ML20127G217

Requests Assistance in Conducting Licensing Action Review for Encl Util 850531 Submittal Re Fire Hazards Analysis Reevaluation.Complete SER & SALP Input Using SRP & STS as Guidance Requested by 851129

ML20127G217
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	06/17/1985
From:	Thompson H Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Walker R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
TAC-57243, TAC-57244, TAC-57854, TAC-57855, TAC-57856, TAC-60032, NUDOCS 8506250389
Download: ML20127G217 (3)

Text

'

I June 17, 1985 Docket No. 50-348 Distribution (wo/ encl. )

Docket file A NRC PDR

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

Roger D. Walker, Director 5 0RB#1 RDG L PDR Division of Reactor Projects Memo file HThompson Region II CParrish EReeves (2)

DGruber SVarga FROM:

Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director Glainas Division of Licensing, NRR

SUBJECT:

LICENSING ACTION REVIEW FOR FARLEY UNIT 1 Your assistance is requested in conducting) reviews of the enclosed submittal from Alabama Power Company (APCo dated May 31, 1985, fer Farley Unit 1.

The product expected from you in each case as a result of your review is a complete safety evaluation report suitable for use in an amendment, if necessary.

Your reviewers should use the Standard Review Plan (SRP) and Standard Technical Specifications (STS) as guidance in determining acceptance criteria, recognizing, of course, that, for operating reactors, the criteria in these documents are not requirements.

In accordance with NRR Office Letter No. 44, each safety evaluation performed by a technical division shall have a separate SALP input provided.

For purposes of these reviews, the Regional personnel involved are considered part of the technical divisions.

Therefore, we are requesting that your forwarding memorandum contain a SALP input for each of the safety evaluations performed.

Work for the APCo submittal concerning the Unit 1 fire protection technical exemption requests were discussed between the NRR Project Manager, E. Reeves, and T. Conlon of your staff. The TAC number for the review is 57854 for Unit 1.

The requested completion date is November 29, 1985. This review should be coordinated with the results of the scheduled June 24, 1985 site Fire Review Team meeting if at all possible. TAC 57243 and TAC 57244 now at Region 2 for review are very similar reviews to this new review.

Please notify me as soon as possible if these completion dates are acceptable. Any contact with the licensee concerning these reviews or any additional information deemed necessary should be obtained through the NRR Project Manager for Farley, Edward Reeves, who can be reached at 492-7386.

original signed by

/ Frank J. Miraglia

, 4 / Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director

/ Division of Licensing, NRR

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure:

E. Reeves D. Gruber

• SEE PREVIOUS WHITE FOR CONCURRENCE A M ORB #1:DL*

ORB #1:DL*

BC-ORB #1:DL*

AD:0R:DL*

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pp06/homp, son CParrish EReeves/ts SVarga Glainas 06/11/85 06/11/85 06/12/85 06/11/85 85 8506230389 850617 PDR ADOCK 05000348 F

PDR

9 Docket No. 50-348 Distribution (wo/ encl.)

ocket file NRC PDR MEMORANDUM FOR:

Roger D. Walter, Director ORB #1 RDG L PDR Division of Reactor Projects Memo file HThompson Region II CParrish EReeves(2)

DGruber SVarga FROM:

Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director Glainas Division of Licensing, NRR

SUBJECT:

LICENSING ACTION REVIEW F0 FARLEY UNIT 1 Your assistance is requested in conducting eviews of the enclosed submittal from Alabama Power Company (APCo dated May 31, 1985, for Farley Unit 1.

The product expected from you in each case as a result of your review is a complete safety evalcation r ort suitable for use in an amendment, if necessary. Your reviewer should use the Standard Review Plan (SRP) and Standard Technical Speci ications (STS) as guidance in determining acceptance criteria, recoq izing, of course, that, for operating reactors, the criteria in t ese documents are not requirements.

In accordance with NRR Office Lette No. 44, each safety evaluation performed by a technical division all have a separate SALP input provided. For purposes of these r views, the Regional personnel involved are considered part of the techni al divisions. Therefore, we are requesting that your forwarding morandum contain a SALP input for each of the safety evaluations performe.

Work for the APCo submittal co cerning the Unit I fire protection technical exemption requests were discus ed between the NRR Project Manager, E. Reeves, and T. Conlon of your staff.

he TAC number for the review is 57854 for Unit 1.

The requested compl ion date is November 29, 1985. This review should be coordinated with t e results of the scheduled June 24, 1985 site Fire Review Team meeting if at all possible. TAC 57243 and TAC 57244 now at Region 2 for review are ery similar reviews to this new review.

Please notify me as soon possible if these completion dates are acceptable. Any contact ith the licensee concerning these reviews or any additional information d emed necessary should be obtained through the NRR Project Manager for Farl y, Edward Reeves, who can be reached at 492-7386.

Hugh L. Thompson, Jr., Director Division of Licensing, NRR

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ enclosure:

E. Reeves D. Gruber ORB #1:DL ORB #1 1:DL AD: R. L D:DL CParrish ERe es/ts a

GL inas HThompson 06/0/85 06/ /85 06 5

06/[/85 06/ /85

Cciting Address Atacama Power Company 600 Nortn 18th Street

• Post Off.ce Bow 2641 9 rrmngram Alatama 3$29' 4

Telephone 205 783-6090 A. P. McDonsed b

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MabamaPower May 31, 1985 Docket No. 50-348 Director, Nuclect React.or Regulation U. S. Nucle:r Roulatory Ccamission Washington, D.C.

20555

?.ttention:

Mr. S. A. Varga Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 10CFR50.48 and 10CFR50, Appendix R Fire Protection Exemption Requests 1

Gentlemen:

As discussed in Alabama Power Company's letter dated March 13, 1985 which submitted the exemption requests for all Unit 2 and shared fire areas, a second review of the Farley Nuclear Plant fire areas in Unit I was conducted. This review was conducted to determine the level of compliance with the requirements of 10CFR50.48 and 10CFR50, Appendix R in light of the interpretations to Appendix R set forth in IE Notice 84-09 and Generic Letter 83-33. As a result of this. review, the enclosed document J. M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1,10CFR50 Appendix "R" Fire Hazards Analysis -Reevaluation: i4ay 1985 containing the technical exemption requests from the provisions of 10CFR50 Appendix R is submitted, pursuant to 10CFR50.12(a), for NRC approval. Appendix R compliance reports for each unit, including the criteria used for the review, will be prepared and are scheduled to be available at the plant site by the end of 1985.

Except as described below, all modifications identified in the enclosed technical exemption requests have been implemented.

In technical exemption requests 1-035 and 1-037, Alabama Power Company proposes to install disconnect switches outside the electrical penetration room for the charging pump suction and discharge valves.

Consequently, a schedular exemption is also requested, pursuant to 10CFR50.12, from the requirements of 10CFR50.48(c)(3). The requested schedular exemption is to allow installation of the modifications described in exemption requests 1-035 and 1-037 to be deferred until the first outage of sufficient duration subsequent to design and procurement completion, but no later than the Unit 1 seventh refueling outage which i

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Mr. S. A. Varga May 31, 1985 U. S. Nuclea'r Regulatory Commission Page 2 is currently scheduled for the fourth quarter of 1986. The need for I

this' modification was not identified until February 27, 1985. Design 4

and material needed for this modification could not be obtained in time to allow installation of these modifications during the Unit 1 sixth refueling outage (the estimated lead time on the Class I-E disconnects is 12-16 weeks). Compensatory actions which will be taken until the modifications are completed are described in the exemption requests.

1 Also included in the enclosed document is Revision 1 to exemption request 2-018 submitted in the March 13, 1935 letter. This revision j

provides the correct justification for ensuring the service water inlet valve to CCW heat-exchanger 2B is maintained open in the event the CCW pump 2C and CCW heat-exchanger 2C are out of service.

It should be noted that Alabama Power Company has developed and implemented a detailed shutdown / repair procedure for a cable spreading room fire in Unit 1.

This scenario is considered to have the most severe impact on plant safe shutdown and recovery. This procedure conforms to the guidance issued in Generic Letter 83-33. Similarly, l

detailed procedures for all other fire areas of the plant will be developed based upon the detailed unit compliance report and implemented prior to the end of the Unit i seventh refueling outage currently l

scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986. These procedures will include any operator action identified in the attached exemption requests. Consequently, a schedular exemption is also requested, pursuant to 10CFR50.12, from the requirements of 10CFR50.48(c)(1) for this procedure development based upon the schedule described above. Justification for continued operation until these i

procedures are developed and approved is provided in Attachment 1.

In accordance with 10CFR170.21, enclosed is the application fee of 1

5150.00.

4 i

If you have any questions, please advise.

Yours very truly,1 7

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R. P. Mcdonald RPM /DHJ:bdy-D37 cc:

Mr. L. B. Long Regional Administrator Mr. E. A. Reeves j

Mr. W. H. Bradford Mr. G. F. Trowbridge i

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Attachnent 1 Justification for Continued Operation The following justificatf or, for continued operation is provid!d until detailed procedures for fire areas other than the cable spreading room fire are developed.

( A procedure for the cable spreading room has been issued). These detailed procedures will be based upon the detailed unit compliance report and will be implemented prior to the end of the Unit 1 seventh refueling outage currently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

1.

Operators will be made aware that the enclosed document contdins information that can assist them in responding to a fire in an area other than the cable spreading room.

2.

Additional operator actions / repairs that are necessary to achieve cold shutdown are longer term items which would allow time for operator determination of the problem and the appropriate solution.

To assist in this determination of the problem, the operators have available:

a) Existing Emergency Response Procedures, while not written to specifically address a fire in an area, could be used by the operator in the presence of potential fire damage to a single train, b) existing emergency assistance organizations comprised of scheduled on-call personnel with established contacts within the design organization, c) the design organization with responsibility for the Appendix R analysis has available information which can be used to determine the appropriate action.

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J. M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 10.CFR 50 Appendix "R" Fire Hazards Analysis Reevaluation May 1985 9

PDR

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Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 10CFR'50 Appendix "R" Fire Hazards Analysis Reevaluation May 1985 l

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EXEMPTION REQUEST CROSS-REFERENCE TO F:RE AREA Exemption Request Fire Area -

1-14 1-008 1-15 1-021 1-16 1-013 1-17 1-020

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1-18 1-075-1-19 l'-023 1-20 1-017 1-21 1-018 1-22 1-S02 1-23 1-041 1-24 2-041 1-25 1-042 1-26 2-042

.,a 1-27 1-019 1-28 1-016 1-29 1-030 1-30 1-076 1-31 1-009 1-32 1-012 1-33 1-031 1-34 1-005 1-35 1-034 1-36 1-001 1-37 1-035 1-38 1-006 1-39 1-004 1-40 Generic a

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FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT ICCFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIEE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATICN EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-14 FIRE AREA:

1-008 LOCATION:

UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING CABLE CHASE TRAIN A Fire area 1-008 consists of only room 116 and is bounded by 3-hour fire-rated floor, ceiling, and walls.

Area boundary doors are UL Class A fire rated.

EXEMPT!CN

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Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier.having 1-hour fire rating.

(J CONDITICNS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

TOTAL LOSS OF THE ELECTRICAL TRAIN-A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Fire area 1-008 contains control and power cables for the train-A electrical distribution system.

An analysis of the potential effects of fire induced failures on these cables demonstrates that the plant'could experience a total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system.

This could result in the loss of RCS hot leg temperature instrumentation and neutron flux monitoring instrumentation.

Justification A.1 RCS Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION N1B21TE413(LOOP-1)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1B21TE423(LCOP-2)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1321TE433(LOOP-3)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication Each RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loop is powered from channelized inverter-1A.

Inverter-1A is powered from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-de bus 1A.

A fire in area 1-C08 along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit 1 could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 1A; however, inverter 1A will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus 1A and will supply power to the instrument loops for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

If after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature indication is available from the core exit 1-14-1

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thermocouples.

Core exit thermocouple temperature indication will not be affected by a fire in area 1-008.

In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and, core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.

1.97 will provide a redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N1321TE413, N1321TE423, and N1321TE433. In order in implement this design change, it is required that all design and I

material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.

Based upon the R.G.

1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is currently planned for the seventh refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

After implementation of this modification, a fire in area 1-008 will not affect the ability to monitor one 10cp of RCS hot leg temperature.

A.2 Neutron Flux Monitor Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION 4

Q1C55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor 5

Source range neutron flux monitors N1C55NE031-P1 and N1C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters 1A and 13.

The post-accident neutron-flux monitor Q1C55NE0049A-A is 4

powered from the inverter-1F.

Inverters 1A, 13, and 1F are all powered from 600 V-ac MCC-1A or 125 V-dc bus-1A.

Therefore, neutron-flux monitoring following potential fire damage in area 1-008 and the resultant loss off 600 V-ac MCC 1A will be 1

available for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RER system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RER Ex No. 1 and No. 2 sample valves Q1P15HV3105-B and Q1P15HV3106-3 for determination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area

-l 1-008.

e B.

MAIN STEAM RELEASE Fire area 1-008 contains control cables required for post-fire operation of the main steam atmospheric relief valves.

An analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables demonstrates that the valves could become electrically inoperable in the closed position.

In addition, a total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system as discussed under

" Condition A" could render the valves electrically inoperable in the closed position.

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EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief-Valve (S.G.-1A)

Q1NilPV33713-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-13)

Q1N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1C)

Justification One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam re' ease for cooldown.

The atmospheric re'ief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve j

to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.

Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-008.

The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 1-008 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

C.

FALSE SI, CVI, AND CI SAFETY SIGNAL INITIATION Fire area 1-008 contains instrumentation cables which are not required for post-fire safe shutdown, but due to fire induced failures could cause initiation of safety signals (SI, CI, and CVI) to safe shutdown components.

Justification Fire induced cable failures in fire area 1-008 to nonpost-fire safe shutdown circuitry could potentially result in a false SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system.

Plant procedures exist, or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI, and CI safety signals from the main control room and can be used, if required, for a fire in this area, i

Plant procedures will be developed to include above actions for a fire in this area.

1-14-3 i

J FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA:

1-008 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LCAD FIRE

]

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY

( Btu /f t2)

SE*/ERITY i

116 A

Cable insul.

4489 lb 1,250,296

<9 h Cable Chase i

DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

j Doors:

Airtight UL class A doors are installed between rooms 116 and 335 (area 1-041) and rooms 116 and 185 (area 1-006).

Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Ventilation:

There is no normal ventilation for this area and fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

I

• Floor Drains:

'I.4ere are no floor drains.

l FIRE PROTECTION i

i smoke detection system and automatic sprinkler water n

j suppression system are provided in this area.

In addition, the water hoses located in room 185 (area 1-006) and room 319 (area t

1-042) are available for use as backup.

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F J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALIJATION 4

i EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-15 FIRE AREA:

1-021 l

LCCATION:

UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING SWITCHGEAR ROOM TRAIN 3 i

Fire area 1-021 consists of recms 229 and 233 en el 121 ft - 0 in.

All fire area boundary floors, ceilings, and walls are 3-hour l

rated.

Fire area boundary decrs are UL Class A fire rated.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

INSTRUMENT AIR AND PRESSURE CONTROL d

a Fire area 1-021 contains electrical train-3 eculpment, and power and control cable raceways.

The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area upon the equipment and cabling shows that the plant could lose the entire electrical train-3 system.

Due to the loss of the electrical train-B system, the following safe shutdown equipment could become inoperable in the closed position.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room Q1B13HV2228-B Backup Air /N Supply to Pressurizer i

PORVs Q1831PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PORV, Train A Q1B31PCV0444B-B Pressurizer PORV, Train B j

Q1E21HV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray

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Justification 8

1 Failure of value Q1E21HV8145-N in the closed position will disable the pressurizer auxiliary spray system which provides l

one method to achieve depressurization of the RCS.

Pressuri=er l

PORVs Q1931PCV0445A-A and Q1331PCVO444B-B provide another means of achieving RCS depressurization.

Valves N1P19HV3885-B and Q1813HV2228-B will fail in the closed position on loss of train-B de power.

This will isolate the instrument air supply I

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l to the pressurizer PCRVs Q1B31PCV0445A-A and Q1331PCVO444B-B.

PORV QiB31PCVO444B-B will also be inoperable due to loss of the train-3 de power supply.

However, the train-A de suppIy to PORV Q1931PCVO445A-A is not affected due to a fire in this area.

Since only one of the PORVs is required for RCS depressurization, and RCS depressurization is a long term requirement, the operator has adequate time to take. manual action to restore the instrument air by handwheel operation of valve N1P19EV3885-B.

Once air is restored, PORV Q1331PCVC445A-A will be ope able to achieve RCS depressuri=ation.

Plant procedures will be revised to include the above action f:r a fire in this area.

B.

FIRE'CCGR The door between rooms 233 (area 1-021) and 228 (area 1-020) is provided with a removable transom.

The door and transom assembly cannot be certified as UL Class A.

Justification The door between rooms 233 (area 1-021) and 228 (area 1-020) is provided with a removable transom to facilitate the movement of

- large. equipment.

The transem has been certified by the vender as being constructed of materials And in a manner similar to that of the UL Class A criteria.

The door and transom assembly has not, and cannot, be certified as Class A; however this assembly meets the highest fire rating standards and provides sufficient fire retardancy capability.

(Reference APC letter to NRC dated April 16, 1981.)

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA:

1-021 MA?.IMUM

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ROOM NUMBERS /

SEUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QMNTITY (Btu /ft2)

SEVERITY 229 B

Cable insul. 9,619 lb Switchgear Panels 22 lb Room r

233 3

Cable insul. 8,596 lb Switchgear Panels 22 lb i

Room Area Average 109,062

<1-1/2 h 1-15-2 l

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DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the~ area-boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Doors:

An airtight UL Class A door exists between rooms 229 and 228 (area 1-20); an airtight UL Class A double door exists between room 233 and 228 (area 1-20); and a UL Class A door exists.between rooms 233 and 235 (area 1-23).

Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Ventilation:

Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste EVAC system and the 6CO-V load center air-cendit oning system.

A room cooler serves room (229.

Fire dampers are provided at duct penetrations.

Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Floor Drains:

No floor drains are provided.

FIRE PROTECTION An area smoke detection system is installed.

Heat detectors are provided in the 4.16-kV switchgear, the 5-kV disconnect switch, and the four 600-V load centers.

These heat detectors activate the alarm horn located in the area and total-flooding Com systems in each piece of equipment.

A water hose is installed in room 234 (area 1-20) outside of room 235 (area 1-23) and, would be available.

A 00 hose reel located in room 210 (area 2

1-20) is also available for use in this area.

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1-15-3

l J. M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CER50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATICN EXEMPTICN REQUEST:

1-16 FIRE AREA:

1-013 LOCATICM:

UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING VERTICAL CABLE CHASE Fire area 1-013 consists of rocms 227 (el 128 ft - 0 in.), 30C (el 141 fc - 0 in.)

465 and 466 (el 155 ft - O in.),

and 3CC (el 168 ft - 6 in.).

All fire area boundary walls, flect, and ceiling are 3-hcur fire rated and fire area boundary decrs are UL Class A fire rated.

EXEMPTICN Request exemption from section III.G 2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hcur fire rating.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

INSTRUMENT AIR Fire area 1-013 contains control and power cables for the train-B electrical distribution system.

An analysis of the potential effects of fire induced failures of these cables demonstrates that the plant could experience a total loss of the electrical train-B distribution system.

This could result in the following safe shutdown equipment becoming inoperable in the closed position.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1P19EV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room Q1B13HV2228-B Backup Air /N Supply to Pressurizer PORVs In addition, fire area 1-013 contains control cables associated with valve Q1B13HV2228-8 and the following Unit-1 service air compressors.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1P19M001A-N Service Air Compressor - 1A N1P19M001B-N Service Air Compressor - IB N1P19M001C-N Service Air Compressor - IC N1P19M001D-N Service Air Compressor - 1D 1-16-1 9

The analysis of the potential effects of fire induced failures on these cables demonstrates that valve Q1313EV2228-B.could become inoperable in the closed position and all service air compressors could be disabled.

Justification The only safe shutdown components which require instrument air are the pressuriser PORVs which are required to be operable for RCS depressurization.

RCS depressurication is a long term action required to initiate RHR.

This allows adequate time for manual action to be performed to restore instrument air / backup Na to the pressuriser PCRVs.

The plant has existing procedures to restore the instrument air en loss of the service a r compressors.

Once air is restored, valve N1P19EV3385-3 can be manually operated to restore air to the pressurimer PORVs.

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3.

DEPRESSURIZATION/LETOOWN AND RCS BOUNDARY Fire area 1-013 contains HSP control cables for the following safe shutdown components:

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1B31PCVO445A-A Pressuriser Power Operated Relief Valve Q1313MOV8000A-A Pressurizer PORV Block Valve Q1313SV2213A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve Q1313SV2214A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve The subject cables are associated with control functions from the hot shutdown panel Q1H21NBAFP26050-A.

In addition control cables which shift control from the main control board to hot shutdown panel via the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 2-A are in this fire area.

A fire induced failure. causing multiple hot shorts could cause these components to become inocerable in either closed or open condition, resulting in ne inability to depressurice, letdown, as may be required.

or maintain the R03 bcundary Justification Fire induced failure (het shorts) to the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 2-A could cause control for the power operated relief and blocking valves, and the reactor head vent valves, to shift from the normal main control bcard alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel.

Subsequent fire induced failures shared raceway or(hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the open circuits) of the control cables for QlB31PCV0445A-A, power operated relief valve. and QlB133V2213A-A, and Q1313SV2214A-A roactor h)ad vent valves, could result in the valves failing in undesirable position.

The power relief blocking valves (MOV) could become electrically 1-16-2 1

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In the unlikely event of the

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ransfer relays and manual operation

.nys, thereby shifting control to the Is shutdown panel control cables for components.

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~

FUNCTION l

I Main Steam Isolation SG-1A Main Steam Isolation SG-13

~-

Main Steam Isolation SG-lc

~

Lated with control function from the

?2 605G-A.

In addition, control

~ ' ~.

-;n 7 rom the main control board to the Q. -. ;~h:~r _ T.A ~

..f 7 ~

<n ;* ~..

5

.:er relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 3-A are in 6_.ey a:

~

n..

ww.LC

. m. r-u... ~. eC;n _._..

1. 2-

.-~

cd failure causing multiple hot

.:.e

?

)onents to become inoperable in the i;

t. _..; d9 E 6 @ TTi's3_". M 's

'.~ ^ ~n-L._

/ge.. x.

s a-~--

I 1 -.._

s-B main steam isolation valves wprm 94w

- ~'* a

_~

f~~

-~

'.o open position due to loss of ion syatem.

n

\\

g..- ~ g j. E # w we-w g_. q ;;,r -

,c,m. -. x,

w 7,__

- n w-r

~D.

+,C-' r k

.1

$~ N S N h,ii.@t@d$h' b-.Y

-. _ i c M. {-.".-

orts) to control cables for the 003-A could cause control for the t

-- ~ ~ ' ~

IN11SV3369AC-A, Q1N11SV3369BC-A.

from normal main control board td.E,..Y 1, ~.-_

'E

. --~

hutdown panel.

Subsequent fire Io for the main steam isolation

_ ~ ~~. M. ~ / ~ =-. :,_ _

oulE in the valves becoming r._.

7 yn.. In the unlikely event of the this condition can be mitigated lensfer mlays anel manual operar. ion f, thereby shifting control to the

{

1 onable the plant to maintain main sn-A isolation valves.

STY SIGNAL INITIATION

==

rumentation cables and power supply for post-fire shutdown, but due to atentially initiate a false to colid state protection system.

L.

ll-16-3

Justification Plant procedures exist, or will be developed, for resetting i

spurious SI, CVI, and CI safety signals from the main control room and can be used, if required, for a fire in this area.

Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above actions for a fire in this area.

FIRE AREA INFCRMATION FIRE AREA:

1-013 MAX::CM ROCM NUMBERS /

SECTOCWN COM3UST:3LE FIRE LOAD F:RE I

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL CUANTITY (3:u/ft2)

SEVERITY

227, A,

3, C

Cable 16,524 lbca' 256,281<a> <3-1/2 h(1'

300, A,

3, C insul.4a>

465

466, A

and 500 A

Vertical Cable Chase 3

a.

Applies to rooms 227, 300, 465, 466, and 500 collectively.

OESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Doors:

UL Class A fire-rated doors exist between rooms 300 and 319 (area 1-042), 465 and the primary access point, and 466 and the primary access point (area 1-004).

Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

Penetrations through area l

boundary are sealed with silicone foam.

Ventilation:

Normal supply and exhaust is provided by cable chase supply and exhaust fan.

Fire dampers are provided where ducts penetrate through the floors within the area and where area boundaries are penetrated.

Floor Drains:

A 4-inch diameter floor drain having 1C0 gal /m capacity is located in the bottom of the chase and drains to the floor drain tank.

4 r

l l-16-4 i

I

FIRE PROTECTICN Ionization smoke detectors are located throughout the area.

An automatic water suppression system is provided for this areh.

Two portable fire extinguishers, and two water hose stations located outside room 300 (el 139 ft - 0 in.) in area 1-042 are available as backup.

f 1

1-16-5

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-17 FIRE AREA:

1-020 LOCATION:

NCN-RAD. SIDE CORRIDOR - AUXILIARY BUILDING, EL 121 FT - 0 IN.

Fire area 1-020 consists of rooms 234, 228, 211, 210, 213, 244, 225, and 245 which constitute the corridor, battery service area, and battery room me::anine on el 121 ft - O in. on the non-rad. side of the auxiliary building.

EXEMPTION l

An exemption to section III.G.2.c is requested to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION i

A.

INSTRUMENT AIR FOR PRESSURIZER PORVs Fire area 1-020 contains control and power cables for the train-B electrical distribution system.

An analysis of the potential effects of fire induced failures of these cables demonstrates that the plant could experience a total loss of the electrical train-B distribution system.

This could result in the following instrument air isolation valves becoming inoperable in the closed position.

These valves isolate the primary air and backup air /Na to the pressurizer PORVs.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION e

N1P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to the Penetrations Room Q1313HV2228-B Backup Air /N2 Supply to Pressurizer PORVs Justification The pressurizer PORVs are required to be operable for RCS depressurization.

RCS depressurization is a long term action required to initiate RHR.

Adequate time is available to manually operate N1P19HV3885-B and restore air to the pressurizer PORVs.

