letdown via head vents or PORV's due to a fire in this area, a !

j control room action can be initiated to open the valves i Q1E21MOV8801A-A and QlE21MOV8803A-A for charging through boron injection tank.

l F. FALSE SI, CVI, AND CI SAFETY SIGNAL INITIATION '

Fire area 1-034 contains instrumentation cables which are not required for post-fire safe shutdown, but due to fire induced failures, could cause initiation of SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system.

Justification Plant procedures exist or will be developed for resetting l spurious SI, CVI, and CI signals from the main control room and can be used if required for a fire in this area.

l J

Plant procedures will be developed to include above actions for a t fire in this area. >

G. PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SIGNAL l L

i Fire area 1-034 contains instrumentation cable for the following safe shutdown instrumentation:

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION QlB31PT0455-P1 Presaurizer Pressure Transmitter .

N1B31PT0444-4 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter

Q1B31PT04442-4 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter i 1-35-5 Rev. 1

e J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION QlB31PT0456-P2 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter QlB31PT0457-P3 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter N1B31PT0445-3 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter At least one of the above pressure transmitter signals is required for safe shutdown. Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the instrumentation cables of the pressurizer pressure transmitters, all the pressure transmitter signals will be lost.

Justification Instrumentation cable for QlB31PT0455-P1 has been rerouted out of fire area 1-034 so that pressurizer pressure signal from at least one pressure transmitter, Q1B31PT0455-P1 is available.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA: 1-034 MAXIMUM t

ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 2

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY I

334 A, B Cable insul. 16,409 lbs 90,955 <l-1/2 h Electrical Panels

, Penetration Room Train B 317 A, B Cable insul. 613 lbs 24,606 <30 min Penetration Charcoal 1,548 lbs Filteration filter i

Equipment Pipe insul. 7 lbs Room DESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floors, ceilings, and walls forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete. A self expanding cork is installed for the portions of the area boundary along the containment wall.

Doors: Fire rated UL Class A doors are installed between rooms 334 and 333 (area 1-035), 334 and stairwell no. 2, and 317 and 322 (area 1-004). The tendon access openings in the el 139 ft -

0 in and 155 ft - 0 in slabs are covered by a steel plate and a concrete slab and have a 3-hour fire rating.

The two rooms of the fire area communicate via two stainless steel pipes used in the penetration room filtration system.

These pipes are encased in concrete and contain no combustibles.

! l-35-6 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Pipe and Electrical Penetration: All penetrations through the area boundary in room 334 are sealed with silicone foam except those through the containment wall that are watertight. All penetrations through the area boundary in room 317 are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating.

Ventilation: No normal ventilation is provided. Fixed smoke removal capability is not provided.

4 Floor Drains: Three 4-in. diameter floor drains, each having 100 gal /m capacity and drain to floor drain tank, are provided.

FIRE PROTECTION Smoke detectors are provided in rooms 317 and 334. A manual hose station located in rooms 316 (area 1-004) is available for use in this area.

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1-35-7 Rev. 1

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r J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-36 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-001 LOCATION: UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING. EL 83 FT - 0 IN.. 100 FT -

0 IN., AND 121 FT - 0 IN.

Fire area 1-001 consists of the following rooms:

El 83 Ft -0 In.

Room 101 Waste Decay Tank Room Room 102 Valve Compartment Room Room 103 Corridor Room 104 Passageway to Unit 2 Room 105 Catalytic H2 Recombiner A Room Room 106 Catalytic H2 Recombiner B Room Room 107 Storage Room Room 108 Waste Monitor Tank Room Room 109 Waste Monitor Tank Pump Room Room 110 Monitor Control Panel Room Room 111 Containment Spray Pump Room A Room 112 Access to Tendon Access Gallery Room 113 Valve Encapsulation Room 114 Pipe Chase Room 115 Hallway Room 118 Floor Drain Tank Room Room 119 Waste Holdup Tank Room Room 120 Corridor Room 121 Floor Drain Tank Pump Room Room 122 Waste Evaporator Feed Pump Room Room 123 Pipe Chase Room 124 Valve Encapsulation Room 125 Containment Spray Pump Room B Room 126 Pipe Chase Room 127 Pipe Chase Room 128 RHR Heat Exchanger Room Room 129 RHR Low Head Pump Room B Room 130 Pipe Chase Room 131 RHR Low Head Pump Room A El 100 Ft -0 In.

Room 183 Tendon Access Gallery Entrance Room 184 Piping Penetration Room Room 169 Pipe and Duct Chase Room 196 Tendon Access Gallery El 121 Ft - 0 In.

Room 223 Piping Penetration Room 1-36-1 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPEND'X "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION An exemption is requested from section III.G.2.c to the extent it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cable to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and automatic fire suppression.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A. NON-RATED STEEL HATCH COVER !

A hatchway in the ceiling of room 103 communicates with room 163 (area 1-004). A non-rated steel plate covers the hatchway.

l Justification The sprinkler system installed in the hatchway. area of room 163 will serve the purpose of a water curtain to prevent the spread of fire via the hatchway. As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, a sprinkler head in this system will be relocated to improve water distribution in the hatchway area.

B. INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION Control cables for instrument air isolation valves OlP19KV3611 and Q1P19HV3825 are routed through area 1-001. A fire induced failure in the control cable for either valve could cause the valve to fail closed. The subsequent loss of instrument air would cause the normal charging line isolation valve ole 21RV8146 and the alternate charging line isolation valve ole 21HV8147 to ;

fail open. It may be necessary to close these valves during the !

course of shutdown to isolate charging flow.

The control cable for the pressurizer PORV backup air /N2 supply l valve QlB13HV2228-B is also routed through area 1-001. A fire induced failure in the control cable could cause the valve to fail closed. If the pressurizer PORV backup air /N2 supply valve (QlB13HV2228-B) and either instrument air isolation valve (QlP19HV3611 or QlP19KV3825) fail closed, the pressurizer PORVs will be inoperable in the closed position. Operation of the pressurizer PORVs may be required to achieve depressurization of the RCS.

Justification Instrument air isolation valves Q1P19KV3611 and Q1P19HV3825 are equipped with a handwheel to facilitate manual operation. In the event that one or both valves fail closed, an operator can manually open them. This action will restore instrument air to the charging line isolation valves and pressurizer PORVs.

Consequently, action would not have to be taken on the pressurizer PORV backup air /N2 supply valve OlB13HV2228-B.

l-36-2 Rev. 1 l

L I ,. _- - .u . x

. . _ _ . - . - - - - - - ~_ -

l J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION i

C. REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY INTEGRITY '

Fire induced failures (hot shorts) within the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet OlH22 LOO 2-A could cause control for r the power operated relief and blocking valves and the reactor head vent valves to shift from their normal main control board

] alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel.

Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent i control cables in the shared raceway) of the control cables for

! OlB31PCV0445A-A, power operated relief valve, and Q1B13SV2213A-A '

and QlB13SV2214A-A, reactor head vent valves, could result in the valves being energized to open. The power relief blocking valve j (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position.

Justification In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer .

relays and manually aligning the affected relay (handle is I provided), thereby shifting control to the main control board.

To remove power from the transfer relay open breaker 17 on de i distribution panel IB (OlR41 LOO 1B-A) in fire area 1-043 Room 0343. Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-1 in fire area 1-035 room 347 and manually shift transfer relays TR1 (01B13SV2213A-A),

TR2 (QlB13SV2214A-A), TR3 (OlB13PCV0445A-A), and TR5 4

(QlB13MOV8000A-A) restoring control to the main con.rol board to ,

4 allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.

i' D. MAIN STEAM ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF

Control cables associated with the three redundant atmospheric f relief valves are routed through fire area 1-001. An analysis of p potential effects of a fire upon these cables has shown that the t subject valves cculd become inoperable in the closed position. :

Justification One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its ,

related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve j steam release for cooldown. The atmospheric relief valves are i provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually i opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies. j The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to icolate !

the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed ;

off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator. Both the air j i control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their :

associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible l despite a fire in area 1-001. The capability to control steam !

generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with i the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was l-36-3 Rev. 1 i

r J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing. Consequently, a fire in area 1-001 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

E. INITIATION OF SAFETY SIGNALS ,

Fire area 1-001 contains instrumentation cables associated with the following redundant containment pressure instrument channels.

PT950-P1 CTMT Pressure Channel 1 PT951-P2 CTMT Pressure Channel 2 PT952-P3 CTMT Pressure Channel 3 PT953-P4 CTMT Pressure Channel 4 These instrument loops are not required for post-fire safe shutdown, but due to fire induced failures, the circuitry could cause initiation of safety signals (SI, CI, and CVI).

Justification Plant procedures exist, or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI and CI safety signals from the main control room.

F. CHARGING PUMP OPERATION Train-A cables for the following equipment are routed through room 183 in area 1-001.

Train-A Charging Pump Room Cooler - ole 16M001A-A Swing Charging Pump - ole 21M001B-AB Swing Charging Pump Room Cooler - ole 16M001B-AB

. Train-A RWST Isolation Valve - ole 21LCV0115B-A Train-B cables for the following equipment are routed through room 223 in area 1-001.

Train-B Charging Pump Room Cooler - Q1E16M001C-B Swing Charging Pump Room Cooler - Q1E16M001B-AB (power cable to MCC)

The cables associated with these two groups of equipment are redundant to one another.

Justification Although both rooms 183 and 223 are in area 1-001, there is a high degree of separation between them. Room 183 is located on el 100 ft - 0 in, and room 223 is located on el 121 ft - O in.

! The routing of the cables is such that the redundant groups are separated by 10 ft horizontally in addition to the vertical 1-36-4 ,

Rev. 1

+

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION separation between elevations. The slab between rooms 183 and 223 is 2 ft thick and penetrated by only two 8 in, and one 12 in. mechanical penetrations. The part of room 223 through which the subject cables are routed is covered by an automatic suppression system and both rooms are covered by detection systems.

In conclusion, the degree of separation between rooms 183 and 223 would prevent a single credible fire from spreading from one room to the other and adversely affecting cables for redundant equipment.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA: 1-001 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIHE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft2 1 SEVERITY 101 - Cable 29 lb(a) 1,251(a) <30 min (a)

Waste Gas insul.(a)

Decay Tank Room 102 - Cable insul.

Valve Compartment Room 103 B Cable insul.

Corridor 105 B Cable insul. 490 lb 7.634(b) <30 min (b)

Catalytic H2 Panels ins.(b)

Recombiner A 28 lb Room panels 106 -

Cable insul.