1-17-1 8

3.

PRESSURIZATION, LETDOWN, RCS 3CUNDARY Fire area 1-C20 contains HSP centrol cables for the fol' lowing safe shutdown components:

EQUIPMENT FUNCTICN Q1331POVC445A-A Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Q1313MOV8000A-A Pressurizer PCRV Block Valve Q1313SV2213A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve Q1313SV2214A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve The subject cables are associated with centrol fun:::;ns fr:m the hot shutd:wn panel.

In additi:n, centro; cables which shift cont:01 from the main centrol board to the het shutdown panel via transfer relays are in this fire area.

A fire induced failure causing multiple and selective shorts could cause these components to becere inoperable in either a closed or open condition, resulti I in the plant's idability to depressurize, letdown, or maintain the RCS boundary as may be required.

Justification M

Fire induced failures (hot shcrts) within the control cables for the transfer relays could cause centrol of the valves to shift

' # from the main control board to the remote hot shutdown panel.

Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent centrol cables in the shared raceway or open circuits) of the control cables for Q1331PCV0445A-A, power operated relief valve, and Q1313SV2213A-A, and Q13135V2214A-A reactor head vent valves, could result in the valves failing in undesirable positions.

The power relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position.

In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manually resetting the affected relays (handle is provided), thereby shifting control to the main control board.

C.

CCNDENSATE STORAGE TANK LEVEL INDICATION Fire area 1-020 contains instrumentation cables for redundant condensate storage tank level instrument channels.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTICN Q1P15LTS15-A CST Level Train A Q1P15LT516-3 CST Level Train 3 The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area shows that the plant could lose both trains of CST level indication.

1-17-2

Justification Verification of condensate storage tank level is a long term consideration.

In the event that both channels of CST level are disabled, manual operator action can be taken to determine CST level independent of fire area 1-020.

D.

MAIN STEAM ISOLATION Fire area 1-020 contains hot shutdown panei control cables for the following safe shutdown components.

SOUIPMSMT FUNCTICN 21N11573369AC-A Main Steam !sciation 33-1A Q1N11SV33693C-A Main Steam Isolation SG-13 Q1N11SV3369CC-A Main Steam Isolation SG-lC The subject cables are associated with the control functicn from the hot shutdown panel Q1H21NBAFP26C5G-A.

In addition, control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22LCO3-A are in this fire area.

A fire induced failure causing multiple hot shorts could cause these components to become inoperable in the open position.

In addition, electrical train-B main steam isolation valves could become inoperable in the open position due to loss of the electrical train-3 distribution system.

Justification Fire induced failures (hot shorts) within control cables for the transfer relays could cause control for the main steam isolation valves Q1N11SV3369AC-A, Q1N11SV3369BC-A, and Q1N11SV3369CC-A to shift from the main control board to the remote hot shutdown panel.

Subsequent fire induced failures of the cables for the main steam isolation valves listed above, could result in the valves becoming inoperable in the open position.

In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occurring, this

~

condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manually resetting the affected relays (handle is provided), thereby shifting control to the main control board.

This will enable the plant to maintain main steam isolation using the train-A isolation valves.

E.

FALSE SI, CI, AND CVI SAFETY SIGNAL INITIATICN Fire area 1-020 contains power supply cables which, potentially initiate a falso SI, CVI, and CI safety signal from the solid state protection system.

I 1-17-3

i Justification Plant procedures exist, or will be developed, for resettin.;

spurious SI, CVI, and CI safety signals from the main contr'l o

room and can be used, if required, for a fire in this area.

F.

MAIN STEAM RELEASE Fire area 1-020 contains control cables required for post-fire operation of the main steam atmospheric relief valves.

An analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables de=cnstrates that the valves could become electrically inoperable in the closed position.

EOUIPMENT FUNCTICN Q1N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A)

Q1N11PV33713-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-13)

Q1N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1C)

Justification One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and related steam generator is required to be operable to achieve steam 3

release for cooldown.

The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.

Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-020.

The capacility to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant. system temperature with the use of manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 1-020 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

G.

RCS SAMPLING A fire in area 1-020 could result in the loss of the train-B electrical distribution system.

This could cause the following samples valves to fail closed.

1-17-4

VALVES FUNCTION Q1P155V3881-B Pressuriser Sample

~

Q1P155V3332-B Pressurizer Sample Q1P15SV3101-B RCS Loop 1 Hot Leg Sample QlP15SV3333-3 RCS Hot Leg Sample Q1P155V3105-3 RHR Heat Exchanger Sample Q1P15SV3106-3 RHR Heat Exchanger Sample In addition, cables for neutron flux monitors N1055NE0031-F1, N1C55NE0032-P2, and Q1C55NE0048A-A are in the fire area.

An analysis of the potential effects of fire induced failures Of these cables demonstrates that these mon : Ors may beccme inoperable.

Justificatien An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RER system by manually operating RER heat exchanger sample valves Q1P15SV3105-B or Q1P155V3106-B.

H.

MAKZUP AND RCP SEAL INTEGRITY Centrol cables for the following valves are routed through fire area 1-020.

VALVES FUNCTION QlE21LCV0115B-A RWST to Charging Pump Suction Q1E21LOV0115D-B RWST to Charging Pump suction Q1P17MOV3047-B CCW Heat Exchanger Discharge Control cables in area 1-020 for Q1E21LOV01153-A and QlE21LCV0115D-B are associated with control of the valves from the hot shutdown panel., In addition, control cables which shift control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via transfer relays are in the fire area.

A fire induced failure causing multiple and selective shorts could cause these components to become electrically inoperable in the closed position.

At a point in the shutdown process one of these valves may be required to be open to line up charging pump suction to the RWST.

Control cables in area 1-020 for Q1P17MOV3047-3 are related to control of the valve from the hot shutdown panel and control of the valve frem the main centrol board.

An analysis of the potential effecta of fire induced failures of these cables demonstrates that the valve may close spuriously and isolate component cooling water to safe shutdown equipment.

I l-17-5

Justification In the unlikely event that multiple and selective cabis failures occur and the valve failures described above result, the conditions can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manually resetting the affected relays (handle is provided), thereby shifting control to the main control beard.

Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above action for a fire in this area.

I.

NCN-F:RE RATED EATOH COVERS Two hatchways in roem 234 directly above one another have ncn-rated steel plate covers.

These hatchways communicate with fire area 1-042 and 1-006.

Justification The sprinkler system installed in room 234 will serve the purpose of a water curtain to prevent the passage of a fire from area 1-020 to the adjacent fire areas via the non-rated steel hatches.

Sprinkler systems existing in the hatch area of the fire areas above and below room 234 will prevent the spread of fire from these areas into area 1-020.

J.

FIRE DCORS The doors between room 235 (area 1-023) and 234 (area 1-020) are provided with removable transoms.

The door and transom assembly cannot be certified as UL Class A.

Justification The doors between rooms 235 (area 1-023) and 234 (area 1-C20) are provided with removable transoms to facilitate the movement of large equipment.

The transoms have been certified by the vendor as being constructed of materials and in a manner similar to that of the UL Class A criteria.

The door and transom assembly has not, and cannot, be certified as Class A; however, this assembly meets the highest fire rating standards and provides sufficient tire retardancy capability.

(Reference AFC letter to NRC dated April 16, 1981.)

1-17-6

FIRE AREA INFORMATICN FIRi AREA:

1-020 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SEUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LCAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft2)

SE*1ERITY 210 A,

B Corridor Channel 2 211 B, A Corridor Char.nels 3 and 4 213 Battery Service C

Room 228 B,

C Corridor Cable 2,296 lbia' 27,754ca

<30 min ca.

234 Hallway insul.ca>

244 Roof, A,

B Battery Channels B Room, 1 and 2 El 131 ft -

0 in 245 Roof, B,

A Battery Channels A Room, 1 and 2 El 131 ft -

O in.

225 Battery C

Cable insul. 137 lb 14,556

<30 min Charger Panels 14 lb (a) Applies to rooms 210, 211, 213, 228, 234, 244, and 245 collectively.

DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete with removable steel plate hatches between rooms 234 and 345 (area 1-042) and between 234 and 185 (area 1-6).

1-17-7

Doors:

A UL Class B door exists between room 234 and stairway No. 1; two airtight UL Class A doors exist between rooms 234 and 235 (area 1-23); an airtight UL Class A door exists between rooms-228 and 233 (area 1-21) and rocms 228 and 229 (area 1-21); and a UL Class A door exists between rooms 210 and 254 (area 1-12), rooms 211 and 226 (area 1-19), rocms 210 and 201 (area 1-14), rooms 210 and 202 (area 1-15),

rocms 213 and 212 (area 1-16), rooms 213 and 214 (area 1-17), rec =s 225 and 224 (area 1-18), and rooms 225 and 226 (area 1-19).

Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

Penetrations through the area beundary are sealed.

Ventilation:

Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste H7AC system.

There is an individual r:Om cooler serving room 225.

Fire damper decrs are pr:v;ded at duct penetrations in the area boundaries.

Floor Drains:

Five 4-in. diameter floor drains having a 1CC-gal /m capacity each are pkovided throughout the area.

These drains discharge to a sump in room 185 (area 1-6) which has two pumps of 100-gal /m capacity each with discharge to the floor drain tank.

FIRE PROTECTION M

An ionization smcke detection system provides coverage to the entire

• area.

Automatic water suppression systems cover the entire area, except reem 225.

A CO hose reel is located in room 210.

A water hose is provided in 2

recms 211 and 234.

Fortable extinguishers are provided throughout the area.

EXISTING FIRE PROTECTICN JUSTIFICATION Room 225 is not covered by an automatic suppression system.

The roem does not contain redundant safe shutdown cable or equipment.

e 1-17-8

i J. M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PTANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATICN EXEMPTICN REQUEST:

1-18 FIRE AREA:

1-075 LCCATION:

UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING TO DIESEL BUILDING CABLE TUNNEL TRAIN A i

Fire area 1-C73 consists of a cable tunnel running from the Unit 1 auxiliary building to the diesel generator building.

The fire area boundary floor, ceiling, and walls are 3-hour fire rated.

A UL Class A fire-rated door exists between the tunnel and the diesel buil:fing.

A non-fire-rated watertight door and bulkhead exist between the tunnel and auxiliary building room 251 (area i

1-031).

The non-rated door has had a fire-resistant coating applied.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it l

requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be

[

enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire detection system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION N

\\,

A.

TOTAL LOSS OF ELECTRICAL TRAIN-A DISTRIBUTION' SYSTEM 5 s3 A fire in area 1-075 could potentfally result in fire damage to i

the electrical circuitry of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 train-A i

diesel generators.

This condition along with.an ass'umed loss of %

s offsite power (LOSP) for Unit I could result in totaf loss ofi the electrical train-A distribution' system. %Thisi could 'resulth !

in the loss of RCS hot leg temperature indication and neutron _]

flux monitoring instrumentation, 1

('-

.,., {

g'% - '

s x

Justification s

t

\\

i A.1 RCS Hot Leg Temperature Indication:

,(

[

s.8

.8 INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTIOM

• s

,9 N1321TE413(LOOP-1)

RCS Hot Lec1%, Temperature Indication g

7 N1B21TE423(LOOP-2)

RCS Hot LegTemperatuie,IIndication h' '[i N1B21TE433(LOOP-3)

RCS Hot Leg Temperattke,,Indicatio:

"^

q '1 4

r Each RCS loop hot leg temperature 1:nstramentation le'op is powered from channelized inverter-1A. ' Inverter-1A is pokered from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus 1A.

A 'fith in arda 1-079 Y

h

\\

~.

l 1

s s

}

c,

)

Q.'4

?:

'.ig_1 f

s

./

g A

I t

g

,i q

4 l

.t

---

t..

~

along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit 1 could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 1A; however, inverter 1A will continue to operate frem 125 V-dc bus 1A and will supply power to the instrument loc'ps for a minimum cf 2 hcurs.

If after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature indication is available from the core exit thermocouples.

Core exit thermocouple temperature indica:icn will not be affected by a fire in area 1-075.

In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.

1.97 will provide a redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature leeps N1321TE413, N1321TE423, and N1321TE433.

In order ::

implement this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the =cdification.

Based upon the R.G.

1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the mcdification is currently planned for the seventh refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

After implementation of this modification, a fire in area 1-075 will not affect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS hot leg temperature.

A.2 Neutron Flux Monitor Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION Q1C55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor Source range neutron flux monitors N1C55NE0031-P1 and N1C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters 1A and 1B.

The post-accident neutron-flux monitor Q2C55NE004SA-A is powered from inverter-1F.

Inverters 1A, 1B, and 1F are all powered from 600 V-ac MCC-1A or 125 V-de bus-1A.

Therefore, neutron flux monitoring following potential fire damage in area l

1-075 and the resultant less ::

'i-a : MCC 1A will be L

available for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

An RCS sample can be L.

obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portions of l

the RCS sampling system and RHR Ex No. 1 and No. 2 sample valves I,

Q1P15HV3105-3 and Q1P15HV3106-B for determination of the bcron L

concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area f

1-075.

B.

MAIN STEAM RELEASE

?

A total loss of the electrical train-A distributien system, as discussed under " Condition A," could render main steam atmospheric relief vales electrically inoperable in the closed position.

1-18-2

EQUIPMENT FUNCTICN Q1N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A)

Q1N11PV33713-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-13)

Q1N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1C)

Justification One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.

The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manual'y _

opened or cl,osed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.

Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-075.

The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2. natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 1-075 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve, Plant procedures will be developed to include above actions for a fire in this area.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA:

1-075 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUAMTITY (Btu /ft2)

SEVERITY i

Cable Tunnel A

Cable insul. 32,650 lb 59,600

<1 h i

DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floor, ceiling, and walls forming area boundary area of reinforced concrete.

Doors:

The door to diesel building is UL Class A fire-rated.

The door between tunnel and auxiliary building (area 1-031) is a non-fire-rated watertight door.

A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the non-rated door.

l 1-18-3

5 l

Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

All wall penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Bulkhead between cable tunnel and ausiliary building (area 1-031) is non-fire rated.

Ventilation:

None Floor drains:

The floor drainage has a capacity of 100 gal /m which discharges to yard drains.

A sump and su=p pump are provided.

er.R_e : =_r _ r_ -. e n N e

v

.e An automatic water suppression system is installed in this area.

JUSTIFICATIGN FOR FIRE PRCTECTICN 1

The watertight door ar.

the bulkhead between auxiliary building (area 1-031) and cable tunnel (area 1-075) do not comply with 3-hour fire rated boundary requirements.

However, a fire in area 1-075 propagating into area 1-031 will not have any additio.nal impact on Unit-1 safe shutdown because the same redundant safe shutdown function cables are contained in both 3

the areas.

e 1

1 1-18-4

-1 J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE EAEARDS ANALYSIS REEVALdATIO,N EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-19 FIRE AREA:

1-023

+

LOCATION:

UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING CRDM SWITCEGEAR RCCM TRA:N 3 i

Fire area 1-023 consists only of room 235 and is bounded by 3-heur fire-rated walls, floor, and ceiling.

Area bcundary doors are UL Class A fire rated.

l EXEMPT!CN Request exemption from section III.G.2.C to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdcwn cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating.

1 4

i; CONDITIONS RECU! RING EXEMPTION A.

IESTRUMENT AIR AND PRESSURE CONTROL j

Fire area 1-023 contains electrical train-B power and control cable raceways.

The analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables shows that the plant could experience a total loss of the electrical train-B distribution system.

Due to loss

. of the electrical train-3 distribution system the following safe shutdown components will beccme inoperable in the closed position.

l t

EQUIPMENA eUNCTION N1P19EV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Reem

^

Q1313EV2228-B Backup Air /N2 Supply to Pressurl___

"T_

Q1331PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PORV, Train A 3

i Q1331PCV0444B-B Pressurizer PORV, Train B l

Q1E21EV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Justification l

l Failure of valve Q1E21EV8145-N in the closed position will disable the pressuriser auxiliary spray system which provides cne method to achieve depressurization of the RCS.

Pressuriser PORVs Q1331PCV0445A-A and Q1331PCV04443-B provide i

another means of achieving RCS depressurization.

Valves t

N1P19EV3885-B and Q1313EV2228-B will fail in the closed position j

on loss of train-B de power.

This will isolate the instrument air supply to the pressuriser PORVs Q1331PCV0445A-A and I-i l_

1-19-1

'O I

, m m-

,w,,--,-n,

,,,,.,--,er--

-w,,,,nwe,,n.we v, -,,

n---.nmm,mmn-a,--

=,, -

r,-

~ -. -,, ~ - -. ~,,

~

we.

- - ~ - ~ +

i e

QlB31PCV0444B-B.

PORV Q1B31PCV0444B-B will also be inoperable due to loss of the train-B de power supply.

However, the train-A de supply to PCRV QlB31PCV0445A-A is,not affected due to a fire in this area.

Since only one of the FORVs is required for RCS depressurization, and RCS depressurization is a long term requirement, the operator has adequate time to take manual action to restore the instrument air by hand wheel operation of valve N1P19EV3885-3.

Once air is restored, PORV QlB31PCV0445A-A will be Operable to achieve RCS depressurization.

Plant procedures will be revised to include the ab:ve acti:n for a fire in area 1-023.

B.

FIRE-RATED DCORS The doors between room 235 (area 1-023) and 234 (area 1-020) are previded with remodhble transoms.

The door and transom assembly cannot be certified as UL Class A.

Justification The doors between rooms 235 (area 1-023) and 234 (area 1-020) are provided with removable transoms to facilitate the movement

- *of large equipment.

The transoms have been certified by the vendor as being constructed of materials and in a manner similar to that of the UL Class A criteria.

The door and transom assembly has not, and cannot, be certified as Class A; however, this assembly meets the highest fire rating standards and provides sufficient fire retardancy capability.

(Reference AFC letter to NRC dated April 16, 1981.)

FIRE AREA INFORMATICN FIRE AREA:

1-023 e

MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft8)

SEVERITY 235 B

Cable insul.

6,599 lb 68,002

<1 h Switchgear Panels 43 lb Room DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

y Doors:

Two airtight UL Class A doors are located between rooms 235 and 234 (area 1-20) and a UL Class A door exists between 1-19-2

I rooms 235 and 233 (area 1-21); airtight UL Class A doors exist between rooms 235-and 249 (area 1-30) and rooms 235 and 250 (area 1-31).

~

Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Ventilation:

Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste HVAC system.

Fire dampers are provided and are interlocked with the total-flooding Halon system.

Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Floor Drains:

No floor draino are provided.

t FIRE PROTECTICN Four ionization smoke detectors are prov_ded which activate an alarm bell in. room 234 (area 1-20) and annunciate in the control room.

A total-flooding Halon system is provided which is activated by the detectors.

A water hose installed in room 234 (area 1-20) outside of room 235 is available as a backup.

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FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 4

1.OCFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION 4

1 1'

EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-20

+

FIRE AREA:

1-017 1

i LCCATICN:

UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING TRA!N-A BATTERY RCCM i

i l

Fire area 1-017 consists of only room 214 and is bounded by 3-hour fire-rated floor, ceiling, and walls.

Area boundary door is UL Class A fire rated.

EXEMPTICN Request exemption from section.III.G.2.c to the extent that it

}

requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION I

A.

TOTAL LOSS OF THE ELECTRICAL TRAIN-A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Fire area 1-017 contains electrical train-A 125 V-dc plant i

batteries and related 125 V-dc train-A power cabling.

An evaluation of the potential effects of a fire in this area shows that the plant could exper;ence a total loss of the 125 V-dc train-A distribution system.

This condition along with an i

assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit-1 will cause total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system.

A total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system could cause j

loss of RCS hot leg temperature indication and neutron flux i

monitoring instrumentation.

j Justifications A.1 RCS Hot Leg Temperature Indication I

t l

INSTRUMENTATICN EUNCTION i

N1B21TE413(LOOP-1)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1321TE423(LOOP-2)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication l

N1321TE433(LCOP-3)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication I

Each RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loop is 1

powered from channelized inverter-1A.

Inverter-1A is powered i

from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus 1A.

A fire in area 1-017 i

j r

i t

i i

1-20-1 i

b 1

along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LCSP) for Unir 1 could result in loss of RCS hot leg temperature indication.

Alternate RCS hot leg temperature indication is available from the core exit thermocouples.

Core exit temperature indication will not be affected by a fire in area 1-017.

In addition to the alternate core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.

1.97 will provide a redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N1321TE413, N1B21TE423, and N1B21TE433.

In order to implement this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.

Based upon the R.G.

1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the mod;fication is currently planned for the seventh refueling cutage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

After implementation of 3his modification, a fire in area 1-017 will not affect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS het leg temperature indication.

A.2 Neutron Flux Monitor Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION QlC55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor '

N1C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor Source range neutron flux monitors N1C55NE0031-P1 and N1C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters lA and 13.

The post-accident neutron-flux monitor Q1C55NE0048A-A is powered from inverter-lF.

Ipverters lA, 1B, and 1F are all powered from 600 V-ac MCC.1A or 125 V-dc bus-1A.

A fire in area 1-017 along with an assumed loss of offsite power could cause loss of neutron flux monitoring.

An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portions of the RCS e

sampling system and RHR Ex No. 1 and No. 2 sample valves Q1P15HV3105-B and Q1P15EV3106-B for determination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area 1-017.

B.

MAIN STEAM RELEASE Total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system, as discussed under " Condition A," could render the following valves electrically inoperable in the closed position.

EQUIPMENT FUNCT!CN Qlh11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A)

Q1N11PU13713-A Mai" Staim AtPasch?"c Pa7iaf "1'/t (S.G.-1B)

Q1N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1C) 1-20-2

i i

+

i Justification One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves ahd 4

related steam generator is required to be operable to achieve i

steam release for cooldown.

The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air suoplies.

i The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.

Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity 3

i of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be t

accessible despite a fire in area 1-017.

The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric j

relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 1-017 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

C.

FALSE SI, CVI, AND SI SAFETY SIGNAL INITIATICN.

4, Total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system as 3

i discussed under condition A could potentially result in a false

~

SI, CVI, and CI safety signal initiation from the solid state t

protection system.

1 Justification l

Plant procedures exist or will be developed for resetting spurious SI, CVI, and CI safety signals from the main control l

room and can be used, if required, for a fire in this area.

i j

Plant procedures will be developed to include above actions for i

a fire in this area.

i FIRE AREA INFORMATION f

i

\\

j FIRE AREA:

1-017 i

MAXIMLH l

ROOM NUMBERS /

SEUTDOWN CCM3USTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE l

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft 1 SEVERITY

[

8 i

j 214 A

Cable insul. 23 lb 1391

<30 min l

Battery Room Panels 14 lb j

DESIGN FEATURES l

Construction:

Floor, ceiling, and walls formin'g area boundary are of reinforced concrete, i

i i

1 1

1-20-3 1

1 b

_ _ ~ ~__ ___ _ -,_- _

Doors:

UL Class A door is located between rooms 214 and 213 (area 1-020).

Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

All wall penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Ventilation:

Normal supply is by the non-radwaste EVAC system.

Normal exhaust is by the battery room exhaust fan.

Fire dampers are provided at.the duct _ penetrations.

Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Elcor drains:

A 4-in. diameter ficer drain having a 120-gal /m capacity drains to a sump in recm 241 (area 1-24).

The sump has two 10C-gal /= capacity sump pumps which discharge to the ficer drain tank.

FIRE PROTECi!CN s

smoke detection system in the room will previ-!.e an early n

warning.

A CO hose reel located in reem 230 (Jire aret 2

1-020) is available for use.

In addition, the battery room is provided with a temperature switch that provides a high temperature alarm on BCP cabinet-1L in the main control room.

e k

1-20-4

J. M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 1CCFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATICN EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-21 FIRE AREA:

1-018 LCCATION:

TRAIN-A DC SWITCHGEAR ROCM, AUXILIARY BUILDING, EL 121 FT - 0 IN.

EXIMPTICN Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

TOTAL LOSS OF ELECTRICAL TRAIN-A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Fire area 1-018 contains control and power cables for the train-A electrical distribution system.

An analysis of the potential effects of fire induced failures on these cables demonstrates that the plant could experience a total loss of the electrical. train-A distribution system.

This could result in the loss of RCS hot leg temperature indication and neutron flux monitoring instrumentation.

Justifications A.1 RCS Hot Leg Temperature Indication INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION w

N1B21TE413(LOOP-1)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1B21TE423(LOOP-2)

RCS Hot Leg Temperatura, Indication N1B21TE433(LOOP-3)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication Each RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loop is powered from channelized inverter-1A.

Inverter-1A is powered from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus 1A.

A fire in area 1-018 could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 1A; however, inverter 1A will continue to operate from 125 V-de bus 1A and will supply power to the instrument loops for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

If after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature indications are available from the core exit thermocouples.

Core exit temperature indication will not be affected by a fico in area 1-010.

In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and core exit 1-21-1

temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.

1.97 will provide redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N1321TE413, N1321TE423, and N1321TE433.

In order to imple..ent this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.

Based upon the R.G.

1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is currently planned for the seventh refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

After implementation of this modification, a fire in area 1-018 will not affect the ability to monitor at least one RCS hot leg temperature loop.

A.2 Neutron Flux Monitor Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION Q1C55NEOC48A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor Source range neutron flux monitors N1C55NE0031-P1 and N1C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters 1A and 13.

The post-accident neutron flux monitor Q2C55NE0048A-A is powered from inverter-1F.

Inverters 1A, 1B, and 1F are all powered from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus-1A.

A fire in area 1-018 may result in the loss of 125 V-dc bus-1A and loss of power to MCC 1A.

An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RER system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RHR Ex No. 1 and No. 2 sample valves.Q1P15HV3105-B and 01P15HV3106-B for determination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area 1-018.

B.

MAIN STEAM RELEASE Fire area 1-018 contains power and control cables required for post-fire operation of the main steam atmospheric relief valves.

An analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables demonstrates that the valves could become electrically inoperable in the closed position.

In addition, a total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system as discussed under " Condition A," could render the valves electrically inoperable in the closed position.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A)

Q1N11PV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1B)

Q1N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1C) 1-21-2

Justification One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and related steam generator is required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.

The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical control or air supplies.

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.

Both the air centrol and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief va've and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-018.

The capability to centrol steam genera:cr pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 1-018 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

C.

FALSE SI, CI, AND CVI SAFETY SIGNAL INITIATION A total loss of train-A power including the train-A de bus could result in false SI, CI, and CVI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system.

Justification Plant procedures exist or will be developed for resetting spurious SI, CI, and CVI signals from the main control rocm and can be used, if required, for a fire in this area.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA:

1-018 MAXIMUM RCOM NUMBERS /

SEUTDOWN CO61BUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft8)

SEVERITY 224 A,

Cable insul. 691 lb 29,191

<30 min de Switchgear Channels Panele

$1 lb Room 1 and 2 DESION FEATURES Construction:

Floor, ceiling, and walls forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Doors:

A UL Class A door exists between rooms 224 and 225 (area 1-20).

1-21-3

~ -

d Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam.

o Ventilation:

Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste HVAC system.

A room cooler is located outside the room in room 245.

Fire dampers are provided in the duct penetrations.

Floor drains:

No floor drains are provided.

j FIRE PROTECTION An ionization smoke detector is located in the room.

A portable extinguisher is located in room 225 (area 1-22).

Portable i

extinguishers are also located in rooms 210 and 211 (area 1-20).

A CO2. hose reel located in room 210 (area 1-20) is available for use in this area,

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FARLEY NUCLEAR PLAN'"

10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZAR.DS ANALYSIS REEVALUATICN EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-22 FIRE AREA:

1-SO2 LOCATION:

UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING STAIRWELL NO. 2 Fire area 1-502 extends vertically from el 77 ft - 0 in. to its ceiling at el 163 ft - 0 in.

All fire area boundary walls are a:

a minimum 2-hour fire rated.

All doors are Class B fire doors with the exception of dcor 317A (el.139 ft 0 - in.) and the door in the ceiling (el 163 ft - 0 in.) which are Class A fire doors.

EXIMPTICN Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires the installation of an automatic fire suppressien system.

CCNDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION Fire area 1-502 contains redundant safe shutdown control cabling that is required for operation of the following safe shutdown systems and supporting functions which are not separated by a distance greater than 20 ft with no intervening combustibles.

1.

Instrument Air (Containment Supply) 2.

Component Cooling Water System 3.

Reactor Qoolant Pump Seal Integrity 4.

Boration/Make Up w

5.

Reactor Coolant System Boundary Integrity 6.

Residual Heat Removal System The analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables has shown that fire induced failures could result in component maloperation which would impair the operation of the above systems and functions.

MCDIFICATICH A fire barrier consisting of two 1-in.-thick Knowool blanket wraps with one overall layer of Zetex woven fabric has been t

1-22-1

provided over the raceways in fire area 1-502 that contain redundant safe shutdown cabling.

The following raceways have been provided with fire barriers extending the entire dength of the raceway within the area:

AED130, AMEO71, BHJV18, BHJV21, BHKZ18, BHK221, and BHJW12.

A smoke detection system has been provided in the area of the redundant cable raceways.

Justification With the implementatien of the proposed modification, redundant safe shutdown cabling in fire area 1-502 has been enclosed in a fire barrier and a early warning smoke detection system has been provided.

The insitu ccmbustible fire leading in area 1-S02 is low, consisting cnly of cable insulation with a maximum fire severity of less than 30 min, which is less than the fire rating of the proposed raceway fire barriers.

Based upon the low in-situ combustible loading, the fire protection and detection systems provided, and the accessibility of this area for portable fire fighting equipment, an exemption to the requirements of section III.G.2 for the installation of an automatic fire suppression system is requested.

FIRE \\REA INFORMATION FIRE AREA:

1-S02

?

MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SHUT 00WN CCMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft8)

SEVERITY Stairwell Cable insul. 612 lb 39,678

<30 min No. 2 DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

All fire boundaries are a minimum 2-hour fire rating.

Doors:

All doors are Class B fire doors with the exception of Class A doors between the stairwell and room 334 (area 1-34) and in the northeast cornar of the stairwell ecil;ng (el 163 ft O in.).

Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through the area boundaries are sealed with silicone foam, Nelsen Frames, or steel plates.

i Ventilation:

The area is not served by a HVAC System.

Floor Drains:

The stairwell has a sump and two pumps which discharge to the floor drain tank.

I 1-22-2

~

FIRE PROTECTION The area has no automatic suppression system installed.

A smoke detection system is provided.

A hose cabinet and portible extinguisher are provided on the landing at el 121 ft - 0 i'n.

Hose cabinets and portable extinguishers are readily available in adjacent fire areas at all elevations.

Portable smoke remevable equipment is available at el 77 ft - 0 in.

e F

I t

1-22-3

_ ~ _ _ _.

~ _.. - - _. -

f.

t i

t J. M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATICN EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-23 l

FIRE AREA:

1-041 i

LOCATION:

UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING, EL 139 FT - C IN.

l l

Fire area 1-041 consists of rooms 335, 343, and 346.

All fire area beundary walls, f': ors, and ceilings have a 3-hour fire 3

}

rating, with all electrical and piping penetrations sealed for a j

3-hour fire rating.

All ventilation ducting penetrating the fire area boundary have 3-hour fire rated dampers installed.

All 4

doors located in the fire area boundary are UL listed Class A 1

doors.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the ex**nt that it 1

requires one train of safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an l

automatic fire suppression system.

1 i

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION 1

i

]

A.

TCTAL LOSS OF THE ELECTRICAL TRAIN-A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM t

1 j

Fire area 1-041 contains control and power cables for the train-A j

electrical distribution system.

An analysis of the potential effects of fire induced failures on these cables demonstrates i

that the plant could experience a total loss of the electrical j

train-A distribution system.

This could result in the loss of I

RCS hot leg temperature instrumentation and neutron flux monitoring instrumentation.

l 1

e l

Justifications I

i A.1 RCS Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation i

j INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION i

j N1B21TE413(LOOP-1)

RCS Hot Leg Temp erature, Indication N1B21TE423(LCOP-2)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication i

j N1B21TE433(LCOP-3)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication Each RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loop is powered j

from channelized inverter-1A.

Inverter-1A is powered from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-CC bus lA.

A fire in area 1-041 along l

1 1,

I I

i 1-23-1 i

a I

I I

with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) could result in loss cf the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 1A; however, inverter IA will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus 1A and will supply power to the instrument loops for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

If after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature indication is available from the core exit thermocouples.

Core exit temperature indication will not be affected by a fire in area 1-041.

In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.O.

1.97 will provide a redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops M1321TE413, N1321TE423, and N1321TE433.

In order to implemenc this design change, it is required that all design and material be ensite prior to initiation of the modification.

Based upon the R.G.

1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is currently planned for the seventh refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

After implementation of this modification, a fire in area 1-041 will not affect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS hot leg temperature.

A.2 Neutron Flux Monitor Instrumentation I

INSTRUMENTATION EUNCTION Q1C55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0031-F1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flu.t Monitor Source range neutron flux monitors NIC55NE0031-P1 and N1C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters 1A and 13.

The post-accident neutron flux monitor Q1C55NE0048A-A is powered from inverter-1F.

Inverters 1A, 1B, and 1F are all powered from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-de bus-1A.

Therefore, neut.ron-flux monitoring following potential fire damage in area 1-041 and the resultant loss of 600 V-ac MCC 1A will be available for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RHR Hx No. 1 and No. 2 sample valves Q1P15EV3105-B and Q1P15EV3106-B for determination of the boren concentration and shutd:wn.aacgin foll; wing a fire in a aa 1-C41.

B.

MAIN STEAM RELEASE Fire area 1-041 contains power and control cables required for post-fire operation of the main steam atmospheric relief valves.

An analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables demonstrates that the valves could become electrically inoperable in the closed position.

In addition, a total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system as discussed under "Candition A" could render the valves electrically inoperacle in the closed position.

1-23-2

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A)

Q1N11PV33713-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (.S.G.-13)

Q1N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1C)

Justificatien One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.

The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The operatcr wculd establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air centrcl valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.

Both the air control an3 air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospgeric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-041.

The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 1-041 would not

-g prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

Plant procedures will be developed to include the above actions for a fire in this area.

C.

FIRE DCCR The door between rooms 346 (area 1-041) and 345 (area 1-042) is provided with a removable transom.

The door and transom assembly cannot be certified as UL Class A.

Justification e

The door between rooms 346 (area 1-041) and 345 (area 1-042) is provided with a removable transom to faciliate the movement of large equipment.

The transom has been certified by the vendor as being constructed of matorials and in a manner similar to that of the UL Class A criteria.

The door and transom assembly has not, and cannot, be certified as Class A; however, this assembly meets the highest fire rating standards and provides sufficient fire retardancy capability.

(Reference APC letter to NRC dated April 16, 1991.)

1-23-3

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA:

1-041

~

MAXIMUM RCCM NUMBERS / SEUTDCWN CCMBUSTIBLE FIRE LCAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft )

SE*lIRITY 335 Load A

Cable ca>

25,881 lbea' 105,934ca

<1-1/2 h

Center Rocm insul.

Panels 343 Load A

Center Roem 346 Switch-A gear and M-G Set Room a.

Applies to rooms 335, 343, and 346 collectively.

DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floors, walls, and ceilings forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Doors:

An airtight UL Class A door is located between reems 335 and 339 (area 1-42); 343 and 246 (area 1-21), an airtight UL Class A double door exists between rooms 343 and 339 (area 1-42);

and 346 and 339 (area 1-42); airtight UL Class A doors exist between rooms 335 and 116 (area 1-8) and 117 (area 1-9).

Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:

Penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam.

Ventilation:

Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste HVAC system and the 600-V load center air-conditioning system.

Fire dampers are provided in ducts which penetrate the area boundary.

Floor Drains:

There are no floor drains provided in the area.

FIRE PROTECTION A smoke detection system covers the entire area.

Heat detectors are located in the cabinets of the 600-V load center II, 4160-V swicchgear 1A and 1F, 5-kV disconnect switch 1G, 600-V lead center ID and 1A, and 4160-V switchgear 1B and IC.

Heat detectors will actuate a total-floodino CO2 system in the 1-23-4

i 6

load centers and switchgears.

A CO hose reel located in 2

6 IIB "

room 339 (area 1-42), a water hose station in room 345 (area 1-42), a.nd two water hose cabinets in room 319 (area'1-42), are available for use in this area.

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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 1CCFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAEARDS ANALYSIS REEVAf.UATICN EXEXPTION REQUEST:

1-24 FIRE AREA:

2-C41 (EVALUATICN FOR EFFECTS ON UNIT 1)

LCCATION:

UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BU*LDING, EL 139 FT - 0 IN.

Fire area 2-041 consists of rooms 2335, 2343, and 2346.

All fire area boundary walls, floors, and ceilir.gs have a 3-hour fire rating, with all electrical and piping penetra:1:ns sealed for a 3-hour fire rating.

All ventilation ducting area boundaries have 3-hour fire rated dampers installed.

All doors located in the fire area boundary are UL listed Class A doors.

EXEMPTICN Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and a fixed automatic suppression system installed.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

TOTAL LOSS OF THE ELECTRICAL TRAIN-A DISTRIBUTICN SYSTEM Fire in Unit 2 fire area 2-041 could potentially result in fire damage to the electrical circuitry of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 train-A diesel gena ators.

This condition along wi... o. azzumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit 1 could result in the ' css of the main steam atmospheric relief valves, RCS hot leg temperature instrumentation and neutron flux monitoring

• Ins tr't-an a ti on.

Justifications A.1 Main Steam Release EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1NilPV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.O.-1A)

Q1N11PV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.O.-1B)

Q1N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-lC)

One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.

The atmospheric relief valves are providad with hand whools such that the valves may be manually 1-24-1

opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to. isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.

Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 2-041.

The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 2-041 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospher c relief valve.

A.2 RCS Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTICN NIB 21TE413(LOOP-1)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1B21TE423(LCOP-2)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1B21TE433(LOOP-3)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication Each RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loop is powered from channelized inverter-1A.

Inverter-1A is powered from 600 V-ac,MCC 1A or 125 V-de bus 1A.

A fire in area 2-041 along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 1A: however, inverter 1A will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus 1A and will supply power to the instrument loops for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

f after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature indication is available from the core exit thermocouples.

Core exit temperature indication will not be affected by a fire in area 2-041.

In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and core exit temperature availability; a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.

1.97 will provide a redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N1821TE413, N1B21TE423, and N1B21TE433.

In order to implement this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.

Based upon the R.C.

1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is currently planned for the seventh refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

After implementation of this modification, a fire in area 2-041 will not affect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS het log temperature.

1-24-2

A.3 Neutron Flux Monitor Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION Q1C55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor U1C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NECO32-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor Source range neutron flux monitors N1C55NECO31-P1 and N1C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelised inverters lA and 13.

The post-accident neutron flux monitor Q1C55NEOC48A-A is powered from inverter-1F.

Inverters lA, 13, and 1F are all powered from 6CC V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-de bus-1A.

Therefore, neutren-flux monitoring following potential fire damage in area 2-C41 and the resultant loss of ECO V-ac MCC 1A will be available for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RER system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RER Ex No. 1 and No. 2 sample valves QlP15HV3105-3 and Q1P15EV3106-3 for determination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area 2-041.

Plant procedures will be developed to include the above actions for a fire in area 2-041.

B.

FIRE DCOR The door between rooms 2346 (area 2-041) and 2345 (area 2-042) is provided with a removable transom.

The door and transom assembly cannot be certified as UL Class A.

Justification The door between rooms 2346 (area 2-041) and 2345 (area 2-042) is provided with a removable transom to facilitate the movement of large equipment.

The transom has been certified by the vender as being constructed of materials and in a manner similar to that of the UL Class A criteria.

The door and transom assembly has not, and cannot, be certified as Class A; however, this assembly meets the hightest fire rating standards and provides sufficient fire retardancy capability.

(Reference AFC letter to NRC dated April 16, 1981.)

I 1-24-3 L

FIRE AREA INFORMATICN FIRE AREA:

2-041 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS / SEUTDOWN COMBUSTIB1E FIRE LCAD FIRE

}ITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft2)

SEVERITY 2335 Load A

Cable <a' 25,881 lbea' 105,934ca> <1-1/2 hea>

Center Rocm insul.

Panels 2343 Load A

Center Room 2346 Switch-A gear and M-G Set Room a.

Applies to rooms 2335, 2343, and 2346 collectively.

DESIGN FEATURES

.g Construction:

Floors, walls, and ceilings forming the area

" *^ boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Doors:

An airtight UL Class A door is located between rooms 2335 and 2339 (area 2-42), 2343 and 2344 (area 2-21), and 2335 and 2337 (area 2-8) and 2338 (area 2-9); an airtight UL Class A double door exists between rooms 2343 and 2339 (area 2-42) and between rooms 2346 and 2339 (area 2-4,2).

Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:

Penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam.

Ventilation:

Normal supply and exr.s..

.2 ny the nonradwaste HVAC system and the 600-V load center air-conditioning system.

Fire dampers are provided in ducts which penetrate the area boundary.

Floor Drains:

There are no floor drains provided in the area.

FIRE PRCTECTION A smoke detection system covers the entire area.

Heat detecters are located in the cabinets of the 600-V load center 2I, 4160-V switchgear 2A and 2F, 5-kV disconnect switch 20, 600-V load center 2D and 2A, and 4160-V switchgear 2B and 2C.

Heat detectors will actuate a total-flooding Coa system in the 1-24-4

i 1

I load centers and switchgears.

A CO hose reel located in 2

room 2339-(area 2-42), a water hose station in room 2345 (area 2-42), and 2 water hose cabinets in room 2319 (area 2-42) are available for use in this area.

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FARLEY NUCLEA~a PLANT r<

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1CCFR50 APPENDIX "k" LIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATO N s

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s EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-25

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FIRE AREA:

1-042

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LOCATION:. UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BU!LDING, EL 139 FT - 0 IN.

o.

Fire area 1-042 consists.of rocms 319, 339'[,and 345.

.61 fire t'

area boundary wall are 3 a. hour fire rated <with the except:.cn of x

the wall adj acent to elevator no. 1 and stairwell no. I which are 2-hour fire rated.

All electrical and piping penet'ratic'ns ari s

sealed and are 3-hour-rated.

All ventilationtducting has 3-hour i

fire rated _ dampers installed.< Ali decr,sl located in thV boAndary

- walls are Class A rated with the neept'<cn of a Class B: rated door leading from roem 345 into stairwell No. 1 (area'l-5011 i

The floors and ceilings of fire area,1-04D are o'f reinforced concrete and are 3-hour fire rated 5with the exce"ption of 2 hatchways with steel plate ccvers located in room 345.

The 2' hatches are located directly ~~above one another in the floor and ceiling of room 345 and comrunicate with' fire areas,1-020.andl 1-004.

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EXEMPTION j'

q 3.,

Request exemption from section ID.W.1'.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to bd\\

enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hodr fire rating.". Reqaes,t.

exemption from section III.G.2.a to the extent that it requires separation of cables, equipment, and associated nor-safety circuits of redunda,nt trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour t,

rating.

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's CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION

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s ts A.

TOTAL LOSS OF THE ELECTRICAL TRAIN-A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM-Fire area 1-042 contains control and power cablec for thh trsin-A electrical distribution ayutem.

An analysis of the potential"J effects of fire induced failures on these cables demonstrates i

that the plant could experience a total loss'of the electrical

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train-A distribution system.

This could result in the loss of RCS hot leg temperature instrumentation and neutron flux monitoring instrumentation.

Justifications

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A.1 RCS Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation fd 1-25-1 A

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N1B21TE413(LOOP-1)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature,. Indication F

N1B21TE423(LOOP-2)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1B21TE433(LCOP-3)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication 1

?

Each RCS loop het leg temperature instrumentation loop is powered

(? :

from channelized inverter-1A.

Inverter-1A is powered from j>

600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus 1A.

A fire in area 1-042 along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LCSP) could result in loss 1

of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 1A: however, inverter 1A 4

will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus 1A and will supply power to the instrument loops for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

If after-2 hours power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature indication is available from the core exit thermocouples.

Core exi:

temperature indication will not be affected by a fire in area 1-042.

In, addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and core exit temperature indication j

availability, a design change to be installed as a result of i,

R.G.

1.97 will provide redundant signal processing and indication l'(

between RCS hot leg temperature loops N1B21TE413, N1B21TE423, and N1B21TE433.

In order to implement this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to

. initiation of the modification.

Based upon the R.G.

1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is p'

currently planned for the seventh refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

After implementation of this modification, a fire in area 1-042 will o

not affect the ability to monitor at least one RCS hot leg tenperature loop.

+L A.2 Neutron Flux Monitor Instrumentation Aq INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION g

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Q1C55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor 4

N1C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Men ::.

N1C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor Source range neutron flux monitors N1C55NEOO31-P1 and-(

N1C55NEOO32-P2 are powered from channelized inverters 1A and IB.

_The post-accident neutron flux monitor Q1C55NE0045A-A is powered from inverter-1F.

Inverters 1A, 13, and 1F are all powered from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus-1A.

Therefore, neutron-flux monitoring following potential fire damage in area 1-042 and the

{

resultant loss of 60C V-ac MCC 1A will be available for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portiens of the RCS sampling system end l

RHR Ex No. 1 and No. 2 sample valves Q1P15HV3105-B and j-Q1P15HV3106-B for determination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area 1-042.

I 1-25-2 1 '

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MAIN STEAM RELEASE l

Fire area 1-042 contains power and control cables required for post-fire operation of the main steam atmospheric relief valves, 4

j An analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables demonstrates that the valves could become electrically inoperable i

in the closed position.

In addition, a total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system as discussed under

}

" Condition A" could render the valves electrically inoperable in the closed position.

EQUIPMENT FUNCT!CN Q1N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A)

Q1N11PV3 3 71B-A Main' Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-13)

I Q1N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-lC)

Justification i

One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.

The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually j

opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by cle'ing the manual air control valves to isolate 1

s the air supply and by opening the manual air vent va-lve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.

Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their insociated atmospheric relie'f valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-042.

The capability to control steam 4

i generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the' Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 1-042 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

Plant procedures will. be developed to include the ~above actions for a fire in this area.

C.

NON-FIRE RATED EATCH COVERS Two hatchways located in room 345 directly above one another have

+

non-rated sheet plate covers, and communicate with areas 1-C20 and 1-004.

f Justification The sprinkler system existing in room 345 will serve the purpose

.of a water curtain to prevent the passage of fire from area 1-042 4

to the adjacent fire areas via the non-rated steel hatches.

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a 1-25-3 i

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Sprinkler systems existing in the hatch area of the adjacent fire areas above and below room 345 will prevent the spread of a fire into area 1-042.

D.

FIRE DCCR The door between recms 346 (area 1-041) and 345 (area 1-042) is provided with a removable transom.

The door and transem assembly cannot be certified as UL Class A.

Justificatien The door between rocms 346 (area 1-041) and 345 (area 1-042) is prcvided with a remevable transem to faciliate the movement of large equipment.

The transem has been certified by the vender as being constructed of materials and in a manner similar to that of the UL Class A criteria.

The door and transom assembly has net, and cannot, be certified as Class A; however, this asse=bly meets the highest fire rating standards and prc'vides sufficient fire retardancy capability.

(Reference AFC letter to NRC dated April 16, 1981.)

MCDIFICATICN t

A fire barrier consisting of two 1-inch-thick Kaowool blanket wraps with one overall layer of Zetex woven fabric has been provided over the electrical train-B raceway in fire area 1-042 which contains safe-shutdown cables.

In addition to the existing train-B raceway having barrier protection, the following raceways have barriers that extend the entire length of the raceway in the area:

BED-51, BED-63, and BEH-61.

This additional protection of train-B cabling in area 1-042 along with the existing fixed suppression system, limit the effected safe shutdown functions to those requiring minimal operator actions.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA:

1-042 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDCWN CCMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ftz) ggyggy77 319 Corrider Unit 2A 339 Corridor Unit 2A Unit 1 1,709 lb<a' 32,445'3'

<3C T.in'3' and 2<a>

Cable insul.

345 Hallway Unit 2A a.

Applies to rooms 319, 339, and 345 collectively.

1-25-4

DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete except for removable steel hatches in the floor and ceiling of room 345 to room 234 (area 1-020) and to room 454 (area 1-4).

Door:

A UL Class A door exists between rooms 319 and 2319 (area 2-42) and between rooms 319 and 300 (area 1-13); two airtight UL Class A doors exists between rooms 319 and 312 (area 1-40);

airtight Class A doors exist between room 339 and rooms 335, 343, and 346 (area 1-41); and a UL Class 3 door exists between room 345 and stairway No.

1.

Pipe and Electri:al Penetrations:

Penetrations through the area boundary are sealed to a 3-hour fire resistance rating.

Ventilatio'n :

Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste EVAC system.

Firt damper doors are provided in ducts penetrating the area boundary.

Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Floor Drains:

Three 4-in, floor drains having 100-gal /m capacity each are connected to a sump which has two 100-gal /m pumps that discharge into the floor drain tank.

FIRE PROTECTION Ionication smoke detection is provided throughout the area.

Four portable extinguishers are located in rooms 319 and 339.

Two water hoses are located in room 319.

A Coz hose reel is located in room 319 and a water hose in room 345.

Automatic water suppression systems are installed in the area to protect electrical cable from an exposure fire and to provide coverage in the area of the steel hatches.

Appropriate barriers are provided for electrical cable.

e 1-25-5

J. M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CERSO APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAEARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-26 FIRE AREA:

2-042 (EVALUATION FOR EFFECTS ON UNIT 1)

LOCATION:

UNIT 2 AUXILIARY BUILDING, EL 139 FT - 0 IN.

Unit 2 fire area 2-042 is separated from Unit 1 fire area 1-042 by reinforced concrete walls having a 3-hour fire rating, with all piping and electrical penetrations sealed for a 3-hour fire rating.

The door separating these two fire areas is a UL listed Class A dcor.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent it requires one train of redundant safe-shutdown cables.to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

TOTAL LOSS OF THE ELECTRICAL TRAIN-A DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM A fire in Unit 2 fire area 2-042 could potentially result in damage to the electrical circuitry of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 train-A diesel generators.

This condition along with.an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit 1 could cause loss of the main steam atmospheric relief valves, RCS het leg temperature instrumentation, and neutron flux monitoring instrumentation.

Justifications A.1 Main Steam Release a

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A)

Q1N11FV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Pelief Valve (S.G.-13)

Q1N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1C)

One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam ger.zator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.

The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric 1

1-26-1

relief valves by closing the manual air control valver to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.

Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 2-042.

The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled nt=cspheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 2-042 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

A.2 RCS Hot Leg Temperature Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATICN FUNCTION N1B21TE413(LOOP-1)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1B21TE423(LCOP-2)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1B21TE433(LOOP-3)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication Each RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loop is powered from channelized inverter-1A.

Inverter-1A is powered frem 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus 1A.

A fire in area 2-042 along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 1A; however, inverter 1A will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus 1A and will supply power to the instrument loops for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

If after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature indication is available from the core exit thermocouples.

Core exit temperature indication will not be affected by a fire in area 2-042.

In addition to the alternate de power aupply for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and core exit temperature availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.

1.97 will provide a redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N1821TE413, N1821TE423, and N1B21TE433.

In order to implement this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.

Based upon the R.G.

1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is cu*rantly pisnned for the covanth refueling cutage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

After implementation of this modification, a fire in area 2-042 will not affect the ability to monitor one one loop of RCS hot leg temperature.

A.3 Neutron Flux Monitor Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION Q1C55NE0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor 1-26-2 m

Source range neutron flux monitors N1C55NECO31-P1 and N1C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters 1A and 1B.

The post-accident neutron flux monitor Q1C55NEC048A-A*is powered from inverter-1F.

Inverters lA, 1B, and 1F are all powere'd from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus-1A.

Therefore, neutron-flux monitoring following potential fire damage in area 2-042 and the resultant loss of 600 V-ac MCC 1A will be available for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RER system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RHR Ex No. 1 and No. 2 sample valves Q1P15HV3105-B and Q1P15HV3106-B for determinatien of the boron concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area 2-242.

Plant procedures will be developed Oc include the above actions for a fire in area 2-042.

B.

FIRE CCOR The door between rooms 2346 (area 2-041) and 2345 (area 2-042) is provided with a removable transom.

The door and transom assembly cannot be certified as UL Class A.