Catalytic H2 Panels Recombiner B Room 107 - Cable insul. 85 lb 22.561 <30 min Storage Room Charcoal 310 lb filter 104 B Cable insul.

Passageway to Unit-2 l

1-36-5 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 2

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY IBtu/ft 1 SEVERITY 109 B Cable insul. 417 lb 5.742(c) <30 min (c)

Waste M5nitor Lube oil ins (c)

Tank Pump Room 0.25 gal oil 14 lb panel 110 - Cable insul.

Monitor Control Panels Panel Room 108 - Cable insul. 75 lb 19,457 <30 min Waste Monitor Charcoal 375 lb Tank Room filter 169 - None - 0 0 Duct and Pipe Chase 118 - Cable insul. 22 lb 831 <30 min Floor Drain Tank Room 119 -

Cable insul. 60 lb 2,711 <30 min Waste Holdup Tank Room 120 B, C Cable ~insul. 42 lb 5,540 <30 min Corridor 121 B. C Cable insul. 287 lb 21,402 <30 min Ploor Drain Lube oil 0.25 gal Tank Pump Room 122 B, C Cable insul. 287 lb 21,402 <30 min Waste Evaporator Lube oil 0.25 gal Feed Pump Room 127 B, C None 0 0 0 Pipe Chase 128 A. C Cable insul. 454 lb 2,607 <30 min RHR Heat Exchanger Room 129 B, C Cable insul, 217 lb 3,837 <30 min RHR Low Head Pump Room B 1-36 Rev. 1

r-J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 2

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY 130 - None 0 0 0 Pipe Chase 131 - Cable insul. 222 lb 6.332 <30 min RHR Low Head ~

Room A 126 - None 0 0 0 Pipe Chase 124 -

Cable insul. 7 lb 6,329 <30 min Valve Encapsulation 125 - Cable insul. 261 lb 3.569 <30 min Containment Lube oil 0.25 gal Spray Pump Room B 114 -

Cable insul. 7 lb 3,885 <30 min Pipe Chase 111 - Cable insul. 101 lb 3,469 <30 min Containment Lube oil 0.25 gal Spray Pump Room A 113 -

Cable insul. 6 lb 3,333 <30 min Valve Encapsulation 115 -

Cable insul. 4 lb 1.655 <30 min Hallway 112 -

Cable insul. 4 lb 175 <30 min i Access to Tendon Access Gallery 196 -

Cable insul. 4 lb 175 <30 min Access to Tendon Access Gallery 123 - None 0 0 0 Pipe Chase 183 A Cable 1,050 lb(d) 6.405(d) <30 min (d)

Tendon Access insul.(d)

Gallery Entrance 1-36-7 Rev. 1

b J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft2 1 SEVERITY 184 -

Piping Penetration Room, el 100 ft - 0 in.

223 A, B Cable insul. 16,663 lb 40,625 <1 h Piping Charcoal 400 lb Penetration Room, e1

! 121 ft - 0 in.

(a) Applies to rooms 101 and 102 collectively (b) Applies to rooms 103, 105, 106 collectively (c) Applies to rooms 104, 109, 110 collectively (d) Applies to rooms 183 and 184 collectively DESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete. The ceiling of room 223 has tendon access openings to room 334 (area 1-34). Steel plates with 3-hour rated coatings and which are topped by removable concrete slabs have

been installed over the tendon access openings.

There is a non-rated steel hatch cover over the hatchway between 1

rooms 103 and 163 (area 1-004).

Doors: An airtight. UL Class B door is installed between room 223 and stairway No. 2. The door between rooms 184 and 162 (area 1-4) is an airtight UL Class A door. Non-airtight Class B doors are installed between rooms 110 and 115 and stairway No. 2.

Piping and Electrical Penetrations: Penetrations through the I area boundary are sealed with silicone foam. Three-hour rated fire dampers are installed between rooms 169 and 163 (area 1-4).

Ventilation: No normal ventilation exists. Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

I Floor Drains: Twenty-one 4-in. diameter floor drains with a 100-gal /m capacity each are located throughout the area. Sumps are provided in rooms 103, 111, 125, 128, 129, and 131. The sumps contain two 100-gal /m pumps each. The sump pumps discharge to the waste holdup tank or the floor drain tank. The floor drains above el 77 ft to 83 ft drain to the floor drain tank.

! The other floor drains drain to the sumps.

1-36-8 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION FIRE PROTECTION A detection system covers the majority of the area. Exceptions to this coverage are rooms 112, 114, 115, 123, 126, 127, 130, 169, and 196. The western half of the piping penetration room on el 121 ft - 0 in, and the floor area of room 184 beneath the covered tendon hatchway into room 223 above are the only parts of fire area 1-001 covered by automatic suppression.

Portable extinguishers, smok'e removal equipment, and water hose cabinets are located throughout the fire area for use by the fire brigade.

1-36-9 Rev. 1

r J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-37 Rev. 1 FIRE AREA: 1-035 LOCATION: UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING. ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS ROOM TRAIN A Fire area 1-035 consists of rooms 333 and 347 at el 139 ft -0 in. All fire area boundary, walls, ceilings, and floors are 3-hour fire rated and area boundary doors are UL Class A fire rated. Self-expanding cork is installed for the portions of the area boundary along the containment wall.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a 1-hour rated fire barrier and installation of automatic fire suppression system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A. RCS HOT LEG TEMPERATURE INDICATION Fire area 1-035 contains instrumentation cables associated with the following RCS hot leg temperature indication.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1B21TE413-P1 RCS Loop-l Hot Leg Temperature Indication N1B21TE423-P1 RCS Loop-2 Hot Leg Temperature Indication N1B21TE433-P1 RCS Loop-3 Hot Leg Temperature Indication The analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables shows that the plant could lose hot leg temperature indication for all three RCS loops.

Justification Each RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loop is powered from channelized inverter-1A. Inverter-1A is powered from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus lA. A fire in area 1-035 along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit I could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 1A:

however, inverter 1A will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus lA and will supply power to the instrument loops for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . If after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months power is lost. RCS hot leg temperature indication is available from the core exit thermocouples. Core exit thermocouple temperature indication will not be affected by 1-37-1 Rev. 1

v J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION a fire in area 1-035. In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months and core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G. 1.97 will provide a redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N1B21TE413 N1B21TE423, and N1B21TE433. In order in implement this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite Based upon the R.G.

Prior to initiationschedule, 1.97 commitment of the modification.

implementation of the modification is currently planned for the seventh refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986. After implementation of this modification, a fire in area 1-035 will not affect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS hot leg temperature.

B. MAINTAIN SEAL-INJECTION FLOW B.1 Fire area 1-035 contains power and control cables and equipment (MCC-10) associated with the following valve.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION QlE21MOV8106-A Charging Pump Miniflow Isolation Valve The analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon the equipment and these cables shows that the subject valve could become inoperable in the closed position, isolating charging pump miniflow.

Justification The charging pump can be run safely with miniflow isolated and with a minimum of 24 gpm seal injection flow for a period up to I hour. This will allow the operator time to deenergize MCC-10 and take manual action to open the valve and reestablish the miniflow. In addition, the operating charging pump flow can be increased by opening the following valves from the main control room.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1E21MOV8801B-B Boron Injection Tank Outlet Isol. Valve Q1E21MOV8803B-B Boron Injection Inlet Isol. Valve The increased flow on charging pump will reduce heating of th'e pump due to miniflow isolation and allow additional time for a manual action to open the miniflow valve. Letdown path is available through head vent valves Q1B13SV2213B-B and Q1B13SV2214B-B.

1-37-2 Rev. 1

T J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION B.2 Fire area 1-035 contains power and control cables and equipment (MCC-lU) associated with the following valves.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1E21MOV8131A-A Charging Pump Suction Header Isolation Valve Q1E21MOV8133A-A Charging Pump Discharge Header Isolation Valve The analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon the equipment and these cables shows that the subject valves could become inoperable in the closed position. This condition will result in loss of seal injection water flow when the swing charging pump 1B is operational. These valves cannot be locked open because they are needed for train separation during a LOCA event.

Justification A design modification is proposed to install disconnect breakers in t?.e power supply circuits of these valves outside the electrical penetration room during the next outage of sufficient duration subsequent to design and procurement completion. The next outage is currently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986. In the interim, the operators will be instructed of the potential inadvertent closure of the charging pump suction and discharge valves in the event of a fire in this area.

C. RCS BOUNDARY INTEGRITY Fire area 1-035 contains control cables associated with the following safe shutdown equipment.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION j OlB31PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PORV

QlB13MOV8000A-A Pressurizer PORV Block Valve

OlB13SV2213A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve 01B13SV2214A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve l The subject cables are associated with control from both the hot i

shutdown panel and the main control board. Fire induced failures having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown the PORV and reactor head vent paths.

l Justification l

l Fire induced failure (hot short) of the individual control cables I for OlB31PCV0445A-A. power operated relief valve, and Q1B13SV2213A-A and OlB13SV2214A-A, reactor head vent valvec, 1-37-3 Rev. 1

c J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION could result in the valves to be energized to open. The power operated relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position. In the unlikely event of the multiple fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing 125 V-dc power from cables in the shared raceway. This can be accomplished by opening the breakers on the 125 V-dc switchgear bus lA (01R42B001A-A) for 125 V-dc distribution panels lA, 1B, and 1C and by opening feeder breaker numbers 4 and 16 on 125 V-de distribution panel 1G N1R41 LOO 1G-N.

D. NORMAL CHARGING Fire area 1-035 contains control cables associated with normal charging pump isol valve 01E21MOV8107-A.

An analysis of the effects of a fire upon these cables shows that the subject valve could fail in the closed position and become inoperable.

Justification:

Failure of the valve Q1E21MOV8107-A in the closed position will cause loss of normal RCS charging. Charging pump flow to seal injection is available. In case of uncontrolled letdown via head vents or PORV's, a manual action to open the valve 01E21MOV8107-A will be initiated. In addition, control room action can be initiated to open the valves Q1E21MOV0801B-B and Q1E21MOV8803D-B for charging through Boron Injection Tank.

E. FALSE SI, CVI. AND CI SAFETY SIGNAL INITIATION Fire area 1-035 contains instrumentation cables which are not required for post-fire safe shutdown, but due to fire induced failures, could cause initiation of SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system.

Justification Plant procedurer exist or will be developed for resetting spurious SI, CVI, and CI signals from the main control room and can be used, if required for a fire in this area.