Justification The door between rooms 2346 (area 2-041) and 2345 (area 2-042) is provided with a removable transom to facilitate the movement of large equipment.

The transom has been certified by the vendor as being constructed of materials and in a manner similar to that of the UL Class A criteria.

The door and transom assembly has not, and cannot, be certified as Class A; however, this assembly meets the hightest fire rating standards and provides sufficient fire retardancy capability.

(Reference APC letter to NRC dated April 16, 1981.)

FIRE AREA !NFORMATION FIRE AREA:

2-042 e

MAXIMUM

~

ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LCAD FIRE

_. TI,TLES,_.

._ TRAIN __

_ MATERIA _L_

QUANTITY (Btu /ft 2) SEVERITY 2319 Corridor A,

B Cable 1,709 lbca' 32,445ca>

<30 minea>

Channels insul. 'a >

2, 3,

4 2339 Corridor A

2345 Hallway A

a.

Applies to rooms 2319, 2339, and 2345 collectively.

1-26-3

DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floors, walls, and ceilings forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete except for re.t.ovable steel hatches in the floor and ceiling of room 2345 to rooms 2234 (area 2-020) and 2454 (area 2-004).

Doors:

A UL Class A door exists between rooma 2319 and 319 (area 1-042) and between rooms 2319 and 2300 (area 2-13); two airtight UL Class A doors exist between rooms 2319 and 2318 (area 2-40);

airtight UL Class A doors exist between rooms 2339 and rooms 2335, 2343, and 2346 (area 1-41); and a UL Class B dcor exists between room 2345 and stairwell No. 1 (area 2-501).

Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed to a 3-hour fire resistance rating.

Ventilation :

Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste HVAC system.

Fire dampers are provided in ducts penetrating the area boundaries.

Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Floor Drains:

Three 4-inch floor drains having a 100 gal /m capacity each are connected to a sump which has two 100 gal /m 1

pumps that discharge into the floor drain tank.

FIRE PROTECTION A detection system is provided for all rooms in fire area 2-042.

Four portable extinguishers are located in rooms 2319 and 2339.

Two water hose stations are located in room 2319.

A Con hose reel is presently located in rocm 2339 and a water hose in room 2345.

An automatic water suppression system covers the area except for room 2339.

Appropriate barriers are provided for one train of safe shutdown electric'al cabling.

e 1-26-4

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS,REEVALCATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-27 FIRE AREA:

1-019 LCCATICN:

TRAIN-B DC SW TCHCEAR RCOM, AUXILIARY BUILOINO, EL 121 FT - 0 IN.

EXEMPTIEN Reques exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

INSTRUMENT AIR FOR PRESSURIZER PORVs Fire area 1-019 contains control and power cables for the train-B t

electrical distribution system.

An analysia of the potential effects of fire induced failures of these cables demonstrates that the plant could experience a total loss of the electrical train-B distribution system.

This could result in the following instrument air isolation valves becoming inoperable in the closed position.

These valves isolate the primary air and backup air /Na to the pressurizer PCRVs.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to the Penetratiens Rocm Q1B13HV2228-B Backup Air /Na Supply to Pressurizer PORVs Justification The pressurizer PORVs are required to be operable for RCS depressurization.

RCS depressurization is a long term action required to initiate RHR.

Adequate tima is available to inanually operate N1P19HV3885-B and restore air to the pressuri er PORVs.

Plant procedures will be revised to include this action for a fire in area 1-019.

B.

FALSE SI, CI, AND CVI SAFETY SIGNAL INITIATION Fire area 1-019 contains power supply cables which, if damaged by fire, could initiate false SI, CVI, and CI safety signals from the solid state protection system.

1-27-1

Justification Plant procedures exist or will be developed for resetting spurious SI, CVI, and CI safety signals from the main control room.

F!RE AREA INFORMATION FIRE ARIA:

1-019 MAX DE*M RCCM NUM3ERS/

SEUTDCWN COMEUST:3LE FIRE LCAD F:RE T!TLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANT!TY (Stu/fi8)

?I*/EFIT?

226 de B

Cable insul.

935 lb 34,375

<30 m n Switchgear Channels Panels 65 lb Room 3,

4 DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

'i Doors:

A UL Class A door exists between rooms 226 and 225 (area

^

1-020) and a UL Class A door exists between rooms 226 and 211 A

(area 1-20).

Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam.

Ventilation:

Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste HVAC system.

A room cooler is located outside the room in room 244.

Fire dampers are provided in the duct penetrations.

Floor Drains:

No floor drains are provided.

FIRE PROTECTION e

A ionization smoke detector is located in the room.

A portable extinguisher is available in room 211 and 225 (area 1-20).

A CO hose reel located in room 210 (area 1-20). is available for use in this area.

1-27-2

l l

J. M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HA:'ARDS ANALYSIS REEVAI;UATION t

EXEMPTICN REQUEST:

1-28 FIRE AREA:

1-016 LCCATION:

UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING BATTERY RCCM TRAIN B Fire area 1-016 consists only of room 212 at el 121 ft 0 in.

and is bounded by 3-hour fire rated floor, ceiling. and was.

The area boundary door is UL Class A fire rated.

EXEMPTICH Request exemption from section III.G.2.C to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables and equipment to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire-suppression system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

TOTAL LOSS OF THE ELECTRICAL TRAIN-B DISTRIBUTICN SYSTEM Fire area 1-016 contains the electrical train-B 125 V-de plant batteries and related 125 V-de train-B power cabling.

The analysis of the potential. effects of a fire upon the equipment and cables shows that the plant could experience a total loss of the electrical train-B 125 V-dc distribution system.

This I

condition along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit 1 could result in total loss of the electrical train-B distribution system and the following safe shutdown equipment cou.ld become inoperable in the closed position.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTICN n.

N1P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room Q1B13HV2228-B Backup Air /Na Supply to Pressurizer PORVs Q1B31PCV0445A-A Pressuricer PORV, Train A Q1331PCVC4443-8 Pressurizer PORV, Train B Q1E21HV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Justification Failure of valve Q1E21HV8145-N in the closed position will disable the pressurizer auxiliary spray system which provides one method to achieve depressurl:ation of the RCS.

l 1-28-1

Pressurizer PCRVs Q1931PCV0445A-A and Q1931PCV0444B-B provide another means of achieving RCS depressur:tation.

Valves N1P19HV3885-B and Q1313EV2228-B will fail in the closed position on loss of train-B de power.

This will isolate the instrument air supply to the pressuriser PCRVs Q1831PCV0445A-A and Q1931PCV0444B-B.

PCRV Q1331PCV04448-B will also be inoperable due to loss of the train-B de power supply.

However, the train-A de supply to PORV Q1831PCV0445A-A is not affected due to a fire in this area.

Since only one of the PORVs is required for RCS depressurication, and RCS depressurisation is a long term requirement, the operator has adequate time to take manual action to restore the instrument air by hand wheel operation of valve N1PI9KV3685-B.

Once air is restored, PCRV Q1331PCV0445A-A w ll be operable to achieve RCS depressurization.

Plant procedures will be revised to include the above actions for a fire in this area.

B.

FALSE SI, CI, AND CVI SAFETY SIGNAL INITIATION A total loss of the electrical train-B distribution system cs discussed under " Condition A" above could cause a false SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system.

Justificatien Plant procedures exist or will be develeped for resetting spurious SI, CVI, and CI safety signals from the main control room and can be used, if required, for a fire in this area.

FIRE AREA INFOPMATION FIRE AREA:

1-016 e

MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDCWM COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE

_. TIELE3 _ _

TRAIU, _,

._ MATERIAL, QUAh'T,_I TY (Btu /ft 8 )_

SE'fER I,TV l

212 B

Cable insul.

26 lb 1,567

<30 min Battery Room Panels 14 lb DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Ceiling, floor, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

1-28-2

l Doors:

A UL Class A door exists between rooms 212 and 213 (area l-020).

Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through ;he area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Ventilation :

Normal supply is by non-radwaste EVAC system and exhaust is by battery room exhaust fan.

Fire dampers are provided at the duct penetrations.

Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Floor drains:

A 4-inch floor drain having capacity of 100 gal /m, which drains to a sump located in roem 241 (area '.-24).

The sump has two ICC-gal /m sump pumps that discharge to the floor drain tank.

FIRE PROTECTION A smoke detection system in the room will provide an early warning.

A CO hose reel located in room 210 (area 1-020) is available for use.

Portable extinguishers are available in adjacent rooms 210, 211, and 225.

In addition, the battery room is provided with temperature switches which provide a high temperature alarm on BOP cabinet-1L in the control room.

i 1

6 l

i' 1-29-3

J. M.

FARLEY MUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HA:IARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-29 FIRE ARIA:

1-030 LOCATION:

UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING CABLE CHASE TRAIN B Fire area 1-C30 consists of rooms 249 (el 121 ft - 0 in, and 139 ft 0 in.) and 252 (el 127 f: - 0 in.)

All fire area boundary walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-hour fire rated, except for t.Me decr and bulkhead between room 252 and cable tunnel (area 1-076) which are non-fire rated and watertight.

The non-rated door has a fire-resistant coating applied.

UL Class A fire rated door exists between rooms 249 and 235 (area 1-023).

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.C.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a one-hour fire rating.

CONDITION REQUIRING EXEMPTION TOTAL LCSS OF THE ELECTRICAL TRAIN-B DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM Fire area 1-030 contains power and control cables for the electrical train-B distribution system.

The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area shows that the plant could lose train-B emergency diesel backup power.

In the event of a postultted loss of offiste power (LOSP) for Unit 1 along with a fire in this area, the plant could lose the total electrical train-B distribution system and make the following redundant tsie shutdown components inoperable in the closed position.

EQUIPMENT F_ UNCTION N1P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room Q1B13HV2228-B Backup Air /Ma Supply to Pressuriser PORVs Q1831PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PORV, Train A Q1B31PCV0444B-B Pressurizer PORV, Train B Q1E21HV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray 1-29-1

Justification Failure of valve Q1E21HV8145-N in the closed position uill disable the pressurizer auxiliary spray system which provides ene j

meth:d to achieve depressurization of ne RCS.

Pressuriser PORVs Q1331PCV0445A-A and Q1931PCV0444B-B provide another means of achieving RCS depressuri:ation.

Valves N1P19HV3885-B and Q1313HV2228-B will fail in the closed position on loss of train-B de power.

This will isolate the instrument air supply to the pressurizer PORVs Q1331PCV0445A-A and Q133;PCV0444B-B.

PORV Q1331PCV04443-3 will also be inoperable due :: less of the train-B de power supp*y.

However, the ersin-A d: supply to PCRV Q133;PCV0445A-A is ne affected due to a fire in this area.

Since only One of the PCRVs is required f:r i.C3 depressurization, and RCS depressurization is a long term requirement, the operator has adequate time to take manual acticn

restore the instrument air by hardwheel cperk:1cn Of valve N1P19HV3885-B.

Cnce air is restored, PCRV Q1831PCV0445A-A will be operable to l

achieve RCS depressurisation.

Plant procedures will be revised to include the above action for a fire in area 1-030.

[_:EE AEEA INFCF"ATION i

FIRE AREA:

1-C30 l

MAXIMUM ROCM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE T:TLES TRAIN MATERIAL CUAMTITY (Btu /ft8)

SEVERITY 249 and 252 B

Cable insul.

6,760 lb 423,898'a'

<8 h Cable Chase Rooms a.

Area average DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floors, ceilings, and walls forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete except for a non-rated steel bulkhead between this area and area 1-076.

Doors:

An non-fire rated watertight door is installed in the steel bulkhead between room 252 and train-B cable tunnel (area 1-29-2

1-076) leading to diesel building and an airtight UL Class A fire rated door exists between rooms 249 and 235 (area 1-023).

The non-rated door has a fire-resistant coating applied on the tunnel side.

Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Ven:11a:13n No normal ventilation is provided.

Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Floor Drainst No floor drains are provided.

F:?E P90*'ECT 0N A smoke detection system and automatic water suppression system are installed in this area.

The manual hose station located in room 234 (area 1-020) is available for use in this area.

A 4

P 1-29-3

n J. M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 1CCFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HA::ARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXIMPTICN REQUEST:

1-30 FIRE AREA:

1-076 LCCATICM UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING To DIESEL BUILDING CABLE TUNNEL TPAIN B Fire area 1-C76 censists of a ahle tunnel running fr:m the Unit-1 auxiliary building to the diesel building.

The fire area beundary walls, ficor, and ceiling are 3-hour fire rated exesp:

for a non-fire rated watertight dcor and bulkhead which exist between the cable tunnel and the auxiliary building (area 1-03C).

The non-rated dcor has a fire-resistant coating applied.

A UL Class A fire rated door exists between the cable tunnel and the diesel building.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire detection system.

CtNDITIONS REOUIRING EXEMPTION TOTAL LOSS OF THE ELECTRICAL TP.AIN-B DISTRIBUTICN SYSTEM Fire area 1-076 contains electrical p:wer and control cables for the electrical train-B distribution system.

The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area shows that the plant c:uld lose train-B emergency diesel backup power.

In the event of a postulated loss of offsite power (LCSP) for Unit-1 along with a fire in this area, the plant could l

experience a total loss electrical train-B distribution system and make the following redundant safe shutdown components incperabic in the closed pualtion.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room QlB13HV2228-B Backup Air /N / Supply to Pressuricer PCRVs Q1831PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PCRV, Train A Q1831PCV04448-B Pressura:er PCRV, Train B QlE21HV8145-N Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray 1-30-1 i

Justification Failure of valve Q1E21HV8145-N in the closed positi:n will disable the pressuri:er auxiliary spray system which provides ene method to achieve depressuri:ation of tne RCS.

Pressurizer PCRVs Q1931PCVC445A-A and ClB31PCV04448-B pro /ide another means of achieving RCS depressurt:ation.

Valves N1P19HV3885-B and Q1813HV2229-B will fail in the closed position on loss of train-B de power.

This will isolate the instrument air supply to the pressuriser PORVs Q1331PCV0445A-A and Q 1931PC'.^ 04443-B.

PORV Q1331PCV0444B-3 will also be inoperable due to loss of the train-B d: pcwor supply.

However, the train-A de supply to rCRV Q1B31PCV0445A-A is not affected cue to a fire in this area.

Since enly one of the PORVs is required for ROS depressurization and RCS depressuri:ation is a long term requiremoni, the operator has adequate time to take manual action to restore the instrument air by handwheel operation of valve N1P19HV3885-B.

Once air is restored, PORV QlB31PCVO445A-A will be cperable to achieve RCS depressuri:ation.

Plant procedures will be revised to include the above action for a fire in area 1-076.

FIRE AREA INFCRMATION FIRE AREA:

1-076 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft8)

SEVIRITY Cable Tunnel B

Cable insul, 21,554 lb 39,000

<30 min e

DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floor, cailing, and walls forming the arsa Lo'mht y are of r ainforced con:ratu except for 4 ncn-rated m ui bulkhead between this area and area 1-030.

Doors:

The door to the diesel building is a UL Class A fire rated door.

The door in the steel bulkhead between the tunnel and auxiliary building is a non-fire rated watertight door with a fire-resistant coating applied to the tunnel side.

Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:

All wall penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Dulkhuad between cable tunnel and auxiliary building (area 1-030) is watertight and non-fire rated.

1-30-2

Ventilation No normal ventilation is provided.

Floor Drains:

The floor drainage has a capacity of 100 gal /m which discharges to yard drains.

A sump and sump pump are provided.

ffRE PRCTECTICtl An automatic water supprension system are provided in this area.

e M

1-30-3

I J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUAT CN EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-31 FIRE AREA:

1-009 LOCATICN:

TRAIN-B INS!:E CABLE CHASES, AUX!LIARY BUILDING EXEMPT M

Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to tne extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutd:wn cacles to ce enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire detecticn system.

CONo:T:cNs PEce:R:No EXEMPT:cM A.

INSTRUMENT AIR FCR PRESSURICER PORVs Fire area 1-C09 contains control and power cables for the train-B electrical distribution system.

An analysis of the potential effects of fire induced failures of these cables demonstrates t

that the plant could experience a total loss of the electrical train-B distribution system.

This could result in the following instrument air isolation valves bec: ming incperab'e in the :losed position.

These valves isolate the primary air and backup air /N to the pressuri:er PCRVs.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1P19HV3885-B Instrument Air to Penetration Room Q1313HV2228-3 Backup Air /N Supply to Pressurizer PCRVs Justift:a;;jr.

e The pressurizer PORVo are required to be operable for RCS depressurization.

RCS depressurization is a long term action required to initiate RER.

Adequate time is available to manually opara no M1P19HV3335-P, and rostore air to the prosturicor FORVs.

Plant procedures will be written to incorporate this action for a 2

fire in area 1-009.

B.

AUXILIARY TEEDWATER ISOLATION VALVES Auxiliary feedwater isolation valves Q1NO3MCV37643, Q1N23MOV3764C, and Q1N 3MOV3764E are redundant to one another from the point of view that they isolate flow in redundant auxiliary feedwater supply lines.

Control cables for all three 1-31-1

valves are routed through the fire area.

The analysis of the potential effects of a fire on these control cables shows that spurious operation of the auxiliary feedwater isolation valves could occur, resulting in auxiliary feedwater flow isolation.

Medification The control cable associated with at least one of the auxiliary feedwater isolation valves has been protected by two 1-in. *ayers of Kaowool blanket with an overall layer of 2etex fabric.

The subject valves and associated cables are as follows:

Q1N23MtV3764B:

17BTV-MSC Q1N23MOV3764C:

1VBTV-72C Q1N23MOV3764E 1VBTV-R2C C.

SERVICE WACER DISCHARGE VALVE FOR CCW RX 1B Fire area 1-009 contains a control cable for the CCW heat exchanger 1B service water discharge valve (Q1P16SV3009-8).

A fire induced failure resulting in a hot snort frem adjacent cables in the same raceway, could energize the solenoid and close the valve.

Justification In the unlikely event of hot shorts resulti.kg in the closure of Q1P163V3009-B, the valve can be manually repositioned.

Plant procedures will be written to incorporate this action for a fire in area 1-C09.

D.

MAIN STEAM ISCLATION Multiple cable failures can cause the redundant steam generat:r 1C main steam isolation valves (Q1N11SV3369BC-A and Q1N11SV3370BC-A) to become electrically inoperative in the open position.

e Justification In the event that the steam generator 1C main steam isolation valvos fail to isolate dua to firo inducod failures, the main turbine stop valves would provide isolation.

E.

RCS BOUNDARY INTEGRITY A fire causing multiple hot shorts (shorts between control cables sharing the same raceway) could cause the train-B pressurirer PORV, (Q1831PCV0444B-B) and/or the train-B reactor vessel head vent valves (Q1813SV2213B-B and Q1B13SV2214B-B) to open.

The pressurizer PORV blocking valve (Q1B13MOV80003-B) could beceme electrically inoperative in the open position.

1-31-2

Justification In the unlikely event that the multiple het shorts ocqur, the condition can be mitigated by removing 125 V-de power from. cables in the shared raceway.

This can be ace:mplished by opening the breaker on 125 V-de switchgear bus 1B (21R429001B-D) for 125 V-dc distribution panels ID, 1E, and 1F.

Plant procedures will be written to incorporate the above actions for a fire in this area.

FIRE AREA INFORMATICN FIRE AREA:

1-C09 MAX; MUM RCCM NUM3ERS/

SHUT CWN COMBUST:3LE F:RE LOAO F*R:

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANT!TY (3:u/ft 8 i SEVER:!?

117 Cable B

Cable insul.

4,489 lb 2,921,199

<9 h Chase 3

246 Cable B

Cable insul.

2,135 lb 180,180

<2-1/2 h Chase DESIGN FEATURES og Construction:

Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Doors:

Airtight UL Class A doors are located between rocms 117 and 195 (area 1-6) and between re ms 117 and 335 (area 1-41); an airtight UL Class A door exists between rooms 246 and 343 (area 1-41).

Piping and Electrical Penetratiens:

All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Ventilation:

There is no normal ventilation for this area.

Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Floor Drains:

There are no floor drains.

FTUE PPOTECTION A smoke detection system and automatic water suppression system are provided throughout the chase.

In addition, water hoses and portable extinguishers located in room 185 (area 1-6) and room 319 (area 1-42) are available for use in the area.

1-31-3

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 1CCFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HA::ARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUAT:CN EXIMPTION REQUEST:

1-30 F RE AREA:

1-012 LCCATICti:

UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING LCCAL HCT SRUTOCWN PANEL PCCM Fire area 1-C12 consists of only room number 254 and is beunded by 3-hour fire ratsd floor, ceilino, and walls, and OL Class A fire rated doors.

EXEMPT!ON Request exemption frem section

.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier haviig 1-hour fire rating and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

MAIN STEAM RELEASE FCR COOLDOWN Fire area 1-012 contains electrical train-A control cables associated with the following main steam atmospheric relief valves.

EOUIPMENT FUNCT:CN Q1N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A) 21N11PV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-13)

Q1N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmosp...

~ ;

• 1: f 'laive (S.G.-1C)

The analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables shows that the main stear, atmospheric relief valves could become inaperable in ho closed paaltion.

Justification one of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.

The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

1-32-1

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheri:

relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent va.'ve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.

Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-012.

The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown l

startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 1-012 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheri:

relief valve.

B.

HOT SHUT 00WM PANEL Fire area 1-012 contains hot shutdown panel control cables for the following safe shutdown equipment.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION j

QlB31PCV0445A-A Pressuri er Power Operated Relief Valve QlB13MOV8000A-A Pressurizer PORV Block Valve QlB13SV2213A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve QlB13SV2214A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve I

In addition, control cables which shift control frem the main control board to the hot shutdown panel via transfer relays are i

in this fire area.

A fire induced failure causing multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the 70RV and reactor head vent paths.

Justification FIreinducedfailures (hot shorts) to the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 2-A could cause control for the pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves and the reactor head vent valves, to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel.

Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) of the control cables for QlB31PCV0445A-A, presauricor power operated relief valve, and Q18133V2213A-A and QlB13SV2214A-A, reactor head vent valves, could result in the valves being energized to open.

The power relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position.

In the unlikely event of the multiple het shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manual operation (handle) of the affected relays thereby shifting control to the main control board.

Plant procedures will be written to incorporate above actions for a fire in this area 1-012.

1-32-2

.e. _ - -

. _ - - ~ -, -. _

4 FIRE AREA INFCPMATICN FIRE AREA:

1-012 MA?.::CM ROCM !! UMBERS /

SHUTDCWN COMBUST BLE FIRE LOAD FIRE i

TITLES

_ TRAIN MATERIAL QUA!!?!TY (Btu /ft 8)

S E'!ER I TY 254 Hallway A,B Cable insul.

1.405 lb 63,382

<1 h and Local Panels 29 lb Hot Shutdown Panel Room DES:0:J 7 EAT';RES Construction:

Floor, ceiling, and walls forming the area boundary ar,e of reinforced concrete.

Doors:

UL Class A rated doors are installed between rooms 254 and 2254 (area 2-012) and between rooms 254 and 211 (area-1-020).

Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

All wall penetrations are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating.

Ventilation:

No normal ventilation is provided.

Fire and smoke removal capacity has not been provided.

Floor Drain No floor drains are provided.

F: RE PROTECTION A smoke detection system is provided for the room.

A CC:

hose reel located in room 210 (area 1-020) is available for use.

e 1-32-3

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 1CCFR50 APPE!! DIX "R" FIRE HA ARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUAT:CN EXEMPT!CN REQUEST:

1-33 FIRE AREA:

1-031 LOCATIC!!:

U!!IT 1 AUX:L! ARY BU!LD!No CABLE CMASE T?A!!! A Fire area 1-C31 c:nsists of rooms 250 (el 121 ft - 0 in, and 137 ft 0 in.) and 251 (*! 127 ft - 0 in.).

All area beuriary walls, floors. and ceilings are 3-hour fire rated ex:ept f:r a ncn-rated bulkhead between this fire area and the :able unnel (area 1-C75).

A non-fire rated watertight door and bulkhead exist between room 251 and cable tunnel (area 1-075), and a UL Class A fire rated d:or exists between room 250 and 235 (area 1-023).

The non-rated door has a fire resistant coating

applied, i

EXEMPT!CN Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables and j

equipment to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating, i

CONDIT!Cf!S RE2V! RING EXEMPT!C!!

l A.

TOTAL, LOS" 0F ELIOTR::AL TRAI!! A DISTRIBUTIC!! SYSTEM A fire in area 1-031 could potentially result in fire damage to the electrical circuitry of both Unit 1 and Unit 2 train-A diesel generators.

This condition along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit 1 could result in total loss of the electrical train-A distribution system.

This could result in the loss of RCS hot leg temperature indication and neutron flux monitoring instrumentation.

Justificatione A.1 RCS Hot Lug Temperature Indication INSTRUMENTATION TUNCTION N1921TE413(LOOP-1)

RC5 Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1B21TE423(LCOP-2)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication N1B21TE433(LOOP-3)

RCS Hot Leg Temperature, Indication Each RCS loop het leg temperature instrumentation loop is powered from channelized inverter-1A.

Inverter-1A is powered from i

l 1-33-1

{

1 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus 1A.

A fire in area 1-C31 along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Unit 1 could result in loss of the 400 V-ac power supply to inverter 1A, however, inverter 1A will continue to operate from 125 V-do bus IA and will supply power to the instrument loops for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

If after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> power is lost, RCS not leg temperature indication is available frcm the core exit thermocouples.

C:re exit thermocouple temperature indication will not be effected by a fire in area 1-031.

In addition to the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.

1.97 will provide a redundant signal processing and indication between PC3 hot leg temperature loeps N13217 413, N1321TE423, and N1821;E433.

In order to implement this des:gn change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.

Based upon the R.G.

1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is currently planned for the seventh refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

After implementation of this modification, a fire in area 1-031 will not effect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS hot leg temperature.

A.2 Neutron Flux Monitor Instrumentation INSTRUMENTATION FUNCTION QlC55ME0048A-A Post-Accident Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0031-P1 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor N1C55NE0032-P2 Source Range Neutron Flux Monitor Source range neutron flux monitors N1C55NE0031-P1 and N1C55NE0032-P2 are powered from channelized inverters 1A and 18.

The post-accident neutron flux. monitor Q1C55NE0048A-A is powered from inverter-1F.

Inverters 1A, 1B, and 1F are all powered fr:m 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-de bus-1A.