Plant procedures will be developed to include the above actions for a fire in this area.

1-37-4 Rev. 1

e

- J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA: 1-035 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 8

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY 1 Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY 333 and 347 A Cable insul. 8549 lbs 83,542 <1-1/2 h Electrical Panels Penetration Room DESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete. Self expanding cork is installed for the portions of the area boundary along the containment wall.

Door: A UL Class A door is located between rooms 333 and 334 and a UL Class A door exists between rooms 333 and 347.

Piping and Electrical Penetrations: All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam.

Ventilation: No normal ventilation is provided. Fixed smoke removal capability is not provided.

Floor Drains: Two 4-in. diameter drains each having capacity of 100 gal /m and draining to floor drain tank are provided, i

FIRE PROTECTION Ionization smoke detectors are provided to alarm at the main control room. The water hose station located in room 334 (atea i 1-004) is available for use in this area.

l 1-37-5 Rev. 1

- -- _ - - _ . - ~. ~ - -. . - - - -- . - - - - . .

i

! J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION i

l EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1-38 Rev. 1 I FIRE AREA: 1-006 4

LOCATION: UNIT 1 AUKILIARY BUILDING. EL 100 FT - 0 IN.,

I 121 FT - 0 IN., 127 FT - 0 IN., 139 FT - 0 IN..

155 FT - 0 IN., AND 175 FT - 0 IN.

Fire area 1-006 consists of the following rooms:

l El 100 Ft - 0 In, Room 167 Combustible Storage Roon

. Room 185 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Room Room 189 Plant Heating Equipment Room l

Room 190 Motor Control Center lE Room Room 191 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (Train A)

Room 192 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (Train B)

Room 193 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (Turbine Driven) ,

Room 194 Lower Equipment Roon j Room 195 Access Hatch Area El 127 Ft - 0 In.

Room 241 Main Steam and Feedwater Valve Roon

Room 242 Pipe Chase i Room 243 Pipe Chase L

The floors, walls, and ceilings of fire area 1-006 that form the boundary between area 1-006 and adjacent fire areas are of reinforced concrete and rated for 3-hours with the exception of a hatchway with a steel plate cover between rooms 185 (area 1-006)

{ and 234 (area 1-020). All electrical and piping penetrations

between adjacent fire areas are sealed for a 3-hour rating. All

doors between adjacent fire areas are UL Class A or Class B rated with two exceptions. There are non-rated doors between stairway No.1 and room 190 and between stairway No. 1 and room 241. These doors are watertight and pressuretight respectively.

Fire area 1-006 has several openings to the outside. Most notably, a checkered steel plate at el 155 ft - 0 in, which is the outside entrance to the access hatch area (room 195) and portions of the walls of rooms 241, 242, and 243 that are ,

constructed of steel grating. l l EKEMPTION Anexenfresonetrainofredundantsafeshutdowncableandtion it requ to section III.G.2.c is requested to the equipment to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of automatic fire suppression systems.

l 1-38-1 Rev. 1

a J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION I

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION

, A. AUKILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM The two redundant motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump are located within

- area 1-006. Cables for all three pumps are routed through the

< area, unprotected by fire barriers.

Justification and Modification A fire barrier has been provided over the raceways carrying cables for the train-B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump throughout area 1-006 with the exception of the train-B pump room t (192). The barrier consists of two 1-in. layers of Kaowool blanket wraps with one overall layer of Zetex woven fabric. The subject raceways are BDDA09. BDDA06, BDDA03, BDDA0A, BEE 016, and BFDDOM.

l An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire limited to i one of the AFW pump rooms would not defeat the auxiliary fee' dater system. A fire in any one of the pump rooms would impact the AFW system only to the extent that one AFW pump and AFW flow to one steam generator could be disabled.

The AFW pump rooms are highly segregated watertight rooms with 2-feet thick reinforced concrete walls and watertight doors that 4

are maintained closed. Lubricating oil and cable insulation are the only combustibles present in the pump rooms. Leaking oil would be contained within the individual rooms or would drain 1 into the sump servicing the room. The combustible loading of any one pump room is estimated to be less than 30,000 BTU /ft2 with a maximum fire severity of less than 30 minutes.

, A smoke detection system is installed in each of the three l auxiliary feedwater pump rooms. The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond. A manual hose station, portable extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use in the area.

I The room construction coupled with a low quantity of combustible l material, the presence of smoke detection systems, and the i availability of equipment for use by the fire brigade ensures that a fire in one of the AFW pump rooms would be confined to the

! affected room. Such a fire would not prevent auxiliary feedwater i flow to at least one steam generator. Credit has been taken for the separation afforded by the subject pump room boundaries. As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, to

! ensure that the as-built configuration is maintained, the sealed

penetrations shall be placed in the surveillance program.

4 l

l l-38-2 Rev. 1 i .

- . , . - - - , - _ - , . - - _ - , , . , - _ . _ . - - . . - _ - - - - _ , - - . _ . - . , - , ~ - - . - - . , , , , . - . , - - . . , , . - , _ _ - , , .

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION I B. COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Protection and/or separation of component cooling water system cables and equipment complies with 10CFR50 Appendix R section III.G.2.c throughout fire area 1-006 with the exception of the component cooling water heat exchanger room (185). This room, contains all three couponent cooling water (CCW) pumps. The CCW pumps are located on 21-ft centers and fire barriers are provided for the pump control and power cables. However, there are small quantities of intervening combustibles consisting primarily of cable insulation between the pumps and the pumps are not provided with fire barriers. In addition, the service water inlet valves to redundant component cooling water heat exchangers (MOV3130A-B, MOV3130B-B, and MOV3130C-A) and service water discharge valves from redundant component cooling water heat exchangers (SV009A-B, 1 SV009B-B, and SV009C-A) are located less than 20 ft apart. '

Although the cables for the train-B valves are provided with fire barriers and automatic suppression, the valves themselves are not provided with fire barriers.

Justification A smoke detection system and automatic fire suppression systems are installed throughout the area. As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, one of these suppression systems -

I will be modified to provide direct, unobstructed water impingement on the CCW pumps. The combustible loading in the room is less than 35,000 BTU /ft2 with a maximum fire severity of less than 30 minutes. The detection system in the room would provide early warning of a fire allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond. A manual hose station, portable extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use in the area.

The CCW pumps are located on 21-ft centers. Heat detectors are provided in the 5-kV CCW pump disconnect switch which alarms locally and in the control room. The 5-kV disconnect switch cabinets are provided with a total-flooding CO2 system that is activated by the heat detectors.

The CCW pump cables are wrapped with two 1-in. layers of Faowool with the exception of the train-A cables for the swing CCW pump which are wrapped with a single 1-in. layer. All trains of CCW t

pump cables are covered by an automatic sprinkler system.

Cables for the train-B service water inlet and discharge valves on the CCW heat exchangers are protected by two 1-in. layers of Kaowool and covered b: automatic suppression. Cables for the train-A service water inlet and discharge valves on the CCW heat exchanger are not protected. Although neither train-A or train-B service water valves are provided with fire barriers, the nearest 1-38-3 Rev. 1

-c - - . _ - - - - - - , - - - , . , - _ - , - - . , - - - - , . - , _ , . _ _ _ _ _ , . _ _ _ - . . , _ _ . . . .-_.,.,,,_____..,.___--_,,.-.-_,,.,,,,v.___ , . . .

l l \

j J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT i l' i 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION {

i redundant valves are separated by a distance of approximately 10 f ft. Intervening combustibles between redundant valves are ,

, minimal, consisting primarily of cable insulation. !

! Due to the existing level of fire detection and protection .

j features provided as discussed above, fire damage in room 185 i would be limited such that one train of redundant CCW system j components and cabling would be available for safe shutdown. i

('

) C. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION i Cables for the redundant main steam isolation valves traverse i

! rooms 185. 189. 190. and 194 on el 100 ft - 0 in. unprotected by l j fire barriers and in close proximity to one another. In the main l

! steam and feedwater valve room (241) on el 127 ft - 0 in., the l l redundant main steam isolation valves are back-to-back in each of {

i the three main steam lines and the associated valve control j cables are separated by less than 20 ft.

Justification j In the event that the main steam isolation valves fail to isolate {

i due to fire induced failures in the valves or valve control

! circuitry, the main turbine stop valves would provide isolation i j of the main steam lines. The main turbine stop valves and l l related control circuitry would not be affected by a fire in area 1-006. ,

D. MAIN STEAM RELIEF i

control cables for the redundant main steam atmospheric relief ;

valves (MSARV) traverse rooms 185, 189, 190, and 194 on ;

f el 100 ft - 0 in. These cables are separated by less than 20 ft i i in the rooms mentioned above. One train of the redundant MSARV l control cables is not protected by a fire barrier on q el 100 ft - 0 in. The local control station and related control

j cabling for all three MSARVs are located together in room 189.

t Fire barriers are not provided to protect the local control i

stations or control cabling. On el 127 ft - 0 in., the three

! valves and their control cabling are located in one room (241).

! Adjacent valves are within 20 ft of one another. Fire barriers l

! are not provided to protect the valves or control cabling, and

, fire suppression is not provided in room 241. t l Justification i l

! The main steam atmospheric relief valves are located in the main ;

steam and feedwater valve room (241) on el 127 ft - 0 in. The '

backup air compressors and local control station for the :

I atmospheric relief valves are located in the plant heating !

j equipment room (109) on el 100 ft - 0 in. The combustible i j loading of either room is such that the maximum expected fire ;

j il .

1-38-4 Rev. 1

(

L

t J. M. PARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFRSO APPENDIX "R" FIRE IIAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION severity is less than 30 minutes. The main steam and feedwater valve room is a restricted area with limited personnel accesc during plant operation. A smoke detection system is installed in both rooms. An automatic sprinkler system covers the plant heating equipment room. The main steam and feedwater valve room does not have sprinkler coverage because of the high temperature piping in the room.

The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond. A manual hose station, portable extinguishers and portable smoke removal equipment are availhble for use in both rooms.

The main steam and feedwater valve room is a large room divided into three bays. The bays are separated by partial walls, 14 ft in height. One main steam line lies in each bay. The main steam lines and their atmospheric relief valves are on 18-ft centers and separation of the valve control cabling for redundant MSARVs is maximized between the bays. The floor of the main steam and feedwater valve room is watertight. The only communication between the main steam and feedwater valve room is an equipment hatch. On el 127 ft - 0 in. the equipment hatch area is enclosed in a separate room.

In the event of fire induced failures affecting the redundant MSARV control cables or the local control station located on el 100 ft - 0 in., the atmospheric relief valves located in room 241 on el 127 ft - 0 in, are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies. Due to the degree of separation provided between MSARVs and related control cabling in room 241, the minimal combustible loading, the presence of an early warning smoke detection system, and the administrative controls imposed at the plant to limit access to room 241 during plant operations, a credible fire in room 241 would not result in the inability to operate the MSARV associated with one steam generator.

E. NON-FIRE RATED !!ATCil COVER A hatchway located in room 185 has a non-rated steel plate cover. The hatchway communicates with room 234 (area 1-020).

Justification The sprinkler system installed in rooms 234 and 185 will serve the purpore of a water curtain to prevent the spread of fire via the hatchway.

1-38-5 Rev. 1

t J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT '

10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATIOh l

FIRE AREA INFORMATION l

l FIRE AREA: 1-006 l

MAXIMUM l

ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 2

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft 1 SEVERITY 167 Cable insul. 2 lb 5,323 <30 min Combustible Miscellaneous 100 lb Storage Room material 185 A, B, C Cable insul. 10.775 lb 34,775 <30 min Component 5-kV dis- 14 lb Cooling Water connect 1 gal Heat Exchanger switch Room Lube oil 191 A Cable insul. 463 lb 20,107 <30 min Auxiliary Lube oil 0.25 gal Feedwater Pump Room 192 B Cable incul. 553 lb 26,411 <30 min Auxiliary Lube oil 0.25 gal Feedwater l Pump Room 189 A, B Cable insul.

l Plant Heating Lube oil 1 gal Equipment Room 190 A, B 6,195 lb(a) 27,356(a) <30 min (a' i

Motor Cable insul. (a) 14 lb Control Panel l Center I

1E Room 193 C Cable insul. 6 gal Auxiliary Lube oil Feedwater Pump Room 194 - Cable insul.

Equipment Roon l

195 - Cable insul.

Access Hatch Room 1-30-6 Rev. 1

4 J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT s

10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 2

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY

<30 min 241 - Cable insul. 1.384 lb 3,869 Main Steam and Feedwater Valve Room 242

- Cable insul. 19 lb 1.287 <30 min Pipe Chase ,

243 - Cable insul. 30 lb 1.670 <30 min Pipe Chase (a) Applies to rooms 189. 190 193 194 and 195 collectively.

DESIGN FEATURES Construction: Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete or open to the outside. There is a removable steel hatch between room 185 and 234 (area 1-20).

1 Doors: UL Class A doors exist betwoen rooms 105 and 116 (area 1

1-8) and between rooms 185 and 117 (area 1-9). A UL Class B door exists between room 185 and stairway no. 1. A checkered steel plate is located at el 155 ft - 0 in. at the outside exit of room 195. A pressuretight door exists between room 241 and stairway no. 1. A watertight door is installed between room 190 and stairway no. 1.

3 Piping and Electrical Penetrations: Penetrations to adjacent fire areas are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Ventilation: Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste heating and ventilating (HVAC) system and the lower equipment room HVAC system with the exception of rooms 192 and 191 which have individual room coolers. Room 185 also has two room coolers. Fire dampers are provided in the duct penetrations in room 167. Fixed smoke removal capability is not provided. Rooms 241, 242, and 243 are vented to the atmosphere.

Floor Drains: Eleven 4-in. diameter floor drains each having a 100-gal /m capacity are provided which drain to sumps located in rooms 185 (2 sumps). 191, 193, and 189. Each sump has two 100-gal /m pumps that discharge to the floor drain tank. In room :

241, there are four 4-in. diameter floor drains having a 100-gal /m capacity that drain to the main steam room drain tank, which has a 65-gal /m pump that discharges to the turbine room drain system.

1-38-7 Nov. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIK "R" PIRE EIAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION FIRE PROTECTION A detection system covers the entire area except for rooms 195, 242, and 243. Room 167 has a wet-pipe sprinkler system which activates a local fire alarm bell and trouble horn that annunciates in the control room. Automatic water suppression systems are provided for rooms 189, 190, 194, and 185. As previously noted, a suppression system in room 185 will be modified to provide direct water impingement on the CCW pumps.

The auxiliary feedwater pump rooms (191, 192, and 193) are not covered by automatic suppression. This has been taken into consideration and the consequences are addressed as part of the justification for the auxiliary feedwater system. Automatic suppression is not provided in the main steam and feedwater valve room (241) because of the presence of high temperature piping.

This has been taken into consideration and the consequences are addressed as part of the justification for main steam isolation and main steam relief.

lieat detectors are provided in the 5-kV disconnect switch in room 185 that alarm both locally and in the control room. The 5-kV disconnect switch cabinets are provided with a total-flooding CO2 system which is activated by the heat detectors. Two water hose stations, located in rooms 185 and 189, are provided. A portable extinguisher is located in room 185 outsido room 167. A hose station in room 234 (area 1-20) will be available for use in this area. Automatic water suppression systems are provided for rooms 185, 189, 190, and 194 to protect electrical cable from exposure fires.

1-38-8 Rev. 1

? I J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 2

10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANAI.YSIS REEVALUATION e

i EXEMPTION REQUEST: 1.::J9 Rev. 1

} FIRE AREA: 1-004 1

) LOCATION: UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING. EL 100 FT - 0 IN.. 121.FT_-

! O IN.. 130 FT - 0 IN.. 139 FT - 0 IN.1,l_i}_f1 - 0 IN..

175 FT - 0 IN., AND 184 FT - 0 IN. l j Fire area 1-004 consists of the following rooms:

El 100 Ft - 0 In.

i Room 151 Waste Gds Decay Tank Rooms !

Room 152 Valve Compartment Room Room 153 Waste Gas Compressor Roon j Room 154 Waste Evaporator Steam Generator Room i Room 155 Passageway to Unit 2 ,

Room 156 Holdup Tank Room 4 Room 157 Holdup Tank Room '

] Room 158 Holdup Tank Room ,

Room 159 Recycle Evaporator Feed Pump Room !

Room 160 Hatch Area l Room 161 Corridor i Room 162 Hallway I Room 163 WDS Control Panel Roon

Room 164 Storage Room / Laundry and Hot Shower Tank Room 1 Room 165 Waste Gas Decay Tank Roon l Room 166 Waste Gas Decay Tank Room !

j Room 168 Chemical and Laundry Drain Tank Room i' Room 170 Letdown Heat Exchanger Room i Room 175 Hallway Room 176 Secondary Spent Resin Storage Tank Room Room 177 Pump Room

Room 178 Filter Room Room 179 Valve Room / Combustible Storage l Room 180 Recycle Evaporator Steam Generator Room Room 186 Boric Acid Area Room 187 Hydro Test Pump Roon

] Room 188 Boric Acid Tank Area l

El 121 Ft - 0 In.

1 Room 203 Waste Condenser Tanks and Pump Room Room 204 Waste Evaporator Package Room Room 205 Passage to Unit 2 Room 206 Heat Exchanger Roon l Room 207 Hatch Area l Room 208 Corridor Room 209 Hallway l Room 215 Duct and Pipe Chase I i Room 216 Valve Compartments Area J

l-39-1 Rev. 1

- - .-_= ._ - . _-.. ___ - .- - . - - -. .. . _- . - - . - - - - _ . - .

? . ,

i i

~

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 4

Room 217 Volume Control Tank Room !

! koom 210 Chiller Unit Room i Room 219 Pipe Chase -

l Room 220 Valve Compartment Room )

Room 221 Primary spent Resin Storage Tank Room i Room 222 Corridor Room 230 Recycle Evaporator Package Room !

Room 231 Sluice Pump Room i Room 232 Sluice Filter Roon :

l Room 236 HVAC Duct Chase ,

, Room 237 Corridor l Room 238 Cask Storage Area :

Room 239 Transfer Canal 1 Room 240 Spent Fuel Pool Room !

l Room 253 Valve Compartment

{l El 130 Ft - 0 In. !

l Roca 601 Drumming Area l Room 602 Passageway :

j Room 603 Drum Storage Area - Combustible Storage Area ,

a Room 404 Passage l l Room 605 Riowdown Pumps and Surge Tank Roca !

! Room 606 Filter Roon l Room 607 Filter Roon j i Room 608 Blowdown Heat Exchanger Room t i Room 609 Storage Room Room 610 Valve Compartment Roon l l

El 139 Ft - 0 In.

Room 301 Seal Water Filter Room i Room 302 Recycle Evaporator Feed Filter Room !

! Room 303 Reactor Coolant Filter Room

, Room 304 Waste Monitor Tank Filter Roon l 4 Room 305 Seal Injection Filter Room i 1

Room 306 Recycle Evaporator Feed Domineralizer Room Room 307 Valve Compartment Room i Room 308 Waste Condensate and Monitor Tank Domineralizer Room i Room 309 Hatch Area ,

Room 310 Valve Compartment Roon l Room 311 Recycle Evaporator Concentrates Filter Room !

i Room 312 Corridor !

Room 313 Floor Drain and Laundry Tank Filter Roon j

Room 314 Waste Evaporator Feed Filter Roon l j Room 315 Recycle Waste Condenser Filter Room l

! Room 316 Passage to Unit 2 l Room 322 Hallway i

Room 323 Sample Room Room 324 High Activity Radioactive Lab l Room 325 Counting Room Room 324 Gas Analyzer Room i

i i

1-39-2 Rev. 1 l

I

I .

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Room 327 Valve Access Area Room 328 BTR Demineralizer Room Room 329 Pipe Tunnel '

Room 330 Chiller Surge Tank Pump Room ,

Room 331 Valve Access Area Room 332 MCC 1A Area Room 340 Domineralizer Compartment '

Room 341 Pipe Chase Room 342 Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Room 348 Cask Wash Area j El 155 Ft - 0 In. i i

Room 402 Passage to Unit 2 Room 403 New Resin Storage l Room 404 Filter Hatches Room / Combustible Storage

! Room 405 Hatch Room i Room 406 Decon Room

Room 407 Hot Machine Shop

. Room 408 Hallway Room 409 Hallway 4

Room 410A 600-V Load Center (Station Service Transformer Room) i Room 410B 600-V Load Center s l Room 415 Corridor

Room 417 Corridor ,.