Therefore, neutron flux monitoring following potential fire damage in area 1-031 and the resultant loss of 600 V-ac MCC 1A will be available for a minimum a

of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

An RCS sample can be obtained after initiation of the RHR system by using portions of the RCS sampling system and RHR Hx No. 1 and No. 2 sample valves Q1P15HV3105-B and Q1P1511V3106-3 for dolormination of the boron concentration and shutdown margin following a fire in area 1-031.

B.

KAIN STEAM RELEASE FOR C00LDOWN A total loss the electrical train A distribution system, as discussed under " Condition A",

could render main steam atmospheric relief valves electrically inoperable in the closed pocition.

1-33-2

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s EQUIPMENT FUNCTICN Q1N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-1A),

_Q1N11PV33713-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-13)

Q1N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-lC)

Justification One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cooldown.

The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the" valves may be manually cpened or closed without,electrica.1 contro's cr air; supplies.

The operator would establish. manual control of the; atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air centrol valves.cto isolate j

the air supply and-by opening the. manual air. vent valve'to bleed off air from the diaphragm o~f the valve actuator.

Beth the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-031.

The capability to control steam i

generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown 4

startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 1-031 would not

~%

prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric I.-

• relief valve.

.y i

Plant procedures will be developed to include,above acti:ns for a fire in area 1-031.

f FIRE AREA INFORMATION 4

FIRE AREA:

1-031 o

MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOh*N COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD SIRE 1

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft8)

SEVERITY

^

e 250 and 251 A

Cable insul.

12,303 lb 794,491 Cable Chase

<9 h t

DESIGN FEATURES 7

Construction:

Floors, ceiling, and wallt forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Doors:

Airtight UL Class A door exists between rooms 250 and 235 (area 1-C23).

A non-fire rated watertight door exists between room 251 and the cable tunnel (area 1-075).

A fire-resistant coating has been applied to the tunnel side of the non-rated door.

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Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelsen fittings.

Bulkhead between this fire area and cable tunnel (area'1-075) is watertight and non-fire rated.

Ventilation:

There is no normal ventilation for this area and fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Ficor Drains:

There are no floor drains.

r. e n..e. e. e..n.. r C.,. C.J A smoke detecti:n system and aut ma:

aprinkler water suppression system are provided in this area.

In additien, the water hese located in reem 234 (area 1-020) is available for use as backup.

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FARLEY NUCLEAR PLAN

• 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATICN EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-34 FIRE AREA:

1-C05 LCCATION:

UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING, EL 100 FT - 0 IN. CHARGING PUMP ROOMS AND STORAGE AREAS Fire area 1-005 consists of the three charging pump rocms (173, 174, and 181), a hallway (172), a general storage area (171),

and a contaminated storage area (182).

The fire area beundary walls, floors, and ceilings are 3-hour fire rated except for the containment, wall.

The fire area boundary door is fire rated.

Self expanding cork is installed between the fire area boundary walls and the containment.

EXEMPTION An exemption to section III.G.2.a is requested to the extent that it requires a 3-hour fire barrier between redundant safe shutdown cabling and equipment (Condition A).

An exemption is also requested to section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cable to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and automatic fire suppression system (Conditions B and C).

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

PHYSICAL SEPARATION OF THE CHARGING PUMPS The fire area contains the three redundant charging pumps) related valves, and air handling units.

Fire area 1-005 was subdivided into the four zones identified below to perform the fire hazards analysis.

Zone 1:

Room 181 - Train-A Charging Pump Room-Zone 2:

Room 174 - Swing Charging Pump Room Zone 3:

Room 173 - Train-B Charging Pump Room Zone 4:

Rooms 171, 172, and 183 - Storage Rooms and Hallway The analysis is based on the premise that a fire would be contained in one of the four zones listed above.

1-34-1

b 4

1 1

Justification The charging pump rooms (173, 174, and 191) are watertight with 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete walls.

Penetrations in the~ pump room walls internal to fire area 1-005 are sealed to provide a watertight boundary.

The seals utilized to provide the watertight boundary are of the type (feam, welded plate, or grout) to provide an adequate barrier to inhibit the spread of i

fire, smoke, or gas.

The doors are watertight and are normally maintained closed.

Lebricating oil and cable insulation are the only combustibles present in the pump rooms.

Lubricating oil I

would be contained within the individual recms or would drain into the sump servicing the rocm.

n additi:n, there is a fixed suppression system installed in rooms 172 (hallway) and 171 l

which provide additional protection in the area of the pump r:ce decrs that communicate with this hallway.

Room 171 is a designated combustible material storage area with 3-hour fire rated boundaries and door.

Smoke detection systems are installed throughout the area including the three charging pump rocms.

The maximum cembustible in-situ loading in any room of this fire area is estimated to be less than 48,000 Stu/ft2 with a maximum fire severity of less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Based upon the evaluation of the protection provided, a credible fire would be contained within the zone of its initiation.

4 B.

RWST ISCLATION VALVES a

Room 172 in fire area 1-C05 contains the redundant RWST isolation valves (LOV1153 and LCV115D) and control cables for CVCS makeup valves (FCV113A-2, FCV1133-A, FCV114A-A, and FCV1143-A).

The CVCS makeup valves control the flow of beric acid from the boric acid transfer pumps and centrol the flow of primary water from the primary water makeup pump.

Fire barriers and full suppression coverage is not provided for the valves or-cables.

The analysis of the effects of a fire in the area shows that the RWST isolation valves could become electrically inoperable in the closed position and makeup to either the VCT or charging pump suction header could be isolated.

Justification In the event of a fire in room 172 charging pump suction could be switched to the RWST by manually repositioning one of the RWST isolation valves (LCV1153 or LCV115D) after the fire is overhauled and the area is accessible.

In the interim, the RCS will be stabilized in hot standby.

The duration and severity of a fire in room 172 would be limited due to low quantities of combustibles and partial automatic fire suppression system ccverage.

The ccmbustible loading in room 172 consists of cable insulation and is of such quantity that the maximum expected fire severity is less than 30 minutes.

1-34-2

f i

i i

C.

REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY INTEGRITY Control cables of the train-A pressuriser power operated relief

~

l and blocking valves Q1331PCVO445A-A and Q1313MOV80 COA-A and the reactor head vent valves Q13135V2213A-A and Q1313SV2214A-A are located in fire area 1-005.

The subject cables are associated a

with the control function from the hot shutdown panel j

Q1H21NBAFP2605G-A.

In addition, control cables which shift i

i control from the main control board to the hot shutdown panez via the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22 LOO 2-A are in this area.

A A

fire induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to le:down via the PCRV and reactor head vent paths.

4 Justification Fire induced failures (het shorts) within the control cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q1322 LOC 2-A could cause control for the pressuriser power operated relief and blocking valves and the reactor head vent valves to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel.

Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) of the control cables for Q1B31PCVO445A-A, pressurizer power operated relief valve, and Q13135V2213A-A and Q1313SV2214A-A, reactor head vent valves, could result in the valves being energized to open.

The power relief blocking valves (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position.

In the unlikely event of the multiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing power from the transfer relays and manually aligning ~

the affected relay (handle is provided), thereby shifting control to the main control board.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA:

1-005 j

MAXIMUM j

ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft2)

SEVERITY 173 B

Cable insul.

148 lb 27,563

<30 min Charging /

Lube oil 35 gal r

Safety Injection Pump Room 174 A,

B, C

Cable insul.

103 lb 28,506

<30 min Charging /

Lube oil 35 gal Safety Injection Pump Room i

1-34-3

MAXIMUM RCCM NUMBERS / SHUTDCWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE.LCAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft2 1 SEVERITY 181 A

Cable insul.

625 lb 47,414

<1 h Charging /

Lube oil 35 gal Safety Injection Pump Room 171 Cable insul.

Combustible Storage Area <a>

172 A,

C Cable insul.

2,393 lbcb> 31,820cb><30 mincb>

Hallway 182 A

Cable insul.

Contaminated Storage Area

a. Room.171 is occasionally utilized to store combustible I

material, usually in the form of contaminated clothing, cables, and tools in drums.

b. Applies to reoms 171, 172, and 182 collectively.

DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Self-expanding cork i.s installed between the fire area boundary walls and the containment.

Room 171 is bounded by 3-hour fire rated walls.

Doors:

A fire-rated airtight door is installed between rooms 172 and 161 (area 1-4) and between rooms 171 and 172.

Pipe and Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Ventilation:

There is no normal ventilation for the area.

There is a Class A fire damper door installed in each of the four ventilation openings through the area ceiling into room 223 (area 1-1).

Fixed smoke removal capability is not provided.

Floor Drains:

A 4-in. diameter floor drain having a 100-gal /m capacity is installed in each of rooms 173, 174, and 181 and drains to a separate sump for each room.

The sumps for rooms 1-34-4

b I

173 and 181 are located inside the oems room 174 is located immediately outside 1r F'4' de A

.e sumps each have two 100-gal /m pum s ~" ' d.4scharge to the waste holdup tank er the floor drain an '

4-in. d ameter floor drains each having a 100-gal /m cac.ao4 Y are 1 cated throughout the

• =-mai.nde of,wn,e area and drain into the floor drain tank.

FIRE PRCTECTION Smoke detection syster.s are insta' ' ad hro w

his area.

A manual hose station CO k

p rtable extinguishers, and pertable smcke r= " ova' $s^'.m.2.+.3ocated in th.

o

~~4da-J"s.

_..__,a

~ '

---a-e..ne area are available for use

~43 -w* ""**

U automatic serinkl." sv.e a,. 4s.4ns a33.ed in rooms 171 and 172.

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J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLA!C 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-35 FIRE AREA:

1-034 LCCATION:

UNIT-1 AUXILIARY BUILDING, ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS RCCM TRAIN B AND PENETRATION ROCM FILTERATICN SYSTEM EQUIPMENT RCCM Fire area 1-034 consists of rooms 334 and 317 at el 139 ft -0 in.

The walls, ceilings, and floors forming the area boundary are 3-hour. fire rated.

These rooms communicate via two stainless steel pipes used in the penetration room filteration system.

The stainless steel pipes are encased in concrete and contain no combustibles.

A self expanding cork is installed for the portions of the area boundary along the containment wall.

UL Class A fire rated doors exist between rooms 334 and 333 (area 1-035), 334 and stairwell no. 2, and 317 and 322 (area 1-004).

EXEMPTICN Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a 1-hour rated fire barrier and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTICN A.

SERVICE WATER TO CCW HEAT EXCHANGER Fire area 1-034 contains power and control cables and equipment (MCC-1V) associated with the following valve.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1P16MOV3130B-B Service Water Inlet to CCW EX-1B t

Valve Q1P16MOV3130B-B is required to be maintained open to maintain service water flow to CCW heat exchanger 13.

In the event that CCW pump-1C and CCW heat exchanger 1C are out of service for maintenance and the swing CCW pump 1B is aligned to electrical train-A power, the effects of a fire in area 1-034 upon the control cables of valve QlP16M0V31303-B could fail the valve in the closed position causing loss of service water to tha CCW heat 4xchanger IB.

1-35-1

Justification The plant procedures will be modified to maintain valye QlP16MOV3130B-B in the open position by racking out the MCC-breaker whenever CCW pump 1C and CCW heat exchanger 1C are out of service.

B.

MAINTAIN SEAL-INJECTION FLOW B.1 Charging Pump Isolation Valves Fire area 1-034 contains power and control cables and equipment (MCC-IV) associated with the following valves.

EQUIPMEh""

FUNCTION Q1E21MOV813'0B-B Charging Pump Suction Header Isolation Valve Q1E21MOV8133B-B Charging Pump Discharge Header Isolation Valve For a fire in this area, seal injection flow will be established using either charging pump 1A or charging pump 13 aligned to electrical train-A power.

Valves Q1E21MOV8130B-B (suction header) and QlE21MOV8133B-B (discharge header) are required to be maintained in the open position to supply seal injection water from the RWST through charging pump 1A or 1B.

Due to the effects of a fire in this. area upon the control cables for the subject valves, the valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperative.

This will cause the plant to lose seal injection water and seal integrity.

These valves cannot be locked in the open position because they are needed for train separation during a LOCA event.

Justification A design modification is proposed to install disconnect breakers in the power supply circuits of these valves outside the electrical penetration room during the next outage of sufficient duration subsequent to design and procurement completion.

The next outage is currently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

In the interim, the operators will be instructed of the potential inadvertent closure of the charging pump suction and discharge valves in the event of a fire in this area.

B.2 Charging Pump Miniflow Valves Fire area 1-034 contains power and control cables and equipment (MCC-IV) associated with the following valves:

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION i

Q1E21MOV8109A-B.

Charging Pump 1A Miniflow Valve QlE21MOV8109B-B Charging Pump 1B Miniflow Valve 1-35-2 i

l Valve Q1E21MOV8109A-B or Q1E21MOV81093-B is required to be maintained in the open position to establish miniflow-for charging pump 1A or 1B respectively.

Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the control cables for the subject l

valves, the valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperative, thereby isolating charging pump miniflow.

Justification The charging pump can be run safely with miniflow isolated and with a minimum of 24 gal /m of seal.'.njection flow for a period of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

This will allow the operater time to deenergize MCC-1V and take manual action to open the valve and reestablish the miniflow.

C.

-RCS AND PRESSURIZER SAMPLE VALVES Fire area 1-034 contains control cables associated with the following valves:

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1P15HV3332-B Pressurizer Liquid Sample CTMT Isolation-Valve Q1P15HV3881-B Pressurizer Liquid Sample CTMT I

Isolation-Valve Q1P15HV3765-A RCS Hot Leg Sample Line CTMT Isolation-Valve I

Q1P15HV3333-B RCS Hot Leg Sample Line CTMT Isolation-Valve RCS and pressurizer aample line valves Q1P15HV3333-B, Q1P15HV3765-A, Q1P15HV3332-B, and Q1P15HV3881-B are required to be maintained in the closed position to maintain RCS boundary integrity.

Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the control cables of the subject valves, the valves could fail in the open position and become inoperative.

Justification i

i the open position of the subject valves will allow an RCS sample to flow to the VCT, through the sample cooler.

This flow is of no immediate significance for safe shutdown.

An operator action will be performed to close the manual valves Q1P15V051A and Q

Q1P15V051B to stop the flow of RCS and pressurizer liquid.

The 4

valves Q1P15V051A and Q1P15V051B are located in the sample room 323 outside of fire area 1-034.

D.

RCS BOUND \\RY INTEGRITY Fire area 1-034 contains control cables associated with the following safe shutdown equipment:

1 1-35-3

-l

~

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1331PCV04443-3 Pressurizer PCRV

~

Q1B13MOVSOOO3-3 Pressurizer PORV Block Valve Q13135V22133-3 Reactor Head Vent Valve Q1313SV22143-3 Reactor Head Vent Valve The subject cables are associated with contrcl from beth het shutdown panel and main control board.. Fire induced failures having multiple het shorts could cause the reactor inventory te letdown via the PORV and reactor head vent paths.

Iustificati:n Fire induced failure (het short) of the individual control cables for Q1331PCV04443-3 (power operated relief valve)

Q1313SV22133-3 and Q1313SV2214B-3 (reactor head vent valves),

could result in the valves being energized to open.

The power operated relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position.

In the unlikely event of the multiple fire induced failures (het shorts from adjacent centrol cables in the shared raceway) occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing 125 V-dc power from cables in the shared raceway.

This can be accomplished by opening breakers on the 125 V-dc switchgear bus 13 (Q1R4230013-3) for 125 V-dc distribution panels ID, IE, and 1F, feeder breaker 12 on 125 V-dc distribution panel N1R41 LOO 1G-N, and breaker 15 on 125 V-dc distribution panel N1R41 LOO 1H-N.

E.

FALSE SI, CVI, AND CI SAFETY SIGNAL INITIATION Fire area 1-034 contains instrumentation cables which are not required for post-fire safe shutdown, but due to fire induced failures, could cause initiation of SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system.

Justification e

Plant procedures exist or will be developed for resetting i

spurious SI, CVI, and CI signals from the main control room and can be used if required for a fire in this area.

Plant procedures will be developed to include above actions for i

a fire in this area.

F.

PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SIGNAL Fire area 1-034 contains instrumentation cable for the following safe shutdown instrumentation:

1-35-4

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION QlB31PTO455-P1 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter N1331PTO444-4 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter QlB31PTO4442-4 Pressuriser Pressure Transmitter QlB31PT0456-P2 Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter QlB31PTO457-P3 Pressuricer Pressure Transmitter N1331PTO445-3 Pressuriser Pressure Transmitter At least one of the above pressure transmitter signals is required for safe shutdown.

Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the instrumentation cables of the pressuricer pressure transmitters, all the pressure transmitter signals will be lost.

Justification Instrumentation cable for QlB31PTO455-P1 has been rerouted out of fire area 1-034 so that pressurizer pressure signal from at least one pressure transmitter, QlB31PT0455-P1 is available.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA:

1-034 MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SEUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE

' TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft2)

SEVERITY l

334 A,

B Cable insul.

16,409 lbs 90,955

<l-1/2 h Electrical Panels Penetration Room Train B i

317 A,

B Cable insul.

613 lbs 24,606

<30 min Penetration Charcoal 1,548 lbs Filteration filter

, Equipment Pipe insul.

7 lbs Room t

DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floors, ceilings, and walls forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

A self expanding cork is installed for the portions of the area boundary along the containment wall.

I Doors:

Fire rated UL Class A doors are installed between rooms i

334 and 333 (area 1-035), 334 and stairwell no.

2, and 317 and 322 (area 1-004).

The tendon access openings in the el 139 ft -

O in. and 155 ft - O in. slabs are covered by a steel plate and a concrete slab and have a 3-hour fire rating.

1-35-5 i

The two rooms of the fire area communicate via two stainless steel pipes used in the penetration room filtration. system.

These pipes are encased,in concrete and contain no combustibles.

Pipe and Electrical Penetration:

All penetrations through the area boundary in room 334 are sealed with silicone foam except those through the containment wall that are watertight.

All penetrations through the area boundary in room 317 are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating.

Ventilation:

No normal ventilation is provided.

Fixed smoke removal capabil ty is not provided.

Floor Drains:

Three 4-in. diameter floor drains, each having 100 gal /m capacity and drain to floor drain tank, are provided.

c 1._; r.o.O. ~-.rcN

-2 A

Smoke detectors are provided in rooms 317 and 334.

A manual hose station located in rooms 316 (area 1-004) is available for use in this area.

. L 1

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e I

f 1-35-6

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 1CCFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXIXPTION REQUEST:

1-36 FIRE AREA:

1-CC1 LOCATICN:

UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING, EL 83 FT - 0 IN.,

100 FT -

0 IN.,

AND 121 FT - 0 IN.

Fire area 1-001 consists of the following rooms:

El 23 Ft 0 In.

Room 101

- Waste Decay Tank Room Rocm 102 Valve Compartment Room Room 103 Corridor Room 104 Passageway to Unit 2 Room 105 Catalytic H2 Recembiner A Room Room 106 Catalytic H2 Recombiner B Room Room 107 Storage Room Room 108 Waste Monito: Tank Room Room 109 Waste Monitor Tank Pump Room Room 110 Monitor Control Panel Rocm Room 111 Containment Spray Pump Room A Rocm 112 Access to Tendon Access Gallery Room 113 Valve Encapsulation Room 114 Pipe Chase Room 115 Hallway Room 118 Floor Drain Tank Room Room 119 Waste Holdup Tank Room Room 120 Corridor Room 121 Floor Drain Tank Pump Room Room 122 Waste Evaporator Feed Pump Room Room 123 Pipe Chase Room 224 Valve Encapsulation Room 125 Containment Spray Pump Room B Room 126 Pipe Chase Room 127 Pipe Chase Room 128 RER Heat Exchanger Room Room 129 RER Low Head Pump Room B Room 130 Pipe Chase Room 131 RHR Low Head Pump Room A El 100 Ft 0 In.

Room 183 Tendon Access Gallery Entrance Room 184 Piping Penetration Room Room 169 Pipe and Duct Chase Room 196 Tendon Access Gallery 1-36-1

El 121 Ft -0 In.

Room 223 Piping Penetration Rocm

~

EXEMPTION An exemption is requested from section III.G.2.c to the extent it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cable to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and automatic fire suppression.

CONDITIONS EEQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

NCN-RATED STEEL HATCH COVER A hatchway in the ceiling of reem 133 communicates with reem 163 4

(area 1-004).

A non-rated steel plate covers the hatchway.

Justificatien i

The sprinkler system ins'talled in the hatchway area of room 163 will serve the purpose of a, water curtain to prevent the spread of fire via the hatchway.

B.

INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION Control cables for instrument air isolation valves Q1P19EV3611 and Q1F19HV3825 are routed through area 1.-001.

A fire induced failure in the control cable for either valve could cause the valve to fail closed.

The subsequent loss of instrument air would cause the normal charging line isolation valve Q1E21HVS146 and the alternate charatag line isolation valve Q1E21HV8147 to fail open.

It may Le necessary to close these valves during the course of shutdown to isolate charging flow.

The control ca'ble for the pressurizer PORV backup air /Na supply valve Q1B13EV2228-3 is also routed through area 1-001.

A fire induced failure in the control cable could cause the valve to fail closed.

If the pressurizer PCRV backup air /Na supply valve (Q1313HV2228-B) and either instrument air isolation valve (Q1P19HV3611 or Q1P19EV3825) fail closed, the pressurizer PORVs will be inoperable in the closed position.

Operation of the

. pressurizer PCRVs may be required to achieve depressurization of the RCS.

Justification Instrument air isolation valves Q1P19HV3611 and QlP19EV3825 are equipped with a handwheel to facilitate manual operation.

In the event that one or both valves fail closed, an operator can manually open them.

This action will restore instrument air to the charging line isolation valves and pressurizer PORVs.

Consequently, action would not have to be taken on the pransurlanr PORV backup air /Na supply valva Q1B13HV2228-B.

1-36-2

A C.

REACTOR COOLANT BOUNCARY INTEORITY Fire induced failures (hot shorts) within the control. cables for the transfer relay cabinet Q1H22LCO2-A could cause control for the power operated relief and blocking valves and the reactor head vent valves to shift from their normal main control board alignment to the remote hot shutdown panel.

Subsequent fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) of the control cables for Q1331?C70445A-A, power operated relief valve, and Q1313572213A-A and Q1313SV2214A-A, reactor head vent valves, could result in the valves being energized to open.

The power relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically inoperative in the open position.

Justificatien In the unlikely event that the cc=bination of het shorts occur and the condition described above materializes, the condition can be mitigated as follows.

Remove power from the transfer relays and manually reposition (handle is provided) the effected relay.

This action will transfer control back to the main control board where complete valve control is available.

D.

MAIN STEAM ATMOSPHERIC RELIEF Control cables asscciated with the three redundant atmospheric relief valves are routed through fire area 1-001.

An analysis of potential effects of a fire upon these cables has shown that the subject valves could beccme inoperable in the closed position.

Justification one of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release for cocidown.

The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.

Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and would be accessible despite a fire in area 1-001.

The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 1-001 would not prevent the operation of at least one redundant atmospheric relief valve.

1-36-3

E.

INITIATION OF SAFETY SIGNALS Fire area 1-001 contains instrumentation cables associated with the following redundant containment pressure instrument channels.

PT950-P1 CTMT Pressure Channel 1 PT951-P2 CTMT Pressure Channel 2 PT952-P3 CTMT-Pressure Channel 3 PT953-P4 CTMT Pressure Channel 4 These instrument loops are not required for post-fire safe shutdown, but due to fire induced failures, the circuitry could cause initiation of safety signals (SI, CI, and C7I).

Justification Plant procedures exist, or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI and CI safety signals from the main control room.

F.

CHARGING PUMP OPERATION Train-A cables for the following equipment are routed through room 183 in area 1-001.

Train-A Charging Pump - Q1E21M001A-A Train-A Charging Pump Room Cooler - Q1E16M001A-A Swing Charging Pump - Q1E21M001B-AB Swing Charging Pump Room Cooler - Q1516M0013-AB Train-A RWST Isolation Valve - Q1E21LOVC1153-A Train-B cables for the following equipment are routed through room 223 in area 1-001.

Train-B Charging Pump Q1E21M001C-B Train-B Charging Pump Room Cooler - Q1E16M001C-B Swing Charging Pump - Q1E21M001B-AB Swing Charging Pump Room Cooler - Q1E16M0013-AB The cables associated with these two groups of equipment are redundant to one another.

Justification Although both rooms 183 and 223 are in area 1-001, there is a high degree of separation between them.

Rocm 153 is located on el 100 ft - 0 in. and room 223 is located on el 121 ft - 0 in.

The routing of the cables is such that the redundant groups are separated by 10 f horizontally in addition to the vertical separation between elevations.

The slab between rooms 133 and 223 is 2 ft thick and penetrated by only two 8 in. and one 12 in. mechanical penetrations.

The part of room 223 through which the subject cables are routed is covered by an automatic suppression systen and both rooms are coverad by detection systems.

1-36-4

_ = _ -

In conclusion, the degree of separation between rooms 183 and 223 would prevent a single credible fire from spreading from one room to the other and adversely affecting cables for redundant equipment.

FIRE AREA INFORMATICN FIRE AREA:

1-001 MAXIMUM ROCM NUMBERS /

SEUTDCWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft2)

SE*/ERITY 101 Cable 29 lb<ai 1,251<a> <30

.:n'a>

Waste Gas insul.can Decay Tank Room 102 Cable insul.

Valve Compartment Room 103 B

Cable insul.

Corridor 105 B

Cable insul.

490 lb 7,634 <30 mincb>

Catalytic Hz Panels ins.cb>

Recombiner A 28 lb Room panels 106 Cable insul.

Catalytic H 2 Panels Recombiner B Room 107 Cable insul.

85 lb 22,561

<30 min Storage Room Charcoal 310 lb filter 104 B

Cable insul.

Passageway to Unit-2 i

109 B

Cable insul.

417 lb 5,742<c> <30 min <c)

Waste Monitor Lube oil ins <ci Tank Pump Room 0.25 gal oil 14 lb panel 110 Cable insul.

Monitor Control Panels

? sac 1 Room 1-36-5

g MA:CMUM RCCM NUMBERS /

SHUTDCWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL Q UAN"'I""I (Btu /ft8)

SEVERITY 108 Cable insul.