) Room 418 Auxiliary Building and Containment Purge Vent i

! Equipment Roon l Room 419 Domineralizer Hatch Area -

Room 420 , Drum Storage Room Room 421 Drumming Station Room Room 422 Corridor Room 423 Valve Compartment Room 424 Desineralizer Compartment Room 425 Domineralizer Compartment i j Room 426 Domineralizer Compartment Room 427 Domineralizer Compartment Room 429 Containment Purge Air Equipment Room Room 430 Disrobe Area -

Room 431 Health Physicist Room Room 432 Corridor Room 433 Corridor Room 434 Passage Room 435 Hot Shower i

Room 436 Hot Toilet Room 437 Hot Janitor ,

i Room 438 Hot Water Heater Room l Room 439 Drying Area Room 440 Laundry Area l Room 441 Drying Area I

Room 442 First Aid Room Room 443 Locker Roon l

l-39-3 Rev; 1

e ,

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIK "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Room 444 Clean Linen Storage Room 445 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Room l Room 446 Hallway Room 447 Cask Wash Storage Room Room 448 SFPC Pump Roon Room 449 Domineralizer Room Room 450 Valve Compartment Room 451 Filter Room Room 452 Clean Shower Room 453 Clean Janitor Roon Room 454 Lobby Room 455 Clean Toilet Room

' Room 456 Drying Area Room 461 Environmental Low Activity Lab Room 462 Non-Radioactive Vent Equipment Room Room 463 Nitrogen Storage Room Room 464 Nitrogen Storage Room Room 467 SFP Heat Exchanger Roon Room 478 Motor Control Center Roon Plant modification in progress is deleting fire area 1-043.

Rooms 438, 440, 443, 444, 452, 453, 455 and 456 are now in fire area 1-004. The analysis for Appendix "R" shows this modification will have no effect upon area 1-004 as the same safe shutdown cabling exists in 1-004 as reviewed.

El 175 Ft - 0 In.

Roon 506 Component Cooling Surge Tank Room El 184 Ft - 0 In.

Roon 504 Stair No. 6 Roon 505 Spent Fuel Pool Vent Equipment Room All of the fire area boundary walls are rated as a 3-hour fire barrier with all electrical and piping penetrations sealed for a 3-hout rating. All doors that are part of the fire area boundary are UL Class A doors except for class a doors to stairwells used for access and egress and for doors in the fire area boundary leading to the outside which are not rated. The floors and ceilings of fire area 1-004 which bound other fire areas are rated for 3-hours with the exception of two non-rated steel hatch covers. A non-rated steel hatch cover in the floor of room 143 (area.1-004) communicates with room 103 (area 1-001) and a non-rated steel hatch cover in the floor of room 454 (area 1-004) communicates with room 345 (area 1-042) and steel bolted access plates to NVAC duct chases roome 215 and 236 (area 1-004) on t elevation 139'-0" from Ecom 317 (area 1-034) and room 346 (area ,

1-041) respectively. All internal floors of fire area 1-004 are '

reinforced concrete, and exposed structural steel has been protected by fire proofing. Credit has been taken for the 1-39-4 Rev. 1 4

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION separation afforded by several non fire-rated walls and floor slabs internal to the subject fire area, and are defined in the exemption justifications. As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, to ensure that the as-built configuration is maintained, those sealed penetrations for which credit has been taken shall be placed in the surveillance program.

EXEMPTION An exemption to section III.G.2.c is requested to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and full coverage fixed suppression system. (Conditions A through I)

An exemption to section III.G.2.a is requested to the extent that it requires separation of redundant cables and equipment by a fire barrier having a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months rating (Condition K).

The above exemptions are based upon implementation of the four modifications.

CONDITIONS REQt!! RING EXEMPTION A. REDUNDANT ELECTRICAL POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM A.1 Motor _ Control Center 1A and IB Fire area 1-004 contains redundant safety related MCCs. (IA)

OlR17B001A-A and (1B) 01R17B001B-B. These motor control centern provide power for various train-A and train-B safe-shutdown components respectively. Power supply cabling and subject motor control centers are not protected by fire barriers and full coverage automatic suppression is not provided.

Justification An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire would be limited to one MCC and/or its associated power feed and would not effect the redundant MCC and/or its associated power feed.

Therefore, only one train of redundant electrical distribution could be lost due to a credible fire in area 1-004. MCC 1A is located in room 332, el 139 ft - 0 in, having its power feed continue through room 312 thence up to el 155 ft - 0 in. MCC IB is located in room 209 el 121 ft - 0 in, having its power feed exit this room into an adjacent fire area. The redundant MCCs are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floor at el 139 ft - 0 in. Unsealed penetrations located in the subject floor have been reviewed and will not effect the separation afforded by the concrete floor. The minimum horizontal separation between components is approximately 60 ft between MCC IB (el 121 ft - 0 in.) and MCC 1A power feed (el 155 ft - 0 in.).

This 60 ft horizontal separation and has complete automatic suppression coverage at el 121 ft - 0 in.

1-39-5 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE ilAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION A.2 DC Distribution Panels 1C and IF Fire area 1-004 contains redundant safety-related de distribution panels (lC) Q1R41LOOlC-A and (1F) 01R41 LOO 1F-B. These 125 V-dc distribution panels provide power for various train-A and train-B safe-shutdown components respectively. Power supply cabling and distribution panels are not protected by barriers.

Justification An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire would be limited to one de distribution panel and/or its associated power feed and would not effect the redundant panel and or its associated power feed. Therefore, only one train of redundant de distribution panels could be lost.

DC distribution panel IC is located in room 312. el 139 ft -

0 in., and dc distribution panel 1F is located in room 209, el 121 ft - 0 in. The redundant oc distribution panels are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floor at el 139 ft - 0 in. Unsealed penetrations located in the subject floor have bcen reviewed and will not effect the separation afforded by the concrete floor. The minimum horizontal separation between these redundant panels is approximately 40 ft and has complete automatic suppression coverage at el 121 ft -

0 in, and 139 ft - 0 in. A smoke detection system is installed in all rooms containing the subject equipment. The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond. Manual hoso stations, portable extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use on the subject elevations.

B. STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION Pire area 1-004 rooms 462 and 464 contain redundant steam generator pressure transmitters and cabling. The redundant steam generator pressure instruments provide the following signals:

EOUIPMENT FUNCTION 01N11PT3371A-A G/G-A Press, Atmospheric Relief Valve Control and Ilot Ghutdown Panel Pressure Indication Q1N11PT0474-P2 G/G-A Press, Protection Signal, Indication Q1N11PT0475-P3 S/G-A Press, Protection Gignal, Indication 01N11PT0476-P4 G/G-A Press, Protection Signal, Indication 01N11PT3371B-A G/G-B Press, Atmospheric Relief Valve Control and flot Ghutdown Panel Pressure Indication.

1-39-6 Hov. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1N11PT0484-P2 S/G-B Press Protection Signal, Indication Q1N11PT0485-P3 S/G-B Press, Protection Signal, Indication OlN11PT0486-P4 S/G-B Press, Protection Signal, Indication OlNilPT3371C-A S/G-B Press, Atmospheric Relief Valve Control and Hot Shutdown Panel Pressure Indication.

Q1N11PT0494-P2 S/G-C Press, Protection Signal, Indication Q1N11PT0495-P3 S/G-C Press, Protection Signal.

Indication OlN11PT0496-P4 S/G-C Press, Protection Signal, Indication The redundant pressure transmitters and their cabling are not protected by fire barriers and full coverage automatic suppression is not provided.

Modification A fire rated barrier has been provided in Room 462 for redundant q instrument cabling raceway 21E047, 21E048, 3!E017, 4!E019, and 41E017. The barrier extends from pull box to wall penetration or to pressure instrument. The barrier consists of two 1-in. layers of Kaowool and an overall layer of Zetex fabric. A fire rated barrier inside the following conduits is provided where they attach to pull boxes located in room 462. This barrier is the same as those provided inside conduit which penetrates a fire rated barrier penetration. The conduits are 21E045, 212047, 3!E018, 3IE020, 41E017, and 41E019. An automatic fire partial suppression system presently covers the area of modification in the eastern portion of room 462.

Justification Room 464 of fire area 1-004 contains cabling and pressure instruments for steam generator A. Based upon a review of unsealed penetrations in the subject wall and the approximate 32-ft horizontal separation between redundant steam generator pressure instruments and cabling, a credible fire in room 464 would not propagate into room 462. Early warning provided by the smoke detection system in room 464 would provide adequate time for fire brigade personnel to extinguish the fire in room 464.

In addition, initiation of the automatic fixed suppression system and the barriers provided for redundant cabling in room 462 would protect the redundant S/G B and C instrumentation. For a fire in room 462 a portable extinguisher and manual hose station are available for use in room 464.

1 39-7 Nov. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE ilAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION i

Room 462 of fire area 1-004 contains S/G A, B, and C pressure instruments and associated cabling for the pressure instruments.

Based upon the modification, the existing raceway barriers, smoke detection, and fixed suppression in the area, a credible fire in room 462 would not effect the ability to monitor S/G A pressure.

One functional steam generator is sufficient for safe shutdown at plant Farley. Due to fire induced signals from S/G B and C pressure transmitters in room 462, a false SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system may result. Plant procedures exist or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI, or CI safety signals from the main control room and can be used if required for a fire in this area.

C. INSTRUMENT AIR Fire area 1-004 contains redundant instrument air system de power and control cabling which serve N1P19SV3825-A (instrument air penetration room isolation valve). 01P19SV3611-A (instrument air containment isolation valve) train A, and OlB13SV2228-B (power relief valve backup air supply) train B. The de power and control cabling are not protected by barriers, and full automatic fixed suppression coverage is not provided.

Justification An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire would be limited to one train of redundant PORV instrument air header isolation valve cabling.

Train A cabling is located in rooms 168, 163, and 162, el 100 ft - 0 in., and rooms 322, and 323, el 139 ft - 0 in.

Train B cabling is located in rooms 203 and 209, el 121 ft -

0 in. The redundant cables are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floor at el 121 ft -0 in, and 139 ft -

0 in. Unsealed penetrations in the subject floors have been reviewed and will not effect the separation afforded by these concrete floors. The train A cables have full suppression coverage on el 100 ft - 0 in, and el 139 ft - O in. As discussed during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, heat collectors will be installed on all sidewall sprinkler heads of the system in room 161 to increase their responsiveness to a fire condition. Train B cables have full suppression coverage on el 121 ft - 0 in. A smoke detection system is installed in all rooms containing the subject cabling. The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond. Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are available for use on the subject elevations.

D. BATTERY ROOM VENTILATION Fire area 1-004 contains redundant power and control cabling of battery charging room coolers Q1E16M006A-A and 01E16M0068-B.

1-39-8 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT i

10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION i

trains A and B respectively, and battery room exhaust fans and exhaust dampers, Q1V47C012A-A, OlVC/C012B-B and Q1V47MOV3644-A, ;

Q1V47MOV3643-B, trains A and B respectively. The subject power 1

, and control cabling is not protected by barriers and full l coverage automatic fixed suppression is not provided. l l

Justification i Fire induced failures in control and power cables could

Potentially result in the loss of ventilation in both the redundant train A and B battery and battery charger rooms. A l failure of the ventilation system will not result in a failure of 4

the redundant train-A or -B 125 V-dc battery systems. Therefore, the potential fire induced failure of the power and control cable for the redundant battery and battery charger room ventilation fans and dampers will not result in the loss of systems necessary

! to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions. The safe

! shutdown requirement for battery and battery charger room ;

ventilation is a long term requirement. If ventilation is lost 1 due to a fire in area 1-004, either portable ventilation equipment will be installed in the effected room (s) or the -

damaged ventilation system will be repaired within 20 hours2.314815e-4 days 0.00556 hours 3.306878e-5 weeks 7.61e-6 months of post-fire hot shutdown initiation to insure that battery room hydrogen concentrations do not exceed acceptable limits. Plant procedures covering these actions will be developed for a fire in area 1-004.

E. BORATION/ MAKEUP, DEPRESSURIZATION, AND RCP SEAL INTEGRITY Flow from the charging pumps is required for reactor coolant boration and makeup, reactor coolant system depressurization, and reactor coolant pump seal integrity. The following independent a conditions concern cables related to the charging pumps and charging pump room coolers:

(a) Fire area 1-004 contains redundant charging pump train-A and 4

-B power cables. One train of redundant power cables is not provided with a fire rated barrier for its entire route in the fire area, nor is full suppression coverage provided for both redundant trains throughout their entire route in the fire area.

(b) Fire area 1-004 contains redundant charging pump room cooler l power and control cables. One train of redundant power and 1

control cable is not provided with a fire rated barrier for j its entire route in the fire area, nor is full suppression 1 coverage provided for both redundant trains throughout the entire route in the fire area.

. 1-39-9 Rev. 1 I

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT l

10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION !

I i

Modification l l

(a) A fire rated barrier has been Provided for train-A power i cable raceway ADDA21, ADDA18 ADDA15, and ADDA09. The

' subject barrier will extend the complete route of the train-A changing pump power cable in fire area 1-004.

(b) The existing fire rated barrier on raceway BFDB03 has been ;

extended and a fire rated barrier for raceway BHFA03 is i being provided along its entire length on el 100 ft - 0 in. l 1

In addition, an open penetration approximately 2 ft - 6 in. !

l north of column 18 and 15 ft -8 in, west of column N. el i 121 ft - 0 in., floor slab has been sealed. l 6

Justification (a) An analysis was performed based upon the subject 3

modification to demonstrate that a credible fire would be limited to only one train of redundant charging pump power j

cabling. ;

4 i

! Train-A power cabling is located in rooms 161, 162, 163, and i 168. Train-B cabling is located in rooms 175, 160, 159, f

, 158, 157, 156, 155, 154, 153, 152, 151, 165, and 166. The f l redundant power cables are provided with a barrier (two l j 1-in.-thick wraps of Kaowool blanket) having a fire rating j greater than that of the projected fire in the following i rooms in fire area 1-004: train A in rooms 261, 162, 163, and 168; train B in rooms 175, 160 and 159. Full fixed suppression coverage is provided in rooms 163, 162, 161, i 160, 175, and 186. As previously noted, heat collectors j will be added to the sidewall sprinkler heads in room 161 to increase their responsiveness to fire conditions. In .

addition, the redundant power cables are separated minimally by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete wall bounding rooms 159, 158, 157, 156, 154, 153, 152, 151, 165, and 166, with the i exception of room 155 where there is approximately 32 ft of separation. Unsealed penetrations in the subject walls have been reviewed and the walls are considered to afford >

adequate separation. I I

A smoke detection system is. installed in all rooms containing the subject cabling. The detection system would j provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond. Manual hose stations, portable :

extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are !

available for use on this elevation. l I

(b) An analysis was performed based upon the subject :

modification to demonstrate that a credible fire would be -

limited to only one train of redundant charging pump cooler !

power and control cabling. l t

1-39-10 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION El 100 ft - O in, contains redundant charging pump room cooler power and control cables. Train-B cables are protected by a fire rated barrier which extends to a point of 40-ft horizontal separation from the redundant train-A cables. Automatic fired suppression and smoke detection systems provide coverage for the subject cables.

El 121 ft - O in, contains the same redundant charging pump room cooler cables which have a minimum horizontal separation of approximately 40 ft. The train-B power and control cables are provided with automatic suppression and smoke detection coverage for their entire route on this elevation.

In addition, redundant train-A and -B charging pump room cooler power and control cables are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete slab floor at el 121 ft -

0 in. Unsealed penetrations in the floor slab have been reviewed and are considered to afford adequate separation.

In conclusion, a credible fire in fire area 1-004 could not effect both trains of redundant charging pump room cooler power and control cables.

F. MAIN STEAM ISOLATION Fire area 1-004 contains power and control cables for S/G-1C steam supply to TDAFW pump valve Q1N12SV3235B-AB and TDAFW pump steam admission valve Q1N12SV3226-AB. The subject cables are not protected by barriers nor is full coverage automatic suppression provided.

Justification Fire induced failures (hot shorts) to the subject cables could cause the subject valves to open, causing auto start of the TDAFW pump and the dragging of steam from S/G-lc. In the unlikely event of multiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by manually tripping the TDAFW pump throttle valve Q1N12MOV3406-A.

1 Plant procedures will be revised to include the above actions for a fire in area 1-004.

G. STEAM RELEASE (COOLDOWN)

Fire area 1-004 contains de distribution panel (lC) QlR41LOOlC-A which supplies solenoid power for atmospheric relief valves, OlN11PV3371A, Q1N11PV3371B, and Q1NilPV3371C. The subject panel and cables are not protected by barriers.

1-39-11 Rev. 1

. . ~ - - - ..- . . - . - - . - , , - , , _ - . .- -.- .- .

5 J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Justification Loss of de distribution panel IC would render the main steam atmospheric relief valves electrically inoperable. One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown. The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies. The subject valves are not located in fire area 1-004. The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing. Consequently, a fire in area 1-004 i would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

H. NEUTRON FLUX MONITORING Fire area 1-004 contains redundant instrumentation cabling and equipment OlC55NM0048-A of neutron flux monitoring Q1C55NE0048A-A ,

(post accident neutron flux monitor) and N1C55NE0031-Pl. and N1C55NE0032-P2 (source range neutron flux monitors). The subject cabling and equipment is not protected by barriers and automatic fixed suppression is not provided.

Justification Instrumentation cables for the source range neutron flux monitors j

N1C55NE0031-P1 and N1C55NE0032-P2 traverse fire area 1-004 through conduit embedded in the floor slab at el 155 ft - 0 in..

] and are accessible through embedded pull boxes on this elevation.

The instrumentation cables for the neutron flux monitors

, QlC55NE0048A-A are routed through fire area 1-004 on el 100 ft -

1 O in., 121 ft - 0 in and 139 ft - 0 in. The amplifier QlC55NM0048-A for the neutron flux monitor is located on elevation 139 ft - 0 in.

5 The redundant cables are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced

! concrete floor slab at el 155 ft - 0 in. Unsealed penetrations

in the subject floor slab have been reviewed and are considered not to effect the separation afforded by the concrete floor.

I. REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY INTEGRITY Fire area 1-004 contains cable for redundant RCS and pressurizer sample line boundary valves. The RCS valves are OlP16HV3101-B, i QlP15HV3102-B, and Q1P15HV3765-A. The pressurizer valves are i

QlP15HV3103-A and Q1P15HV3881-B. The subject cables are not provided with barriers and full coverage automatic fixed suppression is not provided.

1-39-12 Rev. 1

1

. J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION t

Justification An analysis of the effects of fire upon subject redundant line isolation valves shows that it would take multiple hot shorts to energize the solenoids to open all valves. In the unlikely event ,

! of multiple hot shorts (induced from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) occurring, the condition can be mitigated for the train-A powered valves OlP15HV3765-A and Q2P15HV3103-A by removing power from all cables in the shared raceway. This can be accomplished by opening the supply breaker on 125 V-dc switchgear lA (QlR42B001A-A) for 125 V-dc distribution panel 1C (01R41LOOlC-A). Distribution panel 1A is located in fire area l-018 room 0224.

Control cables of the train-A pressurizer power operated relief

and blocking valves OlB31PCV0445A-A and QlB13MOV8000A-A and the reactor head vent valves QlB13SV2213A-A and Q1B13SV2214A-A are I located in fire area 1-004. The subject cables are associated I with the control function from the hot shutdown panel l Q1H21NBAFP2605G-A. In addition, control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 2-A are in this area. A fire

, induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PORV and reactor head vent

paths.

l Justification i

l Fire induced failures (hot shorts) within the control cables for -

! the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 2-A could cause control for

! the pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves and the j reactor head vent valves to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel. Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in

the shared raceway) of the control cables for Q1B31PCV0445A-A, pressurizer power operated relief valve, and QlB13SV2213A-A and ;

Q1B13SV2214A-A, reactor head vent valves, could result in the valves (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position. In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts

occurring, this condition.can be mitigated by removing power fron ;

i the transfer relays and manually aligning the affected relay ,

(handle is provided), thereby shifting control to the main l

'- control board. To remove power from the transfer relay open j j breaker 17 on dc distribution panel IB (01R41LOOlBA) in fire area j i 1-043 room 0343. Then go to transfer relay cabinet TRC-1 in fire '

area 1-035 room 0347 and manually shift transfer relays TR1

(QlB13SV2213A-A), TR2 (OlB13SV2214A-A). TR3 (Q1B13PCVO445A-A),

and TRS (01B13MOV8000A-A) placing control back to main control

board to allow the operator to mitigate the letdown.

i l

l-39-13 Rev. 1 i

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION l Plant procedures will be developed to include the above action for a fire in area 1-004.

J. NbN-FIRE-RATED HATCH COVERS IN FIRE AREA BOUNDARY (a) A non-fire-rated steel hatch cover in the floor of room 163 (area 1-004) communicates with room 103 (area 1-001).