75 lb 19,457

<30 min Waste Monitor Charcoal 375 lb Tank Room filter 169 None 0

0 Duct and Pipe Chase

'15 Cable insul.

22 lb 331

<3 3.in Floor Drain Tank R o=

119 Cable insul.

60 lb 2,711

<30 mir.

Waste Holdup Tank Room A

f 120 B,

C Cable insul.

42 lb 5,540

<30 min Corridor i

121 B,

C Cable insul.

287 lb 21,402

<30 min Floor Drain Lube oil 0.25 gal 2' Tank Pump Room 122 B,

C Cable insul.

237 lb 21,402

<30 min Waste Evaporator Lube oil 0.25 gal Feed Pump Roem 127 B,

C None 0

0 0

Pi.pe Chase 129 A,

C Cable insul.

454 lb 2,607

<30 min R'iR Heat

• • ~

.;2r Room m.

129 B,

C Cable insul.

217 lb 3,837

<30 min RER Low Head Pump Rocm B 130 None 0

0 0

Pipe Chase 131 Cable insul.

222 lb 6,332

<30 min RER Low Head Room A 126 None O

O O

Pipe Chase 124 Cable insul.

7 lb 6,329

<30 min Valve Encapsulation 1-36-6

MAXIMUM RCCM NUMBERS / SEUTOOWN CCMBUSTIBLE FIRE LCAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/Tt2)

SEVERITY l

125 Cable insul.

261 lb 3,569

<30 min Containment Lube oil O.25 gal Spray Pump Room B 114 Cable insul.

7 lb 3,885

<30 min Pipe Chase 111 Cable insul.

IC1 Ib 3,469

<30 =:n Containmen-Lube oil 0.25 gal Spray Pump Room A 113 Cable insul.

6 lb 3,333

<30 min Valve Encapsulation 115 Cable insul.

4 lb 1,655

<30 min Hallway 112 Cable insul.

4 1; 175

<30 min Access to Tendon Access Gallery 196 Cable insul.

4 lb 175

<30 min Access to Tendon Access Gallery 123 None O

O O

Pipe Chase 183 A

Cable 1,05C lb<d>

6,405<d' <30 min <d>

Tenden Access insul.'d' Gallery Entrance 184 Piping Penetration Room, el 100 ft - O in.

223 A,

B Cable insul.

16,663 lb 40,625

<1 h Piping Charcoal 400 lb Penetration Room, el 121 ft - O in.

(a) Applies to rooms 101 and 102 collectively (b) Applies to rooms 103, 105, 106 collectively (c) Applies to rooms 104, 109, 110 collectively (d) Applies to rooms 183 and 184 collectively 1-36-7

DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floors and walls forming the area beundary,are of

~

reinforced concrete.

The ceiling of room 223 has tendon access openings to room 334 (area 1-34).

Steel plates with 3-hour rated coatings and which are topped by removable concrete slabs have been installed over the tendon access openings.

There is a non-rated steel hatch cover over the hatchway between rooms 103 and 163 (area 1-CC4).

Doors:

An airtight, UL Class B door is installed between room 223 and stairway No.

2.

The door between rooms 184 and 162 (area 1-4) is an airtight *.'; Class A door.

Ncn-airtight Class 3 doors are installed between rooms 110 and 115 and stairway No. 2.

Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

Penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam.

Three-hour rated fire dampers are installed between rooms 169 and 163 (area 1-4).

Ventilation:

No normal ventilation exists.

Fixed smoke removal capability has not been provided.

Floor Drains:

Twenty-one 4-in. diameter floor drains with a 100-gal /m capacity each are located throughout the area.

Sumps are provided in rooms 103, 111~, 125, 128, 129, and 131.

The sumps contain two 100-gal /m pumps each.

The sump pumps discharge to the waste holdup tank or the floor drain tank.

The floor drains above el 77 ft to 83 ft drain to the floor drain tank.

The other floor drains drain to the sumps.

FIRE PROTECTION A detection system covers the majority of the area.

Exceptions to this coverage are rocms 112, 114, 115, 123, 126, 127, 130, 169, and 196.

The western half of the piping penetration room on el 121 ft - 0 in, and the floor area of room 184 beneath the covered tendon hatchway into room 223 above are the only parts j

l of fire area 1-001 covered by automatic suppression.

l Portable extinguishers, smoke removal equipment, and water hose l

cabinets are located throughout the fire area for use by the fire brigade.

l i

l l

t i

t l

t l

1-36-8 l

l

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVAEUATICN EXEMPTION REQUESI:

1-37 FIRE AREA:

1-035 LCCATION:

UNIT 1 Ai"GLI ARY BUIIOING, ELECTRICAL PENETRATICNS RCCM TRAIN A Fire area 1-035 consists of rocms 333 and 347 at el 139 f O

in.

All fire area beundary walls, ceilings, and ficers are 3-hcur fire rated and area bcundary doors are UL Class A fire rated.

Self-expanding cork is installed for the portiens of the area boundary along the centainment wall.

EXEMPTION Request exemption from section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe. shutdown cables to be enclosed by a 1-hour rated fire barrier and installation of automatic fire suppression system.

CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

RCS HOT LE3 TEMPERATURE INDICATION Fire area 1-035 contains instrumentation cables associated w::h the following RCS hot leg temperature indication.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION N1321TE413-P1 RCS Loop-1 Hot Le2 Temperature Indication N1321TE423-P1

-I Ecc Leg Temperature Indica:::n N1B21TE433-P1 RCS Loop-3 Hot Leg Temperature Indication The analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon these cables shows that the plant could lose hot leg temperature indication for all three RCS loops.

1-37-1

Justification Each RCS loop hot leg temperature instrumentation loop is powered from channelized inverter-1A.

Inverter-1A is powdred from 600 V-ac MCC 1A or 125 V-dc bus 1A.

A fire in area 1-035 along with an assumed loss of offsite power (LOSP) for Uni: 1 could result in loss of the 600 V-ac power supply to inverter 1A; however, inverter lA will continue to operate from 125 V-dc bus lA and will supply power to the instrument loops for a minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

If after 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> power is lost, RCS hot leg temperature indication is available from the core exit thermoccuples.

Core exit thermoccuple temperature indication will not be affected by a fire in area 1-035.

In addition ::

the alternate de power supply for a minimum of 2 hcurs and core exit temperature indication availability, a design change to be installed as a result of R.G.

1.97 will provide a redundant signal processing and indication between RCS hot leg temperature loops N1321TE413, N1321TE4 3, and N1321TE433. In order in implement this design change, it is required that all design and material be onsite prior to initiation of the modification.

Based upon the R.G. 1.97 commitment schedule, implementation of the modification is currently planned for the seventh refueling outage presently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

After implementation of this modification, a fire in area 1-035 will not affect the ability to monitor one loop of RCS hot leg temperature.

3.

MAINTAIN SEAL-INJECTICN FLOW B.1 Fire area 1-035 contains power and control cables and e.quipment (MCC-lU) associated with the following valve.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION QlE21MOV8106-A Charging Pump Miniflow Isolation Valve The analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon the equipment and these cables shows that the subject valve could become inoperable in the closed position, isolating charging pump miniflow.

1-37-2

I Justification 4

The charging pump can be run safely with miniflow isolated and with a minimum of 24 gpm seal injection flow for a period up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

This will allow the operator time to deenergize MCC-1U and take manual action to open the valve and reestablish the miniflow.

B.2 Fire area 1-035 contains power and control cables and equipment (MCC-1U) associated.with the following valves.

EQU:PMENT FUNCTICN i

Q1E21MOV8131A-A Charging Pump Suction Header : solation Valve QlE21MOV8133A-A Charging Pump Discharge Header Isolation Valve The analysis of the potential effects of a fire upon the equipment and these cables shows that the subject valves could become inoperable in the closed position.

This condition will result in loss of seal injection water flow when the swing charging pump 1B is operational.

These valves cannot be lecked open because they are needed for train separation during a LOCA event.

Justification A design modification is proposed to install disconnect breakers in the power supply circuits of these valves outside the electrical penetration room during the next outage of sufficient duration subsequent to design and procurement completion.

The next outage is currently scheduled to commence during the fourth quarter of 1986.

In the interim, the cperators will be instructed of the potential inadvertent closure of the charging pump suction and discharge valves in the event of a fire in this area.

C.

RCS BOUNDARY INTEGRITY 4

Fire area 1-035 contains control cables associated with the following safe shutdown equipment.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1B31PCV0445A-A Pressurizer PORV Q1B13MOV8000A-A Pressurizer PORV Block Valve Q1B13SV2213A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve Q1B135V2214A-A Reactor Head Vent Valve The subject cables are associated with control from both the hot shutdown panel and the main control board.

Fire induced failures having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor invantory to lerdown the PORV and reactor head vent paths.

1 1-37-3 f

a i

1 y,-w

-,n.--,

.,------,-----n-

---

r

r Justification Fire induced failure (ho; short) of the individual control cables for Q1331PCV0445A-A, power operated relief valve, and Q13135V2213A-A and QlB12SV2214A-A, reactor head vent valves, could result in the valves to be energized to open.

The power operated relief blocking valve (MCV) could beceme electrically inoperative in the open position.

In the unlikely event of the multiple fire induced failures (hot shorts frem adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) occurring, this condition can be mitigated by removing 125 V-dc power from cables in the shared raceway.

This can be accomplished by opening the breakers on the 125 V-dc switchgear bus 1A (01?42BOCIA-A) for 125 V-de distribution panels lA, 13, and 1C and by opening feeder breaker numbers 4 and 16 on 125 V-dc distribution panel 1G N;R4; LOO;C-N.

D.

FALSE SI, CVI, AND CI SAFETY SIGNAL INITIATION Fire area 1-035 cdttains instrumentation cables which are not required for post-fire safe shutdown, but due to fire induced failures, could cause initiation of SI, CVI, or CI safety signal l

initiation from the solid state protection system.

4 Justification

~$

Plant procedures exist or will be developed for resetting

.L a

spurious SI, CVI, and CI signals from the main control room and can be used, if required for a fire in this area.

Plant precedures will be developed to include the above acticns for a fire in this area.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE AREA:

1-035 ROOM NUMBERS / SEUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE _+-

- P TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft y 3373p;77 333 and 347 A

Cable insul.

8549 lbs 83,542

<l-1/2 h Electrical Panels Penetration Room DESIGN FEATURES Construction:

Floors, ceilings, and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

Self expanding cork is installed for the portions of the area boundary along the concainment wall.

Door:

A UL Class A door is located between rooms 333 and 334 and a UL Class A door exists between rooms 333 and 147.

1-37-4

I s

Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through the area boundary are sealed with silicone foam.

Ven'tilation:

No normal ventilation is provided.

Fixed smoke removal capability is not provided.

Floor Drains:

Two 4-in. diameter drains each having capacity of 100 gal /m and draining to floor drain tank are provided.

FIRE PROTECTION i

Ioni=ation smoke detectors are provided to alarm at the main control recm.

The water hose.staticn located in rccm 334 (area 1-004) is available for use in this area.

P

~

f a

f 9

E l.

M 1-37-5

J.

M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 1CCFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZAPSS ANALYSIS REEVALITAT!CN EXEMPTICN REQUEST:

1-38 FIRE AREA:

1-006 LCCATION:

UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING, EL 100 FT - 0 IN.,

121 FT - 0 IN.,

127 ET - 0 IN.,

139 FT - 0 IN.,

155 FT - 0 IN.,

AND 175 FT - 0 IN.

Fire area 1-006 consists of the following recms:

El 100 Ft 0 In.

~

Room 167 Combustible Storage Room Room 185 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Rocm Room 189 Plant Heating Equipment Room Room 190 Motor Control Center 1E Room Room 191 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (Train A)

Room 192 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (Train B)

Room 193 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room (Turbine Driven)

Room 194 Lower Equipment < Room Room 195 Access Hatch Area El 127 Ft 0 In.

Recm 241 Main Steam and Feedwater Valve Room e

Room 242 Pipe Chase Room 243 Pipe Chase The floors, walls, and ceilings of fire area 1-006 that form the boundary between area 1-006 and adjacent fire areas are of reinforced concrete and rated for 3-hours with the exception of a hatchway with a steel plate cover between rooms 185 (area 1-006) and 234 (area 1-020).

All electrical and piping penetrations between adjacent fire areas are sealed for a 3-hour rating.

All doors between adjacent fire areas are UL Class A or Class B rated with two exceptions.

There are non-rated doors between stairway No.1 and room 190 and between stairway No. 1 and room 241.

These doors are watertight and pressuretight respectively.

Fire area 1-006 has several openings to the outside.

Most notably, a checkered steel plate at el 155 f:

0 in. which is the outside entrance to the access hatch area (room 195) and portions of the walls of rooms 241, 242, and 243 that are constructed of steel grating.

1-38-1

4 4

( -

1 EXEMPTION i

.An~ exemption to section III.G.2.c'is requested to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cable and equipment to be.encleted by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and the installation of automatic fire suppression E.79tems.

l CONDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION A.

AUXILIARY FEE WATER SYSTEM The two redundant motor driven auxiliary feecwater pumps and the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump are located within area 1-0C6.

Cables for all three pumps are routed through the area, unpr_otected by fire barriers.

Justification and Modification i

A fire barrier has been provided over the raceways carrying cables for the train-B motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump i

throughout area 1-006 with the exception of the train-B pump room (192).

The barrier consists of two 1-in. layers of Kaowool i

blanket wraps with one overall layer of Zetex woven fabric.

The i-subject raceways are BDDA09, BDDA06, BDDA03, BDDA0A, BEE 016, and BFDDOM.

An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire limited to l

one of the AFW pump rooms would not defeat the auxiliary i

feedwater system.

A fire in any one of the pump rooms would impact the AFW system only to the extent that one AFW pump and AFW flow to one steam generator could be disabled.

^

The AFW pump rooms are highly segregated watertight rooms with 2-feet thick reinforced concrete walls and watertight docrs that i

are maintained closed.

Lubricating oil and cable insulation are the only combustibles present in the pump rooms.

Leaking oil 2

would be contained within the individual rooms or would drain 1

into the sump servicing the room.

The combustible loading of any one pump rocm is estimated to be less than 30,000 BTU /ft 8 with a maximum firo severity of less than 30 minutes.

A smoke detection system is installed in each of the three auxiliary feedwater pump recms.

The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond.

A manual hose station, portable extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use in the area.

The room construction coupled with a low quantity of combustible s

j material, the presence of smoke detection systems, and the availability of equipment for use by the fire brigade ensures that a fire in one of the AFW pump rooms would be confined to the affected room.

Such a fire would not prevent auxiliary feedwater flow to at least one steam generator.

1.

1-38-2 6

+ - - +.,

-,,,.._,.._,._y-,-m_,

,__m&

~n y_,

.y,g.

,,m_.,gg

-,_,,,,y.,,,,.y...

,,m---

.~

r r

4 4

B.

COMPCNENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM Protection and/or separation of ecmponer.t cooling watir sy. stem cables and equipment complies with 10CFR50 Appendix R section III.G.2.c throughout fire area 1-006 with the exceptien of the s

component cooling water heat exchanger room (185).

This recm, contains all three component cooling water (CCW) pumps.

The COW pumps are located on 21-ft centers and fire ~ barriers are-provided for the pump control and power cables.

However,i there i

s are small quantities of intervening combustibles consisting primarily of cable insulatien between the pumps and the pumps T

are not provided with fire barriers.

In addition, the service water inlet valves to redundant component eccling water host t

exchangers (MOV3130A-3, MOV31303-B, and MCV3130C-A) and service water discharge valves frcm redundant component eccling water heat exchangers (SV009A-3, SVC093-3, and SVOO9C-A) are Jhcated less than 20 ft apart.

Although the cables for the train-B valves are provided with fire barriers and automatic suppression, the valves themselves are not provided with fire barriers.

Justification f.

A smoke detection system and automatic fire suppression system is installed throughout the area.

The combustible loading in t

the room is less than 35,000 BTU /ft with a maximum fire 2

severity of less than 30 minutes.

The detection systen,in the roem would provide early warning of a fire allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond.

A manual hose station, portable extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use in the area.

The CCW pumps are locate'd on 21-ft centers.

Heat detectors are provided in the 5-kV CCW pump disconnect switch which alarms 4

locally and in the. control room.

The S-kV disconnect switch a

cabinets are provided with a total-flooding CO 2 system that is activated by the heat detectors.

The CCW pump cables are wrapped with two 1-in. layers of Kaowool with the exception of the train-A cables for the swing CCW pump l

which are wrapped with a single 1-in. layer.

All trains of CCW pump cables are covered by an automatic sprinkler system.

l Cables for the train-B service water inlet and discharge valves on the CCW heat exchangers are protected by two 1-in. layers of Kaowool and covered by automatic suppression.

Cables for the train-A service water inlet and discharge valves on the CCW heat l

exchanger are not protected.

Although neither train-A or train-B service water valves are provided with fire barriers, l

the nearest redundant valves are separated by a distance of l

approximately 10 ft.

Intervening combustibles between redundant valves are minimal, consisting primarily of cable insulation.

1-38-3 i

A Due to the existing level of fire detection and protection

' features provided as discussed above, fire damage in room 185 would be limited such that one train of redundant CCW'syst.em j

components and cabling would be available for safe shutdown.

h

/

t C.

MAIN STEAM ISCLATION w

Cables for the redundant main steam isolation valves traverse rooms 185, 189, 190, and 194 on el 100 ft - O in. unprotected by fire _ barriers and in close proximity to cne another.

In the 3

m main steam and feedwater valve room.(241) on el 127 ft - 0 in.,

4 the redundant main steam isolation valves are back-to-back in each of the three main steam lines and the associated valve centrol cables are separated by less than 20 ft.

Justification In the event that the main steam isolation valves fail to isolate due to fire induced failures in the valves or valve control circuitry, the main turbine stop valves would provide i-

' isolation of the main steam lines.

The main turbine stop valves and related control circuitry would not be affected by a fire in 4

area 1-006.

r D.

MAIN STEAM RELIEF Control cables for the redundant main steam atmospheric relief valves (MSARV) traverse rooms 185, 189, 190, and 194 on el 100 ft - O in.

These cables are separated by less than 20 ft m,

in the rooms mentioned above.

One train of the redundant MSARV control cables is not protected by a fire barrier on el 100 ft - 0 in.

The local control station and related control t -

cabling for all three MSARVs are located together in room 189.

Fire barriers are not provided to_ protect the local control stations or control cabling.

On el 127 ft - O'in.,

the three valves and their control cabling are located in one room (241).

Adj acent valves are 'within 20 ft of one another.

Fire barriers are not provided to protect the valves or control cabling, and fire suppression is not provided in room 241.

Justificatien The main steam atmospheric relief valves are located in the main i

steam and feedwater valve room (241) on el 127 ft - O in.

The

[

backup air compressors and local control station for the atmospheric relief valves are located in the plant heating i

s equipment room (139) on el 100 ft - O in.

The combustible a

loading of either room is such that the maximum expected fire L

severity is less than 30 minutes.

The main steam and feedwater j

valve room is a restricted area with limited personnel access during plant operation.

A smoke detection system is installed in both rooms.

An automatic sprinkler system covers the plant l

l-38-4 l

I l

I

.~

heating equipment rocm.

The main steam and feedwater valve roem does not have sprinkler coverage because of the high temperature piping in the room.

The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond.

A manual hose station, portable extinguishers and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use in both rooms.

The main steam and feedwater valve room is a large reem divided into three bays.

The bays are separated by partial walls, 14 ft in height.

One main steam line lies in each bay.

The main steam lines and their at=cspheri: re'ief valves are 0.9 15-ft cen ers and separation of the valve control cabling for redundant MSARVs is maximised between the bays.

The fi:cr of the main steam and feedwater valve room is watertight.

The only communication between the main steam and feedwater valve room is an equipment hatch.

On el 127 ft - 0 in. the equipment hatch area is enclosed 9h a separate room.

In the event of fire induced failures affecting the redundant MSARV control cables or the loca1 control station located on el

~

100 ft - 0 in., the atmoseheric relief valves located in room 241 on el 127 ft - 0 in. 'are provided with hand wheels such that

~i the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical

• controls or air supplies.

Due to the degree of separation provided between MSARVs and related control cabling in room 241, the minimal combustible loading, the presence of an early warning smoke detection system, and the administrative controls imposed at the plant to limit access to room 241 during plant operations, a credible fire in room 241 would not result in the

~

inability to operate the MSARV associated with one steam generator.

E.

NON-FIRE RATED. HATCH CCVER A hatchway located in room 185 has a non-rated steel plate cover.

The hatchway communicates with room 234 (area 1-020).

Justification The sprinkler system installed in rooms 234 and 185 will serve the purpose of a water curtain to prevent the spread of fire via the hatchway.

1-38-5

FIRE AREA INFORMATION FIRE ARIA:

1-006 MAX! MUM RCOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDCWN CCMBUST!BLE FIRE LCAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY

( Btu /f t * )

SEVERITY 167 Cable insul.

2 lb 5,323

<30 min Combustible Miscellaneous 100 lb Storage Room material 135 A,

B, C

Cable insul.

10,775 lb 34,775

<30 min Component 5-kV dis-14 lb Cooling Water connect i gal Heat Exchanger switch Room Lube oil 191 A

Cable insul.

463 lb 20,107

<30 min Auxiliary Lube oil 0.25 gal Feedwater Pump Room 192 B

Cable insul.

553 lb 26,411

<30 min Auxiliary Lube oil 0.25 gal Feedwater Pump Room 189 A,

B Cable insul.

Pla.70 Heating Lube oil 1 gal Equipment Room 190 A,

B Cable 6,195 lbca> 27,356ca>

<30 minca>

Motor insul.ca' 14 lb Control Panel

~

Center 1E Room 193 C

Cable insul.

6 gal Auxiliary Lube oil Feedwater Pump Room 194 Cable insul.

Equipment i

Room f

l 195 Cable insul.

Access r

Hatch Room l

l 1-38-6 l

1 MAXIMUM ROCM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stufft2)

SE7ERITY 241 Cable insul.

1,384 lb 3,869

<30 min Main Steam and Feedwater Valve Room 242 Cable insul.

19 lb 1,287

<30 min Pipe Chase 243 Cable insul.

30 lb 1,570

<30 min Pipe Chase (a)

Applies to rooms 189, 190, 193, 194, and 195 collectively.

DESIGN FIATURES Construction:

Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinforced concrete or open to the outside.

There is a removable steel hatch between room 185 and 234 (area 1-20).

Doors:

UL Class A doors exist between rooms 185 and 116 (area 1-8) and between rooms 185 and 117 (area 1-9).

A UL Class B i

door exists between room 185 and stairway no. 1.

A checkered steel plate is located at el 155 ft - 0 in, at the outside exit of room 195.

A pressuretight door exists between room 241 and stairway no.

1.

A watertight door is installed between room 190 i

and stairway no.

1.

b Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

Penetrations to adjacent fire areas are sealed with silicone foam or Nelson fittings.

Ventilation:

Normal supply and exhaust is by the nonradwaste heating and ventilating (HVAC) system and the lower equipment

+

room HVAC system with the exception of rooms 192 and 191 which have individual room coolers.

Room 185 also has two room coolers.

Fire dampers are provided in the duct penetrations in i

room 167.

Fixed smoke removal capability is not provided.

Rooms 241, 242, _and 243 are vented to the atmosphere.

p Floor Drains:

Eleven 4-in. diameter floor drains each having a 100-gal /m capacity are provided which drain to sumps located in rooms 185 (2 sumps), 191, 193, and 189.

Each sump has two 100-gal /m pumps that discharge to the floor drain tank.

In room 241, there are four 4-in. diameter floor drains having a 100-gal /m capacity that drain to the main steam room drain tank, which has a 65-gal /m pump that discharges to the turbine room drain system.

t 1-38-7

,,, - + - -,

-,,,,,y..

.m,.

m.-

-y.,_,

,.-_y_

__.~.,.4

FIRE PROTECTION A detection system covers the entire area except for reor.s 195, 242, and 243.

Room 167 has a wet-pipe sprinkler system wh'ich activates a local fire alarm bell and trouble horn that annunciates in the control room.

Automatic water suppression systems are provided for rooms 189, 190, 194, and 185.

The auxiliary feedwater pump rooms (191, 192, and 193) are not covered by automatic suppression.

This has been taken into consideration and the consequences are addressed as part of the Justification for the auxiliary feedwater system.

Automatic suppression is not provided in the main steam and feedwater valve roem (241) because of the presence of high temperature piping.

This has been taken into consideration and the consequences are addressed as part of the justification f:r.ain steam isolation and main steam relief.

Heat detectors are provided in the 5-kV disconnect switch in room 185 that alarm both locally and in the control room.

The 5-kV d sconnect switch cabinets are provided with a total-flooding CO 2 system which is activated by the heat detectors.

Two water hose stations, located in rooms 185 and 189, are provided.

A portable extinguisher is located in room 185 outside room 167.

A hose station in room 234 (area 1-20) will be available for use in this area.

Automatic water suppression systems are provided for rooms 185, 189, 190, and 194 to protect electrical cable from exposure fires.

0432n 1-38-8

J. M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX."R" FIRE FAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-39 FIRE AREA:

1-004 LOCATICN:

UNIT 1 AUXILIARY BUILDING, EL 100 FT - 0 IM.,

121 FT -

0 IN.,

130 FT - 0 IN.,

139 FT - 0 IN.,

155 FT - 0 IN.,

175 FT - 0 IN.,

AND 184 FT - 0 :N.

Fire area 1-004 consists of the following rooms:

El 100 Ft -0 In.

Room 151 Waste Gas Decay Tank Rooms Room 152 Valve Compartment Room Room 153 Waste Gas Compressor Room Room 154 Waste Evaporator Steam Generator Room Room 155 Passageway to Unit 2 Room 156 Holdup Tank Room Room 157 Holdup Tank Room Room 158 Holdup Tank Room Room 159 Recycle Evaporator Feed Pump Room Room 160 Hatch Area Room 161 Corridor Room 162 Hallway Room 163 WDS Control Panel Room Room 164 Storage Room / Laundry and Hot Shower Tank Room Room 165 Waste Gas Decay Tank Room Room 166 Waste Gas Decay Tank Room Room 168 Chemical and Laundry Drain Tank Room Room 170 Letdown Heat Exchanger Room Room 175 Hallway Room 176 Secondary Spent Resin Storage Tank Room Room 177 Pump Room Room 178 Filter Room Room 179 Valve Room / Combustible Storage Room 180 Recycle Evaporator Steam Generator Room Room 186 Boric Acid Area Room 187 Hydro Test Pump Room Room 188 Boric Acid Tank Area El 121 Ft - 0 In.