(b) A non-fire-rated steel hatch cover in the floor of room 454 4

(area 1-004) communicates with room 345 (area 1-042).

f Justification (a) Room 163 (area 1-004) contains an automatic fixed suppression system which provided suppression coverage in 4

the area of the subject steel hatch cover. As discussed

during the NRC site exemption request walkdown, one ,

j sprinkler head of this system will be relocated to improve water coverage of the steel hatch cover. In addition, an j analysis of safe shutdown circuits in room 163 (area 1-004)

J and room 103 (area 1-001) was performed to determine if there were any new redundancy problems identified if a fire propagated between the adjacent fire area rooms. The 4 analysis showed that physical separation afforded redundant

! safe shutdown cabling in each fire area was adequate as applied to one another. Therefore, with the detection system provided in rooms 163 and 103 and the suppression provided in the area of the hatch in room 163, fire rating of the subject hatch cover is not required.

(b) The existing sprinkler systems in room 345 (1-042) and 454 (1-004) will serve the purpose of a water curtain to prevent the passage of fire from fire area 1-004 to the adjacent fire area via the non-rated steel hatch.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION i Fire Area: 1-004 l MAXIMUM i ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY 151 Waste A. B Gas Decay Tank Rooms i 152 Valve A, B l Compartment Cable (a) 1,122 lb(a)l5,877(a) <30 min (a) l Room insul.

l Charcoal 810 lb filter l

l l-39-14 Rev. 1

-~w-t-=-+--m v---*'w'--w-' - - ' + - * ' ' ' - - - ' ' * ' ' - - *

v - e wm--'Mr?--- - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - -- -* ' ~ - -~ = * * -

=+

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY 8 SEVERITY (Btu /ft 1 165 Gas A, B Decay Tank Room 166 Waste A. B Gas Decay Tank Room 153 Waste A, B Charcoal 570 lb 34,733 <30 min Gas Compressor filter Room Cable insul. 448 lb Lube oil 1 gal 159 Recycle B Cable insul. 299 lb 26,783 <30 min Evaporator Lube oil O.5 gal Feed Pump Room 168 Chemical A. B Charcoal 200 lb 52,037 <1 h and Laundry filter Drain Tank Cable insul. 890 lb Room Lube oil 0.5 gal l 175 Hallway A. B Cable insul. 972 lb 29,580 <30 min 154 Waste B Evaporator Steam Gen.

Room 155 Passageway B to Unit 2 160 Hatch A, B Area 161 Corridor A, B, C Cable (b) 12,531 lb(b)27,995(b) <30 min (b) insul.

Lube oil O.75 gal Panel 14 lb 162 Hallway A, B

163 WDS Panel A, B Room 1-39-15 Rev. 1

. _ . - . , _ __~ _

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ftal SEVERITY 164 Laundry A and Hot Shower Tank Room 177 Pump -

Room 178 Filter -

Room 215 Duct and -

None O O O Pipe Chase 176 Secondary -

None 0 0 0 Spent Resin Storage Tank Room 179 Valve -

Cable insul. 56 lb 2,724 <30 min Room /

Combustible Storage (c) 180 Recycle -

Cable insul.

Evaporator Steam Gen.

Room i

186 Boric A, B Cable insul, 2,437 lb(d)23,636(d)<30 min (d)

Acid Area Lube oil 3.75 gal 187 Hydro -

Cable insul.

Test Pump Lube oil Room 204 Waste Channel Cable insul. 183 lb 4,963 <30 min Evaporator 1 Package Room 219 Pipe -

None 0 0 0 Chase 203 Waste A Cable insul.

Condenser l Tanks and

! Pump Room 1-39-16 .Rev. 1

. . . . . . - . :-- . . - . . --. . - - - . - _. , - ~ .

4 J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CPR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY 205 Passageway -

Cable insul.

4 to Unit 1 207 Hatch B Cable insul.

Area j 208 Corridor A, B Cable insul. 20,365 lb(e)40,542(8)<1 h(e)

, Channel Panels 71 lb 1

209 Hallway A, B Cable insul.

Channel Panels 1

4 218 Chiller -

Cable insul.

Unit Room Panels Lube oil 6 gal 222 Corridor A. B Cable insul.

237 Corridor -

Cable insul.

253 Valve B Cable insul.

Compartment 156 Holdup B Cable insul. 274 lb 11.029 <30 min Tank Room

. 157 Holdup B Cable insul. 358 lb 13,879 <30 min Tank Room 158 Holdup B . Cable insul. 278 lb 10,769 <30 min Tank Room 188 Boric -

Cable insul. 111 lb 619 <30 min i Acid Tank l Area 206 Heat B Cable insul. 143 lb 6,305 <30 min Exchanger Room 220 Valve -

Cable insul. 25 lb 3,200 <30 min Compartment Room s

1-39-17 Rev. 1

l J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Dtu/ft21 SEVERITY 230 Recycle B Cable insul. 557 lb 17,048 <30 min Evaporator Package Room 231 Sluice B Cable insul. 134 lb 17.258 <30 min Pump Room 232 Sluice - Cable insul, 296 lb 25,132 <30 min Filter Room 236 Duct B None 0 0 0 Chase 216 Valve A, B Cable insul. 40 lb 6.549 <30 min Compartments Area 217 Volume -

None 0 0 0 Control Tank Room 221 Primary -

None 0 0 0 Spent Resin Storage Tank Room 238 Cask -

Storage Area l

l 239 Transfer -

l Canal l

Cable insul.(f) 204 lb(f)l.243(f)<30 min (f) 240 Spent -

Fuel Pool Room 348 Cask -

Wash Area 447 Cask -

Cable insul. 8 lb 21.236 <30 min Wash Storage Misc. material 100 lb l Area /

Combustible l Storage (c) l 309 Hatch -

Area l 1-39-18 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COM3USTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Bto/ft*1 SEVERITY 312 Corridor Channels 2 and 4 A, B 325 Counting -

Room 322 Hallway A, B 316 Passageway A .;ty;l to Unit 2 ~~!

327 Valve - Gas bottles (9) 34 lb(9)29,989(9)<30 min (9)

Access Area Cable insul. 6,366 lb Panel 22 lb 332 MCC 2A Channels Pipe insul. 24 lb 2 and 4 Flammable 5 lb A. C liquid 307 Valve A Compartment Room 310 Valve A Compartment Room 330 Chiller Channels Surge Tanks 2 and 4 Pump Room A 301 Seal -

Water Filter Room 302 Recycle -

Evaporator Feed Filter Pump 303 Reactor A Coolant Filter Room 304 Waste A Cable insul.(h) 13 lb(h) 392(h)<30 min (h)

Monitor Tank Filter Room 1-39-19 Rev. 1

. _ . _ =_. . _ - _ _ - . - -. - _..

J. M, FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAKIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY 311 Recycle A Evaporator

. Concentrates Filter Room 313 Floor -

Drain and Laundry Tank Filter Room 314 Waste -

Evaporator Feed Filter Roon

l 315 Recycle -

Waste

Condenser Filter Room 305 Seal -

Injection Filter Room

! 306 Recycle -

None 0 0 0 Evaporator Feed Demin.

Room 308 Waste -

None 0 0 0 Condensate and Monitor Tank Demin.

Room 323 Sample A, B Cable insul. 515 lb 35,280 <30 min Room Pipe insul. 3 lb 324 High -

Cable insul. 998 lb 23,950 <30 min Activity Pipe insul. 11 lb Radioactive Flammable 200 ft3 Lab gas bottles 326 Gas -

Cable insul. 25 lb 1,889 <30 min Analyzer Pipe insul. 3 lb 2,083 Roon 1-39-20 Rev. 1 c

1 J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 8

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY 329 Pipe -

None 0 0 0 Tunnel 331 Valve A Cable insul. 330 lb 10,936 <30 min Access Area 342 Spent Channels Cable insul, 112 lb 5,247 <30 min Fuel Pool 2 and 4 Pump 340 Demin- -

None -

0 0 eralizer Compartment 328 BTR -

None 0 0 0 Demin.

Room 601 Drumming - .

Area 602 Passageway -

Cable (i) 627 lb(1) 2,141(i) <30 min (i)

insul.

l Panel 7 lb 603 Drum -

Storage Area Combustible Storage Area 604 Passage -

Cable 128 lb 3,859 <30 min insul.

605 Blowdown B Cable 247 lb 8,885 <30 min Pumps and insul.

Surge Tank Room 606 Filter -

Cable 55 lb 7,208 <30 min Room insul.

607 Filter -

Cable 3 lb 563 <30 min i Room insul.

608 Blowdown Channels Cable 85 lb 1,720 <30 min Heat 2 and 4 insul.

Exchanger Room 1-39-21 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE i 2

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY 609 Storage Channels Cable 136 lb 3,891 <30 min Room 2 and 4 insul.

B 610 Valve - Cable 4 lb 616 <30 min Compartment insul.

Room 341 Pipe Channels None 0 0 0 Chase 2 and 4 B

445 Spent B Cable (l) 1,758 lb(3) 24,570(3)<30 min (3)

Fuel Pool insul.

1 Heat .

Exchanger Room 448 SFPC -

Pump Room 451 Filter -

None 0 0 0 Room 449 Demin- -

None 0 0 0 eralizer Room 450 Valve -

None 0 0 0 Compartment 406 Decontam- -

Cable insul. 171 lb 5,702 <30 min ination 407 Hot -

Cable insul. 424 lb 4,488 <30 min Machine Pipe insul. 7 lb Shop 409 Hallway Channels 1, 2, 4 A, B 410A 600-V Channels Load Center 2 and 4 A

410B 600-V -

4 Load Center 1-39-22 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 8

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL OUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 SEVERITY 405 Hatch B Room 419 Demin- A, B Cable (k) 22,752 lb(k) 35,737(k)<30 min (k) eralizer insul.

Hatch Area Panel 36 lb Pipe insul. 16 lb 408 Hallway A 422 Corridor A 446 Hallway -

423 Valve -

Compartment 420 Drum -

Cable insul. 943 lb 12,212(1)<30 min (l)

Storage Room 421 Drumming -

Panel 14 lb Station Room Flammable 459 lb liquid 424 -

None 0 0 -

Demineralizer Compartment 425 -

None 0 0 -

Demineralizer Compartment 426 -

None 0 0 -

Demineralizer Compartment 427 -

None 0 0 -

Demineralizer Compartment 418 Auxiliary -

Cable insul. 561 lb 58,754 <45 min Building and Charcoal 7,400 lb Containment filter Purge Vent Equipment Room l

1-39-23 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE 2 SEVERITY TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 1 404 Filter Channel Cable insul. 30 lb 306 <30 min Hatch Room / 1 Combustible Storage (c) 403 Hot -

Cable insul. 124 lb 3.852 <30 min Instr. Shop Pipe insul. 33 lb 402 Passage A to Unit 2 417 Corridor A 430 Disrobe -

Area 435 Hot - ss Cable (m) 6,337 lb(R)57,839(m)<45 min (R)

Shower insul.