Room 203 Waste Condenser Tanks and Pump Room Rcom.204 Waste Evaporator Package Room Room 205 Passage to Unit 2 Room 206 Heat Exchanger Room Room 207 Hatch Area Room 208 Corri' dor Dem 209 H311way I

1-39-1

Room 215 Duct and Pipe Chase Room 216 Valve Compartments Area Room 217 Volume Control Tank Room Rocm 218 Chiller Unit Room Rocm 219 Pipe Chase Room 220 Valve-Compartment Room Room 221 Primary Spent Resin Storage Tank Room Room 222 Corridor Room 230 Recycle Evaporator Package Room Room 231 Sluice Pump Room Room 232 Sluice Filter Room Reem 236 HVAC Duct Chase Room 237 Corr:dar Reca 238 Cask Storage Area Rocm 239 Transfer Canal Room 240 Spent Fuel Peel Room Rocm 253

- Valve Compartment El 130 Ft - 0 In.

Room 601 Drumming Area Room 602 Passageway Room 603 Drum Storage Area - Combustible Storage Area Room 604 Passage Room 605 Blowdown Pumps and Surge Tank Room Room 606 Filter Room Room 607 Filter Room Room 608 Blowdown Heat Exchanger Room Room 609 Storage Room Room 610 Valve Compartment Room El 139 Ft - 0 In.

Room 301 Seal Water Filter Room Room 302 Recycle Evaporator Feed Filter Room.

Room 303 Reactor Coolant Filter Room Room 304 Waste Monitor Tank Filter Room Room 305 Seal Injection Filter Room Room 306 Recycle Evaporator Feed Demineralizer Room Recm 307 Valve Compartment Room Room 308 Waste Condensate and Monitor Tank Demineralizer Room Room 309 Hatch Area Room 310 Valve Compartment Room Room 311 Recycle Evaporator Concentrates Filter Room Room 312 Corridor Room 313 Floor Drain and Laundry Tank Filter Room Room 314 Waste Evaporator Feed Filter Room Room 315 Recycle Waste Condenser Filter Room Room 316 Passage to Unit 2 Room 322 Hallway Room 323 Sample Room Room 324 High Activity Radioactive Lab Room 325 Counting Room En+n 326 G e Analy m W oo 1-39-2

Room 327 Valve Access Area Room 328 BTR Demineralizer Room Room 329 Pipe Tunnel Room 330 Chiller Surge Tank Pump Room Room 331 Valve Access Area Reem 332 MCC 1A Area Room 340 Demineralizer Compartment Room 341 Pipe Chase-Room 342 Spent Fuel Pool Pump Room Room 348 Cask Wash Area El 155 Ft - 0 In.

Room 402 Passage to Unit 2 Room 403 New Resin Storage Room 404 Filter Hatches Room / Combustible Storage Room 405

- Hatch Rocm Room 406 Decen Room Roem 407 Hot Mhhine Shop Rocm 408 Hallway Room 409 Hallway Room 410A 600-V Load Center (Station Service Transformer Room)

Room 410B 600-V Load Center Room 415 Corridor

.g Room 417 Corridor

' ' Room 418 Auxiliary Building and Containment Purge Vent Equipment Room Room 419 Demineralizer Hatch Area Room 420 Drum Storage Room Rocm 421 Drumming Station Room Room 422 Corridor Room 423 Valve Compartment Room 424 Demineralizer Compartment Room 425 Demineralizer Compartment Room 426 Demineralizer Compartment Room 427 Demineralizer Compartment Room 429 Containment Purge Air Equipment Room Room 430 Disrobe Area Room 431 Health Physicist Room Room 432 Corridor Room 433 Corridor Room 434 Passage Room 435 Hot Shower Room 436 Hot Toilet Room 437 Hot Janitor Rocm 439 Drying Area Room 441 Drying Area Room 442 First Aid Room Room 445 Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger Room Room 446 Hallway Room 447 Cask Wash Storage Room Room 448 SF?C Pump Room Room 449 Demineralizer Room Room 450 Valvo compartment 1-39-3

O n

Rocm 451 Filter Rcom Room 454 Lobby Room 461 Environmental Low Activity Lab Room 462 Non-Radioactive Vent Equipment Room Room 463 Nitrogen Storage Room Room 464 Nitrogen Storage Room Room 467 SFP Heat Exchanger Room Room 478 Motor Control Center Room El 175 Ft - 0 In.

Room 506 Component Cooling Surge Tank Room El 184 Ft -0 In.

Room 504 Stair No. 6 Room 505

- Spent Fuel Pool Vent Equipment Room All of the fire area boundary walls are rated as a 3-hour fire barrier with all electrical and piping penetrations sealed for a 3-hour rating.

All doors that are part of the fire area boundary are UL Class A doors except for Class B doors to stairwells used for access and egress and for doors in the fire area boundary leading to the outside which are not rated.

The I

floors and ceilings of fire area 1-004 which bound other fire areas are rated for 3-hours with the exception of two non-rated sceel hatch covers.

A non-rated steel hatch cover in the floor of room 163 (area 1-004) communicates with room 103 (area 1-001) and a non-rated steel hatch cover in the floor of room 454 (area 1-004) communicates with room 345 (area 1-042).

All internal floors of fire area 1-004 are reinforced concrete, and exposed structural steel has been protected by fire proofing.

EXEMPTION An exemption to section III.G.2.c is requested to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown cables to be enclosed by a barrier having a 1-hour fire rating and full coverage fixed suppression system.

(Conditions A through I)

An exemption to section III.G.2.a is requested to the extent that it requires separation of redundant cables and equipment by I

a fire barrier having a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rating (Condition K).

The above exemptions are based upon implementation of the four modifications.

(

1-39-4 l

I L

i 1

CCNDITIONS REQUIRING EXEMPT 1CN A.

REDUNDANT ELECTRICAL PCWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM A.1 Motor Control Center 1A and 1B Fire area 1-004 contains redundant safety related MCCs, (IA)

Q1R17B001A-A and (13) Q1R17B0013-B.

These motor control centers provide power for various train-A and train-B safe-shutdown components respectively.

Power supply cabling and subject motor i

control centers are not protected by fire barriers and full j

coverage automatic suppression is not provided.

I Justification An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire would be limited to one MCC and/or its associated power feed and would not effect the redundant MCC and/or its associated power feed.

Therefore, only one train of redundant electrical distribution could be lost due to a credible fire in area 1-004.

MCC 1A is located in room 332, el 139 ft - 0 in. having its power feed continue through room 312 thence up to el 155 ft - O in.

MCC 13 is located in room 209 el 121 ft - O in. having its power feed

- exit this room into an adjacent fire area.

The redundant MCCs 1

are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floor at i,

i el 139 ft - O in.

Unsealed penetrations located in the subject floor have been reviewed and will not effect the separation 1

afforded by the concrete flocr.

The minimum horizontal separation between components is approximately 60 ft between MCC 1B (el 121 ft O in.) and MCC 1A power feed (el 155 ft - 0 in.).

This 60 ft horizontal separation and has complete' automatic suppression coverage at el 121 ft - O in.

A.2 CC Distribution Panels 1C and 1F 1

Fire area 1-004 contains redundant safety-rel'ated dc i

j distribution panels (1C) Q1R41 LOO 1C-A and (1F) Q1R41 LOO 1F-B.

These 125 V-dc distribution panels provide power for various 3

j train-A and train-B safe-shutdown components respectively.

l Power supply cabling and distribution panels are not protected i

by barriers.

i i

Justification An analysis was performed to demonstrate that a fire would be limited to one de distribution panel and/or its associated power 4

feed and would not effect the redundant panel and or its associated power feed.

Therefore, only one train of redundant de distribution panels could be lost.

I 1

i i

1-39-5 l

1

,m-

, _. _ -.. _,. _ -,,, _ _ _ _ _ --_~ _.,__ _.,_.,__._ __.__ _,_ _ _ _....__. __, _ _ _,,,.__ _ _ _. ____-

r____.

O DC distribution panel 1C is located in room 312, el 139 ft 0 in., and de distribution panel 1F is located in rocm,209, el 121 ft - 0 in.

The redundant de distribution panels are, separated by a 2-ft-thick. reinforced concrete ficer at el 139 ft - 0 in.

Unsealed penetrations located in the subject ficor have been reviewed and will not effect the separation afferded by the concrete floor.

The minimum horicontal separation between these redundant panels is approximately 40 ft and has complete automatic suppression coverage at el 121 ft -

0 in, and 139 ft - 0 in.

A smcke detection system is installed in all recms containing the subject equipment.

The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigado adequate time to respond.

Manual hcsa stati:ns, portable extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use en the sub;ect elevations.

3.

STEAM GENEP). TOR PRESSURE INSTRUMENTATION Fire area 1-004 rooms 462 and 464 contain redundant steam generator pressure transmitters and cabling.

The redundant steam generator pressure instruments provide the following signals:

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION Q1N11PT3371A-A S/G-A Press, Atmospheric Relief Valve Control and Hot Shutdown Panel Pressure Indication Q1N11PT0474-P2 S/G-A Press, Protection Signal, Indication Q1N11PT0475-P3 S/G-A Press, Protection Signal, Indication Q1N11PT0476-P4 S/G-A Press, Protection Signal, Indication Q1N11PT3371B-A-S/G-B Press, Atmospheric Relief Va,1ve Control and Hot Shutdown Panel Pressure Indication.

Q1N11PT0484-P2 S/G-B Press, Protection Signal, Indication Q1N11PT0485-P3 S/G-B Press, Protection Signal, 4

Indication Q1N11PT0486-P4 S/G-B Press, Protection Signal, Indication Q1N11PT3371C-A S/G-3 Press, Atmospheric Relief Valve Control and Hot Shutdown Panel Pressure Indication.

Q1N11PT0494-P2 S/G-C Press, Protection Signal, Indication Q1N11PTO495-P3 S/G-C Press, Protection Signal, Indication Q1N11PT0496-P4 3/G-C Press, Protection Signal, Indication 1-39-6 L

The redundant pressure transmitters and their cabling are not protected by fire barriers and full coverage automatic -

suppression is not provided.

Modification A fire rated barrier has been provided in Room 462 for redundant instrument cabling raceway 2IE047, 2IE043, 3:E017, 4:E019, and 4:E017.

The barrier extends from pull box to wall penetration or to pressure instrument.

The barrier consists of two 1-in.

layers of Kaowool and an overall layer of Zetex fabric.

A fire rated barrier inside the following conduits is previded where they a.:ach :: pull hexas '. cated in r:cm 462.

This barrier is the same as those provided inside conduit which penetrates a fire rated barrier penetration.

The conduits are 2:EC45, 2:E047, 3:E019, 3:2020, 4IE017, and 4IEC19.

An automatic fire partial suppression system presently covers the area of modifica icn in the eastern portion of roem 462.

Justification Room 464 of fire area 1-004 contains cabling and pressure instruments for steam generator A.

Based upon a review of unsealed penetrations in the subject wall and the appr2ximate 32-ft horizontal Teparation between redundant steam generator pressure instruments and cabling, a credible fire in room 464 would not propagate into room 462.

Early warning provided by the smoke detection system in reem 464 would provide adequate time for fire brigade personnel to extinguish the fire in room 464.

n addition, initiation of the automatic fixed suppression system and the barriers provided for redundant cabling in room 462 would protect the redu dant S/G B and'C instrumentation.

For a fare in r:cm 462 a portable extinguisher and manual hose station are available for use in room 464.

Room 462 of fire area 1-004 contains S/G A, B,

and C pressure instruments and associated cabling for the pressure instruments.

Based upon the modification, the existing raceway barriers, smoke detection, and fixed suppression in the area, a credible fire in room 462 would not effect the ability to monitor S/G A pressure.

One functional steam generator is sufficient for safe shutdown at plant Farley.

Due to fire induced signals from S/G B and C pressure transmitters in room 462, a false SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system may result.

Plant procedures exist or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI, or CI safety signals from the main control room and can be used if required for a fire in this area.

1-39-7

1 C.

INSTRUMENT AIR 4

j Fire area 1-004 contains redundant instrument air system de

~

power and control cabling which serve N1P19SV3825-A (instrument air penetration room isolation valve), Q1P19SV3611-A (instrument I

air containment isolation valve) train A, and Q13135V2228-B (power relief valve backup air supply) train B.

The de power and control cabling are not protected by barriers, and full automatic fixed suppression coverage is not provided.

Justification An analysis was perf rmed to demcnstra:e that a fire sculd me limited to one train of redundant FCRV instrument air header isolation valve cabling.

Train A cabling is located in rooms 168, 163, and 162, el 100 ft - 0 in.,

and roc =s 322, and 323, el 139 f

- 0 in.

Train B cabling is located in rooms 203 and 209, el 121 f I-0 in.

The redundant cables are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floor at el 121 ft - 0 in, and 139 ft 0 in.

Unsealed penetrations in the subject floors have been reviewed and will not effect the separation afforded by these concrete floors.

The train A cables have full suppression coverage on el 100 ft - 0 in, and el 139 ft - O in.

Train B cables have full suppression coverage on el 121 ft - 0 in.

A smoke detection system is installed in all rooms containing the subject cabling.

The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond.

Manual hose stations and portable extinguishers are available for use en the subject elevations.

l D.

BATTERY RCCM VENTILATION Fire area 1-004 contains redundant power and control cabling of battery charging room coolers Q1E16 MOO 6A-A and Q1E16M006B-B, i

trains A and B respectively, and battery room exhaust fans and exhaust dampers, Q1V47C012A-A, Q1V47C012B-B and 01V47MOV3644-A, 4

Q1V47MOV3643-B, trains A and B respectively.

TI

.ubject power and control cabling is not protected by barriers and full l

coverage automatic fixed suppression is not provided.

Justification Fire induced failures in control and power cables could potentially result in the loss of ventilation in both the redundant train A and B battery and battery charger rooms.

A failure of the ventilation system will not result in a failure of the redundant train-A or -B 125 V-dc battery systems.

i i

1-39-8

3 Therefore, the potential fire induced failure of the power ard control cable for the redundant battery and battery charger room ventilation fans and dampers will not result in the loss of.

I systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions.

The safe shutdown requirement for battery and battery charger room ventilation is a long term requirement.

If ventilation is lost due to a fire in area 1-004, either portable ventilation equipment will be installed in the effected room (s) or the damaged ventilation system will be repaired within 20 i

hours of post-fire hot shutdown initiation to insure that battery room hydrogen concentrations do not exceed acceptable limi s.

Plant precedures covering these actions will be deve; aped for a fire in area 1-C04.

E.

BORAT: ON/MA**.EUF, DEPRESSUR::'ATION, A :D RCP SEA *., :::TEGE:TY Flow from the charging pumps is required for reactor coolant boration and makeug, pump seal integrity reactor coolant system depressurization, and reactor coolan.

The following independent conditions concern cables related to the charging pumps and charging pump room coolers:

l (a)

Fire area 1-004 contains redundant charging pump train-A

.g and -B power cables.

One train of redundant power cables is not provided with a fire rated barrier for its entire

^^

route in the fire area, nor -is full suppression coverage provided for both redundant trains throughout their entire route in the fire area.

(b)

Fire area 1-004 contains redundant charging pump rocm cooler power and control cables.

One train of redundant power and control cable is not provided with a fire rated barrier for its entire route in the fire area, nor is full suppression coverage provided for both redundant trains throughout the entire route in the fire area.

i Modification f

(a)

A fire rated barrier is being provided for train-A power cable raceway ADDA21, ADDA18, ADDA15, and ADDA09.

The 1

subject barrier will extend the complete route of the train-A changing pump power cable in fire area 1-0C4.

l (b)

The existing fire rated barrier on raceway 3FDB03 is being extended and a fire rated barrier for raceway BEFA03 is i'

being provided along its entire length on el 100 ft - 0 in.

In addition, an open penetration approximately 2 f 6 in, north of column 18 and 15 ft 8 in, west of column l

N, el 121 ft - O in.,

floor slab has been sealed.

1 1-39-9 i

s

,m

..,--~,m.-,__ - _ _ _ - ~. - _. _ _,,

. -. _. _. - - - - -. _,,, -, - - -, - - - - ~, _ _ _ _ _ _. _....... -, - -

Justification

~

(a)

An analysis was performed based upon the subject modification.to demonstrate that a credible fire would be limited to only one train of redundant charging pump power cabling.

Train-A power cabling is located in rooms 161, 162, 163, and 168.

Train-B cabling is located in rooms 175, 160, 159, 158, 157, 156, 155, 154, 153, 152, 151, 165, and 166.

The redundant power cables are provided with a barrier (two 1-in.-thick wraps of-Kaowool blanket) having a fire rating greater than that of the projected fire in the following rooms in fire area 1-004: train A in rooms 161, 162, 163, and 168; train 3 in rooms 175, 160 and 159.

Full fixed suppression coverage is provided in rooms 163, 162, 161, 160, 175, and 186.

In addition, the redundant power cables are separated minimally by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete wall bounding rooms 159, 158, 157, 156, 154, 153, 152, 151, 165, and 166, with the exception of room 155 where there is approximately 32 ft of separation.

Unsealed penetrations in the subject walls have been reviewed and the walls are considered to afford adequate separation.

A smoke detection system is installed in all rooms containing the subject cabling.

The detection system would provide early warning of a fire, allowing the fire brigade adequate time to respond.

Manual hose stations, portable extinguishers, and portable smoke removal equipment are available for use on this. elevation.

(b)

An analysis was performed based upon the subjeo:

modification to demonstrate that a credible fire would be limited to only one train of redundant charging pump cooler power and contr.ol cabling.

2.

- 0 in. contains redundant charging pump. room cocier power and control cables.

Train-B cables are l

protected by a fire rated barrier which extends to a point j.

of 40-ft horizontal separation from the redundant train-A cables.

Automatic fired suppression and smoke detection j

systems provide coverage for the subject cables.

t

~

El 121 ft - 0 in, contains the same redundant charging pump room cooler cables which hs.ve a minimum horizontal

(

separation of approximately 40 ft.

The train-B power and control cables are provided with automatic suppression and l

smoke detection coverage for their entire route on this l-elevation.

i In addition, redundant train-A and -B charging pump room i

cooler power and control cables are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinferced concrate alab floor at 61 121 ft 0 in.

Unsealed penetrations in the floor slab have been reviewed and are considered to afford adequate separation.

I 1-39-10 l

l i

i i

In conclusion, a credible fire in fire area 1-004 could not effect both trains of redundant charging pump room, cooler power and control cables.

F.

MAIN STEAM-ISCLATICN Fire area 1-004 contains power and control cables for S/O-10 steam supply to TDAFW pump valve Q1N12SV32353-A3 and TDAFW pump steam admission valve Q1N12SV3226-AB..The subject cables are not protected by barriers nor is full coverage automatic suppression provided.

Juscification Fire induced failures (het shorts) to the subject cables c:uld e

cause the subject valves to open, causing auto start of the TDAFW pump and the dragging of steam from S/G-1C.

In the unlikely event of multiple hot shorts occurring, this condition can be mitigated by manually tripping the TDAEW pump throttle valve Q1N12MOV3406-A.

Plant procedures will be revised to include the above actions for a fire in area 1-004.

i G.

STEAM RELEASE (COOLDOWN)

Fire area 1-004 contains de distribution panel (IC) Q1R41L001C-A which supplies solenoid power for atmospheric relief valves, Q1N11PV3371A, Q1N11PV3371B, and Q1N11?V3371C.

The subject panel l

and cables are not protected by barriers.

1

~

Justification Loss of de. distribution panel IC would render the main steam atmospheric relief valves electrically inoperable.

One of the three main steam atmospheric relief valves and its related steam generator are required to be operable to achieve steam release i

for cooldown.

The atmospheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually opened or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The subject valves are not located in fire area 1-004.

The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually controlled atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit 2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.

Consequently, a fire in area 1-004 would not prevent the operation of at least one i

redundant atmospheric relief valve.

i f

l-39-11

4 i

i a

E.

NEUTRON FLUX MONITORING Fire area 1-004 contains redundant instrumentation cabring and equipment Q1055NM0048-A of neutron flux monitoring Q1C55NE0048A-A (post accident neutron flux monitor) and N1C55NE0031-F1, and NIC55NE0032-P2 (source range neutron flux monitors).

The subject cabling and equipment is not protected by barriers and autematic fixed suppression is not provided.

Justification Instrumentation cables for the source range neutron flux mcnitors N1C55NE0031-P; and M1C55NE0032-P traterse fire area 1-004 through conduit embedded in the floor slab at el 155 ft -

O in., and are accessible through embedded pul. boxes on th s elevation.

. The instrumentation cables for the neutron flux monitors Q1C55NE0048A-A are routed through fire area 1-004 on el 100 ft -

0 in.,

121 ft 0 in. and 139 ft - 0 in.

The amplifier Q1C55NM0048-A for the neutron flux monitor is located on elevation 139 ft - 0 in.

The redundant cables are separated by a 2-ft-thick reinforced concrete floor slab at el'155 ft - O in.

Unsealed penetrations

~

in the subject floor slab have been reviewed and are considered not to effect the separation afforded by the concrete floor.

REACTOR COOLANT BOUNDARY INTEGRITY Fire area 1-004 contains cable for redundant RCS and pressuriser j

sample line boundary valves.

The RCS valves are Q1P16EV3101-B, Q1P15EV3102-B, and Q1P15EV3765-A.

The pressurizer valves are Q1P15EV3103-A and Q1P15EV3881-5.

The subject cables are not provided with barriers and full coverage automatic fixed suppression is not provided.

l Justification j

An analysis of the effects of fire upo'n subject redundant line isolation valves shows that it would take multiple hot shorts to energize the solenoids to open all valves.

In the unlikely

[

event of multiple hot shorts (induced from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) occurring, the condition can be mitigated for the train-A powered valves Q1P15EV3765-A and Q2P15EV3103-A by removing power from all cables in the shared l

raceway.

This can be accomplished by opening the supply breaker on 125 V-de switchgear 1A (Q1R423001A-A) for 125 V-dc distribution panel 1C (Q1R41 LOO 1C-A).

l i

l 1-39-12 i

l

Plant procedures will be developed to include the above action for a fire in area 1-004.

J.

NON-FIRE-RATED'EATCH C6 VERS IN FIRE AREA BOUNDARY (a)

A non-fire-rated steel hatch cover in the floor of roc = 163 (area 1-004) communicates with room 103 (area 1-001).

(b)

A non-fire-rated steel hatch cover in the ficer of room 454 (area 1-004) communicates with room 345 (area 1-042).

Justification (a)

Room 163 (area.1-004) contains an autcmatic fixed suppress en system which prev ded suppress:cn coverage in the area of the subject steel hatch cover.

In addition, an analysis of safe shutdown circuits in room 163 (area 1-004) and roem 103 (area 1-001) was performed to determine if there were any new redundancy problems identified if a fire propagated between the adjacent fire area rooms.

The analysis showed that physical separation afforded redundant safe shutdown cabling in each fire area was adequate as applied to one another.

Therefore, with the detection system provided in rooms 163 and 103 and the suppression provided in the area of the hatch in room 163, fire rating of the subject hatch cover is not required.

'(b)

The existing sprinkler systems in room 345 (1-042) and 454 (1-004) will serve the purpose of a water curtain to prevent the passage of fire frcm fire area 1-004 to the adjacent fire area via the non-rated steel hatch.

FIRE AREA INFORMATION Fire Area: 1-004

.v3.XIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIEL-FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*)

SEVERITY 151 Waste A,

B Gas Decay Tank Rooms 152 Valve A,

B Compartment Cable ca' 1,122 lbea>15,877ea' <30 minta, Room insul.

Charcoal 810 lb filter 165 Gas A, B Dacay Tank Room 1-39-13

n MAXIMUM RCOM NUMBERS /

SHU*DOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft8)

SEVERI"Y 166 Waste A,

B Gas Decay Tank Room 153 Waste A,

B Charcoal 570 lb 34,733

<30 min Gas Compressor filter Room Cable insul'.

448 lb Lube oil 1 gal 159 Recycle B

Cable insul.

299 lb 26,783

<30 m.in Evaporator Lube oil O.5 gal Feed Pump Room 168 Chemical A,

B Charcoal 200 lb 52,037

<1 h and Laundry filter Drain Tank Cable insul.

890 lb Room Lube oil O.5 gal 175 Hallway A,

B Cable insul.

972 lb 29,580

<30 min i

154 Waste B

Evaporator Steam Gen.

Room 155 Passageway B

to Unit 2 160 Hatch A, B Area 161 Corridor A,

B, C

Cable ib' 12,531 lbtb>27,995 b'

<30 min'b>

insul.

Lube oil O.75 gal Panel 14 lb 162 Hallway A,

B 163 WDS Panel A,

B Room 164 Laundry A

and Hot i

Shower Tank Room 171 Pump

. Room 1-39-14

4 J

MICCMUM ROCM NUMBERS /

SHUTDCWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTIN (Stu/ft2)

SEVERITY 178 Filter Room 215 Duct and None 0

0 0

Pipe Chase 176 Secondary None 0

0 0

i Spent Resin Storage Tank Room 179 Valve Cable insul.

56 lb 2,724

<30 min Room /

Combustible A

Storage' 180 Recycle Cable insul.

Evaporator Steam Gen.

Room g

' 186 Boric A,

B Cable insul.

2,437 lbcd>23,636cd> <30 cin<d>

Acid Area Lube oil 3.75 gal 187 Hydro Cable insul.

Test Pump Lube oil Room 204 Waste Channel Cable insul.

183 lb 4,963

<30 min Evaporator 1

Package Room 219 Pipe None 0

0 0

Chase 203 Waste A

Cable insul.

Condenser Tanks and Pump Room 205 Passageway Cable insul.

to Unit 1 207 Hatch B

Cable insul.

Area i

j 1-39-15 k

MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SEUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LCAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL CUANT!TY (Btu /ft2)

SEVERITY 208 Corridor A,

B Cable insul. 20,365 lb40,542'8'

<1 h'**

Channel Panels 71 lb

~1 209 Hallway A,

B Cable insul.

Channel Panels 1

21E Chiller Cable insul.

Uni: Recm Panels Lube o 1 6 gal 222 Corridor A,

B Cable insul.

237 Corridor Cable insul.

253 Valve B

Cable insul.

Compartment 156 Holdup B

Cable insul.

274 lb 11,029

<30 min Tank Room 157 Holdup B

Cable insul.

358 lb 13,879

<30 min Tank Room 158,Heldup B

Cable insul.

278 lb 10,769

<30 min Tank Room 188 Boric Cable insul.

111 lb 619

<30 min Acid Tank Area 206 Heat B

Cable insul.

143 lb 6,305 Exchanger Room 220 Valve Cable insul.

25 lb 3,200

<30 min Compartment Room 230 Recycle B

Cable insul.

557 lb 17,048

<30 min Evaporator Package Room 231 Sluice B

Cable insul.

134 lb 17,258

<30 min Purp Rocm 232 Sluice Cable insul.

296 lb 25,132

<30 min Fittee Room 1-39-16 L

MAXIMUM ROCM NUMBERS /

SEUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft*)

SEVERITY 236 Duct B

None O

O O

Chase 216 Valve A, B Cable insul.

40 lb 6,549

<30 min Compartments Area 217 Volume None 0

0 0

Centrol Tank Room 221 Primary None 0

0 0

Spent Resin-Storage Tank Room 238 Cask Storage Area 239 Transfer Ca.nal Cable insul.'f' 204 lb'f*l,243'f' <30 min'f' 240 Spent Fuel Pool Room 348 Cask Wash Area 447 Cask

, Cable insul.

8 lb 21,236

<30 min Wash Storage

, Misc. material 100 lb Area /

Combustible Storage'

~

309 Hatch Area 312 Corridor Channels 2 and 4 A, B 325 Counting Room 322 Hallway A,

B 316 Passageway A

to Unit 2 1-39-17

MAXIMUM ROCM NUMBERS /

SEUTDCNN CCMBUSTISLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft8)

SEVERITY 327 Valve Gas bottles'9' 34 lb'9'29,989'i' <30 min'?'

Access Area Cable insul.

6,366 lb Panel 22 lb 332 MCC 2A Channels Pipe insul.

24 lb 2 and 4 Flammable 5 lb A,

C liquid 307 Valve A

Compartment Room 310 Valve A

+

Compartment.

Room 330 Chiller Channels Surge Tanks 2 and 4 Pump Room A

301 Seal Water Filter Room 302 Recycle Evaporator Feed Filter Pump 303 Reactor A

Coolant Filter Room 304 Waste A

Cable insul.'h' 13 lb e h>

392<h'

<30 minch>

Monitor

~

Tank Filter Room 311 Rocycle A

i Evaporator Concentrates Filter Room 313 Floor Drain and Laundry Tank Filter Room 1-39-18 y

.-e

,,-.-...,,,.,.-,___m-_v.

-.-_-._.__.-..,.,7~v

__m-r-

r MXCMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUAN*ITY (Btu /ft*)

SEVERI""I 314 Waste Evaporator Feed Filter Room 315 Recycle Waste Condenser Filter Roc =

305 Seal Injection Filter Room -

306 Recycle None O

O O

Evaporator Feed Demin.

Room 308 Waste None O

O O

Condensate and Monitor Tank Demin.

Room I

323 Sample A,

3 Cable insul.

515 lb 25,230

<30 min Room Pipe insul.

3 lb 324 High Cable insul.

998 lb 23,950

<30 min Activity Pipe insul.

11 lb Radioactive Flammable 200 ft8 Lab gas bottles 326 Gas Cable insul.

25 lb 1,889

<30 min Analyzer Pipe insul.

3 lb 2,083 Room 329 Pipe None 0

0 0

Tunnel 331 Valve A

Cable insul.

330 lb 10,936

<30 min Access Area 342 Spent Channels Cable insul.

112 lb 5,247

<30 min Fuel Pool 2 and 4 Pump 1-39-19

MAXI.WM ROCM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN CCMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft2)

SEVERITY 340 Domin-None 0

C eralizer Compartment 328 BTR None 0

0 0

Demin.

Room 501 Orumming Area Cable'i' G27 lb'i' 2,141'i' <30 min'i' 602 Passageway insul.

Panel 7 lb 603 Drum Storage Area Combustible Storage Area 604 Passage Cable 128 lb 3,859

<30 min insul.

605 Blowdown B

Cable 247 lb 8,885

<30 min Pumps and insul.

Surge Tank Room 606 Filter Cable 55 lb 7,208

<30 min Room insul.

607 Filter Cable 3 lb 563

<30 min Room insul.

608 Blowdown Channels Cable 85 lb 1,720

<30 min Heat 2 and 4 insul.

Exchanger Room 609 Storage Channels Cable 136 lb 3,891

<30 min Room 2 and 4 insul.

B 610 Valve Cable 4 lb 616

<30 min Compartment insul.

Room 341 Pipe Channels None O

O O

Chase 2 and 4 53 1-39-20

MA: CMC 4 ROOM tWMBERS/

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Stu/ft2)

SEVERITY

~

445 Spent B

Cable *j' 1,758 lb'j' 24,570'j'

<30 min'

• Fuel Pool insul.

Heat Exchanger Room 448 SEPC

. Pump Room 451 Filter None 0

0 0

RCCm 449 Demin-None 0

0 O

eralizer Room k

450 Valve None 0

0 0

Compartment 406 Decontam-Cable insul.

171 lb 5,702

<30 min ination

'6 1

2407 Hot Cable insul.

424 lb 4,488

<30 gin Machine Pipe insul.

7 lb Shop 409 Hallway Channels 1,

2, 4

A, B

410A 600-V Channels Load Center 2 and 4 A

410B 600-V Load Center 405 Hatch B

Room 419 Demin-A, B Cable' '

22,752 lb' '

35,737'

<30 min' '

eralizer insul.

Hatch Area Panel 36 lb Pipe insul.

16 lb 408 Hallway A

422 Corridor A

t 446 Hallway 1-39-21

MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTIN

( Btu / f.t2)

SEVERITY 423 Valve Compartment Cable insul.

943 lb 12,212'l'<30 min'l' 420 Drum Storage Room 421 Drumming Panel 14 lb Station Room Flammable 459 lb liquid 424 None O

O Domineralizer Compartment,

425 Nbne O

O Demineralizer Compartment 426 None O

O Domineralizer Compartment 427 None 0

0 Demineralizer Compartment 418 Auxiliary Cable insul.

56'. ib 58,754

<45 min Building and Charcoal 7,400 lb Containment filter Purge Vent Equipment Room 404 Filter Channel Cable insul.

30 lb 306

<30 min Hatch Room /

1 Combustible Storage ec>

403 Hot Cable insul.

124 lb 3,852

<30 min Instr. Shop Pipe insul.

33 lb 402 Passage A

to Unit 2 417 Corridor A

430 Disrobe Area 4

1-39-22

-,,..--,-.n..

c.

______________________________________(______________________________

.s si M.XIM.

RCOM NUMBERS / SHUTDOWN COMBUSTISLE FIRE LOAD F!RE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUAN*ITY (Btu /ft*)

SI'/ER ITY 435 Hot Cable em' 6,337 lbem'57,839em> <43 min =>

e Shower insul.

s 439 Drying Area 441 Drying Area 4

434 Passage 433 Channels 2,

3, 4

415 Corridor Channels c,

2, 3,

4 A

432 Corridor A

Cable insul.

4,337 lb 61,284

<45 Inin /

454 Lobby A

None 0

0 j

462 Non Channels Cable insul.

1,019 lb 7,673

<30 :rin Radioactive 2,

3, 4

Pipe insul.

30 lb f

Vent Equip.

A t

Room 463 Storage Cable insul..

106 lb 4,542

<30 min Room Misc. items =

100 lb 464 Storage Channels Cable insul.

115 lb 7,818

<30 min Room 2,

3, 4

Misc. items 100 lb A

a-

\\

467 SEP Cable insul.

65 lb 1,704 L

<30 min Heat Exchanger Room

/

429 Channel Cable insul.

6,015 lb 188,885

<2-1/2'h Containment 2

Panel 7 lb f

Purge Air A,

B Charcoal 23,000.lb Equipment filter Room 431 Health Channels Cable insul.

381 lb 28,391

<30 min Physics Room 2,

3, 4 1

1-39-23 1

?

i

.vAXIM"M ROCM h"JMBERS/

SHUTDOWN COMBUSTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE

^,

TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANTITY (Btu /ft2)

SEVERITY 461 Channels Cable insul.

586 lb 18,077

<30 min Environmental 2,

3, 4

Low Activity Lab 436 Hot Cable insul.

9 lb 296

<30 min Toile 437 Hot None Janitor 442 First Channels Cable insul.

136 lb 9,933

<30 min Aid Room 2,

3, 4

478 Motor A,

B Cable insul.

7,403 lb 39,085

<30 min Control Panel 7 lb Center Room 504 Stairwell Cable insul.

51 lb 925

<30 min No. 6 Floor, El 184 ft -

0 in.

505 Spent Cable insul.

661 lb

<30 min Fuel Pool Charcoal 3,800 lb 27,117 Vent filter Equipment Ranel 14 lb Room 506 Component Cable insul.

28 lb 947

<30 min Cooling Surge Tank Room 170 Letdown A, B Cable insul.

61 lb 2,198

<30 min Heat Exchanger Room a.

Applies to rooms 151, 152, 165, and 166 collectively.

b.

Applies to rooms 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 177, and 178 collectively.

c.

These roomr >re occasionally utilized as combustible storage areas, parut sularly during outage periods.

They will have 3-hour rated boundaries, smoke detection, and sprinkler systems that provide a density of 0.30 gal /m/ft upon 2

completion of modifications.

d.

Applies to rooms 180, 186, and 187 collectively.

1-39-24 c.

- _ _. _. _ - ~. _ -

e.

Applies to rooms 203, 205, 207, 208, 209, 218, 222, 237, and 253.

f.

Applies to rooms 238, 239, 240, and 348.

g.

Applies to rooms 309, 312, 325, 322, 316, 327, 332, 307, 4'

310, and 330 collectively.

I h.

Applies to rooms 301, 302, 303, 304, 311, 313, 314, 315, and 305 collectively.

i.

Applies to rooms 601, 602, and 603 collectively.

j.

Applies to rocms 445 and 448 collectively.

k.

Applies to rooms 409, 410A, 4103, 405, 419, 4C8, 422, 446, and 423 collectively.

1.

Applies to rooms 420 and 421 collectively.

1 m.

Applies to rooms 402, 417, 430, 435, 439, 441, 434, 433, and 415 collectively.

DESIGN FEATURES 4

Construction:

Floors and walls forming the area boundary are of reinfor:ed concrete.

Portions of the area boundary along the containment wall which are also boundaries for other fire areas are self expanding cork.

Doors:

Doors that are a part of the area boundary are UL Class A doors except for Class B doors to stairways and for doors in the area boundary leading to the outside which are net rated.

Piping and Electrical Penetrations:

Penetrations through the area boundary are sealed to a 3-hour fire resistance rating.

Ventilation:

This area is served by both the radwaste and nonradwaste HVAC systems.

Fire damper / doors are installed in duct penetrations through the area boundary.

I Floor Drains:

The 111 4-in. diameter floor drains having a i

100-gal /m capacity drain to either the waste holdup tank or the floor drain tank.

FIRE PROTECTICN Smoke detection systems are installed in all rooms containing safe-shutdown equipment (except rooms 236 and 341) or where there is appreciable combustible material.

Automatic 1-39-25 1

e

--..w,.

---n.

.,,.m---,,

.,.e v.--,a,~-

, - -, - ~.,

-,,..--n--m,,

l.

l l

suppression is provided in the following rooms 16C (partial),

161, 162, 163, 164, 168, 175, 205 (partial), 207 (partial), 208, 209, 222, 312 (partial), 316, 322, 402, 403, 404, 415 (consealed space), 417 (consealed space), 420, 421, and 447.

The 5-kV disconnect switches in room 161 and the load centers in rooms 410A and 41CB have an automatic heat-actuated CO2 suppression system.

Hose stations are installed to satisfy the requirements of NFPA 14.

Portable extinguishers and portable smoke removal equipment are provided on each elevation.

JUSTIFICATICN FOR FIRE PROTECTION Roem 236 (duct chase), 341 (pipe chase), and 342 (spent fuel pool pump room) have safe shutdown control and instrumentation cabling which pass through them and smoke detection is not provided.

Modification Smoke detection has been added in room 342.

Justification Room 236 (duct chase) contains safe shutdown cabling.

All cabling in this chase is routed in conduit.

The duct chase is considered to have low in-situ combustibles The duct chase runs vertically from el 121 ft -0 in. through 139 ft - O in, and 155 ft - 0 in.

As there is no redundant safe-shutdown cabling in room 236, there is low in-situ combustible loading and very low probability of a transient combustible being introduced, the installation of a smoke detection system is not required.

Room 341 (pipe chase) contains safe shutdown cabling.

All cabling in this pipe chase is installed in conduit.

The pipe chase is considered to have low in-situ combustibles.

The pipe chase exits the auxiliary building at el 139 ft - 0 in, which is below grade.

As there is no redundant safe-shutdown cabling in room 341; there is low in-situ combustible loading and very low probability of a transient combustible being introduced, the installation of a smoke detection system is not required.

l l

i 0454n l

1-39-26 l

--,,-v

-r_..-

--e-

-w

J. M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAEARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION EXEMPTION REQUEST:

1-40 FIRE AREA:

N/A LOCATION:

FIRE AREAS IN UNITS 1 AND 2 EXEMPTION Request exenptien frem 10CFR50, Appendix R in that it requires separation of fire areas by a barrier hating a 3-hour fire rating.

CONDITICNS-REQUIRING EXEMPTION Non-fire rated redbh-rod penetrations are located in the walla between the following rooms for Units 1 and 2:

MAXIMUM ROOM NUMBERS /

SEUTDOWN NUMBER OF FIRE LOAD FIRE t

.g TITLES TRAIN PENETRATIONS (Btu /ftz)

SEVERITY

, w 173 Charging /

B 2

27,563

<30 min Safety Injection Pump Room and 161 Corrider A,B,C 27,995<a*

<30 minca>

177 Pump Room 6

27,995ca>

<30 minca>

and 179 Valve Room /

2,724

<30 min Combustible Storage 171 Combustible 8

31,820

<30 mincb>

Storage Area and 170 Letdown A,B 2,198

<30 min Heat Exchange Room 2173 Charging /

B 3

27,563

<30 min Safety Injection Pump Room and 2161 Corridor A,B,C 27,995'C'

<30 min <c>

1-40-1

MI*.XI:C4 ROOM NUMBERS /

SHUTDOWN NUMBER OF FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN PENETRATIONS (Btu /ft*).

SEVERITY 2177 Pump Room 5

27,995cc>

<30 min'C' and 2179 Valve Room /

2,724

<30 min Combustible Storage 2170 Letdown A,3 10 2,198

<30 min Heat Exchange R0 =

and 2171 Combustible A

31,820 c d >

<3; min id>

Storage Area (a)

Applies to rooms 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 177, and 175 collectively.

(b)

Applies to rooms 171, 172, and 182 collectively.

(c)

Applies to rooms 2154, 2155, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2177, and 2178 collectively.

(d)

Applies to room 2171, 2172, and 2182 collectively.

Justification The reach-rod penetrations used at Plant Farley are non-fire rated.

These penetrations range in size from 2 in. to 10 in, with the ma; ority being of the 2 in. size.

The cross-sectional area of all penetrations is reduced by using a welded steel plate on one side penetrated by the reach rod.

The only opening in the penetration is the gap between the rod and the steel plate which allows for the operation of the reach rod.

The fire severity in the affected rooms is less than 30 minutes for all cases.

In addition, there is a sprinkler system installed in rooms 161, 179, 171, 2161, and 2179 and smoke detection systems in all rooms to provide early warning capability and protection from the spread of a fire from one room to the next.

Therefore, the existence of these non-rated penetrations will not affect the ability of the plant to achieve safe-shutdown.

t i

i l

0508n 1-40-2 l

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" F:RE HAZARDS ANALYS!S REEVALUAT:CN EXIMPTION REQUEST:

2-18 Revision 1 FIRE AREA:

2-034 LCCATICN:

UNIT-2 AUXILIARY BUILDING, ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS RCCM TRAIN 3, AND PENETRATICN RCCM FILTRATION S? ITEM EQUIPMENT ROCM Fire area 2-034 consists of 2334 and 2317 at el 139 ft - C in.

The walls, ceilings, and floors forming the area boundary are 3-h fire rated.

These rooms-communicate via two stainless steel pipes used in the penetration room filtration system.

The stainless steel pipes are encased in concrete and contain no combustibles.

A self expanding cork is installed for the portions of the area boundary along the containment wall.

UL Class-A fire-rated doors exist between rooms 2334 and 2333 (area 2-C34), 2334 and 2322 (area 2-004), and 2317 and 2322 (area 2-004).

EXEMPTION:

Request exemption for section III.G.2.c to the extent that it requires one train of redundant safe shutdown i

cables and equipment to be enclosed by a 1-h-rated fire barrier i

and the installation of an automatic fire suppression system.

CON!!TIONS REQUIRING EXEMPTION:

This fire area contains electrical Train-B equipment, power and control cables, electrical Train-A control, and control power supply cables associated with the following. safe. shutdown equipment.

EQUIPMENT FUNCTION e

Q2P16MOV3130B-B Service Water Inlet to CCW HX-2B Q2E21MOV8130B-B Charging Pump Suction Header Isolation Valve Q2E21MOV81333-B Charging Pump Disch. Header Isolation Valve Q2E21MOV8109A-B Charging Pump 2A Miniflow' Valve Q2E21MOV8109B-B Charging Pump 2B Miniflow Valve Q2P15HV3101-B RCS LOOP-2 Hot Leg Sample Q2P15HV3102-B RCS LOOP-3 Hot Leg Sample Q2P15HV3765-A

,RCS Hot Leg Sample Line CTMT Isolation Valve Q2P15HV3103-A Pressurizer Liquid Sample Q2P15HV3881-B Pressurizer Liquid Sample CTMT Isolation Valve Q2N11PV3371A-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2A) 2-18-1

J.

M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZAPSS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION Q2N11PV3371B-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2B)

Q2N11PV3371C-A Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valve (S.G.-2C)

The analysis of the potential effects of a fire in this area upon the cables and equipment shows that the subject valves could shift position frem their required safe shutdewn positten or become inoperative.

Fire area 2-034 also contains instrumentatica cables and pcwer supply cables which are not required for post-fire safe shutdown, but due to fire induced failures could cause initiation of safety signals (SI, CVI, and CI) to safe shutdown ce=penents.

Reactor Coolant Boundary Fire area 2-034 contains control cables for the Train-B pressurizer power operated relief and blocking valves Q2B31PCV0444B-B and Q2B13MOV80 COB-B, and reactor head vent valves Q2B13SV2213B-B and Q2B13SV2214B-B.

The subject cables are associated with control from both the hot shutdown and main control board.

A fire induced failure having multiple hot shorts could cause the reactor inventory to letdown via the PCRV and reactor heat vent paths.

JUSTIFICATION:

Valve Q2P16MOV3130B-B is required to be maintained open to maintain service water flow to CCW heat-exchanger 2B.

In the event that CCW pump-2C and CCW heat exchanger 2C are out of l1 service for maintenance and the swing CCW pump 2B is aligned to electrical Train-A power, the effects of a fire in area 2-034

~

upon the control cables of valve Q2P16MOV3130B-B could fail the valve in the closed position causing loss of service water to the CCW-Heat Exchanger-2B.

The plant procedures will be modified to maintain valve Q2P16MOV3130B-B in the open position by racking out the MCC-Breaker whenever the CCW-Pump 2C and CCW Heat Exhanger 2C are out of service.

2-18-2

s-J J. M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLAN

• 1CCFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATICN For a fire in this area, seal injection flow will be established using either charging pump 2A or charing pump 23 aligned to electrical Train-A power.

Valve Q2E1MOV81303-3 (suction header) and Q2E21MOV81333-3 (discharge header) are required to be maintained in the open positzen to supply seal injection water frcm the RWST through charging pump 2A or 23.

Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the centrol cables for the subject valves, the valves could fail in the cicsed positien and become inoperative.

These valves cannot be locked cpen because they are needed fer train separaticn during a LCCA event.

AFC preposes to install disconnect switches cutside the electrical i

penetration.rcem during the next outage of sufficient duration i

sub sequent to design and procurement completion currently scheduled for completion in the second quarter of 1986.

In the interim, AFC will instruct the Operators of the potential inadvertant closure of the charging pump suction and discharge valves in the event of a fire in this area.

Valve Q2E21MOV8109A-B or Q2E21MOV8109B-B is required to be maintained in the open position to establish miniflow for charging pump 2A or 2B respectively.

Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the control cables for the subject valves, the valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperative.

In the event these valves fail closed, the miniflow will be discontinued.

2 The charging pump can be run safely with m niflow isolated and with a minimum 24 gal /m of seal injection flow for a period of up to 1 h.'

This will allow the operator time to de-energice MCC-2V and take manual action to open the min flow valve corresponding to the operating charging pump.

e RCS and pressurizer sample line valves Q2P15HV3101-B, HV3102-3, HV3765-A, HV3103-A, and HV3881-B, are required to be maintained in the closed position to maintain RCS boundary integrity.

Due to the effects of a fire in this area upon the control cables of the subject valves, the valves, could fail in the open position and become inoperative.

The open position of these valves will allow an RCS sample to flow to the VCT through the sample coolers.

This flow is of no immediate significance for safe shutdown.

An operator action will be performed to close the manual valves Q2P15V051A and Q2P15VO513 to step the ficw of 1

2-18-3 i

l l

I

..m....

c

..c m.

9-J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 1CCFR30 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATICN RCS and pressuriner liquid.

The valves Q2515V051A and Q2P15VC51B are located in the sample room 2323 cutside of fire area 2-034.

Fire area 2-034 contains de control power supply cable for the main steam atmospheric relief valves Q2N11PV3371A-A, 3371B-A, and 3371C-A.

Due to the effect of a fire in this area upon this cable, the subject valves could fail in the closed position and become inoperable.

One of the three main steam at=cspheric relief valves and its related steam generater are required to be Operable to achieve steam release for cocidewn.

The at=cspheric relief valves are provided with hand wheels such that the valves may be manually open or closed without electrical controls or air supplies.

The operator would establish manual control of the atmospheric relief valves by closing the manual air control valves to isolate the air supply and by opening the manual air vent valve to bleed off air from the diaphragm of the valve actuator.

Both the air control and air vent valves are located in the vicinity of their associated atmospheric relief valve and could be accessible despite a fire in area 2-034.

The capability to control steam generator pressure and reactor coolant system temperature with the use of the manually control, led atmospheric relief valves was demonstrated during the Unit-2 natural circulation and cooldown startup testing.

Consequently, a fire-in area 2-C34 would not prevent the operation of at least ene redundant atmospheric relief valve.

Fire induced cable failures in f: re trea 2-034 to non-post-fire safe shutdown circuitry could potentially result in a false SI, CVI, or CI safety signal initiation from the solid state protection system.

Plant procedures exist, or will be developed, for resetting spurious SI, CVI, and CI signals from the main control recm and can be used, if required, for a fire in this area.

Reactor Coolant Boundary - Justification Fire induced failure (hot short) of the individual control cables for Q2B31PCV0444B-B power operated relief valve and Q2B135V2213B-B, Q2B13SV22143-B reactor head vent valves, could result in the valves to be energized to open.

The power operated relief blocking valve (MOV) could become electrically ineperable in the open position.

In the unlikely event of the multiple fire induced failures (hot shorts from adjacent control cables in the shared raceway) occuring, this condition can be mitigated by removing 125 V-dc power from cables in the shared 2-18-4 a

s J. M.

FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE HA2ARDS ANALYS!S REEVALUATION raceway.

This can be accomplished by opening breaker en the 125 V-dc switchgear bus 23 (Q2R42BCOl3-3) for 125 V-dc distribution panels, 2D, 2E, and 2F.

Plant precedures will be developed to include the manual actions as required to achieve safe shutdown for a fire in this area.

FIRE ARIA INFORMATION:

FIRE AREA:

2-034 MAXIMUM RCOM NUMBERS /

SEUTDOWN COM3USTIBLE FIRE LOAD FIRE TITLES TRAIN MATERIAL QUANT!TY (3:u/ft2)

SEVERITY Room 2234 A,

3 Cable Insul.

16,409 lb 90,955

<1-1/2 h Electrical Panels 7 lb Penetration Room Train B M

Room 2317 A, B Cable Insul.

613 lb 24,606

<30 min

- *' Penetration Charcoal 1,548 lb

Room, Filter Filtration Pipe Insul.

7 lb Equipment Room DESION FEATURES:

Construction:

Floors and walls forming area boundary are of reinforced concrete.

A self expanding cork is installed for the portions of the area boundary along the containment wall.

Doors:

Fire' rated UL Class-A doors are installed between rooms 2334 and 2333 (area 2-035), 2334 and 2322 (area 2-004), and 2317 and 2322 (area 2-004).

The tendon access openings in the el 139 ft - 0 in. and 155 ft - O in. slabs are covered by a steel plate and a concrete slab having a 3-h fire rating.

The two rooms of this fire area are connected by two stainless steel pipes used in the penetration room filtration system.

These pipes are encased in concrete and contain no combustibles.

Pipe & Electrical Penetrations:

All penetrations through the area boundary in room 2334 are sealed with silicone foam except i

2-18-5

J. M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT 10CFR50 APPENDIX "R" FIRE EAZARDS ANALYSIS REEVALUATION those through containment walls that are watertight.

All penetrations threugh the area boundary in rocm 2317 are sealed to a 3-h fire rating.

Ventilation:

No normal ventilatien is provided.

Fixed smcke remo.'al capability is not provided.

Three-h fire-rated dampers are previded at all duct penetrations through area boundaries.

(This limits fire in rooms 2317 and 2334 to each rcom because ducts are the enly fire communication path between the two

es).

Ficor Drains:

Three 4-in.-diameter floor drainsc each having 100-gal /m capacity and draining to the floor drain tank, are provided.

FIRE PROTECTION:

Smoke detectors are provided in rooms 2317 and 2334.

A manual hose station located in rooms 2316 (area 2-004) is available for use in this area.

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2-18-6

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