443 Locker -

Cable 408 lb > 3.376 <30 min Room 453 Clean Channels Janitor Room 2 3, 4 455 Clean Channels Toilet Room 2 3 4 456 Drying -

> Miscellaneous 100 lb Area /

452 Clean -

Shower 444 Clean Channels Stored items Linen Storage 2, 3, 4,/'

440 Laundry -

Cable 522 lb 20,626 <30 min Area insulation 438 Hot Water -

Cable 27 lb 4,770 <30 min Heater Room insulation 439 Drying -

Area l 441 Drying -

l Area 1-39-24 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft 18 SEVERITY 434 Passage -

433 - Channels 2, 3, 4 415 Corridor Channels 2, 3, 4 A

432 Corridor A Cable insul. 4.337 lb 61.284 <45 min 454 Lobby A None 0 0 -

462 Non Channels Cable insul. 1,019 lb 7,673 <30 min Radioactive 2, 3, 4 Pipe insul. 30 lb Vent Equip. A Room 463 Storage -

Cable insul. 106 lb 4,542 <30 min Room Misc. items 100 lb 464 Storage Channels Cable insul. 115 lb 7,818 <30 min Room 2, 3, 4 Misc. items 100 lb A

467 SFP -

Cable insul. 65 lb 1,704 <30 min Heat Exchanger Room 429 Channel Cable insul. 6,015 lb 188,885 <2-1/2 h Containment 2 Panel 7 lb Purge Air A, B Charcoal 23,000 lb Equipment filter Room ,

i 431 Health Channels Cable insul. 381 lb 28,391 <30 min Physics Room 2, 3, 4 461 Channels Cable insul. 586 lb 18,077 <30 min Environmental 2, 3, 4 Low Activity Lab 436 Hot -

Cable insul. 9 lb 296 <30 min Toilet 1-39-25 Rev. 1

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*1 SEVERITY 437 Hot -

None - - -

Janitor 442 First Channels Cable insul. 136 lb 9,933 <30 min Aid Room 2, 3, 4 478 Motor AB Cable insul. 7,403 lb 39,085 <30 min Control Panel 7 lb Center Room 504 Stairwell - Cable insul. 51 lb 925 <30 min No. 6 Floor.

El 184 ft -

0 in.

505 Spent -

Cable insul. 661 lb <30 min Fuel Pool Charcoal 3,800 lb 27.117 Vent filter Equipment Panel 14 lb Room 506 Component -

Cable insul. 28 lb 947 <30 min Cooling Surge Tank Room 170 Letdown A, B Cable insul. 61 lb 2,198 <30 min Heat Exchanger Room

a. Applies to rooms 151, 152, 165, and 166 collectively,

b. Applies to rooms 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 177, and 178 collectively.

c. These rooms are occasionally utilized as combustible storage areas, particularly during outage periods. They will have 3-hour rated boundaries, smoke detection, and a systemsthatprovideadensityof0.30 gal /m/ftgrinkler upon completion of modifications.

d. Applies to rooms 180, 186, and 187 collectively,

e. Applies to rooms 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 218, 222, 237, and 253.

f. Applies to rooms 238, 239, 240, and 348.

1-39-26 Rev. 1

E P

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION

g. Applies to rooms 309, 312, 325, 322, 316, 327, 332, 307, 310, and 330 collectively,

h. Applies to rooms 301, 302, 303, 304, 311, 313, 314, 315, and 305 collectively.

i. Applies to rooms 601, 602, and 603 collectively.

j. Applies to rooms 445 and 448 collectively,

k. Applies to rooms 409, 410A, 410B, 405, 419, 408, 422, 446, and 423 collectively.

1. Applies to rooms 420 and 421 collectively,

m. Applies to rooms 402, 417, 430, 435, 439, 441, 434, 433, and 415 collectively.

DESIGN FEATURES

, Construction: Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete. Portions of the area boundary along the containment wall which are also boundaries for other fire areas are self expanding cork.

Doors: Doors that are a part of the area boundary are UL Class A doors except for Class B doors to stairways and for doors in the area boundary leading to the outside which are not rated.

Piping and Electrical Penetrations: Penetrations through the area boundary are sealed to a 3-hour fire resistance rating.

Ventilation: This area is served by both the radwaste and nonradwaste HVAC systems. Fire damper / doors are installed in duct penetrations through the area boundary. The steel bolted access plates located in the HVAC duct chases rooms 215 and 236 on elevation 139'-O" are constructed to provide a heat barrier as specified on design drawing D-176781.

Floor Drains: The 111 4-in. diameter floor drains having a 100-gal /m capacity drain to either the waste holdup tank or the floor drain tank.

FIRE PROTECTION Smoke detection systems are installed in all rooms containing safe-shutdown equipment (except rooms 236 and 341) or where there is appreciable combustible material. Automatic suppression is provided in the following rooms 160 (partial), 161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 175, 205 (partial), 207 (partial), 208, 209, 222, 312 (partial), 316, 322, 402, 403, 404, 415 (consealed space), 417 1-39-27 Rev. 1

3 3-e J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION (consealed space), 420, 421, and 447. As previously noted. heat collectors will be added to the sidewall sprinkler heads in room i 161 to increase their responsiveness to fire conditions. The l 5-kV disconnect switches in room 161 and the load centers in rooms 410A and 410B have an automatic heat-actuated CO2 suppression system. Hose stations are installed to satisfy the requirements of NFPA 14.

Portable extinguishers and portable smoke removal equipment are provided on each elevation.

JUSTIFICATION FOR FIRE PROTECTION Room 236 (duct chase), 341 (pipe chase), and 342 (spent fuel pool pump room) have safe shutdown control and instrumentation cabling which pass through them and smoke detection is not provided.

Modification Smoke detection has been added in room 342.

Justification Room 236 (duct chase) contains safe shutdown cabling. All cabling in this chase is routed in conduit. The duct chase is considered to have low in-situ combustibles . The duct chase runs vertically from el 121 ft -0 in. through 139 ft - O in, and 155 ft - 0 in. As there is no redundant safe-shutdown cabling in room 236. there is low in-situ combustible loading and very low probability of a transient combustible being introduced, the installation of a smoke detection system is not required.

Room 341 (pipe chase) contains safe shutdown cab 11ug. All cabling in this pipe chase is installed in conduit. The pipe chase is considered to have low in-situ combustibles. The pipe chase exits the auxiliary building at el 139 ft - 0 in. which is below grade. As there is no redundant safe-shutdown cabling in room 341; there is low in-situ combustible loading and very low probability of a transient combustible being introduced, the installation of a smoke detection system is not required.

1 l

1-39-28 Rev. 1 t

L - '\

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT

, 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST: 0 Rev. 1 1_1.0.

FIRE AREA: N/A LOCATION: FIRE AREAS IN UNITS 1 AND 2 EXEMPTION Request exemption from 10CFR50, Appendix R in that it requires separation of fire areas by a barrier having a 3-hour fire rating.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION Non-fire rated reach-rod penetrations are located in the walls between the following rooms for Units 1 and 2:

MAKIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN NUMBER OF FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN PENETRATIONS (Btu /ft 12 SEVERITY 173 Charging / B 2 27,563 <30 min Safety Injection Pump Room and 161 Corridor A,B,C 27,995(a) <30 min (a) 177 Pump Room -

6 27,995(a) <30 min (a) and 179 Valve Room / -

2,724 <30 min Combustible Storage 171 Combustible -

8 31,820(b) <30 min (b)

Storage Area and 170 Letdown A,B 2,198 <30 min Heat Exchanger Room i

175 Corridor A,B 5 29,580 <30 min and 173,174, 181 A,B.C 33,033(c) <30 min (c)

Charging Pump Rooms 2173 Charging / B 3 27,563 <30 min Safety Injection Pump Room and i l 2161 Corridor A B.C 27,995(d) <30 min (d) I 1-40-1 Rev. 1

w w a

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS PEEVALUATION MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN NUMBER OF FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN PENETRATIONS (Btu /ft2 1 SEVERITY 2177 Pump Room -

5 27,995(d) <30 min (d) l and 2179 Valve Room / - 2,724 <30 min Combustible .

Storage 2170 Letdown A,B 10 2,198 <30 min Heat Exchanger Room and g

2171 Combustible A 31,820(*) <30 min (*) '

Storage Area 2175 Corridor A,B 6 29,580 <30 min and 2173,2174,2181 A,B,C 33,033(f) <30 min (f)

Charging Pump Rooms (a) Applies to rooms 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 177, and 178 collectively.

(b) Applies to rooms 171, 172, and 182 collectively.

(c) Applies to rooms 173, 174 and 181 collectively.

(d) Applies to room 2154, 2155, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2177, and 2178 collectively.

(e) Applies to room 2171, 2172, and 2182 collectively.

(f) Applies to rooms 2173, 2174 and 2181 collectively.

Justification The reach-rod penetrations used at Plant Parley are non-fire rated. These penetrations range in size from 2 in, to'10 in, with the majority being of the 2 in. size. The cross-sectional area of all penetrations is reduced by using a welded steel plate on one side penetrated by the reach rod, The only opening in the penetration is the gap between the rod and the steel plate which allows for the operation of the reach rod. The fire severity in the affected rooms is less than 30 minutes for all cases. In addition, there is a sprinkler system installed in rooms 161, 179, 171, 2161, and 2179 and smoke detection systems in all rooms to provide early warning capability and protection from the i

spread of a fire from one room to the next. Therefore, the existence of these non-rated penetrations will not affect the ability of the plant to achieve safe-shutdown.

L TL-&l-8 OnL A 2

v t e Letter Sequence Other
TAC:57854, (Open) TAC:57855, (Open) TAC:57856, (Open) TAC:60032, (Open)
Initiation Acceptance... Administration Questions Answers Results Approval... Other: ML20127G217, ML20128Q878, ML20138G213
MONTHYEAR1985-05-31 [Table View]

ML20138G213

Text

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